

COLLECTION:
ACFOA Human Rights Office – East Timor files

SERIES / FOLDER GROUP
Actions / Campaigns

SUB-SERIES
Santa Cruz Massacre

FOLDER TITLE
Indonesian Responses / Inquiry

DATE RANGE
1991-1992

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Alguns dados sobre os Timorenses assassinados pelo ABRI, na MASSACRE DE SANTA CRUZ, Díli, em 12 de Novembro 1991.

NOME	IDADE	NAT.Res.	Filiação
1. Mariano da C. Alves	31	Suai	Manuel Costa e Ana Sousa
2. Filomeno Martins Lay	33	Liquiça	António Lay/Diana Cunha Vong
3. Carlos Martins	29	Ossu	Domingos Martins/Maria Cunha
4. Hermengildo Gomes	29	Dili	Joao Gomes/Regina Alves
5. Joao Baptista Gomes	28	Dili	Joanico Baptista
6. Maria Valente Braz	23	Ossu	Martinho Braz/Imaculada Conceição
7. Beatriz da Conceição	29	Ermera	Domingos Alves/Maria Barbara
8. Jose Ant. Lay	28	Dili	Lay Vong Thing/Maria Mesquita
9. Mariana Tilman	31	Dili	Joao Tilman/Melina Tilman
10. Jose Baptista	29	Maliana	Pedro Baptista/Rosa Barros
11. Antonio Valente	27	Lospalos	Joac Valente/Diana Sousa
12. Jose Miranda	25	Dili	Jose M. Miranda/Rita Alves
13. Domingos da Silva	29	Dili	Tomas da Silva/Olandina Gomes
14. Mateus Barros	22	Suai	Jose Barros/Ana Maria
15. Joao Almeida	29	Dili	Marcos da Cunha/Rosa Mota
16. Antonio Viana	29	Dili	Mateus Viana/Rosalina Viana
17. Jose Mota	28	Manatuto	Mau Bere/Bi Roça
18. Romana Tilman	29	Aileu	Mali Mau/Maria Araujo
19. Elvira Ramos	25	Aileu	Malimau/Maria Araujo
20. Antonio Ramos	25	Aileu	Mali Mau/Maria Araujo
21. Maria Ramos	27	Aileu	Mau Dassi/Saramali
22. Joao Ramos	24	Aileu	Antonio Ramos/Roslina Braz
23. Leandra Ramos	25	Suai	Victor Ramos/Diana Ramos
24. Pedro Sousa	32	Dili	Pedro Gomes/Armanda Lin
25. Rosa Mota	24	Dili	Antonio Sousa/Antonieta
26. Jose Goncalves	24	Lospalos	Joao Mota/Ana Pereira
27. Americo Lopes	26	Liquiça	Antonio Goncalves/Jovita Sousa
28. Alda Sara	31	Aileu	Jose Lopes/Joana Sousa
29. Ilda Tilman	31	Ainaro	Antonio Braz/Maria Augusta
30. Jose Alves	33	Dili	Filomeno Martins/Ilda Tilman
31. Mateus da Costa	24	Dili	Mateus Alves/Herminia Chaves
32. Jose da Costa	25	Dili	Jose da Costa/Rosa Tilman
33. Antonio Sousa	25	Dili	Marcos da Costa/Ana Saldanha
34. Mateus Sousa	29	Dili	Romao Son/Diana Braz
35. Antonio Boavida	24	Dili	Jose Boavida/Linda Mota
36. Domingos Mota	31	Aileu	Jose Mota/Aida Sousa
37. Maria Barros			
38. Joana Mota			

Alguns dados sobre os Timorenses assassinados pelo ABRI, no MASSACRE DE SANTA CRUZ, em Dili, em 12 de Novembro de 1991 (Cont.)

Nome	Idade	Natur. ou Res./Filiacao
39. Mariana Sousa	30	Baucau/Alberto Sousa/Diana Gomes
40. Norberto Gomes	30	Balibo/José Gomes/Alda Tilman
41. Norberto Tilman	24	Suai/José Tilman/Berta Sousa
42. Carlos Vong	25	Soibada/Antonio Vong/Mariana Alves
43. Francisco Pires	29	Viqueque/Romão Tilman/Armanda Borges
44. David Soares	29	Aileu/Carlos Soares/Saramera
45. Lucas Tilman	26	Dili/João Pinto/Maria Borges
46. Pedro Caldas	24	Baucau/João Caldas/Romana Gomes
47. José Caldas	29	idem/idem/idem
48. Tomaz Caldas	24	idem/idem/idem
49. Joana Tilman	28	Tibar Dili/Mateus Tilman/Maria Rosa
50. Diana Sousa	31	Bazartete/Mateus Sousa/Laurinda Tilman
51. Francisco da Silva	21	Becora. Dili/Domingos Silva/Carolina
52. José Rodrigues Rego	23	Becora/José do Rego
53. Eulalia de Jesus Araujo	20	Dili/Artur/Suzana de Jesus
54. Adelia Perpetua S. Araujo	19	Dili/Vitorino/Maria
55. Domingos Segurado	29	Dili/Frederico
56. Duarte Magno	20	Dili/
57. Eduardo da Silva	23	Sta. Cruz Dili/
58. Eduardo da Silva	23	Bidau. Dili
59. Tomaz Mendes Pereira	17	Dili
60. Tomaz Ximenes	33	Dili/Carlos Ximenes/Lidia da C
61. Olinda Marques	25	Tirilolo. Baucau/
62. Basilio de Araujo	21	Dili/Mateus Silva/Angelina Costa
63. João da Costa Sequeira	24	Dili/João Costa
64. Domingos dos Santos	23	Ossu/Alvaro/Teresinha
65. Antonio Tilman	19	Viqueque/Fernando/Joana
66. Adelaide M. Faria	26	Ossu/Antonio Faria/Alga
67. Rui Alves	25	Dili/Victor Tavares/Maria
68. Mario Tavares	23	Same/Mouzinho Lay
69. Fernando Lay	30	Dili/Joaninha Gomes Lay

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East Timor. This is one of the 'Testimonies' reproduced in the 7 December issue of Editor.

[In the first half of the statement, Major General Sintong describes the military structure in East Timor, names the section C commander, the area which covers Dili, as Infantry Colonel Binsar Aruan and the battalion involved as Battalion 303 from West Java. He then explains why the troops involved in the shooting on 12 November have been withdrawn.]

*Rangitans
Regional
Commander
based in
Bali*

"This is a very procedural matter. He can't be said to have been mistaken. Any commander will act fast if there is a problem in his area. He can't wait for others. There is no question of any violation. There's no question of any punishment. It's quite possible that Binsar, after being withdrawn from that post, will be promoted. Who knows. If there is a judicial investigation, what did he do wrong? But for us, the result was, yes, less than satisfactory [= 'memang, ya, kurang'] Yes, a matter of concern. It's possible for the work to have been done well, but for it to be a matter of concern.

"The withdrawal of the troops was in the report of BAIS (the army's Strategic Intelligence Agency). But the investigation was not to find out anyone's mistakes. But we act on the basis of an evaluation. Battalion 303 had been on this tour of duty only eight months, though they had a year to serve.

"East Timor is a military operation region. The basic task of every soldier there is to destroy the enemy. If there are enemy forces in the bush, we kill them. If they run and resist, we kill them. In the incident on 28 October, who killed Sebastio? Was it ABRI? No. I say, No. They say the shooting came from inside. As a result of this incident, one person was killed and later, on 12 November, there was a flower scattering ceremony on 12 November. This was the follow-up. In actual fact, planned.

"There was no order to shoot at Motael. The commander gave no order to shoot. The situation just led to that. I can say to you, you are not allowed to shoot. But if someone wants to stab you, what then. The circumstances were exceptional, and you must defend yourself. If an ABRI member's weapon is

seized, he will be dismissed. Punished. It's a disgrace for someone in ABRI to lose his weapon. Anyone who loses his weapon must be dismissed. So, you have to look at the circumstances.

"So, the bodies were buried fast? This is how things were: one body was buried by the family and later 19 died. If the 19 bodies had been given to the families, how many hundreds more would have died. So, we say, to hell with all that. Bury them first. The important thing is the security of the people. It's not for them to be pitied. If they had buried them, there would have been more masses. Then how many more people would have been killed. Are we expected to go on working like this?

"There is absolutely no doubt that elements in the church were involved. We respect the church and its priests. Now, we have to see first. We will not let things go on like this. Geerhan was stabbed with a knife. They were coming from Motael Church, weren't they? Did they pick up the knife on the street? This shows that coming from the mass, they were able to murder someone. It means they brought the machete from the church.

"I've seen the foreign video on the Dili incident. But people who don't understand can be mistaken. Yes, because they control the television and everything, it isn't possible for us to deny it. We are knocked for six. ('Kita ini babak belur saja.'). But that doesn't matter. What's important is that things will be okay again in East Timor."

Washington Post editorial, December 9, 1991

The Indonesian government has reacted in panic and defiance to the ballooning world reaction to its slaughter of East Timor independence demonstrators on Nov. 12 - an Indonesian "Tiananmen." It is fending off international observers, but enough reports are getting through to convey a picture of something akin to mass terror - soldiers everywhere, roundups, shootings, threats. Indonesia seems to believe it can intimidate the independence movement and stiff-arm foreign concern at one swoop.

But can it? More to the point, will the United States let it? At least until recently, the answer might have been yes. The United States stood by wittingly and permissively on Dec. 7, 1975, as friendly anti-communist American-armed Indonesia, a rising regional prize and power, snapped up East Timor out of the disintegrating Portuguese empire. The subsequent repression took 100,000 or more Timorese lives but occasioned little interest in Washington.

The events of Nov. 12, however, suggested that things were changing. It was not merely that unimpeachable Western observers were on the scene to witness a massacre. The world freedom movement has released many people previously inhibited by the Cold War to ask for change in places like Indonesia. Sen. Malcolm Wallop, for instance, initiated the letter signed by more than 50 colleagues urging President Bush to play a greater role. The Indonesian government has gone into a defensive crouch, accusing the demonstrators of provocation, launching its own meant-to-be preemptive investigation and hoping obviously to ride out the storm. This should not be tolerated. The immediate priority is to put enough heat on and to put observers in East Timor to prevent further retaliation against the independence people. Australia can make a special contribution: to suspend its agreement with Jakarta dividing oil rights in the sea between it and Timor.

There must be a parallel effort to deal with the political roots of the problem. That means going beyond condemnation and impartial investigation and organizing an expression of self-determination. The United Nations could do the job best.

If Indonesia is right in claiming it has brought prosperity and light to East Timor, it would not fear a fair poll. President Bush, liberator of Kuwait, should make this his policy's priority.

THE INDONESIAN COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE

Composition: in close consultation with the President...

Headed by Supreme Court Justice M. Djaelani. The choice of a Supreme Court judge is no doubt designed to lend the investigation an aura of respectability and impartiality. But there are several reasons to be doubtful about the impartiality about any such investigation.

The first reason is the man who is leading it. M. Djaelani is not the greying independent-minded career judge the title Supreme Court Justice conjures up. He is Major General (Army) M. Djaelani, one of the country's foremost military lawyers with a long history of involvement with the existing military elite. After serving as a battalion commander during the revolution he rose to become a commander of the elite RPKAD (paracommando) training school in West Java in the mid 1950s. This is significant because it was the RPKAD (now called Koppasus - Special Forces) which not only led the invasion of East Timor but which remains the toughest and most formidable section of the Indonesian Armed Forces. At least two of the figures with responsibility for the forces in East Timor, Defence Minister General L.B. Moerdani, as well as Major General Sintong Panjaitan, the commander responsible for the Udayana military region which includes East Timor, made their careers in the RPKAD. Djaelani's association with Murdani goes back at least to 1955, when Murdani was a trainer at Djaelani's commando school.

It was only after his arrest in 1956 for his role in a failed right-wing military coup that Djaelani turned his attention to law. He studied at Indonesia's Military Law Academy and the Military Law College and in 1972 graduated from the US Army's Judge Advocate General's School, in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he wrote a thesis on Indonesian military law.

From 1982-88 he headed the Defence Department's Legal Development Body, in which position he had wide powers over investigations and prosecutions.

After 1988 he had responsibility for 'Law and Order' in Bakorstanas, Indonesia's feared internal security body, when he reported directly to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff (Vice Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo, probably Indonesia's top

intelligence officer) and Major General Harsudiono Hartas, the Head of the Armed Forces' powerful Social and Political

Affairs section. In other words, although he has a solid legal background, it has all been within military structures.

Djaelani is one of the newest appointees to the Supreme Court, a body which despite its grand name, exercises no independence. Although constitutionally autonomous, the Supreme Court has never overruled executive orders which are contrary to legislation. Only a few weeks ago President Suharto argued that the separation of powers was a concept foreign to Indonesia. This in itself effectively rules out any possibility of an 'independent' inquiry. The very idea of a group of high powered investigators acting independently of the will of the government is out of step with the way Indonesia is governed.

[The only precedent was in ¹⁹⁷⁰ ~~1955~~ when a number of ... led by former prime minister Mohammad Hatta were appointed to investigate allegations of corruption in government. The report they produced was suppressed and its recommendations not implemented.]

The indications from Indonesia so far indicate that the inquiry will concentrate not on why the order was given to gun down demonstrators but how the demonstration was allowed to happen in the first place and who, exactly, took part. INDONESIANS BOTH HERE AND IN INDONESIA FEAR THAT THE INQUIRY WILL NOT ONLY WHITEWASH THE ACTIONS OF THE TROOPS BUT ACTUALLY BECOME PART OF THE PROCESS OF VICTIMISATION.

Following the massacre of over 300 Muslim protesters at the Jakarta docklands in September 1984 the military brought hundreds of people to trial, many of them suffering from gunshot wounds (which were taken as evidence that the victims were culpable) - check the green Tapol book for numbers etc.

Commission Members

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1972: Graduated in the Twentieth Advanced Class at the Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, where he wrote a thesis on Indonesian military law.
1973: [Captain] Published an article on Indonesian military law in the Military Law Review. (Summary of his thesis)
1982-88: Kepala Babinkum, Hankam [Legal Development Body] (2.2.82 - 19.XII.83) (Antara press release 6 Feb 1983, in CSIS Era Hukum dalam Pembangunan, 1986) According to RTs interview with a Dutch embassy employee in Jakarta, 1988, as Ka Babinkum he is chief of both the Central Investigation Team and the Central Prosecution Team. These units are formed every time there is a need and staffed accordingly.
1982-84: Director of the AHM and PTHM
Also involved in Kopkamtib staff - 'Law and Order' on a chart mentioned by RT - reporting to both Kasum and Kassospol. (Source largely Siapa Dia)
1988- : a Hakim Agung (one of many -51?) Retired from ABRI.

Rest of Team:

2. Harisoegiman / Hari Sugiman
Brigadier-General TNI (Ret.)
Born Ngawi, East Java. 17 Sep 1931
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91: Appointed as Chairman of the Panitia Penelitian Pusat (Panlisus?) of the Komite Penelitian Nasional (Timor massacre inquiry) [Nov] This Panlisus(?) has power to delegate people to do certain duties.
(SD:123 +Berita Buana 19 Nov 91).

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Suyata, Anton SH

Born Yogya

Has worked as the Kepala Perwakilan Kejaksaan in the Hong Kong Consulate, Kepala Kejaksaan Negeri Bogor and since about Nov 1990 has worked as Inspektur Umum in the Dept Kehakiman.

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mentioned as one of the compilers of 'Buku Timor Timur' but not sure whether this is him or what the book was.

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Clementino Dos Reis Amaral

Born Viqueque, East Timor. A Tetun. 9 July 1940.

7-73: Camat/kepala polisi

1973: Wakil Bupati Kabupaten Baucau (Portuguese equivalent not mentioned)

Member of DPR.

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Said the KPN had to be honest and just in the interests of the ET people. 'If there are members of ABRI who did wrong then they must be punished'. Admitted to Berita Buana that 'Though neutral, I am in my heart sympathetic to UDT'. Said to know the 'ins and outs' of E Timor. Speaks Portuguese, Spanish, English and Tetun. Eldest child (23) is being educated in Miami.

(Berita Buana 19 Nov 91)

(5)

Hadia Wayarabi Alhadar

Born Halmahera 1942. Moved to Ternate at SMEA age. Studies pol science at Universitas Nasional. Frizzy hair, glasses.

Started work in Deplu in 1968. Served in Syria 73-77, and then 1979-84 Perm mission RI UN in NY, then 1986-90 Perm Mission RI UN in Geneva.

Since the Timtim case, he has often come home from work late at night, said his son. Been involved with the Timtim problem at least indirectly, since 1978, when he served in Indonesia's Permanent Mission to the UN. 'At that time I was involved with Carrascalao'. Now Direktor Organisasi Internasional in Dept Luar Negeri. He was told by the Dirjen Deplu Wirjono Sastrohandoyo that he would be a member of the team. 'It is a fairly heavy duty' said the father of four. 'It just so happened I was currently handling the Timtim problem' he said. Has been to Timtim 4 or 5 times, most recently March 91 with Alatas. Got to know Carrascalao well, and also knows Belo (less well).

(6)

Drs Ben Mang Reng Say

Born Flores, 15 July 1928. Catholic. Grad Sospol UGM 1956. By 1965 he was a senior Deplu man. Has been Indonesian ambassador in Portugal and Mexico. 1968-71 Wakil Ketua MPRGR. Now Wakil Ketua DPA. Daughter describes him as 'tertutup' never discusses work at home. One of founders of PDI. Was told on Monday (18th) that he would be part of the team by leader of DPA. Never been to Timtim, but has followed it closely as he was amb to Portugal.

4.

Sumitro (Laksamana Muda) Irjen ABRI - no information.

Summary:

Djaelani M. SH Maj Gen RPKAD and Kopkamtib

Harisoegiman / Hari Sugiman Intelligence and Kopkamtib

Suyata, Anton SH Public Servant - Insp Umum Dept Kehakiman Clementino Dos Reis Amaral - ET Parliamentarian

Hadia Wayarabi Alhadar - history of representing Indo on Timtim in UN

Drs Ben Mang Reng Say Has represented Indon pos on Timtim in Portugal

A second internal BAIS inquiry is also to be conducted into the Dili massacre headed by Arie Sudewo.

ACFOA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
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Australia. Tel: (03) 417-7505

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Born Halmahera 1942. Moved to Ternate at SMEA age. Studies pol science at Universitas Nasional. Frizzy hair, glasses.

Started work in Deplu in 1968. Served in Syria 73-77, and then 1979-84 Perm mission RI UN in NY, then 1986-90 Perm Mission RI UN in Geneva.

Since the Timtim case, he has often come home from work late at night, said his son. Been involved with the Timtim problem at least indirectly, since 1978, when he served in Indonesia's Permanent Mission to the UN. "At that time I was involved with Carrascalao". Now Direktur Organisasi Internasional in Dept Luar Negeri. He was told by the Dirjen Deplu Wirjono Sastrohandoyo that he would be a member of the team. 'It is a fairly heavy duty' said the father of four. It just so happened I was currently handling the Timtim problem' he said. Has been to Timtim 4 or 5 times, most recently March 91 with Alatas. Got to know Carrascalao well, and also knows Belo (less well).

PS.
J. A. C.
Munir

(6)

Drs Ben Mang Reng Say

Born Flores, 15 July 1928. Catholic. Grad Sospol UGM 1956. By 1965 he was a senior Deplu man. Has been Indonesian ambassador in Portugal and Mexico. 1968-71 Wakil Ketua MPRGR. Now Wakil Ketua DPA. Daughter describes him as 'tertutup' never discusses work at home. One of founders of PDI. Was told on Monday (18th) that he would be part of the team by leader of DPA. Never been to Timtim, but has followed it closely as he was amb to Portugal.

PS.
J. A. C.
Munir

4.

ABRY-

Sumitro (Laksamana Muda) Irjen ABRI - no information.

Summary:

Djaelani M. SH Maj Gen RPKAD and Kopkamtib

Harisoegiman / Hari Sugiman Intelligence and Kopkamtib

Suyata, Anton SH Public Servant - Insp Umum Dept Kehakiman Clementino Dos Reis Amaral - ET Parliamentarian

Hadia Wayarabi Alhadar - history of representing Indo on Timtim in UN

Drs Ben Mang Reng Say Has represented Indon pos on Timtim in Portugal

A second internal BAIS inquiry is also to be conducted into the Dili massacre headed by Arie Sudewo.

ACFOA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
124 Napier St. Fitzroy, 3065
Australia. Tel: (03) 417-7505

26-NOV-91 TUE 21:20

P.01

4



YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA

JALAN DIPONEGORO NO. 74 JAKARTA 10320
TELEPON 3105518 - 4214226 - 4214227, FAX. : 330140

M E M O

DARI :

KEPADA :

URGENT !!

**Attn: PAT WALSH
(ACFOA)**



YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA

INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION

JL. DIPONEGORO 74, JAKARTA 10320, TELEPON 3105518 - 4214226 - 4214227, FAX : 330140

KETERANGAN PERS YAYASAN LBH INDONESIA Selasa, 26 Nopember 1991

Hasil Tim YLBHI yang dipimpin oleh Luhut M.P. Pangaribuan, SH, LL.M, dengan anggota H.J.C. Princen, Frans Hendra Winarta, SH dan Rini Dwi Dharmawati dalam usaha bertemu dengan 70 mahasiswa asal Timor Timur ke Polda Metro Jaya, pada tanggal 26 Nopember 1991 jam 14:15 w.i.b. sebagai berikut:

Pertama, Tim bertemu sangat singkat dengan Keditserse Kolonel (Pol) Drs Wagiman kemudian mendelegasikan pada Sesdit Letkol (pol) Chaerudin Ismail untuk mengatur pertemuan dengan mahasiswa. Pertemuan langsung didalam sel tidak diperkenankan.

Kedua, Tim kemudian diinformasikan bahwa 49 diantara 70 orang itu akan ditanggguhkan penahanannya. Ketika Tim berada di Polda, mereka yang akan ditanggguhkan sedang diberi pengarahannya sebelum meninggalkan Polda.

Ketiga, Tim kemudian bertemu di ruang Mayor (Pol) Drs Iman Haryatna dengan Yose Anthony Loyola (mahasiswa Politeknik ITB), Gabriel Anthony (mahasiswa Bandung).

Keempat, Tim pada kesempatan terpisah dengan kedua mahasiswa di atas juga bertemu dengan Joao Freitas Camara di Intelpam Polda Metro Jaya dengan didampingi 2 orang petugas. Diinformasikan bahwa dia ditempatkan terpisah dengan mahasiswa-mahasiswa lain, ditempatkan dalam 4 sel. Joao Freitas Camara diperiksa secara intensif setiap hari.

Kelima, Joao Freitas Camara memerlukan bantuan pakaian, odol, sabun dan lain-lain karena sampai sekarang belum bisa diambil dari rumahnya karena untuk sementara belum bisa dimasuki.

Keenam, 21 orang lagi masih tetap dalam tahanan antara lain Fillipe, Gregorio (mahasiswa IKOPIN Bandung), Arauzo (Politeknik LPPU), Yoze Maria (Politeknik ITB), Avelino, Aureo Belo (siswa kelas 1 SMA), Anthony Amory. Terhadap mereka masih dilakukan pemeriksaan.

Tim YLBHI masih menunggu kesempatan untuk menjenguk mereka yang masih belum bebas secara langsung di tahanan dan mendampingi ketika pemeriksaan dilakukan. Kesempatan untuk menjenguk dan mendampingi ketika pemeriksaan ini adalah hak mereka sebagai tersangka menurut prinsip-prinsip hukum universal dan KUHAP.

Demikian, Keterangan Pers/Informasi yang dapat disampaikan.

Dikeluarkan di Jakarta
26 Nopember 1991

Hubungan Masyarakat
YAYASAN LBH INDONESIA

HENDARDI
Kepala

5
The Carter has
~~not~~ support
from a variety of
reform-minded civilians.

The Timor Crisis : Background Notes on Politics in Jakarta

1. To understand the crisis which has unfolded since the Dili massacres of 12 November, Australians should consider not only the politics of censorship and anti-censorship, the themes and leadership of East Timorese nationalism as it has developed since 1974 (and especially since 1989) and the ways in which the Indonesian state has responded to this nationalism.

They should also consider the ways these are related to the struggle for the succession to President Soeharto. And they should take into account some subtle arguments about the Indonesian armed forces' claim to continuing primacy in the leadership of the state.

2. Since at least March 1988 a key dimension of Indonesian politics has been the tension between Soeharto loyalists hoping for the President to be given a further five-year term in March 1993 and an army-led coalition of forces hoping for an alternative leadership to emerge at that point.

3. Soeharto loyalists, sometimes described as the "palace group", often present ^{the axis of} ~~that~~ tension as one between the President and the Defence Minister, General Benny Moerdani, and there is ~~a strong~~ ^{an} element of truth in that depiction.

But it obscures the fact that many other key generals -- like Army Chief Edy Sudradjat -- and ex-Generals -- like Interior Minister Rudini and Chairman of Parliament Kharis Suhud -- are equally important members of the anti-palace faction. Unlike General Murdani, who is widely believed to be ineligible for the succession because he is a Catholic, these three have all often been described as contenders for the top job. Indeed each of them has been described as a frontrunning contender.

4. General Try Sutrisno, the Armed Services Chief, who has emerged since 12 November as the main spokesperson for a hardline approach to East Timor and the massacre, is a long-time Soeharto loyalist. A one-time Personal Aide (Ajudan) to President Soeharto, he is widely seen as owing his position more to the President's patronage than to his standing in the officer corps. In 1993 scenarios presenting Soeharto as gaining a further five-year term General Try has often been suggested as a likely choice for Vice-President.

5. Closely related to the politics of succession is a long-running contest for who is to succeed General Edy Sudradjat as Army Chief of Staff. One leading contender is Strategic Reserves Commander Wismoyo Arismunandar, who is married to a sister (cousin ?) of Mrs Soeharto. Another is Sintong Pandjaitan, the head of the Bali-Nusa Tenggara command, who has overall command of operations in East Timor.

6. While it is true that no major faction of officers has ever taken a strong position against the incorporation of East Timor, there have long been major disagreements within the army leadership on how the war there should be run. One major one, little reported, was a contest in 1989 between Defence Minister Benny Moerdani, a supporter of East Timor Governor Mario Carrascalao, and Lieut.-Col. Prabowo, a son in law of the President, who wanted to oust the governor, a Timorese who had been a leader of the UDT Party in 1974-75, and to replace him by a leader of the rival APODETI party.

7. In the present situation there are strong disagreements in Jakarta about how the massacre should be investigated, how much freedom should be given to the foreign and Indonesian media to conduct investigations which parallel those of the official National Commission of Inquiry, and what is to be done with the survivors of the massacres. Closely connected with these are less public disagreements about who is to blame for the 12 November massacre -- would-be discreditors of Try Sutrisno? of Sintong Pandjaitan? -- and about how the good name of the army is to be restored.

8. If and when what the international community now takes to be the facts about the massacre become visible to Indonesia's political community, the army's authority in relation to the leadership of the country will be dramatically threatened.

9. In its own eyes, and the eyes of large numbers of middle class Indonesians, the army has done a great deal for the country in the past -- by its role in the achievement of independence, its suppression of regional challenges which threatened the unity of the country in the 1949-65 period, its defeat of a communist challenge in 1965 and its contributions to maintenance of stability since that time. *and economic development!*

10. Till the recent events there was widespread support for the Dual Function doctrine of the army (or more precisely the Armed Forces), the idea that the services should continue to play a central leadership role in the state for the foreseeable future.

perhaps even more than
11. One central question now emerging for army leaders -- a question which greatly affects their perceptions of East Timor issues, affects them ~~as much as~~ the succession question does -- is how the Dual Function doctrine can be saved. One answer being preferred, particularly by officers of the mainline or anti-palace faction, is that it will need to be reinterpreted in a way that permits a larger role for civilians.

-- far-reaching
deregulation to
boost export earnings
+ attract foreign capital-

These last points
~~in need of~~ (12 + 13)
in need of
considerable expansion

12. The 1980s were a period of rapid economic change in Indonesia, not least because of the dramatic falls in prices of Indonesia's principal export commodities, oil and natural gas. One consequence of the way the government responded to these changes was to increase the role of private business. Another was to give wider scope to a variety of so-called non-governmental organizations.

13. This has led to widespread demands for political reform. In the words of the pre-departure message of Paul Wolfowitz, who was the US Ambassador in Jakarta until 1990: Indonesia has successfully introduced economic reform and now needs to underpin that with political reform. Two central dimensions of political reform as perceived by the Indonesians who think about this issue are that there should be a real choice between presidential candidates in 1993 and that the Dual Function doctrine should be given a more minimal interpretation than to date.

Rough Draft HF

25/11

Source: Jayakarta. Date: 14 November 1991. Original language: Indonesian. Unabridged (only the part dealing with General Try's speech).

About the disturbance in East Timor

ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: THEY MUST BE EXTERMINATED

Commander-in-chief of the armed forces (ABRI General Try Soetrisno is seething with rage towards those who carried out the disruption in Dili, East Timor. He said that they are people who must be exterminated. "These ill-bred people have to be shot.", said the C-in-C, when opening the seminar of the Association of Lemhanas Graduates [Lemhanas = National Defence Institute] on Wednesday.

He went on to say that these disruptors are people who used to fight as guerrillas in the bush. They can no longer do this because the population in the interior oppose them. "As a result, they are causing disruption in the towns."

What is most outrageous of all, said Try, is that they take advantage of the social infrastructure, even places of worship, for the purposes of their activities. In the recent period, even the church has become a basis for operation. "So, I ask the church to beware of such people. We have built many churches but we didn't build them for the disruptors."

He said that the gangs of people spreading chaos began by unfurling posters with slogans discrediting the government. They also shouted many unacceptable things.

However, he went on, members of ABRI who were on guard in the location of the incident held themselves back. These officers, he said, showed a great deal of patience in coping with a situation that was actually goading them into anger. "Our armed forces are not like armies in other countries. Our people's army is very tactful."

It turns out, the four-star general continued, that the patience shown by our officers was not appreciated; on the contrary, the disruptors became even more brutal. Then, some shots were fired into the air. "But they persisted with their misdeeds," he said.

General Try Soetrisno then said that ABRI would never allow itself to be ignored. "In the end, they had to be shot," he said, reiterating his words that such raptors had to be shot. "And we shall shoot them," he stressed.

Try did not reveal who was the leader of the disruptors. "Let us pray that he will soon be caught," he said, without saying anything about what was being done to catch him.

After the incident on 12 November, ABRI members searched Motael Church in Dili and found some weapons, including a grenade. "From the results of this search, it is very clear that their movement is extremely dangerous," he said.

There was one casualty on ABRI's side, a battalion deputy commander of battalion 700, while on the side of the disruptors, 19 people were killed.

The disruptors began their movement on Tuesday after holding a mass at Motael Church. They demonstrated along the road leading to the Governor's Office.

According to the version of the ABRI Information Centre, the action was originally to have been aimed at the Portuguese parliamentary delegation. But because the visit was cancelled, the group became very frustrated and switched the target of their action.

It is thought that the incident was connected with the disturbance in Motael Church on 29 (sic) October. But the situation is now under control.

The commander-in-chief called on the public not to panic, not to be influenced and to remain confident in ABRI's ability to resolve everything. "Abri is determined to exterminated anyone who disrupts stability."

....

PRESS STATEMENT BY THE YOGYAKARTA STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (IKATAN MAHASISWA YOGYAKARTA)

On the Bloody Tragedy in East Timor on 12 November 1991

The shedding yet again of the blood of the people of East Timorese, following the process of integration with Indonesia which began in 1975, is a matter of the utmost concern for all humankind. The total disregard for humanitarian principles is yet again evident from the loss of 196 innocent East Timorese lives, including Kamal Bamadhaj, a New Zealander, at the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991.

The Ikatan Mahasiswa Yogyakarta, the communications network for all intra- and extra-university organisations in Yogyakarta, unanimously decided, at a restricted meeting on 15, 16 and 18 November 1991, to issue the following press statement on that bloody tragedy:

1. We express our profound grief that this tragedy occurred and express our heartfelt condolences to the bereaved families of the victims. May those who died find a place at the side of the Almighty, and for their families, may they have the strength to cope with their terrible loss.
2. We call on the United Nations to take over this question and set up, without delay, an independent and objective fact-finding team to discover the true facts about how such a tragedy could have happened. The results of this fact-finding team should be widely disseminated to the public at large.
3. Those who are found to be guilty and who violated the law should be tried before an international tribunal, under the supervision of agencies of the United Nations.
4. We ask international agencies of the UN as well as the International Red Cross to provide comprehensive protection to those who were injured - some 147 people - who are now being treated in hospital and to those who sought refuge at the home of the Bishop in an attempt to evade the military authorities.
5. We urge the government to immediately release the 400 or so people who have been rounded up and are being held in military detention centres in connection with the incident, so as to avoid the loss of yet more innocent lives. According to information we have received, some 28 people have been murdered in these places.
6. We firmly reject the plan of the government to set up an Investigation Commission chaired by a Supreme Court judge with members from the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Supreme Advisory Council, the Armed Forces headquarters and the Justice Ministry. This Commission is composed of government officials and will clearly uphold the army's actions. It is neither independent nor genuine nor fair. It is virtually certain that the armed forces were responsible for this tragedy, yet they are part of the Commission. Even though the government persists in proceeding with this investigation, we declare that this investigation cannot be trusted and we will not accept its findings.
7. For the sake of humanity, we protest at the actions of the government and the armed forces in dealing with social unrest in various parts of the country, always taking the security approach, not the social approach, always using force rather than reason. We have not forgotten the 400 Muslims killed in Tanjung Priok in 1984, the two hundred who were slaughtered in Way Japara, Lampung, the 20 or so killed in

Bima, and most recently, the two thousand people slaughtered in Aceh, and the thousands more arrested and held without any legal process. And now, hundreds of families in East Timor - on top of the thousands in earlier years - have lost their loved ones. We believe that the armed forces should return to barracks and stop handling social problems, a practice that has had such bad consequences for developments in this country.

8. For the sake of humanity and the welfare of our fellow human beings, we call on the government to re-consider the spurious integration of East Timor which, far from persuading the East Timorese to support integration, causes more and more casualties with every passing day. We propose that a referendum should be conducted without delay under the supervision of the United Nations, to assess the wishes of the people of East Timor.

We hope the general public will pay attention to these eight points so that humanitarian principles shall be given priority and acts of violence shall be avoided in seeking solutions to every social problem.

Yogyakarta, 18 November 1991

Presidium of IKATAN MAHASISWA YOGYAKARTA [IMY]

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION DECLARATION ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

(Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Egmont Palace, Brussels, 2-3 December 1991)

The Community and its member States reviewed the situation in East Timor in the light of the latest reporting available as well as the decisions of the Government of Indonesia to set up a commission to investigate the violent incidents of Dili that cost the life of many innocent and defenceless citizens.

They reiterate their condemnation of these unjustifiable actions by the armed forces of Indonesia.

The Community and its member States stressed once again the paramount importance they attached to the full respect of human rights as expressed in particular in the declaration of the European Council of Luxembourg on 25/26 June 1991.

They also stress in this respect the importance of the resolution and of the regulation adopted by the Development Council on human rights, democracy and development of 28 November 1991.

They call upon the Indonesian authorities to respond to the serious concerns expressed by the international community. They support the demands for a thorough and credible investigation by impartial and independent experts.

The Community and its member States will review the cooperation between the European Community and Indonesia in the light of the above mentioned orientations and regulation, and taking into account the response of the Indonesian authorities.

The Community and its member States stress their support for a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement of the East Timor issue, respecting the principles of the United Nations' Charter, and taking into account the need to defend human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the full respect of the legitimate interests and aspirations of the population of this territory.

Source: Jayakarta. Date: 14 November 1991. Original language: Indonesian. Unabridged (only the part dealing with General Try's speech).

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
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PRESS Release

Published by the Information Section of the Embassy of Indonesia
8 Darwin Avenue, Yarralumla, ACT 2600, Ph 06. 273 3222, Fax 06. 273 3248



No. 014/PR/XI/91

In conjunction with the Statement issued by the Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on Thursday, 14 November 1991 on the Dili incident of 12 November 1991, the Minister/State Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 November 1991 issued a follow-up statement, as follows:

1. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia deeply regrets the incident which had caused casualties to members of the society as well as members of security apparatus. Besides, the Government also noted with profound concern on the premeditated provocation by certain elements which had ignited the bloody incident.
2. The President had instructed that the handling of this matter should be done with a high degree of thoroughness and should be well coordinated. For this purpose, a National Investigation Commission will be established by a Supreme Judge, member of the Supreme Courts. The said Commission will consist of senior officials representing the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Justice, the Armed Forces Headquarters and members of the House of Representatives and the Supreme Advisory Council. This Commission shall conduct a comprehensive investigation on all aspects of the incident and the result will be announced in due course.
3. Anyone proven to have violated the prevailing laws will be brought to the authorised court of justice in accordance with the principles of constitutional state upheld by the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila.

Jakarta, 17 November 1991
Minister/State Secretary
Signed


MOERDIONO

A rough sketch of Left - Right

politics in Jakarta


Nov 91

Military (and ex-military)
underlined



An even rougher sketch of Left - Right

politics in Dili



HF 28/11/91

TO PEOPLE ATTENDING THE FLINDERS CONFERENCE ON INDONESIAN CULTURE

Editorial work on the English-language Prisma

Herb Feith has been asked to look for help with the editing of the English-language Prisma, published by LPPES in Jakarta.

A number of Australians have worked in this job in the past, including Peter Britton, Halina Nowicka and Ian Chalmers. At least two of them were in Indonesia under the Australian Volunteers Abroad Scheme of the Overseas Service Bureau.

The person who has been doing the work since the beginning of 1991, is Dra Indrawati Gunawan, a niece of Dr Tuti Gunawan who is at the conference. Indrawati is part-Dutch and an Anthropology graduate of the University of Amsterdam. She has been trying to get funding (from the German foundation which provides her own salary) for a second person to work on the magazine. And it seems likely that she will succeed. So she is looking for someone to work as the deputy managing editor of the magazine. The main types of work are editing, soliciting articles and interviewing people; and the person should start as soon as possible.

Can you think of anyone who would be interested in this job? If so please talk to Herb Feith during the conference, or ask the person concerned to write to Indrawati Gunawan at LP3ES, Box 493, Jakarta.

28 September 1991

TO : MR. PAT WALSH

PERNYATAAN

INFIGHT : [Indonesian Front for The Defense of Human Rights]

Pada HARI HAK ASASI MANUSIA 10 Desember 1991

Pada tanggal 12 November 1991, terjadi Peristiwa Dili, yang menewaskan 50 - 80 orang. Sekalipun Peristiwa Dili tidaklah mengejutkan dibanding jumlah orang yang terbunuh dalam **Pembunuhan Misterius**, Peristiwa Tanjung Priok, Peristiwa Lampung, dan Peristiwa Aceh, namun dari peristiwa tersebut pemerintah dan ABRI telah dipaksa memahami bahwa kepedulian terhadap hak asasi manusia di seluruh dunia tidak main-main lagi.

Hal di atas diperlihatkan pula dengan diprakarsainya pembentukan Komisi Penyelidik Nasional (KPN) oleh pemerintah, menyusul tanggapan dari dunia yang mengutuk terjadinya Peristiwa Dili. Sikap pemerintah ini tidak seperti biasanya, karena hal yang sama tidak dilakukan terhadap **Pembunuhan Misterius**, Peristiwa Tanjung Priok, Peristiwa Lampung, dan Peristiwa Aceh. Kendati demikian prakarsa pemerintah ini sedikit banyak menunjukkan itikad untuk tidak menjadikan pembunuhan atau kekerasan senjata sebagai cara menyelesaikan masalah politik dalam mana kita tidak bisa menutup mata bahwa saat pergantian Orde Lama ke Orde Baru ratusan orang juga telah terbunuh oleh banyak tangan.

Namun Peristiwa Dili merupakan suatu ironi ketika UNDP, suatu badan di bawah PBB, baru saja mengeluarkan seruan pentingnya indikator keberhasilan pembangunan dikaitkan dengan pelaksanaan hak asasi manusia. Berdasarkan kriteria tersebut, konon Indonesia menduduki peringkat ke 77. Peristiwa Dili juga menjadi ironi tatkala Indonesia ditunjuk sebagai Anggota Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia PBB dan tuan rumah Lokakarya Regional PBB tentang hak asasi manusia untuk Asia - Pasifik tanggal 16 - 18 Desember 1991. Peristiwa Dili juga menyajikan kontradiksi terhadap pernyataan Jenderal Try Sutrisno sendiri yang baru-baru ini dengan lantang menyatakan bahwa bangsa Indonesia tidak perlu diajari tentang hak asasi manusia karena bangsa Indonesia telah memiliki Pancasila.

Tak kurang reaksi internasional atas Peristiwa Dili bermunculan dari bentuk protes, pemboikotan, sampai ancaman pemotongan dana bantuan luar - negeri Berbagai kedutaan asing dengan inisiatif sendiri-sendiri berusaha mengumpulkan fakta tentang Peristiwa Dili. Pada akhirnya sekalipun KPN telah terbentuk, karena anggota KPN adalah orang-orang yang berafiliasi dengan pemerintah, maka PBB berniat mengirimkan komisi penyelidikannya sendiri yang lebih independen.

Reaksi internasional ini menunjukkan 4 kecenderungan penting. **Pertama**, hak asasi manusia, seperti lingkungan hidup, telah menjadi masalah universal dan bentuk dari solidaritas dunia yang baru. **Kedua**, pada hekekatnya pembangunan fisik dan ekonomi tidak bisa dilepaskan dari penghormatan terhadap pelaksanaan hak asasi manusia secara konsekuen. **Ketiga**, mulai ditinggalkannya era kekerasan fisik atau penggunaan kekerasan senjata untuk mencapai tujuan sosial dan politik. **Keempat**, konsep dominator atau otoritarianisme dalam kekuasaan politik tidak populer lagi dan bahwa konsep zero sum dalam kekuasaan politik (totalitarianisme) adalah suatu kemustahilan.

Menanggapi adanya masalah hak asasi manusia yang aktual, seperti Peristiwa Dili, di samping pelanggaran terhadap hak atas tanah (Land Rights) yang sampai sekarang masih menghantui masyarakat, INFIGHT (Indonesian Front for the Defense of Human Rights) mengingatkan beberapa hal:

Pertama, ditinjau dari pelaksanaan hak asasi manusia yang substansial, pemerintah Indonesia belum dapat mewujudkan hak asasi manusia dalam kehidupan masyarakat. Hal ini bisa dilihat dari adanya hambatan terhadap kebebasan berekspresi, sensor media massa, pengekangan hak berorganisasi, pengekangan hak berbeda pendapat, dan berdirinya lembaga ekstrakonstitusional dan semi militer yang pada dasarnya mengurangi hak-hak sipil/warganegara.

Kedua, pemerintah hanya terdorong untuk melaksanakan pembangunan fisik/ekonomi yang berorientasi pada pertumbuhan dengan mengesampingkan prinsip-prinsip pemerataan yang pada

hakekatnya hanya bisa terwujud jika pembangunan demokrasi politik juga terjamin. Sebagai akibatnya terjadi penindasan golongan ekonomi kuat terhadap golongan ekonomi lemah, melahirkan monopoli/oligopoli, timbulnya nepotisme ekonomi berskala besar, dan kalaborasi antara pemodal dengan birokrat yang tidak sehat.

Ketiga, sistem politik tidak dibangun berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip hak asasi manusia dan demokrasi, sehingga sekalipun saat ini ada satu golongan dan dua partai pada kenyataannya lebih mencerminkan sifat-sifat monopartai. Apalagi di Indonesia masih ada pembatasan jumlah partai dan pembatasan ruang gerak partai atau dilaksanakan konsep massa mengambang yang hakekatnya merupakan suatu depolitisasi massa. Sistem politik yang ada sama sekali tidak menjamin dipisahkannya kedudukan lembaga legislatif, eksekutif, dan judikatif.

Keempat, pendekatan keamanan yang dilaksanakan di Indonesia di sengaja atau tidak disengaja pada kenyataannya telah melegitimasi berjalannya suatu sistem yang mendekati sifat-sifat negara militer, di mana birokrasi militer telah menelan birokrasi sipil yang ada. Pendekatan keamanan di samping bertentangan dengan asas keterbukaan dan cenderung membangun sistem politik yang tertutup, juga terbukti selalu menggoda untuk digunakannya kekuatan, kekerasan, pemaksaan, dan senjata untuk melakukan penyelesaian politik. Pada akhirnya setiap gejolak politik akan diselesaikan dengan prinsip demi menyelamatkan 160 juta rakyat Indonesia, pembunuhan terhadap sejumlah orang adalah syah.

Kelima, di Indonesia selalu berlaku kebijakan berpura-pura (window dressing policy), artinya janji atau pernyataan pemerintah tidak selalu sejalan dengan kenyataan. Hal ini dimungkinkan, karena pemerintah mendominasi saluran informasi dan media komunikasi. Lebih jauh pemerintah dengan infra struktur yang ada masih mengendalikan akses masyarakat ke lapangan dan pengambil keputusan dengan berbagai mekanisme perijinan. Akibatnya di masyarakat timbul kesangsian massal atas pernyataan yang beredar dan masyarakat selalu menjadi korban dari demagogi legal yang dilansir oleh pemerintah.

Menanggapi kondisi hak asasi manusia di Indonesia pada umumnya, INFIGHT mengajukan tuntutan untuk mewujudkan hak asasi manusia yang hakiki di Indonesia, sebagai berikut:

1. Pemerintah harus tetap menghormati prinsip-prinsip hak asasi manusia seperti yang telah menjadi kepedulian berbagai negara seperti tercermin dalam deklarasi hak asasi manusia yang telah ditetapkan oleh PBB (Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa). Bersikap reaktif terhadap opini dunia tentang hak asasi manusia akhir-akhir ini pada akhirnya akan mempersulit Indonesia dalam mewujudkan tata hubungan dunia yang baru. Daripada bersifat reaktif, lebih baik pemerintah mencoba memenuhi tuntutan-tuntutan masyarakat dunia akan hak asasi manusia sambil mencari model kontekstualnya.
2. Pemerintah maupun ABRI hendaknya mengevaluasi mengenai pendekatan keamanan selama ini berserta infrastrukturnya. Pendekatan keamanan dengan melibatkan infrastruktur militer secara aktif guna menyelesaikan masalah politik, justru menyebabkan ketergantungan dan pada akhirnya tidak mendidik masyarakat untuk menciptakan stabilitas sosial secara mandiri. Peristiwa Dili dengan segala prolog dan epilognya hendaknya dijadikan hikmah untuk meninggalkan era kekerasan senjata menuju kehidupan politik yang menjamin terlaksananya hak-hak sipil yang sesungguhnya.
3. Pemerintah maupun ABRI hendaknya bersifat realistis terhadap kecenderungan dunia pada umumnya untuk mengkaitkan indikator keberhasilan pembangunan dengan sukses dalam pelaksanaan hak asasi manusia atau keinginan berbagai negara untuk menghubungkan bantuan ekonomi dengan realisasi perwujudan hak asasi manusia di setiap negara penerima bantuan. Sekalipun bantuan ekonomi menimbulkan masalah tersendiri, namun harus dihormati keinginan dari negara donor yang tidak menginginkan bantuan ekonominya secara tidak langsung digunakan untuk menyokong penindasan dari para pemerintah fasis atau secara tidak langsung menyokong kekerasan bersenjata di negara-negara berkembang.
4. Pemerintah maupun ABRI hendaknya realistis dalam menghadapi kenyataan bahwa hak asasi manusia merupakan masalah yang universal dan salah satu bentuk solidaritas dunia yang baru. Dengan mempertimbangkan hal ini sebagai suatu faktor nyata, maka kita dapat membuat kebijakan

yang realistis dan komprehensif, sehingga dampak politik akibat kesalahan menerapkan pendekatan keamanan atau pelanggaran hak asasi manusia tidak menyebabkan kegoncangan ekonomi dan perdagangan. Pemerintah maupun ABRI hendaknya memiliki tolok ukur yang tepat mengenai apa yang disebut dengan "campur-tangan asing", daripada menggunakan istilah ini secara sporadis dan pada akhirnya merugikan kepentingan nasional. Hal ini mengingat bantuan ekonomi, jual-beli persenjataan, kerjasama multilateral dan bilateral bisa diartikan pula sebagai campur-tangan asing. Kita pun harus menyadari bahwa kemerdekaan RI 17 Agustus 1945 adalah hasil kerjasama dengan pihak asing, yakni negara-negara yang solider terhadap kemerdekaan bangsa Indonesia.

5. Pemerintah perlu meninggalkan sikap reaktif dan defensif menanggapi kritisisme masyarakat dan menjunjung tinggi asas-asas demokrasi. Pemerintah juga perlu meninggalkan kecenderungan berburuk-sangka dan keras kepala dalam menanggapi pernyataan-pernyataan dan peristiwa-peristiwa nasional. Kebiasaan untuk mencari *dalang* dan mengungkap interest di balik segala pernyataan dan peristiwa di masyarakat kini lebih menunjukkan itikad buruk untuk mengalihkan perhatian dan menghindar dari penyelesaian yang substansial daripada tanggung-jawab satu rezim atas tindak-tanduk dan kebijakannya. Dalam kenyataan dunia yang transparan, sikap reaktif dan defensif justru akan mengurangi simpati internasional, di samping menyulitkan mencari penyelesaian yang sesuai dengan hak asasi masyarakat [People Rights].
6. Khususnya terhadap Peristiwa Dili 12 November 1991, pemerintah perlu menyadari dalam menghadapi kenyataan bahwa Timor-Timur tetap merupakan isu internasional. Karena itu demi menjaga kehormatan dan kewibawaan nasional, seperti ditunjukkan ketika kita mendukung isi Deklarasi Bandung [Hasil konferensi Asia-Afrika 1955], maka pemerintah harus berani memikirkan dan memberi tanggapan atas faktor-faktor meta integrasi [misalnya soal-soal kedaulatan bangsa-bangsa dan hak menentukan pendapat sendiri] yang muncul dan tidak terjebak dalam persoalan pro- kontra integrasi. Sikap seperti ini akan memberi penyelesaian politik yang tuntas dan terhormat terhadap masalah Timor-Timur tanpa selalu menjawab bahwa masalah Timor-Timur adalah "masalah dalam negeri", sekalipun hal ini akan menghadapi dua kemungkinan. *Pertama*, integrasi Timor-Timur secara de facto mungkin memperoleh pengakuan de jure yang jujur dan syah secara internasional. *Kedua*, integrasi Timor-Timur tidak lagi diartikan secara fisik dan geografis, melainkan sebagai integrasi substantif adanya kesamaan dalam geohistoris, geopolitik, geoekonomi, dan geokultural, sebagaimana Indonesia terintegrasi ke dalam ASEAN. Keberanian bersikap ini seharusnya diambil mengingat bahwa Timor-Timur betapapun merupakan korban dari teori domino yang dominan pada waktu itu, ketiadaan konsep bertetangga-baik, serta ketiadaan konsep pertahanan yang invasif. Tetapi dengan meningkatnya penghargaan atas kedaulatan bangsa-bangsa dan ditinggalkannya teori domino, kemampuan Indonesia menjalin kerjasama regional dalam ASEAN, kemampuan Indonesia bertetangga baik dengan negara satu pulau [dengan Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, dan Papua Nugini], serta adanya sistem pertahanan bersama [dengan Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, PNG, dan Australia]: maka di tengah tengah gejolak perkembangan pemikiran demokrasi dari hak asasi manusia di dunia saat ini, kebijakan Timor-Timur terbuka untuk dikaji kembali.

Jakarta, 10 Desember 1991

S. Indro Jajiono
Devisi tanah & lingkungan hidup

INFIGHT
PO BOX 6288 JATRA
JAKARTA 13063

STATEMENT ISSUED AT DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE U.S. EMBASSY IN
JAKARTA, INDONESIA, 14 JANUARY, 1991.

ANTI-GULF WAR COMMITTEE.

A CALL FOR AN END TO WAR

Since the end of the Second World War, a tiny group of people in control of the American government and economy have, in defence of their own economic and political interests, regularly dragged their people into war. This has happened despite opposition from the American people themselves and the American people's own desire for peace. We continue to hold the belief that the American people love peace. They do not want history to repeat itself; every generation of American people suffer the bitter effects of war.

Those using war to protect their own economic and political interests always endeavour to make their reasons sound beautiful: we hear the terms World Policeman or Defenders of Democracy. Yet, history shows that such words are no more than slogans: they always cover up a policy of double standards. We, the countries of the third world, have so often felt just how these people have operated to destabilise our security, political, cultural, and economic life. *Our natural resources are ravished, while we remain poverty stricken; our so-called independent and active foreign policies are twisted and turned into policies in support of their interests; their cultural values which our own irresponsible leaders allow be imposed rob our people of their moral heritage and their values of human solidarity; and several of Third World countries have felt directly the oppression of direct military aggression. Even when this tiny group has not ordered direct aggression they are often playing behind the scenes, giving or selling military equipment to our governments on the one hand while trying to pit one against the other on the other hand.*

Even the most stupid person understands that war is always against the interest of the people. It is always the ordinary people that suffer the most loss of life. Human and natural resources, which would be better used to solve problems of human welfare, are wasted. The environment and eco-system is damaged, also raising the possibility of affecting the climate or bringing on a green house effect.

For these reasons, the ANTI GULF WAR COMMITTEE, call for the comprehensive resolution of the Gulf Crisis, through the following means:

1. the withdrawal of the multi-national and Iraqi forces from their respective areas of aggression;
2. So that such a crisis as the Gulf Crisis, which in its essence stems from and is itself a violation and rejection of human rights, is not repeated again, then other similar cases and problems should also be resolved. Such cases include: the case of the Palestinian people, the East Timor people, the West Papuan people, the South African people, the Cambodian people, the Panamanian people, the Northern Ireland people, the Filipino people and so on. These peoples should be allowed to resolve their situations through referendums.
3. There should be a referendum as soon as possible in Kuwait.
4. The control of the waters of the Gulf should be left in the hands of the peoples of the gulf themselves.
5. All those who have suffered as a result of this crisis should be compensated.

from Max.

ATTN: JOHN WESTLAND

4 PAGES FOLLOW

**PRESS Release**

Published by the Information Section of the Embassy of Indonesia
8 Darwin Avenue, Yarralumla, ACT 2600, Ph 06. 273 3222, Fax 06. 273 3748

No. 017/PR/XII/91

SUMMARY OF THE PRELIMINARY REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION
WITH REGARD TO THE 12 NOVEMBER DILI INCIDENT

Introduction

The National Investigative Commission was established under Presidential Decree no 53/1991 comprising one chairman and six members. The conduct of investigation was divided into two stages: collecting data in Jakarta from November 21 to November 27, 1991 and carrying out on-the-spot investigation in Dili from November 28 to December 12, 1991. The purpose of the Commission is to undertake an independent, accurate, thorough, and just investigation so that objective data and facts with regard to the Dili Incident, November 12, 1991 could be obtained.

In order to get comprehensive results as mandated by the Decree, the Commission among others had examined documents, met and interviewed reliable sources and eye witnesses, conducted field examinations, reconstructions, information and data cross-checking, tabulation and analyses.

With regard to the above mentioned methods, the Commission had met various sources including high ranking local officials (five times with Governor Carrascalao, five times with Brig. Gen. Rudolf Warouw, Military Commander of East Timor and other local officials), religious leaders (four times with Bishop Ximenes Belo, other church leaders such as

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Alberto Ricardo da Silva, Albrecht Kareem, Markus Wanandi, Locatelli, Jose Carbonell and Jose Antonio da Costa), local parliamentarians, socio-political organizations etc. The Commission had also met and interviewed 132 eye witnesses, visited military hospital, public hospital, local community health centre and local police custody.,

The Commission found 70 bullet-prints on the Santa Cruz' walls and gates, trees and lamp posts. At the Hera public cemetery, the Commission found out that the dead bodies were buried accordingly. Other locations suspected to be mass graveyards, such as areas around Hera, Pasir Putih, Tasi Tolu and Tibar had also been excavated but the Commission did not find any evidence to prove the allegations.

About the Incident

The vast and rapid pace of the development in East Timor during 15 years of integration has increased the welfare of the society, which i.e. encouraged mass urbanization in Dili. It is estimated that about 25,000 people live in Dili at the beginning of the integration, but now 124,284 out of 755,950 East Timor's population live in Dili alone. The increasing number young graduates under the education-policy of the Indonesian Government has caused the imbalance of job opportunities among many young Timorese. The unemployed youths become easily cajoled by the agitation of the Fretilin disturbance movement, which is now under heavy pressure due to the diminishing support from the people. With the unilateral cancellation of visit of the Portuguese Parliamentary Delegation, Fretilin had changed their long prepared activities into urban guerilla warfare concentrated in Dili with the purpose to attract the attentions of the international community.

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The Dili Incident of November 12, 1991 is an epilogue of incidents previously occurred in East Timor, such as Tasi Tolu Incidents during Pope's visit on October 12, 1989, Turismo Hotel Incident during the visit of US Ambassador John Monjo on January 19, 1990, the demonstration during the 50th anniversary of Dili diocese on September 4, 1990, unruly actions by anti integration groups in some schools in Dili in October 1991 and the latest one was the mass brawl in the compound of Motael Church, Dili on October 28, 1991.

With the cancellation of the Portuguese Parliamentary visit, the said long overdue preparation was shifted into a demonstration, taking advantage of the memorial service of Sebastiao Gomes and the presence of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission of Human Rights. Based on the information from the eye witnesses and the data collected, some foreigners had been actively participating in the demonstration. It was obvious that Fretilin had played prominent role in triggering and mobilising the unruly, provocative and violent demonstration.

Conclusion

1. The Dili Incident of November 12, 1991 was as the culmination of a series of demonstrations and incidents initially occurred organized by the group of anti-integration/the Fretilin disturbance movement in order to attract international attention of their existence.
2. It was not an incident premeditated or deliberately ordered by neither the central government nor the Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters as well as the local military command of East Timor. It was, however, a regretful accident.

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3. It was a provocative demonstration designed by the group of anti integration/the Fretilin security disturbance movement; not a peaceful memorial service for Sebastiao Gomes.
4. The largely comprised youth demonstrators, had acted violently, emotionally and destructively. They were presumed to have been long influenced and agitated by the group of anti integration/ Fretilin security disturbance movement. They intentionally carried and unfurled the Fretilin and the Falentil flags, picture of Xanana Gusmao, posters and shouted anti-integration and insulted yells to the security apparatus.
5. Some foreigners had actively been participating in the demonstration.
6. The heightening strenuous conditions which was initiated by the stabbing and wounding of two young security officers, the provocative and brutal mass had led to spontaneous reactions from the lower ranking security officers as to defend themselves and the weapons in the form of unguided shootings which subsequently caused death casualties and injuries. At the same time, an unorganized and uncontrolled group of security apparatus had opened fire and tortured some demonstrators which increased the number of casualties.
7. Despite the presence of the anti-riot units, the Commission is of the view that the standard procedures of handling riots are not properly applied. Some security apparatus had conducted excessively which caused more casualties. Although the claimed number of victims so far has been 19 dead and 91 injured, the Commission has enough strong reason to believe that the number of

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victims who died were around 50 and the injured were more than 91 people.

8. The handling of the dead body of the victims, apart from the availability of the visum et repertum, was not carefully managed and identified accordingly. The opportunity to identify the victims was not given to their relatives or friends.
9. The Commission is of the opinion that legal action should be taken to those involved in and responsible to the incident in accordance with the existing law in Indonesia which upholds Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Canberra, December 27, 1991

✓ L.

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PAT, SOME ADDITIONAL ITEMS OF INTEREST...
from David

New York Times editorial, 21 January 1992

The Tiananmen in East Timor

What President Bush has called "the tragedy in East Timor" is finally eliciting more than ritual sympathy. The former Portuguese colony was forcibly seized by Indonesia in 1975, an act comparable to Iraq's devouring Kuwait. This was largely ignored until last Nov. 12, when Indonesian troops killed 50 Timorese at a wreath-laying ceremony for a slain youth, an act reminiscent of China's 1989 massacre of pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square.

Unable to ignore protests, Jakarta's military rulers ordered an inquiry. They now acknowledge the 50 deaths, but say they resulted from a "spontaneous reaction by soldiers" provoked by mourners waving "anti-Indonesian" banners. Numerous witnesses, including two American journalists, say the troops acted with cool deliberation.

Creditably, Portugal has mounted a campaign in behalf of its former colonial subjects. In Washington the other day, President Mario Soares sought President Bush's active help in holding Indonesia accountable for its misdeeds. Jakarta insists that it seized East Timor for humanitarian purposes to save lives threatened by civil strife and says that a largely Roman Catholic people have welcomed their annexation by Islamic Indonesia. If so, the Portuguese ask, why not let the East Timorese express their wishes in a genuine referendum?

Mr. Bush condemned the situation as "a tragedy" at a news conference on Dec. 19, before his Asian trip. He went on to say, "We pride ourselves, and I think properly so, on standing up for human rights, and I think we've made clear to the parties that are interested there the U.S. position." But after his meeting with President Soares, a White House statement - much to Mr. Soares' dismay, did not mention East Timor at all, alluding only to "Asian developments."

This skittishness harks back to the cold war deference to a huge Asian country that has been a major buyer of U.S. arms. Times have changed.

Less deferential members of Congress rightly condemned Indonesia's Tiananmen and are weighing trade and loan sanctions. That may be the kind of "Asian development" that Jakarta's rulers will take seriously.

Topic 81637 Dili defendants names
gn:tapolreg.easttimor 7:32 am Jan 21, 1992

CDPM lists the Timorese to be tried in Dili

The Lisbon-based Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People (CDPM) has strongly condemned the trials of 37 East Timorese which are soon to commence in Dili. In a statement issued on 20 January 1992, the CDPM said the trials were unlawful. The prisoners had had no access to legal assistance during their interrogation and they were being forced to accept defence lawyers appointed by the authorities. No facilities were being provided for interpretation, for their proper understanding of the charges and for the preparation of their own defence.

The CDPM called on the Portuguese authorities to protest in its capacity as the Administ
ring Power, and to approach the
appropriate international authorities to ensure the presence
of international lawyers at the trials.

The names of the 37 persons were supplied by reliable sources whose identity cannot be divulged. The names, with their ages and places of residence, are as follows:

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CDPM lists the Timorese to be tried in Dili

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The names of the 37 persons were supplied by reliable sources whose identity cannot be divulged. The names, with their ages and places of residence, are as follows:

1. Carlos dos Santo Lemos, 30, Becora-Dili
2. Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves, 34, Taibesse-Dili
3. Francisco Miranda Branco, 41, Balide-Dili
4. Filomeno da Silva Ferreira, 34, Campo Alor-Dili
5. Juvencio de Jesus Martins, 29, Campo Alor-Dili
6. Saturnino da Costa Belo, 22, Bidau Santana-Dili
7. Aleixo da Silva Gama, 22, Bidau-Dili
8. Augusto Felipe Gama Xavier, 24, Bidau Santana-Dili
9. Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, 29, Santa Cruz/Audian-Dili
10. Matias Gouveia Duarte, 40, Taibesse-Dili
11. Jacob da Silva, 22, Vila Verde-Dili
12. Boby Xavier, 18, Matadouro-Dili
13. Joancio dos Santos, 24, Bairro Pite-Dili
14. Lourenco Rodrigues Pereira, 21, Vila Verde-Dili
15. Antonio Baptista Sequeira, 20, Vila Verde-Dili
16. Bonifacio Barreto, 20, Maliana
17. Aleixo Lay, 21, Bidau-Dili
18. Jose Barreto Marques, 19, Bairro Pite-Dili
19. Bonifacio Magno, 35, Taibesse-Dili
20. Janio Ferdinando, 17, Santa-Cruz-Dili
21. Fernando Tilman, 21
22. Januario Gomez, 18, Caicoli-Dili
23. Filomeno Gomez, 50, Caicoli-Dili
24. Joao Pereira, 18, Becora-Dili
25. Simplicio de Deus, 19, Vila Verde-Dili
26. Marcio da Graca, 18
27. Jose Felipe, 24, Dili
28. Antonio Belo, 33, Baucau
29. Francisco Guterres, 21, Becora-Dili
30. Jose Francisco da Costa, 22, Baucau
31. Eusebio Pinto Pedroso, 24, Lahane-Dili
32. Renilde Guterres Corte Real, 24, Ossu
33. Basilio Francisco Bento, 18, Culu-Hun-Dili
34. Manuel Eduardo dos Santos, 26, Baucau
35. Domingos Joaquim Pereira, 20, Dili
36. Mario Abel, 24, Baucau
37. Joao dos Santos, 22

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25
38
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Second letter from the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation to
General Try Sutrisno:

Jakarta 13 November 1991

Dear Sir,

Following our letter dated November 12, 1991, regarding the disturbances in Dili, East Timor, on October 28 and November 12 1991, and additional information which we have received, and reading press reports of November 13, 1991 reaffirming the disturbance and violence which resulted in the deaths of many civilians, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation again urges you as the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces to:

1. In order to fulfil the people's right to objective information on the facts surrounding the events about which we are concerned, and in order to determine steps toward a resolution which are in accordance with the values of a just and civilized humanity, it is appropriate that an Independent Fact Finding Commission be established consisting of people from government circles, the legal profession and Non-Governmental Organizations, working to collect facts exhaustively and responsibly. For this purpose, the Legal Aid Foundation as an independent organization is willing to participate in the afore-mentioned commission.
2. Openly and honestly announce to the public the results of the Fact Finding Commission.
3. Investigate those who have committed violations of the law in accordance with the legal procedures in effect.
4. Without exception, bring to trial those who are proven to have violated the law, based on fair, objective and open judicial principles (fair trial).
5. Provide maximum protection for the civilian population that has not committed any wrongdoing, so that violent actions or other extra-legal actions against them can be avoided.
6. A process of restoration of security and order should be carried out for the people, according to the stipulations of the criminal law procedures in effect. This process of restoration should conform to existing legal procedures (due process of law) and be carried out faithfully so as not to disturb the principles of our constitutional state.

Topic 81637 Dili defendants names
gn:tapolreg.easttimor 7:32 am Jan 21, 1992

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Fri

Jan 24 92

15:17

PAGE 1/4

17

DATE : Jan 24, 1992

TO : Pat Walsh

:

FROM : David Bouchier

:

FAX PHONE : 03 5346060 (ring first if not answering)

VOICE PHONE : 03 5346060

MESSAGE : Pat, the translations. Feel free to change anythi
: ng that sounds odd. Additional LBH things left out
: 'cause repetitive. Another fax to follow. David.

Two letters from the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation to General Try Sutrisno:

Jakarta 12 November

To:

General Try Sutrisno
Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces [ABRI]
ABRI Headquarters Cilangkap
Jl. Raya Hankam, Cilangkap
WEST JAVA

Dear Sir,

We have just received the news that on 11 November 1991 [sic] mourners at a funeral procession [sic] for two victims [sic] of a disturbance two weeks earlier came under armed attack in a graveyard in Dili, killing about 115 people. Local armed forces personnel are strongly suspected to have perpetrated the attack.

In relation to this matter, we appeal to you as Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces to:

1. Establish a verification team to investigate the truth about this very worrying incident
2. Openly and honestly announce to the public the results of the investigation.

Thank you for your attention.

13 November 1991

Dear Sir,

Following our letter dated November 12, 1991, regarding the disturbances in Dili, East Timor, on October 28 and November 12 1991, and additional information which we have received, and reading press reports of November 13, 1991 reaffirming the disturbance and violence which resulted in the deaths of many civilians, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation again urges you as the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces to:

1. In order to fulfil the people's right to objective information on the facts surrounding the events about which we are concerned, and in order to determine steps toward a resolution which are in accordance with the values of a just and civilized humanity, it is appropriate that an Independent Fact Finding Commission be established consisting of people from government circles, the legal profession and Non-Governmental Organizations, working to collect facts exhaustively and responsibly. For this purpose, the Legal Aid Foundation as an independent organization is willing to participate in the afore-mentioned commission.
2. Openly and honestly announce to the public the results of the Fact Finding Commission.
3. Investigate those who have committed violations of the law in accordance with the legal procedures in effect.
4. Without exception, bring to trial those who are proven to have violated the law, based on fair, objective and open judicial principles (fair trial).
5. Provide maximum protection for the civilian population that has not committed any wrongdoing, so that violent actions or other extra-legal actions against them can be avoided.
6. A process of restoration of security and order should be carried out for the people, according to the stipulations of the criminal law procedures in effect. This process of restoration should conform to existing legal procedures (due process of law) and be carried out faithfully so as not to disturb the principles of our constitutional state.

INGI
International NGO Forum on Indonesia

Press Release
29 November 1991

INGI's Statement of Concern at the 'Dili Incident' in East Timor

After closely monitoring the sequence of violent incidents in East Timor which occurred on 28 October and 12 November 1991, which have resulted in the deaths of many civilians, INGI observes that:

- a) For various reasons, the events in East Timor have attracted enormous attention both from within Indonesian society and abroad, and that this has placed the Indonesian people and the Government in a difficult position.
- b) Acts of violence which claim such a heavy toll materially, spiritually and in terms of human life directly reflect an insufficient level of dialogue with the people which [if carried out satisfactorily] would accommodate their initiative and aspirations and result in a climate of mutual security and mutual respect.
- c) The readiness of most foreign nations to cut off aid will do little to help the people of Indonesia in general or the people of East Timor in particular.

Therefore, all the Indonesian members of INGI hereby:

- a) express our deep concern over the incident in which violence claimed many victims, because the community will forever be affected by fear, loss of family members or other forms of physical or psychological suffering.
- b) call on the National Commission of Inquiry established by the government to be truly independent and to announce openly to the public the results of its investigation, because the government's credibility in the eyes of the Indonesian people in general and the East Timorese in particular, as well as the international community, hinges on the work of the commission.
- c) urge that all acts of violence be stopped and that dialogue or other peaceful means be found to resolve the problems in East Timor, because ultimately acts of violence beget new violence and lead to a 'culture of violence'.
- d) urge that all those implicated in the violence be brought before courts of law and that every opportunity to given for legal aid to be made available and for human rights to be upheld.
- e) as a forum for discussion of development assistance to Indonesia, INGI urges governments and international bodies participating in IGGI to base their aid policies not only on particular incidents but on the overall observance, protection and implementation of human rights [in Indonesia].
- f) proposes the formation of an independent and permanent national commission to protect human rights in Indonesia.

(signed)
Ir. Zulkarnaen MA
Vice Chairman of the INGI Indonesia
Guidance Council

Ir. August Rumanera(???)
Secretary of INGI Indonesia

Tues Dec 03 91

22:38

PAGE 1/6

18

DATE : Dec 03, 1991

TO : Pat Walsh

:

FROM : David Bouchier

:

FAX PHONE : 03 5346060 (ring first if not answering)

VOICE PHONE : 03 5346060

MESSAGE : Pat, This is amazing! But Ariel has pointed out
: that these are not official reps of student senate
: s, - perhaps self appointed. But nevertheless...!

Statement of Attitude by University Student Senates throughout Java

(On the bloody incident in Dili, East Timor, 12 November 1991)

STUDENTS CALL FOR INDONESIA'S COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO BE DISSOLVED AND FOR AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR

Students, as an important element in Indonesian public life who occupy a strategic position, should respond to developments in the political, social and cultural life of the nation. As future leaders of the nation, Indonesian students are very conscious of the need to take a position quickly towards various problems of society, and without hesitation to spearhead the struggle against all forms of injustice and falsehood.

Dedicated to this mission, Indonesian students who are members of the Communications Forum of Student Senates throughout Java used the occasion of their National Meeting on 20 and 21 November 1991 at Parahyangan University, Bandung to discuss the Bloody Incident in Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991.

At this meeting, we formulated our opinion and agreed on the following demands directed specifically to the Indonesian Government:

1. We condemn the bloody incident in Dili on 12 November 1991, the spilling of the blood of hundreds of 'expendable' human lives (just like the incidents in Tanjung Priok and Way Jepara, Lampung) which, in our opinion, could easily have been avoided. Persuasion or at the very most, tear-gas, fire-hoses or sticks should have been used to handle a mass demonstration. For any nation or people with a sense of

dignity, the 'thirst to kill' fellow human beings should be avoided.

2. We call on the Indonesian government - in the name of humanitarianism and to preserve the good name of the nation and state in the eyes of the world community, and to avoid being branded as an uncivilised nation with no respect for basic human rights - to allow an international (UN) team to conduct an investigation so as to ensure that an objective and independent investigation is conducted, and to dissolve the National Commission of Investigation (KPN), whose independence is untrustworthy as it is composed of people from government circles. We also strongly insist that the Polkam [Politics and Security Department] investigation team headed by Major-General Sudewo, deputy chief of BAIS [the army's strategic intelligence agency] should be disbanded; the armed forces [ABRI] should themselves be the object of investigation because they are the ones who were involved in the bloody onslaught of 12 November 1991.

[Point 3 attacks members of the state-sponsored youth organisation, KNPI who have been demonstrating outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta and accuses them of smuggling and of the murder of a student at a hostel in Banda Aceh some years ago.]

4. We demand the release of our seventy co-students from East Timor who held a demonstration at the UN office, the Japanese embassy and the Australian embassy on 19 November 1991, as well as ten Bandung students who are now in custody in the police detention centre [Polwiltabes] in Bandung. These arrests show more clearly than ever that the government has ended all freedom of expression and freedom of opinion in this country. Meanwhile, demonstrations 'orchestrated' by the

government have been held by the KNPI, Pancasila Youth, Democratic Youth and the Cipayung Group without let or hindrance; nor is it a secret that those taking part received 'due recompense' for their trouble.

5. We demand an end to the arrest and torture of relatives of the East Timorese students who are being held at Polda Metro Jaya, Jakarta. The families in East Timor of these students are innocent and are not involved in anything and should not be subjected to such undue harassment.

6. We demand that the government make public information about the death of an East Timorese student while in police custody at Polda Metro Jaya, after having been tortured beyond all endurance by the police, the Jakarta military command and BAIS.

7. We call upon the world community which until now has channelled aid to the Indonesian government, to exert pressure on the Indonesian government, by imposing an arms embargo and possible economic sanctions, until the Indonesian government and the armed forces begin to respect the human rights of people in Indonesia and stop extinguishing human life as a way to crush protest and discontent among the people. The attention being shown by world opinion towards events in East Timor reveals grave concern at the methods used by the Indonesian government, and is proof of worldwide solidarity for the universal respect for human rights. It is petty narrow-mindedness to regard such a response as a hostile act or outside intervention in the internal affairs of the Indonesian nation and state. It is essential to distinguish clearly between 'the government' on the one hand, and 'the nation' and 'the state', on the other.

8. We call on the Indonesian government to withdraw all elements of the armed forces from East Timor without delay and give the people of East Timor absolute freedom to 'exercise their right to self-determination', in order to put a halt to any more spilling of blood.

9. We are resolute in our determination to carry out actions in opposition to armed violence against the people of East Timor until these demands have been met.

Bandung, 23 November 1991.

Signed by:

1. Agung Narawato*, Coordination Body of the Student Senate, University of Indonesia, Jakarta.
2. Abdurrahman Gapar*, Faculty of Industrial Technology of the Bandung Institute of Technology.
3. Hariyanto*, Student Communications Forum of Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
4. Rachmat*, Student Senate, Diponegoro University, Semarang.
5. Parlindungan Hutapea, Student Senate Communications Forum, Pancasila University, Jakarta.
6. Zaharia al*, Student Senate Coordinating Body, Ibn Khaldun University, Bogor.

7. Rab....* Lestari, Students Coordinating Body, 11 March University, Solo.

8. Andika Jus.....*, Student Senate Coordinating Body, Pajajaran University, Bandung.

9. Djarot Sungkono, Student Senate Coordinating Body, Indonesian Institute of Technology, Jakarta.

10. Sulistyono*, Communications Forum of Student Senates, IKIP (Teacher Training College), Jakarta.

11. F. Jimmy Constantio, Student Senates of 10th November Institute of Technology, Surabaya.

*) Some names are illegible because they are covered by the rubber-stamp of the organisation in question.

MENGUTUK BRUTALISME MILITER INDONESIA TERHADAP RAKYAT TIMOR-TIMUR

Belakangan kami mendengar dan semua dunia mengetahui bahwa baru saja terjadi pembantaian keji terhadap rakyat Timor-timur. Walaupun media massa nasional tidak pernah berani untuk bicara jujur tentang 180 rakyat Timor-timur, termasuk salah seorang Pencinta perdamaian- Jurnalis yang kita kenal KAMAL AHMAD telah menjadi korban, gugur di rengut peluru panas di Timor-timur.

Dengan kejadian yang sangat terkutuk itu, seluruh mata dunia kembali menyorot ketanah yang tak henti akan teror dan kekerasan dari ABRI, tentara yang menghisap pajak rakyat indonesia, terlatih oleh Amerika untuk melindungi kepentingan Penguasa.

Apapun kebohongan yang terucap, dunia warga dunia tidak akan pernah bisa ditipu dengan sekian data yang penuh dengan manipulasi, lewat media massa nasional yang telah dikangkangi.

Perjuangan untuk hak dan pembebasan yang sejati dari teror oleh rakyat Timor-timur, kini telah membuka kesadaran rakyat indonesia. Perjuangan untuk menghentikan intimidasi dan penghianatan terhadap hak-hak rakyat yang telah berlangsung sekian lama kini kembali melahirkan martir-martir baru yang akan terus menguatkan langkah berikutnya.

Rakyat Indonesia, kaum Muda dan mahasiswa terpelajar, Menundukkan kepala, bela sungkawa yang sedalam-dalamnya untuk para martir. Dan iktu berduka akan kepergian seorang kawan; KAMAL AHMAD yang konsisten amat mencintai perdamaian dan hak-hak azasi dalam perjuangan kongkritnya.

Timor-timur, kebenaran pasti terbuktikan, perjuangan akan menang, Tuhan beserta mu !!

Indonesia
Yogyakarta, November 1991

Komite Solidaritas Mahasiswa untuk Timor-timur

Mahasiswa Jakarta
Mahasiswa Yogyakarta
Mahasiswa Bandung
MAhasiswa Surabaya
Mahasiswa Malang
Mahasiswa Lampung
Mahasiswa Medan
Mahasiswa Ujung Pandang
Mahasiswa Irian
Mahasiswa Aceh
Mahasiswa Bogor
Mahasiswa Balikpapan
Mahasiswa Palangkaraya

20
KL

Yogyakarta, November 15, 1991

Kawan-kawan AKSI, Resistance dan pejuang demokrasi yang kami hormati !!

Salam dalam perjuangan untuk Demokrasi yang sejati

Kami, mendengar dan membaca di koran tentang gugurnya kawan seperjuangan kita, KAMAL

Kami merasa sangat kehilangan, dengan kepergiannya, tapi itulah kamal, yang telah menjadi bagian dari perjuangan rakyat tertindas, yang pernah berkata bahwa Kematian bukanlah masalah, dalam memperjuangkan demokrasi yang sejati, Kamal yang ikut dalam aksi solidaritas buat rakyat tergusur di parang tritis akibat VIY.

Rezim Soeharto dan Fascisme secara umum telah merengutnya dengan pelor panas, pada saat Kamal sedang berada dalam tugas mulianya di Timor-timur. Darah yang bersimbah ditubuhnya akan terus mengalir ditanah terjajah itu, dan tak akan pernah kering menguap, tapi akan terus membasahi dan menyuburkan semangat rakyat untuk berjuang menuntut hak dan pembebasan dari antek-antek Militer soeharto, boneka Amerika !

Biarlah rakyat akan terus ingat akan kerja dan semangat pembebasannya, dan akan terus menjadi penyulut api perjuangan baik di Indonesia, Timor timur, dan rakyat asia yang tertindas !

~~Rezim ini sangat berhati-hati dan haus darah ! Mereka tidak puas dengan pembunuhan massal 1 juta rakyat tahun 1965 , pembantaian di timor-timur 1974-1978. Setelah menghisap darah dan keringat kaum buruh indonesia, merampas tanah rakyat untuk proyek-proyek raksasa, membakar hutan-hutan dan rumah-rumah rakyat di lampung dan Kalimantan, merampas kebun-kebun rakyat !~~

Biarlah beratus, beribu dan berjuta Kamal akan lahir buat pembebasan rakyat tertindas di Indonesia, dan di Timor-timor.

Terkutuklah Rezim orde baru !
Stop dukungan persenjataan dan latihan-latihan militer dengan Rezim Totaliter haus darah !
Bangkitlah rakyat tertindas Indonesia, setelah puluhan tahun di bawah ancaman bayonet dan peluru, atau anak-cucu kita akan terbelah tujuh olehnya !
Bangkitlah Rakyat Tim-tim ! setelah ayah dan saudara serta ibumu menjadi korban kebathilan !

Untuk seorang Kamal, dan ratusan rakyat Tim-tim yang telah gugur dan kaum tertindas di Indonesia : Kami acungkan kepala tangan kami !! PERJUANGAN RAKYAT HARUS MENANG !!

FKMY/ FORUM KOMUNIKASI MAHASISWA YOGYAKARTA

Murder at Motael Church, East Timor

27-10-1991

At 1:30am East Indonesian time (in the dead of night) a group of mysterious killers known as Ninjas (a special squad set up by Prabowo) fronted up at the church and requested to see the pastor. They asked permission to enter the church where they claimed young anti-integration activists were hiding. Pastor Ricardo, however, refused them permission to enter the church because the church is a place for prayer. Nevertheless, the Ninjas, who already had the operation planned out beforehand, launched an attack with the justification that a thief was lurking in the church grounds. Faced with violent attack by the Ninjas, the activists were forced to defend themselves, and as a result one of the Ninjas, Afonso Henrique, was killed. In return, the Indonesian military intelligence, renowned for its sadistic treatment of the East Timorese people, killed an activist by the name of Sebastiao Gomes in the church, considered by the East Timorese people as a holy place.

28-10-1991

After this event the activists reconsolidated themselves, and almost half of the inhabitants of Dili came out in support of a solidarity action in protest of the killing of Sebastiao Gomes. The military answered by staging a show of force to the unarmed populace. 20 participants of the solidarity action, beleived by the military to be anti-integration activists, were arrested and detained in Dili District Police Office. Among the 20 detained were Aleixo Gama and Aleon, both of whom have several times been tortured due to their involvement in protest actions during the visits of the Pope and the US Ambassador.

29-10-1991

Due to the dissatisfaction of the military's actions and the detention of the activists on the 28th of October, another big action was staged in the middle of Dili, which coincided with the funeral of Sebastiao Gomes. The procession began at 2pm Eastern Indonesian time, and included nuns and priests joined in to accompany the body to its final resting place. The participants urged the people of East Timor to remain calm in the face of the threats they have been receiving since the occupation of their land by East Timorese soldiers.

Further Information:

Meanwhile news came out that similar attacks had also been carried out by the Ninjas at Dom Bosco-Fatumaka technical school, under the care of Selisaino priests. According to the news it can be estimated that as many as 40 activists were arrested and till now their whereabouts remains unknown. This has also occurred in the sub-district of Ossu and the district of Viqueque. The main

target of the military in these two regions is pro-independence activists. Brig. Gen. R.S. Warrow has ordered that pro-independence activists must be 'cleaned out' of East Timor before the Portuguese parliamentary visit.

On the 30-10-1991 the Jakarta post included a report of Warrow's claim that 150 Fretelin members had surrendered to ABRI. But underground sources in Dili confirm that such an event never occurred. In fact, the contrary has occurred. That is, there has been consolidation among solidarity activists and the local community in their commitment to express their opposition to integration and their desire for independence to the Portuguese parliament and the United Nations Delegation.

Conclusion: the news items included in the domestic press should be read with the following points in mind:

1. that the flow of information from east Timor is controlled by the military and is not representative of reality.
2. that generally, publication of news such as documented above, in particular information concerning killings, is prohibited
3. That the report concerning the affair as reported in the Indonesian press is an attempt by ABRI (Indnesian Armed Forces) to cover up its inhumane deeds
4. That such false reports preempt factual reports from credible sources is an attempt to avoid international criticism

Since the postponement of the Portuguese parliament (November 1991) to East Timor, the situation in East Timor, especially in Dili, has been extremely tense. This is because the two parties concerned, the Indonesian government and Fretilin, have differing interests at stake in the Portuguese visit.

On Fretilin's part, it is hoped that the visit would yield a decision to hold a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations. Because the United Nations only recognises Portugal as the government responsible for East Timor.

Naturally, then, the Timorese people who advocate independence for East Timor, were extremely disappointed at the decision to postpone the Portuguese visit. Such was the source of the recent conflicts. The extreme actions taken by the Indonesian Armed Forces is very regrettable.

Both Fretilin and East Timorese civilians have been clear that they do not want to initiate any violent actions, because they are well aware that any violence on their part will undermine their position in the world of international diplomacy.

Thus, the first conflict was initiated by ABRI themselves, on the 28 October 1991, in Motael Church, a place considered to be safe for pro-independence activists fleeing from the Indonesian Armed Forces.

At 1:30 in the morning, East Indonesian time, a group of Indonesian soldiers known as the Ninja Force visited the Motael church, due to their suspicion that pro-independence activists were hiding there.

The Ninjas stirred up provocation by yelling warnings that there was a thief in the church compound.

But as the activists didn't come out, the Ninjas began to shoot in the direction of the church, shooting through the church buildings and killing one of the activists by the name of Sebastiao Gomes (20 years).

Following this incident, at 8:00 on the same morning, Timorese pro-independence activists demonstrated in protest of the murder of Gomes, walking through the streets of Dili. Several activists were arrested by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Their names are as follows:

1. Bonifacio BARRETO: a student originally from Maliana: age 20 years;
2. Aleixo DA SILVA GAMA: originally from Laga, age between 20-25 years;
3. Domingos SOARES: originally from Ermera, age between 20-25 years;
4. Domingos DA SILVA: " " Bobonaro, age 20/25;
5. Nazario TAVARES: " " Baucau, age 20/25;
6. Juliao MAUSIRI: " " Dili, age 20/25;
7. Valdemar DA SILVA: " " Bazartete-Liquica, age 20/25;
8. Afonso RANGEL: " " Viqueque, age 20/25;
9. Augusto SARMENTO: " " Watulari, age 20/25;
10. Francelino GUTERRES: " " Ossu, age 20/25;

In the 29 of October at 2pm, in the preparation for the funeral of Gome

On the 12 November 1991, 2 weeks after Gomes's death, the people of Dili and activists planned a commemration of the death. Starting from Motael church, around 2000 people moved towards the Santa Cruz cemetery, about 2 kilometres from the centre of the town. The group arrived at the cemetery at around 8am. After the group had entered the cemetery and sprinkled flowers, all of a sudden shots were fired from several directions into the crowd. As a result, 84 Timorese were killed. In addition a Malaysian man holding a New Zealand passport was shot twice, and taken to the hospital where he later died. 5 Foreigners were arrested, and later released. They are:

- In addition to the 85 victims, as many as 300 Timorese were arrested, and several of them, the exact number as yet unknown, killed in detention. Some of the injured were taken to the hospital, and 13 of them later died in hospital due to serious injuries. The total number of dead at Santa Cruz is 98 people.

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KELOMPOK KERJA PETISI 50 / PERNYATAAN KEPRIHATINAN

Sekertariat: Ratu Plaza Office Tower - Lantai 26
Jl. Jenderal Sudirman 9 - Jakarta 10270 - Indonesia - Telp. 712209 - pcs. 2630 & 2631

Jakarta, 21 November 1991

Kepada Yth:
Pimpinan dan Para Anggota DPR RI
di
Jakarta

Dengan Hormat,


Peristiwa Dili, Timor Timur, tanggal 12 November, telah tercatat dalam sejarah sebagai suatu tragedi berdarah. Dalam pada itu, kejadian tersebut pada dasarnya serupa dengan Peristiwa Tanjung Priok tanggal 12 September 1984. Pola penjelasan pemerintah mengenai kedua peristiwa tersebut hampir tidak ada bedanya.

Tetapi ada satu perkecualian yang mencolok, ialah bahwa lima hari setelah Peristiwa Dili, pemerintah sudah mengumumkan terbentuknya Komisi Penyelidik Nasional untuk kejadian itu, sedangkan setelah lebih dari tujuh tahun, pemerintah dan DPR masih belum berbuat yang sama untuk Peristiwa Tanjung Priok. Padahal usulan pembentukan komisi pencari fakta telah datang dari berbagai pihak termasuk Kelompok Kerja Petisi Limapuluh — lewat Lembaran Putih 17/09/84 dan surat-suratnya pada DPR RI tanggal 17/01/86, 10/12/87, 12/09/88 dan 12/09/89.

Schubungan dengan hal-hal tadi, kami terdorong untuk menyampaikan hal-hal berikut ini kepada DPR RI:

1. Selama Orde Baru ini sudah banyak peristiwa tindak keamanan aparat pemerintah yang membawa korban jiwa manusia. Antara lain: Peristiwa Tanjung Priok (1984), Peristiwa mahasiswa Ujungpandang (1987), Peristiwa Lampung (1989) dan peristiwa lainnya seperti yang terjadi di Aceh, Bima, Bandung, Yogyakarta dan lain-lain. Dalam pada itu, sebagaimana dibuktikan lagi dalam Peristiwa Dili, pemerintah dan aparat keamanannya nampak terlalu mudah menggunakan senjata dan kurang mempertimbangkan cara-cara penanganan yang manusiawi. Mengingat kecenderungan yang memprihatinkan itu, DPR hendaknya membentuk suatu komisi untuk mencari fakta mengenai semua peristiwa berdarah tanpa kecuali. Komisi tersebut harus non-pemerintah dan terdiri dari pemuka-pemuka masyarakat dan lembaga-lembaga kemasyarakatan yang layak dapat diharapkan akan bekerja secara obyektif sesuai dengan sila *perikemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab*.
2. Mendesak DPR, yang menurut UUD 1945 adalah sederajat dengan presiden, untuk minta Presiden Soeharto, selaku pemerintah, memberi penjelasan langsung di depan sidang pleno DPR mengenai peristiwa dan perilaku yang dimaksud di atas.

Kelompok Kerja Petisi Limapuluh


H. Ali Sadikin
Letjen TNI Mar (Pur)


Dr. Anwar Haryono S.H.


dr. Azis Saleh
Mayjen TNI (Pur)


Ir. Slamet Bratanata


Suyitno Sukirno
Marsekal Muda (Pur)


Drs. Chris Siner Key Timu


M. Rajab Ranggasoli


Drs. Wachdiat Sukardi

Tembusan: Presiden dan Wakil Presiden
Pimpinan Lembaga Tinggi Negara lainnya
Pimpinan Departemen dan ABRI/Kepala Staf Angkatan
Pimpinan Fraksi dalam DPR RI
Pimpinan Partai Politik dan Golongan Karya
Organisasi Kemasyarakatan dan Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat
Media Massa

2 PAGES.

Intriguing Diplomacy

On the morning of the 12 November at 7:30 am, between 2000 and 4000 Timorese marched from the Gereja Motael to the Dili cemetery, to commemorate the 14th day of the death of a Timorese youth who was murdered by the 'Ninja' mercenaries in Motael church. Throughout the day, underground news reports came through in trickles. The first I heard of the affair was that 70 Timorese had been killed when the armed forces opened fire on a demonstration meant to commemorate the killing of two weeks ago, and that three foreign journalists had also been shot. The reports that appeared in Jakarta press the following day were hardly consistent with those of independent sources. The press release prepared by the armed forces as their version of the affair went something like this (translated from Kompas, 13 November 1991):

The situation in Dili is once again calm. The provocation which occurred yesterday, initiated by people influenced by rebel groups (Geromboloan pengacau keamanan, lit: upsetters of a safe environment) has been overcome. The people have been requested stay calm, to avoid the influence of subversive gossip, and provocation by certain irresponsible figures.

Such was the Armed Forces' press release which was distributed to the media on Tuesday evening. According to the release a certain group initiated the provocation as a crowd of people began moving towards the Governors' office in Dili to protest, following a mass held at Motael Church.

Security forces attempted to disperse the crowd using persuasive methods met with resistance and even physical attacks, from the crowd. Included in the victims of the attacks was a Battalion Vice Commando.

According to the press release, in their attempts to deal with the worsening situation, the security forces were forced to defend themselves by resorting to strict methods, as according to the appropriate procedures. Thus inevitably, among the provocateurs there were also some victims, and several wounded.

Meanwhile, the Head of Information for the District Military Command IX/Udayana, Let. Col. Anton Tompoding announced yesterday that 9 people had died as a result of the conflict.

Udayana District Military Command concluded that those involved were clearly under the influence of the Timorese rebel group who have recently moved their operations to Dili as they have been pushed down and closed off from their traditional area of operation inland.

Their actions were planned to be aimed at the Portuguese Parliament. Their frustration caused by the postponement of the Parliamentary visit was thus vented in a brutal manner.

It is obvious that this chain of events is connected to the conflict that occurred at Motael Church on 28 October, and that that some church figures have become involved in the activities of the rebel groups.

Because of this, Udayana Military Command made a point of reminding church figures and certain groups that make use of the church, that the church is a holy place and should not be used for non-religious purposes, such as practical political purposes and opposing the government.

The security forces state their intention to maintain the calm, and warn that they will take strict measures against any activities that upset national stability, national development, and civil safety.

According to the report included in Berita Buana of the same date, about 100 rebels, who had descended from the hills and were carrying arms including hand grenades, were involved in the conflict. This report denied that the armed forces had resorted to military action. Let Col. Tompoding was quoted, in response to a question referring to the Indonesian Armed Forces' difficulties in capturing the Falintil leader Xanana, as saying "This is not such a problem if we just do away with them all" Berita Buana also briefly reported the Legal Aid Institute's claim that 115 people had been killed in the conflict.

According to other sources independent of ABRI, 84 people were shot dead by security forces, who opened fire on the crowd which had gathered in the Dili cemetery to commemorate the 14th day of the death of the young independence activist in Motael church. A further 13 were wounded and later died in hospital. Several foreigners were also involved in the conflict, including two journalists from the New York Times and 2 from the London Observer. One of the American journalists managed to escape to Guam where she later gave an interview and reported on the events as she witnessed them. The two English journalists were detained by police who saw them filming, and later released. In addition, a young man travelling on a New Zealand passport was shot twice in the street and left, to be later picked up by Red Cross and taken to the hospital where he later died from gunshot wounds. According to reports, he was merely observing the events. An Australian believed to be accompanying the New Zealander fled from the scene and later was said to be hiding in the house of the Archbishop. Another Australian man is believed to have been present at the scene but his whereabouts are as yet unknown.

P.S. Tian. Kamal's death was confirmed by
Red Cross & District Military Command.

24.

5.

Conf?

Topic 187 Carrascalao on Timor Elections
gn:tapol reg.easttimor 9:11 pm May 14, 1992

Subject: Carrascalao on Timor Elections

/* Written 5:31 pm May 12, 1992 by igc:apakabar in gn:reg.indonesia */ /* -----
"Carrascalao on Timor Elections" ----- */

Reuter, Dili, East Timor, May 12 - Indonesia's ruling party on Tuesday held its first election rally in the disputed territory of East Timor, near the scene of an army massacre last year in which up to 180 people were killed.

The former Portuguese colony, which Indonesia invaded in 1975 and annexed in 1976, is one of the poorest regions in the huge tropical archipelago. Political analysts blame revolt against Jakarta's rule there on widespread unemployment among the urban youth.

"(The ruling party) Golkar has a clear programme for youth. We will struggle for that...so we want you to elect Golkar," party chairman

Wahono told a rally in the Santa Cruz district of the capital Dili. He was speaking about 200 metres (yards) from a cemetery where Indonesian troops opened fire on mourners last November, killing up to 180 people.

About 2,000 people, mostly youths and civil servants, attended the rally in a dried river bed, entertained by musicians and dancers brought in from Jakarta. Golkar won all four East Timor seats in the 1987 elections when it swept 73 per cent of the national vote.

Local governor Mario Viegas Carrascalao said last weekend that many East Timorese would probably stay away from polling booths because of the scars left by the November shooting.

"Some people are still hurt by the incident and have unpleasant feelings towards the government," one local paper quoted Carrascalao as saying.

He is due to retire later this year and local parliament speaker Guillermo dos Santos said the province would reject any attempt to replace him with an outsider.

INFIGHT

INDONESIAN FRONT for THE DEFENSE of HUMAN RIGHTS
Jl. Pulau Asem Raya No.23, Jati Rawamangun - Jakarta 13220, INDONESIA.
Telp & Fax: [62-021] 4711388

N60
Jkm
Europe
hangar

25

INFORMATION

(news from East Timor and Malang)

1. Youths in Ermera, Liquisa and Manatuto were tightly monitored by security forces during the recent election period after it was discovered that the PDI vote experienced sharp increases.
2. People were forced to participate in the General Election and forced to vote Golkar. Those who refused were branded as rebels or 'disturbers of safety'.
3. East Timorese, especially youths, returning home for their annual school holidays are continually monitored and closely guarded by intelligence personnel, and prevented from freely socialising with their relatives and friends.
4. Priests and nuns have been pressured, closely monitored and threatened by military personnel as they attempt to carry out their pastoral duties. Several of them have been called in periodically for interrogation, including Father Domingos Soares and Father Ricardo da Silva.
5. Pursuits and arrests of supposedly 'suspicious' East Timorese continue to occur. As a result, suspected people are forced to hide in order to protect themselves.
6. East Timorese under suspicion are from time to time subject to the rude slogans of the security forces, who even enter houses to spy on 'suspects'.
7. Uniformed and armed ABRI forces have spread broadly, and regularly undertake house checks.
8. Intelligence personnel are cruising around several places and certain circles to monitor all activities in which East Timorese people are involved. Any signs of suspicious activities lead to house raids, thorough checks, and violent threats by the military towards the inhabitants. Intelligence personnel are often disguised and often as mobile street traders.
9. Changes and shifts have been made in several governmental agencies, to facilitate the monitoring and marginalisation of East Timorese civil servants who are suspected of 'involvement in East Timorese political problems'.
10. The identity of people entering Dili from the outlying districts, and vice versa, in particular to and from Hera and Tibar, is regularly checked. In addition, passengers on public transport, including women and old people, not carrying the appropriate ID are treated harshly.
11. Photocopying and photo printing outlets are monitored by intelligence personnel in disguise.

12. A Political Science student of Universitas Merdeka, Malang, Antonio Soares Araujo, was called in and interrogated by Brigadier General Hartono of Brawijaya District Military Command, over a period of 7 hours. This occurred in Surabaya on June 6, and the interrogation was carried out by the Brigadier General himself. The interrogation was reiterated on June 8, and again lasted for seven hours. This second interrogation was undertaken by two captains and a colonel.

13. The military has planned to undertake special investigations into every East Timorese student studying in Java and Bali. According to the District Military Commander, such investigations have been ordered by the President.

14. There has been an increase in the number of intelligence personnel for the monitoring of East Timorese in Java and Bali. They are always in disguise and hang around East Tiorese students' places of residence.

Lampiran 1

JADWAL ACARA SEMINAR

Hari/tgl	Waktu	Acara	Pesbicara
Kamis 23-04-92	07.00-08.00	Registrasi ulang	Panitia
	09.00-08.30	Pembukaan	Gubernur Timor Timur sebagai Pelindung IMPETTU-JABOTABEK
	08.30-10.30	Session I	Gubernur Timor Timur
	10.30-10.45	Snack	Panitia
	10.45-12.30	Session II	Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional / Ketua BAPPENAS
	12.30-13.30	Makan Siang	Panitia
	13.30-16.30	Session III	1. Dr. Ir. P. Wiryono P., SJ 2. Drs. Frans Seda 3. Prof. Dr. Mauritz Simatupang
	16.30-17.00	Snack	Panitia
	17.00-18.45	Session IV	KASAD
	08.30-10.15	Session V	MENAKER
Jumat 24-04-92	10.15-10.45	Snack	Panitia
	10.45-12.45	Session VI	1. DR. Sukadani Sahid S. 2. Dr. Hidayat
	12.45-13.45	Makan Siang	Panitia
	13.45-16.45	Session VII	1. Ketua BAPREDA Timor Timur 2. Dr. Hadi Susastro 3. Drs. Yusuf Arbyanto
	16.45-17.15	Snack	Panitia
	17.15-18.45	Session VIII	MENLU
	18.45-19.30	Persiapan Penutupan	Panitia
	19.30-20.00	Penutupan	PANGDAM JAYA

VII. TARGET PESERTA

Mengingat Seminar ini berskala Nasional, peserta yang diharapkan hadir secara kuantitatif memberikan sumbangan pemikiran dipilih sebagai berikut :

1. Professional (Sisnis)	70 orang
2. Praktisi (Pemerintah Pusat, Daerah dan ABRI) Depdagri, Deplu, Dephankam, Depnaker, DPU, Dep. Perindustrian, Dep. Perdagangan, Sekneg, BAPPENAS, Depdikbud, Menpora, MABES ABRI, Dep. Koperasi, Dephub, Dep. Parpostel, BKPM, DPR (komisi I, II, IX), Dep. Agama, KODAM Jaya, Kodam IX Udayana dan Kolakops Timor Timur.	24 orang
3. Lembaga Pendidikan dan Penelitian a. UI, UAJ-Jakarta, IIP, UKI, AUP, UGM, UAJ-Yogyakarta, UKSW-Sala-Tiga, UNDIP, UNIKA-Sugio Pranoto, UNS, AKMIL, UNPAR, ITB, IPB, PETRA-Surabaya, BRAWIJAYA, ITS, Unl. Jember, UDAYANA dan UNTIM b. CSIS dan LIPI	21 orang 4 orang
4. Mahasiswa Timor Timur (Jawa, Bali dan Dili) IMPETTU JABOTABEK, IMPETTU Bandung, IMPETTU Bali, IMPETIM Salatiga, IMPETTY- Yogyakarta, IMAPTIS-Semarang, IMPETTU- Jember, IMPETTU-Malang, IMPETTU-Surabaya, IMPETTU-Solo dan UNTIM	60 orang
5. Organisasi Masyarakat Kepemudaan (ORMAS) a. Pusat : KNPI dan PMKRI b. Daerah: KNPI dan AMPI	2 orang 4 orang
6. Para	15 orang
Jumlah	200 orang

X. PENGORGANISASIAN

- lampiran 3

XI. ANGGARAN

- lampiran 4

XII. SPONSORSHIP

- lampiran 5

XIII. PENUTUP

Hasil Seminar akan dirumuskan dengan ringkasan dalam bahasa Inggris dan Portugis sebelum disebarkan luaskan kepada berbagai instansi pemerintah, lembaga dan pihak lain yang terkait.

Demikian proposal ini atas perhatian dan bantuan semua pihak panitia haturkan limpah terima kasih.

Jakarta, akhir Februari 1992.-

TRIBUN
BEBAS



Saudara,

Marilah tetap bersatu dalam Perjuangan Kita !

Insiden Dili 12 Nov tetap bergema dan melambung tinggi dalam Perjuangan Kita baik di dalam maupun di Fora Internasional. Dunia telah mengkutuk keras dan mengancam Pelakunya. Bantuan diberhentikan, protes dan demonstrasi diarahkan di berbagai tempat. Espresso dari Lusitania menjadi heboh dan telah membentuk Opini Dunia. Satu Kemenangan politis. Kini Dunia tertuju pada Kita untuk menguji kembali "Unidade Nacional" Kita, kali ini dengan tawaran murah mengadakan Seminar Pembangunan dan menciptakan lapangan kerja yang kita sering dengar dan jenuh. Bukankah banyak seminar tanpa hasil telah dilakukan mengenai pembangunan di Timor Timur?!

Bukankah penelitian Prof.Dr. Mubyarto cukup jelas dalam hal ini dan akhirnya dilarang untuk diseminarkan karena tersirat masalah politis perjuangan Rakyat Timor Timur ?!

Masalah Timor Timur bukan soal "Pembangunan dan Penggangguhan". Masalah Timor Timur bukan "multiplier effect" yang diajak untuk bicara. Masalah Timor Timur bukan masalah dalam negeri.

Masalah Timor Timur adalah invasi, pencaplokan kedaulatan negara lain oleh satu Negara Dunia Ketiga, perintis Konferensi Negara2 ASIA-AFRIKA Masalah Timor Timur adalah pelanggaran dan pemerkosaan Hak2 Asasi Manusia, pembunuhan dan pembantaian terhadap perlawanan seluruh Rakyat Timor Timur dalam perjuangan Kemerdekaannya. Pembantaian Bangsa Timor Timur selama 15 tahun ini dikutuk keras oleh Dunia karena tiada tandin gannya dalam Sejarah Peradaban Manusia.

Penyelesaian Masalah Timor Timur adalah PERUNDINGAN dan MEMATUHI RESOLUSI-RESOLUSI PBB sejak 1975 sampai sekarang.

Kami cinta Perdamaian, Kemerdekaan dan pembangunan yang abadi adalah jawabannya. Kami punya konsep dan strategi tersendiri dalam pembangunan Negara Kami tanpa campur tangan negara lain yang kami tidak undang, apalagi direkayasa oleh Jakarta dan pengikut2-nya.

Kami mampu membangun negara kami dengan sumber daya alam yang berlimpah ruah dan tenaga manusia yang cukup andal walaupun sedikit. Bukan kah minyak kami di celah Timor menjadi rebutan dan diancam pencurian?! Minumlah kamu berdua supaya kami dengan mudah membakar sampai hangus. Kami mampu meletakkan strategi dasar pembangunan negara kami dan memenajenya. Bukankah Perjuangan 15 tahun melawan satu raksasa di Asia telah membuktikan hal itu?

Saudara, batalkan saja niat anda mengikuti seminar 23-24 besok supaya tidak dapat dipermainkan oleh mereka. Mereka licik dan bobrok. Marilah Saudara melakukan aksi BOIKOT nasional utk tdk mengikuti "Seminar-seminaran" sebagai PROTES KERAS terhadap pembantain di Santa Cruz 12 November 1991, pencaplokan Timor Timur, penangkapan, penahanan, pemerkosaan terhadap pejuang Kita di Timor Timur dan di Jakarta.

HARGAILAH DARAH2 INSIDEN SANTA CRUZ 12 NOV 91 YANG MENGUKIR SEJARAH KITA dan ayo segera BOIKOT.

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HARGAILAH DARA2 INSIDEN SANTA CRUZ 12 NOV 91 YANG MENGUKIR SEJARAH KITA dan ayo segera BOIKOT.

LSM Australia terlibat?

Jakarta, Buana

Siapa di balik insiden Dili sedikit demi sedikit kian terkuak. Dan itu juga tecermin dari pengakuan Ny. Helen Todd, ibu almarhum Kamal Bhamadhay. Kamal salah satu korban tewas dalam insiden Dili 12 November lalu. Dari pengakuan Helen itu, beberapa pihak kemudian menduga, CAA, sebuah LSM Australia terlibat dalam insiden Dili.

Pengakuan Helen Todd itu ditulis di *The Asian Wall Street Journal* edisi 25 November 1991. Menurut Helen Todd, Kamal yang sedang belajar di Universitas New South Wales, Australia, memang banyak mengetahui tentang kegiatan GPK di Timor Timur. Sejak pertengahan Oktober lalu, dia sudah masuk ke Timtim.

Penjelasan Helen Todd jika menyiratkan, Kamal telah mengetahui benar akan meletusnya insiden Dili itu. Kamal bekerja sebagai penerjemah Mr. Bob Muntz (44 tahun), seorang petugas dari CAA (Community Aid Abroad), suatu LSM Australia yang beroperasi di Dili. Masih menurut Helen, tiga hari sebelum insiden Dili pecah, keduanya selalu

berada di tengah-tengah massa perusuh.

Dari berbagai sumber diperoleh informasi, CAA adalah sebuah organisasi yang didominasi oleh kelompok kiri Australia. Dan CAA inilah yang disebut-sebut sejak 1970-an mendalangi demonstrasi dan kegiatan-kegiatan anti-integrasi Timor Timur di Australia. CAA dikabarkan juga mendukung kegiatan pelarian GPK Timor Timur termasuk pelarian Ramos Horta ke Australia.

Sejauh ini suara dari CAA sendiri memang belum terdengar. Buana yang mencoba mengkonfirmasi tuduhan beberapa pihak itu, belum berhasil menghubungi CAA.

Tentang kemungkinan keterlibatan pihak asing, Pangab Jenderal Try Sutrisno sendiri, Rabu (27/11) lalu di DPR sudah membeberkan. Sedikitnya ada lima orang asing yang patut dicurigai. Antara lain Christopher Wender warga negara Inggris, Allan Yoseph Naim warga Amerika Serikat, Kamal Bamadhaj warga Selandia baru, Stephen Christopher Cooks warga Inggris dan Ami Goodman Wbay warga Amerika Serikat. ■ pr

Enam mahasiswa Timtim²⁸ di Bali diperiksa

Denpasar, Buana

Buntut insiden sampai ke Bali. 6 Mahasiswa Timtim yang disekolahkan Pemdanya di Bali diperiksa polisi. Penangkapan dan pemeriksaan mereka itu dilakukan Minggu pagi, sekitar pukul 10.00. Penggrebagan berlangsung di pondokan mereka di Gang Tamansari II Sesetan, Denpasar.

Menurut sumber Buana dalam penggrebagan aparat keamanan menemukan beberapa selebaran anti-integrasi, 3 bendera Fretilin. Selebaran bendera itu ditempel di pintu kamar. Aparat juga menemukan sebuah granat anti-personil buatan Korea. Juga ditemukan rekening telepon senilai Rp 1 juta lebih. Telepon itu diketahui kebanyakan dipergunakan untuk berbicara ke luar negeri.

Sumber Buana di Polda Nusra membenarkan adanya penangkapan itu. Tetapi ia tak bersedia merinci kronologinya. Hanya saja ia memberikan gambaran kasar, sebagian besar mahasiswa yang diperiksa itu sedang

belajar di Universitas Udayana (Unud). "Penyidikan masih berlangsung, jadi tunggu saja," ujar sumber itu.

Kependam Udayana, Letkol Inf. Anton Tompudong kepada Buana membenarkan adanya penangkapan dan pemeriksaan keenam mahasiswa asal Timtim. "Pemeriksaan terhadap mereka masih berlangsung," katanya. Anton tak memberi komentar tentang ditemukannya sejumlah senjata dan keterlibatan pihak asing terhadap mahasiswa itu. "Pokoknya mereka menyimpan barang yang tak layak dimiliki mahasiswa," kata Anton.

Sementara itu, Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi Timor Timur, Bennyto Bya, S.H. mengatakan, saat ini tinggal 26 orang yang ditahan berkaitan dengan insiden Dili 12 November lalu itu. Kepada Antara di Dili, Sabtu, Bennyto menambahkan, 8 petugas kejaksaan serta tiga petugas dari Jakarta bekerja sama dengan Polwil Dili dan Oditur Militer Dili, sedang mengusut peristiwa tersebut. ■ jkolpr

TO: PAT WALSH
FROM: DAVID BOURCHIER

Pat, here is a translation of parts of the INFIGHT statement. Given the (widening) suspicion about halal-ness of the student senate statement, I think we should perhaps highlight the Infight one instead. What do you reckon?

The trouble is that the fax stuffed up on the third page (your copy) Please give me a ring in the morning and send page three (onwards) again. Thanks.

PS Have you ever spent any time in PNG? Iwona and me just bought some non refundable tickets to Moresby for 2 Jan. Gulp. Any ideas where would be good to go? Not Blackwater refugee camp! Any idea what Wewak is like? Rabaul????
Cheers, David.

INFIGHT's statement on Human Rights Day, 10 December 1991

Extracts:

On 12 November 1991 the Dili Incident took place, resulting in the deaths of 20-80 people. Although the number of people killed in the Dili Incident is not as alarming as in the Tanjung Priok Incident, the Lampung Incident or in Aceh, it has forced the government and ABRI (the Armed Forces) to realise that worldwide concern for human rights is now has to be taken seriously.

...The international reaction indicates four important tendencies. First, that human rights, like the environment, has become a universal issue and a new form of worldwide solidarity. Second, that in essence, physical and economic development can no longer be seen as something separate from respect for the consistent implementation of human rights. Third, that we are leaving behind the era in which social and political ends can be achieved with brute force or firepower. Fourth, that the concept of the oligarch or authoritarian political rule is no longer popular, and that 'zero sum' notions of political power (totalitarianism) are no longer possible.

...In response to the general human rights situation in Indonesia, INFIGHT believes that the realisation of basic human rights in Indonesia demands:

1. That the government must respect the human rights principles that many other countries are concerned about and which are manifest in the United Nations' declaration of human rights. Simply reacting to world opinion on human rights issues has recently and will in the long term make it more difficult for Indonesia to participate in the building of a new world order. Rather than simply reacting, it would be better if the government tried to meet the demands of the global community on human right issues while actively looking for a contextual model.

2. That the government and ABRI should re-evaluate the prevailing security approach and the infrastructure that supports it. By actively involving the military apparatus to

solve political problems, the security approach merely delays a solution and in the long term does nothing to educate the society to generate its own independent sense of social stability. The lesson of the Dili incident, with all the events that preceded and followed from it, is that we should leave behind the era of armed force in favour of a politics which guarantees the genuine implementation of civil rights.

3. That the government and ABRI should adopt a realistic attitude toward the general world tendency to link indicators of development success with progress in implementing human rights and the desire of several countries to link economic assistance with the realisation of human rights in all recipient countries. Even though foreign aid gives rise to its own problems, we have to respect the wish of donor nations which do not want to see their economic aid being used indirectly to support the oppression of fascist regimes or to support armed violence in developing countries.

4. That the government and ABRI should be realistic in facing the fact that human rights are a universal issue and a form of worldwide solidarity. While accepting this as a real factor we can formulate realistic and comprehensive policies so that the political impact of mistakes in implementing the security approach or violations of human rights do not disrupt the economy and trade. The government and ABRI should keep things in perspective when they speak of 'foreign intervention' rather than using this term in a sporadic and ultimately counterproductive way. Economic aid, the arms trade, multilateral and bilateral cooperation could also be seen as foreign intervention. We should also be aware that Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 was achieved with the cooperation with foreign forces, namely those nations which showed solidarity with the independence of the Indonesian people.

5. That the government needs to abandon their reactive and defensive stance in the face of society's criticism and aim to uphold basic human rights. The government should also abandon its suspicion and stubbornness in responding to domestic pronouncements and events. The habit of looking for a dalang (puppeteer) and identifying hidden interests behind every pronouncement and event in society indicates that the regime is more interested in apportioning blame for the sake of distracting attention and avoiding a substantial resolution than taking responsibility for its actions and policies. In this transparent world, reactive and defensive attitudes only diminish international sympathy and make it all the more difficult to solve problems in a way consistent with People's Rights [English in original].

6. That in regard to the Dili Incident of 12 November 1991, the government needs to come to terms with the fact that East Timor remains an international issue. For the sake of our nation's dignity and standing, which we demonstrated by our support for the Bandung Declaration (the product of the 1955 Asia-Africa conference) the government must have the courage to consider and respond to

Assalamu'alaikum wr. wb.

Kepada Saudara-saudara seperjuangan !

Menanggapi perkembangan Nasional yang saudara-saudara sampaikan dalam berbagai kesempatan percakapan kepada kami selaku sesepuh; dan dalam rangka menghadapi tantangan-tantangan selanjutnya sebagai konsekwensi perjuangan demi menegakkan kehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas atas dasar dan dengan tujuan seperti termaktub dalam Pembukaan UUD Proklamasi 1945;

Maka dengan ini kami sampaikanlah Pandangan kami;


Semoga kiranya dapat sambutan kritis yang berjiwa penghayatan semangat meneruskan amal Perjuangan Proklamasi Kemerdekaan yang diucapkan 45 tahun yang lalu;


Haraplah saudara-saudara mengajukannya sebagai pemikiran kepada sesama teman seperjuangan, demikian juga kepada lembaga-lembaga berwenang Republik Indonesia, sebagaimana MPR telah meminta masukan dari masyarakat;

Wassalamu'alaikum wr. wb.

JAKARTA, 1 AUGUSTUS 1990
10 MUHARRAM 1411 H.


H.M. SANUSI HARDJADINATA


M. NATSIR


A.H. NASUTION

SAUDARA-SAUDARA SEPERJUANGAN !

1. Pada hari-hari ini kita semua bersama-sama mensyukuri dan mengenang Proklamasi Kemerdekaan oleh Dwitunggal Soekarno-Hatta Atas Nama Bangsa Indonesia 45 tahun yang lalu.

Dalam Pembukaan UUD Proklamasi dirisalahkan sbb.;

"Dan perjuangan pergerakan kemerdekaan Indonesia telah sampailah kepada saat yang berbahagia dengan selamat sentosa mengantarkan rakyat Indonesia ke depan pintu gerbang kemerdekaan negara Indonesia, yang merdeka, bersatu, berdaulat, adil dan makmur.

Atas berkat rahmat Allah Yang Maha Kuasa dan dengan didorongkan oleh keinginan luhur, supaya berkehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas, maka rakyat Indonesia menyatakan dengan ini kemerdekaanya." (garis bawah dari kami)

Disamping kita syukuri tercapainya kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia dan berbagai hasil upaya perjuangan dan upaya pembangunan seluruh bangsa selama ini, sejak dari perang kemerdekaan ke penegakan keutuhan Republik Indonesia tercinta sampai pada pembangunan kini (a.l. Pemilu berkala, pertumbuhan ekonomi, swasembada beras, KB dll); tetapi kita juga prihatin terhadap kecenderungan berbagai kesenjangan sosial, jurang antara kaya-miskin yang semakin berkembang dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara kita.

Dalam hubungan ini telah memasyarakat berbagai macam istilah yang penuh mengandung makna yang mencerminkan perasaan masyarakat (a.l. pungli, keangkuhan kekuasaan, monopoli, oligopoli, konglomerat, penggusuran si miskin, DPR tidak berungsi dll.)

Sedang di sisi lain dunia di luar kita tengah dilanda oleh perkembangan yang mengarah kepada perubahan besar yang sangat mendasar: pembaharuan, demokratisasi, globalisasi dll.

2. Sesungguhnya tersusunnya suatu kehidupan yang lebih baik, amatlah ditentukan oleh adanya suatu tatanan sistem politik yang sehat.

Kita berkeyakinan, bahwa sistem politik yang terkandung dalam UUD Proklamasi itulah sistem politik yang dapat memberikan tatanan yang diperlukan itu, dalam Pembukaan dicantumkan sbb.:

" Republik Indonesia yang berkedaulatan rakyat dengan berdasar kepada: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, Persatuan Indonesia, dan Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmah kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan, serta dengan mewujudkan suatu Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. " (garis bawah dari kami).

Demi untuk kembali tertegaknya tatanan itu pulalah, Orde Baru bertekad supaya semua lembaga-lembaga permusyawaratan/perwakilan dibentuk dengan Pemilihan Umum yang bersifat langsung, umum, bebas dan rahasia (TAP. MPRS XI/1966).

Koreksi total telah kita ikrarkan pada kebangkitan Orde Baru 25 tahun yang lalu. Penegakan sistem politik demokrasi Pancasila telah dirinci dalam pidato Pejabat Presiden Soeharto di depan DPR tanggal 16 Agustus 1987, dan yang telah dapat dukungan dari kita bersama. Koreksi total yang terutama ditujukan terhadap pemusatan kekuasaan yang berada disatu tangan, yang dalam penyelenggaraannya ditandai oleh a.l.: Pelanggaran hak-hak dasar rakyat, dan penyalahgunaan kekuasaan demi kepentingan sejumlah kecil orang.

Selanjutnya Pejabat Presiden Soeharto berkata: "Penyelewengan serius terhadap UUD 1945 terjadi dengan memusatnya kekuasaan secara mutlak pada satu tangan, yaitu pada Kepala Negara. Asas dan sendi Negara Hukum lambat laun ditinggalkan, sehingga akhirnya menjadi negara yang berdasarkan kekuasaan. Asas dan sendi sistem konstitusi, dalam praktek berubah sehingga bersifat absolutisme". (garis bawah dari kami)

Pangkal tolak demokrasi Pancasila adalah kekeluargaan dan gotong royong, karena itu demokrasi Pancasila tidak mengenal kemutlakan golongan, baik kemutlakan ekonomi, dan atau kemutlakan karena kekuasaan maupun kemutlakan karena besarnya jumlah suara.

Kehidupan demokrasi Pancasila tidak boleh diarahkan semata-mata untuk mengejar kemenangan dan kepentingan pribadi atau golongannya sendiri. Apalagi jika ditujukan untuk mematikan golongan lain selama golongan tsb. termasuk dalam warga Orde Baru yang mengamalkan Pancasila dan UUD Proklamasi yang semurni-murninya dan selurus-lurusnya.

Asas demokrasi Pancasila sebenarnya telah diatur secara konstitusional, yakni prinsip yang mengikut sertakan semua golongan yang mempunyai kepentingan dalam kehidupan kenegaraan dan kemasyarakatan dengan jalan musyawarah untuk mufakat.

Pemilu adalah tata penentuan kehendak rakyat. Dalam demokrasi kita itu berarti penentuan haluan apa yang akan dipakai oleh Republik Indonesia untuk lima tahunan mendatang (UUD ps. 3); dan menentukan pemilihan siapa yang dipercaya untuk jadi "mandataris" (Pemerintah).

Dalam penyelenggaraan Republik sampai sekarang masih nyata adanya kesenjangan, masih jauh dari tujuan semula Proklamasi Kemerdekaan, karena MPR yang dimaksud sebagai lembaga pemangku kedaulatan rakyat ternyata barulah berisi 40% sebagai hasil pemilu langsung; sedang 33% adalah dipilih/diangkat oleh Presiden; adapun yang selebihnya ialah hasil penunjukan.

Adapun calon-calon yang diajukan dalam pemilu-pemilu berkala selama ini haruslah terlebih dahulu melalui suatu sistem skrining yang ketat oleh pemerintah. Jadi semua pemilu yang telah berlangsung secara berkala dan yang diselenggarakan oleh pemerintah Orde Baru belum cukup untuk dapat berfungsi sebagai sarana kedaulatan rakyat secara hakiki.

Pelaksanaan pemilu tersebut belumlah cukup "luber". Yang dipilih sebenarnya adalah partai/Golkar. Hanya Golkar, PPP, PDI saja yang sah sebagai Organisasi Peserta Pemilu (OPP). Karena itu sebagai OPP hanya Golkar/PPP/PDI yang menentukan siapa orangnya yang akan dicalonkan - kemudian dilanjutkan dengan skrining oleh pemerintah. Jadi yang dapat maju sebagai calon dalam pemilu ialah hanya mereka yang telah lulus oleh skrining pemerintah.

Organisasi Peserta Pemilu/OPP (Golkar/PPP/PDI) belum dapat mewujudkan kekuatan rakyat yang sebenarnya sebagaimana dikehendaki oleh UUD Proklamasi seperti tsb. dalam pasal 1, pasal 27, pasal 28, karena pelaksanaan UUD Proklamasi secara murni, konsekwen, dan normalisasi konstitusional masih perlu terus diperjuangkan.

Kondisi seperti ini jadi subur sebagai peluang untuk melancarkan berbagai rekayasa oleh pihak kekuasaan, atau oleh aparatnya atau oleh oknumnya apa lagi mengingat budaya paternalis, pengaruh pejabat dll. masih kuat; maka cara rekayasa nampak berjalan seiring.

Dalam kemajemukan masyarakat kita masih luas golongan aspirasi yang belum tertampung oleh PDI/PPP/GOLKAR sebagai lembaga yang hanya diberi hak pengemban mutlak aspirasi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. Barulah kalau partisipasi telah cukup luas, maka dapat tertegakkan ketentuan-ketentuan UUD Proklamasi tentang penjelmaan kedaulatan rakyat, yakni terwakilinya seluruh rakyat, seluruh golongan, seluruh daerah (penjelasan UUD; garis bawah dari kami).

Adapun tentang kualitas pemilu semestinya ketentuan-ketentuan konstitusional UUD yang satu-satunya jadi takaran ukur. Secara substansial UUD dalam psl. 1 yang menentukan, bahwa " kedaulatan adalah di tangan rakyat "; di pasal 27 dicantumkan, bahwa " segala warga negara bersamaan kedudukannya di dalam hukum dan pemerintahan dan wajib menjunjung hukum dan pemerintahan itu dengan tidak ada kecualinya "; serta dalam pasal 28 yang menegaskan, bahwa ada " kemerdekaan berserikat dan berkumpul, mengeluarkan pikiran dengan lisan dan tulisan dan sebagainya... ".

3. Kesemua hal itu hanya dapat tertegak apabila telah dapat terlaksana normalisasi konstitusional secara komplit dan tidak sepotong-sepotong; sebagaimana tekad kita dulu dalam TAP. MPRS No. IX/1966, yakni harus rampung setelah " terbentuknya MPR hasil pemilu "; dalam hal ini ialah tahun 1973.

Namun proses normalisasi konstitusional itu belum rampung; karena berlakunya Kewenangan darurat ekstra konstitusional selama ini.

Pada tahun 1988 memang benar bahwa pemerintah telah mengumumkan berakhirnya kekuasaan darurat yang diberlakukan oleh Presiden Soekarno sejak peristiwa G 30 S/PKI dalam tahun 1965; namun masih ada kekuasaan yang tak terbatas dan mempunyai sifat darurat di tangan Presiden berdasarkan TAP. MPR No. VI/MPR/1988; sedang yang benar ialah UUD Proklamasi kita yang mengikuti adanya asas pengaturan dalam keadaan damai dan pengaturan dalam keadaan darurat.

Diharapkan jika tidak ada lagi kewenangan darurat seperti itu, lanjutannya nanti ialah dengan secara berangsur-angsur akan dapatlah diproses normalisasi konstitusional; khususnya dalam hal penegakan kembali norma-norma demokrasi dan hak-hak warga negara yang dalam kedaruratan memang ada kalanya dibatasi; padahal sebenarnya demokrasi dan hak warga negara mutlak amat diperlukan untuk pengelolaan dinamik perubahan yang merupakan anak kandung dari dinamika masyarakat itu sendiri, secara demokratis, teratur dan terbuka sebagaimana ketentuan UUD Proklamasi (penjelasan ps1 3).

Kami yakin, bahwa tanpa tertegakkannya demokrasi politik menurut UUD secara konsekwen, tidak pula dapat tertegakkan demokrasi ekonomi menurut pasal 33 UUD; demikian juga halnya dengan demokrasi-demokrasi aspek lain yang juga tercantum dalam UUD Proklamasi: Pengawasan efektif dari wakil-wakil rakyat (DPR dll) terhadap kebijaksanaan pemerintah tidak dapat dilaksanakan; Tertib hukum tidak pula dapat ditegakkan sebagaimana semestinya sehingga mengakibatkan kesenjangan-kesenjangan sosial, ekonomi, politik dllnya. Bahkan kesenjangan antara yang formal dan yang kenyataan sehari-hari malah semakin berlarut yang pada gilirannya dan pada waktunya dapat merupakan bahan eksplosivitas dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara kita.

Hanyalah dengan cara kebersamaan kita semua dalam menangani berbagai ketimpangan itu keadaan dapat diatasi, diperbaiki, ditata kembali tanpa mengundang gejolak sosial.

AMPERA memerlukan demokrasi dan hukum secara mutlak. Kehidupan demokratis tidak akan terwujud tanpa tertegakkannya prinsip "kebersamaan kedudukan dlm hukum" (pasal 27 UUD). Di pihak lain hukum tidak akan tertegakkan tanpa adanya kontrol demokratis yang efektif.

4. Justru pada saat-saat sekarang ini di mana kita sedang berada di ambang peralihan generasi kepemimpinan dan di ambang pembangunan nasional taraf kedua serta diiringi dengan pesatnya dinamika perkembangan dunia, yang berinti demokrasi, globalisasi dll; maka perlu kesungguh-sungguhan kita semua dengan cara kebersamaan merenungkan hal-hal tersebut di atas demi kekonsistenan kita semua untuk dengan cara kebersamaan pula merealisasikan tujuan dan cita-cita Proklamasi Kemerdekaan yang diucapkan 45 tahun yang lalu.

Kami tetap yakin, sebagaimana yakinnya para pendiri Republik Indonesia 45 tahun yang lalu, dan sebagaimana pula Orde Baru 25 tahun yang lalu menekadkan pula keyakinannya, bahwa "kehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas" demi Indonesia yang "adil dan makmur" barulah dapat tertegakkan apabila terwujud secara nyata demokrasi politik dan demokrasi ekonomi.

Untuk itu perlulah kita mawas diri dan menangani persoalan kesenjangan dengan cara kebersamaan sebagaimana yang kita hayati dan amalkan pada masa proklamasi. Kita semua sebagai warga negara tak mungkin pula terlepas dari moralita ikut dalam melaksanakan tugas kepala negara yang ditentukan oleh UUD Proklamasi dalam pasal 9 UUD (Sumpah Presiden/Wakil Presiden yang berbunyi:

" Demi Allah, saya bersumpah akan memenuhi kewajiban Presiden Republik Indonesia (Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia) dengan sebaik-baiknya dan seadil-adilnya, memegang teguh Undang-undang Dasar dan menjalankan segala Undang-undang dan peraturannya dengan selurus-lurusnya serta berbakti kepada Nusa dan Bangsa ".

Sehubungan dengan semua yang telah diuraikan di atas, maka adalah sangat wajar dan merupakan suatu keharusan untuk:

1. Diakhiri selekasnya kewenangan darurat ekstra konstitusional dan beserta semua unsur-unsur terkaitnya yang masih tertinggal, sehingga dapatlah tertegakkan normalisasi konstitusional dengan sepenuhnya (pelaksanaan Pancasila dan UUD Proklamasi secara murni penuh dan konsekwen penuh).
2. Semua lembaga permusyawaratan/perwakilan hanya disusun dengan cara pemilu belaka (luber); dan harus diberfungsikan menurut kemurnian pelaksanaan UUD Proklamasi. Khusus MPR supaya terbentuk sesuai ketentuan dalam penjelasan UUD Proklamasi: " Supaya seluruh rakyat, seluruh golongan, dan daerah mempunyai wakil dalam Majelis, sehingga Majelis ini dapat dianggap sebagai penjelmaan rakyat ".
3. Dirubah dan disesuaikan perundang-undangan dan peraturan yang bersangkutan secara konstitusional, di mana perlu secara bertahap, dan dengan masa peralihan, namun hendaklah dalam tempo sesingkatnya.-

Hendaknya kita janganlah sekedar ingin mengejar ketertinggalan dari negara-negara maju, melainkan selaku orang beriman tentunya kita ingin supaya tercipta keserasian hidup spiritual dan material dalam masyarakat yang bermartabat dengan ridho Allah.

Kita yakin, bahwa hanya ridhoNya-lah yang mampu mengantarkan kita pada kebahagiaan hakiki dunia akhirat.

INSYA ALLAH !


JAKARTA, 1 AUGUSTUS 1990
10 MUHARRAM 1411 H.



H.M. SANUSI HARDJADINATA



H. NATEK



A.H. NASUTION

Jakarta, 14 Agustus 1990

Kepada Yth.

Pimpinan dan para anggota MPR/DPR
di
Jakarta

Dengan hormat.

Memenuhi himbauan pimpinan MPR kepada masyarakat sebagaimana dimuat oleh media massa pada tanggal 22 Januari 1990, dengan ini kami sampaikan hal-hal sebagai berikut:

1. Setelah memantau dengan saksama pemikiran-pemikiran yang hidup dalam masyarakat, antara lain dengan mengadakan percakapan-percakapan dengan tiga sesepuh/tokoh masyarakat, yakni Bapak Moh. Natsir, Bapak Moh. Sanusi Hardjadinata, dan Bapak Jenderal (Pur) A.H. Nasution, maka kepada kami telah disampaikan pemikiran beliau-beliau itu, tertuang dalam surat terlampir, yang ditujukan kepada saudara-saudara seperjuangan di manapun mereka berada, termasuk yang berada dalam lembaga-lembaga permusyawaratan/perwakilan.
2. Isi surat tersebut adalah suatu penilaian atas penyelenggaraan kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara, yang menurut ketiga tokoh masyarakat tersebut, telah tidak sejalan dengan tekad mengamalkan Pancasila secara murni dan melaksanakan UUD 1945 secara konsekuen. Ketiga tokoh masyarakat tersebut selanjutnya mengemukakan langkah-langkah yang bersifat kenegarawanan yang perlu dilakukan guna meluruskan kembali perjalanan bangsa dan negara RI pada jalur Pancasila dan UUD 1945.
3. Setelah kami mempelajari secara saksama isi surat tiga tokoh masyarakat tersebut di atas, kami berkesimpulan bahwa hal-hal yang telah dikemukakan oleh ketiga tokoh masyarakat tersebut adalah benar. Oleh karena itu kami yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini menyatakan dukungan sepenuhnya atas hal-hal yang telah dikemukakan oleh ketiga tokoh masyarakat tersebut, dengan harapan semoga pimpinan dan para anggota MPR/DPR dapat pula memahami dan menerimanya dengan penuh kearifan.
4. Jika selama ini timbul suara-suara bahwa MPR/DPR kurang berfungsi sebagaimana layaknya lembaga permusyawaratan/ perwakilan rakyat, maka hal itu tidak dapat dipertanggungjawabkan kepada anggota-anggotanya semata-mata, melainkan pada sistemnya, yakni sistem penataan kehidupan politik secara keseluruhan.
5. Sistem seperti itu terwujud dan diberlakukan karena adanya kewenangan-kewenangan darurat ekstra konstitusional yang dijalankan oleh Presiden Soeharto selama hampir seperempat abad, sejak tahun 1967; kewenangan-kewenangan darurat itu setiap sidang MPR senantiasa diperbaharui, dan terakhir dengan TAP MPR No. VI/MPR/1988, sedangkan UUD 1945 pada dasarnya mengatur keadaan damai dengan tidak mengabaikan pengaturan keadaan darurat.
6. Kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara seperti itu telah mengakibatkan terjadinya kesenjangan-kesenjangan sosial politik dan sosial ekonomi yang makin lama makin melebar, sehingga dikhawatirkan dapat menimbulkan gejolak-gejolak sosial.

7. Hanya dengan kebersamaanlah semuanya itu dapat diatasi sebaik-baiknya menuju normalisasi kehidupan konstitusional.

Berdasarkan pemikiran tersebut di atas, kami menyetujui pendapat ketiga tokoh masyarakat tersebut, bahwa haruslah:

1. Diakhiri selekasnya kewenangan-kewenangan darurat ekstra konstitusional.
2. Semua lembaga permusyawaratan/perwakilan disusun dengan Pemilu belaka dan difungsikan menurut kemurnian pelaksanaan UUD 1945.

Untuk itu, diperlukan usaha-usaha pembaruan dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara, antara lain sebagai berikut:

1. Memasyarakatkan kehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas dengan antara lain, menumbuhkan keberanian untuk menilai secara terbuka pengamalan Pancasila dan pelaksanaan UUD 1945 dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara oleh penguasa dan lembaga kenegaraan lainnya.
2. Meninjau kembali sebelum Pemilu 1992 berbagai Ketetapan/Keputusan MPR, Undang-Undang dan peraturan pelaksanaannya serta tata tertib MPR/DPR/DPRD yang tidak selaras dengan hakekat dan jiwa kedaulatan rakyat, supaya hak-hak demokratis dan hak-hak asasi rakyat dipulihkan kembali secara wajar sesuai dengan UUD 1945.
3. Mengadakan pergeseran dalam strategi pembangunan sehingga benar-benar mengarah pada keinginan luhur rakyat, dengan lebih banyak mendengar pendapat umum, berorientasi kepada kepentingan rakyat kecil dan keadilan sosial, serta menunjukkan kepercayaan kepada potensi nasional.
4. Mewajibkan pemerintah untuk mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, pertama-tama dalam arti mengikis jiwa budak dan menumbuhkan kehidupan kejiwaan yang merdeka guna meniadakan rasa takut serta kemudian menumbuhkan harga diri bangsa dan warga negara.
5. Karena Presiden Soeharto sudah memangku jabatannya selama lima kali masa jabatan berturut-turut sehingga akan seperempat abad pada tahun 1993, maka untuk memungkinkan usaha-usaha pembaruan, seharusnya dianggap sudah lebih dari cukup, dan selanjutnya ditetapkan bagi presiden-presiden berikutnya pembatasan masa jabatan hanya untuk dua kali masa jabatan saja.
6. Agar usaha-usaha pembaruan itu dihayati sebagai suatu kesungguhan dan tanggungjawab bersama.

Dan karena merasa terpanggil dalam usaha-usaha pembaruan seperti yang dikemukakan di atas, kami mengambil prakarsa menumbuhkan Solidaritas untuk menghidupkan kembali demokrasi (kedaulatan rakyat) dalam suasana keterbukaan.

Semoga atas dorongan niat luhur untuk membela bangsa dan negara proklamasi Republik Indonesia 17 Agustus 1945, kita semua - segenap bangsa - ikut tergugah tanpa kecuali, untuk mengadakan pembaruan secara konstitusional.

Tembusan surat ini disampaikan juga kepada:

1. Presiden dan Wakil Presiden RI.
2. Pimpinan Lembaga Tinggi Negara lainnya.
3. Para Menteri Kabinet Pembangunan V.
4. Pimpinan Parpol/Golkar.
5. Pimpinan Organisasi Kemasyarakatan.
6. Pimpinan Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat.
7. Media Massa.

Kami yang menandatangani:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Prof.DR. Deliar Noer | 2. Abdul Madjid |
| 3. Dr. Marsillam Simanjuntak | 4. H.J.C. Princen |
| 5. Drs. Hoegeng (Jenderal Pol.Pur) | 6. H.Ali Sadikin (Letjen Mar-Pur) |
| 7. Dr. Azis Saleh (Mayjen TNI-Pur) | 8. Suyitno Sukirno (Marsekal Pertama-Pur) |
| 9. H.M. Ch. Ibrahim | 10. Ir. Slamet Bratanata |
| 11. Drs. Wachdiat Sukardi | 12. Drs. Chris Siner Key Timu |
| 13. M. Rajab Ranggasoli | 14. Bangun Yudhi |
| 15. DR. Anwar Harjono, SH | 16. Ny. T. Azis Saleh |
| 17. H. Didi Rubidy Tisnasenjaya | 18. Ir. S. Indro Tjahjono |
| 19. Sudjana Oyo BChk | 20. Agus Edy Santoso |
| 21. K.H. S u j a i | 22. K.H. Rusli Abdulwahid |
| 23. S a h i A d i | 24. M. J u n u s |
| 25. A s i k i n | 26. Drs. Achmadi S. |
| 27. Dr. D. Ch. Suriadiredja | 28. Iskandar Marzuki |
| 29. Darsjaf Rahman St. Kalifah | 30. Wem Kaunang |
| 31. Drs. Zakaria Raib | 32. Djukardi S.M. |
| 33. Abdulrahman Sy. | 34. Hamid Husein S.H. |
| 35. Rinda Desianti | 36. S o l i c h i n |
| 37. Dyah D.Iskandar | 38. W u l i o a d i |
| 39. A. Rachman Madrais | 40. S. E n a s |
| 41. A. Maksum S.H. | 42. Sy. M. Madiaras |
| 43. A. Zainuddin | 44. M. A b b a s |
| 45. Khalad Malisi | 46. Erik Pattinama |
| 47. H.S. Syadali | 48. D.N. S y a h r i s |
| 49. S. Suparman | 50. M. Hasib Sa'rani |
| 51. N. Mastur | 52. S u t i s n a D. |
| 53. G. D a m a n H. | 54. T.B. Bunyamin M.N. |
| 55. S. S a p e i | 56. Muhamad C. Anas |
| 57. Hendar di | 58. Drs. Paulus Baut |

SENT BY: GRAMEDIA-MAJALAH

: 11-20-91 : 17:29 :

JAKARTA JAKARTA-

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INi Stokemauk demo KNPI
di depan Kedubes Australia pk 13.00
- 13.30 tadi

knpi



To: David Boorchior

No Fax: 61-3-534-6060

dewan pengurus pusat - komite nasional pemuda indonesia
Indonesian national youth council - central board
Kompleks GEMA Jl. Rasuna Seld Kuningan/ Telp. 612811, 614347 Jakarta 12050 P.O. Box 2534

**PERNYATAAN SIKAP KOMITE NASIONAL PEMUDA INDONESIA
ATAS TINDAKAN TIDAK BERSAHABAT MASYARAKAT AUSTRALIA
TERHADAP REPUBLIK INDONESIA
DI KBRI CANBERRA**

Bangsa Indonesia amat meninggikan persatuan, ketertiban dan perdamaian dunia. Hal ini tersurat dalam Pembukaan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 bahwa salah satu tujuan Negara Indonesia adalah ikut melaksanakan perdamaian dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial.

Dengan semangat ini bangsa Indonesia menjunjung tinggi sikap bersahabat dan hormat menghormati kehidupan antar bangsa-bangsa di dunia. Sikap tersebut amat jelas dari seluruh sekap terjang Republik Indonesia di dunia internasional dalam usaha menghikmatikan usaha ketertiban dunia dan perdamaian abadi.

Itu juga yang menyebabkan bangsa Indonesia amat menghormati eksistensi masyarakat bangsa-bangsa lain. Penghormatan bangsa Indonesia terhadap masyarakat bangsa lain, harus pula diimbangi oleh sikap penghormatan yang sama atas keberadaan bangsa Indonesia.

Karena itu, tindakan yang tidak menghormati kepentingan dan keberadaan bangsa Indonesia termasuk yang dilakukan oleh sebahagian masyarakat Australia di Kantor Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia di Canberra, Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia di Sidney dan Demontrasi di Pusat Kota Adeleyde pada hari Sabtu dan Senin, tanggal 16 dan 18 November 1991 waktu setempat amat mengecewakan seluruh rakyat Indonesia, termasuk para Pemuda.

Dalam kaitan itu, maka Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) secara tegas dan keras memberikan reaksi sikapnya sebagai berikut:

1. Bahwa pemuda Indonesia merupakan bahagian yang tidak terpisahkan dari totalitas bangsanya, karena itu meraga bahwa sikap tindakan dan perlakuan masyarakat Australia di Komplek Kantor Kedutaan secara langsung telah mengusik dan menyudutkan secara sepihak harkat dan martabat bangsa bangsa Indonesia, yang sekaligus telah mengusik harga diri Pemuda Indonesia.
2. DPP KNPI berkesimpulan bahwa sikap dan perbuatan sekelompok masyarakat Australia di Komplek KBRI tersebut menunjukkan adanya sikap tidak bersahabat dan bermusuhan dari masyarakat Australia kepada rakyat bangsa Indonesia. Karena itu Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia mengutuk perlakuan tersebut.
3. Bahwa tindakan pengrusakan dan "Penurunan dan pembakaran Bendera Kebangsaan Indonesia MERAH PUTIH" oleh masyarakat Australia di KBRI Sidney dan di Pusat Kota Adelaide tanggal 16 November 1991 adalah amat brutal dan menghina bangsa dan negara kami.

SENT BY: GRAMEDIA-MAJALAH

; 11-20-91 ; 17:31 ;

JAKARTA JAKARTA→

; # 2

-2-

4. Bahwa peristiwa pemblokadean KBRI tersebut adalah sikap bermusuhan masyarakat Australia terhadap bangsa Indonesia, karena itu apapun yang dilakukan masyarakat Australia tersebut mutlak menjadi tanggung jawab Pemerintah Australia. Dan atas dasar itu Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia meminta pertanggungjawaban dari Pemerintah Australia.
5. Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia beranggapan bahwa apabila Pemerintah Australia tidak dapat menindak secara tegas pelaku tindakan yang bermusuhan dan tidak bertanggung jawab tersebut, maka Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia beranggapan bahwa Pemerintah Australia ikut mendalangi Peristiwa tersebut.

Demikian Pernyataan Sikap kami.

Jakarta, 20 November 1991.

DIWAN PENGURUS PUSAT
KOMITE NASIONAL PEMUDA INDONESIA

Ketua Umum,

Sekretaris Jenderal,

TJAHYO KUMOLO

BAMBANG SUMEDI



Tembusan disampaikan Kepada Yth :

1. Ketua Majelis Pemuda Indonesia
2. Pimpinan Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Pemuda Tingkat Nasional.
3. Ketua DPD KNPI Tingkat I se-Indonesia.



YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA
INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION

JL. DIPONEGORO 74, JAKARTA 10320, TELEPON 3105518 - 4214226 - 4214227, FAX. : 330140

No.: 426/SK/YLBHI/XI/1991.

Jakarta, 13 Nopember 1991.

Kepada Yth.
 Jendral Try Sutrisno
 Panglima ABRI
 Mabes ABRI Cilangkap
 Jl. Raya Hankam, Cilangkap
 JAWA BARAT

Dengan Hormat,

Menyusuli surat kami tertanggal 12 Nopember 1991 tentang terjadinya kerusuhan berturut-turut di Dilli, Timor Timur pada tanggal 28 Oktober 1991 dan tanggal 12 Nopember 1991, serta informasi tambahan yang masuk pada kami dan membaca pemberitaan pers tanggal 13 Nopember 1991, mempertegas kebenaran tentang terjadinya kerusuhan dan kekerasan yang mengakibatkan tewasnya sejumlah penduduk sipil, bersama ini Yayasan LBH Indonesia kembali mendesak kepada Bapak selaku Panglima ABRI untuk:

1. Guna memenuhi hak-hak masyarakat atas informasi yang obyektif terhadap kebenaran yang faktual atas kejadian yang memprihatinkan tersebut, serta guna menentukan langkah penyelesaian yang sesuai dengan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, adalah pada tempatnya segera dibentuk suatu Komisi Fact Finding Independen yang beranggotakan kalangan pemerintah, profesi hukum serta Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat yang bekerja mengumpulkan fakta secara lengkap dan bertanggungjawab. Untuk kepentingan tersebut, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum sebagai lembaga independen bersedia untuk berpartisipasi dalam komisi termaksud.
2. Mengumumkan kepada publik hasil-hasil Komisi Fact Finding tersebut secara terbuka dan jujur.
3. Mengusut pihak-pihak yang melakukan pelanggaran hukum sesuai prosedur hukum yang berlaku.
4. Menghadapkan kemuka pengadilan tanpa terkecuali pihak-pihak yang terbukti melanggar hukum dengan menganut prinsip-prinsip peradilan yang adil, obyektif dan terbuka (*fair trial*).
5. Memberikan perlindungan maksimum terhadap warga masyarakat sipil tidak berdosa sehingga mereka dapat terhindar dari tindakan-tindakan kekerasan atau tindakan-tindakan *extra legal* lain.
6. Agar proses pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat dapat dijalankan sesuai ketentuan-ketentuan hukum acara pidana yang berlaku, memenuhi prosedur-prosedur hukum yang ada (*due process of law*) dan dijalankan secara taat asas supaya tidak mengganggu sendi-sendi negara hukum kita.

YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA

Langkah-langkah yang didasarkan pada pendekatan kekerasan dalam proses penyelesaian masalah niscaya mengundang konsekuensi tidak saja bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip hukum yang berlaku, akan tetapi juga mengundang lahirnya kerawanan-kerawanan sosial yang baru.

Demikian, atas perhatian Bapak atas persoalan ini, kami ucapkan terima kasih.

Hormat kami,
Dewan Pengurus
YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA

YAYASAN
LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM
INDONESIA

ABDUL HAKIM G. NUSANTARA, SH, LL.M
Ketua

Tembusan:

1. Ketua DPR/MPR, Bapak Kharis Soehoed.
2. Menteri Koordinasi Bidang Politik dan Keamanan, Bapak Soedomo.
3. Menteri Dalam Negeri, Bapak Rudini.
4. Pangdam IX Udayana, Mayjen TNI Sintong Panjaitan.
5. Arsip.

AHN:rw.



YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA
INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION

JL. DIPONEGORO 74, JAKARTA 10320, TELEPON 3105518 - 4214226 - 4214227, FAX. : 330140

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Panglima ABRI
Mabes ABRI Cilangkap
Jl. Raya Hankam, Cilangkap
JAWA BARAT

Dengan Hormat,

Kami baru saja memperoleh berita bahwa pada tanggal 11 Nopember 1991, di saat prosesi penguburan dua orang korban kerusuhan dua minggu silam di salah satu pemakaman Dili, telah terjadi penyerangan bersenjata terhadap para pe-
layat yang mengakibatkan korban tewas sejumlah kurang lebih 115 orang. Para pelaku tindakan tersebut diduga keras berasal dari aparat-aparat ABRI se-
tempat.

Berkenaan dengan hal tersebut di atas, kami meminta pada Bapak selaku Panglima ABRI untuk:

1. Membentuk tim verifikasi yang menyelidiki kebenaran yang faktual atas kejadian yang sungguh memprihatinkan itu.
2. Mengumumkan kepada publik hasil-hasil verifikasi tersebut secara terbuka dan jujur.

Demikian, atas perhatian Bapak kami ucapkan terima kasih.

Hormat kami,
Dewan Pengurus
YAYASAN LBH INDONESIA

YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA

ABDUL HAKIM G. NUSANTARA, SH, LL.M
K e t u a

AHN:rw.

TO: Pat Walsh
FROM: David Bouchier
10 Graylings Grove
St Kilda
Victoria 3183
AUSTRALIA

Phone/Fax: (03) 534 6060
(Ring first to fax)

1 January 1992

Pat, here are a couple of things off Pegasus. Sorry I didn't ring before setting off to New Guinea, but I'll pass on your regards to Leo. I'll take him some whisky as well as the Timor stuff. All the best, David.

Source: Original document.

Date: 26 Dec 91.

Story Type: 16-page report.

Original Language: Indonesian.

Dateline: Jakarta.

Byline: Signed by 7 members of KPN.

Text: Digest and verbatim excerpts. Excerpts appear in quotes.

Brief Remark: Occasional annotations appear in brackets.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION

12 NOVEMBER 1991 INCIDENT IN DILI

Held 5 meetings with Governor Carrasacalo. Held 4 meetings with Bishop Belo, also held meetings with Fathers Alberto Ricardo da Silva, Albrecht Kareem, Markus Wanandi, Locatelli, Jose Carbonell, and Jose Antonio da Costa. Held 5 meetings with East Timor Operations Execution Commander [Pangkolakops] Brig. Gen. Warouw, several times with his staff. Met with Udayana Military Area Commander Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan in Denpasar. Meetings and interviews with 132 witnesses. Visited Wira Husada Military Hospital, Dili Central Public Hospital, several community health centres [puskesmas], and police [sic, not Army] detention centres.

Found about 70 bullet holes on the wall and entrance to the Santa Cruz graveyard, on trees, and on electricity poles.

Examined the Hera public cemetery. Exhumed 1 of 18 [sic] graves of the casualties, found the victim in a coffin, fully clothed in accord with the Catholic faith. Clearly, only one body in that grave. Excavated locations around Hera, Pasir Putih, Tasi Tolu [sic] and Tibar on the basis of information obtained from the public that these places contained mass graves of the 12 November incident. No proof obtained of graves at these locations. [Tasi Tolu is a notorious graveyard. No further details whatsoever provided on excavations in these additional sites.]

Since integration, Dili urbanized, population grown from 25,000 to 124,284 out of East Timor's total of 755,950. Development produced "quite a lot" of primary and secondary school graduates who needed jobs, resulting in much youth unemployment. "This fact is one of the reasons the young generation could be persuaded by the propaganda of the anti-integration group/Fretilin security disrupters. Some of them consciously became core actors in the demonstration in addition to youth who just joined in and those forced [sic] to join the demonstration."

"The Fretilin remnants have been increasingly pressed and weakened. So they changed their pattern of operation from forest guerrillas to town guerrillas [gerilya kota], using every available opportunity to create confusion and acts of terror [sic] and to attract the attention of the international world to prove their existence. The only hope of

the Fretilin security disrupters to remain in existence and support the East Timorese people is the hope of aid from abroad, both from Fretilin security disrupter remnants abroad and other anti-Indonesia [sic] groups abroad." [This paragraph is a typical one equating the resistance with Fretilin, whereas especially among the youth affiliation with or affinity for any of the old Timorese parties is secondary, residual, or non-existent. The Indonesian military, and here the military-led KPN, cannot concede -- and perhaps cannot conceive -- that the resistance is nationalist and non-party in character. This holds for the resistance abroad as well.]

Six incidents which the commission considers a "prologue" to the 12 November incident are recounted, covering the 1989-1991 period. 1989 - 20 youth with anti-integration posters demonstrate after Pope John Paul II concludes mass during his 12 October visit. Stones thrown by 50 youths at 2 officers in Dili on 4 November. 1990 - 50 youths demonstrate at Hotel Turismo during US Ambassador Monjo's visit on 17 January, with subsequent marches around Dili of 250 demonstrators on 18 and 19 January. Demonstration by 200 anti-integration youths carrying the Fretilin flag after the mass commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Dili diocese on 4 September. Damage to a state lower secondary school and vehicle of security officer there on 8 October by anti-integration youths using the Externato school as the base of their activities. Blows by a student of Santo Paulo lower secondary school in Dili against a security officer who erased writing and took posters rejecting Pancasila, efforts to seize his weapon and later to take down the Indonesian flag in the schoolyard on 15 October. 1991 - Fight among anti- and pro-integration youths in the Motael church complex "resulting in the death of Sebastiao Gomes from the anti-integration group and Afonso Gomes from the pro-integration group on 28 October." [Here the commission displays its bias by acknowledging no brutality, much less atrocity, by any ABRI member in Dili over the course of 3 years. The 28 October killings are seriously distorted. Why there were no mass shootings of youths in the earlier large demonstrations is not explained.]

After cancellation of the visit by the Portuguese parliamentary delegations, preparations already undertaken were shifted toward a demonstration making use of the "momentum" of a mass and strewing of flowers on Sebastiao Gomes' grave on 12 November and the visit of Prof. Kooijmans. "Based on the statements of witnesses and data obtained, several foreigners actively participated in the demonstration." Fretilin's role in the demonstration was "proved" by the Fretilin and Falantil flags, Nationalist Convergence symbol, anti-integration banners, and pictures of "Fretilin leader Xanana." During their march to the graveyard "in a disorderly and wild atmosphere, demonstrators stabbed Major Gerhan Lantara, Deputy Commander of Battalion 700 concurrently an officer in the Sector C [Dili] Intelligence Section." [Here the commission, in a pattern evident throughout its report, chooses not to deal with accounts widely available in Indonesia's major newsmagazines. Editor, for example, reported that Gerhan was stabbed only after he punched a female demonstrator and tried to grab the flag or banner she was carrying.]

The marchers joined with a large crowd which had gathered earlier in the graveyard. There are "2 versions" about warning shots. Several witnesses say these occurred once or twice, while several say shots were just fired directly into the crowd without any warning shots. [There is no effort to weigh the validity of the differing versions.]

There are "3 versions" of the shooting at the crowd. Some say shots were fired directly at the crowd by security personnel in anti-riot formation. [This is the account attested to by the early foreign eyewitness reports.] Some say the shooting occurred only after a fight and efforts to seize weapons and the throwing of a grenade at security personnel. [This is the pre-report official ABRI line.] In addition [and this is not necessarily

a third "version" but is compatible with the first two], "Some witnesses say the shooting was carried out by uncontrolled security personnel members not in orderly formation or uniform who were in a state of high emotion." "Besides the shooting, security personnel also carried out stabbing with sharp objects, beatings with blunt instruments, fisticuffs, and kicking against the demonstrators." [The commission later accepts fully only "version" 3 but comes close to accepting the validity of version 1. No military unit is identified here or anywhere in the report as culpable. Official accounts score Battalion 303's "involvement," while Indonesian reporters minimally identify not the 303rd but rather Gerhan Lantara's Battalion 700 as the main culprits.]

Warouw's command says 19 were known dead, but others cite figures of 50, 60, and even over 100.

Figures on the wounded taken to Wira Husada Military Hospital show that 42 had been shot, 14 stabbed, and 35 beaten. Actual figures may be higher because some victims may have fled and self-medicated. As of 14 December, 41 remained at Wira Husada, while the rest were returned to their families.

There are about 90 persons missing, according to witnesses and informants. Some may have died, been wounded, remain healthy, fled to the forest, or become refugees.

The commission has "quite strong reasons" for concluding the following. [TAPOL has previously posted its own translation of these conclusions. The key points are abbreviated here with an occasional slight variation in translation.]

The demonstration was "the peak" of a series of demonstrations and incidents "undertaken by Fretilin." The 12 November incident "clearly did not occur on the basis of an order or government or ABRI policy whether at the centre or at East Timor provincial level." The incident was "a disaster which should properly be regretted." The demonstrators carried out pre-meditated provocations by "the anti-integration group/Fretilin security disrupters and did not comprise an orderly and peaceful procession aimed at remembering the soul of Sebastiao Gomes." "Most" of the demonstrators were youth who acted "wildly, emotionally, and destructively," and "some are suspected of having been incited and long guided by the anti-integration group/Fretilin security disrupters." Some foreigners "actively participated in the demonstration." When tension peaked with the stabbing of an officer and recruit, the wildness of the crowd became provocative, and "it was felt resistance by the crowd could endanger the safety of their weapons and lives, there occurred a spontaneous reaction by soldiers not under command control to defend themselves and excessive firing was directed at the crowd." "Together with this, a group of security personnel members, disorderly and outside the chain of command, undertook shooting and brutality, increasing the casualties." In handling the "riot," while there were anti-riot units present, "the Commission finds that no use was made of optimal anti-riot procedures.

The actions of security personnel exceeded the limits of propriety, resulting in casualties, including dead, wounded, stabbed, and beaten persons." While the estimate of casualties given was 19 dead and 91 wounded, the Commission believes about 50 persons died and over 91 were wounded." The dead were not handled carefully and were not properly identified. Opportunities were not given to families and friends of the victims to identify them. The Commission believes that to uphold the law against all those involved in the 12 November incident and those suspected of violating the law, it is necessary to act and go through the operative Indonesian legal procedures based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Signatories: M. Djaelani SH, Chairman, Supreme Court judge. Members: Drs. Ben Man Reng Say, DPA (Supreme Advisory Council). Clementino dos Reis Amaral, DPR (People's Representative Council). Harisoegiman, (Interior Department). Drs. Hadi A. Wayarabi Alhadar (Foreign Affairs Department). Ant n Sujata (Foreign Affairs Department). Rear Admiral

To
00 61 3 416 2746
PAT. WINSUP
AUSTRALIA

From
NETHERLANDS
FAX

PH - PERMANENT NUMBER
OF OUR NEW HOME
AS OF TOMORROW.
020-6892208

3 PAGES FOLLOW

Hi Pat

I've heard you sent us a long fax, but we've been spending Xmas + new year at Saskia's Mums place so I'll pick up the fax tomorrow when we return to Amsterdam.

Here's our statement about the Preliminary Report. ~~we~~ I have sent it to - Green Ant - Chips MacInolty and he'll see if it can go to a newspaper.

I recently spoke with Bob Muntz - it sounds a bit worrying in Aust. with Aust groups not really pushing the East Timor issue hard enough. Especially now that governments can start to feel satisfied at "around 50" and not "19" - Anyway I will read your fax tomorrow and contact you next week.
note of strength
Russell.

EAST TIMOR
REACTION TO THE INDONESIAN INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS,
PRELIMINARY REPORT

The Preliminary Report by the Indonesian National Commission of Enquiry (KPN) into the Dili massacre is at worst a repetition of the military's unacceptable version and at best a genuine attempt to appease the watchful eye of the international community.

Two aspects in the Preliminary Report are important: the amount of deaths and the cause of the massacre.

" The number of casualties up to now is 19, the Commission thinks it has strong enough reason to believe that the number of dead is around 50 ". This is peculiar to say the least. The head of this very same Commission Judge Nicolson, after returning from - to definitely not more than 19 people had died.

So it seems the additional deaths were not found in Dili but in Jakarta. Could it be that the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Gareth Evans not only succeeded in signing a profitable oil deal but this time secured a very important concession? Early last month Evans left Jakarta, to the surprise of many, daring to contradict the Indonesians by claiming there were at least 75 deaths in Dili. Australian commentators already then predicted a juggling game with the number of deaths in the Report.

The international community has also played an important role. The KPN tries to secure a safer margin by stating " around 50 " in order to test the international waters and probably even modify figures again in the Final Report in case the international community is not satisfied enough.

The KPN report says the

shooting started by a " spontaneous reaction by the service men, without any command control, because they thought their weapons and lives were in danger ". This contradicts eyewitness reports and video material.

It was the military who arrived in trucks after the march had assembled at the Santa Cruz cemetery. The four foreign eyewitnesses who stood in front of the cemetery have stated there was initially about 80 meters between the East Timorese and the Indonesian army and that there was NO contact between the two groups. There was NO " provocative savagery of the masses " as stated in the Report. According to eyewitnesses the military from the trucks formed lines with the hundreds of foot soldiers who arrived. They were the ones who moved towards the crowd and opened fire, without warning, to create a calculated cold blooded massacre.

The situation, moments before the shooting, as stated by the eye-witness's was in fact the opposite to the Report. I, Russell Anderson was standing amongst the demonstrators and noted that the majority had moved away. There were 1,000 approximately left at the time the soldiers moved towards the crowd, many were already walking away some were running. Most demonstrators would have been shot in the back, like I could have been as we fled.

But lets assume the initial firing started by a "spontaneous reaction" or some trigger happy soldiers. How then can what followed be explained? The military under command of plain clothed men with walkie talkies systematically searched and surrounded the Santa Cruz cemetery. There was continuing gunfire, stabbing and beatings for at least half an hour later. There seemed nothing spontaneous about military trucks on standby taking away several hundred people and the speed with which bodies were taken and blood stained washed away.

If the command to fire didn't come from Jakarta then there was a peculiar deathly silence immediately after the massacre. Or was there? With whose permission were the unidentified bodies buried on several places? On whose command was nobody - including the Red Cross - allowed to visit the wounded and who kept hundreds of East Timorese in prison? Who is bringing to trial 52 East Timorese - of which eight face a possible death sentence - because they demonstrated against Indonesian activities in East Timor? And why does Amnesty International continue to receive story after story of serious human rights violations including imprisonment, death threats and beatings? Why are the East Timorese living in fear? These matters one could hardly describe as "spontaneous reactions of service men".

The massacre on Nov-12th can in no way be seen as "basically a regrettable mishap (musibah)". It is an unavoidable consequence of a consistent Indonesian policy. Wasn't what happened on Nov-12th exactly what the Indonesians had said would happen? For months the Indonesians had prepared East Timor for the scheduled arrival of a Portuguese Parliamentary / U.N. Delegation, to arrive early November. The army played an important role in these preparations. Military were present everywhere including the smallest village, watching everyone. Checkpoints controlled everyone's movements. More East Timorese, than normal, disappeared.

Essential is the story, confirmed by many different sources, that virtually every East Timorese was told through meetings at schools, work or market place that if anyone expressed anti-Indonesian feelings to the Delegation they would be killed. It was even spelled out to them were they would be buried. All soldiers must have been fully aware of these threats. So wasn't it logical what followed? The East Timorese publicly shouted anti-Indonesian slogans and carried anti-Indonesian banners, so... the soldiers killed. Perhaps the time place and manner didn't coincide to the letter with the Indonesian scenario, but can the blame lie solely with the soldiers? Even after Nov-12th the military Commander in Chief, General Try Sulrisno leaves little doubt about the expected behaviour of the soldiers, when he said "Yes, they had to be blasted. Delinquents like these agitators have to be shot and we will shoot them".

The massacre on the 12th November can not be seen as a " mishap " for another obvious reason. This is not just one bloodbath in the 16 years of Indonesian occupation/integration of East Timor but one of hundreds. In 1980 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja admitted, in London, that 120,000 people had died since the occupation in 1975. According to Amnesty International, after that year, another 80,000 have died. It might be true that there did exist in recent years streams within the Indonesian government who fought to establish a more humane development strategy in East Timor, but they seem to be all too late and were too little.

Indonesia must recognize it has failed both through military means and by " Operation Sympathy " to create a so much desired Indonesian province of " Tim Tim ". This is not solely an Indonesian failure, but it seems an unwritten law in which there are no success stories of a people who are forced to learn another language (culture) then their own. Rebellion is just a question of time. Indonesia knows this from their own experience. During the Dutch colonial time the Dutch also tried to use force. The East Timorese will not give up. As has been seen when they risked their lives, on the 12th November in a peaceful demonstration calling for independence.

The East Timorese are, after Nov-12th, left with many deaths, disappearances, fear and unavailable bodies for family and friends to mourn. Don't they deserve more than the words of General Sutrisno who stated recently " After the investigation mission is accomplished we will wipe out all separatist elements who have tainted the government's dignity ". They at least deserve a United Nations Delegation, granted the authority to ask the East Timorese what happened and offer protection to people once they have gone. The KPN after all admitted it encountered " obstacles " by the refusal of witness's to testify because of a feeling of unease and fear. A thorough investigation by a UN Delegation should not be limited to the Nov-12th massacre but also examine allegations of abuses including summary executions, disappearances, detentions and harassment. The East Timorese deserve a long term solution in which they will have a say.

Governments can no longer fool themselves with whatever explanation is given by the Indonesian government of Nov-12th. The juggling of the exact amount of deaths does not change the deplorable circumstances in which the East Timorese have to live. Governments, of course, know this but are still reluctant to take any concrete measurements out of fear of Indonesian repercussions. This is certainly true for Australia who almost spasmodically tries to secure good neighbourly relations, in the first place for economic ties. But if governments, Australia included, want to take the issue of human rights serious then it should know it seldom will come with a cheap price tag. Australia should rectify its shameful past policies concerning East Timor before it takes its place in the Human Rights Committee of the UN. Otherwise a foul odour will cling to the words spoken on other human rights issues. The smell will be of dead East Timorese bodies.

SURAT DARI DILI TIMOR TIMUR

Dili, 13 November 1991

Aku mau ceritera kejadian "brutal" terbaru di Dili yang mirip Tian Anmen (Beijing). Sebaiknya aku cerita kronologi perjalananku ke Timur (yang langsung aku kaitkan dengan apa yang terjadi. Sebelumnya sorry kalau tulisanku semrawut. Maklum aku baru datang capek, ngantuk plus "nggrantes" atiku).

Pagi jam tujuh tanggal 12 aku keluar dari seminari. Sebelum berangkat ada ide ke kota sebentar sekedar beli nyamikan di jalan. Di kota, aku merasa ada sesuatu yang aneh melihat pemandangan banyak orang. Sampai di toko ada yang bilang "lagi ada demonstrasi". Tidak pikir panjang romo ku minta aku jalankan mobil. Berangkat sampai dekat stadion (lihat gambar) lalu lintas pagi terhenti oleh barisan demonstran "meneriakan suara-suara emosional yang kurang jelas. Mereka bawa bendera Vatikan, bendera "Nasional Timor" (yang dulu kuduga bendera Fretilin) aku taksir jumlahnya lebih dari seribu limaratus orang. Aku mengikuti sampai ke arah makam 'Santa Cruz'. Aku sebenarnya mau ikut sampai makam itu, tapi Romo ku kelihatan menganggap nggak perlu, ya sudah aku cabut ke sektor timur, kota Baucau, Venilale, Viqueque.

Dari Viqueque aku kembali ke Venilale ± pk. 18. pukul 19 seorang pastor setempat pulang dari Dili (sorry lampu mati. Aku harus melakukan sesuatu, tidak seperti biasa kalau lampu mati. Sekarang 19.45 (?). Aku ke belakang bangunan seminari melihat ke bukit persis di halaman belakang. Aku senter anak-anak yang sudah masuk ruang tidur dan yang berhenti saja di koridor. Kecemasan menyelinap di balik wajah mereka. Anak-anak yang di ruang tidur, dari bawah ku lirik, mereka pada menatap ke bukit belakang. Seolah-olah ada sesuatu yang memeng pantes dicurigai muncul dari balik bukit. Sepuluh menit lampu terang kembali).

Cerita bermula dari gereja Motael. Subuh orang-orang sudah kumpul di gereja untuk misa peringatan 'arwah' 28 oktober. Karena jumlahnya besar, misa dibuat di luar gedung. Selesai misa, orang-orang membentuk barisan, rencananya prosesi untuk tabur bunga di makam korban Santa Cruz. Tapi dalam rombongan prosesi di bawa juga bendera Vatikan, 'Nasional Timor' (hitam, merah berbintang putih segilima). Mereka berjalan lewat kantor gubernur (selanjutnya lihat di gambar). Sementara diantara KODIM dan Bank Summa militer berjaga. Entah bagaimana seorang militer (Asisten Komandan) diserang dengan pisau dan kabarnya meninggal (?). Sementara prosesi terus berjalan militer tidak ada reaksi. Dugaanku, saat inilah militer mengkoordinasi beberapa pos militer untuk melampiaskan DENDAMNYA.

Sampai di depan SMA St. Yosep, militer kelihatan muncul dari arah barat (belakang prosesi). Tau pemandangan 'mengerikan' guru-guru SMA bubar. Murid tak terkontrol, dasar anak, mereka mau lihat. Tapi malang mereka kegiring militer ke arah Santa Cruz. sampai di Santa Cruz (ternyata sudah banyak orang di makam) militer dari utara selatan masuk (polisi, hijau, doreng) lengkap dengan senjata siap. Dan tanpa ba-bi-bu duar! ...rat...tat...tat peluru di muntahkan ke kerumunan orang, puluhan orang bergelimpangan. Dalam sekejap, makam banjir darah (aku masih melirik hari ini maish tersisa bekasnya). Tidak ampun lagi, seminaris ada yang kena pecah-pecahan peluru, terinjak dan dihajar. Seorang seminaris sampai hari ini belum pulang (terkena peluru) di RS Militer yang tertutup untuk umum seketika itu juga.

Dua truk mayat (termasuk yang belum pasti) dibawa entah kemana. Menurut saksi mata cara memasukkan ke truk tidak lebih halus dari melempar batu. Mereka yang masih hidup diangkut dengan beberapa truk, entah ke mana, termasuk orangtua dan anak-anak yang kebetulan ada di sana yang sebenarnya tidak tahu apa-apa.

Aku lanjutkan: "Romo dari Dilli menceriterakan dengan kegelisahana yang tak tersembunyikan (dia dari Spanyol). Dia ceriterakan, militer menggunakan peluru yang diarahkan ke para demonstran di Santa Cruz. Lebih dari limapuluh orang dilihatnya meninggal. Sekalipun capek, ngantuk aku ikut seorang romo menunggu berita BBC jam 21 (WIT). Jam 21.15 BBC menyiarkan peristiwa di Dilli sebagai liputan khusus. Saya juga sempat dengar wakil 'Fretilin' di Amerika berkomentar. Terjemahannya kurang lebih mengutuk perbuatan militer Indonesia. Dan minta seluruh negara mengutuk Indonesia.

Rencana, sore baru pulang ke Dilli, tapi siang aku sudah berangkat. Seperti kesetanan aku bawa mobil, tidak peduli romo tua di sebelahku, tidak peduli jurang laut di sebelah. Dua setengah jam aku sampai Dilli. (Biasanya tiga jam)

Sampai rumah, begitu parkir mobil aku lihat beberapa siswa, kaki dan tangannya dibalut. Ada yang jalan pincang. Aku sudah 'lemes' melihat mereka. Beberapa siswa mendatangi aku dan berceritera. Ceritera ini sangat bisa dipercaya karena dari siswa dan dari rektorku yang langsung mengalami peristiwa. Aku mencoba cerita secara kronologis. Oh ya, di samping sumber itu, ceritera aku tambah juga dari temanku, aku temui dia di rumahnya, magrib, sekalian lihat jalan. Ampun! Jalanan sepi mati (jam 19), hanya satu dua orang lewat.

Aku tidak bisa mengerti bagaimana ini bisa terjadi. Aku tidak ingin komentar dulu. Yang jelas 'Indonesia' telah mencatat dan menandatangani sendiri dengan peluru kontrak untuk memperpanjang kesulitannya sendiri masuk ke Timor. Sistem pendidikan 'indoktrinasi' paket, terutama yang berkaitan dengan moral, kebangsaan dan juga kepahlawanan yang 'dipaksakan' seolah-olah menjadi bumerang yang menghajar 'tuannya' sendiri. Hak dan kebebasan segala bangsa, penghormatan dan penanaman jiwa kepahlawanan, masa depan di tangan pemuda. Semua konsep didasarkan lewa menu pelajaran dan upacara-upacara (di sana ketat !), telah dimakan dengan baik oleh pemuda Timor yang "rindu" pembebasan. Hanya Pemuda Timor memakannya karena dan dengan situasi mereka.

Sungguh aku merasa "nelangsa" dengan peristiwa ini. Aku hanya bisa mendengar, melihat dengan dada terbakar tetapi tidak bisa berbuat apa-apa. Mungkinkah aku hanya menjadi penonton setia yang ikut meluap emosinya di tempat duduk. Suatu "kebiadaban" yang tidak perlu lagi aku cari-cari contohnya lewat peristiwa-peristiwa lain. Hanya satu pertanyaanku untukmu (dan mungkin untuk semua) "dimana sebenarnya letak hati manusia ? Disenjata, politik, kekuasaan... entahlah !


Peristiwa ini bertepatan dengan kehadiran delegasi PBB, bukan badan "Human Right" tapi dari semacam badan yang memperdulikan masalah penganiayaan di negara-negara berkembang. Mereka datang berenam didampingi staff dari Jakarta, juga ada wartawan. Dalam insiden dua wartawan asing luka, tidak meninggal. Keterangan akhir yang dapat dipercaya mengatakan kurang lebih 115 orang mati. Sementara isu mengatakan jenazah dikubur massal. Sulit mengecek kebenarannya termasuk berapa ratus yang ditahan, berapa puluh yang dibawa ke rumah sakit militer. Semuanya serba tertutup. Tak ada yang bisa masuk sekalipun pastor, kecuali Uskup

dengan surat Panglima Teritorial.

NB:

*Tulisan ini dibuat satu hari setelah kejadian (12 Nopember 1991)
Gema emosional masih kuat mewarnai tulisan ini.*

Catatan: Tulisan ini berasal dari seorang frater SJ dari Jakarta yang sedang menjalani tahun orientasi Pastoral di Seminari Dili Timor Timur



■ SERDAPU

INTRODUCTION

Conflict and antagonism had been stewing and bubbling for months in East Timor before it erupted in the massacre of hundreds of demonstrators on November 12, 1991. During its period of existence, the New Order regime has committed many such massacres. But the Dili Incident departs in some ways from previous tradition. Never before has a massacre received such widespread coverage in the local media. The formation of an investigative team by the government, such as that which undertook investigation into the Dili Incident, was previously unheard of. Likewise public apologies by military personnel to families of their victims, let alone their removal from their posts.

The political manoeuvrings that followed the massacre may at first glance be interpreted as evidence that the military can no longer get away with the blatant violations of human rights that it has become accustomed to committing during the period of New Order rule. That is, the follow-up to the incident, including the formation of the National Investigative Committee and the removal of the Commander for Territorial Operations, R. Warouw, as well as the Regional Commander, S. Panjaitan, from their respective posts, may seem to represent a triumph for human rights.

But to accurately evaluate the effect of the Dili incident on the human rights situation in Indonesia, the affair needs to be viewed in the context of the general political situation of the New Order regime. Only then does it become evident that the political chess-play that has taken place as a result of the Dili massacre cannot be seen as a victory for human rights.

The New Order Regime: No Human Rights

The most basic point to be made here is that the Indonesian system is not based on the principle of human rights or democracy. The very power of the regime is based on the extra-legal processes by which it ultimately wrenched power. After effectively removing Sukarno from the Presidency with a letter that authorized Suharto to take control of the security apparatus in the interests of public safety, Suharto and his followers in the military proceeded to do away with their political opposition by a method of systematic slaughter. Estimates of the number of supposed PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*: Indonesian Communist Party) members and sympathizers killed during the 1966-9 massacres range from 500,000 to 1 million.

The resort to mass murder by the regime in the shows that its continued survival rests more on its ability to manage dissent than on legitimacy that arises out of popular acceptance. The regime has attempted to contain dissent through extending its control over the institutional structures and political processes occurring in society at large. Failing this, the 'security approach', military jargon for the obliteration of dissenting elements, has continued to be deployed.

Following the massacres of 1966-8 the regime set about the task of mass depoliticisation included the military's taking control of the state apparatus by limiting the number of political parties to two (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*: PPP [The United Development Party] and the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*: PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party]). The PPP and the PDI were prevented from functioning as independent political parties by their isolation from contact with the Indonesian populace following the implementation of the floating mass doctrine in 1972. The floating mass doctrine espoused that villagers should not be distracted from the task of economic development by political activities, and in the name of this doctrine the political party branches below the level of regency were banned.

The ban on party activities at the village level did not, however, extend the 'political grouping' Golkar, the military's political tool. Through a system of 'Golakarisation' (purges), the army took control of the civil bureaucracy.

Large-scale massacres of demonstrators by supposed safeguarders of public safety are not unknown in Indonesia. They could even said to be a common occurrence. A long list of such 'incidents', such as Tanjung Priok (1984), Aceh (1990), Bloody Yogya (1989), Ujung Pandang (1987) and Lampung (1989) make their mark on New Order History at regular intervals. So it is not surprising that the Dili massacre is a familiar taste in the mouths of Indonesians.

Perceptions of East Timor in Indonesia: Governmental Control of Information

The Question of Timor has been on the United Nations agenda since the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and subsequent human rights violations against the East Timorese people have been documented and continually monitored by several human rights organizations in the West. However, little information about the violence about of the invasion and subsequent occupation of the territory, has been documented in Indonesian, let alone reached the Indonesian populace through media channels. This is not unusual for Indonesia where, without the frequent violent military reactions to public expressions of mass discontent, is tightly controlled by the regime. Indeed the government has devised an effective system of press licensing, an extralegal warning and disciplinary devices used to prevent publication of 'dangerous' information.

Unlike other such striking human rights violations committed by the military such as Aceh, Tanjung Priok, Bloody Yogya, The 'Mysterious Killings' and Lampung, all of which have been subject to media black-outs, the Dili Incident and related events received widespread press coverage over the months of November and December. This has meant that the territory has gained a previously unknown public profile and that the room for debate on the question of military presence and development there was pried open.

However, public debate on the issue of East Timor has been limited by several factors. Firstly, opportunities for the press or independent parties to conduct their own investigations into the Dili Affair have remained restricted. Thus, till now within Indonesia there have been no investigative efforts independent of governmental control. When covering the National Mission of Enquiry's investigation, efforts by journalists to carry out more probing investigations that the mission itself met with reprimands from the local military apparatus, who, according to a journalist source, were waiting armed behind every piece of scrub to shoo away any camera-toting reporter. A brave attempt to balance the one-eyed reporting was made by *Jakarta Jakarta* editorial staff who published interviews with three eye-witnesses of the massacre (Edition January 4-10, 1992). Following the publication of the interviews, three editorial staff were sacked. It is also regrettable that the reportage of the affair in the Indonesian press was limited to news items. Few editorials appeared in the daily newspapers, and thus little analysis of the history behind the massacre. Not once was the United Nations Resolution on the Question of Timor mentioned, and there has been little analysis of the reasons behind the aid/trade boycotts and the protests that took place in several Western countries.

So, the explosion of reporting on the territory following the massacre has overlaid the generally held perception of East Timorese people as either ungrateful terrorists, or primitives, or both. And the restrictions that continue to be placed on the media allow few opportunities for these stereotypes to be challenged. That the mass media in Indonesia continues to meet with restrictions in any attempts it makes at 'objective' reporting reflects that the government remains closed to the concept of alternative opinion, or debate, an argument that is further reinforced by Alatas's refusal to receive a United Nations investigative team into the Dili Affair.

The government line on East Timor has been characterized by the development myth that blankets any debate on the issue of human rights. The Fretilin guerrillas, as those in Aceh, are branded as GPK (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan: Disturbers of Public Safety*), an extreme and isolated handful of trouble-makers who have little support among East Timorese civilians. According to the official version

of East Timorese history, Indonesia liberated the colonial backwater from its 400 years of neglect by the Portuguese and proceeded to civilize its people by building roads, bridges and schools.

Such is the myth that reaches the Indonesian populace through the well-controlled media channels. In this way it can be said that general perceptions on East Timor have inevitably followed government line. The question of the quality of development, including the disproportionate military presence and its role in human rights violations against the East Timorese people, until recently had never been publicly debated and are very rarely privately discussed. Indonesian people who are curious about the background to the East Timorese issue are blocked off from information about the social causes of the current situation there. Not many Indonesians, especially young Indonesians, are aware that historically, East Timor is not part of Indonesia; that Indonesia invaded the territory in 1975, that the United Nations has been adopting resolutions on the Question of Timor since 1975 and that many of its members still refuse to recognise integration, that the East Timorese Bishopry does not fall under the authority of the Indonesian Council of Churches but is directly responsible to the Vatican. There is also little information about the socio-cultural problems that arise in the traditional East Timorese context, to provide the Indonesian populace with background information on the various 'incidents' that occur there. There has also been little explanation in the Indonesian press as to why the majority of the people taking part in both the November 12 and other previous demonstrations are youths, who would have been aged between 1 and 5 years at the time.

Domestically the government has deflected Western criticism of its activities in East Timor, including the United Nations resolution on the Question of Timor, by whipping up a kind of 'developmental nationalism' whenever the issue gains a high profile in the international area. The argument that East Timor is an internal Indonesian affair has become a standard government rhetoric both domestically and internationally. Foreigners, be they governments or ordinary citizens, who press the question of Timor are vehemently accused of being imperialist meddlers.

Following the Dili massacre, the question of human rights in East Timor has been much colored by the extreme magnification by the government of the burning of an Indonesian flag by Australian protesters, rumors of an Australian NGO as the 'puppet master' of the Dili Incident, and frequent public threats to domestic NGO's who may be considered to be 'betraying national interests'.

Discussion on the issue of East Timor within Indonesia, therefore, continues to take place within the limits set down by the regime. Suharto's assumption of the role as 'discipliner of the military', while allowing for certain freedoms on the debate on the issue of East Timor in the media, has also ensured his control over the direction of that debate. His new image as an 'objective and responsible statesman' has stolen the political space for opposition and has ensured the public discussion on the issue has been kept within the realm of 'appropriate development'.

Alternative Indonesian Views on East Timor

The official version of East Timorese history has not, however gone unchallenged. In 1990, the final report of a socio-anthropological research project was jointly published Bank Indonesia, the East Timor Regional Development Planning Body (governmental), and the Research Centre for Village Development of the prestigious Gajah Mada University. The report was commissioned by Bank Indonesia as an attempt to find some answers to the perplexing question of why there is so little interest on the part of investors in East Timor. The following points were included in the report's concluding remarks:

1. That the disproportionate military presence in East Timor was causing 'trauma of military overdose' on the part of the East Timorese people.
2. That the integration process of the past 16 years had little to do with local history and culture.
3. That agricultural development policies in East Timor, when implemented through the existing Indonesian bureaucratic structure, have done little to raise the welfare of East Timorese peasants.
4. That the existing social and economic structure in East Timor offers few employment opportunities for East Timorese high school and university graduates, giving rise to youth discontent and social tension.

The report does not go so far as mentioning the basic issue underlying the social and economic problems the East Timorese are presently being subjected to: that of self-determination. It did, however, succeed to some extent in influencing government rhetoric, if not policy. Following the issuance of the report, the phrase, "winning the hearts and minds of the East Timorese people" became somewhat of a cliché in government statements concerning the territory.

Also in 1990, Inflight (Indonesian Front for the Defense of Human Rights), the first Indonesian human rights organization to raise and pursue the issue of human rights in East Timor as a distinct issue, was founded. Its concern for the East Timorese issue is based on an understanding of East Timorese history, including the process of integration otherwise known as 'development' (as detailed below) as a violation of the East Timorese people's right to freely determine their country's fate.

East Timorese History*

*Parts of this section are taken from *East Timor: Towards a Just Peace in the 1990s* [Australian Council For Overseas Aid]

History of the Independence Movement under the Portuguese

Faced with severe economic problems and a coup d'état at home, in 1974 the Portuguese administration that had for 400 years colonised East Timor began to hastily make preparations to withdraw from the territory after 400 years of colonisation. As part of its decolonisation effort, the Portuguese administration rearranged its political party and in May 1974 the former ANP (Acaao Nacional Popular) re-emerged as the *Uniao Democratic Timorensa*: Timorese Democratic Union (UDT). Consequently, a party then known as the *Assoacio Social Democratic Timorensa*: East Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) emerged in opposition to the UDT. In September of 1974 the ASDT became Fretelin (*Frente Revolucioner Timor Leste Independente*: the Revolutionary Front for East Timorese Independence). The two parties, UDT and Fretelin, went ahead to form a proindependence coalition in January 1975.

However not long after the differences in vision between the two parties resulted in sharp conflict and in May 1975 UDT left the coalition under pressure from Indonesia to oppose Fretelin. Indonesian pressuring of UDT formed the one of the first steps in its 'Commando' military operation aimed at destabilising the the political situation within East Timor.

This task was much facilitated by the fact that the decolonisation process that had been initiated by the Portuguese had been left uncompleted. Throughout this period Indonesian pressure and propaganda were destructive influences on political development in East Timor. In August 1975, a group of UDT leaders who had been told by Indonesian intelligence chiefs that Indonesia would intervene if Fretelin gained power, attempted a coup. Fighting broke out in Dili and the central mountain districts. By September 1975, Fretelin, which had the support of most of the rural population, was in control of virtually all Portuguese Timor. The party did, however, continue to recognise Portuguese sovereignty and called on the governor to return to Dili and complete the process of decolonisation. Portugal refused to authorise this and Fretelin thus became a de facto government. Foreign observers who visited at the time recognised that Fretelin governed responsibly and enjoyed popular support.

Short-Lived Independence

Indonesian pressure increased throughout 1975. In March Indonesian authorities closed West Timor to journalists and in September, after Fretelin's victory in the civil war, Indonesian forces mounted to undercover operations in the western areas of East Timor. On November 28, Fretelin leaders declared independence, proclaiming the Democratic Republic of East Timor with Xaver do Amaral as President. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia launched its attack on Dili.

Invasion and Occupation

Since the Indonesian invasion and the subsequent murder of hundreds of thousands of East Timorese, this territory has become known as "one of the world's sadder places". The war resulting from the Indonesian military attack has been referred to as one of the most cruel wars of the 20th century.

The fierceness of the Indonesian military did not stop at the rape and pillage, the murder and the destruction of the invasion. Over the 16 years of its occupation of, the Indonesian military has become infamous for the gross violations of human rights it has continued to commit against the East Timorese people. And at the core of all the torture and executions, of the mourning, the hunger and the fear, is the denial of the Indonesian occupiers of the East Timorese people's basic right to self-determination.

The Indonesian military's frustration at its failure to quell the flame of resistance has only caused it to become all the more fierce in its attempts to wipe out all signs of opposition to integration. Not a few East Timorese have fallen victim to the military's arrests and rapes, the tortures, detentions and killings of the past 16 years. During the invasion, no less than 200,000 East Timorese have died at the hands of the Indonesian military. Since 1988, an estimated 4000 East Timorese (including those arrested before Suharto's visit in 1988 and those arrested as a result of the Dili Massacre) accused of 'anti-integration activities' have been detained. Currently, a total of around 50 (22 in Jakarta, 3 in Bali and 32 in Dili) are awaiting trial for alleged 'involvement' in the Dili Incident'.

Imperialist Development and the Development of Imperialism

As is the case in other provinces of Indonesia, the prevailing politico-economic structure in New Order Indonesia which necessitates top-down planning, project oriented development and leakage of development funds, places severe restrictions on the participation of the development of the East Timorese people in the development process. Development in East Timor has been characterised by the 'security approach' model. An Orwellian term for war, the 'security approach' has been the way the Indonesian military has re-interpreted destruction as development. Employment of the security approach means that East Timor has been allocated 13 battalions, a total of 11,000 troops (not counting police or intelligence personnel of which there are many) for a territory with a population of 700,000.

The economic and social 'development' currently being implemented in East Timor also play an integral role in the security approach, i.e. in the military's attempt to eradicate East Timorese resistance. The 'development' of East Timor is for and by the military, and therefore bears little relation to the improvement in the quality of life of the East Timorese people.

The Indonesian government is clever at advertising the fact that during the period of Indonesian rule per capita incomes in East Timor have increased by 10-fold from Rp 30,000 to Rp300,000 per annum. However, increases in per capita income have little meaning for a people whose daily lives are dictated by the all-pervasive military presence. The system of food production in East Timor has suffered enormous disruption since 1975. Over 90% of the population has been subject to forced relocation from their ancestral lands, and forbidden from venturing into the inland mountainous areas. The wild fruits and vegetables that grow in the mountains are an important source of food for the Timorese. Traditionally, before the corn harvest when stocks run low the people supplement their diet with food gathered from the hills. With the current restrictions placed on their movements famine is an annual phenomenon.

Such relocation schemes are an integral part of the military's efforts to isolate the guerillas, who operate in the mountainous inland areas of the province, from the contact with the civilian population. Considering the theory that guerilla resistance cannot last longer than 10 years without substantial support from the civilian population, this is a vital step in the military's attempt to eradicate the guerillas.

Likewise, infrastructural development primarily of asphalted roads and bridges has clearly been implemented with the underlying aim of facilitating the Indonesian military's insurgence against the guerillas.

One of the reasons for the military's continued presence in East Timor (the other being that it is one of the 2 'practice grounds' the other being Aceh, for aspiring generals) is its central role in investment in East Timor. Capital investments in East Timor, if not controlled by, must go through the military. the

Current Minister for Defence and Security, Benny Moerdani, has significant interests in various corners of the East Timorese economy. Under his protection, Robby Sumpampaw, a Chinese business man, holds the monopoly for the export of coffee from the territory. The monopoly on coffee export has had severe negative effects on the incomes of East Timorese peasants. Since the Portuguese era, a major part of their income has come from coffee. Under the Indonesians, the sole outlet for coffee distribution is the KUD (*Koperasi Unit Desa*: Village Unit Co-operative). However the farmers say that the KUD is merely a tool of Sumpampaw's export company although it masquerades as a farmers co-op. They say they have been subjected farmers to arbitrary decreases in the price of coffee, and that this causes significant decreases in their incomes as a whole.

Moerdani also controls 100 hectares of land between Dili and Baucau which is targetted for marble mining. As agreed to by Benny, Markus Wanandi, the younger brother of CSIS (a Catholic-dominated think-tank aligned to Moerdani, also a Catholic) chief, Yusuf Wanandi, and a Jesuit priest in East Timor is to lead the planned marble operation.

Much of the budget allocated for East Timor has gone to the construction of schools. The Indonesian government is proud of fact that more than 500 primary, junior high and senior high schools, a polytechnic and a university have been constructed under Indonesian rule. It needs to be noted that within the Indonesian education system, there is no element of local history or culture within the formal education system. East Timorese educated under the Indonesians have been subject to the usual New Order propaganda of the illustriousness of the Majapahit kingdom and the wickedness of the now banned Indonesian Communist party. Whilst increases in literacy rates have paralleled intensive construction of school buildings, improved education facilities under the Indonesian have done little to quell the resentment of East Timorese youth for whom there are few employment opportunities in the civil administration after their graduation. Recent efforts have been made to offer employment to young East Timorese in other islands, and in 1990 many high school graduates were transmigrated to Java and elsewhere to work in factories. However, this was perceived as many East Timorese as an effort to clean East Timor of anti-integration elements among the youth before the arrival of the Portuguese Parliament which was later cancelled. In many cases, problems arose when the youths reached their destinations concerning unfair wages and conditions.

Intensified Capitalist Development: A Change in Military Strategy

So long as East Timor remains a war-zone, much of its economic potential, from which the military will draw fat profits, will remain untapped. This is because, as a rule, foreign investors will be reluctant to invest in an area which shows signs of being politically instable.

Recent statements by certain high-ranking military personnel indicate that the military strategy in East Timor is to undergo some changes. Not long after the massacre, Rudini, Minister for Internal Affairs, made an announcement that the Dili Incident that it was time to leave the security approach behind. This was challenged by Try Sutrisno, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, who said in his report that there was still unrest in the territory and thus the need for the security approach to be maintained. Following this, Edy Sudrajat, Army Chief of Staff, recently announced that the military strategy in East Timor was now territorial as opposed to the combat and intelligence operations of the early years of integration. (Suharto is one of the few high-ranking military officers who Suharto will still listen to, and is rumoured to be in line for Sutrisno's job). Hot on Sudrajat's tail, the Governor of East Timor made an announcement welcoming "efforts by conglomerates to take advantage of the economic opportunities offered by East Timor" (*Berita Buana*, 13/1/92).

SUDRAJAT

Coincidentally, the government has increased the budget allocation for East Timor in the next fiscal year by 35.1%, well above the 23.7% increases the other provinces have received. Bappenas (National Development Planning Board) Head Suyanto said that the "government would encourage East Timorese to participate in development", something of an impossibility under the highly-centralised New Order bureaucratic structure. Traditionally, much of the budget for East Timor has been taken up by *Inpres* (*Instruksi Presiden*: Presidential Instruction) funds for rural development, clean water projects, road construction and deforestation.

Industrial development in East Timor will also be heightened as it is drawn into the new zone of co-operation between Australia's Northern Territory and the nine provinces of Eastern Indonesia. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed on January 21, 1992 by the Northern Territory and Indonesian governments. The MOU is an attempt to increase trade links by requiring the two territories to work towards establishing co-operation between private sector businesses of the two countries. Several for the signing of the MOU have been mentioned, namely: the proximity between the two territory and Australia's desire for a "vital link between the Northern Territory and the dynamic economies to the North" - Foreign Affairs and Trade jargon for the ununionised labour and cheap land resources that Indonesia offers. Australia's enthusiasm for investing in Indonesia coincides with the heavy emphasis the Indonesian government is placing on development of the region in its 5th five-year development plan.

Land titles are in the process of being transferred from their status under Portuguese or traditional law to Indonesia's 1960 Agrarian Act. The changes in status are an important step in the industrialisation of East Timor that is to proceed now that investors are being welcomed into the territory with open arms. Under the 1960 Act, the state has the right to appropriate all land not under cultivation for its own development purposes.

There has been a recent avalanche of interest by both foreign and domestic firms investing in the territory. The military of course promises to play a central role in new investments. On December 27, 1991, a joint agreement was signed by M~~X~~atahari Group, an Indonesian conglomerate and East Timor Territorial Operations, making it possible for Matahari to open a department store in Dili. On the same date, 10 companies joined together under the East Timor Development Corps (Timum Cor) to sign a contract to 'develop' East Timor. The 10 companies include Astra International, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Bank Damaman Indonesia, Garuda Indonesia, Great River Garments, Puncak Matahari, Puskopad Kodam Udayana IX, Bintang Tatamilau Cemerlang, and Perum. Telkom. The military stake in Timum Cor is Puskopad Udayana IX.

Probosutedjo, Suharto's son-in-law, is also intending to invest in East Timor, in the field of telecommunications. In addition, 3 companies from Japan, South Korea and Australia respectively have expressed their interest in investing in fishery and livestock husbandry in Lautem Province, 255 kms east of Dili. The firms will co-operate in joint ventures with domestic firms.

Since 1989, Dili has been one of the locations in Eastern Indonesia targeted for tourism development. In that year the territory was declared open for tourists, but up till now there has been little infrastructural development to encourage a large influx. Based on the Baliunese model of tourism development which is now being deployed in other parts of Eastern Indonesia, the government has already set up a state company, the East Timor Tourism Development Board, to oversee developments in the tourism sector there. Recent advertisements on the privately known RCTI (television) promoting East Timor as a tourist destination, suggest that the tourism industry is ready to roll and is being directed, at least in these initial stages, at a domestic elite market.

Heightened investment in East Timor indicate that the military is seeking to derive additional economic benefit from the territory by "turning a war zone into a market place". Considering the highly-centralised military bureaucratic nature of the New Order regime and the fact that the trickle-down theory of capitalistic development has been historically disproven, the East Timorese will derive little benefit from these new developments. Indeed the prevailing social and political structure both in East Timor in particular and in Indonesia in general ensures against local populations and/ or regional administrations playing any part in determining the direction of East Timor's development.

MORE BLOOD IS SHED

The massacre that occurred in Dili on November 12, 1991 was by no means an isolated incident. Four days after it was announced in Lisbon that the Portuguese Parliament's delegation to East Timor was being suspended, Indonesian troops attacked Motael church in Dili. The following report compiled by Infight before the decision to postpone the visit, makes some ominous predictions in conclusion.

Since the postponement of the Portuguese Parliament (November 1991) to East Timor, the situation in the territory, especially in Dili, has been extremely tense. This is because the two main parties concerned, the Indonesian government and Fretelin, clearly have different interests at stake in such a visit. On Fretelin's part, it is hoped that the visit will yield a decision to hold a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations, because the United Nations recognises Portugal as the government responsible for the administration of East Timor.

Naturally then, those East Timorese with aspirations for independence, were extremely disappointed at the decision to postpone the visit. Nevertheless, both Fretelin and the East Timorese in general have been clear in that they do not want to initiate any violent actions, because they are well aware that any violence on their part will undermine their position in the world of international diplomacy.

Murder at Motael Church

Thus the first 'incident' erupted in Motael Church, a place considered to be safe for pro-independence activists fleeing from the Indonesian Armed Forces. At 1:30 on the morning of October 28, a gang of masked killers known as Ninja (a unit formed by Prabowo, President Suharto's son-in-law), visited Motael Church, due to their suspicion that anti-integration activists were hiding there. Although they had been refused permission to enter by the Pastor, Father Ricardo, on the basis that the church was a place of worship, the Ninjas, who had planned the operation beforehand, attempted to stir up provocation by yelling warnings that there was a thief inside the church compound. As a result of this violent attack things grew tense, and the activists had no alternative but to resist the Ninja with the result that one of them, Afonso Henrique, was killed. When this happened, the troops, known for their sadism and inhumanity towards the Timorese - shot dead an activist named Sebastiao Rangel Gomes (20 years). They did this in the church, a holy place for Timorese people. Then the soldiers withdrew, leaving behind them an atmosphere of panic and terror.

After this, the activists organised an action in the streets of Dili, protesting against the death of Sebastiao Gomes. Nearly half the population of Dili took part in this protest. The Army responded with a show of force against the unarmed people and arrested 22 participants in the solidarity action, all students aged between 20 and 25 (see appendix). They were taken prisoner at the church in Motael, on the grounds of social disturbance and for activism in the independence movement, and were detained at the local Dili Police Station. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gatot, they were interrogated and tortured. Interrogations were conducted with the apparent aim of finding out the plans of the resistance for the visit of the Portuguese Parliamentary Team. The types of torture inflicted included solitary confinement, electric shocks and one of the prisoners had one of his toes cut off.

The above report, compiled by Infight prior to the postponement of the Portuguese parliamentary visit, in conclusion made some ominous comments:

The situation in East Timor continues to be one of terror: night curfews, guards on civilian households, and frequent intimidation of civilians. If the Portuguese Parliament do not come, there will be a bloodbath.

Following the Motael Incident, at 8am on November 5 1991, two people, Afonso Maria da Cruz (29 years) of Domisili di Audian, Dili and Julio da Cunha (21 years), a student of Domisili Idem Senior Hight School, were arrested in Santa Cruz Cemetary on the grounds that they were suspected of making pro-independence preparations for the visit of the Portuguese Parliament.

Deaths in Dili

Two weeks after the murder at Motael Church, on November 12, between 3000-4000 East Timorese participated in a procession from the church to Santa Cruz Cemetary. The procession departed from the church, where an early morning mass had been held and began to move towards the cemetary at 6am, with the intention of carrying out a traditional flower-sprinkling ceremony at the grave of Sebastiao Gomes.

Reports of what actually happened during the Dili Incident have taken various forms, namely:

- the Indonesian Armed Forces' version of events
- eye-witness reports by East Timorese foreign participants in the demonstration who survived the massacre.
- the final report of the Indonesian mission of Enquiry the Armed Forces version

The Armed Forces were quick to prepare a press release to recount their version of the affair before details of the massacre reached the Indonesian press through underground channels. Thus the first reports to appear in the Indonesian press merely echoed the Armed Forces line, as is illustrated in the Kompas report translated from the Indonesian below:

The situation in Dili is once again calm. The provocation which occurred yesterday, initiated by people influenced by rebel groups (Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, lit: upsetters of a safe environment) has been overcome. The people have been requested stay calm, to avoid the influence of subversive gossip, and provocation by certain irresponsible figures.

A certain group initiated the provocation as a crowd of people began moving towards the Governors' office in Dili to protest, following a mass held at Motael Church. Security forces attempted to disperse the crowd using persuasive methods met with resistance and even physical attacks, from the crowd. Included in the victims of the attacks was a Battalion Vice Commando. In their attempts to deal with the worsening situation, the security forces were forced to defend themselves by resorting to strict methods, as according to the appropriate procedures. Thus inevitably, among the provocateurs there were also some victims, and several wounded. The Head of Information for the District Military Command IX/Udayana, Let. Col. Anton Tompoding has announced that 9 people had died as a result of the conflict.

Udayana District Military Command concluded that those involved were clearly under the influence of the Timorese rebel group who have recently moved their operations to Dili as they have been pushed down and closed off from their traditional area of operation inland. Their actions were planned to be aimed at the Portuguese Parliament. Their frustration caused by the postponement of the Parliamentary visit was thus vented in a brutal manner. It is obvious that this chain of events is connected to the conflict that occurred at Motael Church on 28 October, and that that some church figures have become involved in the activities of the rebel groups. Because of this, Udayana Military Command has made a point of reminding church figures and certain groups that make use of the church, that the church is a holy place and should not be used for non-religious purposes, such as practical political purposes and opposing the government.

The security forces state their intention to maintain the calm, and warn that they will take strict measures against any activities that upset national stability, national development, and civil safety.

Contradicting the claims made by the Indonesian Armed Forces in their press release, eye-witness reports of both East Timorese and foreign participants in the demonstration preceding the massacre have been consistent in affirming that troops opened fire on an unarmed crowd without warning, and that there was no provocation on the part of the demonstrators. Such reports have been published widely

internationally and do not need to be detailed here (see Asia Watch and Amnesty reports). The East Timorese underground resistance has come up with the names of people found dead at the site of the massacre (see appendix).

Unofficial sources have also reported that in the aftermath of the November 12 massacre, on November 15 about 80 people who were arrested after the incident were blindfolded, bound and taken to Be-musi to be shot dead. On November 17 an additional 10 witnesses to the executions of November 15 were killed and the following day, 7 more people, witnesses to the third massacre, were shot dead. This puts the death toll at around 212. In addition, 32 people remain in detention in Dili in connection with the Incident.

Infight's Response to the Massacre

On December 17, 1991, a delegation of 4 representatives from Infight, the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights (*Lembaga Pembelaan Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia*: LPHAM) and the Institute of Defenders of Justice (*Lembaga Penghayat Keadilan*: LPK) went to the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*: DPR) to present their position on the 12 November Massacre. Although their efforts to get a meeting with the DPR were fruitless, they did manage to get a meeting with several legislators from the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*: PDI). The meeting was attended by the following people:

1. Jopie Lasut (LPK)
2. Dr. Chris Siner Key Timu (LPK)
3. Agus Edy Santoso (Infight)
4. H.J.C. Princen (LPHAM)
5. Suwardi SH (PDI)
6. Jajang Pasundar (PDI)
7. Jenni Suharno (PDI)
8. Sutarno SH (PDI)

The delegation presented the following statement to the meeting:

We, the undersigned, call on the DPR to immediately conduct a complete and objective investigation, based on the principles of honesty and justice, into the Dili Incident which has resulted in the death of many. We call on the DPR to set up a Fact-Finding Commission, consisting of credible eminent persons and social institutions involved in the field of human rights, to conduct the said investigation. We would also like to express the willingness of our respective organisations to take up such a task.

In addition, we demand that the military personnel responsible for the shooting on November 12 in Dili, be tried, in the name of justice for all people.

In the name of just and civilised humanitarianism as advocated by the Pancasila, we also demand that the names of the victims of the shooting be publicly announced, and that their bodies be returned to their families to be buried in accordance with their respective religions.

It is hoped that the DPR will consider these demands in the context of the fifth principle of the Pancasila: just and civilised humanitarianism. We also demand that those people detained as a result of the Dili Incident be allowed to receive family visits.

Thankyou for your kind attention,

H.J.C Princen (LPHAM)

Agus Edy Santoso (INFIGHT)

Yopie Lasut (LPK)

Drs. Chris Siner Key Timu (LPK)

The PDI fraction thanked the delegation for its kind contribution, and promised to discuss the matter further in the PDI fractional meeting.

The National Mission of Enquiry: the criminals judge their own crimes

Out of the country on the day of the massacre, Suharto responded agilely to this attempt to undermine his authority on his return by setting up on November 19 a National Mission of Enquiry (Komisi Penyelidik Nasional: KPN) into the affair. That the KPN was set up by Presidential Decree placed under the direct supervision of, and made it directly responsible to, the President.

Indeed this was the first time that such a mission had been formed to investigate one of the many crimes the New Order regime has committed. That the government evidently declined offers by several Indonesian human rights organisations to be involved in the mission, let alone a UN request to be allowed to send an independent investigative team, reflects the nature of the legal system under the New Order whereby, in cases involving political 'incidents' the criminals become the judge of their own crime and the final verdict is predetermined. The 7-member team consisted of:

1. Supreme Court Justice Maj. Gen. (retired) M. Djaelani (Chair of the mission)
2. Clementino dos Reis Amaral (legislator from East Timor)
3. Ben Mang Reng Say (member of the Supreme Advisory Council)
4. Harisoegiman (Director-General for Social Affairs and Politics)
5. Hadi Wayarabi (Director for International Organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
6. Anton Suyata (Inspector General of the Ministry for Justice)
7. Rear Admiral Sumitro (Inspector General of the Armed Forces)

As is the case with most high-ranking government officials in Indonesia, many of the members of a mission whose task was to conduct an objective investigation into the role of the Armed Forces in the Dili Incident, themselves have long histories of involvement in the military. In this respect, the teams ability to investigate "freely, accurately, impartially and thoroughly the Dili Incident", as it was assigned by the President, must be seriously questioned.

During their visit to the territory, the mission held meetings with Governor Carrascalao, Bishop Belo, Father Ricardo of Motael Church and Commander of Territorial Operations Warouw. They witnessed an on-site reconstruction of the November 12 massacre accompanied by Assistant Chief of the Intelligence for the Regional Command, Col. G. Purwanto. In the reconstruction, 20 soldiers from Battalion 303, one of the companies which took part in the shooting, showed the commission members where they had been standing at the time when the firing began. No-one from the side of the demonstrators took part in the reconstruction.

In addition the mission, accompanied by 4 military officers, carried out the exhumation of one grave at Hera Cemetary apparently to see whether rumours that bodies had been thrown into graves without religious rites were true. However, the commission failed to come up with the identities of the 18 bodies buried at Hera. It also failed to assess what happened to the remaining 31 killed - in its final report the KPN put the death toll at 50. Members of the mission went to Tasi Tolu, Pasir Putih and Tolu outside of Dili where there had been reports of mass graves, but found no evidence of mass graves evidently because, as Djaelani later told reporters, they did not know where to look.

The mission returned to Jakarta after 17 days in the territory and after meetings and discussion with the President released its final report on December 26 1991, the conclusions of which run as follows:

1. The November 12 demonstration represents the peak of a series of demonstrations instigated by the anti-integration group Fretelin. Increasingly cornered, Fretelin has changed its strategy from jungle to

Following the issuance of the KPN's final report which deemed that "a group of military personnel had acted outside above commands", and that "all those found to be breaking the law must be punished", Suharto held Sintong and Warouw responsible and removed them from their posts.

city guerilla warfare. This undermines the development approach aimed at raising general welfare by taking advantage of the current conditions and situation of the youth, encouraging them to oppose integration, in their attempt to focus world attention on their existence.

2. The Dili Incident is clearly not a result of command from above, nor does it represent government or Armed Forces policy in East Timor. It is indeed an incident to be regretted.
3. The demonstration was not peaceful and orderly, but contained elements of provocation previously planned by Fretelin
4. Demonstrators, most of them youths, encouraged by Fretelin were emotional and destructive. They consciously displayed Fretelin and Falintil flags, pictures of Xanana, banners, and screamed insults at the security forces present.
5. Several foreigners actively participated in the march
6. In the increasingly tense situation, in which armed forces personnel was stabbed, security forces considered themselves to be in danger, and spontaneously reacted without command to defend themselves by firing excessively at the demonstrators.
7. Although a riot force was present, the mission was not satisfied that optimal procedures for handling the demonstration were adopted. Despite current estimates put of the numbers of victims as 19 and the number of injured at 91, the mission feels it has sufficient reason to believe that the victims numbered as many as 50, and the injured over 91.
8. Although 19 of the dead were buried appropriately, there was insufficient attempt to identify the bodies, as well as insufficient opportunities for family members to identify the dead.
9. The mission feels that, in the name of the law, all those involved in the November 12 Incident who are considered to have disobeyed the law, must be punished accordingly.

Infight's Response to the Results of the National Mission of Enquiry (KPN)

Following the announcement of the results of the KPN investigation, Infight issued the following statement in response:

On December 27 1991 the National Investigative Committee (KPN) announced the results of its investigation into the 12 November Affair. Infight considers the report of a serious effort to uncover the real train of events connected with the affair. That the report differs from the official ABRI (Try Sutrisno) version is a departure from the norm. In the cases of Malari, Tanjung Priok, Aceh, Lampung, and the (petrus) mysterious killings we have been expected to accept the official (ABRI) figure put on the numbers of victims, which without fail has fallen well short of the actual figure.

Nevertheless, Infight regrets that the formation of the KPN was merely a response to international pressure and that its investigation was conducted at a time when the East Timorese community was too afraid to speak out. Whilst the report surpassed expectations by showing the government's courage to admit to human rights disasters, it did fail to detail the actual train of events of the incident. Thus a neutral commission under the auspices of the United Nations remains a necessity.

Infight hopes the KPN report will mark the end to the military tradition of seeking violent solutions to political issues. The fact remains that the 12 November incident represents violation of the basic human right to freedom of expression. That is, in the final analysis the military's response to the demonstration was violent and it is such violence that must not be repeated.

INFIGHT demands that the following actions be taken as a follow-up to the KPN report:

1. *A guarantee that human rights in Indonesia will be in the future upheld, in particular that criticism, in the form of demonstrations, directed at the government, will no longer be dealt with in a violent manner.*
2. *That the role of the military is limited to security such that the military no longer needs to justify its violent actions by saying its personnel were 'provoked', or to defend itself in a way that is not in keeping with the role of ABRI as national patriot.*

3. *As stated by the KPN report several members of the security apparatus who opened fire on the crowd of demonstrators were acting beyond their command. Those East Timorese detained as a result of the various prologues and epilogues of the 12 November Affair must therefore be released since they are only the victims of the irresponsible actions of certain elements within the military.*
4. *That the formation of a democratic political system as in accordance with the principles of human rights in East Timor in particular as well as in Indonesia as a whole is formed because only then can self-determination be truly realised.*

It should also be noted that while Suharto was busy setting up the KPN as a symbol of the greatness of his humanitarian spirit, arrests, detentions and interrogations of East Timorese in Dili, Jakarta and Bali were continuing.

Further Incursions on Human Rights In Indonesia: Detentions, Expulsions and Sackings

Dili Detainees

35 people are currently being detained in Dili in connection with the November 12 'incident', and an additional 5 remain in detention accused of being 'involved' in the Motael 'incident' of October 28, 1991. The Public Prosecutor who has been ordered to take harsh action against those being detained in connection with the Dili incident.

Three of the 35 faced trial in late January. They are:

1. Amarao de Araujo (28, employee at a car workshop)
2. Felismina dos Santor Consecacao (29, civil servant in the District Military Office)
3. Alfonso Rangel (48, self-employed)

The three, accused of leaking state secrets, were tried in succession: Consecacao on Monday January 20, Araujo on Tuesday January 21 and Rangel on Wednesday January 22. It was alleged that Consecacao stole 'important letters' which she then passed on to Araujo, who gave them to Rangel, who in turn sent them to Jose Ramos Horta, spokesperson for the Maubere People's National Resistance Front. Ramos Horta is said to have then passed the documents to the Portuguese President, Mario Soares. The stolen documents pertain to reports by the East Timor Field Commander to the Chief of Udayana Military Regional Command concerning security arrangements for the visit of the Portuguese Parliamentarians. The documents detailed the sites to be visited where the Portuguese were to stay, and were apparently being used by the resistance to plan demonstrations for the visit. The 3 are to be charged under Article 112 of the Criminal Code, and may face up to 7 years jail.

In addition, the dossier of one of the 35, Gregorio dan Cunha Saldanha, who was arrested following the Dili massacre and is facing subversion charges, was sent to the Public Prosecutor on December 28 1991 but as yet it is unclear when he will face trial. He is believed by authorities to be a 'prime mover' in East Timorese pro-independence actions and one of the urban underground's couriers taking messages and supplies to Xanana. The charge of subversion carries a minimum sentence of 7 years. Gregorio has been reported to be threatened with the death sentence.

The dossiers of the 30 people suspected of being involved in the Dili Incident will be sent to the Public Prosecutor in early February. Of this 31, 18 are to face civil charges and the remaining 13 to be charged with subversion. Among the 18 are 2 university students, a carpenter, and 5 senior high school students.

Arrests and Detentions in Jakarta

On November 19, 1991, 70 people of the East Timorese Nationalist Student's Front marched to the United Nations Office, and the Japanese and Australian Embassies in Jalan Thamrin, Jakarta in protest of the November 12 massacre. They carried banners criticising the way in which the incident was handled

and opposing the 1976 'integration' of East Timor into Indonesia, and presented a statement written in Portuguese to representatives at each of the embassies.

Despite a statement by the Indonesian Armed Forces later that day that none of the students had been detained, the whole 70 were in fact picked up by police and detained in Metro Jaya Police Station, Jakarta. They were charged with inciting the state and disturbing public order under articles 154 and 155 of the Criminal Act.

Only after their third visit to the jail, on November 26, ^{→ LPHAM} was a team of three human rights lawyers consisting of HJC Princen (LPHAM), Frans Hendra Winarta and Rini Dwi Darmawati (LBH) permitted to meet with two of the prisoners, i.e: Joao Barreto and Joao Freitas Camara. From the time of his detention in Metro Jaya, Joao has been kept in an isolated cell on the basis that he was suspected of being the 'mastermind' of the demonstration of November 19 and the 'key' to the underground resistance movement in Jakarta.

On the same day (November 26), after a weeks detention and intensive interrogations in Metro Jaya, 49 of the 70 prisoners were released. Their release was contingent on their stated recognition of East Timor as a part of Indonesia and as Suharto as their President, and on their promise not to talk to journalists about their conditions while in detention. On their release their status was not 'open release' but simply postponement of their detention. To this day they continue to be monitored by authorities. A significant number of them were required to report twice a week to Metro Jaya but about a month after their release they were told they were no longer required to report. (For the names of both the 49 students released and the 21 still remaining in detention see appendix).

The Bali 4

On December 22, 1991, four East Timorese students from Bali, arrested on November 24 1991 in their house and detained in Nusra Police Station, were transferred to Jakarta to join their 21 friends in Metro Jaya.

The chronology of their arrest, detention and subsequent transferral to Jakarta are detailed in a letter from one of the Bali detainees, as follows:

November 22 1991: At 6am our house in Denpasar, inhabited by the 6 people listed below:

- 1. Fernando de Araujo (native of Ainaro, student of Indonesian at Udayana University, Denpasar)*
- 2. Jose Maria Pompeia Saldanha Robeiro (native of Bidau, Dili, and student of Agriculture at Udayana)*
- 3. Antonio dos Santos Matos (native of Mascarenhas, Dili, student of economics at UNDIKNAS)*
- 4. Jose Paoio da Silva (native of Bidau, Dili and student of Agriculture at Udayana)*
- 5. Joaquim da Costa Freitas (native of Los Palos, student of Agriculture at Udayana)*

Was surrounded by around 30 police and intelligence personnel, some of whom were armed. They proceeded to enter the house and ordered the 6 of us to gather in the front room. Meanwhile, 6 of them dressed in traditional Balinese dress began to check the 4 bedrooms of the house unaccompanied by any of us. They then ordered Clemente Soares to accompany them while they checked the rooms again. On the second check, one of the personnel came forwards and presented a box which he claimed to be a bomb he had found in one of the rooms.

The authorities then ascended to the upstairs room and emptied it of all its contents, including documents, medicines and other personal belongings. They then invited Clemente Soares to follow them upstairs again and check the room himself. In the corner, he found a piece of cloth which did not belong to any of the inhabitants of the house, so he went to pick it up and throw it downstairs with the rest of the stuff. He was stopped, however, by the police personnel present who shouted warnings at him not to do so. The piece of cloth was then taken downstairs, opened, and mysteriously, a granate was found inside. Consequently, one of the personnel claiming to be from the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) announced that there was a written order out to arrest the 6 of us. We were never shown such an order, but taken immediately to Nusra Police Station, Denpasar, placed in separate rooms and interrogated.

In this first interrogation we were merely asked personal details such as our age, names and family details.

At 9pm all of us except Fernando Araujo were transferred to Badung Police Station where we stripped down to our underpants and placed in isolated cells.

On November 25, 1991, the 6 of us were brought together again at Nusra and interrogated from 8:30 am until 11 or 12 at night. The interrogations focussed on three main subjects: our disagreement with the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, our views on the November 12 Dili Massacre, and on the structure of Reneil (Resistencia Nacional Dos Estudantes de Timor Leste: the National Resistance of East Timorese Students) network. On this date, two of us, Jose and Paulo, were released.

After around 2 weeks of similar interrogations of the 4 of us remaining in detention, we were transferred from the police intelligence to a police sergeant and similarly interrogated for almost 4 weeks.

The written authorisation of detention stated that we were to be detained for 20 days (November 24 - December 14). Our detention was based on the suspicion that we were subversives and traitors of the Indonesian Republic. On the transferral of our interrogations from the police intelligence to the police sergeant, however, different accusations were mounted against us. It was at this time that we discovered that Fernando Araujo was to be charged under Articles 154 and 155 of the Civil Code and the remaining three of us under Articles 106 to 110 of the Civil Code.

On December 22, 1991 at 7am we were taken with our hands bound, to Ngurah Rai Airport, Bali, and flown to Jakarta where we arrived at 1pm. We were then taken to Metro Jaya Police Station, Jakarta.

In Metro Jaya, the four of us have been placed in Cell Block A6 separated from the other 21 including Joao Camara who is alone. Despite our requests to the authorities to be joined with the other 21 on December 24 in order to perform our Christmas prayers together, since our arrival we have been forbidden to meet them. We are given food three times a day: coffee and fried bananas in the morning, Padang food at midday, and an evening meal which is hardly edible.

Eight of our colleagues detained in Dili have also been charged with subversion. Can our struggle to refuse the integration of our people and country with the Republic of Indonesia be called subversive? It is our belief that the integration process of the past 16 years is a result of force and does not reflect the free will of the East Timorese people. In accordance with International law, Portugal does not recognise that we, the sons and daughters of East Timor, are part of Indonesia. Can our efforts as East Timorese, not as Indonesians, to exercise our right to self determination, be called subversion? After one of us requested a legal representative he was told by police that our cases require no legal representation because the accusations directed at us are justified by the Civil Code. Is such a thing really written into Indonesian Law?

NB : When still in Denpasar, Jose Pompeia Saldanha Robeiro was said by friends to have been so badly beaten that he couldn't walk properly and his facial features were almost unrecognisable.

On January 10, two lawyers from the Legal Aid Institute team to be responsible for the defence of the Jakarta detainees signed a letter of authorisation indicating their intention to act in the defence of the 4 detainees from Bali. However, 9 days later, on January 19, a journalist reported seeing the 25 East Timorese detainees at the High Commission's Office. According to a credible source, the visit of the 25 to the High Commissioner's Office is connected to the government's plans to release the detainees in stages. The first stage will apparently include the release of 7 of the students and the rest will follow. The release of the students represents an effort on the government's part to prove its good intentions in improving the human rights situation here. Most importantly, the two supposed 'puppet masters' of the East Timorese underground network, Joao Camara and Fernando de Araujo, have been told by government authorities that they will have nothing to worry about if they make a public apology to the president. It is our assumption that this means they will be freed on certain conditions. However, till now, the students have refused to make such a statement.

The majority of students arrested on November 18 held government scholarships which since late November have been revoked. On 10 December by Jacob Ribeiro, treasurer of the East Timor Regional Government Projects section, who distributed a letter to 23 students notifying them of the revoking of their scholarships. 13 of these 23 received 20.000 and the remaining 10 Rp 10.000 per month. According to the notification letter dated December 2, their scholarships would be cut for semester II (November/December 1991 and January 1992) in accordance with a government order of November 22. No reason for the

revoking of the scholarships was forthcoming in the notification. An additional 16 students have also yet to receive their monthly payments, and consider that their scholarships have likewise been revoked although they have received no notification letter. Clearly, those still being detained in Jakarta have also had their scholarships revoked. (For the names of the students who been subject to the revocation, not including those still being detained, see appendix.)

As a result, most of these students can only afford to eat once a day and many are falling ill. Many of them also have been given ultimatums by their landlords/ladies that they must pay their rent before the end of January or move out. Consequently, students will be finding it very difficult to complete their courses.

Interweaving the continuing persecution of East Timorese following the massacre were the disciplinary measures aimed at the press, 'certain' human rights organisations and students. While the political elite were playing games with their power following the Dili massacre, the government jumped at the chance to revive the rhetoric of developmental nationalism. The issue of foreigners' participation in the demonstration was greatly publicised, as was the government's claim that an Australian NGO was behind the demonstration of November 12. Suddenly foreign tourists were identified as spies. And press statements were made warning people to beware of unpatriotic Indonesian NGO's. On December 24, Kentot Harseno, Jakarta District Police Chief, warned people to be careful of those wearing the mask of democratisation and human rights. In an interview that appeared on Indonesia's commercial television station on January 17, Minister for Internal Affairs Rudini reminded mass political organisations that they are required to register with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to Rudini, the 1985 Law on Mass Organisations empowers the government to interfere in the affairs of NGOs if their activities are considered to have endangered the nation.

The government's attempt to create a xenophobic Indonesian society not only serves the purpose of its self-defense against international criticism. It also justifies its taking action against anyone it cares to label as 'unpatriotic', and is therefore clearly linked to attempts to create a favourable public opinion for the 'cleaning up' that will inevitably occur as the general election, scheduled for June, approaches.

It seems that the Dili Incident has allowed for the cleaning up to start early. On November 20, the day after the detention of the 70 East Timorese student demonstrators, 3 Indonesian human rights activists (HJC Princen of LPHAM, Yopie Lasut of LPK and Indro Tjahyono of Insight) were arrested and later released on the condition that they report three times a week to the local police station for interrogation.

On January 9, 1992, as a result of the participation in the 21 November Bandung student's protests against the violent methods employed by the military on November 12 in Dili, Pius Lustri Landand of Parahiyangan University in Bandung (UNPAR) was expelled. According to a fellow participant in the action, Pius carries out his task as 'komando' in the action in a disciplined manner. However, before the action began, Pius got into a conflict with one of the rector's staff who, with the aide of a member of the student regiment, attempted to put an end to the action. Pius and his friends continued with their plans however, and the conflict ended with Pius yelling a warning at the Rector's staff not to remove the candles and flowers that had been prepared as symbols of mourning.

On January 15, 1992, three editorial staff of the weekly *Jakarta Jakarta* were sacked following the inclusion in the January 4 issue of the magazine, of an interview with 3 eye-witnesses of the Dili Incident. At a press plenum of the Indonesian Journalists Union, Yakob Oetama, head of the Kompas group that owns *Jakarta Jakarta* was reprimanded by Benny Moerdani, Try Sutrisno, and Moerdiono (Minister for State Secretariat), who were invited to give papers there. Apparently the publishing of the interviews was out of line. As a result of the reprimand, Yakob sacked three of his editorial staff.

THE POLITICAL AFTERMATH OF THE DILI INCIDENT : A TRIUMPH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?

It is no longer a secret that Indonesian intelligence personnel were integrally involved in the November 12 massacre. East Timorese refugees now residing in Portugal, after viewing a videotape of the massacre, have identified Morsani, a well-known secret police agent, and LetCol Poerwanto, Head of Intelligence Operations in East Timor, as instigators of the massacre. Among those who witnessed the videotape of the massacre was Eusebeio Corsino, a former resistance fighter who was captured and conscripted into the Indonesian Army and knows its structure well. According to Corsino, it was Poerwanto who was responsible for the entry, position and withdrawal of troops from the cemetery. Whereas Mursani, shown in the cemetery in civilian clothing, was responsible for co-ordinating the movements of the different military groups present. These groups included Kodim (the local military command), troops from at least one elite Indonesian battalion, a Brimob (riot police) unit, local police and other plainclothes intelligence agents. According to Corsino, this indicates a special intelligence operation whose main co-ordinator must have been Poerwanto.

But the Dili massacre must be read not merely as a military intelligence operation directed at East Timorese pro-independence activists. In fact it plays a much more integral role in Indonesia's political scene, that is in the succession struggle between Suharto and Benny. The formation of the DKM (*Dewan Kehormatan Militer: Honorary Military Council*)¹ is Suharto's attempt to wrench the ABRI leadership from Benny and Try, the military apparatus having been utilized by them in an effort to embarrass Suharto. These events have been analyzed in the following different ways:

1. The killings were an attempt to show that Indonesia continues to be threatened by separatism and that the dominant role of ABRI is therefore justified.
2. Due to the continuing instability in East Timor company licenses must go through the military or must be controlled completely by the military.
3. The massacre was an attempt by the military to ruin Suharto's international image in the hope that foreign aid would be cut providing an opportunity for a military coup.

These analyses pay little attention to the human factors involved in the incident, in particular to the rights of those people who have fallen victim to political powerplay among the elite. The issue should be seen in terms of the killing of East Timorese people as a human rights violation, and the annexation of East Timor without the sanction of a referendum as aggression, which takes place in the context of the military bureaucratic capitalism that prevails in Indonesia.

¹ On January 2 1992 the Army Chief of Staff Edy Sudrajat named 9 high-ranking military officers to the Army Honorary Council (*Dewan Kehormatan Militer: DKM*) to establish what went wrong in the military handling of the November 12 demonstration. According to official statements, the DKM would investigate the actions taken by Panjaitan and Warouw in handling the tragedy. The council was also expected to help determine the whereabouts of the missing bodies of the victims and is expected to begin work in the third week of February. Seven people were named as members of the Council. They are: [a]. Chair: Maj. Gen. Faisal Tanjung (Commander of the Army Staff College) [b]. Vice-Chair: Maj. Gen. Toni Hartono (governor of the Military Academy) [c]. Secretary: Maj. Gen. R. Sunardi (logistics assistant to staff chief) [d]. Maj. Gen. Sutopo (personal assistant to the Army Chief) [e]. Maj. Gen. Suparman Ahmad (Commander of the Infantry) [f]. Maj. Gen. Surjadi Sudirja (head of the socio-political section of the Armed Forces)

Further, such analyses fail to address the impact of the Dili Incident on freedom of movement and freedom of speech in Indonesia as a whole. Disciplining of the military has been paralleled by similar action being taken against NGOs considered 'subversive', journalists and East Timorese living in other parts of the archipelago. While apologies to the families of the victims of November 12 were forthcoming from Suharto, and statements of regret from Panjaitan, the Indonesian security continued in its efforts to uncover the East Timorese resistance network by a systematic series of arrests, detentions and intensive interrogations in Dili, Denpasar and Jakarta.

In this sense it becomes obvious that whilst human rights is definitely on the international agenda, it is no more than a pawn in the chess game of international politics and like a pawn can be moved back and forth and sideways at will. Blame for the destruction that has occurred over the past 16 years in East Timor cannot be entirely put on the Indonesian government. In many ways Western Governments have also handled the East Timor question irresponsibly.

Certain governments need to be applauded on their reaction to the Dili massacre which has forced the Indonesian government to take more seriously the issue of human rights violations by the military than it has on previous occasions. The halting of all new projects in Indonesia by Holland, Canada and Denmark seems to have allowed for more lenient treatment of some East Timorese detainees being held in connection with the Dili Incident than may otherwise have been the case. This has proven the importance of pressure from Western governments in improving the human rights situation in Indonesia.

However, the position Western governments have taken on the issue of the massacre is not without its hypocrisies. It must be remembered that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor was much facilitated by the fact that Portugal refused to complete the decolonization process, after the Portuguese governor fled to Atauro during the civil war that preceded the Indonesian take-over. Also irresponsible was Portugal's postponement of the Parliamentary Visit scheduled for November 1991, after warnings from East Timorese themselves that if the visit did not eventuate, there would be a bloodbath.

In addition, The Dutch government's decision to scrap the boycott on aid to Indonesia was immature when 22 East Timorese remained in detention in Jakarta accused of subversion and insulting the state for expressing their opposition to integration and concern over the military's handling of the Dili Incident. It was also untimely considering that Amarao de Araujo, Felismina dos Santos Consecacao and Alfonso Rangel have all faced trial this week in Dili for leaking state secrets. And further it was an inappropriate response the official KPN figure of victims, considering the other conclusions made in the mission's final report which were based on unprofessional and one-sided investigative methods.

When he was still No. 1 man, Bob Hawke put made his visit to Jakarta scheduled in January 1992 contingent on the fulfillment of the conditions that a fair and honest enquiry is held and that those found to be guilty are punished. Later, Foreign Minister Evans explained in a press conference that the Australian Government would continue to monitor further developments in Indonesia. The letter also emphasized the need for those who condoned or used excessive force to be punished appropriately, and called for their release of all East Timorese political prisoners being held in connection with the Dili Incident.

However it is quite ironic that while Hawke was shedding tears of morality, on December 18, 1991, the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Philip Flood, was signing contracts paving the way for various consortia to start drilling in the gap in 1992². And after signing the Timor Sea away to multinational oil companies, the following day Flood made a reference to the 'historic ties between Australia and East Timor'

² In December of 1991, Portugal filed a protest with Canberra over the signing of 6 of the 11 production sharing contracts up for grabs. The contracts were signed by the Joint (Australian-Indonesian) authority overseeing development in the Cap. 8 consortia and one sole company are to secure the 11 contracts, involving 18 companies in all. A consortium comprising Marathon (US), Santos (Aust.) and Korea Petroleum will drill 12 wells. Another comprising Shell, BHP and BP has secured a contract to drill 3 oil wells and one gas. In January 1991, the Indonesia - Australia Joint Authority for the Timor Gap Zone of Co-operation yesterday signed 4 new contracts for oil exploration in Zone A, with an investment of US\$130.66 m. The contracts were signed in Jakarta by the Executive Director of the Joint Authority D. Zahar, and representatives of the 4 contractor companies, and was witnessed among others by Philip Flood. On the basis of the contract, BHP Petroleum and Index invested US\$33.36million for a period of 6 years with an area of 5000 km². Petros and Sagasco have committed US\$28.5 million for a period of 6 years with an area of 6000km². A consortium of Enterprise/Nippon Oil has committed US\$42.4 million with an area of 6000 km². And Enterprise is to invest US\$26.4m in an area of 4,500km². Zahar explained that yesterday's signing, the second one to take place in Jakarta, represented the last step in the contracting out of Zone A and the Timor Gap, and that exploration is now ready to start.

in connection with Garth Evans' arrival in Jakarta and his intention to discuss the Dili Incident with Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Indeed the initial invasion Australia was not totally innocent. The then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam told Suharto in 1974 that he felt Indonesia should become part of Indonesia. It has also been suggested that Hawk's tears cannot be taken seriously when 22 Indonesian military officers remain in Australia studying at Kunungra Military College as part of a \$2 million defense co-operation project with Jakarta³.

The United States government also took the issue seriously, and on November 15 sent State Department team to Dili to make a report on the massacre. The team concluded that the death toll was between 75 and 100. Resolutions condemning the massacre were passed in both houses of Congress, both calling for the reassessment of IMET (International and Military Education Training), a program for the training of US senior military officers worth US\$1.9 million. State Secretary Bolcher's decision not to halt the program on the basis that it could contribute to professionalism in the Indonesian military and expose it to democratic standards and humanitarianism, is therefore extremely disappointing, apart from the fact that is a hollow argument. If IMET is capable of injecting humanitarianism and 'democracy' into the military, then why until now has it failed to do so?

The United Nations needs to be congratulated for adopting a unanimous resolution calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops only 5 days after the invasion, and continued to adopt resolutions for 6 years thereafter, after which the 'Question of Timor' was entrusted to the Secretary-General. However, given that within 4 months of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council adopted no more than a dozen resolutions, and that resolutions have now been sought in Cambodia and are currently being sought in Palestine, also under the auspices of the United Nations, it is high time that the United Nations took more positive steps towards seeking a satisfactory resolution to the Question of Timor.

The hypocrisies of many Western government's positions on the Question of Timor suggest that 'human rights' is only another chess-piece in the board-game of international politics. It seems, Suharto has proven himself able to adapt to the new rules of the game. His revamped image represents new challenges, rather than a triumph, for human rights in Indonesia.

Continuing restrictions on freedom of expression, censorship in the media, restraints on the right to organize, the right to hold an opinion that differs from the power-holders, the setting up of extra-constitutional and semi-military institutions that infringe upon civil and citizens rights, the Indonesian government has failed to ensure Indonesian society of basic human rights.

In his handling of the Dili Incident, Suharto has killed two birds with one stone. By ordering the formation of the National Investigative Committee which later put the numbers of victims of the massacre at 50, well above the official military figure of 19, and subsequently calling for the removal of Commander of Territorial Operations, R. Warouw, and Udayana Regional Command, S. Panjaitan, from their posts, Suharto has assumed the role of discipliner of deviant elements within the military. With this he has saved himself from the schemes of Benny Moerdani, Minister of Defense and Security, to check-mate him, and at the same time gained some international credibility. In addition, in his new role as a hero of human rights, Suharto has carefully controlled and clearly delineated the limits of the public debate on East Timor.

It needs to be remembered, however, that the very nature of the political system in Indonesian necessarily violates the basic civil rights of freedom of expression and freedom of association. The implementation of the floating mass doctrine, the domination of the central political apparatus by the military, strict controls on the media, and the complex political bureaucratic system effectively blocks the access of the ordinary people to the decision makers. In this way the formation of the KPN is no more than

³ Over the period of 1974 to 1985/6, A74.3 million went into military co-operation projects with Jakarta. The projects included training and study visits, supply of Nomad aircraft, maintenance/capability of Attack Class Patrol boats, supply of electronic target ranges, and survey and mapping of remote areas of Indonesia. Although Jakarta suspended military co-operation programs in 1988 in retaliation to the "Jenkins Affair" of 1985. Negotiations commenced with exchange visits by Peter Graion, Australian Defence Force Chief, and Try Sutrisno. The Royal Australian Navy has also carried out joint exercises with the Indonesian Navy in the Arafura Sea, and, over the next year 50 Indonesian Officers are to attend Australian Defence colleges.

an example of the window dressing at which the government has become adept. In reality, Suharto is clearly no human rights hero, and there can be little improvement in the Indonesian human rights situation without significant structural change.

In view of the above, the following demands are proposed:

1. That the government respect human rights as reflected in the UN Human Rights Declaration. The government's recent reactive response to international opinion concerning human rights will only make it more difficult for Indonesia to find a niche for itself in the New World Order.
2. That the government and the Armed Forces re-evaluate the security approach and the infrastructure that supports it. The security approach, by actively employing the military apparatus, only promotes dependence and ignorance rather than educating society on how to independently achieve social stability. Let the Dili Incident and its many prologues and epilogues be a turning point for the ushering out of the era of armed violence and the ushering in of a new political life where civil rights are truly ensured.
3. That government and the Armed Forces take a realistic stance towards the international tendency to take human rights into account when measuring economic success, or to link human rights with the disbursement of economic aid. Donor countries' concern that their economic aid is not indirectly used to support oppression by fascist governments or armed violence in developing countries, should be respected.
4. That the government and the Armed Forces be realistic in facing up to the fact that human rights, as a manifestation of a new world solidarity, is now a real international concern. Only by taking this into account can we formulate realistic and comprehensive policies such that the political implications of human rights violations does not cause upsets in the economic and trade sector. The government and the Armed Forces should define what they mean by 'foreign intervention' rather than using the term sporadically and against national interests. Indeed, economic aid, the buying and selling of arms, multilateral and bilateral co-operation, could similarly be viewed as foreign intervention. Likewise we should remember the part played by foreigners in Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945, that is, the role of international solidarity in achieving independence.
5. In the name of upholding democracy, the government must leave behind the typical defensive response to criticism arising from society. The government also must move from its usual stubborn stance in dealing with statements and national incidents. The habit of seeking a 'puppet master' or certain 'interests' behind the scene of every incident only illustrates the government's intention to avoid substantial resolution of a problem rather than taking responsibility for the effect of its policies. Transparent statements revealing the government's reactive and defensive position will only serve to determine international sympathy for Indonesia, apart from complicating the task of resolving problems in accordance with People's Rights.
6. Concerning the Dili Incident, we must remember that East Timor is a victim of the domino theory, the lack of a concept of a 'friendly neighbor' and also one of the possibility of non-invasionary security that prevailed at the time leading up to the invasion. But with the departure from the domino theory that has accompanied an increase in concern for national sovereignty, Indonesia's ability to maintain good relation with countries that share her national boundaries (such as Brunei, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea) and the emergence of military co-operation between countries of the region (Brunei, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Australia) in the midst of debates about the development of democracy and human rights, Indonesia's policy towards East Timor needs to be re-examined. The government must face up to the fact that East Timor is an international issue. Thus, in the interests of maintaining national dignity, the government must consider and take a position on issues of national sovereignty and self-determination. Only with the Indonesian government's recognition of the validity of the right to self-determination, rather than continuing to insist that the problem is an 'internal Indonesian affair', will the issue be truly resolved. Remembering the 1982 United Nations Resolution (no. 37/30) on the

question of Timor, which recognizes the "inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations", a neutral investigative team under the auspices of the United Nations remains a necessity. Infigt proposes a 12-person team headed by Secretary General of the United Nations, Bhoutros Chali, and comprising:

Vatican representative

Desmond Tutu

Aung San Kyu

Hashnan Ashrawi

Pat O'Shane

Mother Teresa

Bob Geldof

Lord Avebury

Erika Teepstra

Tony Hall

Dalai Lama

APPENDIX

The following people were detained following the murders at Motael church on October 28:

1. Bonifacio BARRETO, of Maliana, aged 20 years
2. Alcixo DA SILVA GAMA, of Laga, aged between 20 and 25 years.
3. Domingos SOARES, of Ermera, aged between 20 and 25 years
4. Domingo DA SILVA, of Bobonaro, aged 20/25
5. Nazerio TAVARES, of Baucau, aged 20/5
6. Jaulaio Mausiri, of Dili, aged 20/5
7. Valdamar DA SILVA, of Bazartete-Liquica, aged 20/5
8. Afonso RANGEL, of Viqueque, aged 20/5
9. Augusto SARMENTO, of Watulari, aged 20/5
10. Francelino GUTERRES, of Ossu, aged 20/5
11. Marcos DOS SANTOS, of Maliana 20/5
12. anuel EDUARDO, of Maliana , aged 20/5
13. Domingos BARRETO, of Maliana, aged 20/5
14. Jose SOARES, of Dili, Bairro Pite, aged 20/5
15. Augusto Diegas, of Same, aged 20/5
16. Julaio, of Baucau, aged 20/5
17. Gouveia, of Baucau, aged 20/5
18. Jacob BAPTISTE, of Dili, Villa Verde, aged 20/5
19. Bobby XAVIER, of Dili, Matadouro, aged 20/5
20. Olandino ARRETO, of Maliana, aged 20/5
21. Martinho GONCALVES, of Bobonaro, aged 20/5
22. David CONCEICAO , of Dili, Benori, aged ?

The following people were killed as a result of the Dili Massacre

Aghostino Tilamn Fernandes, 18 years, high school student:

Afonso, 18 years, high school student
Amelia, 17 years, high school student

Ana Romana Freitas, 25 years, unemployed
Andre Soares, 21 years, high school student
Aneta, 15 years, high school student
Antonio Clara Filipe Alves, 21 years.
Aristides dos Santos, 19 years, high school student
Aviano Antonio Faria, 18 years, high school student
Custodia Benevides, 15 years, high school student
Dionisio dos Santos
Domingos dos Santos, 21 years, high school student
Domingos, 18 years, high school student
Domingos, 10 years
Domingos Figurado, 27 years, teacher
Dos Reis
Duarte Acolito
Duarte da Silva, 22 years, Lorosae University student and Bank Summa footballer
Elidio Amaral, 25 years, student
Emilio Roberto, high school student
Eulalia Araujo, 17 years, high school student
Felipe, 24 years, university student
Francis da Silva, 18 years, resident of Dili
Franciso Laga, 21 years
Francisco da Silva, 20 years, high school student
Francisco Carlos (Abonno), 22 years, polytechnic student
Fredy da Costa, 17 years, high school student
Hacobio, 17 years, student
Jose Ximenes, 24 years
Jose Kodok, 22 years, unemployed
Jose Lemos Ximenes, 18 years, high school student
Leandro Isaac
Levi M. Corte Real, 18 years, high school student
Lito Calsona
Luis Alves, 21 years, high school student
Manuel da Silva, 14 years, high school student
Marcial da Silva, 14 years, high school student
Marcelino Guterres da Costa, student
Mario Miguel, 20 years, high school student
Miki Neve Reis
Milton Longhuinos, 16 years, high school student
Nunu, 28 years
Paula, 17 years, high school student
Paulo Freitas, 18 years, student
Prfirop da Costa, 24 years

Procopio Rego, 20 years
 Rafael Tilman Fernandes, 20 years, high school student
 Racobio, 17 years, student
 Simplicio de Deus
 Tomas Dias Imenes, student
 Ulises Goncalves, 21 years, high school student
 Varudo
 Vincente Binaraga

Among the wounded were identified the following people

Agio (Pelajo) Dos Santos, 16 years
 Alico dos Santos
 Bernadino Mendes, 22 years
 Crescencio Faria (Matos), 29 years, worker in the Department of Information
 Emilio Araujo, 21 years
 Isabel, student
 Joana Amorim Dias
 Joaquim Fernandes, 15 years, student
 Juvita Maria Lourdes
 Nelie Santo Ximenes, student
 Ricardo Alves, 16 years, student

The following people have been reported as missing

Agapito de Deus, 19 years, student
 Armando de Assis
 Basilio Moniz, 50+ years
 eonisio Aires
 Clementino Faria (Matos)
 Dionisio Alves (Nini)
 Fabiao da Silva
 Germano da Silva, 35/6 years
 Gregorio, 25 years, unemployed
 Ismail Jose dos Reis, 17 years, high school student
 Joanico dos Santos Sarmento, 46 years
 Joao Goncalves Soares
 Joao Bosco Caceres
 Jose Quintao Sarmento, 40 years, married with 7 children
 Luis Joao (Alois)
 Manuel Fatima Guterres, 49 years
 R. Pereira
 Tomas Dias Ximenes, student
 Ulises Goncalves, 21 years, high school student
 Vicente Paolo Madeira

The following people remain in detention in Jakarta:
 (resident of) Jakarta

Joao F. Camara
 Avelino Maria Coelho
Semarang
 Domingos Barreto
 Metodio Muniz
 Francisco Vasco

Yogya
 Jose Luis de Oliveira
 Sergio P. Dias Quintas
 Illidio da Costa

Malang
 Antonio Maher Lopes
 Vergilio da Silva G
 Antonio Soares

Bandung
 Filipe da Silva
 Joao Sarmento Pinto
 Fausto Bernadino
 Gregorio de Araujo
 Jose Maria C.B.X.

Bali
 Agapito
 Joao (alias) Travolta

Surabaya
 Mario Alvero Canelas
 Egas Q. Monteiro

Salatiga
 Benevidos C. Barros

The following people were released from Metro Jaya Police Station on 26/11/91:

Bandung:
 M. Renato M.D.C.,
 Joao de Oliveira,
 Paulo da Silva,
 Adalfredo Ximenes,
 Justino C. Soares,
 Paulino Marques,
 Victor Soares,
 Jose Barreto,
 Baptista Pascoal,
 Gabriel Antonio Sa,
 Nelson de Jesus,
 Gastao M.G.,
 Helder Luis X.J.,
 Avelino Tilman,
 Joanam F. Soares,
 Leoniza Lopes,
 Nelson Martins,
 Jose Antonio Loyola,
 Lidia Gomes,
 Rosa da Costa,

Aventino F.,
Francesco da Cunha,
Lucia M. Cabral,
Felismina S.,
Regina de Esus,
Laurentio S.F.,
Francisco G.O. Ximenes,

Semarang:

Antonio Pereira,
Cesaltino Leao,
Joao Baptista,
Angelo Condinho,
Claudio G. Pinto,
Manuel Soares,

Malang:

Vergilio da Silva Geterres,
Jacinto H.S.,
Rui Viana,
David Bosco Lay,
Dionisia Pinto,

Domingos dos Santos,
Faustino X.,
Miguel dos Santos,
Edith P.,

Yogyakarta:

Domingos dos Ramos,
Rogiero Pires,
Pertencio,
Flavio,
Joao Meco,
Demetrio,

Bali:

Anito Matos,
Jose Pompeia

Jakarta:

Jose A. A. Dias

Procopio Rego, 20 years
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 Racobio, 17 years, student
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 Domingos Barreto
 Metodio Muniz
 Francisco Vasco
Yogya

Jose Luis de Oliveira
 Sergio P. Dias Quintas
 Ilidio da Costa

Malang

Antonio Maher Lopes
 Vergilio da Silva G
 Antonio Soares

Bandung

Filipe da Silva
 Joao Sarmiento Pinto
 Fausto Bernadino
 Gregorio de Araujo
 Jose Maria C.B.X.

Bali

Agapito
 Joao (alias) Travolta

Surabaya

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 Jose Barreto,
 Baptista Pascoal,
 Gabriel Antonio Sa,
 Nelson de Jesus,
 Gastao M.C.,
 Helder Luis X.J.,
 Avelino Tilman,
 Joanam F. Soares,
 Leoniza Lopes,
 Nelson Martins,
 Jose Antonio Loyola,
 Lidia Gomes,
 Rosa da Costa,



amnesty international australia ^{42a}

With Compliments

Report from INFIGHT

Australian Section Office: Level 3, 134 Broadway 2007, Phone: (02) 211 3566 Fax: (02) 211 3608

NSW: Level 3, 134 Broadway, Sydney 2007, Phone: (02) 281 4188; **QLD:** 9th Flr, Advance Bank Bldg, Cnr Edward and Queen St, Brisbane 4000, Phone: (07) 221 0221; **SA:** 1st Flr, 155 Pirie St, Adelaide 5000, Phone: (08) 232 0066; **TAS:** 2nd Flr, Cat & Fiddle Arcade, Hobart 7001, Phone: (002) 34 7858; **VIC:** 14 Risley St, Richmond North 3121, Phone: (03) 427 7055; **WA:** Unit 4/85 Stirling St, Perth 6000, Phone: (09) 328 3144.

Jakarta, 24 Januari 1992

Kepada Yth.

Pimpinan dan Para Anggota DPR-RI
di

Jakarta


Dengan hormat,


Pada kesempatan menerima laporan Komisi Penyelidik Nasional (KPN) Peristiwa Dili-Timor Timur (12 November 1991), Presiden Soeharto telah pula menginstruksikan kepada Panglima ABRI untuk mencari orang-orang yang oleh keluarga mereka dilaporkan hilang sehubungan dengan peristiwa tersebut di atas.

Dalam pada itu pada tanggal 10 Desember 1991 kami telah mengirim surat kepada Panglima ABRI, meminta jaminan bagi keselamatan para saksi yang dapat memberikan keterangan dalam hal Peristiwa Tanjungpriok - 12 September 1984, mengingat bahwa di Tanjungpriok ada keluarga-keluarga yang sudah tujuh tahun lamanya mempertanyakan dalam hati kecil mereka di mana gerangan anak-anak atau anggota keluarga mereka dikuburkan (terlampir surat kami kepada Panglima ABRI tersebut - photocopy).


Dalam hubungan ini, kami menganggap perlu menyampaikan kepada pimpinan dan para anggota DPR-RI, untuk meminta perhatian Presiden Soeharto agar mengupayakan pula ditemukannya kembali mereka yang hilang dalam Peristiwa Tanjungpriok tersebut, satu dan lain hal demi perikemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab. Seandainya anggota-anggota keluarga yang hilang tersebut telah meninggal dunia pada saat terjadinya peristiwa Tanjungpriok - 12 September 1984 tersebut, hendaknya kepada keluarga para korban diberitahukan di mana para korban tersebut dikuburkan.


Atas perhatian Saudara-saudara, kami ucapkan terima kasih.



Dr. Aais Saleh
Mayjen TNI (Purn)


H. Ali Sadikin
Letjen Mar. (Purn)

Hormat kami,


H.R. Dharsono
Letjen TNI (Purn)


Drs. Hoegeng Iman Santoso
Jenderal Pol. (Purn)


Suyitno Sukirno
Marsekal Muda (Purn)

Tembusan:

1. Yth. Presiden Republik Indonesia dan Wakil Presiden R.I.
2. Yth. Pimpinan Lembaga Tinggi Negara lainnya.
3. Panglima ABRI.
4. Pimpinan Parpol dan Golkar.
5. Media Massa.

Jakarta 10 Desember 1991

Kepada Yth:
Panglima ABRI
di
Jakarta

Dengan hormat,

Pertama-tama kami ingin menyampaikan rasa pengertian kami dengan rumitnya permasalahan yang dihadapi Panglima sehubungan dengan Peristiwa 12 November 1991 di Dili, Timor Timur. Bagaimana pun juga, sebagai sesama yang berasal ABRI, kami tidak mungkin lepas dari citra ABRI yang diproyeksikan oleh sementara pihak dan keadaan dewasa ini. Dalam pada itu, kami kurang rela bila segala sesuatunya seolah-olah dipersalahkan kepada ABRI dan diidentifikasi dengan watak keprajuritan yang kurang terpuji.

Betapa rumitnya masalah yang dihadapi oleh ABRI, dapatlah dicontohkan dengan kasus KBN Antara yang mengolah artikel Ny. Helen Todd dalam *Asian Wall Street Journal* tanggal 25 November 1991. Ternyata bahwa tulisan aselinya kurang mendukung apa yang diekspose oleh pemberitaan Antara yang malahan sempat mengundang reaksi yang meragukan dari berbagai pemuka di Jakarta.

Hampir serupa adalah dampak pemberitaan bahwa Javiez Perez de Cuellar, Sekjen PBB, beranggapan ada kemungkinan mengirimkan tim peneliti PBB ke Timor Timur. Berbagai reaksi dari Jakarta mengesankan seolah-olah hal itu sudah merupakan keputusan PBB yang harus ditentang. Selain salah-kaprah, kita telah membuang waktu dan simpati dunia dengan bereaksi secara berlebihan dan tergesa-gesa.

Sementara itu, dalam kedua hal di atas, sudah ada beberapa pemuka yang berani menganjurkan "tahan-diri" dalam memberikan reaksi. Kami pun bergabung dengan mereka dalam menganjurkan kebijaksanaan bilamana bereaksi, juga karena kemungkinan adanya suatu permainan politik tidak boleh dikesampingkan begitu saja. Melihat kecenderungannya, permainan politik itu dapat diduga akan menyudutkan ABRI, padahal perilaku dan tindakan ABRI sekedar merupakan pantulan sikap dan kebijakan pemerintah.

Mengingat hal-hal yang dikemukakan di atas, kami ingin mengusulkan suatu langkah preventif yang mudah-mudahan berguna dalam usaha bersama untuk tetap menjaga nama baik ABRI. Untuk itu, kami mengajak Panglima kembali ke Peristiwa Tanjungpriok tanggal 12 September 1984. Jika surat-kabar *Berita Buana* menurunkan kisah seorang ibu di Dili yang sudah berhari-hari mencari jejak anaknya, maka di Tanjungpriok ada yang sudah 7 (tujuh) tahun mempertanyakan dalam hati-kecilnya di mana gerangan anaknya dikuburkan.

Alangkah mulianya ABRI jika dapat menjamin keselamatan para saksi yang dapat memberikan keterangan dalam hal Peristiwa Tanjungpriok. Di bawah lindungan ABRI suatu tim swasta nasional (yang pada hakekatnya sudah lama *standby*) dapat melengkapi daftar mengenai:


- nama-nama yang menemui ajalnya,
- di mana mereka dikuburkan.

Rasanya kita akan memenuhi salah satu kewajiban orang beriman jika dengan keterangan di atas kita dapat meringankan tekanan batin para keluarga yang ditinggalkan oleh mereka yang menemui ajalnya di malam hari naas tanggal 12 September 1984 di Tanjungpriok.



Kami sadari bahwa kurang bijaksanalah jika ABRI secara resmi memaklumkan sikapnya untuk memungkinkan pengumpulan keterangan seperti yang dimaksud di atas. Tetapi kami pun yakin bahwa usaha itu dapat dilaksanakan dengan efektif lewat pendekatan yang hati-hati (*discrete*) dengan menggunakan suatu lembaga survai yang terhormat. Kami yakin pula bahwa kesediaan ABRI untuk melindungi nara-sumber Peristiwa Tanjungpriok 12 September 1984 akan diketahui dan dihargai oleh masyarakat dalam dan luar negeri serta dengan demikian membantu menetralsir pemberitaan yang mau memojokkan ABRI.

Sekian sumbangan pikiran kami. Bilamana Panglima merasa perlu, kami bersedia memberi keterangan lebih lanjut. Akhirnya, atas perhatian Panglima diucapkan banyak terima kasih.


Hormat,




H. Ali Sadikin
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Letjen TNI (pur)



Drs. Hoegeng Iman Santoso
Jen Pol (pur)



Suyitno Sukirno
Marsda (pur)

amnesty international

EAST TIMOR

After the Massacre



Bob Muntz/Reuter

21 november 1991
AI Index: ASA 21/24/91
Distr: SC/CO

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM

amnesty international

EAST TIMOR

After the Massacre

21 NOVEMBER 1991

SUMMARY

AI INDEX: ASA 21/24/91

DISTR: SC/CO

About 100 people were killed and scores were wounded when Indonesian security forces opened fire for several minutes on a group of mourners at Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor on 12 November 1991. Dozens of others were badly beaten during the incident. The victims, many of them school students and other young people, were among an estimated 3,000 people who had gone to the grave of Sebastiao (Gomes) Rangel, a young man killed on 28 October when Indonesian troops entered the parish church of Motael, Dili, where he and about 20 other political activists had been hiding.

At least 42 people, and possibly as many as 300, have subsequently been detained, and some have reportedly been tortured and killed in police and military custody. According to one report, between 60 and 80 detainees, including witnesses of the Santa Cruz massacre, were taken from various prisons in Dili on 15 November, driven to a spot several miles outside the town, shot and buried in unmarked graves. Dozens of East Timorese were reportedly detained for questioning in Jakarta, on 20 November, following a demonstration in which they called for a thorough investigation into the killings and a referendum on East Timor's political status.

Indonesian government and military authorities have expressed regret at the deaths and the government has established a National Investigation Commission to inquire into the incident. However, the authorities have attempted to justify the massacre by claiming that security forces used force only when attacked and provoked by "a brutal mob". Several eyewitnesses, including a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of foreign journalists, have stated categorically that the procession and graveside ceremony were peaceful and that the soldiers opened fire without warning and without provocation. Amnesty International has viewed film footage and photographs of the incident which corroborate their testimony.

Amnesty International is calling for a thorough, impartial investigation into the circumstances of the massacre at Santa Cruz, and of the alleged extrajudicial executions of 15 November. It is also seeking guarantees that those responsible for extrajudicial

executions or for the ill-treatment of prisoners will be brought promptly to justice. It believes that investigations must be carried out by an independent body which has no link with the security forces allegedly responsible for the massacre. It also believes that any investigating body must include a team of trained forensic experts. The organization urges the Indonesian authorities to permit investigations to be carried out under the auspices of a recognized international body, such as the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions.

Amnesty International is also seriously concerned for the safety of those arrested during and after the Santa Cruz incident, as well as scores of suspected political activists arrested during the past year. It is urging that those detained solely for their non-violent political activities or beliefs be immediately released and that, following their release, their safety be guaranteed.

KEYWORDS: EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION¹ / MASS ARREST¹ / MILITARY / ARMED CIVILIANS / POLITICAL ACTIVISTS / STUDENTS¹ / WITNESSES / CIVIL SERVANTS / UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE / DEMONSTRATIONS / ARBITRARY ARREST / INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION / HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS / ICRC / INVESTIGATION OF ABUSES / PHOTOGRAPHS /

This report summarizes a 13-page document (3,441 words), *East Timor: After the Massacre* (AI Index: ASA 21/24/91), issued by Amnesty International on 21 November 1991. Anyone wanting further details or to take action on this issue should consult the full document.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM

EAST TIMOR

After the Massacre

Introduction¹

About 100 people were killed and scores were wounded when Indonesian security forces opened fire for several minutes on a group of mourners at Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor on 12 November 1991. Dozens of others were badly beaten during the incident. The victims, many of them school students and other young people, were among an estimated 3,000 people who had gone to the grave of Sebastiao (Gomes) Rangel, a young man killed on 28 October when Indonesian troops entered the parish church of Motael, Dili, where he and about 20 other political activists had been hiding.

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Indonesian government and military authorities have expressed regret at the deaths and the government has established a National Investigation Commission to inquire into the incident. However, the authorities have attempted to justify the massacre by claiming that security forces used force only when attacked and provoked by "a brutal mob". Several eyewitnesses, including a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of foreign journalists, have stated categorically that the procession and graveside ceremony were peaceful and that the soldiers opened fire without warning and without provocation. Amnesty International has viewed film footage and photographs of the incident which corroborate their testimony.

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¹ This document provides further information on the killings at Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili, originally documented in an Amnesty International report, East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre (ASA 21/23/91), dated 14 November 1991, and on subsequent developments to 21 November 1991.

link with the security forces allegedly responsible for the massacre. It also believes that any investigating body must include a team of trained forensic experts. The organization urges the Indonesian authorities to permit investigations to be carried out under the auspices of a recognized international body, such as the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions.

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Update on the Santa Cruz Massacre

The testimony of several foreign eyewitnesses confirms earlier reports that the killing at Santa Cruz appeared to be organized and pre-meditated, and that the procession was peaceful.² There does not appear to be any substantial evidence to support the government's claim that the killing was provoked by a violent attack by demonstrators, or the existence of a riotous mob. In important respects, the accounts of military and government authorities are entirely at odds with the weight of eyewitness and circumstantial evidence.

Several eyewitnesses have explicitly refuted claims by the Indonesian military authorities that the soldiers opened fire in response to some threat or physical provocation, such as a gunshot. One said that "...there was *absolutely no physical provocation visible throughout the whole procession*". Another said: "*It was a case of a planned and systematic massacre... This was a very disciplined operation. This was not a situation where you have some hothead who ran amok.*" Film footage of the incident, viewed by Amnesty International, shows soldiers armed with automatic weapons moving confidently, almost casually, around the cemetery and its perimeter during the course of the shooting. It is evident from their demeanour that they are neither encountering nor expecting physical opposition of any sort. The film also confirms that the security forces opened fire several minutes after the procession reached the cemetery and not during a scuffle in front of the Governor's office as military authorities have alleged.

² For a description of the massacre itself, see Amnesty International's East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre, (ASA 21/23/91), dated 14 November 1991.

Describing how the shooting began, one eye-witness said: *...as soldiers leapt off the trucks they formed a line and jogged towards the people and without warning opened fire directly into the crowd indiscriminately killing all in their view...many were shot in the back.* Another said: *"As the soldiers turned the corner they raised their M-16s and began all at once firing into the crowd."*



Young people gather the bloodstained clothes of victims shot by Indonesian Government soldiers at Santa Cruz Cemetery, Dili, on 12 November 1991

Reuter

The firing of automatic weapons reportedly continued for between two and three minutes without interruption, but then continued sporadically for some time. An eyewitness said that minutes after the shooting began he saw about 100 bodies lying on the ground, but he could not say how many were dead. Witnesses who had taken cover inside the cemetery said they saw soldiers beating those they found, including the

wounded, with truncheons and the butts of their automatic weapons. One foreigner, discovered by soldiers while hiding in the cemetery, said:

I left the crypt with at least 10 people bleeding profusely and several dead. All the way to the entrance to the cemetery I was confronted by soldiers brandishing knives and bayonets and thrusting them towards my face. I was kicked and beaten and had guns put to my head while they screamed at me.

Unofficial estimates of the number of people who died at Santa Cruz cemetery range from 50 to more than 200. Amnesty International has so far learned the names of more than 60 people feared to have died in the incident, or shortly thereafter (See Appendix I). The government claims that 19 people were killed and 91 injured in the incident.

Arrests

An estimated 300 people are reported to have been arrested following the Santa Cruz incident, although the government has only acknowledged holding 42 people. One person detained for questioning but later released said he counted 12 vehicles arrive at the police station in Dili, each carrying dozens of people, stripped to the waist and tied. There have been reports of the torture and killing of some detainees and there is serious concern for their safety. There is also concern for the safety of dozens of suspected political activists arrested during the past year, including at least 20 detained in the aftermath of the 28 October 1991 incident at the parish church of Motael, Dili, in which Sebastiao (Gomes) Rangel and one other man died.

Reports from Dili say that security forces and government backed vigilantes have detained dozens of people in house to house searches since the Santa Cruz incident. The whereabouts of many of those detained remain unclear, and relatives fear that they may have been killed. According to one report, three men from a single family and several other men from Bidau, Dili, were taken from their homes by security forces on or about 18 November, and have not been seen since. Arrests have also been reported from several places outside of Dili, including Baucau, Ainaro, Liquica and Lospalos, but the names of those detained are not yet known.

Military authorities have prevented relatives from visiting the wounded in hospital and those detained by the military and police. They have also prevented representatives of the ICRC from conducting independent and confidential visits to prisons and hospitals.

An ICRC official said on 20 November that the conditions laid down by the military were unacceptable. *"We need to see the injured in the hospital, talk to them without witnesses... I cannot accept half steps. We have made many compromises but not any more."*

The Reported Killings of 15 November 1991

Amnesty International has received unconfirmed reports that between 60 and 80 more people were extrajudicially executed on 15 November, and their bodies buried in large unmarked graves outside of Dili. The reported killings occurred just two days after the Armed Forces Commander, General Try Sutrisno, called for the "trouble-makers" in East Timor to be shot. Those killed are said to have included witnesses to the 12 November incident as well as suspected or known political activists, arrested at the time of the incident and in house to house searches in the following days. According to reports, they were taken in military trucks from various prisons in Dili to a place on the outskirts of town. Before being loaded onto the trucks, the prisoners were reportedly made to strip naked; they were blindfolded and their hands were tied behind their backs. They were reportedly taken to the edge of newly-dug ditches and shot with automatic weapons. The troops responsible were said to have been members of the 700th and 744 Battalions of the Hasanuddin Division, based in South Sulawesi.

An eyewitness said that he would provide further details before a UN fact-finding delegation only if his safety could be guaranteed. A foreigner in Dili on 15 November said that, at about 11:45 am on that morning, he heard *"... a volley of automatic rifle fire that resounded right through the valley which lasted approximately 45 seconds...."*, followed by sporadic fire for about 30 seconds. A number of people in Dili reported independently that they had seen between two and four trucks, each carrying dozens of people, leaving town earlier that morning. One claimed to have seen a large pit, about 6 feet deep and measuring about 25 feet by 30 feet, in which it was said the dead were buried.

Unlike the massacre at Santa Cruz, the alleged killings of 15 November were not directly witnessed by foreigners and there are no photographs or films of the event. The sole eyewitness to the event is unwilling to testify for fear of reprisals from the security forces. This has led to some confusion about whether the killings took place; an Indonesian military spokesman has called the report *"a big lie"*. In Amnesty International's view, the lack of certainty in this case serves to highlight the importance of conducting prompt, independent and impartial investigations.



Indonesian Riot Police beat a demonstrator during a peaceful protest by East Timorese in Jakarta on 19 November 1991

Reuter

Protesters Arrested in Jakarta

Dozens of East Timorese demonstrating peacefully in Jakarta on 19 November, one week after the Santa Cruz killings, were detained by security forces. Military authorities initially denied that any had been detained, but unofficial sources said that at

least 35 people had been held at the Central Jakarta Police Station. The local media reported that five East Timorese remained in custody on 21 November, but their names were not known. Amnesty International has learned the names of 13 said to have been held for questioning. In the absence of any information about the whereabouts of those detained, it remains concerned for their safety. The organization is also concerned that some may be charged for their peaceful political activities and beliefs.

The demonstrators went first to the office of the United Nations Information Office on Jalan Thamrin. Unable to enter the premises to present a statement addressed to the UN Secretary General, they instead read it aloud outside the gate. With banners and signs calling for a referendum on East Timor's political future and for inquiries into the massacre at Santa Cruz, they proceeded to the Embassies of Japan and Australia nearby. As they regrouped near the Hotel Indonesia, members of the riot police (SABHARA) moved in to disperse them and journalists were ordered to leave the vicinity. The demonstrators began to flee, but were chased by police who beat them with truncheons and loaded them onto three waiting vehicles. Two foreign journalists at the scene were taken aside by security forces and questioned about their links to the demonstrators before being released.

The next day, 20 November 1991, three Jakarta-based human rights activists were detained briefly by the security forces, apparently for their alleged involvement in the demonstration. Haji Poncke Princen, Director of the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights (LPHAM), Indro Tjahjono of the human rights organization "Infight" and one other were reportedly held for questioning at the office of the military intelligence body (BAKORSTANAS) for several hours. Haji Princen was one of a group of human rights activists and lawyers who had planned to travel to Dili on the same day in order to conduct independent investigations into the Santa Cruz massacre.

The Government and Military Response: An Update

The government has announced the formation of a seven-member National Investigation Commission to inquire into the killings. In a press statement on 19 November, the government said that the Commission was to be headed by a Supreme Court Judge and would have representatives from: the Departments of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, and also from the Armed Forces Headquarters, the President's Supreme Advisory Council and the Parliament (People's Representative

Assembly, DPR).³ The government said that the Commission would be "...*free to carry out their tasks so that it could really find out what was actually going on during the incident...*". However, no details of the Commission's terms of reference were made public. Military authorities indicated that an internal investigation would be headed by the Deputy Chief of Strategic Intelligence, Major General Arie Sudewo, but no further details were made available.

Amnesty International is concerned that the government's National Investigation Commission and the military's investigation team may lack the necessary independence, credibility and forensic expertise to conduct a proper inquiry.

Restrictions which military authorities have placed on access to the wounded and those imprisoned, and their refusal to release the names of those killed, wounded and imprisoned, reinforce doubts that the Commission's investigations will be thorough and impartial and that it will result in the perpetrators being brought to justice. Military authorities have continued to claim that "only 19" people died at Santa Cruz and have hindered efforts to establish an accurate account of the number and the identity of those killed. They have admitted that the bodies of many who died at Santa Cruz were immediately buried at an abandoned graveyard outside of Dili. The hasty disposal of the bodies has precluded the performance of proper post-mortem examinations or forensic tests. It has also prevented families from identifying the deceased and burying them according to their traditions or religious beliefs.

Military authorities have also indicated their intention to restrict the access of outside observers and investigators. Brigadier General Warouw said on 20 November that observers would be allowed to visit the wounded at the military hospital but that they "...*will not be able to talk to them until our interrogations are over because the sight of foreigners could make them start talking about wild rumours.*" On 21 November, he told a journalist that the time was "*not yet right*" for the ICRC and other observers to visit the wounded.

The statements of military and government authorities since the Santa Cruz massacre have also raised very serious questions about the government's sincerity in conducting prompt, thorough and impartial investigations and about the likelihood that

³ According to the official press agency, the Commission will be comprised of: Supreme Court Judge Muhammad Jaelani SH; Clementino dos Reis D'amaral, a member of the DPR; Bin Mang Reng Say, Deputy Chair of the Supreme Advisory Council; Hari Sugiman, Director General of Socio-Political Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior; Hadi Wayarabi, Director General of International Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Anton Suyata, Inspector General in the Department of Justice, and Rear Admiral Sumitro, Inspector General of the Armed Forces.


the perpetrators will be brought to justice. While they have formally expressed regret at the loss of life at Santa Cruz, military and government authorities have attempted to evade responsibility for the killings. They have accused political activists associated with the nationalist movement Fretilin of provoking the incident, and have claimed that soldiers fired as a result of a misunderstood order.

In a press release, dated 14 November, the government said: *"The police, who had made great efforts to pacify the crowd, were then attacked, and this resulted in some of the police being seriously injured...In order to disperse the demonstrators, the police inevitably had to use force which caused a number of deaths."* In a separate statement released to the press at about the same time, the Commander of Regional Military Command IX/Udayana, which covers East Timor, referred to the mourners as *"the mob involved in the riot"*. He said that the security forces had *"...failed in their persuasive efforts in dispersing the furious masses..."* and had been *"...compelled to defend themselves and to control the situation by firm actions."* He specified that the actions of the soldiers were *"in accordance with the standing procedure"*.

One day after the Santa Cruz killings, the Commander of the Armed Forces reportedly called explicitly for political opponents of Indonesian rule in East Timor to be "shot". Speaking at a seminar of the Association of Graduates the National Defence Institute (LEMHANAS) on 13 November, General Try Sutrisno said that people in the procession had *"spread chaos"* by unfurling posters with slogans discrediting the government, and by shouting *"many unacceptable things"*. In response, he said, the soldiers had fired shots into the air, *"but they persisted with their misdeeds... In the end, they had to be shot. These ill-bred people have to be shot... and we will shoot them."*

The military Commander for East Timor, Brigadier General Warouw, acknowledged on 20 November that his troops had fired their weapons into the crowd of mourners for between 5 and 10 minutes, but he denied that this was excessive.

Military authorities have reacted angrily to international expressions of concern over the human rights situation in East Timor. General Try Sutrisno said: *"This is an internal affair and their should be no meddling. If anyone wants to talk about human rights, Indonesia has had them since time immemorial. That's why you should study Pancasila [the state ideology]."* On 21 November, according to the official news agency, he said: *"We will not accept any foreign interference"*.



Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, General Try Sutrisno, answers questions from the press about the Santa Cruz killings. Later the same day he said that the opponents of Indonesian rule in East Timor "...have to be shot...and we will shoot them".

AP

NAME	PERSONAL DETAILS	CONCERN & COMMENTARY
João Goncalves Soares		Missing after incident, feared dead
João Bosco Caceres		Missing after incident, feared dead
Joaquim Fernandes	15 yrs; student	Wounded
José Ximenes	24 yrs	Killed
José Quintão Sarmento	40 yrs; married with 7 children	Missing after arrest
José Kodok	22 yrs; unemployed	Killed
Júlio Lemos Ximenes	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Juvita Maria Lourdes		Wounded
Leandro Isaac		Killed
Levi M Corte Real	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Lito Calsona		Killed
Lourenço		Missing after incident, feared dead
Luis Alves	21 yrs; high school student	Killed
Luis João (Alois)		Missing after incident, feared dead
Manuel da Silva	14 yrs; high school student	Killed
Manuel Fatima Guterres	49 yrs	Missing after arrest
Marçial da Silva	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Marcelino Guterres da Costa	Student	Killed
Mário Miguel	20 yrs; high school student	Killed
Miki Neves Reis	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Milton Longuinhas	16 yrs; high school student	Killed
Nelie Santo Ximenes	Student	Wounded
Nunu	28 yrs	Killed
Paula	17 yrs; high school student	Killed

NAME	PERSONAL DETAILS	CONCERN & COMMENTARY
Paulo Freitas	18 yrs; student	Killed
Porfirio da Costa	24 yrs	Killed
Procopio Rego	20 yrs; student	Killed
R. Pereira		Missing after incident, feared dead
Rafael Tilman Fernandes	20 yrs; high school student	Killed
Recobio	17 yrs; student	Killed
Ricardo Alves	16 yrs; student	Wounded
Simplicio de Deus		Killed
Tomas Dias Ximenes	Student	Missing after incident, feared dead
Ulises Gonçalves	21 yrs; high school student	Killed
Varudo		Killed
Vicente Paulo Madeira		Missing after incident, feared dead
Vincente Binaraga		Killed

APPENDIX I - List of people reportedly killed, missing or wounded in connection with the incident at Santa Cruz Cemetery, Dili, East Timor, 12 November 1991

NAME	PERSONAL DETAILS	CONCERN & COMMENTARY
Agapito de Deus	19 yrs; student	Missing after incident, feared dead
Agio (Pelajo) dos Santos	16 (19?) yrs	Wounded
Agostinho Tilman Fernandes	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Aliço dos Santos		Wounded
Afonso	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Amelia	17 yrs; high school student	Killed
Ana Romana Freitas	25 yrs; unemployed	Killed
André Soares	21 yrs; high school student	Killed
Aneta	15 yrs; junior high school student	Killed
António Clara Filipe Alves	21 yrs	Killed
Aristides dos Santos	19 yrs; high school student	Killed
Armando de Assis		Missing after incident, feared dead
Aviano António Faria	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Basilio Moniz	50+ yrs	Missing after arrest
Beonísio Aires		Missing after incident, feared dead
Bernardino Mendes	22 yrs	Wounded
Clementino Faria (Matos)		Missing after incident, feared dead
Crescencio Henriques Cabral	29 yrs; worker in the Department of Information	Wounded
Custódia Benevides	15 yrs; high school student	Killed
Dionísio dos Santos		Killed
Dionísio Alves (Nini)		Missing after incident, feared dead
Domingos dos Santos	21 yrs; high school student	Killed

NAME	PERSONAL DETAILS	CONCERN & COMMENTARY
Domingos	18 yrs; high school student	Killed
Domingos	10 yrs	Killed
Domingos Figurado	27 yrs; teacher	Killed
Dos Reis		killed
Duarte Acolito		Killed
Duarte (or Eduardo) da Silva	22 yrs; Lorosae University student and footballer	Killed
Elidio Amaral	25 (20?) yrs; student	Killed
Emilio Araujo	21 yrs	Wounded
Emilio Roberto	High school student	Killed
Eulalia Araujo	17 yrs; high school student	Killed
Fabião da Silva		Missing after incident, feared dead
Felipe	24 yrs; university student	Killed
Francis da Silva	18 yrs; resident of Dili	Killed
Francisco Laga	21 yrs	Killed
Francisco da Silva	20 yrs; high school student	Killed
Francisco Carlos (Abonno)	22 yrs; polytechnic student	Killed
Fredy da Costa	17 yrs; high school student	Killed
Germano da Silva	35 (36?) yrs	Missing after arrest
Gregório	25 yrs; jobless	Missing after incident, feared dead
Hacobio	17 yrs; student	Killed
Isabel	Student	Wounded
Ismael José dos Reis	17 yrs; high school student	Missing after incident, feared dead
Joana Amorim Dias		Wounded
Joanico dos Santos Sarmiento	46 yrs	Missing after arrest

Members of the government have also resisted allegations of official wrong-doing. The Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and other Ministers have condemned the foreign media for "*biased*" reports of the incident. Minister Alatas has expressed "*deep regret*" at the deaths of the mourners, but has emphasized that soldiers had to respond with firm action when an unruly procession developed into a rioting mob. He said: "*It would have been senseless for the security forces to shoot people at will.*"

A handful of Indonesian parliamentarians have called for full inquiries into the incident, but the DPR has no authority to bring the government or the military to account. House Speaker Kharis Suhud said he would ask for an explanation from General Try Sutrisno: "*I don't want to blame anybody but I want to know exactly what happened there.*" The Commander of the Armed Forces was scheduled to testify before the House on 21 November, but his appearance was postponed until 29 November.

Background

Indonesian forces invaded East Timor in 1975 in the aftermath of Portugal's withdrawal from its former colony. Since that time Amnesty International has continued to document serious human rights violations by Indonesian security forces in the territory. A pattern of short-term detention, ill-treatment and torture of political detainees in East Timor has worsened in the last year. More than 400 people have been detained since late 1988 for their alleged involvement in pro-independence political activities; at least 200 of them since early 1990. Many may be or may have been prisoners of conscience and many have reportedly been ill-treated or tortured in custody. At least 30 people, and possibly many more, were killed by Indonesian security forces in 1990 and early 1991 in apparent extrajudicial executions, and there are hundreds of unresolved cases of "disappearance".

Serious limitations remain on the reporting of human rights violations in East Timor in spite of the "opening" of the territory to tourism and commerce in January 1989. Those suspected of disseminating human rights information in East Timor and in Indonesia are closely watched by the authorities and have a well-founded fear that they may themselves become victims. Notwithstanding government assurances that access to the territory is unrestricted, and in spite of repeated requests, Amnesty International has not yet been permitted to visit East Timor or Indonesia.

Tentang Kerusuhan di Timor Timur

JAYAKARITA, 14 Nov. 1991

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Pangab: Mereka Harus Dibasmi

Jakarta, Jayakarta.

Panglima ABRI Jenderal TNI Try Soetrisno terkesan amat borang terhadap para pelaku kerusuhan di Dili, Timor Timur. Mereka katanya, adalah orang-orang yang harus dibasmi. "Orang-orang kurang ajar harus ditembak," kata Pangab, seusul membuka seminar Ikatan Alumni Lemhannas 1991 di Gedung Indosat, Jakarta, Rabu (12/11).

Para pengacau itu, tambah Pangab, orang-orang yang dulu bergerilya di hutan-hutan. Sekarang mereka tak mungkin lagi berbuat begitulah, karena penduduk di pedalaman juga menentang. "Walhasil mereka mengacau ke kota," ujarnya.

Paling menjengkelkan, lanjut Try, pengacau-pengacau itu memanfaatkan sarana sosial bahkan sarana ibadah, buat kepentingan gerakannya. Terakhir, gereja pun dijadikan basis operasi. "Maka itu saya minta pihak gereja waspada terhadap orang-orang macam itu. Kita banyak membangun gereja, tapi bukan buat para pengacau," tandasnya.

Dia menyebutkan, kerombo-

lan pembuat onar tadi mula-mula membentangkan poster-poster yang tulisannya mendiskreditkan pemerintah. Mereka juga bertarak-tarik melontarkan kata-kata tak pantas.

Namun, lanjutnya, anggota ABRI yang berjaga-jaga di sekitar lokasi insiden, tetap menahan diri. Para prajurit itu, kata Pangab, cukup sabar menghadapi situasi yang sebenarnya sudah memancing kemarahan. "ABRI kita bukan seperti tentara negara lain. Kita tentara rakyat yang cukup bijaksana," ucapnya.

Rupanya, jenderal bintang empat itu melanjutkan, kesabaran yang diperlihatkan para prajurit bukan diharga, para

pengacau malah berbuat makin brutal. Lalu beberapa kali tembakan dilepaskan ke udara. "Mereka tetap membandel," katanya.

Kemudian Try Soetrisno menambahkan, bagaimana pun ABRI tak bisa diremehkan. "Akhirnya ya terpaksa di-dor," ungkapnya, sambil mengulangi penegasannya. "Orang-orang bandel semacam itu harus ditembak. Dan kita akan menembaknya," tegasnya.

Try belum mengungkapkan gembong para pengacau itu. "Doakan agar lekas tertangkap," ujarnya tanpa menyebutkan sosok sasaran penangkapan itu.

Setelah insiden hari Selasa (12/11), para anggota ABRI mengeledah gereja Motael di kota Dili. Di sana ditemui berbagai jenis senjata, termasuk granat. "Melihat hasil temuan, jelas gerakan mereka sangat

berbahaya," ungkap Pangab.

Dalam tragedi itu, menurut Try, di pihak ABRI jatuh korban wakil komandan Batalyon 700. Sedangkan di pihak perusuh sembilan orang tewas.

Perusuh-perusuh tadi Selasa itu memulai gerakannya setelah melaksanakan misa di gereja Motael, Dili. Mereka unjuk rasa sepanjang jalan menuju ke Gubernuran.

Menurut versi Puspen ABRI, semula gerakan akan ditujukan kepada Parlemen Portugal. Akan tetapi karena kunjungan itu dibatalkan, kelompok tadi frustrasi sekaligus mengalihkan sasarannya.

Diduga peristiwa itu ada kaitannya dengan kerusuhan gereja Motael 20 Oktober lalu. Namun, menurut siaran tadi situasi sudah terkendali.

Pangab minta kepada masyarakat agar tidak panik, tidak

(Bersambung ke hal 11 kol 5)

Pangab.....

(Sambungan dari hal 1)

terpengaruh, dan tetap percaya kepada ABRI untuk menyelesaikan segalanya. "ABRI sudah bertekad membasmi siapa saja yang menantang kestabilan," tekannya.

AMPI mengutuk Sementara itu, organisasi pemuda AMPI (Ankatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia) Rabu (12/11) kemarin, menyebar pernyataan sikap atas peristiwa kerusuhan di Dili, Timor Timur. Pernyataan yang ditandatangani Ketua Umum Widja-


narko Puspoyo dan Wakil Sekjen L. Freemont Pello itu bermaterikan empat sikap.

Sikap pertama, AMPI mengutuk tindakan CPK yang telah menghasut dan menggerakkan pemuda, sehingga timbul kerusuhan, yang mengakibatkan jatuhnya korban jiwa. Kedua, AMPI mengutuk setiap upaya dari sebagian tokoh masyarakat yang dengan sadar dan terencana telah memanfaatkan generasi muda Timor Timur untuk kepentingan politik,

yang bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan UUD '45. Ketiga, AMPI mengajak para tokoh agama dan masyarakat di Timor, agar senantiasa waspada dalam membina umat, sehingga gedung-gedung ibadah tidak dimanfaatkan untuk kegiatan di luar keagamaan. Keempat, AMPI mengajak seluruh jajaran generasi muda Timor Timur di mana pun berada, untuk memandang peristiwa di atas sebagai pelajaran dalam keseluruhan proses perjalanan pembangunan yang tengah berlangsung. (α)

Abilio Jose Osorio Soares:

"Pak Harto, Bagi Orang Suci bagi Rakyat Timtim"



ia disebut-sebut sebagai Gubernur Merah Putih. Latar belakang politiknya pada masa perjuangan integrasi — ia salah seorang pendiri Apodeti (1974), partai yang sejak awal memilih integrasi Timor Timur (Timtim) dengan Indonesia — serta kenyataan politik di Timtim setelah Insiden 12 November, menyebabkan Abilio Jose Osorio Soares dinilai paling pantas menjadi "orang pertama" Timtim periode 1992-1997.

Anak ketujuh dari empat belas bersaudara keluarga campuran Manatutu-Porto ini pernah digiring Fretilin menuju lubang kematian. Berbeda dengan nasib ratusan tawanan pro-RI yang saat itu bersamanya, termasuk kakak kandungnya, Jose Fernando Osorio Soares (waktu itu Sekjen Apodeti), yang dibunuh Fretilin, Abilio berhasil melarikan diri ketika digiring Fretilin ke tempat eksekusi di Same, kawasan selatan Timtim. Namun, ketika bertemu tentara Indonesia untuk meminta perlindungan, dengan susah payah ia meyakinkan bahwa ia bukan Fretilin. Fotonya bersama Ali Moertopo membantu meyakinkan tentara bahwa ia orang Republik.

Bukan ia dan kakaknya saja yang antipemerintah Portugal di

Timtim. Pamannya, Jose Manuel Duarte, dikenal sebagai pemimpin pemberontakan bersenjata melawan Portugal pada 1959. Namun, pemberontakan itu dapat ditumpas. Jose ditangkap, kemudian dibuang ke Angola, salah satu wilayah jajahan Portugal di Afrika. Baru setelah Timtim berintegrasi dengan Indonesia, Jose bisa pulang kembali ke tanah kelahirannya. Kini, pamannya itu masih hidup dan tinggal di Dili.

Abilio memang dikenal berkilat ke Jakarta. Itu sebabnya banyak yang menduga, pada masa jabatannya nanti, gubernur kelahiran Manatutu ini akan membersihkan aparat pemerintahnya dari anasir "berkepala dua". "Di kampung kelahiran, saya ini gembala ternak. Sebagai gubernur saya akan jadi gembala rakyat yang baik. Orang Fretilin yang mau sadar, akan saya rangkul," kata anak guru dan peternak yang hanya mengenyam pendidikan formal sampai SMP itu.

Ketika berada di Jakarta dua pekan lalu, untuk menghadiri pelantikan anggota MPR/DPR, ia menerima Ayu Utami, Tony Hasyim, Pracooyo, dan Baskoro, di Hotel Indonesia, tempatnya menginap.

Gubernur di daerah lain adalah Perwira Tinggi ABRI atau sarjana, Sedangkan Anda cuma lulusan SMP. Bagaimana perasaan Anda?

Sedikit pun saya tidak terganggu. Sebab, saya ditempatkan di daerah yang seharusnya saya menyelesaikan permasalahan. Tidak ada orang lain yang mengerti Timtim selain kami (maksudnya putra daerah, red) yang telah belajar di lapangan. Memang, bapak-bapak itu lebih terdidik dari segi apa saja, tapi kalau ditempatkan di Timtim belum tentu bisa. Sekarang, Bapak Presiden menunjuk saya. Saya harus coba, walaupun saya tahu itu tanggung jawab berat.

Masalah apa yang dihadapi Gubernur Timtim sekarang? Banyak...

Apa yang paling berat?

Semua sama beratnya dan sama ringannya. Tidak ada yang berat dan tidak ada yang ringan. Cuma, prioritasnya mungkin adalah bagaimana usaha mempersatukan rakyat Timtim. Mempersatukan dengan rakyat Indonesia...?

Mempersatukan ke dalam. Rakyat Timtim harus bersatu. Untuk nantinya kita bisa memperkokoh persatuan dengan Indonesia.



UTUSAN DAERAH:

Di gedung MPR/DPR, sebagai wakil rakyat Tim-Tim..

Memangnya masyarakat Timtim sekarang terpecah-pecah?

Kita sudah dikotak-kotakkan oleh partai-partai lama, dan masih dirasakan sampai sekarang. Karena itu, saya mengimbau agar mereka bersatu. "Orang UDT lepaslah kedok Anda, saya sebagai orang Apodeti akan lepas kedok saya, dia orang Fretilin, Tralibista, Kota, lepaskan kedok Anda. Mari kita duduk memandang permasalahan Timtim sebagai permasalahan kita bersama." Kira-kira itu yang saya mau.

Selama ini, belum ada usaha ke sana. Yang selalu mengimbau bukan kita antara kita, tapi dari pihak ABRI. Sedangkan kita selalu duduk saling mengintai, siapa yang mau membokong. Maka, sekarang ini saya mau mencoba. Saya punya keyakinan kalau saya didukung semua pihak, saya pasti bisa berbuat sesuatu.

Berapa persen sebenarnya rakyat yang setuju integrasi?

Kalau kita pesimis, 90 persen. Sedangkan kalau optimis,

95 persen.

Apa sebenarnya yang dituntut rakyat Timtim?

Hem, semua....

Bukankah mereka menuntut perbaikan ekonomi?

Itu bukan hanya di Timtim, seluruh Indonesia juga mau perbaikan ekonomi.

Benarkah salah satu penyebab Insiden 12 November adalah kurangnya lapangan kerja bagi anak muda?

Lho, ada caranya untuk menuntut itu.... Tapi, Anda lihat sendiri bahwa itu dikoordinasi oleh orang-orang tertentu, sehingga ketika Komisi Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia masuk, wartawan dari luar negeri masuk, baru mereka berbuat. Kan maksudnya sudah lain. Bukan minta lapangan kerja, dong....

Kabarnya, dengan dibukanya Timtim (tahun 1988) perekonomian pribumi terdesak oleh pendatang?

Jelas, itu ada.

Tukang bakso atau pemilik warung saja berasal dari Jawa....

Iya, benar di sana tukang baksonya dari Jawa. Warung di sana juga orang Jawa yang buat. Orang Timtim itu tidak mau buat apa yang orang lain buat ha...ha...ha....

Jadi, anak-anak muda itu maunya pekerjaan seperti apa?

Mereka belum selesai sekolah sudah bikin demonstrasi, bagaimana? Ya, toh? Ini bukan orang yang butuh lapangan pekerjaan, tapi anak sekolahan yang bikin onar. Bagaimana alasannya, *enggak* masuk akal. Kalau demonstrasi itu dijalankan oleh orang yang mengganggu, kita terimalah.... Ini kan anak sekolahan yang bikin? Bagaimana mau kasih pekerjaan kalau masih sekolahan?

Berarti ada pendidikannya yang salah?

Tidak. Mereka didalangi orang, sedangkan kita tidak memanfaatkannya. Pembinaan terhadap generasi muda kosong. Kita membangun seluruh sektor, tapi pembinaan generasi muda nol besar. Saya... (Abilio mengangkat tangan)

Pak Carrascalao dulu pernah mengatakan, ia tidak bisa menggunakan kewenangan-

nya secara penuh, Anda juga merasakannya?

Kewenangan di bidang apa dulu?

Sebagai kepala pemerintahan?

Lho, malahan *full*. Saya, ketika menjadi bupati saja, merasa *full*. Apalagi gubernur...

Bagaimana dengan campur tangan militer dalam pemerintahan?

Saya tidak lihat tangan militer di sana.

Sejak kapan?

Sejak dulu kala. Karena ini kan sudah dibagi; masalah *security* kan ABRI yang punya. Saya *enggak* mengerti, di bidang apa campur tangannya.

Dengan masih adanya Kolakops, bukankah situasi Timtim dianggap belum normal?

Terus, apa dia bisa menjamin kepada negara bahwa mereka yang di hutan tidak akan mengganggu? Kan kalau selama yang di hutan masih ada, *enggak* boleh dia mengatakan operasi itu ditiadakan. Itu maunya apa? Apakah dia sudah menawarkan diri bisa menyelesaikan sendiri? Buktinya, tidak pernah. Jadi, ba-

gaimana? Tapi kita tidak usahlah mengomongkan itu lagi. Beliau itu baik. Saya akan meneruskan apa yang beliau sudah perbuat.

Persisnya, berapa banyak tentara yang dibutuhkan di Timtim?

Sekarang ada sepuluh batalyon untuk seluruh kegiatan pembangunan, sedangkan untuk tempur ada dua batalyon (satu batalyon antara 500-1000 orang). Tapi, sebaiknya ini Anda tanya kepada tentara. Kira-kira ada delapan yang terjun di bidang Opster (Operasi Teritorial). Kalau yang di Opster ini, saya masih sangat membutuhkan.

Tapi yang Opster juga dipersenjatai. Tidakkah ini mempengaruhi "psikologi" rakyat?

Ya, dia kan tentara. Kalau tentara tidak bersenjata, ya, bukan tentara, dong. Anda tanpa pulpen dan kertas, bukan wartawan, dong...

Apa tidak sebaiknya diciptakan kesan mereka datang ke sana membawa "pacul"?

Kalau di lapangan (tempat kerja, red) mereka pakai pacul. Tapi, itu pun masih dikritik, kenapa harus tentara yang bikin? Padahal, yang mereka kerjakan itu langsung menyentuh keperluan rakyat.

Banyak yang mengatakan, hampir semua pembangunan di Timtim dikerjakan ABRI. Akibatnya, tidak ada kesempatan bagi rakyat...

Maksudnya Uskup Belo? Maksud dia, yang aktif membangun itu jangan ABRI, tetapi rakyat sendiri. Tapi, kita tahu bahwa kemampuan rakyat masih terbatas. Kita tidak punya tukang. Saya sendiri punya pengalaman di kabupaten. Kalau saya mau bikin sumber air minum baru, saya hanya kasih pipa kepada mereka, langsung dia (ABRI) pasang tanpa biaya. Tapi, kalau saya suruh rakyat yang pasang, belum tentu dia bisa pasang. Dan, kalau toh dia bisa pasang, akan minta biaya.... Karena itu, kita masih sangat membutuhkan ABRI di sana.

(Seorang tamu Abilio, mahasiswa asal Timtim, menambahkan, "Mungkin yang membangun itu memang masih harus militer, tapi jangan secara demonstratif. Harus pakai-pakaian seragam militer, setelah jadi, dituliskan Yon-Yon (maksudnya Batalyon dari kesatuan ABRI, red). Jadi, seolah-olah di mana-mana adalah hasil karya militer. Seragamnya itu enggak perlu, supaya rakyat tidak merasa tegang....")

(Abilio melanjutkan)... Tapi, saya yakin itu dilihat dari mata elite. Kenyataannya, itu diterima baik oleh rakyat. Sebab, begitu selesai langsung dikasih kepada rakyat. Tapi, elite melihat, "Wah ini rakyat mau kerja apa, kalau semuanya dikerjakan ABRI.

Kelihatannya, cara itu terlalu "memanjakan" rakyat?

Saya kira itu harus ada batasnya juga. Tidak akan terus menerus begitu. Masa, kalau itu rusak harus ABRI lagi yang memperbaikinya. Dari satu segi, kita harus mampu memberikan kemampuan kepada rakyat. Kita sudah harus arahkan, ketika itu rusak, dia harus bisa memperbaiki sendiri. Dengan kata lain, mungkin sudah saatnya kita memberi kail, bukan lagi ikan. Ta-

pi, saya tetap berpendapat bahwa Opster itu masih tetap diperlukan. Lebih-lebih sekarang, program saya difokuskan di bidang pertanian. Saya membutuhkan suatu kekuatan militer yang bisa membantu saya membuka lahan pertanian baru.

(Abilio lahir 4 Juni 1947. "Juni itu bulan kelahiran orang-orang yang kemudian jadi pemimpin," katanya terkekeh. Sejak kecil, ia sudah akrab betul dengan kemiskinan dan penderitaan rakyat. Ia terpaksa putus sekolah setamat *Primeiro Ciclo do Ensino Secundario* (setingkat SMP) di Dili, agar adik-adiknya yang sudah cukup umur bisa mengenyam sekolah juga. Pada 1968, ia bergabung dalam Pasukan *Trapaz* sebagai wamil — keharusan bagi pemuda Timtim usia 18 tahun saat itu.

Pada awal munculnya usaha memerdekakan diri dari Portugal, diakui rakyat Timtim belum disiplin dan belum mampu berdiri sendiri. "Kami butuh bantuan Indonesia untuk tetap eksis." Maka, ketika abangnya, Jose, mendirikan Apodeti (*Associacio Popular Democratica Timorese*), yang dalam anggaran dasarnya jelas-jelas menyebut ingin berintegrasi dengan Indonesia, Abilio masuk menjadi anggota.

Ada satu peristiwa kecil di awal perjuangan integrasi yang masih tetap dikenang Abilio. Ketika malam diresmikan berdirinya Apodeti, ia melihat seorang veteran pejuang dalam pemberon-



RAPAT KERJA:

Ketika mengikuti Raker Gubernur dan Bupati/Walikota Februari 1992.

takan pada 1959, yang pernah dibuang ke Afrika, bertutur di lantai dan berseru: "Pastor, berkati kami agar bisa berhasil." Tapi, pastor bilang, "Tidak usah. Setiap niat yang baik, pasti berada di sisi Tuhan." Dan ternyata, "kami menang," tutur gubernur keempat Timtim ini.)

Bagaimana posisi gereja? Kabarnya, mereka juga masih "mendua"?

Di sini kita perlu membedakan dua hal; gereja dan oknum. Saya ini juga gereja. Gereja itu adalah badan yang dibentuk oleh umat. Saya ini umat, berarti saya ini *members of gereja*.

Lalu, mengapa Keuskupan Dili tidak mau bergabung dengan KWI (Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia)?

Itu tidak ada gunanya karena setiap gereja itu independen, setiap uskup independen. Dia harus tergantung langsung kepa-

da Paus. Sekarang, jika Keuskupan Dili mau dijadikan anggota KWI, itu cuma kemajuan yang tidak ada arti, formalitas saja. Tapi, tidakkah ini menyebabkan loyalitas mereka mendua (kepada Paus Roma atau Presiden Indonesia)?

Sebagai gereja, dia ke Paus. Sebagai warga negara, dia loyal kepada Presiden Indonesia. Seperti pengakuan Uskup Belo, bahwa dia adalah warga negara Indonesia. Berarti, sebagai warga negara, dia loyal kepada Pak Presiden. Saya sebagai manusia, secara rohani saya loyal kepada uskup, terus ke Paus. Tapi secara duniawi, saya loyal kepada presiden.

Bagaimana penilaian Anda terhadap Presiden Soeharto?

Bapak Presiden diangkat sebagai Bapak Pembangunan. Tapi, buat saya di Timtim bukan itu. Untuk Timtim, beliau adalah "Bapak Integrasi". Karena beliau orang pertama yang meneri-

ma kami sebagai bagian Indonesia. Itu artinya besar. Saya punya inisiatif mengusulkan agar DPRD mengesahkan titel dari rakyat Timtim untuk Pak Harto ini.

Apakah rakyat Timtim juga berpandangan seperti Anda?

Saya pernah memperkenalkan foto Pak Harto dan Ibu Tien kepada masyarakat desa. Foto itu diterima dan dihormati seperti gambar Yesus.... Betul.

Orang Katolik punya kebiasaan memasang gambar orang kudus di rumahnya. Beliau dianggap orang suci. Gambarnya dipasang di setiap rumah. Mama saya pernah marah kepada seluruh orang di rumah ketika foto itu jatuh....

Pada masa perjuangan integrasi, kabarnya, Anda adalah salah seorang kader yang dididik di "Tanah Abang" (Kantor CSIS — Centre for Strategic and International Studies — di Jalan Tanah Abang III, Jakarta)

Pada 1975, ketika mendirikan Apodeti, (27 Mei 1975, red) ada orang Tanah Abang yang kami undang. Kami memang sudah diskusi dengan CSIS. Waktu itu, partai mengutus kami ke Jakarta untuk mempelajari struktur pemerintahan, peta politik dalam negeri. Sekaligus untuk melihat, kira-kira sejauh mana hubungan Indonesia dengan luar negeri, dengan Asean. Kami juga ke Kupang mencari dukungan, antara lain, lewat Gubernur El Tari (Gubernur NTT waktu itu, red). Juga kepada Konsul Indonesia di Dili, Pak Tumodok. Saat itu, orang Tanah Abang memang sudah ada di konsulat. Dulunya, kami tidak kenal yang lain. Orang Indonesia yang kami kenal waktu itu hanya Pak Harto dan Ibu Tien, Pak Ali Moertopo, dan Pak Panggabean (Menhankam). Menurut Anda, apa keistimewaan yang Anda miliki sehingga terpilih sebagai Gubernur?

Tanya sama yang milih, ha...ha...ha....

Bukannya Anda didukung orang pusat?

Yang jelas, sebelumnya kan Pak Presiden tidak mengenal

saya?

Kabarnya, Anda kenal dengan Prabowo (anak Prof. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo yang menjadi menantu Pak Harto)?

Iya. Saya kenal dia jauh sebelum menjadi menantu Presiden. Waktu dia bertugas di Timtim tahun 1976, pangkatnya masih Letnan. Waktu itu, dia belum menikah dengan anak Pak Harto. Bagaimana ceritanya?

Ceritanya lucu. Saya kenal dia di rumah makan. Saya duduk dekat dia. Setelah makan, karena duduknya berdekatan, kami ngobrol. Saya lihat ia kelelahan. Saya bilang, Anda sakit, segera periksa ke dokter. "Tidak, saya sehat. Saya baru turun dari perbatasan, saya masih sehat," katanya. Coba periksa dulu, menurut saya, Anda sakit, kata saya lagi. Setelah itu, kita berpisah.

Saya pernah memperkenalkan foto Pak Harto dan Ibu Tien kepada masyarakat desa. Foto itu diterima dan dihormati seperti gambar Yesus....



ABILIO JOSE OSORIO SOARES:

Saya perlu bantuan ABRI untuk membangun Tim-Tim.

Waktu itu Anda jadi apa?

Saya menjadi Kepala Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (PU). Terus, pada 1983, saya ke Jakarta. Waktu itu, saya mengurus KONI (Komite Olah Raga Indonesia), sebab saya di Timtim menjabat Ketua Harian KONI juga. Dijemputlah saya oleh Pak Prabowo. Ayahnya waktu itu masih Menteri Riset dan Teknologi. Karena Pak Mitro dekat dengan Pak Sutami (menteri PU), dan karena saya orang PU, dipanggillah Pak Sutami ke rumah. Pak Mitro memperkenalkan saya dengan Pak Sutami. Lalu Pak Mitro bilang, ini teman baik anak saya, tolong dibantu. Nah, mulai dari situ, saya terus bekerja di PU dan dibantu Pak Sutami. Barangkali Anda terpilih karena dekat dengan keluarga Presiden?

Lho, apa hubungannya? Tidak ada hubungannya antara pemilihan gubernur dan persahabatan saya dengan Pak Prabowo. Lagi pula, kalau Pak Prabowo bisa menentukan pemilihan gubernur, seharusnya yang terpilih Pak Lopez da Cruz (salah satu calon dalam pemilihan Gubernur Timtim, awal September lalu, red). Sebab, dia itu teman dekatnya Pak Prabowo. Dia teman Pak Prabowo ketika perang, dan dia lebih dekat dengan Pak Prabowo daripada saya.

(Setelah integrasi, pada 1976, Abilio diangkat sebagai Kepala Dinas PU Timtim, lalu merangkap Kepala Kanwil PU. Selanjutnya, ia menjabat Walikota Dili. Lima tahun terakhir, sebelum menjadi gubernur, ia menjabat Bupati Manututo, tempat kelahirannya. Lelaki berkumis tebal ini adalah gubernur termuda di Indonesia. Dari sosok tingginya sering terdengar gemerincing dua medallion emas bila saling beradu. Satu bergambar Bunda Maria, sebuah lagi inisial namanya. Suaranya seperti lonceng tiap kali badannya berguncang. "Ia pintar. Memberikan kalung ini, supaya tiap kali berbunyi saya teringat kepadanya," katanya perihal leontin bergambar Maria pemberian istrinya, Maria Angela Correia de Lemos.

Yang menarik, di tubuh ayah empat anak ini, ada beberapa tato (raja) yang katanya dibuat ketika di penjarakan Fretilin. Di atas telapak tangan kanan ada gambar bintang bertuliskan, "Hopes Star". Di dada ada gambar burung merpati, bertuliskan "For Peace and Freedom", kemudian pada lengan atas kanan bergambar jangkar dengan tulisan "Everything for You" dan tanggal pembuatannya "4-10-1974". Menurutnnya, masih ada beberapa lagi di bagian tubuh lain. Tapi, Pak Gubernur ini malu menunjukan semuanya. "Ini pekerjaan saya di dalam penjara Porto," ungkapnya sembari tersenyum.

Tato itu menarik, jarang Gubernur punya tato...

Bukan jarang, mungkin belum ada. Orang heran, "Ini, kok, gubernur bertato, sudah pernah di sel kali?" Ha...ha...ha... Everything for You, siapa?

(tersenyum sambil mengusap lengan kanan) Timor Timur... Bagaimana ceritanya ketika Anda ditangkap Fretilin?

Saya sebenarnya ditangkap di rumah. Pagi-pagi kita disuruh berkumpul dengan alasan Fretilin mau mengadakan dialog. Kita dimasukkan ke suatu tempat di kantor Kodim Dili sekarang. Tahu-tahu bukan untuk pertemuan, tapi ditangkap. Kita waktu itu berjumlah 300 orang, yang lolos hanya 20 orang, yang lain habis dibunuh.

Dua puluh orang ini berhasil melarikan diri, seperti Anda?

Ada yang melarikan diri, ada yang tidak sempat dibunuh, selamat. Ada yang waktu dibunuh, tapi selamat dari "penyapuan". (Abilio menirukan orang menembak dengan senapan).

Berapa lama Anda di dalam penjara itu?

Dari tanggal 4 Oktober 1975, saya melarikan diri 7 Desember 1975.

Kapan terakhir bertemu dengan Xanana?

Pada 1975, 4 Desember. Waktu itu saya ada di dalam penjara Fretilin. Saya lihat dia dari dalam sel, sedangkan dia di luar sel. Apa kabar terakhir tentang dia?

Ada berita terakhir, dia pernah masuk ke Dili karena wakil-

nya ditahan di sana. Tapi, itu kabar angin. Anda mau bertemu dengan dia? Syukur-syukur Anda bisa meyakinkan dia supaya menyerah. Wah, dia orangnya ganteng. Sama saya, gantengan dia, ha...ha...ha.... Dia mungkin lebih muda dari saya setahun. Orangnya cakep betul, kira-kira seperti Roy Marten....

Apakah masyarakat masih merasakan gangguan Fretilin?

Sebaiknya, itu Anda tanyakan kepada tentara.

Anda sendiri?

Saya tidak merasakan karena saya bisa jalan bebas selama 24 jam di Timtim. Dan, itu bisa saya buktikan kepada Anda.

Tapi, katanya masih banyak pemeriksaan?

Oh, pemeriksaan itu, bukan berarti tidak ada keamanan.

Kalau ada pemeriksaan, apa indikasinya?

Mungkin dia orang yang dicurigai, mungkin perampok.

Artinya, enggak aman juga, dong?

Di Jakarta juga begitu. Masa, di Jakarta enggak ada pemeriksaan? Orang-orang di luar memang terlalu mendramatisir permasalahan di Timtim. Pada 1979, saya pernah berkeliling Timtim. Waktu itu, masih ada ribuan Fretilin di hutan. Tapi, mereka tidak mengganggu seperti yang dikabar-kabarkan itu. Nah, sekarang apalagi?

Apa ada "pembatasan-pembatasan" lain?

Tidak ada pembatasan. Malah, kita terlalu bebas, sehingga terjadi kejahatan ekonomi.

Orang mengeruk uang yang masuk dan membawa pergi ke luar, menanamkannya di Australia. Kita tidak mau itu.

Ada kejahatan ekonomi?

Banyak sekali kejahatan-kejahatan ekonomi seperti itu. Tidak bisa dilanjuti, karena itu kejahatan besar.

Di sektor apa saja?

Di bidang perdagangan, konstruksi....

Siapa pelakunya?

Pelakunya sudah dapat. Saya tidak mau sebut namanya.

Ada kabar, perekonomian di Timtim diperburuk oleh kelompok-perusahaan "Denok Hatimas", yang memonopoli perdagangan dan barang impor tertentu...

Saya kira, bukan karena perusahaan itu.

Kabaranya pula, harga beli kopi dari petani di sana rendah sekali, dan itu disebabkan adanya monopoli tata nia kopi oleh PT Salazar (Group Denok)?

Yang saya lihat dan dengar adalah keadaan perdagangan kopi di dunia internasional mempengaruhi perdagangan kopi asal Timtim. Kopi kita kalah bersaing dengan kopi Brasil. Harganya merosot. Ini yang jadi masalah. Bukan lagi karena dipegang satu orang. Bukan lagi karena monopoli.

Ada rencana membuka investasi baru?

Saya akan membuka. Dengan catatan, karena Timtim masih memiliki tanah yang cukup luas untuk usaha-usaha perkebunan, kita akan memberikan Hak Guna Usaha sekian puluh tahun, supaya investor tertarik.

Semoga tidak ada investor yang cuma "akan-akan" seperti dikatakan Pak Carrascalao itu?

Saya kira, "akan-akan" itu karena kita sendiri belum serius mengeluarkan tangan untuk mengundang mereka. Jangan kita memanfaatkan mereka, tok, tapi tidak menyiapkan sarannya. Dan, saya lewat Anda, mengimbau kepada dunia usaha di Indo-

nesia, karena masalah Timtim ini kita sudah anggap selesai, tapi di dunia belum diakui, maka setiap orang yang mau menanam modal, yang mau mengeluarkan tangan mengangkat rakyat Timtim dari kemiskinan dan kebodohan, dia harus masuk sebagai pejuang. Jangan hanya semata-mata melihat segi ekonomisnya, tapi segi sosialnya juga harus dilihat. Tapi pengusaha kan selalu lebih berat ke perhitungan bisnis?

Menurut saya, kalau toh mereka mau untung sepuluh persen, bagaimana kalau satu persen saja? Kembalikanlah yang sembilan persen itu untuk kepentingan rakyat. Kira-kira begitulah. Atau, kalau dia seharusnya untung 20 persen, tapi karena dia menggunakan tenaga setempat, cukuplah hanya sembilan persen untuk dia. Lebih-lebih, saya berharap kepada para investor yang masuk, ajaklah penduduk setempat menjadi mitra mereka. Dengan demikian, rakyat Timtim tidak hanya jadi penonton, tapi juga jadi pelaku.

(Abilio menuangkan kopi ke cangkirnya, sambil menawarkan kepada wartawan FORUM, "Ayo, pakai gula supaya manis. Saya harus pakai gula yang banyak, karena hidup saya terlalu pahit," katanya. Menurut Abilio, keinginan rakyat Timtim untuk bersatu dengan Indonesia sudah ada sejak 1959. Waktu terjadi "Pemberontakan Tahun 1959", para pemberontak yang merebut senja-



TERPILIH:
Seusai acara pelantikan gubernur, September 1992.

ta di kantor-kantor pemerintahan Porto menyerbu sambil membawa bendera "Merah Putih". Abilio, yang waktu itu masih berusia 13 tahun, masih ingat, ada tiga orang Indonesia yang membantu pemberontakan tersebut. Namun, karena penyerbuan itu dilaksanakan tidak tepat pada waktunya, mereka berhasil ditumpas habis. Sedangkan yang tertangkap di buang ke Angola. "Waktu itu, banyak rakyat yang dibunuh oleh tentara Porto," ujarnya lirih.

Sejak itu, rakyat Timtim semakin ditindas. Keluarga Abilio dan banyak keluarga lainnya masuk black list. Mereka tidak lagi bebas menyanyikan lagu keroncong dan lagu-lagu berbahasa Indonesia. "Waktu itu, kita sudah bisa menyanyikan lagu Indonesia, tapi tidak tahu artinya."

Abilio kemudian menceritakan asal-usul berdirinya partai-partai politik sampai terjadinya "perang saudara" di Timtim. Wajahnya yang berkesan keras, tiba-tiba menjadi murung. Menurutnnya, cerita yang memakan korban ribuan jiwa itu tidak usah diung-

kit-ungkit lagi. Maksudnya, off the record. "Kita telah menguburnya dengan tumpukan emas. Mari kita bersatu membantu membangun Timtim. Apa gunanya mengenang cerita pahit?" tuturnya.

Dengan terjadinya Insiden 12 November Dili, apa dampaknya terhadap rakyat Timtim?

Di Dili itu ada 120 ribu manusia. Waktu terjadi insiden, yang terlibat dalam demonstrasi itu kira-kira berapa?

Seribu...

Seribu, yang meninggal berapa?

Seratus...

Seratus, lebihlah. Ya, kita anggaplah dua ratus. Berapa persentasenya?

Tapi, dengan adanya korban jiwa, kan bisa meninggalkan dampak psikologis yang negatif bagi masyarakat?

Itu menurut kalian yang di luar. Menurut saya, malah seharusnya mati lebih banyak. Kenapa hanya segitu? Kenapa enggak yang seribu itu sekaligus? Kita melihat permasalahan di Timtim itu harus secara realistis. Apa kita di sana kurang demokratis? Semua rakyat sudah mau berintegrasi, kok, dia masih mau mengganggu?

Setiap korban mempunyai keluarga dan teman. Bukankah ini bisa menimbulkan dendam?

Kira-kira, kalau Anda punya anak meninggal, bagaimana rasanya? Kira-kira begitulah. Kalau anak saya meninggal, sudah pasti saya merasa kehilangan. Kalau, toh, saya tahu siapa yang menghilangkan nyawanya, saya akan merasa tidak enak selamanya terhadap orang itu. Tapi, kalau kita mengkaji lebih dalam, dengan melihat karena apa mereka meninggal, mungkin mereka bisa cukup mengerti. Sebab, kehidupan banyak orang sudah terganggu oleh ulah mereka. Lagipula, dalam hal ini kita tetap berprinsip, itu adalah suatu insiden. Berarti, bukan sesuatu yang kita kehendaki. Waktulah nanti yang akan mengembalikan keyakinannya, bahwa itu memang insiden dan dapat dimaklumi.

Sekarang, akibat insiden itu, Portugal semakin gencar mempersoalkan Timtim di forum internasional...

Portugal seharusnya kami tuntutan karena sudah menjajah kami selama 450 tahun. Kami selama itu sudah setia dan membela kepentingan Portugal di Asia, khususnya Asia Tenggara. Kita membela nama baik bangsa Portugal. Apa yang mereka perbuat untuk kita? Akhirnya, mereka meninggalkan kita dalam perang saudara. Mereka meninggalkan senjata kepada kelompok-kelompok yang ada di Timtim untuk saling membunuh. Kok, sekarang masih mau mengganggu kita?

Mereka seharusnya mengimbau kepada rakyat Timtim supaya mau bersatu. Dan kalau mereka mau tetap berperan, kasihlah tangan kepada Indonesia. Terimalah apa yang sudah diperbuat Indonesia untuk rakyat.

Saya kira, itulah yang ingin saya beritahukan kepada dunia. Saya sebagai pribadi berharap, kelak Indonesia dan Portugal bisa membangun hubungan yang baik dan harmonis. Sehingga, kami rakyat di Timtim juga masih bisa, umpamanya, membangun suatu pusat kebudayaan Portugal. Sebab, bagaimanapun selama 450 tahun mungkin ada hal-hal yang baik yang ditinggalkannya. Termasuk di dalamnya agama Katolik. Itulah yang terbaik yang telah diberikan Portugal kepada rakyat Timtim. •

Sisa Perkara dari Carrascalao

Seorang janda memperjuangkan ganti rugi tanahnya selama sepuluh tahun. Namun, Gubernur Timor Timur waktu itu, Carrascalao, malah mengurangi harganya. Kini dia menggugat gubernur di PTUN.

Belum apa-apa Abilio, Gubernur Timor Timur yang baru, sudah dapat pekerjaan rumah. Seorang warga, Carolina da Conceicao J. Nhieu, 56 tahun, menggugat Pemda Timor Timur cq gubernur ke PTUN. Pangkalnya, Mario Viegas Carrascalao, ketika menjabat gubernur, membuat disposisi yang menurunkan besar ganti rugi tanah dan rumah Carolina untuk kompleks perumahan Koramil dan Direktorat Pembangunan Desa (Bangdes).

Carolina, penduduk Kecamatan Maubara, Kabupaten Liquica, yang sudah menjanda itu terperanjat ketika mengetahui tanahnya yang berada di pinggir jalan raya dipakai untuk pembangunan kompleks perumahan Direktorat Bangdes. Sebelumnya, pada 1982, di bagian lain tanahnya telah dibangun Kantor Koramil. Semuanya tanpa sepengetahuan Carolina. Padahal, tanah seluas 3.613 meter persegi itu sebenarnya merupakan warisan suaminya, Fernando A. Nhieu, yang diduga tewas ditembak karena dicurigai anggota Fretilin.

Begitu mengetahui tanahnya dirampas, dengan berbagai upaya dia berusaha mendapatkan ganti rugi. Kemudian, datanglah Tim Sembilan, sebagai panitia pembebasan tanah yang dibentuk untuk setiap kabupaten di Timor Timur, menaksir harga tanah. Mereka menilai Rp 5 ribu per meter persegi. Dijanjikan, dalam seminggu ganti rugi itu akan dibayarkan.

Namun, setelah ditunggu-tunggu hingga 1988, uang itu tak kunjung datang. Tahun berikutnya, Tim Sembilan datang lagi dengan penawaran lebih rendah.

Dia lalu memprotes ke aparat setempat. Upayanya tak sia-sia. Dalam berita acara Panitia Pembebasan Tanah Kabupaten Liquica, pada 4 Oktober 1989, yang diketuai Gaspar Sarmento, disepakati besar ganti rugi tanah Carolina berikut turutannya. Tanah seluas 402 meter



Mario Viegas Carrascalao

persegi, yang sudah bersertifikat sejak zaman Portugis, ditetapkan sebesar Rp 4 ribu per meter persegi.

Selebihnya, 3.211 meter persegi, yang belum bersertifikat, dinilai Rp 1.000 per meter. Rumah permanen seluas 192 meter ditetapkan sebesar Rp 120 ribu per meter. Jadi, jumlah ganti rugi seluruhnya Rp 16.339.000. Panitia melakukan itu berdasarkan disposisi Gubernur Timor Timur pada 12 Oktober 1988.

Namun, nasib sial kembali menimpa janda setengah baya itu. Ketika dia akan menguangkan harga taksiran ke Pemda, Gubernur Carrascalao menolak pembayaran itu karena dianggap terlalu mahal. Bahkan, tanpa menghiraukan kesepakatan yang telah dicapai melalui musyawarah antara Carolina dan Panitia Pembebasan Tanah, Carrascalao malah membentuk tim penaksir sendiri. Tim dibentuk ini berdasarkan disposisi Gubernur Carrascalao tanggal 28 Desember

1990 dan nota dinas Sekwilda Tingkat I tertanggal 27 Desember 1990.

Seluruh tanah Carolina, menurut tim itu, nilainya hanya Rp 5.646.500. "Ini tidak adil dan sangat menyakitkan hati. Seolah-olah saya dipaksakan untuk menerima saja ganti rugi itu," ujar Carolina. Surat-surat keberatan telah dilayangkannya ke Pemda, tapi tak ada jawaban.

Belakangan, Carolina menggugat Pemda Tingkat I cq Gubernur Timor Timur, atas disposisinya yang menurunkan nilai ganti rugi, ke PTUN Ujungpandang. Karena nyonya itu tak punya uang untuk mengurus perkaranya, hakim PTUN lalu menunjuk LBH Ujungpandang sebagai pengacaranya. Menurut Christina Yoseph dari LBH, disposisi itu merupakan perbuatan melawan hukum. Sebab, itu bertentangan dengan Peraturan Mendagri No. 15 tahun 1975 pasal 6 ayat 1, yang mengatur tata cara pembebasan tanah, dan rasa keadilan karena harga tanah dan rumah di daerah itu jauh melampaui harga taksiran tim.

Carrascalao sendiri ketika dihubungi FORUM mengatakan, dibentuknya lagi tim penaksir karena melihat taksiran harga itu tidak wajar. "Terlalu tinggi. Saya sudah sepuluh tahun jadi gubernur, jadi tahu persis harga tanah yang pantas. Saya berharap PTUN benar-benar melihat di lapangan," ujarnya. Dia mengungkapkan, tim penaksir mendapat komisi empat persen dari harga tanah. Karena itu, mereka menaksir harga tanah sangat tinggi.

Sementara Abilio, yang baru menggantikan posisi Carrascalao, ketika FORUM mengkonfirmasikannya, mengaku belum tahu adanya gugatan itu. Selama ini, sudah berlangsung empat persidangan dengan Majelis Hakim yang diketuai Ketut Suradnya. Rencananya, akhir bulan ini kasus itu akan diputus.

Retno, Sukriansyah (Ujungpandang), dan Pracoyo

TRANSLATION OF SECTIONS OF INTERVIEW WITH
NEW GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR

Source: Forum Keadilan, No 14, 29 October 1992

He's been named 'The Red and White Governor'. Both his political background - he's one of the founders of Apodeti (1974), the party which since its beginning chose integration of East Timor with Indonesia - and the reality of political life in East Timor since the 12 November incident, have resulted in him being judged the most appropriate candidate for the position of East Timor's 'man up front' for the period 1992-1997. The 7th of 14 children from mixed Portuguese-Manatuto parentage, he once escaped death at the hands of Fretilin.....

Not only he and his brother were opposed to the Portuguese government in East Timor. His uncle, Jose Manuel Duarte, is known as the leader of an armed uprising against Portugal which took place in 1959. However, the uprising was a failure and Jose was exiled to Angola.....

Abilio is indeed known to be close to Jakarta. For that reason, it is anticipated that during his term as Governor, the man from Manatuto will cleanse the government apparatus of all those with 'two faces'. 'In the village of my birth, I was a cattle herder. As Governor, I intend to be a good shepherd of my people. I will embrace those members of Fretilin who repent', says the son of a teacher and a livestock farmer whose formal education went only as far as Junior High School.....

FK: What percentage of the people agree with integration?

A: A pessimistic estimate would be 90% and an optimistic one would be 95%.
.....

FK: Precisely how many soldiers are needed in East Timor?

A: At the moment there are around 10 battalions for all of the development activities whilst there are 2 combat battalions (there are around 500-1000 men per battalion). There are about 8 battalions involved in territorial operations (Opster). I'm still in great need of the territorial operations forces.

FK: But these Opster forces are armed. Doesn't this affect the people's psychology?

A: Yes, of course, they're soldiers. If they weren't armed, they wouldn't be soldiers, would they?

FK: Wouldn't it create a better impression if they were seen to come bearing hoes instead of weapons?

A: In the field they certainly carry hoes. But even so, people criticise them, asking why are the soldiers doing that work? This sort of criticism is heard, even though they are doing work related to the people's needs.

FK: Many people have said that almost all development efforts in East Timor have been carried out by ABRI, with the result that the people don't get the chance to.....

A: You mean Bishop Belo? What he meant was that those active in developing the territory should be the people themselves, not ABRI. But we all know that the capabilities of the people are still limited. We don't have tradespeople. I know from my experience in my regency. If I want to develop a new drinking water source, I can give the pipes directly to them (ABRI) without payment. But if I ask the people to do it, there's no certainty that they'll be able to do it. And if they can do it, they'll certainly ask for payment..... Therefore, we still need ABRI there.

FK: Why doesn't the Dili Diocese want to join the Indonesian Bishops' Conference?

A: It's fairly meaningless since every Church is independent, every bishop is independent. He must answer directly to the Pope. If the Dili Diocese now joins the Indonesian Bishops' Conference it's a fairly meaningless advance, just a formality.

FK: What's your opinion of President Suharto?

A: He is known as the Father of Development, but I feel that in the case of East Timor he should be called 'The Father of Integration' since he was the first to accept us as part of Indonesia. This has a great deal of meaning.

FK: Do the people of East Timor share your opinion?

A: I once introduced a village community to the photograph of President Suharto and Mrs Tien. They accepted and respected that photo as if it were a picture of Jesus..... True.....

FK: Were you elected (to the post of Governor) because you are close to the President's family?

A: There's no connection between my appointment and my friendship with Prabowo. If it was up to Prabowo to elect the Governor, he would have chosen Lopes da Cruz, a very good friend of his. He was a very good friend of Prabowo's during the war, and he's closer to him than I am.

FK: When did you last meet with Xanana?

A: On 4 December 1975. At that time I was in a Fretilin prison. I saw him from inside my cell.

FK: What's the latest on him?

A: The latest news is that he entered Dili because his representative was being detained there. But that's all hearsay. Do you want to meet him? God willing, you'll convince him to surrender. Gee, he's such a handsome man. Just like me..... ha ha ha..... He's about one year younger than me. He's really cute, a bit like Roy Marten.....

- FK: Some people say that the East Timorese economy is going to ruin because of the 'Denok Hatimas' group which has a monopoly on the trade and import of certain goods.....
- A: I don't think it's because of that company.
- FK: There are also stories that coffee is bought from farmers there at a very low price and this is because of PT Salazar's (Denok Group) monopoly on the coffee trade.
- A: What I see and hear is that the international coffee market is what is affecting the coffee industry in East Timor. We can't compete with Brazilian coffee. Prices have hit rock bottom. This is the problem. It's got nothing to do with one person or monopolies.
- FK: What was the effect of the November 12 incident on the people of East Timor?
- A: The population of Dili is 120,000. How many people were involved in the demonstration when that incident occurred?
- FK: One thousand.....
- A: One thousand. And how many died?
- FK: One hundred.
- A: One hundred, maybe more. Yeah, let's say it's about 200. What percentage of the people is that?
- FK: But doesn't the presence of so many victims have a negative psychological impact on the people?
- A: That's according to you people outside. In my opinion more should have died. Why only those 200 or so? Why didn't the whole thousand of them perish at the same time? We must view the East Timor problem realistically. Aren't we democratic enough there? Everybody wants integration, so why are these characters still creating a disturbances.
.....

Translation: KS

General defends Dili shootings

By MOSES MANOHARAN,
Dili, Wednesday

The Indonesian military commander in East Timor today admitted that his troops fired into a crowd of mourners for up to 10 minutes last week, but denied that it was excessive.

"No, I don't think it was too long a time," Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw said in an interview. He acknowledged that the firing had continued for between five and 10 minutes.

General Warouw said that he would allow independent observers to visit the wounded.

The Indonesian Government has announced a commission to investigate the shooting, but the general would not comment on whether any soldiers would face a court martial.

The security forces say they opened fire into a crowd of 3500 mourners eight days ago in the former Portuguese colony as a result of a misunderstood order and because it had been provoked. The forces say 19 people were killed and 89 wounded.

Witnesses have said the troops opened fire without provocation. Some reports have put the death toll at up to 180 with nearly 300 wounded. In Lisbon today, the Democratic Union of Timor, a clandestine opposition movement, published a list of 30 people said to have been killed in last week's



The military commander in East Timor, Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw: will allow independent observers to visit the wounded.

massacre. Their ages ranged from 10 to 32.

General Warouw said observers would be allowed to visit the military hospital, until now barred even to relatives, where the wounded are being treated.

"Observers will not be allowed to talk to them until our interrogations are over because the sight of

foreigners could make them start talking about wild rumors," he said.

The observers would also be shown the 42 people who were arrested after the incident. The arrests have provoked an international outcry.

General Warouw said rumors — about the number of dead in the

firing, that a secret mass grave had been dug and that there had been subsequent executions — were inspired by Fretilin guerrillas to influence international opinion.

He said there were no more than 125 guerrillas left, but they still exerted some influence, especially in Dili, the East Timorese capital, where conditions were good for them because of high unemployment and local politics.

The Fretilin leader, Xanana Gusmao, who has eluded the Indonesian army for 16 years, slipped into Dili two months ago to organise public protests during a planned visit to the territory by a Portuguese parliamentary mission, he said. The visit was later cancelled.

MARK METHERELL in Canberra reports: The Australian embassy in Jakarta has inquired into a report that Indonesia's supreme military commander, General Try Sutrisno, had said after last week's Dili killings that dissidents should be "wiped out".

A spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said that the embassy had confirmed that General Try's comments were reported last Thursday in a newspaper controlled by the Indonesian military.

The embassy's inquiry followed a report in 'The Age' of General Try's comments, as published in the 'Jayakarta' newspaper. "People who refuse to toe the line

have to be shot," General Try was quoted as telling graduates of a military academy.

The Australian Government is not expected to take the matter further at this stage.

The Indonesian Government is also believed to have turned down an offer by the Australian Government of medical assistance in treating the injured.

The Indonesian ambassador to Australia, Mr Sabam Siagian, protested to the Department of Foreign Affairs over a union picket imposed on his embassy. He said the picket, which has prevented mail deliveries, was interfering with the embassy's ability to do its work.

In Jakarta, an official statement said that Indonesian authorities did not arrest anyone over an East Timorese independence demonstration through Jakarta yesterday. But journalists have been unable to contact people known to be among those led away by police.

Witnesses said yesterday that they saw about 50 demonstrators bundled into trucks.

But a military spokesman, Brigadier-General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, who estimated the number of protesters at 25, issued a statement saying no one was arrested.

— Reuter, AAP

PAGE 6: US call for full and just Dili inquiry.

A PROFILE OF GENERAL TRY SUTRISNO

Healthy, well-built, friendly, and having a fine but strong dignified appearance, he looks younger than his age. Many people say that, if it were not for his position, they would take him as a film star. That is the opinion of a layman.

In the eyes of diplomats, however, he is really somebody that one of them said of him as "the general in the fast track", a praise for his successful military career.

And that is a general description of General Try Sutrisno, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), the first officer from the military's younger generation to assume the top most commanding post.

General Try took over the post from General L.B. Moerdani, currently Indonesia's defense and security minister, in 1988. Try's appointment as the top man in the military, which was announced unprecedentedly by his predecessor, was the headlines of virtually all newspapers in the country.

"Together with ABRI, all Indonesian people should work closely to strengthen unity, step up alertness to face all possible development challenges in the future," Try said in a speech after his appointment as Armed Forces Commander, urging unity to build a strong Indonesia.



Born in the East Java city of Surabaya on November 15, 1935, Try entered the Army Technical Academy in Bandung, West Java, in 1956. He graduated three years later with a rank of second lieutenant.

He took part in several military training courses in Iran, Burma, and Australia before he was appointed aide-de-camp of President Soeharto. Try was then a colonel.

He also took part in various military operations launched to crush both sectarian and secessionist and communist armed rebellions in Java and Sumatra as well as the liberation of Irian Jaya, the western part of New Guinea, from the hands of the Dutch colonial administration in 1962.


A father of seven children, one of whom had graduated from the Police Academy, Try, a martial-arts enthusiast, was made garrison commander of South Sumatra province from 1979 to 1982. He became more popular among the Indonesian public when in 1982 he participated in the Ganesha operation, a joint civilian-military operation to drive herds of wild elephants from the thick pristine jungle of Lampung, South Sumatra, to the pachyderms' new habitat in the province. The elephants were given the new habitat because they often rampaged the villagers' plantation.

In December 1982, he was named the Jakarta garrison commander, a post which many people consider "elite and only given to brave and brilliant officers". His rank was promoted to major-general.

Four years later Try was appointed Army chief-of-staff with a rank of lieutenant-general, taking over the position of General Rudini, who was regarded as the "bridging generation" of the older generation of 1945 and the younger generation comprising early graduates of Indonesia's Military Academy.

"Pak Try (Sutrisno) is friendly and kind-hearted. He never hesitates to talk with us whenever he has the opportunity to do so. For example, during his tour of inspection," said one private soldier.

Despite, a devout Moslem, Try often finds time to be together with Christian members of the Armed Forces who are on duty and far away from their homes on Christmas Day. ■



Colonel Try at the time when he was President Soeharto's aide-de-camp

Tues Nov 26 91

03:06

PAGE 2/5

Below are two hasty translations from Tempo dealing with the visit of Special Rapporteur on Torture Pieter Kooijmans, who was in Dili at the time the November 12 massacre took place. — UN

Tempo, 23 November 1991, p.31

AFTER THE KOOIJMANS TEAM LEFT

There was an effort to link the November 12 incident in Dili with the implementation of human rights. Did the rioters deliberately try to attract international attention?

An emotional demonstration was staged by Dili residents last week. The demonstration did not just play to the UN Human Rights Commission team who were by chance in East Timor at that moment. It later became the focus of attention of many other parties, after dozens fell victim.

Indeed, it was not the intention of the UN Human Rights Team who were in Indonesia at the invitation of the government, to witness it all. The team, expert in the matter of "torture" which was led by Pieter H. Kooijmans (Holland) with Rueda Castanon (Spain) and Isaac Bitter (Israel) as members, initially wanted to look at how human rights were implemented (see TEMPO, November 16), especially, as Kooijmans told TEMPO, in the matter of using force against ordinary citizens.

East Timor was not their primary objective. While they were in Indonesia, the team met with a number of officials and well-known figures, and also stopped in a number of prisons. But not all the stories they were told were true. For example, a woman member of Fretilin, was captured after she was shot in the foot. According to the report Kooijmans received, the woman had been tortured and abused until she fainted. After [the team] met her in Dili, she admitted she had never been tortured.

It was a coincidence that when Kooijmans and friends were in Dili and this incident happened, "I myself was shocked. The riot happened when I was in Dili as a kind of starting point for the implementation of human rights." He never suspected that his presence would be used by a group of rioters in to stir up feeling. With specific regard to the November 12 incident he witnessed in Dili, Kooijmans in fact was not prepared to say much before he left Jakarta last week.

It was precisely the Legal Aid Foundation which launched an early protest. Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, head of LBH, admitted that three times he had sent a letter to the commander of ABRI, General Try Sutrisno. He asked that the government form an independent fact-finding team consisting of government elements, members of the Indonesian parliament, and non-governmental organizations. Amnesty International in London also regarded it as a serious incident.

The European Community in Brussels stated their regret at the incident which they judged as being in violation of human rights. The EC and its member countries even said in a statement on November 13 that the members of the security forces "involved" should be prosecuted.

Minister Sudomo saw it through different lenses. The Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security said that the riot was carried out by trouble-makers with the deliberate aim of demeaning Indonesia. "They deliberately tried to wreck the image of Indonesia in the international community," he said.

There have been a number of problems noted by several agencies monitoring the issue of human rights, beginning with Tanjung Priok (1984), the Lampung incident (1989), and labor issues. Many institutes,

said Kooijmans, both inside Indonesia and abroad, had frequently sent letters to him. "And the issue of human rights in East Timor is one issue most heatedly raised," he said. Especially, he said, the debate often arises because economic aid is linked to the problem of human rights.

Many steps have already been taken by the government to address the November 12 incident. The Commander of the armed forces formed a fact-finding team lead by the deputy head of the intelligence agency, BAIS, Major General Arie Sadewo. No less than Foreign Minister Ali Alatas joined those speaking of the need for such a mission. Because of this Garuda Nusantara did not want the special team sent by the Commander because it would wreck Indonesia's image in the eyes of the world.

But, said Professor Juwono Sudarsono, the political expert at the University of Indonesia, the fact that this incident had victims would not necessarily ruin Indonesia's international image. Indonesia, he said, would not lose face because Indonesia on its own initiative undertook an investigation openly. The proof of this was the suggestion of the Commander to form a fact-finding team.

But the spokesman for the armed forces, Brig. Gen. Nurhadi Purwosaputro, himself did not want to make an issue out of human rights. "This isn't a question of human rights or any such thing. It's not torture. It's simply a question of defense, an action in self-defense," he said. He added that there was no order to fire. "They just charged like that, throwing grenades," he said.

Commanding general Try Sutrisno said the same. For Indonesia, he said, there was no problem with human rights. Before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed [sic] on December 10, 1948, "we had the values of Pancasila which are full of human rights." In the 1945 Constitution, there are eight articles dealing with human rights, just like those formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three years later.

Indonesia also signed a human rights convention on October 23, 1985. In fact, since last year, Indonesia has been a member of the Commission on Human Rights.

Tempo, 23 November 1991, p.32

IT WASN'T TO TAUNT AND CURSE

Professor Pieter Kooijmans seems exhausted. The legal expert from Leiden, Holland seemed to have circles around his eyes, as though he hadn't slept. The night, he said, seemed so short. The feeling of fatigue not yet over, it was already time for him to get up again to follow an appointed schedule. He is the head of a delegation from the UN Commission on Human Rights who had arrived in Jakarta two weeks ago.

The presence of Kooijmans and two friends attracted increasing attention. The telephone calls from abroad were always ringing in his room, Kooijmans, it seems, had become the focus of journalists as well as other parties who wanted information. Of course, his visit coincided with the explosion of a demonstration which ultimately produced its victims.

This was the reason he was prepared to enjoy short nights after he went back to his office in Geneva to prepare his report. "If it's like this, I'll be like a monk, confined to my room for a full week," he said.

Last Thursday night, Kooijmans met with Yopie Hidayat and Susilawati Suryana from TEMPO for an interview in his room in the Hotel Sahid Jaya. These are the main points:

What was the atmosphere like in Dili when you arrived?

I arrived on Monday, a day before the incident. The atmosphere seemed calm.

Did you actually witness the incident directly?

No, I was meeting with Brig. Gen. Warouw at that time, so I don't know for sure what happened.

What was your impression after seeing the atmosphere outside after it happened?

It was gripping. The faces of people showed their fear. Everyone I met was in a state of shock.

According to you, was the demonstration deliberately undertaken because of the presence of a delegation from the Commission on Human Rights which you headed?

I didn't see any sign that the incident was planned. It seemed to have been an accident. It's difficult to say that the action materialized because we were there. I also don't know for sure how many people paid attention to our visit. It may well be that there was a connection. But I must have evidence if I'm going to make that conclusion.

Whom did you meet there, aside from officials and ABRI officers?

I also met with the Bishop and with a number of other civilians.

What was your impression of Bishop Belo?

The Bishop, like many other people, was in a state of shock.

In your view, what was the role of the church in this?

I was there in an extraordinary situation. So it's difficult to evaluate the role of the church in these circumstances. What happened yesterday, in my own view, was that the church gave protection to those who were afraid. I think that this is exactly the humanitarian mission that the church can play. The question of the political role of the church is something I can't evaluate.

Before all this happened, what was your view of East Timor?

I can only speak of the situation from 1985 until now because I have held this position since then. During that time, there have indeed

been many reports about East Timor sent to the Commission on Human Rights, both from the delegations which have visited there as well as informal [sic] organizations. From those reports, I could conclude that the conditions were slowly returning to normal.

But you still felt it necessary to visit East Timor?

My task here was to press Indonesia to pay more attention to human rights, not to taunt or curse the behavior of the government. Because what has become the focus of our attention on the Human Rights Commission is not the past but how the future of the people there can be better. And further, [this incident] notwithstanding, it's already possible to say there has been progress. Ten years ago, this visit could never have happened. And I believe in one thing, that the process of integration of East Timor must be undertaken in a more natural way. Now, my visit was to collect information on this issue, because now, many more people are going to be paying attention to what happens in East Timor.

Now the incident we wanted to avoid has happened. What will the international reaction be, in your view?

Very harsh. You can already read the commentary from Australia or the United States. The government of Indonesia must treat this question as a major problem. There must be a serious effort to resolve this problem, and now is the best time for that.

Didn't the Indonesian government already undertake an investigation?

The investigation must be truly open and invite representatives of international organizations to convincingly show that an investigation will really be conducted. The government must be able to accept those conditions. Even more so now, the United Nations itself must pay close attention and hope that this problem is resolved well.


Doesn't the involvement of outside organizations violate the sovereignty of Indonesia? This is a domestic affair...

I didn't mean to say there should be an international investigation. I meant that a national investigation should be conducted openly. This is essential to convince the international community that the investigation will be objective.



PRESS Release

Published by the Information Section of the Embassy of Indonesia,
8 Darwin Avenue, Yarralumla, ACT 2600, Ph 06. 273 3222, Fax 06. 273 8748



No. 014/PR/XI/91

In conjunction with the Statement issued by the Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on Thursday, 14 November 1991 on the Dili incident of 12 November 1991, the Minister/State Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 November 1991 issued a follow-up statement, as follows:

1. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia deeply regrets the incident which had caused casualties to members of the society as well as members of security apparatus. Besides, the Government also noted with profound concern on the premeditated provocation by certain elements which had ignited the bloody incident.
2. The President had instructed that the handling of this matter should be done with a high degree of thoroughness and should be well coordinated. For this purpose, a National Investigation Commission will be established by a Supreme Judge, member of the Supreme Courts. The said Commission will consist of senior officials representing the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Justice, the Armed Forces Headquarters and members of the House of Representatives and the Supreme Advisory Council. This Commission shall conduct a comprehensive investigation on all aspects of the incident and the result will be announced in due course.
3. Anyone proven to have violated the prevailing laws will be brought to the authorised court of justice in accordance with the principles of constitutional state upheld by the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila.

Jakarta, 17 November 1991
Minister/State Secretary
Signed

MOERDIONO

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Andrew Howett

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LEADERS

The Economist entered

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Back from the dead? 21/12/91

Monetarists worry that feeble money-supply growth will block economic recovery. They put too much store by fickle figures

IN THE mid-1980s monetarism was reported dead and buried. In 1991 the vampire clambered out of its grave. Just as before, economists and market men are now scrutinising every twitch in the money-supply numbers for clues about recession and recovery. Some do not like what they see. The growth in the broad measure of money has slowed sharply in most big economies, to an average of only 3½% in the past 12 months, the slowest rate for at least 40 years. Monetarists—who believe that changes in the money supply automatically cause changes in nominal GDP—fret that there is not enough liquidity to fuel recovery. Exhuming memories of the Great Depression, when central banks failed to prevent the money supply shrinking, they warn that without big cuts in interest rates the slump in monetary growth could drag economies deeper into recession.

Monetarism—in the sense of strict monetary targeting—fell from favour in the first half of the 1980s, when measures of money gave misleading signals. Financial deregulation and innovation made the monetary statistics harder to interpret, let alone control. As the relationship between money and nominal GDP broke down, central banks turned a blind eye to their monetary targets, and made policy by watching a variety of economic and financial data. Now economic doomsters are taking the money figures seriously again. Is there any reason to believe they have become more reliable?


The way in which monetary growth affects output and prices depends on how fast it is spent—what economists call the “income velocity of circulation”. Monetarists claim that the rate at which a given stock swirls through the economy is stable, or at least changes predictably. History, however, shows that it changes mysteriously. In the 1980s velocity fell in most countries, so rapid monetary growth was not necessarily inflationary. It is such variations that make the money supply a fickle guide to short-term changes in the economy. Though it would be foolish to ignore monetary growth completely, it would be equally risky to overreact to its recent slowdown.

For one thing, different measures tell different stories: narrow definitions of money are growing more strongly than broad ones in many countries. But there are two further reasons for scepticism. First, even if history shows a close relationship between money and nominal GDP, there are good grounds for thinking that the fall in income and output has caused the monetary slowdown, rather than the other way round. If so, weak money growth simply reveals that the economy is already weak, rather than what lies in store. Second, as interest rates have fallen, money-supply measures have become distorted. Households have shifted their savings out of bank deposits (which are included in broad money) into higher-yielding instruments, such as bonds (which are excluded). Likewise, companies have recently been raising money in the equity and bond markets, rather than borrowing from banks and thus creating money. So the velocity of circulation has risen in most countries: a given amount of money is financing a bigger volume of spending.

Kick-starting inflation

On December 17th Michael Boskin, chairman of President Bush's council of economic advisers, said that America's recession is not over. As yet, there is no cause for alarm: a powerful recovery was hardly to be expected from a notably shallow recession. When the recovery does gather pace, monetary growth will most likely revive with output. In the meantime, caution is best. A big monetary boost now would do nothing to hasten the recovery in the short term. The risk that it would spur inflation in the longer term should be taken seriously—witness the policy response to the stockmarket crash of 1987.

The moral is plain: stay calm. Monetarism had its moment of glory in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when, in another financial age, it was called in aid to bring down inflation. It would be a cruel twist if revived faith in this creed were to cause the next big surge in prices.



From Tiananmen to Timor


Why Indonesia may want to listen to outsiders

THE parallels are plain: unarmed civilians killed by army gunfire; the horrified reaction of the outside world; the instinctive rejection of foreign criticism; instant arrests and further repression after the event. Last month's massacre of scores of demonstrators in East Timor has, inevitably, become “Indonesia's Tiananmen”.

Yet the analogy is exact neither in background nor in detail. As communism crumbled beyond China's borders, the gerontocrats of Beijing viewed the student occupation of Tiananmen Square as the start of a much bigger protest and so the

beginning of their end. The slaughter of June 4th 1989 and the repression that followed were deemed necessary by China's old despots for their own survival. By contrast, the government of President Suharto has no such excuse: the Fretilin secessionists of East Timor are no military threat; the 3,000 who gathered at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on November 12th to mourn a young political activist killed two weeks earlier were no threat to the government in distant Jakarta.

Those differences matter. A secure government is likely to be more amenable to foreign views of human rights and politi-



LEADERS

cal freedoms than one that is an anachronism. Whereas China dismisses any foreign criticism as "interference", a UN human-rights delegation had arrived in East Timor (gobbled up by Indonesia in 1975) on November 11th at the government's invitation. The foreign ministry in Jakarta now says (disingenuously) that foreign journalists "have been free to enter and cover events in provinces in Indonesia, including East Timor" and will continue to be so.

In which case, the questions for the outside world are how great is its influence and how should it be used. The same questions were asked after Tiananmen Square; the answers involved western financial sanctions against China and a ban on visits by senior officials. China was unimpressed. All it had to do was wait until the Gulf war and the wrangles with Britain over Hong Kong compelled its inclusion in the West's counsels.

The power of the foreign purse

Many Indonesians, aware of foreign demand for their country's oil and gas, will advocate the same mix of patience and chauvinism. They should not be too confident. Indonesia will hold an election for part of its legislature next April, to be followed by a presidential election in March 1993. Social stability during this period depends on economic growth—which in turn depends partly on the largesse of foreign donors. Last year they pledged \$4.5 billion; for the year ending next March it will

be \$4.7 billion. Indonesia's foreign debt is \$57 billion, and servicing that consumes 30% of each year's export earnings; the government in Jakarta is in no position to thumb its nose at foreigners.

Foreigners, however, some of whom have suspended aid in reaction to the massacre, must use their power not simply to punish Indonesia but to nudge it towards greater tolerance. This does not necessarily mean that donors should take up the cause of the secessionists of East Timor. Nor does it mean the outright condemnation of a regime which, for the past quarter-century, has not done badly in meeting the basic needs of a nation that spreads, with a bewildering array of languages and races, over more than 13,000 islands.

What it should mean is some steady pressure. Let foreign governments press for an international inquiry into the massacre (Indonesia's "independent" one may wash too white), with appropriate punishments to follow. But let them also press more widely, for an uncensored press, free trade unions and an independent judiciary—the institutions needed to make the government, and the armed forces, properly accountable. Above all, let them discreetly (a public loss of face would be unproductive) remind the president that the outside world becoming much less tolerant of institutionalised corruptio nepotism and the abuse of human rights. President Suharto wise enough to realise that Indonesia is a long way from Chin

Once more unto the breech



Ten years from now, we shall look back on a revolution in men's clothing

THE millennium closed with a historic change: the era of trousers ended. For two centuries men of the western world had tinkered with varieties of jackets and trousers, while fashionable women paraded through every imaginable get-up. Then doublet and hose made their come-back, after 400 years in the dressing-up box. Tights were everywhere. Sony saved itself with the launch of its digital Codman. And once again junior executives got jobs by revealing a nicely turned calf.

Many people were surprised by this change, but not *The Economist*. In the early 1990s we had spotted the growing obsession with men's bodies in advertising—for anything from after-shave to ice cream. We watched Levi Strauss selling jeans by stressing the ease with which they could be taken off in public. A male urge to show leg was clearly back. Then the European emperor, Jacques Delors, tried to outlaw tights in his ill-fated menswear directive of 1996. Europe rebelled. The urge became a surge.

Go in codpiece

of France. Small wonder that Americans stayed loyal "pants" thereafter, while the British buried them as underwear. Beau Brummell was the first British toff to sport trousers, but they remained freakish until the Duke of Wellington, who valued their warmth in the Peninsular war, put a long-lasting seal on them.

Sportsmen were the first to break his spell. In the late 19th century sprinters dropped their shorts and came to their marks in long hose of sinister stretchiness. Spidermen in fluorescent tights appeared in pubs in the Lake District talking of severe hangovers. Couriers terrified receptionists as they strode sheathed head-to-toe in black Lycra, gaunt of cheek and fishy of eye, like 14th-century messengers of death. Just as wear for running and basketball became the norm, so did clingy longjohns and pointy footwear of these action men.

Climate drove the fate of menswear across that 2,000-year sweep. In hot, southern-dominated Europe, men did around in chitons and togas. The warm Italian renaissance was the heyday of hose. The little ice-age that began in the 17th

INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO THE KILLINGS FOLLOWING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

1. Set out below is a summary of the Indonesian response to the 12 November killings following the establishment of the National Commission of Inquiry. It is divided into three sections: the establishment, conduct and conclusions of the Inquiry; responses by the Indonesian authorities to the findings of the Inquiry; and comments by the authorities relevant to the longer term reconciliation of the East Timorese people.

The National Commission of Inquiry

2. On 17 November, President Soeharto, through State Secretary Moerdiono, said that the Government "very much regrets" the loss of life and announced the establishment of a "National Commission of Inquiry" to "conduct an investigation in a free, accurate, just and thorough manner into all aspects" of the incident. The Commission was led by Djaelani SH (a Justice of the Supreme Court) and comprised individuals from the Ministries of Social and Political Affairs, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Justice and from the Armed Forces, House of Representatives and Supreme Advisory Council (DPA).

3. The Commission spent from 28 November to 14 December in East Timor where it met with a large number and wide range of people. It had lengthy meetings with Governor Carrascalao, Brigadier General Warouw and Bishop Belo. It also met the Regent of Dili, the Mayor of Dili, various village heads, others associated with the Catholic church in the province including Ricardo da Silva (the parish priest of the Motael Church), and various lower ranking military and police officers and with 132 eyewitnesses. During the course of its investigations, the Commission also interviewed Major-General Panjaitan, Commander of the Ninth Military Region in Denpasar. The Commission also visited the wounded in hospital, and the 26 people who had been detained following the 12 November incident, and investigated allegations of mass graves by visiting and making excavations at various sites in East Timor. Concerns had been expressed by Bishop Belo that many witnesses were too frightened to come forward; however, on 3 December, the Commission met 9 witnesses at the Bishop's residence with the Bishop present.

4. The Commission presented its "advance report" of the 12 November killings in Dili to President Soeharto on 26 December. The report was also released publicly on that day. The major findings of the report and its recommendations, in summary, were:

the 12 November incident represented "the culmination of a series of earlier demonstrations/incidents perpetrated by the anti-integration group/Fretilin SDP";

- "the 12 November incident in Dili which caused a number of deaths and other casualties was clearly not an act ordered by or reflecting the policy of the Government or the Armed Forces, be it in the Capital or in the Province of East Timor";
- the demonstration on 12 November "... showed elements of pre-meditated provocation by a group of anti-integrationist/Fretilin SDP and was not an orderly and peaceful mourning procession ..." and "a number of foreigners took an active part in the demonstration";
- these tense conditions came to a head in the first instance by the stabbing of an ABRI officer and a further injury to a soldier. This situation led the security forces to believe there was a threat to their safety and their weapons. "... a spontaneous reaction took place among the security personnel to defend themselves, without command, resulting in excessive shooting at the demonstrators, causing deaths and wounded. At the same time, another group of unorganised security personnel, acting outside any control or command, also fired shots and committed beatings, causing more casualties";
- correct "riot- control procedures" were not optimally observed. "The actions of a number of security personnel exceeded acceptable norms and led to the casualties, be it in terms of deaths, gunshot wounds, stabbing wounds, or wounds by blunt instruments";
- "... there are sufficiently strong grounds to conclude that the death casualties totalled about 50 while the wounded exceeded 91." The Commission, importantly, also noted reports that 90 people were still missing, saying that "it was acknowledged by the eyewitnesses and other sources that there are some who may have died, maybe have been wounded or be in good health, may have escaped to the forest or taken refuge somewhere";
- the proper identification of bodies was not carried out and there was insufficient opportunity given to family and friends of victims to identify them; and
- the Commission recommended that those involved in the 12 November incident who were "suspected of having violated the law" should be "brought to trial in accordance with the Rule of Law, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution upon which the Republic of Indonesia is based".

Response by Indonesian Authorities to the Report

5. An ABRI spokesman said on 26 December that ABRI accepted the Commission's findings and that some ABRI members would be tried under applicable laws. (Prior to the release of the report ABRI spokesmen had said on a number of occasions from 14 November onwards that only 19 people had been killed).

6. On 28 December President Soeharto through State Secretary Moerdiono announced a number of decisions concerning government follow-up to the incident in Dili. The decisions were:

(a) in his position as Supreme Commander of ABRI, President Soeharto had decided to replace Major General Panjaitan, commander of the 9th Military District which includes East Timor and Brigadier General Warouw, Commander of the East Timor Military Command;

- on 30 December it was announced that Panjaitan's replacement would be Major General Mantiri and Warouw's replacement would be Brigadier-General Theo Syafei. Both replacements are Christian as were Panjaitan and Warouw;

- widespread replacements of the ABRI command structure below Warouw are being made in order to give a "fresh start" to East Timor operations; and

- both Generals Panjaitan and Warouw, on departure from their positions, publicly apologised for any mistakes they or their staff had made while serving in East Timor. Their replacements, Generals Mantiri and Syafei, in their public comments so far, have indicated that the military policies of pre-1989 are no longer appropriate in the current environment in East Timor. Mantiri has indicated the need for continued development of the "territorial approach", that is contributing to provincial development, and has said he also brings to his new job the principle of "winning the hearts and minds, winning people's sympathy". Syafei, however, has been reported as saying that he was willing to listen to a "thousand issues" with his heart and mind but if the issue was related to national unity he was not free to be tolerant;

- (b) General Sutrisno was ordered to find the "missing" persons in order to clarify the discrepancies between the figures presented by the National Commission of Inquiry (50 dead) and ABRI figures of 19 dead;

- (c) Army Commander Soedradjat was ordered to establish a military "Honour Council" to evaluate all policies and the steps taken by the local military apparatus in handling the 12 November incident;

- the Honour Council was also to conduct an investigation to determine those security forces who were involved in the 12 November incident and to recommend follow up action to Soedradjat; and
 - the Council started work in Dili on 6 January and has met with Warouw and Governor Carrascalao; and
- (d) the Attorney-General was instructed to take stern legal measures against all people initiating the incident and against those people involved in the stabbing of the army major.

7. In his New Year's Eve statement President Soeharto registered his "deepest possible condolences" to the families of the victims and his personal concern for those still missing:

- in his budget speech on 6 January, President Soeharto reiterated his personal condolences to the victims of the 12 November shootings (and also addressed the question of longer term reconciliation - see below).

8. Foreign Minister Alatas, commenting publicly on 3 January on the report of the National Commission of Inquiry and its foreign policy implications, said that:

- the final version of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry is expected by late February (the document released in December being an advance copy of an executive summary); and
- a solution to efforts in the reconciliation process between Portugal and Indonesia would be dependent on the new UN Secretary-General.

9. Commenting on the establishment of the Military Honour Council, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Sudomo said on 6 January that:

- Panjaitan and Warouw had to take responsibility for the incident, but it would depend on the recommendations of the Council whether they would be punished;
- punishment for officers who had erred could include dishonourable discharge, demotion or trial in a military court; and
- the changes in the East Timor command structure had been announced by President Soeharto rather than General Sutrisno and were meant to convey the serious way in which Indonesia was handling the tragic incident.

10. In the introduction to the budget speech, Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament, Kharis Suhud commented on 6 January on the 12 November killings:

- the Parliament was "deeply concerned and regretted" the Dili incident;
- the Parliament appreciated the Government's action in establishing the National Commission of Inquiry and "give our positive response to the working methods of the Commission which give the impression that it has thoroughly and diligently conducted the investigation";
- the Parliament welcomed the action taken by President Soeharto as a follow up to the preliminary report submitted to the Commission; and
- the incident should serve as a valuable lesson to the Government and called on the Government to review all relevant policies to ensure that any underlying problems in the province were discovered and rectified.

Longer Term Reconciliation

11. In an additional Presidential instruction in response to the preliminary report, Soeharto ordered Home Affairs Minister Rudini to review the civil administration of the province in order to ensure better coordination of development in the province:

- President Soeharto reportedly indicated that the development budget for East Timor was already large and exceeded that for other regions. (East Timor receives 98 percent of its budget from central government funding and is understood to receive proportionately more per capita from the central government than any other province.)

12. Rudini has sent a team to East Timor to study ways to improve provincial administration and to see why some were unhappy with integration:

- the team has formed four groups and has held discussions with a number of Government officials, including Carrascalao, the Provincial Secretary, his two assistants and the head of the personnel bureau.

13. Addressing the need for reconciliation in the province, President Soeharto, in his New Year's Eve statement, called for the correction of past mistakes and for the Government and ABRI in the province, together with all the people of East Timor to continue the development of the province:

- significantly (although these remarks were not directed solely at East Timor), the President called for greater efforts for development in the eastern and outlying regions to reduce the level of disparity in stages of development in the country. He also called for the process of autonomy, decentralisation, deconcentration and deregulation

to be stepped up in order to boost creativity and innovation to allow people to arrange and run their own affairs.

14. Addressing the longer-term development of the province, media reports from the meeting of the Economic Ministers on 5 January said that Ministers had discussed speeding up development in the province and ways to improve the welfare of the local people. The measures discussed included increasing budget allocations and improving coordination so that funding was utilised more efficiently.



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TELEFAX COVER PAGE

To : Mr. ACFOA P.W.

Fax Nr. : 03/416-27461

From : Fr. R. Hardaputranta, SJ

Nr. of Pages : 4 (including this one)

Re :

If you do not receive all pages,
please contact us as soon as possible.
Thank you.

Date : December 2nd 1991

1.

STATEMENT OF THE K.W.I. THE INDONESIAN BISHOPS CONFERENCE, ON THE EAST TIMOR INCIDENT.

1. With a view of helping settle the East Timor problem, we believe that it is imperative that the feelings and all that lives in the hearts of the people of East Timor, especially in the town of Dili, be given due and full attention and careful consideration.

It was thus that we felt compelled to release a press statement on November the 14th. 1991 wherein the KWI stated that it will continually follow and study developments in East Timor. To this end Father Alfons S. Suhardi OFM, Head of the Documentation and Information Department at the KWI, left for Dili on November the 22nd., to return on November the 26th. He was followed by Mgr. J. Darmatmodja SJ, Chairman of the KWI, together with Mgr. M.D.Situmorang OFMcap, who left on the 25th. and returned on the 27th. of November 1991.

SECRETARY OF THE KWI,

2. These visits proved immensely valuable. We were able to meet people who had witnessed the incident at first hand as well as others who received immediate reports from eyewitnesses of the November 12th. incident. We were able to learn what was commonly being said in and around Dili but not being heard elsewhere.

Besides reports and data that were considerably at variance with official accounts, we also received new information. For instance, many families still do not know whether husband, relative or child are still alive; a good number are still being treated in the military hospital, where they are not allowed to receive any visitors. The location of the graves of the dead is not known. We heard reports

of inhuman treatment of the bodies, dragged away, thrown into trucks and carried off. Families were not informed on burial arrangements. It is not clear whether those buried received a proper religious ceremony. As to the casualty figure, some spoke of three trucks, others a figure of 100 dead. The identity of those shot remains unknown. It is thought that some were Fretilin members, that others were demonstrators, and still others were from among those who had come to the cemetery in great numbers, in response to an earlier radio announcement. Many ask why ABRI opened fire, the cause of so many casualties. These shots were fired at the entrance of the Santa Cruz cemetery, well away from where two members of ABRI had been stabbed.

If this was in self defence one needs ask whether the number of casualties should have been so high. Why did ABRI not take preventive measures to stop the demonstrators mixing with throngs who had come with their flowers for the graves?

3. We therefore find it necessary that the veil surrounding the November 12th. incident be drawn back through an objective probe. It is now left to the KPN...the National Investigation Committee...to carry out this task. We are convinced that opening fire, which led to so many casualties, is not the policy of the government nor of the Armed Forces. To many it seemed that ABRI had been monitoring the demonstrators in an appropriate way. Moreover, some reported that at the time of shooting, some ABRI troops were trying to restrain their colleagues. Another piece of valuable information was that at the location where two ABRI members were stabbed by demonstrators there was no immediate retaliation. Those who usually have access to information question the truth of rumours saying that on the evening of the 12th. of November there were executions taking place. We are therefore deeply concerned that because of the actions of a group in ABRI the moral integrity, honour and national credibility is put at risk, in both the international community and at home, and especially in the eyes of the East Timorese people, whose minds and hearts we should win.

4. We urge that all parties assist the probes of the KPN through creating a situation where people would feel completely free to speak out on what they know and be assured of their welfare and safety.

PASTORAL STATEMENT on the correct use of places of worship and of religious activities.

WE.... by the grace of God and of the Holy See, Titular Bishop of Lorium and Apostolic Administrator of the Diocese of Dili.

As in these last years there have been attempts by certain groups to use/manipulate places of worship and public religious services for ends completely unrelated to spiritual life... we mention:

- a. On October the 12th. 1989, a demonstration after the Mass of Pope John Paul II at Tacé Tula;
- b. On September the 4th. 1990, a demonstration on the occasion of the opening Mass commemorating the Jubilee of the diocese, at Lecidere;
- c. on November the 12th. 1991, the making use of the burial service at the Santa Cruz cemetery, causing the loss of life and many wounded;

we hereby declare:

1. We do not sanction use of any religious services or places of worship for political ends or party purposes;
2. We ask the whole community to make a clear distinction between purely religious activities and political meetings/protest marches;
3. We appeal that from this day forward no religious service (Mass, Procession) be used for a demonstration or protest march;
4. We point out that there are other locations for public demonstration of whatever kind, for instance, public squares, stadiums, the grounds of the Governor's office, the grounds of the DPRD, etc...
5. Referring to what has already been stated in the Pastoral Letter of September the 17th. 1991, that "The church does not choose sides" we appeal to all parties not to indiscriminately involve the Bishop, the priests, the church in social-political and party activities;
6. The church is of a higher order and above parties, while on the side of all who strive for peace, justice and the common good;
7. As mother, the church is always ready to help all and everyone who is suffering, ill, or in danger of death;
8. In these difficult times we appeal to the whole Christian-Catholic community to, once again, forget all feelings of hatred or desire for retaliation, by pursuing a life based on prayer, love and the implementation of the common good.
9. May you all receive the blessing of the bishop.

BISHOP BELO

5. In reports of the November the 12th. incident the involvement of the church of Motael was mentioned. When on October the 28th. ADRI conducted a search of the church and church buildings Mgr. Belo himself was present. Mgr. admits that there were people found there and that they were duly taken out. He claims that there were no sharp weapons shown to him when allegedly found. Yet when the pastor of the church was interrogated at the POLWIL (police station), he was finally led to a table where sharp weapons, posters and other material were displayed. - said to have been found in the presbytery.

We do not wish to say much on the involvement of the Motael church. This could easily be interpreted as self defence and as a failure to seek objectivity. Should it prove to be true that the pastor was involved in the November 12th. incident, then the nature of his involvement would obviously have to be investigated. Suitable measures would then have to be taken. This would apply to anyone else proved to be at fault. However, we do wish to add that the bishop, the priests *and* religious in East Timor, in fulfilling their pastoral task, have to stand above all political affiliations, which often places them in difficult situations. Both opposing sides have regularly accused them of not giving enough support. We can note that in September 1991, Xanana, the leader of Fretilin, expressed sharp criticism of both Pope John Paul II and of Mgr. Carlos Philippe Ximenes Belo.

The attitude of Mgr. Belo relating to the latest incidents is given in his Pastoral Statement of November the 22nd (enclosed).

6. We feel it most pressing now that the people's feelings of security, and trust in the government be restored.

**Statement of attitude by
University Student Senates throughout Java**

(On the bloody incident in Dili, East Timor, 12 November 1991)

**STUDENTS CALL FOR INDONESIA'S COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO BE DISSOLVED
AND FOR AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR**

Students, as an important element in Indonesian public life who occupy a strategic position, should respond to developments in the political, social and cultural life of the nation. As future leaders of the nation, Indonesian students are very conscious of the need to take a position quickly towards various problems of society, and without hesitation to spearhead the struggle against all forms of injustice and falsehood.

Dedicated to this mission, Indonesian students who are members of the Communications Forum of Student Senates throughout Java used the occasion of their National Meeting on 20 and 21 November 1991 at Parahiyangan University, Bandung to discuss the Bloody Incident in Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991.

At this meeting, we formulated our opinion and agreed on the following demands directed specifically to the Indonesian Government:

1. We condemn the bloody incident in Dili on 12 November 1991, the spilling of the blood of hundreds of 'expendable' human lives (just like the incidents in Tanjung Priok and Way Japara, Lampung) which, in our opinion, could easily have been avoided. Persuasion or at the very most, tear-gas, fire-hoses or sticks should have been used to handle a mass demonstration. For any nation or people with a sense of dignity, the 'thirst to kill' fellow human beings should be avoided.

2. We call on the Indonesian government - in the name of humanitarianism and to preserve the good name of the nation and state in the eyes of the world community, and to avoid being branded as an uncivilised nation with no respect for basic human rights - to allow an international (UN) team to conduct an investigation so as to ensure that an objective and independent investigation is conducted, and to dissolve the National Commission of Investigation (KPN), whose independence is untrustworthy as it is composed of people from government circles. We also strongly insist that the Polkam [Politics and Security Department] investigation team headed by Major-General Sudewo, deputy chief of BAIS [the army's strategic intelligence agency] should be disbanded; the armed forces [ABRI] should themselves be the object of investigation because they are the ones who were involved in the bloody onslaught of 12 November 1991.

[Point 3 attacks members of the state-sponsored youth organisation, KNPI who have been demonstrating outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta and accuses them of smuggling and of the murder of a student at a hostel in Banda Aceh some years ago.]

4. We demand the release of our seventy co-students from East Timor who held a demonstration at the UN office, the Japanese embassy and the Australian embassy on 19 November 1991, as well as ten Bandung students who are now in custody in the police detention

centre [Polwiltabas] in Bandung. These arrests show more clearly than ever that the government has ended all freedom of expression and freedom of opinion in this country. Meanwhile, demonstrations 'orchestrated' by the government have been held by the KNPI, Pancasila Youth, Democratic Youth and the Cipayung Group without let or hindrance; nor is it a secret that those taking part received 'due recompense' for their trouble.

5. We demand an end to the arrest and torture of relatives of the East Timorese students who are being held at Polda Metro Jaya, Jakarta. The families in East Timor of these students are innocent and are not involved in anything and should not be subjected to such undue harassment.

6. We demand that the government make public information about the death of an East Timorese student while in police custody at Polda Metro Jaya, after having been tortured beyond all endurance by the police, the Jakarta military command and BAIS.

7. We call upon the world community which until now has channelled aid to the Indonesian government, to exert pressure on the Indonesian government, by imposing an arms embargo and possible economic sanctions, until the Indonesian government and the armed forces begin to respect the human rights of people in Indonesia and stop extinguishing human life as a way to crush protest and discontent among the people. The attention being shown by world opinion towards events in East Timor reveals grave concern at the methods used by the Indonesian government, and is proof of worldwide solidarity for the universal respect for human rights. It is petty narrow-mindedness to regard such a response as a hostile act or outside intervention in the internal affairs of the Indonesian nation and state. It is essential to distinguish clearly between 'the government' on the one hand, and 'the nation' and 'the state', on the other.

8. We call on the Indonesian government to withdraw all elements of the armed forces from East Timor without delay and give the people of East Timor absolute freedom to 'exercise their right to self-determination', in order to put a halt to any more spilling of blood.

9. We are resolute in our determination to carry out actions in opposition to armed violence against the people of East Timor until these demands have been met.

Bandung, 23 November 1991.

Signed by:

1. Agung Narawato*, Coordination Body of the Student Senate, University of Indonesia, Jakarta.
2. Abdurrahman Gapar*, Faculty of Industrial Technology of the Bandung Institute of Technology.
3. Hariyanto*, Student Communications Forum of Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
4. Rachmat*, Student Senate, Diponegoro University, Semarang.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

File No:

Date: 30 Dec 1991

No. of Pages: 10
(including this page)TO:Louise Coppel
Media Unit
CAAFAX No:

03-4195895

FROM:Chris Munn
Indonesia Section

MESSAGE:

Embassy translation of National Commission of Inquiry
preliminary report.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL.

THE SEVEN MEMBER NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION FORMED ON THE BASIS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO 93 OF 1991, BEGAN ITS TASK ON 21 NOVEMBER 1991. ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED COVERED PREPARATION AND COLLECTION OF DATA IN JAKARTA FROM 21-27 NOVEMBER, AS WELL AS INVESTIGATION IN EAST TIMOR (DILI AND ITS SURROUNDS) FROM 28 NOVEMBER TO 14 DECEMBER 1991.

2. AIM AND OBJECTIVE.

THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION FREELY, ACCURATELY, FAIRLY AND THOROUGHLY TO PROVIDE OBJECTIVE DATA

AND FACTS ABOUT THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI.

3. SCOPE.

IN CONDUCTING ITS DUTIES THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION PERFORMED INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS COVERING ALL ASPECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI, BUT DID NOT CONDUCT CRIMINAL/POLICE INVESTIGATION.

4. METHODOLOGY.

THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION METHODOLOGY WAS TO EXAMINE DOCUMENTATION, MEET AND INTERVIEW WITNESSES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION, CONDUCT FIELD OBSERVATIONS, RECONSTRUCT EVENTS, CORRECT CONFLICTING INFORMATION AND DATA, AND TO TABULATE AND ANALYSE THE DATA.

5. OUTLINE.

THIS REPORT IS SET OUT AS FOLLOWS:

I. INTRODUCTION.

II. CONDUCT OF ACTIVITIES.

III. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER IN DILI.

IV. CONCLUSION.

V. CLOSURE.

II. CONDUCT OF ACTIVITIES.

1. PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES AND DATA COLLECTION IN JAKARTA.

A. SET DOWN A WORKING PROGRAMME: COLLECT AND STUDY DATA, INFORMATION AND RESEARCH REFERENCES; AND TO FORM A SECRETARIAT TO SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES.

B. AUDIENCE WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT.

C. RECEIVED CLARIFICATION AND INPUT FROM THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY AND ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES.

2. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE PROVINCE OF EAST TIMOR (DILI AND

.../3

ITS SURROUNDS).

A. MET WITH THE GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR (FIVE TIMES), THE HEAD OF THE REGENCY OF DILI, THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF DILI, AND SELECTIVELY AND SEPARATELY WITH A NUMBER OF LESSER LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND VILLAGE HEADS.

B. MET WITH BISHOP CARLOS FILEPE XIMENES BELO (FOUR TIMES), AND WITH PRIESTS ALBERTO RICARDO DA SILVA, ALBRECHT KAREEM, MARKUS WANANDI, LOCATELLI, JOSE CARBONELL AND JOSE ANTONIO DA COSTA.

C. MET WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROUH (FIVE TIMES), WITH SEVERAL STAFF WITHIN HIS COMMAND, INCLUDING WITH LOCAL AREA POLICE AND THE TEAM OF PROSECUTORS FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT THAT WAS FORMED TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER IN DILI. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION (NCI) ALSO MET WITH THE COMMANDER OF PANGDAM IX/UDAYANA (SINTONG PANJAITAN) IN DENPASAR.

D. MET WITH THE RESPECTIVE HEADS OF THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT AND DILI MUNICIPAL PARLIAMENT.

E. MET WITH SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS AND LEADING COMMUNITY FIGURES.

F. MET AND INTERVIEWED 132 WITNESSES.

G. VISITED THE WIRA HUSADA MILITARY HOSPITAL IN DILI, THE CENTRAL GENERAL HOSPITAL AND SEVERAL COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTRES AS WELL AS LOCAL POLICE DETENTION CENTRES.

H. FOLLOWED THE ROUTE OF THE DEMONSTRATION FROM THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE MOTAEL CHURCH TO THE SANTA CRUZ CEMETERY AND CONDUCTED SEVERAL RECONSTRUCTIONS AT THE SITE OF THE INCIDENT. THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ALSO INVESTIGATED AND RECORDED THE EXISTENCE OF ABOUT 70 BULLET STRIKES IN WALLS AND DOORS OF THE SANTA CRUZ CEMETERY, IN TREES AND IN ELECTRIC POWER POLES.

I. CONDUCTED AN INSPECTION OF THE HERA GENERAL CEMETERY AND EXHUMED ONE OF EIGHTEEN GRAVES OF VICTIMS WHO DIED. THE BODY WAS BURIED IN A COFFIN, FULLY DRESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION. THERE WAS ONLY ONE BODY IN THE GRAVE. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION ALSO CONDUCTED INSPECTIONS AND DID SOME DIGGING IN LOCATIONS AROUND HERA, PASIR PUTIH, TASI TOLU AND TIBAR ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE LOCAL COMMUNITY THAT THOSE AREAS CONTAINED MASS GRAVES OF VICTIMS OF THE DILI 12 NOVEMBER INCIDENT, BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF BURIALS IN THOSE AREAS.

III. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF THE DILI 12 NOVEMBER INCIDENT.

1. GENERAL.

A. IN THE SPACE OF 15 YEARS THE INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF EAST TIMOR HAS PROCEEDED VERY RAPIDLY AND THE RESULTS HAVE IMPROVED COMMUNITY WELFARE. AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENT THE CITY OF DILI, WHICH AT THE TIME OF INTEGRATION HAD A POPULATION OF ABOUT 25,000, HAS EXPERIENCED URBANISATION TO THE EXTENT THAT ITS POPULATION IS NOW 124,284 OUT OF A TOTAL POPULATION IN EAST TIMOR OF 755,950 AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE RESULTED. WITH THE SPEED OF DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION A LARGE NUMBER OF GRADUATES OF PRIMARY, JUNIOR AND SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS NEEDING EMPLOYMENT HAVE SWELLED THE RANKS OF UNEMPLOYED YOUTH. THIS FACT REPRESENTS ONE OF THE REASONS SECTIONS OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION ARE PERSUADED BY ANTI-INTEGRATION/GPK FRETILIN PROPAGANDA AND SOME OF THEM KNOWINGLY BECOME ACTIVISTS IN DEMONSTRATIONS, OTHERS JOIN IN FOR THE SAKE OF TAGGING ALONG WHILE OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE BECOME INVOLVED IN THESE DEMONSTRATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE FORCED TO. HAND IN HAND WITH THE POLICY OF DEVELOPMENT, IN 1989 TERRITORIAL OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY ABRI ALONG WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT APPARATUS AND COMMUNITY FORCES WERE BEGUN, USING AN APPROACH OF DEVELOPMENT, BROTHERLY LOVE AND COMMUNITY WELFARE.

B. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE GPK FRETILIN WERE INCREASINGLY PRESSURED AND WEAKENED TO THE POINT WHERE THEY CHANGED THEIR MODUS OPERANDI FROM JUNGLE GUERILLA STYLE TACTICS TO URBAN GUERILLA TACTICS USING EVERY AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY TO THREATEN AND TERRORISE AND TO ATTRACT WORLD ATTENTION TO PROVE THEIR CONTINUING EXISTENCE. THE ONLY HOPE OF GPK FRETILIN IN MAINTAINING ITS EXISTENCE AND THWART THE EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE IS THE HOPE THAT THERE WILL ASSISTANCE FROM OVERSEAS, BOTH FROM ELEMENTS OF GPK FRETILIN OVERSEAS AND FROM ANTI-INDONESIAN FORCES IN OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

2. PROLOGUE TO THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER IN DILI

THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER IN DILI IS BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO INCIDENTS THAT PRECEDED IT, NAMELY:

A. 1989

1) A DEMONSTRATION BY ABOUT 20 YOUTHS FEATURING ANTI-INTEGRATION POSTERS AFTER MASS AT TASI TOLU, DILI DURING THE VISIT OF POPE JOHN PAUL II ON 12 OCTOBER 1989

2) A STONE THROWING ATTACK BY ABOUT 50 YOUTHS ON 2 OFFICIALS AT THE LESIDERE PARK, DILI ON 4 NOVEMBER 1989.

B. 1990

- 1) A DEMONSTRATION BY ABOUT 50 YOUNG PEOPLE AT THE HOTEL TURISMO DURING THE WORKING VISIT OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, JOHN MONJO, ON 17 JANUARY 1990 WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY A PROTEST MARCH THROUGH THE STREETS OF DILI BY ABOUT 250 YOUNG PEOPLE ON 18 AND 19 JANUARY 1990.
- 2) A DEMONSTRATION BY ABOUT 200 YOUNG PEOPLE CARRYING ANTI-INTEGRATION BANNERS AND A FRETILIN FLAG AFTER A MASS TO COMMEMORATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DILI DIOCESE ON 4 SEPTEMBER 1990.
- 3) VANDALISM OF A SCHOOL AND VEHICLES BELONGING TO THE SECURITY APPARATUS AND ATTACK ON AN OFFICIAL AT STATE JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL IV, DILI ON 8 OCTOBER 1990 BY AN ANTI-INTEGRATION GROUP OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHO HAVE USED THE EXTERNATO SCHOOL AS THE BASE FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES.
- 4) ON 15 OCTOBER 1990, A NUMBER OF STUDENTS FROM THE SANTO PAULUS JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL BEAT AND DISARMED AN OFFICIAL WHO WAS REMOVING GRAFFITI AND A POSTER WHICH WERE ANTI-PANCASILA IN TONE. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY TAKING DOWN THE INDONESIAN FLAG AT THE SCHOOL ON 15 OCTOBER 1990.

C. 1991

ON 28 OCTOBER 1991 FIGHTING BETWEEN AN ANTI-INTEGRATION GROUP OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHICH WAS INSIDE THE MOTAEL CHURCH COMPLEX AND A PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP FROM OUTSIDE THE COMPLEX RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF SEBASTIAO GOMES FROM THE ANTI-INTEGRATION GROUP AND AFONSO GOMES FROM THE PRO-INTEGRATION GROUP.

3. THE INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991

A. IT IS BELIEVED THAT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PLANNED VISIT OF A PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION ANTI-INTEGRATION GROUPS/GPK FRETILIN WERE ACTIVE AS THEY REGARDED THIS VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ANTI-INTEGRATION GROUPS/GPK FRETILIN TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR EXISTENCE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. BECAUSE THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION VISIT WAS CANCELLED, THE PREPARATIONS ALREADY MADE WERE TRANSFERRED TO DEMONSTRATIONS BY EXPLOITING THE MOMENTUM OF A MASS AND FLOWER LAYING CEREMONY ON 12 NOVEMBER 1991 TO MARK 2 WEEKS SINCE THE DEATH OF SEBASTIAO GOMES AND THE PRESENCE IN DILI OF PROF PIETER KOOIJMANS, THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

B. BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY WITNESSES AND DATA OBTAINED, A

NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE DEMONSTRATION.

C. THE VERY EVIDENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE GPK FRETILIN IN THE DEMONSTRATION IS PROVED BY THE APPEARANCE OF FRETILIN FLAGS, FALENTIL FLAGS (THE FLAG OF THE MILITARY WING OF FRETILIN), THE SYMBOL OF THE UNIAO DE CONVERGENCIA NACIONAL DE TIMOR LESTE, SEVERAL ANTI-INTEGRATION BANNERS AND PICTURES OF THE GPK FRETILIN LEADER XANANA. THE DEMONSTRATION BEGAN ON THE STREET OUTSIDE THE MOTAEI CHURCH AND MOVED ALONG MAJOR STREET IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SANTA CRUZ CEMETERY. ALONG THE STREET THE DEMONSTRATORS YELLED ANTI-INTEGRATION SLOGANS, GLORIFIED THE GPK FRETILIN LEADER XANANA AND INSULTED THE SECURITY APPARATUS. IN THIS CONFUSED AND EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE, THE DEMONSTRATORS STABBED MAJOR GERHAN LANTARA, DEPUTY COMMANDER OF BATTALION 700 WHO WAS ALSO AN OFFICER OF THE SECTOR C INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND PRIVATE SECOND CLASS DOMINGOS OF THE DILI MILITARY DISTRICT IN FRONT OF THE WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION CANTEEN AND THREW STONES AT THE SUMMA BANK BUILDING AND THE FORMER POLICE DISTRICT OFFICE RESULTING IN BROKEN GLASS IN BOTH BUILDINGS.

D. CONCERNING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF THE INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991, PARTICULARLY EVENTS AT THE SANTA CRUZ CEMETERY, THE INFORMATION GATHERED CAN BE CATEGORISED AS FOLLOWS:

1) BEFORE THE SHOOTING

WHILE THE DEMONSTRATION WAS PROCEEDING ALONG THE STREETS A GROUP HAD ALREADY ASSEMBLED AT THE SANTA CRUZ CEMETERY. AFTER THE DEMONSTRATORS MIXED IN WITH THE GROUP THAT WAS ALREADY AT THE CEMETERY, THEY CONTINUED TO WAVE FRETILIN FLAGS, FALENTIL FLAGS, SYMBOLS OF THE UNIAO DE CONVERGENCIA NACIONAL DE TIMOR LESTE, ANTI INTEGRATION BANNERS, AND PICTURES OF THE GPK FRETILIN LEADER XANANA WHILE YELLING ANTI-INTEGRATION SLOGANS AND INSULTING THE SECURITY APPARATUS.

2) WARNING SHOTS

BASED UPON WITNESS INFORMATION THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT VERSIONS. ON ONE SIDE, SEVERAL WITNESSES STATED THERE WERE ONE OR TWO WARNING SHOTS, WHILST ON THE OTHER SIDE SEVERAL WITNESSES STATED THAT THERE WAS DIRECT SHOOTING INTO THE CROWD WITHOUT WARNING SHOTS.

3) SHOTS INTO THE CROWD.

BASED UPON WITNESS INFORMATION THERE ARE THREE DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS. ON ONE SIDE SEVERAL WITNESSES STATED THAT SHOTS WERE DIRECTED STRAIGHT AT THE CROWD BY SECURITY FORCES IN ANTI RIOT FORMATION. IN ONE OTHER VERSION SEVERAL WITNESSES STATED THE SHOOTING WAS CONDUCTED AFTER A CLASH OCCURRED AND THERE WERE EFFORTS TO SEIZE

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WEAPONS, AS WELL AS THE THROWING OF A GRENADE AT THE SECURITY FORCES WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE CROWD.

IN ADDITION TO THESE VERSIONS THERE WERE SEVERAL WITNESSES WHO STATED THAT THE SHOOTING WAS CARRIED OUT BY A GROUP OF UNRESTRAINED SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS, OUT OF FORMATION AND UNIFORM, AS WELL AS IN A HIGHLY CHARGED STATE OF EMOTION.

4) BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM WITNESSES, BESIDES THE SHOOTING THERE ALSO OCCURRED STABBINGS WITH SHARP OBJECTS, BEATINGS WITH BLUNT OBJECTS AND FISTS AND KICKING OF THE CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

4. VICTIMS WHO DIED, WERE INJURED OR ARE MISSING.

BASED UPON INFORMATION COLLECTED, THE NCI (NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION) OBTAINED DATA AS FOLLOWS:

A. VICTIMS WHO DIED.

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE (EAST TIMOR) MILITARY COMMAND THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO DIED TOTALLED 19 PEOPLE, WITH PROOF BEING THE NUMBER OF BODIES WHICH WERE BURIED IN THE WERA PUBLIC CEMETERY. THESE WERE BURIED WITH A PRAYER BY A CATHOLIC SPIRITUAL OFFICER. THESE VICTIMS WHO DIED WERE NOT PHOTOGRAPHED FOR IDENTIFICATION, NOR WERE THERE NAMES OR ADDRESSES OF IDENTIFICATION, ALTHOUGH THESE WERE SUPPLEMENTED 'VISUM ET REPERTUM'. AMONG THE 19 WHO DIED INCLUDED KAMAL AHMAD BAMADHAJ, A NEW ZEALAND CITIZEN, WHOSE REMAINS, UPON REQUEST HAVE BEEN HANDED OVER TO HIS FAMILY. HOWEVER ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM EYE-WITNESSES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VICTIMS WHO DIED WAS MORE THAN 19 WITH THEIR INFORMATION VARYING IN THE VICINITY OF 50, 60 OR 100 PEOPLE OR MORE.

B. THE INJURED.

ACCORDING TO DATA OBTAINED FROM WIRA HUSADA MILITARY HOSPITAL IN DILI AND WITH CONCURRENCE 'VISUM ET REPERTUM' THE VICTIMS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

1) INJURED FROM SHOOTING	42 PEOPLE
INJURED FROM STABBING	14 PEOPLE
INJURED FROM BEING BEATEN BY A BLUNT OBJECT	35 PEOPLE

THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THIS FIGURE COULD INCREASE SHOULD NOT BE CLOSED AS A NUMBER OF VICTIMS WERE CONSIDERED TO HAVE FLED WITH THE DEMONSTRATING CROWD AND CARRIED OUT MEDICATION BY THEMSELVES. AS OF 14 DECEMBER THERE WERE ONLY 41 PATIENTS IN WIRA HUSADA HOSPITAL. MEANWHILE AS MANY AS 50 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE FAMILIES.

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C. MISSING.

ACCORDING TO VERBAL AND WRITTEN INFORMATION FROM WITNESSES AND OTHER SOURCES, THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE MISSING IS ABOUT 90 PERSONS. IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE WITNESSES AND OTHER SOURCES THAT AMONG THE MISSING INCLUDES SOME WHO MAY HAVE DIED, BEEN INJURED, ARE HEALTHY, RAN TO THE FORESTS OR FLED.

5. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS.

POLICE IN EAST TIMOR HAVE INVESTIGATED 308 DEMONSTRATORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING PROCEDURES AND LEGAL REGULATIONS. OF THIS TOTAL 261 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE FAMILIES THROUGH THE RELEVANT VILLAGE HEAD. OF THE 47 PEOPLE WHO WERE FURTHER INVESTIGATED 15 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN FREED, 8 ARE SUSPECTED OF CARRYING OUT SPECIAL CRIMINAL ACTS AND 24 ARE SUSPECTED OF HAVING CARRIED OUT GENERAL CRIMINAL ACTS. THE CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATIONS HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LEGAL REGULATIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF A LAWYER TO PROVIDE LEGAL AID.

IV. CONCLUSIONS.

THE COMMISSION HAS FIRM REASONS AND GROUNDS TO REACH THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

1. THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI WAS THE CULMINATION OF A CHAIN OF EARLIER DEMONSTRATIONS/INCIDENTS CARRIED OUT BY A GROUP OF ANTI-INTEGRATIONISTS/GPK FRETELIN.

GPK FRETELIN WHICH IS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE AND HAS CHANGED ITS PATTERNS OF OPERATION FROM JUNGLE GUERILLA (ACTIVITIES) TO URBAN GUERILLA (ACTIVITIES) HAS MISUSED THE POLICIES OF DEVELOPMENT IN EAST TIMOR WHICH ARE BASED UPON THE APPROACH OF LOVE AND CARING AND WELFARE AND USED THE SITUATION, CONDITIONS AS WELL AS THE INSTABILITY OF THE YOUNG GENERATION BY INFLUENCING THEM TO OPPOSE INTEGRATION, MEANWHILE ATTRACTING WORLD ATTENTION TO ITS (FRETELIN) EXISTENCE.

2. THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND INJURY WAS NOT SOMETHING WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE BASIS OF AN ORDER, OR GOVERNMENT OR ABRI POLICY EITHER IN THE CENTRE OR AT THE EAST TIMOR PROVINCIAL AREA. THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI IN TURN REPRESENTED A DISASTER WHICH WAS RIGHTLY REGRETED.

3. THE DEMONSTRATION OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF PROVOCATION WHICH HAD BEEN PLANNED BEFOREHAND BY A GROUP OF

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ANTI-INTEGRATIONISTS/GPK FRETILIN AND WAS NOT AN ORDERLY PROCESSION WITH THE PEACEFUL AIM OF REMEMBERING THE DEPARTED SOUL OF SEBASTIAO GOMES.

4. THE DEMONSTRATORS, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM CONSISTED OF YOUTHS, BEHAVED IN A HOT TEMPERED, EMOTIONAL AND DESTRUCTIVE MANNER, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THEY WERE INCITED BY THE GROUP OF ANTI-INTEGRATIONISTS/GPK FRETILIN WHICH HAS CULTIVATED THEM FOR SOMETIME. BESIDES THAT THEY CONSCIOUSLY WAVED THE FLAG OF FRETILIN AND FALENTIL, PHOTOS OF THE GPK FRETILIN LEADER XANANA AND YELLED OUT ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST CALLS AND INSULTED THE SECURITY FORCES.

5. SEVERAL FOREIGN CITIZENS WERE PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN THE DEMONSTRATION.

6. THESE TENSE CONDITIONS CAME TO A HEAD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE STABBING OF AN ABRI OFFICER AND AN INJURY TO A SOLDIER, AND BY THE PROVOCATIVE AND HOT TEMPERED BEHAVIOUR BY THE DEMONSTRATORS. THIS SITUATION LED THE SECURITY FORCES TO BELIEVE THERE WAS A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF THE THEIR WEAPONS AND LIVES, AND LED TO THE SPONTANEOUS REACTION OF THE SOLDIERS WHO WITHOUT COMMAND ORDERS UNDERTOOK SELF-DEFENCE AND FIRED EXCESSIVELY AT THE CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS RESULTING IN DEATHS AND INJURIES. AT THE SAME TIME ANOTHER GROUP OF SECURITY FORCE MEMBERS WHO WERE DISORDERLY AND WHO WERE NOT UNDER COMMAND ALSO FIRED AT THE CROWD AND BEAT PEOPLE RESULTING IN EVEN MORE CASUALTIES.

7. IN HANDLING THE RIOT WHICH OCCURRED IN THE EVENT/INCIDENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1991 IN DILI, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ANTI-RIOT UNITS TO CONTROL THE RIOT, NONETHELESS THE COMMISSION DID NOT SEE EVIDENCE OF OPTIMAL USE OF RIOT CONTROL PROCEDURES/RULES. THE ACTIONS OF A GROUP OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES EXCEEDED THE APPROPRIATE LIMIT RESULTING IN VICTIMS FALLING EITHER KILLED, SHOT, STABBED OR INJURED AS A RESULT OF BEING STRUCK WITH BLUNT OBJECTS. ALTHOUGH THE CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS TO DATE IS 19 DEAD AND 91 INJURED, NONETHELESS THE COMMISSION FEELS IT HAS STRONG GROUNDS TO BE OF THE OPINION THAT THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS WHO DIED WAS ABOUT 50 PEOPLE AND THE NUMBER INJURED WAS OVER 91 PEOPLE.

8. THE HANDLING OF THE DEAD APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN IN ORDER. THE BODIES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED AS THEY SHOULD, AND IN ADDITION, INSUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY WAS GIVEN TO THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF THE VICTIMS TO IDENTIFY THEM.

9. THE COMMISSION IS OF THE OPINION THAT IN ORDER TO UPHOLD THE LAW ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN THE 12 NOVEMBER 1991 INCIDENT WHO WERE SUSPECTED OF BREAKING THE LAW SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BY DUE PROCESS OF THE EXISTING LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA WHICH IS BASED ON

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DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

PANCASILA AND THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

IN CLOSING

IN CARRYING OUT ITS DUTIES THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION HAS RECEIVED THE FULL ASSISTANCE OF ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT, ABRI, CHURCH LEADERS, AND THE PEOPLE. HOWEVER, IT NEEDS TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION MET WITH OBSTACLES BECAUSE A NUMBER OF WITNESSES WHO WERE ASKED TO TESTIFY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO SO BECAUSE THEY WERE STILL AFFECTED BY ANXIETY AND WERE CONCERNED AT BEING CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE 12 NOVEMBER 1991 DILI INCIDENT OR WERE AFRAID OF BEING BRANDED AN ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST.

JAKARTA, 26 DECEMBER 1991

SIGNED BY ALL SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION.


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No. 014/PR/XI/91

In conjunction with the Statement issued by the Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on Thursday, 14 November 1991 on the Dili incident of 12 November 1991, the Minister/State Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 November 1991 issued a follow-up statement, as follows:

1. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia deeply regrets the incident which had caused casualties to members of the society as well as members of security apparatus. Besides, the Government also noted with profound concern on the premeditated provocation by certain elements which had ignited the bloody incident.
2. The President had instructed that the handling of this matter should be done with a high degree of thoroughness and should be well coordinated. For this purpose, a National Investigation Commission will be established by a Supreme Judge, member of the Supreme Courts. The said Commission will consist of senior officials representing the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Justice, the Armed Forces Headquarters and members of the House of Representatives and the Supreme Advisory Council. This Commission shall conduct a comprehensive investigation on all aspects of the incident and the result will be announced in due course.
3. Anyone proven to have violated the prevailing laws will be brought to the authorised court of justice in accordance with the principles of constitutional state upheld by the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila.

Jakarta, 17 November 1991
Minister/State Secretary
Signed

MOERDIONO



Republic of Indonesia


East Timor: Building for the Future

Issues and Perspectives

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Republic of Indonesia



PREFACE

This report details the history, society, culture, political structure and development of the Indonesian province of East Timor.

Over the past 20 years, considerable debate and misinformation have muddled the issues involving East Timor, overshadowing the aspirations of the East Timorese people whose welfare has been an important priority of the Indonesian Government.

Repeatedly, propaganda and rhetoric have colored history in a transparent attempt to compensate for a self-serving and irresponsible display of political opportunism on the part of Portugal. The impact has been most severe on a people who have been buffeted by those attempting to disrupt their desire for peace, tranquility and socio-economic progress.

This record must be set straight.

The facts about East Timor are presented in the following pages. They stand as a comprehensive reply to the distortions and allegations that have been mounted by those who oppose peace, stability and progress in East Timor. Many of these allegations and distortions demand a direct response:

- Why did the Portuguese leave East Timor?

What is described as a "process of decolonization" by Portugal deserves rather to be termed a record of failure and ineptitude. In August 1975, the colonial authorities in Dili, in a most irresponsible manner, simply packed up and left East Timor, after allowing the situation in the territory to deteriorate to the point of civil war. Portugal was, in fact, guilty of practically instigating civil war by secretly turning over its arms and ammunition to one particular minority group, FRETILIN. This development can be seen as the culmination of centuries of colonial neglect and a completely bungled decolonization process. By utterly failing in its responsibility, Portugal in fact has forfeited any right to be still considered the "administering power" of East Timor.

In the face of this, the East Timorese people had rightly assumed their inherent right to decolonize themselves, considering themselves no longer bound to any decolonization covenant with the erstwhile colonial power. This they did by

choosing independence through integration with Indonesia in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and Principles VI, VIII and IX of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) and as further confirmed by the relevant provisions of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).

• **Why and how did Indonesia become involved?**

- In the wake of Portugal's abdication of responsibility, Indonesia was confronted by a situation that was neither desired nor of its making, but that threatened seriously to disrupt the national development and reconstruction efforts in which it was engaged after the ravages of the 1965/1966 abortive coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
- Sharing the western part of the same island, Indonesia was forced to shoulder the burdens and consequences of civil war right at its doorstep, in the form of thousands of refugees flooding into West Timor, armed skirmishes at its border and the prospect of prolonged political strife, economic upheaval and foreign interference.
- Indonesia was explicitly asked to respond to the request for integration by the legitimate representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor.
- East Timor's process of integration into the Republic of Indonesia has conformed with the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions on decolonization, and the United Nations was fully informed of every step in this long and difficult process.
- Indonesia from the outset supported the efforts of the new government of Portugal to decolonize East Timor and time and again reaffirmed its readiness to cooperate with Portugal in the peaceful and orderly implementation of the process of decolonization. Indeed, at the request of Portugal, Indonesia extended its active cooperation to the process as *inter alia* evidenced by the series of meetings held between high-level representatives of the two sides in New York, September 1974; Lisbon, October 1974; London, March 1975; Jakarta, August and September 1975; and Rome, November 1975.
- In fact, as late as in November 1975, three months after Portugal's abandonment of East Timor, at a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in Rome, Indonesia still urged Portugal to return to East Timor in order to complete the decolonization process in a just and orderly manner. Portugal, however, again failed to make good on its own promise.

- Indonesia's subsequent involvement in East Timor can, therefore, be seen as endeavoring to respond, in as restrained a manner as possible, to the chaotic and tragic circumstances that unfortunately accompanied the decolonization process in East Timor.
- Thus, far from "disrupting the decolonization process" or from "annexing, invading or illegally occupying" another independent state, as some have spuriously charged, Indonesia's involvement in East Timor was, on the contrary, one of contributing to the process of decolonization in that territory, *inter alia*, by helping to ensure that the democratically expressed will of the majority of the people not be overruled by the armed terror and unilateral imposition of a ruthless minority.

- **How has Indonesia helped East Timor?**

Every part of the archipelago that is the Republic of Indonesia has been an integral and self-determining part of this strong and unified nation. It has been and remains a goal of Indonesia to ensure that the benefits of development reach every part of our vast country, proportionate to the needs. Indeed, that is the single reason why East Timor receives the largest amount of development funds on a per capita basis, an investment that has produced hospitals, schools, roads and commerce when little to none had existed under Portuguese rule.

- **What about the "population discrepancy"?**

Of all the numerous myths about East Timor developed and disseminated by Indonesia's detractors, none is more malicious and misleading than the endlessly repeated allegation of the number of lives lost in East Timor during and after the process of integration. These critics charge that East Timor's population decreased by 200,000 or more, thus implying that about one-third of the population has either perished or disappeared and that Indonesia should be held responsible for this. Some even go so far as recklessly accusing Indonesia of "genocide."

Not only does this juggling of numbers represent a shameless distortion of the tragic facts surrounding Portugal's mishandled decolonization of East Timor, but it also shows a complete and often deliberate misreading of the process of population surveying and census-taking that has taken place prior to and following the departure of the colonial government.

The only internationally accepted census of East Timor was taken in 1980 as part of a nationwide count carried out by the Government of Indonesia. The resulting population figure — 555,350 persons — seemed to show a decline of some 69,000

from the last colonial estimate of 624,564. The true difference will never be known: colonial authorities themselves acknowledged that their figures for 1974 and earlier were estimates based on reports by "liurais" (village headmen), whose counts were never verified by the Portuguese Government. In any case, any drop in the population of East Timor was much lower than the distorted figures disseminated by these critics.

In 1976, a spokesman of the East Timor provisional government was quoted in the international press as having said that "60,000 had been killed" in East Timor. The next day, however, the same spokesman said that the press had misquoted him, for what he in fact had stated was that 60,000 had "lost their lives or homes" and this figure included the 40,000 refugees who had fled to West Timor.

These figures and the apparent short-fall in population have subsequently been eagerly seized upon by Indonesia's critics and, through a process of mutual citation, have not only been constantly repeated but gradually exaggerated to reach what has now become the fabricated and completely unsubstantiated claim of 200,000 lives lost.

It is a sad fact that the tragedy that engulfed the East Timorese people after 1974 did exact a regrettable toll in human lives. It should be borne in mind, however, that two key factors contributed to any real changes in East Timor's population:

- First, the civil war that raged in East Timor in 1975-1976 claimed many lives directly and indirectly. Not only did many East Timorese die as a result of the FRETILIN reign of terror, but many also delayed plans for marriage and child-bearing, and many families were separated. As a result, the 1980 census showed that children younger than five years old accounted for only 14.15 percent of the total population, well below the percentage in other provinces. The hunger and disease caused by the disruption of civil war were joined by acts of FRETILIN aggression as major direct causes of loss of life. As might be expected in a violent and chaotic security situation, an abnormally low birthrate was an indirect result of the ongoing civil war.
- Second, thousands of refugees flooded across the border to West Timor during and immediately after the war. They either settled in West Timor or emigrated to other parts of Indonesia or other countries. A large number of East Timorese and Portuguese nationals have also emigrated to other countries or returned to Portugal under the repatriation and family reunion program initiated in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Careful examination of the facts by several observers, including respected Western journalists, suggests that war-related deaths numbered around 5,000, with another 25,000 victims of malnutrition and disease brought about by a war-ravaged economy and a gross lack of health care services. That people have died is tragic enough, but the deliberate manipulation of the number of victims is highly irresponsible and simply dishonest. It is to be hoped, therefore, that this unsavory numbers game can finally be put to an end.

- **How are the cultural and social traditions of the East Timorese protected?**

The allegation that the East Timorese are different from other Indonesians ignores the fact that Indonesia is a land of diversity, comprising 300 distinct ethnic groups and almost as many languages. People of the same Melanesian ancestry, and with the same culture, language base and customs, inhabit the western part of Timor island and the surrounding islands of eastern Indonesia.

Since East Timor was integrated into the Republic of Indonesia, the Government has worked carefully to ensure that cultural traditions are maintained, local languages are preserved and religious practices are respected. This has included support for cultural institutions and organizations, expansion of economic opportunities for those involved in commercialization of traditional handicrafts and financial support for the construction and rehabilitation of facilities of worship in all the major faiths represented in the province.

East Timor, like the rest of Indonesia, is a province of extraordinary ethnic, religious and cultural diversity — a piece of the extraordinary mosaic that is the pride of Indonesia. And in this diversity, no one group is dominant. Respect and tolerance for different cultural and religious traditions is at the heart of the national philosophy. This protection and nurturing in East Timor cannot be denied.

- **What were the actions taken in connection with the November 12, 1991, incident in Dili?**

The tragic outcome of the demonstration that occurred in Dili, East Timor, on the 12th of November 1991 was deeply regrettable, as was immediately and repeatedly expressed by the Indonesian Government at the highest levels. Most unfortunately, the demonstration was not entirely peaceful and indeed displayed premeditated provocation and belligerence. It triggered a spontaneous reaction by some security

personnel, acting outside the control or command of senior officers, and resulted in a deplorable loss of lives and a number of wounded people. It was a tragic incident and clearly not an act ordered by or reflecting the policy of the Government or the Armed Forces.

Nothing can be done to alter the facts of the incident: The test is in how the Indonesian Government and people responded — by acting firmly and swiftly to get the facts, by establishing a National Committee of Inquiry and a Military Council of Honor, and by initiating a due legal process, subjecting all those held accountable for having violated the law, whether on the part of the demonstrators or on the part of the security personnel, to trial by the appropriate courts of justice. This legal process shall be pursued in accordance with the Rule of Law, the Pancasila State Philosophy, the 1945 Constitution and the relevant Penal Codes upon which the Republic of Indonesia is based.

- What is Indonesia's position on human rights?

As a conscientious member of the United Nations and, since 1991, a member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Indonesia accepts and recognizes the universal validity of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. But, as the United Nations rightly enjoins us to do, the promotion and observation of human rights should be put within the context of international cooperation. And, international cooperation presupposes as a basic condition respect for the sovereignty of states and the national identity of peoples.

Human rights values are essentially ethical and moral in nature. Hence, any approach to human rights issues with different intentions or ulterior motivations, in other words, politically motivated intentions, should be eschewed.

Human rights are vital and important by and for themselves. Indonesia, therefore, cannot accept linking questions of human rights to other issues, such as to economic and development cooperation, or worse, making them into political conditionalities to such cooperation, as such linkages will detract from the value of both.

As is well known, there are various categories of human rights: civil and political rights, economic and social rights, the rights of the individual human being and the rights of the community, the society and the nation. It is universally accepted that all these categories of rights are indivisible and inter-related, and that there should be balance in the appreciation and promotion of all these rights in their integral

whole. Undue emphasis on one category of human rights over another cannot be justified. In assessing the human rights conditions of countries, and of developing countries in particular, the international community should, therefore, take into account the situation in relation to all categories of human rights.

This is consistent with the basic principles contained in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948. Article 29 of that declaration addresses two aspects that balance each other: On the one hand, there are principles that respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual; on the other, there are stipulations regarding the obligations of the individual toward society and the state.

It is clear, therefore, that implementation of human rights implies the existence of a balanced relationship between individual human rights and the obligations of individuals toward their community. Without such a balance, the rights of the community as a whole can be denied, which can lead to instability and anarchy, especially in developing countries.

While human rights are indeed universal in character, it is generally acknowledged that their expression and implementation in the national context should remain the competence and responsibility of each government while taking into account the complex variety of problems, of different economic, social and cultural realities, and of different value systems prevailing in each country. This national competence not only derives from the principle of sovereignty of states, but is also a logical consequence of the principle of self-determination.

In Indonesia, as in many other developing countries, the rights of the individual are balanced by the rights of the community, in other words, balanced by the obligation equally to respect the rights of others, the rights of the society and the rights of the nation. This does not only conform to the cultural traditions and customs prevalent in most developing countries where, often, the interests and the rights of the community prevail over those of the individual, but is also fully in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Moreover, in the application of human rights in developing countries including our own, it should be borne in mind that in most of these countries there are other fundamental rights and concerns besides certain civil and political freedoms to which equally urgent attention should be given, such as the right of the vast majority of the people to be free from want, from hunger, from ignorance, from disease and backwardness. Attention must also be given to the right to development and

the right to be free from external political and economic coercion in pursuit of development in an atmosphere of peace and national stability. Precisely because human rights are indivisible no singular emphasis should be put on certain aspects of those rights.

Indonesia is of the firm view that in evaluating the application and implementation of human rights in individual countries, the characteristic problems of developing countries in general, as well as the specific problems of individual societies should be taken fully into account. Similarly, there should be a balanced approach towards respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the rights and interests of society, of the nation as a whole.

Finally, the primary objective of actions in the field of human rights is not to accuse nor to assume the role of judge and jury over other countries but together to develop a common consciousness in the international community and to encourage improvement in the observance of these fundamental rights and freedoms. We should not try to remake the world in our own image, but we can and should try to make the world a more humane, peaceful and equitably prosperous place for all.

For its part, the Indonesian Government has consistently endeavored to adhere to the humanitarian precepts and basic human rights and freedoms embodied in its State Philosophy, Pancasila, its 1945 Constitution and its national laws and regulations. Indeed, these precepts, rights and freedoms, as embodied in the constitutional and legal system, derive from age-old traditions, customs and the philosophy of life of the Indonesian people.

The philosophical basis of Indonesia, Pancasila, which translates to Five Pillars or Five Principles, embraces humanitarian precepts that are mutually interlinked and inseparable. These five principles are:

- o Belief in one, supreme God
- o Just and civilized humanity
- o The unity of Indonesia
- o Democracy, led by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives
- o Social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people

The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila, also contains humanitarian precepts and basic principles of human rights. These principles have been incorporated into a number of national laws and regulations. It is also important to note that the 1945 Constitution has many principles that are similar to those contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

As in many developing countries, Indonesia's culture and its ancient and well-developed customs have traditionally put high priority on the rights and interests of the community. This means that the interests of the majority often prevail over individual or group interests without, however, in any way harming the rights and interests of those individuals and groups. Individual and group rights are always fully taken into account, based on the principle of "musyawarah-mufakat," which translates to deliberations to attain consensus and which is firmly embedded in the nation's socio-political system and unique form of democracy.

- Is Indonesia willing to resolve the dispute with Portugal?

Although at the time of the last voting on the East Timor issue at the U.N. General Assembly in 1982 Portugal was hardly in a position of strength on the issue, Indonesia agreed to the appeal by the then-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cueller, to start a dialogue with Portugal under his auspices. The purpose was to find a peaceful, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution, under the general mandate of the Secretary-General, through dialogue rather than through continuing sterile debate in the General Assembly.

Since 1983, we have been engaged in such a tri-partite dialogue between Indonesia, Portugal and the U.N. Secretary-General, under the general mandate as referred to above and not on the basis of or pursuant to any specific General Assembly resolutions. This dialogue has been, on the whole, a constructive one as it contributed to removing any earlier misunderstandings and to resolving many outstanding humanitarian issues.

Although in the course of that dialogue Indonesia has been deeply disappointed on two occasions by Portugal's renegeing on earlier understandings reached in the course of these discussions, we believe a resumption of such a dialogue on the same basis and under the same modalities as before, would be a worthwhile endeavor to pursue. However, it would be difficult to resume such a dialogue if it were to be based on other premises and if additional aspects were to be proposed to its modalities.

In short, it is Indonesia's view that any resumption of the dialogue should remain an effort of, and be personally led by, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his designated deputy, and not become a mediation effort by third parties. It should also remain strictly tri-partite in nature.

Not all readers of this volume will accept every statement; nor should they. History is a stern master, worth studying in all its variety and subtlety. But history rests on fundamental facts; it is the interpretation that leads to personal conclusions. It is the aim of this report to facilitate that study and interpretation in the interests of the people of East Timor.

AN EAST TIMOR CHRONOLOGY

1509-1974

Period of Portuguese colonial presence.

1633

First Portuguese settlement on East Timor.

1769

Portugal establishes Dili as the capital of East Timor.

1896

Portugal separates East Timor as a colony from Macau.

1910

First major rebellion against Portuguese rule on East Timor is violently suppressed after 18 months.

1942-1945

Japanese occupy Indonesia, driving out Portuguese from East Timor.

August 17, 1945

Indonesia proclaims its independence from the Netherlands. War of liberation begins.

August 1945

People of East Timor begin their own rebellion against Portuguese rule. The rebellion is brutally suppressed.

December 27, 1949

The Netherlands agrees to end its attempt to thwart creation of an independent Indonesia. Sovereignty is formally transferred to the new republic. East Timor remains under Portuguese rule.

April-May 1974

Portugal's government is overthrown and the new regime announces democratic rights would be given its overseas territories, including Portuguese Timor.

September-October 1974

First Indonesian-Portuguese talks are held on decolonization of East Timor.

May-November 1974

Five political parties are organized in East Timor in preparation for self-determination.

March 1975

First scheduled referendum on independence is suppressed by Portuguese military in East Timor. Pro-Portuguese FRETILIN party begins series of terrorist attacks on political opponents.

August 10, 1975

UDT forces, learning of FRETILIN plans for a coup, take pre-emptive action and stage large demonstrations.

August 20, 1975

FRETILIN forces seize control of the capital, touching off civil war.

August 26, 1975

Portuguese government abandons Dili, rather than attempt to restore order. Governor and staff return to Lisbon.

August 29, 1975

In bilateral talks, Indonesia urges return and re-establishment of Portuguese authority over the territory in order to complete the decolonization process, but Portugal fails to re-establish its presence.

August–October 1975

FRETILIN forces expand their attacks throughout East Timor. Thousands of refugees flee to Indonesian West Timor. In their pursuit, FRETILIN forces stage raids across frontier.

November 28, 1975

FRETILIN issues unilateral declaration of independence without benefit of any act of self-determination.

November 29, 1975

Portugal proclaims itself the administering power in East Timor three months after abandoning the territory. It still refuses to send any forces or any officials to restore order.

November 30, 1975

Four other parties, including UDT, issue their proclamation of independence and simultaneous integration with the Republic of Indonesia, and with Indonesian volunteers begin process of restoring order in the territory.

December 7, 1975

Dili is retaken from FRETILIN forces, and 10 days later Provisional Government of East Timor is proclaimed. Four months of bloodshed are ended.

January 15, 1976

U.N. Special Representative Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi arrives to assess situation, meets with Foreign Minister Adam Malik, reports back that situation is inconclusive.

January 20–22, 1976

U.N. Special Representative meets leaders of the Provisional Government in Dili, as well as with several FRETILIN leaders in Oecussi, Atauro, Manatuto, Baucau and Dili.

February 1, 1976

U.N. Special Representative visits Australia and meets with representatives from FRETILIN in Darwin and Melbourne.

April-May 1976

Letters sent repeatedly to the United Nations by the Provisional Government requesting observers for election of a People's Assembly and its vote on self-determination are met with refusals.

May 31, 1976

The elected People's Assembly votes to request integration of the territory into the Republic of Indonesia.

June 5, 1976

A delegation of the people of East Timor, led by Mr. Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, Chief Executive of the Provisional Government of East Timor, arrives in Jakarta to present the petition calling for immediate integration of East Timor with Indonesia.

June 23, 1976

Fact-finding team of Indonesian MPs and Government officials, led by Minister for Internal Affairs Amir Mahmud, arrives in East Timor to assess the situation.

July 17, 1976

President Soeharto formally proclaims East Timor Indonesia's 27th province.

1976-1979

Period of emergency assistance to refugees from civil war, establishment of administrative structures and inauguration of economic development and social welfare programs throughout the province.

Fall 1982

At 37th session of the U.N. General Assembly, opponents of East Timor's integration with Indonesia muster only 30 percent of vote in censure motion.

Fall 1984

Indonesian and Portuguese representatives begin series of discussions at the United Nations dealing with situation in East Timor and repatriation of former Portuguese civil servants still residing there.

December 1986

After more than 12 rounds of talks under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General, it is agreed a U.N. team will observe voting in East Timor during the April 1987 Indonesian General Elections.

March 1987

During 14th round of talks, Portugal rejects U.N. observation plan. Instead Portugal proposes an observation mission from its own Parliament. Discussions continue over next four-and-a-half years.

October 12, 1989

Twenty youths stage anti-Indonesian demonstration during visit of Pope John Paul II in Dili.

November 4, 1989

Some 50 youths stone police officers in Dili.

January 17-19, 1990

About 50 youths stage demonstration and 250 subsequently march through Dili during visit of U. S. Ambassador.

September 1990

Following negotiations at the United Nations, Indonesia agrees to terms for Portuguese Parliamentary visit to East Timor. Portugal promises early response.

September 4, 1990

Pro-FRETILIN demonstration by about 200 youths follows mass commemorating 50 years of the Dili diocese.

October 8, 1990

Group of anti-integration youths attack a police officer and a school in Dili.

May 23, 1991

Portugal responds to September 1990 proposal, agreeing to concept of visit of Parliamentary delegation; negotiations reopen.

June 27, 1991

Both countries agree on terms of visit during meeting held under auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General.

September 30 1991

Five-day visit to East Timor of advance team with U.N., Portuguese and Indonesian representatives begins.

October 1991

Visit is suddenly canceled after Portuguese renege on agreement on composition of the journalist delegation.

October 28, 1991

Fighting erupts between a group of anti-integrationist youths in the Motael Church and a group of pro-integrationist youths outside, leading to the death of one anti-integrationist and one pro-integrationist.

November 12, 1991

Memorial march to the Dili cemetery marking the death of the anti-integrationist turns violent. Security personnel, without higher command, fire into the crowd. Casualties include 50 dead and 91 wounded.

November 18, 1991

President Soeharto appoints a National Commission of Inquiry to investigate the incident.

December 26, 1992

The commission presents its preliminary report, citing army officers and civilian demonstrators as sharing responsibility for the tragedy.

December 28, 1992

President Soeharto orders Army Chief of Staff to conduct inquiry into military role.

March 3, 1992

Army reports six senior officers shared responsibility; they are dismissed or transferred. Eight other officers and soldiers will face courts-martial.

March 15-20, 1992

Trials of civilians alleged to have been organizers in the demonstrations begin in Dili and Jakarta.

April 17, 1992

After meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas announces Indonesia is prepared to resume talks with Portugal on East Timor under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General.

EAST TIMOR: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

The island of Timor is located at the eastern end of the 13,000-island Indonesian archipelago. At 34,000 square kilometers or 13,100 square miles, it is the size of the Netherlands. The province of East Timor, which occupies the eastern half of the island, is nearly 15,000 square kilometers or 6,800 square miles. The terrain of Timor is mountainous, with the northern coastal range rising almost directly from the sea. A number of mountains peak at more than 9,000 feet. A wide southern coastal plain is broken by swampy areas, river mouths and deltas. The climate is tropical, with alternating wet and dry seasons — the dry season from May to November, the rainy season from December to April.

The earliest indigenous people of Timor are the Atoni, and Tetum is the largest linguistic group on the island. Long before the arrival of European colonial powers — the Dutch and the Portuguese — Timor was visited by traders from nearby Java, and many of their descendants still call Timor home. Other non-indigenous residents include direct or mixed-race descendants of the Portuguese colonialists, Chinese, Arabs and Indians, plus a number of Indonesian citizens from other parts of the country who have settled on Timor. Chinese traders were encouraged to settle on the island since the turn of the century by the Portuguese to help promote commerce.

Accurate Census Undertaken

While Indonesia's official language, Bahasa Indonesia, is spoken throughout the province, at least 12 other languages and dialects are spoken in East Timor, ranging from the most widespread, Tetum, an Austronesian language dominant around the capital of Dili, to more obscure non-Austronesian dialects, such as Kairui, Nidiki and Baibenu.

Demographic information available on East Timor during Portuguese rule indicates very slow population growth rates that can be attributed to poor health conditions and a short life-expectancy that prevailed throughout the territory during that time. The first Indonesian census showed a 1980 population of 555,350 persons, substantially lower than the last Portuguese census of 624,564 persons in 1973. The latter figure was based on estimates by village headmen and is believed to have been inflated by these district leaders seeking to enhance the territory's importance to Portuguese authorities. The former figure was the first accurate census undertaken using Western methods of enumeration.

Two key factors contributed to the reduction in population:

- First, the civil war that preceded and immediately followed East Timor's decolonization in 1975-1976 and the reign of terror conducted by FRETILIN, armed with the arsenal abandoned by the Portuguese, took thousands of lives, as did the hunger and disease caused by the strife. During this period, the birthrate also declined because couples delayed marriage or childbearing, or because families were separated during the fighting.
- Second, thousands of refugees fled to West Timor or other destinations in Indonesia or Southeast Asia.

HISTORY OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

From the earliest times, Timor has been an integral part of the history of the Indonesian archipelago. For a thousand years before the arrival of the first warships of the Dutch and Portuguese colonizers, much of the archipelago, including Timor, had been part of the Sriwijaya and Majapahit Empires, which successively dominated much of Southeast Asia. During the ascendancy of the Sriwijaya, which dated from 672 A.D., the dynasty used its strong military and commercial fleets to spread its influence from its capital at Palembang in Sumatra to all parts of the Indonesian archipelago, promoting trade and spreading their culture and civilization. With the decline of Sriwijaya at the end of the 13th Century, a short period of disorder ensued with a number of its former vassal states contending for hegemony.

Eventually, Majapahit, which was centered in East Java, succeeded in knitting together the various kingdoms and ruled the archipelago for 200 years. During this period, traders arriving from the Arabian peninsula spread the religion of Islam throughout the Majapahit Empire. In the year 1520, this second empire disintegrated into several kingdoms. It is likely that, given time, these separate fiefdoms would once again have consolidated into a single political unit. But before they could unite, they were confronted with the arrival of the military and naval forces from a new power — the colonial forces of Europe.

The Portuguese were the first to arrive, entering Indonesian territory in 1509 after first attacking and occupying Malacca in what is now West Malaysia. Although a number of local rulers in Sumatra, Java and the Moluccan islands joined forces in an effort to drive off the Portuguese, they failed to secure the united backing of all the rulers in the archipelago. Alternating persuasion with force, the Portuguese established cooperation with local kings, who later were baptized along with their subjects.

The Portuguese succeeded in dividing and conquering, though determined resistance meant that it was not until the last quarter of the 16th Century that the Portuguese finally succeeded in conquering some of the more remote reaches of the archipelago, particularly the lands ruled by Sultan Baabullah of Ternate, overlord of Timor. Baabullah sought an ally in the United East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) of the Netherlands, but soon discovered that he had merely exchanged one master for another as his kingdom fell under Dutch control.

Dutch Establish Presence

The Dutch pursued their expansion into Indonesia vigorously and quickly managed to drive the Portuguese from most of the islands they had seized. In 1651, Dutch forces captured Kupang, the capital of West Timor. From this base they expanded their influence throughout the next century. But East Timor's lack of readily exploitable resources and the strong opposition of the Portuguese Catholic friars to domination by the Dutch discouraged Dutch forces from pressing ahead with a seizure of the entire island.

Since the early 16th Century, when Portuguese forces conquered Timor and the surrounding islands including the Moluccas, they began disseminating the Catholicism of their homeland. The Catholic priests who sailed with the Portuguese armada to perform religious services for the crew also preached the gospel in the conquered territories, indeed, wherever the fleet landed.

It was not for another 200 years, until 1859, that a formal boundary was established defining the Dutch-controlled western Timor and Portuguese-controlled East Timor. East Timor continued to be governed by Portugal as part of the colony of Macau, the island off Hong Kong, until 1896 when the two were made separate colonies, each with its own governor. This did little, however, to improve the conditions of chronically neglected development by Lisbon, which bred social unrest in East Timor. This culminated in 1910 with a large-scale armed rebellion against the Portuguese, which took colonial forces nearly two years to suppress.

The Portuguese remained in power until World War II, when Japanese invaders succeeded in ousting the Dutch and Portuguese from both halves of Timor, as well as the rest of Indonesia and much of Southeast Asia. Three-and-a-half years of military rule led to famine and the death of at least 40,000 people in East Timor alone before the Japanese finally surrendered to Allied forces.

Indonesian Independence Achieved

It was at this moment that the people of Indonesia seized the initiative and declared their independence, embarking on four more years of armed struggle against the Dutch that culminated in agreement on an independent nation of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. At the same time, the people of East Timor were staging their own revolution seeking their independence from Portuguese rule. However, Portuguese forces succeeded in protecting their territory where the Dutch had failed. East Timor was to remain a Portuguese colony for 30 more years.

Throughout this period, however, the Portuguese maintained that Portuguese Timor was not a colonial territory but rather an "overseas province" of Portugal, a claim that was formalized in 1951 in an amendment to the Portuguese constitution. As a result, when the issue was brought before the United Nations, the Portuguese said repeatedly that U.N. resolutions and charter provisions regulating colonial peoples did not apply to East Timor. The United Nations considered the question of Portuguese Timor as part of the overall problem of the territories under Portuguese administration, regularly condemning Portugal for its refusal to permit its colonial subjects the right of self-determination.

On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese military overthrew the civilian government in Portugal, and the military, under the leadership of General Antonio de Spínola, took control of that country. Less than a month later, President Spínola declared that democratic rights would be accorded the inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia, including East Timor. Twelve days later, on May 28, 1974, the Portuguese Governor and military commander, Colonel Fernando Alves Aldela, gave permission for the people of East Timor to set up political parties and open the process that was intended to culminate in a referendum on March 13, 1975. Three options were to be on the ballot — to become an autonomous territory under Portuguese rule, to become a free and independent country within or outside a Portuguese Commonwealth or to join the Republic of Indonesia as its 27th province.

Beginning in September 1974, a series of talks was held in New York and Lisbon between senior Indonesian and Portuguese officials concerning the process of decolonization of Portuguese Timor. But despite its original proclamation of the choices to be offered in a referendum, Portugal began to back off.

By October 1974, Portugal's Minister for Interterritorial Coordination, Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos, was claiming that it would be unrealistic to advocate establishment of an independent state of East Timor because its weakened political and

economic condition would promptly encourage recolonization by other powers. Nevertheless, Santos agreed that the decolonization would proceed under representatives of its own people. After meeting with the Portuguese official, Indonesia's President Soeharto said that his Government had no territorial ambitions in East Timor or indeed anywhere else, was opposed to colonialism and would accept Portuguese Timor's integration with Indonesia if that was in line with the wishes of the people.

In Portuguese Timor, it was necessary to start from the beginning to establish a political structure that could result in a referendum. Before the Portuguese revolution, all political activities in the colonies had been suppressed and political parties banned with the exception of one pro-Portuguese party. Now, political parties could organize freely and five promptly sprang up:

- Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT)

Formed with elements of the former pro-Portuguese party, the main goal of the UDT was to see that Portugal fulfilled its responsibility to lead Timor gradually toward independence while maintaining a privileged relationship with Portugal. The UDT was reluctant to press for immediate independence, however, since it understood that the necessary conditions of economic development did not yet exist. The UDT claimed, with considerable justification, to be the largest party in East Timor. It received the support of 230 of the 472 existing clans in the territory, or about 50 percent of the total population.

- The Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN)

FRETILIN is headed by Francisco Xavier do Amaral, a tax and customs officer with links to Portugal's colonial secret police. Its secretary general is Jose Ramos Horta, a former journalist of a leading newspaper in Dili. The FRETILIN program called for immediate independence and radicalization of the entire social and economic structure of East Timor and drew its major support from radical, younger elements of the electorate. As *The Far Eastern Economic Review* observed on October 17, 1975:

FRETILIN has all the appearances of a hastily assembled identical model of a third world independence movement. Up to six weeks ago it would have been hard to take seriously a self-important party of Dili 'intellectuals' that was formed only after General Spínola's coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, and busily acquired a Frelimo-type image through a vague collectivist ideology, a flag and an anthem.

- **The Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI)**

Founded May 27, 1974, it was chaired by Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, an ex-teacher who for 29 years had been imprisoned by the colonial regime. The secretary general was Jose Fernandez Osorio Soares, an intellectual and former employee of the Portuguese Timor Social Service who was later murdered by FRETILIN troops. From its inception, APODETI favored the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia. Believing that the people of Portuguese Timor shared the same island with Indonesian Timor, as well as the same ancestry and cultural background, APODETI held that the separation of the two Timors was due purely to colonial politics and did not reflect ethnic, cultural or historical realities. Most of the party's supporters were in the western portion of East Timor, and its leaders played an active part in an unsuccessful 1959 revolt against Portuguese rule in which hundreds of Timorese died.

- **Klibur Oan Timur Aswain (Son of the Warriors) (KOTA Party)**

Its aim was to preserve the authority of the "liurais" (village headmen) as the traditional leaders of the people. It supported integration with Indonesia.

- **Traballista Party (Labor Party)**

Its goal was to achieve the independence of East Timor while retaining some association with Portugal, and it was closely tied to the UDT Party.

Leaders of these newly formed parties quickly began visiting Jakarta. In June 1974, Foreign Minister Adam Malik said during a visit by FRETILIN leaders that Indonesia would strictly observe a policy of non-interference in the referendum process. The FRETILIN visit to Jakarta was followed by a visit from APODETI representatives, whose chairman announced its goal of integration with Indonesia as the nation's 27th province.

The lines between the parties quickly began to blur. By January 1975, the UDT, which favored gradual independence and association with a vaguely defined Portuguese commonwealth, agreed to form a coalition with FRETILIN, which favored more radical changes and immediate independence. Reports quickly began circulating in Australia that an agreement had been reached between Portugal, the UDT and FRETILIN, transferring the government of the territory to the two parties.

This alliance of the UDT and FRETILIN, with or without Portuguese complicity, was apparently motivated by the rapid growth of popular support for APODETI and its program of integration with Indonesia. The UDT-FRETILIN alliance lasted only a few months, however, disintegrating when FRETILIN cadres who had served in the colonial army began a campaign of blackmail and terror against members of the other East Timor parties.

Portuguese military officials helped organize this campaign of terror, targeting leaders of APODETI who favored unification with Indonesia. At the same time, the Portuguese Governor continued publicly to assure the electorate that his country intended to guarantee self-determination to the people of East Timor. Nevertheless, the spreading violence led a number of pro-integrationists to flee across the border into western Timor.

Talks in London Open

This same violence led to the opening of talks in London between senior Portuguese and Indonesian officials with the aim of restoring some calm to the territory. There was an agreement for subsequent discussions between Portuguese officials and leaders of each of the East Timor political parties. The March 1975 election date passed amid bickering and violence.

In July 1975, the Portuguese Government ordered formation of a transitional government for the colony to prepare for election in October 1976 of a Popular Assembly that was to take responsibility for determining the future status of the territory. The transitional government would be headed by a High Commissioner appointed by Portugal and five members — two Portuguese members and three chosen from representatives of the East Timor political parties. Portuguese sovereignty was to be terminated in the territory as of October 1978.

In August 1975, talks resumed between Portugal and Indonesia with the aim of restoring some sense of authority in the territory. The Indonesian Government proposed a Joint Authority comprising representatives of Australia, Indonesia, Portugal and Malaysia to administer the territory after a joint military task force had brought the fighting to an end. Australia, however, refused to send troops to East Timor, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam telling Parliament that restoration of order was "the sole responsibility of Portugal" and that refugee aid would not be forthcoming until a cease-fire had been established. The concept of a multinational authority promptly collapsed. At the same time FRETILIN, which continued to expand its military activities in the territory, refused to join talks with other political parties in East Timor.

Civil War Erupts

At the same time, however, rumors of a Portuguese-supported FRETILIN coup had spread widely, leading Portugal finally to deport two of its own army majors who had been leading the underground support for FRETILIN. Undeterred, however, on August 20, 1975, FRETILIN troops descended from surrounding hills and entered Dili. Lightly armed forces of the UDT, joined by APODETI and ultimately by KOTA and Trabalhista, were forced to battle FRETILIN troops armed with heavy mortars, machine guns and artillery. A civil war had broken out.

As fighting spread, tens of thousands of East Timor residents fled across the border to Indonesian territory, placing an enormous burden on Indonesia. Yet the Portuguese Government made no serious attempt to end the bloodshed and political chaos in its territory. Instead, suddenly on August 26, 1975, the Governor and other senior Portuguese officials precipitously abandoned their posts in Dili, fleeing to the island of Atauro 20 miles outside Dili harbor.

Within a few weeks, they had abandoned even this outpost, leaving a total power vacuum in the colony that Portugal had ruled for some 300 years. With no authority to check the widening bloodshed, FRETILIN expanded its reign of terror in the territory. Using the weapons that had been supplied by the Portuguese from their arsenal, FRETILIN was able to continue its aggression for three more years.

The civil war continued to rage, with forces of the parties opposed to FRETILIN regrouping and launching a series of counterattacks. At times, fighting, including guerrilla and artillery attacks, also spilled across the border into the Indonesian territory of western Timor, resulting in casualties to Indonesian civilians. Spreading famine due to the disruption of farming by the civil war also led to raids across the border for food and cattle.

Diplomatic Efforts Continue

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the fighting continued at the United Nations and through talks between Indonesia and Portugal. Discussions in Rome in November 1975 led to a mutual conclusion by both countries that the fundamental responsibility for the orderly decolonization of Portuguese Timor lay with Portugal. However, FRETILIN stubbornly rejected this concept and on November 28, 1975, unilaterally issued a "Declaration of Independence" of East Timor and announced the formation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Two days later, the four other political parties issued a separate proclamation of independence and called for the simultaneous integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia. Announcing the

formation of a Provisional Government of East Timor based in Dili, the four parties called on the Indonesian Government to supply economic and military aid and, above all, to take whatever steps necessary to protect the lives of the East Timorese people who had declared themselves to be Indonesian citizens.

Portugal promptly rejected both the FRETILIN and Provisional Government declarations, announced it still considered itself the administrative power in the territory, yet admitted in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations that it was unable to deal effectively with the situation in the territory.

Colonial Power Ends

FRETILIN remained in control of Dili. However, convinced that negotiations with FRETILIN were now impossible, the four parties that comprised the Provisional Government redoubled their efforts to retake the capital. Joined by Indonesian volunteers, the provisional forces pressed forward and captured Dili on December 7, 1975. This marked the effective end of colonial power in East Timor and led to the installation of the Provisional Government of East Timor 10 days later. With the election of Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, leader of APODETI, as chief executive of the Provisional Government, four months of bloodshed came to an end.

At the same time, the U.N. Security Council was taking up the issue of East Timor. Following adoption of Resolution 384 (1975), the U.N. Secretary-General named Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, a U.N. official based in Geneva, as a Special Representative to assess the situation. Beginning in January 1976, the U.N. envoy traveled to Jakarta and East Timor, meeting representatives of the Indonesian Government and, in Dili, leaders of the Provisional Government. He also met with officials of FRETILIN in the town of Oecussi and later in Darwin and Melbourne in Australia, though he was not able for security reasons to travel farther through the interior of East Timor. He then returned to New York, where he reported to the Secretary-General. As he concluded in the second of two reports he presented to the Secretary-General, his efforts to assess the situation were unsuccessful: "Under the circumstances...it was not possible to assess accurately the prevailing situation in East Timor...."

Both the Provisional Government in East Timor and the Indonesian Government believed that in the absence of the Portuguese, the United Nations had an important role to play in the completion of the decolonization process in the former Portuguese territory, though not a mandatory role under international law or U.N. regulations. However, repeated invitations by Indonesia and the Provisional Government

of East Timor for U.N. envoys to return to the territory in 1976 were refused, including a plea for U.N. supervision of the process of self-determination.

POLITICS, GOVERNMENT AND CULTURE OF EAST TIMOR

It soon became clear that there was widespread reluctance at the United Nations to take any major actions to insert itself into the process of decolonization. This was due in part to perceptions of East Timor as a small territory of little strategic significance, with a 400-year colonial legacy of neglect. Awareness was another key issue, since few people outside the Asian region had even heard of East Timor. Many U.N. representatives expressed grave doubts as to the economic viability of the territory, should it become independent. Other nations expressed apprehension at the prospect of an extended and violent conflict and the accompanying power vacuum as potentially spreading instability beyond Timor's immediate borders in a region that had successfully managed to avoid much of the turmoil that affected other parts of Southeast Asia during the conflicts in Indochina.

Still, despite the refusal of the United Nations to participate in oversight of the transition to civilian rule, the people of East Timor needed an elected government. So, the Provisional Government proceeded to establish a process that involved election of two delegates from each of the 13 electoral districts in the territory, with an additional delegate from Dili due to the density of the population in the capital. In addition to these 27 representatives, 10 other prominent leaders from various disciplines were to be appointed by the Provisional Government. These 37 representatives would constitute the new People's Assembly.

Provisional Government Requests U.N. Representation

Representatives of the Provisional Government visited New York and Geneva in an ongoing effort to seek U.N. representation or at least first-hand observation of the transition to post-colonial rule. The Provisional Government continued to file reports with the Secretary-General of the United Nations at every stage of the process. Finally, on May 31, 1976, the popularly elected People's Assembly of East Timor decided, in an open session, with members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Jakarta present as well as the international press, to request formally that the Government of Indonesia accept the decision of the people of the territory for integration with the Republic of Indonesia as the 27th province.

On June 7, 1976, a delegation of the People's Assembly and the Provisional Government formally presented to President Soeharto the official request to become a part of the nation of Indonesia. A month later, the Indonesian Parliament approved the integration bill that was promulgated on July 17, 1976.

As President Soeharto observed during his 1976 State Address:

Time and again we have stated that the East Timor problem is a question of self-determination. It is a problem of abolishing colonialism... The fate of the people of East Timor can only be decided by themselves and right there on the soil of East Timor. Not in New York, not in Lisbon and not even in Jakarta. Now the people of East Timor have made the decision about their own future, namely integration with the people and the state of the Republic of Indonesia. There is no other way, therefore, but to accept with full responsibility such an integration.

Immediately, the new government began organizing a provincial administration to provide essential services to the new Indonesian province. Administered by a governor, East Timor consists of 13 kabupatens or regions, and 64 kecamatans or districts with each kecamatan comprising several villages, each in turn led by a village head. A bupati heads each kabupaten and a camat is in charge of each kecamatan. This is identical to the governing structures in the other Indonesian provinces.

The most immediate problem was personnel, since during the colonial period few East Timorese occupied any government or administrative positions. Illiteracy was also widespread. As a result, among the first orders of business was training for all levels of government personnel.

Humanitarian Program Begins

The Indonesian Government promptly dispatched trucks and helicopters, as well as relief personnel. By June 1980, nearly 74,000 individuals had been supplied with assistance. Since the Fall of 1979, Catholic Relief Services and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have also been operating throughout East Timor, distributing food and medical assistance by truck and helicopter to even the most remote villages. These efforts, coupled with larger programs carried out by the central and regional governments, have provided basic human needs to people throughout the province.

DEVELOPMENT AND EAST TIMOR

By any number of measures, Indonesia has one of the world's most valuable collections of natural resources — deposits of oil (it is the only Asian member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and a range of minerals, lush rain forests and rich land that supports vast agricultural production. International trade in commodities and manufactured goods plays an increasingly important role in the Indonesian economy. Its two-way trade with the United States alone is larger than that between the U.S. and all of Eastern Europe.

As the world's fourth most populous nation, it is also rich in human resources that are, however, as much an enormous challenge as an unparalleled gift. By history and nature some parts of Indonesia and some of its people are more advanced than others along the road to development. Indonesia's challenge is to spread its wealth and opportunities, so that all of its people can benefit from the tremendous progress the country is achieving. Each of its 27 provinces, its more than 13,000 islands, plays an important role in the nation's development.

East Timor is one of those areas of particular challenge. As a direct result of 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule, as they embarked on their new status as Indonesia's newest citizens, almost all of the population of East Timor found themselves substantially behind their fellow Indonesians in many aspects of their lives. At the time of integration, more than 80 percent of the population was illiterate, many were isolated in remote villages with no roads or means of communicating with the outside world, agriculture was of the most primitive subsistence nature. In short, much of the 20th Century had passed them by. This was the Portuguese legacy to the people of East Timor — poverty and isolation.

Recognizing the urgent need to provide not only basic human needs but also a foundation for future development, Indonesia has devoted six times as much of its own economic development budget to East Timor on a per capita basis than to any other province.

In 1991, East Timor received some \$170 million in Indonesian Government grants. This is almost exactly 100 times the average yearly development expenditure for East Timor in the final period of Portuguese rule. And all those Portuguese development funds were in the form of repayable loans rather than outright grants. But Indonesia has also been instrumental in channeling international development funds to East Timor, as well. For example, the United States has provided more than twice as

many project dollars under the Agency for International Development programs to East Timor than to the rest of Indonesia.

During the first six months of integration, a survey was conducted to determine the precise nature of the needs of Indonesia's newest province if it was to achieve the development it so desperately needed. This inventory established six priorities:

- The return of law and order in all parts of the province.
- The improvement of the administrative system and government for the province, including delivery of social and educational services.
- Redressing the imbalance between natural energy resources and the size of the population.
- Improving the primitive conditions of the infrastructure, particularly roads and telephones, that made communication among the regions difficult if not impossible.
- Raising the low level of health, education and nutrition of the population and improving the delivery of public social services, particularly in the new nuclear villages in the more remote rural areas.
- Raising the purchasing power of the population.

The following are some graphic figures that demonstrate how the Indonesian Government addressed these issues.

- The number of schools grew from 47 elementary schools, two middle schools and one high school and no college serving the entire population at the end of Portuguese rule to 579 elementary schools, 90 middle schools, 39 high schools and three colleges serving a population of 750,000 today.
- The number of hospitals and clinics grew from two hospitals and 14 clinics with three doctors and two dentists in 1974 to 10 hospitals and 197 village health centers staffed by 104 doctors, six specialists and 14 dentists, assisted by more than 1,500 paramedics today.

- The 20 kilometers (12 miles) of paved roads in 1974, all within the capital, Dili, have grown to 536 kilometers (333 miles) of asphalt roads throughout the province today.
- In 1974 East Timor had 100 churches. Today it has 793.

Following the first six-month development phase in which the inventory of priorities was established, the second, or consolidation phase, occupied East Timor's first full year as a province — from April 1977 through March 1978. During this phase efforts were made to deal with immediate critical problems of humanitarian aid to refugees and the most severely affected of the rural population while at the same time building a government and administrative structure that would be able to channel development resources efficiently and productively.

By the start of Repelita III (the Third Five-Year National Development Plan) for Indonesia in 1979, East Timor was in a position to take advantage of the plentiful resources that were being earmarked for its use. Indonesian development funds alone expended in East Timor rose from 2.26 billion Rupiahs (\$5.3 million) in 1976-77 to 51.7 billion Rupiahs (\$53.3 million) in 1983-84.

As Repelita IV (the Fourth Five-Year National Development Plan) began in 1985, development efforts expanded in all of the key targeted sectors.

AGRICULTURE

Land ownership, use and especially increase in productivity have been a top priority of the development efforts in East Timor. A detailed survey of the entire arable territory has been under way for more than a decade. Nearly 1,000 certificates of land ownership have been distributed to residents of the Dili area alone. The purpose of distributing land ownership certificates is to encourage stability and continuity in land cultivation, which is vital if productivity is to increase and modern practices of soil conservation instituted. The distribution of land ownership also has differed markedly from the colonial period when certificates were doled out parsimoniously and then almost entirely to Portuguese settlers or their descendants.

During the colonial period, the quality of the soil was seriously compromised by the primitive system of shift farming on unirrigated arable land as well as the disorganized methods of raising domestic animals. The extensive rain forests that covered much of East Timor were also destroyed during this period, leading to erosion and widespread flooding.

Agriculture continues to account for the employment of 80 percent of the population of East Timor. Historically, most production was carried out with the simplest of tools and techniques resulting in yields far below what should have been obtained. The priority for the Portuguese administration was the single valuable cash crop — coffee. A superb and highly desired grade of coffee has been produced for centuries on East Timor and has been the territory's most valuable export.

As a result, during the colonial period, far less attention was paid to the cultivation of food crops, such as rice and corn, though they have been and remain the staple food of all communities on the island. According to Portuguese statistics, the highest production level of food crops under their administration was reached in 1970. With the start of the upheavals in 1974, food production began dropping sharply. By 1976 it had fallen to a quarter of its 1970 level. Only 8,005 tons of paddy crops were harvested in 1976 to feed the entire population of some 555,000. But then, with increased government support, a gradual upturn began. Yield from paddy crops rose from 16,000 tons in 1979 to 22,500 tons a year later. In part, this is due to the increase in paddy acreage under cultivation, which increased fourfold in four years — from 5,180 hectares in 1978 to 20,482 hectares in 1982. By 1989, some 47,800 tons of paddy crops were produced and last year that was increased to more than 55,090 tons. Corn was grown on 22,876 hectares in 1978, while 73,408 hectares were under cultivation four years later.

Infrastructure and Facilities Improved

Increasing the acreage under cultivation was only one priority. There were also accelerated efforts to rehabilitate the agriculture infrastructure and facilities — repairing old irrigation systems and building new ones. Around the town of Bobonaro alone, for instance, an irrigation system was built to irrigate some 10,000 hectares of rice fields.

The systems have been built with the financial and logistical assistance of the Indonesian Government and with the full participation of each village and each family. In the village of Leolima [Ainaro], local farmers and their families dug canals to irrigate some 90 percent of the rice fields throughout the area. All these efforts paid off in substantial increases in yields. In many districts rice productivity has reached four to 4.5 tons per hectare, compared with one ton per hectare at the time Portuguese rule ended.

In addition to crops, livestock farming was particularly hard hit by the years of civil war in the mid 1970s. But concerted efforts at rebuilding herds are beginning to pay off. In the four years between 1978 and 1982, the number of cattle more than doubled, and within the first five years after integration, more than 10,000 cattle and water buffalo have been supplied by the national government. By 1989, East Timor herds counted some 63,612 cattle — more than double the figure from a decade before. Last year, the number of cattle increased to 68,028. In the same period the number of cattle increased so significantly, the number of swine rose from 64,013 to 256,031.

But while the immediate focus has been to rebuild the food production capacity of East Timor — the ability of the province to feed its own people — it is clear that at least near-term, much of the future prosperity of East Timor will depend heavily on sustaining production of the coffee plantations left behind by the Portuguese. Ninety percent of the territory's total exports in the colonial years came from the coffee plantations. The rich Arabica and Robusta beans from Timor were much sought-after by the international coffee market.

With the departure of the Portuguese experts after Lisbon abandoned its colony, the production of coffee dropped sharply. Replanting efforts were all but abandoned as workers fled the plantations. An early priority of the new provincial government of East Timor was to resume the replanting and cultivation of the plantations — cloves and coconuts in addition to coffee.

Crop Diversification Intensified

In the first four years after the end of colonial rule, more than one million Arabica and Robusta coffee seedlings and another million clove seedlings were distributed to the population, broadening the base of cultivation beyond the former large plantations. In coffee alone, this represented the replanting of some 10,000 hectares. By 1990, more than 7,347 tons of coffee were being produced. Another 10,000 hectares have been planted in young sugar cane in an effort to diversify production into another cash crop.

The Indonesian Government realized from the outset that the dependence of an impoverished region like East Timor on a single cash crop left the province at the mercy of uncontrollable forces on international commodity markets. Indeed, in the past, the fortunes of the colony fluctuated considerably under the Portuguese, depending on movements in world coffee prices. By diversifying into a number of cash crops, this risk to the province's economic stability could be eased.

The waters around East Timor are as rich as the most productive agricultural land. Yet under colonial management little or no attention was paid to developing a viable commercial fishing industry. Now, fishermen are being encouraged to develop their fleet with new boats and nets provided by the Government, and they are being trained in the latest techniques. In 1989, some 7,000 East Timorese fishermen produced some 680 tons of fish. Yet that is still estimated to be only 3 percent of the province's potential.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

While 90 percent of the working-age population is employed in agriculture, the Indonesian Government has made major efforts in developing trade and small-scale industry. More than 300 commercial licenses have been issued for the opening of businesses in East Timor since integration, compared with the 67 that were issued when the territory became a province. The Government has also established special commercial and managerial courses designed to develop entrepreneurs who would also be able to make use of the bank credits that the government is issuing at below-market interest rates. Three major national banks have opened branches in East Timor.

The emphasis on industrial growth has been largely directed toward processing agricultural products and promotion of local handicraft industries including straw and textile weaving. Since East Timor became a province, new industries that have also been established, in addition to sugar and coffee-processing facilities, include factories involved with printing, soap manufacturing and electrical equipment assembly. Special vocational training courses have been introduced. As the infrastructure support increases, the intention is to move into the development of assembling and manufacturing industries, thus providing a number of labor-intensive jobs.

The nature of the rugged, mountainous terrain of East Timor made development of a modern system of roads and telecommunications another early priority of development assistance. During the colonial period little effort was made to expand the highway and communications network into the interior. Indeed, what links were built were designed to serve the interests of the colonial administration, particularly with respect to tax collection and transport of the coffee crop to foreign markets.

During the entire 450 years of Portuguese rule, only one paved road 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) long was built-and that was through Dili. Today, more than 3,800 kilometers (2,360 miles) of roads have been built, including 428 kilometers (266 miles) of paved highways, as well as 18 bridges.

Transportation Systems Enhanced

In the first year after integration, the number of motor vehicles in the province increased fourfold. Scores of bus routes were established to link dozens of towns and villages. The number of buses in service increased from 16 in 1976 to 187 in 1989. Passenger cars increased elevenfold in the same period — from 171 to 1,964, and the number of trucks rose from 262 to 1,567. The number of motorcycles (the transportation of choice particularly into the more remote reaches of the interior) rose from 878 in 1976 to 5,476 in 1989.

In air transport, two major airlines serve Dili's Komoro Airport, completed in 1981 — Garuda, the Indonesian national airline, and Merpati Nusantara Airlines. A second airport capable of handling DC-10s has been built in the town of Baucau at the eastern end of the island, and a helicopter field also serves the capital. Scheduled passenger and cargo ships connect East Timor to the rest of Indonesia.

Telecommunications have also been substantially improved. East Timor is now linked with all other Indonesian provinces through Indonesia's Palapa satellite, which also ties the province into international telephone and television circuits. A new automatic telephone switching system has also been installed in Dili.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

All of these development measures, however, will be useless without a substantial expansion in educational opportunities and a move toward eradicating the widespread illiteracy that marked the colonial years. Every Indonesian citizen has the right to acquire the educational tools required for personal growth and advancement, and so be able to take an active part in the process of national development. At the start of the post-colonial period, more than 80 percent of all East Timorese were illiterate — indeed, 78 percent had never been inside a school. The most urgent need was for new classrooms and new teachers. The first priority was to enroll as many as possible of those who were of school age no matter where they were located in the province. This divided itself into two projects. The first was to build classrooms. The number of schools grew from 50 schools serving the entire population at the end of Portuguese rule, to 673 schools and three colleges serving a population of 750,000 in 1991.

The second project involved finding qualified teachers. This required recruitment from throughout the nation to meet this urgent need. While the national language of Bahasa Indonesia is taught in schools in all Indonesian provinces, the broad variety of local languages and dialects in East Timor is recognized as part of the indigenous culture. The emphasis now is on developing sufficient numbers of East Timorese teachers to take over instruction of their own people. Graduates of East Timor high schools and colleges are being encouraged to pursue higher education not only in the province but also at universities in Malang, Jakarta and Denpasar. In 1989, more than 1,500 East Timorese students obtained university scholarships.

Focus on Eradicating Health Problems

Eradicating serious health problems has taken its place alongside eradication of illiteracy as a major development priority. In 1970, more than 66,000 people, or nearly 11 percent of the population of East Timor, were reported to be suffering from malaria. As was the case with education, correcting health problems required massive improvements in delivery systems. The nearly 2,000 health care professionals, working in more than 200 facilities, are battling with considerable success the range of diseases that affect people throughout the province.

At the same time, sanitation programs to improve health conditions are also being undertaken by Indonesian authorities. The construction of hundreds of small reservoirs to collect rain water and drilling of wells will, in the first instance, remove many of the breeding grounds for malaria-carrying mosquitoes and at the same time provide potable drinking water for the population.

In cooperation with UNICEF, child, mother and family welfare improvement programs are being opened. While family planning is being encouraged, East Timor is still seriously underpopulated — many living in villages of just a few families, scattered and isolated in remote and mountainous areas in conditions of almost total neglect. This poses a serious obstacle to promoting social and economic development of the region. In recognition of this problem the Government has focused on rural development and on strengthening village infrastructures.

RELIGION

Throughout the development process, the goals of the national and provincial governments have been identical — to promote tolerance and a better life for all the people of Indonesia. Freedom of religion plays an important role here. While Indonesia is the world's largest Islamic community, there is no official state religion —

indeed, members of all religions are free to worship as they choose. Despite some 450 years of Portuguese rule, more than half the population of East Timor practices animism. Nevertheless, Catholicism remains the largest single organized religion in the province.

In 1974, at the end of Portuguese rule, there were 100 churches in the territory. Today there are 793, including the spectacular Immaculata Cathedral in Dili. Catholic Relief Services runs a number of social services programs in the province, and the Government has provided allowances for priests and nuns.

In short, the national and provincial governments are working together in a broad range of social and economic development areas to improve the quality of life of the people of East Timor.

ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN EAST TIMOR

One of the principal goals of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia was an end to the bloodshed and instability that marked the years of civil war and political strife that followed the precipitous Portuguese abandonment of their colony.

Restoration of a measure of security was a prerequisite for any of the development programs, particularly in the more remote regions of the interior where forces of FRETILIN retreated after they were driven from Dili and a provincial government established. During the period of Repelita IV (the Fourth Five-Year Plan from 1984 to 1989) there was a clear and measurable improvement in the internal security of East Timor. Nevertheless, where anti-Indonesia forces continued to commit acts of terrorism or other crimes against the population or security forces, the Government has not hesitated to take resolute measures against them.

This is not say that peaceful political opposition has not been encouraged. All dissident elements who emerged from the mountains and surrendered following the conflicts at the time of separation from Portuguese rule were covered under a general amnesty. In 1982, the residents of East Timor participated in the first national election campaign held under their new status as Indonesia's 27th province. Voters elected members of the national House of Representatives (Parliament) and a provincial parliament, as well.

The electoral process involved two steps — a population census and a campaign before the day of balloting. During the population census, the election officials met with every individual, even in the most remote areas, to reach an accurate count of the voting population and to make certain those who wished to vote were aware of the process. Often, the election officials had to ride horses or pick their way on foot along mountain ridges to reach the inhabitants of the most remote areas. In this first election, more than 300,000 persons cast their ballots, electing four representatives to the national parliament and 40 to the provincial legislature.

Represented in the balloting were three social-political groups in East Timor — the Functional Group (Golongan Karya), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). In March 1983, eight representatives of East Timor took their places as members of the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly. Five years later, the people of East Timor again participated with the rest of Indonesia in general elections, as they will every five years.

East Timorese Participate in Election Process

Through their participation in this democratic process, the people of East Timor have three times over the past 15 years reaffirmed their desire to live like the rest of the citizens of Indonesia in a peaceful, secure and orderly society. The country's security forces have worked to ensure peace and stability in the province as they do throughout Indonesia.

From time to time, however, public demonstrations staged by a small group advocating the province's independence have taken place in Dili and in other parts of East Timor. According to the report of a presidential commission, at least seven incidents have occurred in the provincial capital over the past two years. This was the purpose of a demonstration on November 12, 1991, when a march in the East Timor capital turned into a bloody political conflict. Fifty individuals were killed and 91 others wounded when the march turned violent and security forces fired into the crowd.

President Soeharto and other leading government officials promptly condemned the activities of the military officers who led or participated in the bloodshed, and a number were subsequently removed or demoted. Today, it is clear that the Government of Indonesia, as well as provincial authorities, is anxious to make every effort to assure that such incidents do not occur again.

Moreover, the continuing economic progress and development of East Timor, the opportunities for young people to lead rewarding lives as citizens of Indonesia, the desire of foreign governments for a strong, stable anchor in this part of Southeast Asia, will all combine to produce the kind of atmosphere on and off the island of Timor that will hopefully continue to reduce agitation and civil disorder throughout the province.

THE FUTURE OF EAST TIMOR

The real future of East Timor and Indonesia lies in the promise of its people. The past is no longer prelude. The colonial era is behind Indonesia and each of its provinces. With investment and economic development assistance pouring into the country without interruption, with new incentives for foreign partnerships in all sectors of Indonesian commerce and industry, all of Indonesia's diverse provinces promise to profit.

For nearly five centuries, Timor was exploited for the benefit of foreign colonial powers. For them the colonial responsibility was a one-way street — they took as much as they were able and gave as little as they could to make life comfortable for themselves. Today, as part of an independent and growing Indonesia, East Timor is only at the beginning of tapping its mineral and agricultural potential, building a modern infrastructure and establishing commerce and industry for the benefit of the East Timorese.

It will take considerable energy, resources and, above all, commitment to achieve this goal. The Government of Indonesia is as committed as its citizens in its 27th province to making East Timor a productive and growing part of the nation. From the beginning of Repelita V, the Fifth Five-Year Plan for Indonesia that began in 1989 and will conclude in 1993, the commitment in every area of social and economic development is clear. In agriculture, development funding is increasing twelvefold in the course of the five years covered by the plan, to 9.7 billion Rupiah or \$4.5 million. Development of mines and energy resources will be increasing more than fivefold to 2.8 billion Rupiah or \$1.4 million.

The extraordinary effort being made to build roads, bridges and similar infrastructure is clear by the sixteenfold increase in public works appropriations to 37.7 billion Rupiah or \$18.8 million. And this is only a sampling of the broad range of development programs under way and funded by the Indonesian Government in areas from education and culture to industrial development, health, forestry, telecommunications and family planning.

In all, expenditures in East Timor are projected to rise from 15.7 billion Rupiah (\$7.8 million) in 1989 to 96.9 billion Rupiah or \$48.5 million in 1993 — a more than sixfold increase in five years — a staggering commitment for one of 27 Indonesian provinces. And Repelita VI (the Sixth Five-Year Plan), now in the final stages of preparation, is expected only to accelerate the pace of development in the province. At the same time, Indonesia is eager to encourage foreign investment in East Timor, particularly with respect to development of natural resources and industry that will mean more and better jobs and a higher standard of living for all the residents of the region.

Development Assistance Continues

Foreign development assistance under the current Five-Year Plan is continuing unabated from the United States, Australia, UNICEF and numerous other foreign nations and international organizations. Indonesia is anxious that this assistance for the people of East Timor continue and is prepared to welcome visitors to demonstrate the progress that has been made in the province.

Clearly there are those who would derail for their own personal gain many of the processes now under way. The motives they express may appear pure. But in the final analysis, there remains the real question as to how those who would prefer to sever ties with Indonesia envision accelerating the process of development and improvement in the quality of life of the people of this island province.

Indonesia is one of the developing world's true success stories. It is a nation that has managed, against all odds, to unite under one banner a multitude of cultures, languages, histories and religions all with a single goal — personal advancement of the individual and collective advancement of the nation. It is a strong, stable anchor in a strategic region known in the past for its chronic instability and strife. And all of its peoples — from Sumatra to East Timor — share this vision of a future of peaceful development and individual opportunity.

EPILOGUE

There remains, however, another, darker vision that some in the international community retain for the people of East Timor — a vision that is a legacy of its colonial past. This vision would replay the events of two decades ago, turn back the clock on the progress in development and democracy that has improved the lives for all the people of this province, and promises to threaten the very stability of a corner of Asia that has been uniquely isolated from the strife and turmoil that have marked other parts of this region in the past half-century.

This vision preys on the legitimate concerns of those who value and respect the rights of man, while distorting the record of Indonesia and its people. Moreover, those who hold this vision ignore the good-faith efforts that have been brought to bear on behalf of the people of East Timor to assure that their rights are respected, that their lives are improved. And these advocates ignore the historical record of abandonment and arrogance displayed by East Timor's former colonial master — Portugal, which leads the chorus of those who would deny the history of the last two decades.

Nevertheless, and despite a campaign of vilification combined with historical distortion, Indonesia has repeatedly affirmed its willingness to discuss a resolution of the issue of the future of East Timor with Portugal under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General. The goal would be, as it has from the moment Portugal summarily abandoned its stewardship in August 1975, to find a formula that would at once recognize contemporary reality and allow those who would return to the past to find a means of joining the people of East Timor in building a better and more certain future for their children, as well as for themselves.

Portugal Abdicates Responsibility

History shows that no two cases of decolonization are exactly the same. In each case the process must recognize the realities of the specific territory. From the moment in 1975 when Portugal and its authorities in the territory abandoned their post, turning over their store of weapons to one of the factions contesting for power in post-colonial East Timor, the result was civil war. Ever since, whether through collective guilt or 20-20 hindsight, Portugal has sought to put Indonesia in the international dock of world opinion — and failed. At the point of Portuguese abandonment, no subversion was at work — except from within. The people of East Timor awoke one day to the harsh reality that they had been abandoned — that they had no more government, no law, no order. Facing anarchy, they turned to Indonesia through their popularly elected representatives, and it accepted the responsibility that Portugal had rejected.

By what right, then, it might be asked, does Portugal seek to reassert its 17-year-old claim as the “administering authority” of this province? By what right does it demand negotiation on this issue? A popularly selected provincial parliament voted on May 31, 1976, to seek integration with the Republic of Indonesia. This plebiscite conforms with every conventional standard of international law.

Yet Indonesia is prepared to meet with Portugal, under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General, to remove the final obstacle to a peaceful and productive future for East Timor.

For the past decade, Indonesia has said that the Secretary-General should find a solution that is acceptable to both sides. And acceptable to the international community, as well. But it is equally clear that there can be no turning back the clock. Decolonization has taken place. Any solution must recognize that, yet still be internationally acceptable. This is how the talks started 10 years ago — tripartite talks on the question of East Timor between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

Despite a series of Indonesian proposals over the past decade, it took until 1986 for Portugal, Indonesia and the United Nations to arrive at a formula. An official U.N. mission would visit Indonesia and East Timor during the 1987 elections. They would go to East Timor, but they would also split up and visit other parts of Indonesia — observing the general elections in East Timor, talking with the people there, asking questions, observing every aspect of the electoral process.

The result would be a report to the U.N. General Assembly. Certainly, as in any pluralistic society, the observers would have heard some dissenting voices. But Indonesian officials were confident that the observers would see the overwhelming majority of the people peacefully and freely participating in general elections as part of a democratic Indonesia. A full General Assembly debate, it was anticipated, would follow submission of the observer report. Then, Indonesian officials confidently expected a vote to resolve the East Timor debate once and for all.

This solution of 1986 remains, with some modifications, workable today. It failed then because Portugal, at the last minute, pulled out, refusing to participate in the observer mission, though Indonesia had agreed — despite all the uncertainties of an independent commission and independent report.

Since 1987, a new proposal has been submitted. Portugal proposed that a parliamentary mission visit East Timor. Again, Indonesia agreed with the plan to dispatch a Portuguese parliamentary delegation, along with a small group representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But again, Portugal created disagreement at the very moment when hope was so strong, and the visit was canceled.

Today, one more time, it is being proposed that talks be reopened. A solution must be reached for the benefit of the people of East Timor and their fellow Indonesians. Energy and resources should be committed to the ongoing task of political, social and economic development that is filling the vacuum left by centuries of abuse and neglect. They deserve no less.