

East Timor

monthly memo
news

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(Information received during December 1991)

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR:

Since the events of November we have been receiving such a large volume of information, particularly through Electronic Mail, that it has not been possible to be as comprehensive as we would like, in processing and publishing everything we receive. Accordingly, we have opted to give priority to three areas:

- 1) news from within East Timor;
- ii) material in Portuguese;
- iii) news from Portugal.

1. EAST TIMOR

a) Xanana radio interview

Resistance leader, Xanana Gusmão said that he was prepared to participate in negotiations with Indonesia but that everything pointed towards "a continuation of the armed struggle" and that he was prepared to intensify armed resistance. "If necessary I will die for Timor" he declared.

He was speaking in a radio interview, originally made for Australian radio, which was broadcast on Portuguese "Radio Renascença".

Xanana spoke out on the environmental destruction taking place in East Timor because of the occupying troops burning of the bush three times a year which has led to extensive burnt-out areas.

He condemned the Australian government position as "mafia politics" and compared it to Saddam Hussein in its eagerness to get petroleum, albeit in "a more democratic manner". (Diário de Notícias 7 December 1991)

It was reported later in the month that the resistance leader had visited Dili itself in early December and remained there for a week to "restructure various sectors of the clandestine network" which had been effected by the killings and repression in the wake of the massacre in November. (Expresso 21 December 1991)

b) "Press for UN investigation" - Xanana to solidarity groups

In a message dated 24 November, Xanana Gusmão called on international East Timor solidarity groups to concentrate the efforts on lobbying their governments to bring about a UN investigation of the events of 12 November and to put pressure on Indonesia through sanctions and force of international opinion. He applauds the moves already made in this respect by Holland and Canada.

The full text of his message, which recently reached Lisbon, is included as an appendix.

c) More shootings - Governor

Governor Mário Carrascalão said that he had heard rumours of fresh shooting taking place in the outskirts of Dili but that "at the moment nothing definite is known. The investigation team will certainly be investigating all of this. He mentioned the specific case of an attack which took place in the village of Mape which he attributed to "a group of Timorese volunteers which had been recruited by the military".

As regards the political situation, Carrascalão speculated that "perhaps Jakarta should stop East Timor as an Indonesian province", while in reference to Luso-Indonesian negotiations, he suggested that "perhaps Portugal also could recognise some rights over Timor". (O Jornal 6 December 1991)

Carrascalão himself was the object of criticism in a letter signed by 50 pro-Indonesia Timorese which was presented to the Commission of Inquiry. The letter accused the governor of being responsible for promoting a policy of opening-up the borders, of employing FRETILIN members and of contributing to anti-Indonesian feeling which led to the massacre (Público 21 December 1991)

d) Repression in rural areas, Dili tense but quiet

From Ermera, south of Dili, TAPOL's sources say that anyone picked up without identity cards is required to do push-ups and stand in the glaring sun for a day.

The Portuguese-language São José school in Dili is still closed, and many pupils of other schools, particularly boys, are afraid to go to school for fear of being picked up by the military or pro-Indonesian vigilantes. The main Dili marketplace remains deserted. An announcement by the military commander, Brigadier-General Warouw, that the masked vigilantes who parade the Dili streets at night would be shot is being treated with derision by the population. It is seen as an attempt to persuade Timorese to go out into the streets, to create an impression of normality during the commission's investigations.

A policeman who would not give his name, told an Associated Press reporter that Dili, with a population of about 125,000 people, seems normal during the day, but public places begin to empty as the sun sets.

Jose Ramos Horta has also reported that sporadic killings were continuing throughout East Timor "peasants have been shot at random in the small hamlets, many priests have been beaten up and the military have been confiscating rosary beads and crucifixes from churches". (Green Left Weekly, E-mail, 4 December 1991)

An report in Tempo suggested that the authorities intended shutting down São José school permanently. (Público 14 December 1991)

Resistance sources have reported attacks on the population of Suai, in the south of the territory, by Indonesian forces. (Diário de Notícias 7 December 1991)

e) Interview with Fr Ricardo

The following article is from the Indonesian paper Editor:

Father Ricardo, pastor of Motael Church, celebrated the mass to pray for Sebastiao Gomes, shortly before the bloody incident on 12 November. "The dead man's parents asked for the mass which is the custom here." The mass was attended by the entire family. "If not, there would

have had to be sanctions according to tradition." That's why, he said, "the duty to attend was broadcast widely, by radio, written invitation and word of mouth.

I knew them all, though some came whom I did not know. But after the incident, many people came, among them many I didn't know."

Father Ricardo, born on 26 April 1947, is also deputy bishop and chairman of the East Timor Church Liturgy Commission. His parish consists of 40,000 congregants.

Q: It is said that secret meetings were held at Motael Church...

A: That is absolutely untrue. In accord with the Second Vatican Council, the church is categorically against being used as a secret meeting place for political affairs. We only have meetings about pastoral business.

Q: Is it true that many items of evidence were found in the church?

A: It is not true that the security forces found anything. A church is not the place to keep things of that kind. When I celebrated mass, there were no signs that any incident would happen.

Q: So it isn't true to say that you and the Motael church were involved?

A: Because the events on 28 October and 12 November began at Motael Church, people think I'm connected with anti-integration youngsters and have had secret meetings with them. That is quite wrong. I have never done any such thing. As a 'shepherd', I have always given pastoral guidance to the congregation. Anything that happens beyond that is outside my knowledge.

Q: But why do so many anti-integration youngsters seek the protection of your church?

A: Should I turn them away? That is impermissible. As a shepherd, I must let them in and help them solve their problems. Every day in my parish, many young people come to ask for help. This is apparently what some people take to mean that I was planning something political. This is completely untrue! It is my duty to help those of my sheep who have gone astray and are in difficulty. This is where people are mistaken in assessing the position of the church. And this is what groups of youth mean when they mention the bishop or the priests.

Q: What is your attitude towards young people who get involved?

A: All I can do is urge parents to advise their children not take part in political activities. Should I condemn them? I can't possibly do that. If I were to do so, I would be exceeding my position. But to solve their problems, I have to approach them. And I must try to understand the problems they face. As a 'shepherd', I must constantly look for the sheep who have gone astray, to the best of my ability.

Q: What do you think about integration?

A: At the start, the East Timorese people placed their hopes in integration; then problems arose because people could not understand many things. We have tried to help the government resolve these problems. Among other things, to uphold the truth.

Q: What is the truth about human rights up to now?

A: First of all, you should understand that the East Timorese have always been accustomed to justice. If something is wrong, say so. If it is true, say so. Anyone who does something wrong should be punished according to the rules. It isn't right to beat them. People who have done nothing wrong should be released.

Q: Have there been human rights violations since integration?

A: To be quite honest, yes. For instance, about land. But we are trying to resolve this. I often accompany the Bishop when he goes to see the governor to discuss the best way out. For instance, if someone's property rights have been harmed, we try to find a way out with the government.

Q: What do you think about the National Commission of Investigation?

A: This is an important moment for getting at the truth. But we are still trying to understand who the KPN will ask to make statements. For the time being, only the Bishop has said that he's willing to make a statement. If I am asked for a statement, I will explain things according to what I know. Now that the KPN is here, people should try to discover the true facts. In this way, it will be possible for the problem and the various issues to be fully resolved. (Editor 7 December 1991) See also section g) below.

f) Student prisoners transferred to Jakarta

Four of the Timorese students detained in Bali after the demonstrations in November, were transferred to Jakarta to await trial along with those arrested during the demonstrations in front of the UN Information Office there. Their trials are scheduled for January and considerable concern has been expressed because of the possibility of the accused being condemned to death under Indonesia's harsh anti-subversion laws. (Público 27 December 1991)

g) Bishop Belo recommends dialogue

In an interview on Portuguese radio on 30 December, Bishop Belo stressed that the question of East Timor could be solved "on the basis of dialogue, a wide dialogue open to all parties involved: Portugal, Indonesia, the Timorese, the parties of the resistance and the Church" He also expressed indignation that Fr Ricardo had been submitted to three interrogations by the Indonesian military. (Público 31 December 1991)

Amnesty International has also reported that Fr Ricardo has been subjected to "repeated intensive interrogation" by the security forces and is said to be "in grave danger of psychological breakdown" (Amnesty International 3 January 1992)

h) Documents received

- 1) Preliminary Report by the Djaelani Investigation Commission into the Santa Cruz massacre, Jakarta 26 December 1991, 8p (English); ETN/326
- 2) Statements by Russell Anderson and Saskia Kouwenberg concerning the Santa Cruz massacre, December 1991, 25p (English); ETN/327

2. ADMINISTERING POWER: PORTUGAL

a) Three-point government strategy rules out direct aid to Armed Resistance

The Lisbon government continued to keep its plans under wraps but Foreign Minister, João de Deus Pinheiro told the press that its strategy would have three main lines of action:

- i) convincing its EC partners to move from a position of "accompanying" events in Timor, to an "offensive" during Portugal's presidency in the first semester of 1992;
- ii) endeavouring to change the US position by a non-confrontational approach. This would rule out the suggestions from some quarters that the US base at Lajes in Portugal would be used to pressure Washington.
- iii) efforts at the UN to capitalize on the fact that Cape Verde, former Portuguese colony and "a secure ally of both Portugal and Timor" is now a member of the Security Council.

Neither direct aid to the Armed Resistance in Timor or a clarification as to whether the PPD visit had been definitively cancelled (as requested by Xanana Gusmão) were forthcoming from the meetings in Lisbon involving all the senior political figures to define Portuguese government strategy after the November massacre.

The Portuguese President, Mário Soares, wrote to various heads of state, particularly those who would be hosts to President Suharto during his visits abroad in December pressing them to take up the issue with him. This led to considerable comment in the Venezuelan press during Suharto's presence at the Group of 15 meeting there on 25 November. (Semanário 30 November 1991)

b) "Lusitania Express" to sail to Dili:

A group of students intend to sail from Lisbon to Dili, via Australia, to lay a wreath on the graves of the Santa Cruz victims. The voyage, aboard the Lusitania Express and with students from over a dozen countries participating, is intended to focus world attention on human rights in Timor and the boat intends to call at Darwin to pick up international public figures and journalists for the last leg of the voyage. (Expresso 28 December 1991) Stop press: The ship set sail from Lisbon on 23 January.

c) "Peace is possible" booklet on massacre

The "Peace is possible in East Timor" group has compiled a 30 page resource booklet on the Santa Cruz massacre which covers in detail the eye-witness accounts, the aftermath and both international and Indonesian reactions. The booklet, in both English and French, is in A4 format and should be available mid-February.

3. INTERNATIONAL

a) Initial reactions to Commission's Report:

The Portuguese Foreign Office condemned the "new version" of the shameful actions of the Indonesian armed forces as merely being "aimed at improving Indonesia's deteriorated image"; "it leaves much still unexplained, does not clear up the divergent accounts of the number of dead, and ignores the fate of those who disappeared, the eye witness testimony as to the discipline and orderly behaviour of the Timorese on the march, the grave accusations of later executions and of attempts to hide corpses". (Público 27 December 1991)

Diplomats in Jakarta said Japan, Indonesia's major aid and trade partners, and the United States had largely accepted the Indonesian version of events though some European countries might demand more. They said that in particular the question of punishment of the soldiers involved still remained unsettled. However the report appeared to have successfully prevented the shooting from being linked to vital supplies of fresh foreign aid.

Leading U.S. human rights group Asia Watch said that Indonesia's official report (see below) on the army massacre in East Timor was unacceptable and demanded an international investigation. "There is not much time left. Bodies will decay, making identification all the more difficult; memory of specific details will fade; the 'official' version will be increasingly accepted as fact," Washington-based Asia Watch said in a report received in Jakarta. "The international community must continue to press the Indonesian government for a full and accurate accounting of what happened. The preliminary (government) report deserves no accolades."

A local daily said the Indonesian investigators would return to East Timor next week to complete their inquiry and that a final report was expected in about two months.
(Reuter, Jakarta, Jonathan Thatcher, Jan 3)

The Dutch Foreign Ministry regards the preliminary report as a move in the right direction, but the matter has not been resolved, the Ministry argues. Parliament too insists on there being an investigation, to determine whether the shooting at the crowd was premeditated or, as the official Indonesian version says, a matter of self-defence. (De Volkskrant 2 January 1992)

b) Vanuatu in UNGA: "Murder!"

In the U.N. General Assembly's human rights committee, several countries like Portugal and Vanuatu have asked for a U.N. investigation of the Dili incident. Vanuatu called the incident a "cold-blooded and premeditated murder of civilians by military forces of a foreign occupying power." The island's representative to the United Nations, Robert Van Lierop, has been exchanging harsh words with the Indonesian U.N. delegation. Van Lierop called for the Indonesian delegation to invite other delegations to hold an open debate on the Dili incident in the human rights committee. There was no answer from that delegation. (UPI, Dec 2 via Task Force Indonesia)

c) Canada cuts aid

The Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregationalist Churches called for the government to put pressure on the Indonesian government to renounce the use of military force and allow a process of self-determination to the people of East Timor. The Chairman of the Canadian Council of Churches declared that the suspension of economic aid to Indonesia which had been decided by the government was not sufficient and that it should impose an embargo on arms sales (AFP Ottawa 9 December 1991).

d) UN Investigator visit?

In New York, UN spokesman Francois Giuliani said Amos Waco, the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Commission on Arbitrary Executions, was to fly from Geneva to the Southeast Asian country under instructions from the U.N. secretary-general to make an impartial and independent investigation. Giuliani said the head of the Geneva-based commission, Jan Martenson, has contacted the Indonesian government requesting its assistance for Waco. (UPI, Dec 2)

On Monday 2 December, Indonesia's Foreign Ministry spokesman Suteja Kartawijaya said his country had not had any contact with the United Nations on a special envoy to visit East Timor. "If it is true that the Secretary General wants to send an envoy to Indonesia for a simple visit, we maybe would accept it," he said. "But if he wants to negotiate sending a fact-finding mission to East Timor, the problem would be different," he said. "It would be necessary for Indonesia to agree" and "the Secretary General would have to respect the U.N. procedures," he said. (AFP, Dec 3)

It had since been reported that Mr Waco was recalled to Kenya in December and postponed his visit which is now scheduled to take place in February.

e) "East Timor embassy" opened in Canberra

An East Timorese embassy has been established in the Australian capital, further straining Indonesian-Australian government relations following the November 12 massacre in Dili. Relations were already strained after the revelation that the Australian government has been monitoring and decoding Indonesian military broadcasts in East Timor and might know more details of the massacre than it is revealing.

Located at the gates of the Indonesian embassy, the East Timorese embassy has an information centre and about 100 white crosses daubed with red paint to represent those who have died. The embassy is being supported by the ACT Trades and Labour Council, which has placed a picket on the Indonesian embassy. (Green Left Weekly, E-mail 4 December 1991)

Clashes and stone-throwing incidents occurred between Indonesian embassy officials and the protesters which led to a 14 year old Timorese boy being treated for a fractured hand.

4. INDONESIA

a) Preliminary report of Investigation Commission

The publication of the preliminary report of the Djaelani Commission on 26 December was followed by the sacking of two of the officers involved, Generals Warouw and Panjaitan who were recalled from their units and replaced. Gen. Syafei, Warouw's successor, declared on his arrival in Dili that he "would not be as patient as Gen Warouw".

We include as an appendix some excerpts from the findings of the commission.

The commission describes three versions of the shooting: without warning, the troops in formation opened fire on the crowd; a grenade was thrown from the crowd which also attempted to take the soldiers weapons, provoking the shooting; the shots coming from a crowd which the security forces could not control, which preceded the shooting. It does not opt for either one of these versions but instead attributes the main responsibility for the massacre to demonstrators many of whom, it claims, were manipulated or even forced to participate by a minority opposed to integration with Indonesia. It also recognises that the security forces had gone beyond acceptable norms with regard to the number of dead and wounded from the shooting, the stabbings and the other injuries.

b) Yogyakarta students outspoken statement

The Yogyakarta Students association (Ikatan Mahasiswa Yogyakarta Rta) issued a strongly worded press statement on 18 November:

"On the Bloody Tragedy in East Timor -

On 12 November 1991 the shedding yet again of the blood of the people of East Timorese, following the process of integration with Indonesia which began in 1975, is a matter of the utmost concern for all humankind. The total disregard for humanitarian principles is yet again evident from the loss of 196 innocent East Timorese lives, including Kamal Bamadhaj, a New Zealander, at the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991 (...)."

(Forwarded by Tapol)

Editor and translator: Billy Williams

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Please address all correspondence to the address on page 1.

APPENDIX I

A MESSAGE TO ALL EAST TIMOR SOLIDARITY GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

Warm greetings friends and companions in struggle. I am speaking to you from the mountains of East Timor. We are between marches and combats and in our backpacks we carry the information that we receive on the situation of generalised terror under which the Maubere people are living.

If the 12 November massacre had happened two years earlier then it would have gone by unnoticed by the world. The massacre would not have had such wide repercussions if it had not been for the video that the British journalist managed to get out of East Timor. We are aware that a lot of governments only took a definite stand after they had heard about the film. In this way the film became the catalyst for international reaction, which was initially sceptical, as has become the custom in politics.

There have been notorious cases, like Australia, where at every increasingly obvious violation of human rights in East Timor, Australia would send its ambassador, Philip Flood, to talk to the puppet governor and to the military authorities and he would return saying that he had seen no evidence of any violations. If Gareth Evans had been in Canberra this time, he would have sent his ambassador for more lunches with Carrascalão and would have shaken hands with the murderer Warouw and would have stated that the most recent grave in the Santa Clara cemetery was that of Sebastião Rangel, there being no evidence of any massacre.

We were deeply touched by the compassion of the Pope, John Paul or John Peter. It must have been a difficult decision because we always believed that the Holy See did not involve itself in politics and much less did it interfere in the internal affairs of countries, especially in the case of Indonesia, the most important Moslem country in the world. We truly believe that he was morally (but what morality) obliged by the film's evidence.

The position taken by Holland, a tireless defender of the annexation of East Timor as a historically consistent continuation of the process of annexation of Western Papua, was unanticipated and admirable. We also believe that the images of the film had an effect here.

In this way, friends and comrades, this film is our weapon; ours and yours, but mainly yours, for your work of raising the awareness of people and governments in the countries where your solidarity groups are based.

We call for a concerted action in the different countries on December 7 with the showing of this film and holding of seminars. We propose that all East Timor solidarity groups set up small groups that go to other countries where solidarity groups with East Timor have not yet been set up, providing the opportunity for awareness raising and interest in the problem and creating the conditions for the

setting up of groups in these countries. We are fully aware of the whole range of difficulties, especially financial difficulties, in the running of your and our projects, but even so we dare to ask you for special attention this coming 7 December. We propose the following themes as general lines of action:

1) The setting up of a UN, or other international body, investigation team to verify the facts of 12 November.

2) Putting pressure on governments so that they reconsider their complacent policies in relation to Indonesia and that they support Portugal's position. The difference in criteria adopted for the violation of Human Rights is notorious; when a journalist is detained in China the United States protests vociferously; a house arrest in Rangoon is enough to provoke the western powers to a storm of protest; all the world threatens after an act of repression in Kenya; and meanwhile they continue to affirm their total respect for the cultural difference between Indonesia and the western world and manage to justify the crimes committed by Indonesia as mere questions of national interest.

3) Putting pressure on respective governments to maintain or to apply cuts in economic aid to Indonesia as long as it refuses to allow a UN or international inquiry team to visit East Timor. The arrogance of Jakarta merely comes from the commercial relations it has with Australia, Japan, Great Britain, France, Spain, Holland, Germany, etc...The positions taken by Canada and Holland should be widely congratulated and held up as an example to be followed. The investigation team nominated by Jakarta does not deserve the slightest credibility. Everything points to the fact that this team will merely add its signatures to the report already prepared by the military. This report is the result of inquiries carried out under torture, coercion and promises of release, of treatment of the wounded and of offers of food etc... inquiries with a view to denouncing those in charge of the clandestine organisation for future detention. It is enough, surely, that one of the members of the team has already accused Portugal of being behind the 12 November massacre. Likewise enough, those statements of Try Sutrisno's which Australia found so repugnant; or indeed the declarations by Warouw, who only allowed the International Red Cross to visit the wounded and the detained on condition that they did not speak to the victims. These facts are enough for us to firmly believe that this investigation team was hurriedly put together at Suharto's behest, so as not to create obstacles to his planned peregrinations overseas and that this investigation team will serve to draw a veil of innocence over the eyes of the various governments closely associated with the Jakarta regime, who have unfortunately been troubled by the massacre.

This I believe, dear friends and comrades, is the response, in terms both general and down to earth, to the demands of your part in the struggle, and thus we can all achieve the optimum results from our efforts.

I take advantage of this opportunity to express to you our total and sincere appreciation for your unstinted and unselfish solidarity work for the just cause of freedom for our people. Your work and dedication to the people of East Timor, has been for us a moral incentive, and has enabled us to believe in the solidarity of peoples involved in the common struggle for freedom, peace, justice, and progress.

We especially hope for the continuing and renewed effort from those solidarity organisations in the member states of the EEC , in the United States, in Canada, Australia and Japan so that the intentions which have already been announced at governmental, political party and parliamentary levels are not forgotten.

The Maubere people, dearest friends and comrades, after 16 years of a difficult war in difficult conditions, can only ask you, friends and comrades, that you speak for them. To all of you, friends and comrades a warm embrace from all the fighters of FALINTIL and from all our people, and a special greeting from the National Council of Maubere Resistance.

Honour and glory to the martyrs of the Maubere fatherland!
Viva the people of East Timor !
Viva international solidarity !
Fatherland or death !
The struggle continues on all fronts !
Resistance is victory !

General-headquarters of the National Council of Maubere Resistance
the mountains of East Timor,
24 November 1991.

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão
Commander of FALINTIL.

Translation by East Timor News

APPENDIX II

PRELIMINARY REPORT: NATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY (KPN) INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991, DILI - Extracts (Translated from the Indonesian by Tapol)

2. Investigative activities within East Timor (Dili and Surrounds)

- a) Arranged to meet with the Governor of East Timor as many as five times, and also with the Bupati and Mayor of Dili, and a number of village and district heads from Dili, selectively chosen and interviewed independently of one another.
- b) Arranged to meet with Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo up to 4 times, and also with Fathers Alberto Ricardo da Silva, Albrecht Kaream, Markus Wanandi, Locatelli, Jose Carbonelli and Jose Antonio da Costa.
- c) Arranged up to 5 meetings with the PANGKOLAKOPS (Operational Command for East Timor) and a number of meetings with his staff and troops, including the regional police force and 'Justice Team' formed to look into the November 12 incident. The KPN also met with the Udayana District Military Commander in Denpasar.
- d) Met with the Dili and East Timor Chairmen of the People's Representative Council.
- e) Met with socio-political and community organisations and community figures.
- f) Met with and interviewed 132 witnesses.
- g) Visited the Wira Husada Military Hospital in Dili, the central Public Hospital in Dili and a number of Community Health Centres and district police detention centres.
- h) Followed the route of the demonstration from the street in front of the Motael Church to the Santa Cruz public cemetery and carried out a reconstruction a number of times at the site of the Incident. The KPN also investigated and noted the presence of as many as 70 bullet holes in the walls and gates of the Santa Cruz cemetery and also in the trees and electricity poles.
- i) Carried out an investigation in the public cemetery of Hera, digging up one of the 18 graves of the dead to find the corpse in a coffin and fully dressed according to Catholic custom. Only one body was found in this grave. The KPN also carried out similar investigations around Hera and Pasir Putih, Tasi Tolo and Tibar, based on information received from locals that the above places were the sites of mass graves dug for the victims of the November 12 incident. No proof that such graves exist in these places was obtained.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Commission has strong reasons and grounds to come to the following conclusions:

1. The 12 November 1991 event/incident [peristiwa/insiden] in Dili was the climax of a series of demonstrations and incidents beforehand conducted by the anti-integration/GPK Fretilin group. [GPK - 'security disruptor gangs', the initials used by the regime for the East Timorese resistance.] The GPK/Fretilin which has come under increasing pressure, has changed its method of operations from bush guerrilla operations to town guerrilla operations, misused the wisdom of development in East Timor based on love and welfare, and has taken advantage of the situation, conditions and instability of the younger generation by exerting influence on them to oppose integration, while at the same time drawing international attention to their existence.
2. The 12 November 1991 event/incident in Dili which resulted in a number of deaths and injuries clearly did not occur because of any command or policy of the Government or the Armed Forces, either at the centre or in the Province of East Timor. The 12 November 1991 event/incident in Dili was basically a regrettable mishap [musibah].
3. The demonstration on 12 November 1991 in Dili contained a provocation element which was planned in advance by the anti-integration/GPK Fretilin group; it was not an orderly procession intended to be peaceful, to honour the departed Sebastiao Gomes.

4. The demonstrators, the majority of whom were young, behaved savagely, emotionally and destructively, partly it is believed because of incitement by the anti-integration/GPK Fretilin group, and had been cultivated for quite a long time. Besides this, they deliberately unfurled the Fretilin and Falentil (sic) flag, the picture of Xanana, leader of the GPK/Fretilin, banners, and shouted anti-integration yells, insulting the security apparatus.
5. Some foreign citizens took an active part in the demonstration.
6. In a condition of rising tension which began with the stabbing of an officer and the injuring of a soldier, the provocative savagery of the masses, and opposition by the masses which the security forces deemed could endanger their weapons and their lives, there was a spontaneous reaction by servicemen who, without any command control, exercised self-defence and excessive shooting at the demonstrators, causing deaths and injuries. Along with this, a group of irregular members of the security forces outside the command structure also started shooting and maltreating, which led to yet more casualties.
7. In handling the rioting that occurred during the 12 November 1991 event/incident in Dili, although riot control units were there, the Commission saw nothing to show that the procedures/regulations for handling a riot were implemented to the full. The actions of some members of the security apparatus exceeded what was proper, resulting in casualties, including deaths, and injuries from gunfire, stabbing and beating with blunt implements. Although the number of casualties up to now is 19 dead and 91 wounded, the Commission thinks it has strong enough reason to believe that the number of dead is around 50 and the number of wounded is more than 91.
8. Insufficient care was taken in handling the dead because, although autopsies (visum et repertum) were conducted, the dead were not properly identified. Besides, inadequate opportunities were given to family/friends of the victims to identify them.
9. The Commission believes that, in order to uphold the law, action should be taken and trials conducted against all those who were involved in the 12 November 1991 Event/Incident in Dili and are deemed to have broken the law, in accordance with the laws in force in the law-based Republic of Indonesia, which is based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

V. CLOSING SECTION

In the pursuit of its task, the KPN had the full assistance of all sides, the Government as well as the Armed Forces, Church Leaders and the Community. It is recognised however that the KPN encountered obstacles because a number of witnesses who were to be asked for testimony were not willing because they were still affected by a feeling of unease and feared that they would be deemed to have been directly involved in the 12 November 1991 Event/Incident in Dili or were afraid of being considered to be from the anti-integration group.

Jakarta, 26 December 1991