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EAST TIMOR

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A continuing saga



for change

EDITORIAL

It's been a tremendous, stupefying year.

Dictators fell, tyrants "sodomized" each other, mass killers surrendered, the economic bubble went bust, an actor became president, dolphins were savaged and women were ravaged only because they were chinky-eyed.

Still, dictators fell. Women fought back. And mass of peoples poured out into the streets. In Dili, Rangoon, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh. Even as a Singaporean maverick asserted the free expression tenet to his eventual discomfort and incarceration. Even if a strongman embraces two architects of the killing fields in the guise of reconciliation. Even when a junta arrests foreigners distributing goodwill messages and sentencing them to hard labor before deporting them. Even as students are gunned down and riots are instigated in the teetering nation of Indonesia. While massacres are masked in that never-say-die nation of East Timor. Never mind too that a Catholic country is passionately divided on the question of death penalty.

The important thing is that there seems to be an inevitable surge of people power in the region. Of civil society ripening and its concomitant social movement maturing at a pace almost overtaking preparations for the Y2K bug. Despite the slings of obstacles set up by a hallucinating autocracy and an obsolete class of generals. Despite the opportunism and change of tactics of their erstwhile corporate backers. Despite the divisions being repeatedly foisted on them—even by themselves.

It looks like 1999 is going to host more of these tumult. And we should be graced by being potential actors in this unrelenting and continually unfolding saga for change.



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regarding East Timor.

BY JOHN ROOSA, EAST TIMOR ACTION NETWORK (ETAN) - MADISON



According to one report, Suharto told his military commanders in the crisis days before his May 21 resignation, "If I go down, you go down."

He may not have needed to explicitly state this since the implications of his fall would have been tacitly understood by the generals. The social unrest in Indonesia, the student demonstrations especially, forced the 77 year-old dictator from power but also delegitimized the military's dominant role in Indonesian politics. The military's violent response to anti-Suharto forces, as in the kidnapping of over 50 activists and the killing of four Trisakti University students, discredited it even in the eyes of Java's domesticated middle class.



John MacDougall/AFIP

SUHARTO'S FALL: A New Era in East Timor

Once its "Godfather" fell the military (ABRI) lost its sense of absolute impunity and invulnerability. Demands have come from all sides for investigations into the massacres of the past 33 years (including Aceh, Tanjung Priok, and Lampung). With ABRI on the defensive for the first time and its finances strained by the economic crisis, it has been unwilling and unable to sustain world-famous levels of repression in both Indonesia and occupied East Timor.

The partial, perhaps temporary, defanging of ABRI has led to a new era in East Timor. While ABRI is still killing, torturing and beating the East Timorese, the level of repression and the spread of its intelligence network has noticeably declined. There has been a profusion of meetings, demonstrations, and free-speech forums in recent months of unprecedented size and militancy. On June 6, a daylong meeting of several thousand, organized by the government itself in an auditorium directly behind the Governor's offices, focused on President Habibie's offer of autonomy. Against the wishes of the Governor, Abilio Soares,

who was jeered and booed, those present rejected the autonomy proposal and endorsed a referendum on independence.

Over the following weeks, free-speech forums were held at the University of East Timor. Hundreds of students organized caravans to other regions of the country, from Los Palos in the east to Suai in the west, to hold more such forums. Banners supporting a referendum and photos of Resistance leader Xanana Gusmão were displayed at all these events. Such public displays of support for independence would have been violently suppressed just one month prior. Now the East Timorese feel confident to make them every day.

On June 18, over 10,000 students and youths marched through Dili after holding a funeral for Herman dos Reis Soares (21), who was shot dead by a soldier on June 16. Military commanders in Dili, who in the past ordered the dispersal and shooting of demonstrators, kept the soldiers in barracks.



Realizing that its customary tactic of massacre would draw more international attention to East Timor, ABRI attempted to subvert the popular movement by creating an appearance of mass support for continued integration with Indonesia. For the visit of three European diplomats on June 27, the ABRI-controlled government mobilized civil servants, paid spies, and paramilitary youth gangs for a demonstration favoring integration. This group of several hundred people greeted the ambassadors at the Dili airport, followed their car into town, and then disbanded after clashing with a much larger pro-independence rally.

People from all over East Timor headed for Dili on June 27 to demonstrate support for a referendum. Convoys of buses, trucks and cars clogged the road along the northern coast (the only decent paved road). At the town of Manatuto, 50 kilometers east of Dili, the convoy was halted by a pro-integration group. In the ensuing confrontation, soldiers fired into pro-independence civilians, killing one man, Manuel Marques Soares (21), and injuring two others. The pro-independence group brought Manuel's body into Dili. Thousands of demonstrators, despite being tear-gassed when they carried the corpse to the governor's office, marched through the capital for the rest of the day. Such pro-independence demonstrations continued on June 28 and 29.

In Baucau, thousands demonstrated on June 29 when European ambassadors arrived to meet with Bishop Nacimento. A van full of military intelligence officers surrounded by East Timorese chanting "Viva Timor Leste" opened fire from inside their vehicle, killing one man, Orlando Marcelino da Costa (35), and seriously wounding five others. As they sped off, they drove into and badly injured two men.

Through these demonstrations and forums in June, the East Timorese people clearly made known their preference for independence. On July 17, when the government celebrated Integration Day, the anniversary of East Timor's formal annexation by Indonesia, virtually all East Timorese boycotted the official ceremonies and wore black clothing.

In July and August, student activists concentrated on organizing more free-speech forums so that East Timorese could discuss what kind of independence they wanted and how to achieve it. The newly formed Student Solidarity Council (Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa) avoided an affiliation with any political party and opened the discussions to all

viewpoints. The largest forum was held on August 22 in Dili. For the first time in history, Indonesian activists and intellectuals (namely, Wilson, Yeni Rosa Damayanti, and Father Mangunwijaya) delivered speeches inside East Timor condemning the occupation and supporting a referendum.

There is a clear consensus among all political parties (Fretilin, UDT, etc.) and all non-party organizations that East Timor should have a referendum on independence. (Even some in the historically pro-integration Apodeti party support this goal!) But there remain differences of opinion on many questions. The Student Solidarity Council organized an open public meeting on August 22, again near the Governor's office in Dili, to discuss the range of issues associated with a referendum.

East Timorese students studying in Indonesia have had a very active year. Many participated in the Indonesian student protests against Suharto prior to his resignation. On June 12, they organized their own demonstration in front of the Foreign Ministry office in Jakarta, where about 1,500 young East Timorese protested Indonesia's illegal annexation of their country. They were billy-clubbed by the military and forced to board buses that took them out of the city. Several were hospitalized but all were later released. The demonstration was an historic achievement: the first mass protest of East Timorese openly held in Jakarta (In 1994-95 protests, East Timorese students jumped over the fences of various embassies and usually were deported to Portugal. The organizers of a 1991 protest were given long prison sentences; some are still in jail.)

Many East Timorese students who stayed in Jakarta during summer break joined a demonstration on Indonesian Independence Day, August 17, in front of Cipinang prison, where Xanana is held. This demonstration, demanding the release of all political prisoners, was a joint project of the People's Democratic Party (PRD), six of whose leaders are in Cipinang, a faction of Megawati's party, and the East Timorese students. Though no political prisoners were released that day, prison officials allowed Xanana and Budiman Sujatmiko, the head of the PRD, to speak to the crowd from a balcony.

There is a new hope surging through the East Timorese nation and a confidence to seize the basic civil liberties so long denied them. It would be a disgrace for those countries that abandoned the East Timorese in 1975, the United States and Australia most notably, to continue their infatuation with ABRI, when the East Timorese themselves have so clearly demonstrated their desire for what is rightfully theirs: an act of self-determination and a peaceful end to their country's illegal occupation.



Year-end REVIEW of Indonesia



Kemal Jufri/AFR

Indonesia had one of the most tumultuous years in its modern history: economic collapse spurred student-led demands for political reform, bringing President Soeharto's three-decade rule to an end in May. His successor and protege, Vice-President B.J. Habibie tried to distance himself from his patron by releasing political prisoners, lifting political controls, and setting a timetable for free elections, but these measures won him little legitimacy from a skeptical populace.

The army, traditionally the country's most powerful institution next to the president, appeared weaker than any time in recent memory as more and more evidence of past abuses came to light. Rising prices, food shortages, and massive unemployment led to outbreaks of violence throughout the year, much of it directed against the small ethnic Chinese minority, widely resented for their disproportionate control of the retail economy. Poor but resource-rich provinces used the newly open political atmosphere to demand more economic autonomy.

These demands, together with major progress in negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia over political autonomy for East Timor and renewed pro-independence activity in Irian Jaya, led to the renewal of a long dormant debate about federalism as well as widely expressed fears for the country's disintegration.

By year's end, there was no sign of economic recovery, and it was impossible to know whether Indonesia was on its way to pluralist democracy, prolonged upheaval, or both.



HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS

The year began with the free fall of the Indonesian currency, an outbreak of anti-Chinese riots, and the beginning of student protests with a view to influencing the outcome of the planned session in March of the unopposed "re-selection" of President Soeharto by Indonesia's version of an electoral college. The economic decline and political unrest were both exacerbated by Soeharto's announcement on January 21 that B.J. Habibie, an unpopular Cabinet minister with a penchant for expensive showcase projects such as a national airline industry, was his choice for vice-president. Soeharto's son-in-law, Gen. Prabowo Subianto, helped fuel anti-Chinese sentiment by making veiled references to "traitors" who took their money abroad.

As campus protests escalated and security tightened in February, well-known political activists began to "disappear," abducted from their homes or workplaces in what was clearly an organized operation. On March 10, Soeharto was duly reappointed to a seventh five-year term, and the consensus among political observers at home and abroad was that only violence in the streets followed by army intervention, or Soeharto's death, could prevent him serving out the full term. Discontent escalated with the announcement on March 14 of a new Cabinet that included Soeharto's daughter and several cronies; it was seen as a clear sign that Soeharto had no interest in reform of any kind.

Student protest became a lightning rod for demands for change, gaining widespread support from the middle class and among the political elite, including parts of the military. International outrage over the "disappearance" of activists and pressure for clarification of their whereabouts led to the creation of a new organization, KontraS, to work on behalf of the families of the "disappeared," and to the eventual resurfacing of several young men in April and early May. Pius Lustrilanang, the first to give a public account of his abduction, torture, and detention, set an example for others; the evidence they produced pointed directly to the involvement of the army special forces, Kopassus, and to General Prabowo, former Kopassus commander.



East Timorese students dance outside Cipinang Prison

In May 4, the government announced a gasoline price hike, fulfilling strictures set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Riots erupted immediately, with the worst violence in Medan, North Sumatra, much of it anti-Chinese. On May 9, Soeharto left the country for a meeting in Egypt. On May 12, four students were shot dead, apparently by army or police snipers, following a demonstration at Trisakti University in Jakarta. The next day, the worst violence Jakarta had seen in decades broke out and continued for three days, with security forces standing by as mobs torched Chinese shops and homes. Over 1,000 died, many of them non-Chinese shoppers or would-be looters trapped in burning shopping malls. Foreign embassies and companies evacuated staff and dependents, and thousands of Chinese-Indonesians fled the country.

President Soeharto cut short his visit to Cairo and returned home, but it was too late. Political support among those closest to him had evaporated, and by May 19, student protestors had occupied the national parliament building, with tacit military endorsement. Promising at first to step down after new laws were drafted and an election held at some indeterminate time in the future, Soeharto then bowed to public pressure (and the resignation of half his Cabinet); on May 21, he turned over power to Vice-President Habibie. In a development of almost equal import, General Wiranto, commander of the armed forces and defense minister emerged the victor in a power struggle with General Prabowo, whose allies were suspected not only of the "disappearances" but also of shooting the Trisakti students and organizing the Jakarta riots. (In August, Prabowo admitted his role in the "disappearances" to a military investigating board and was dismissed from the army; in September, it was announced that he would be court-martialled, even though he was now a civilian.)



President Habibie formed a new Cabinet that dropped the most notorious cronies and political hard-liners, but his efforts to include opposition figures failed; such was his association with Soeharto that none agreed to serve. Within days, he announced a series of steps designed to demonstrate his reformist credentials, including the release of two of the country's best-known political prisoners, labor leader Muchtar Pakpahan and former opposition parliamentarian Sri Bintang Pamungkas. By late August, more than one hundred other prisoners had been freed, with the notable exception of East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao; Budiman Soejatmiko, Dita Sari, and other political organizers associated with the leftist People's Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik or PRD); and several men linked to a coup attempt in 1965.

In June, Habibie announced an "action plan" for human rights that included ratification of key human rights treaties. By the end of the year, the government had ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Labour Organization's Convention 87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize.

Ordering the Justice Ministry to draft new laws on political parties and elections to be presented to the People's Consultative Assembly in late 1998, Habibie also lifted controls on political party formation, including a Soeharto-era ban on the PRD. By September, more than seventy parties had registered with the Home Ministry, most of which were likely to lack the mass



Panic-buying in Jakarta

base necessary under a new draft law to compete in parliamentary elections.

The print and broadcast media enjoyed virtually full freedom after Soeharto's fall for the first time in thirty years, and well over one hundred licenses for new publications were issued by the Ministry of Information between June and August. The newsmagazine Tempo, banned in 1994, reopened in October. A controversial draft law on demonstrations was tabled in July, designed to place curbs on any demonstrations of more than one hundred persons. The National Human Rights Commission and rights activists denounced the bill as a curb on internationally recognized rights, and by October, it had become the first piece of legislation in years defeated by popular protest. (A less restrictive version was passed in its place.)

July saw a number of issues come to the fore that remained unresolved by the end of the year. Violence against the ethnic Chinese, and ethnic Chinese women in particular, was one. Soon after the May riots in the cities of Jakarta, Solo, and Surabaya, reports began to emerge of mass rapes and other forms of sexual assault against ethnic Chinese women in a systematic, organized fashion. The reports were followed by graphic descriptions and photographs that appeared on the Internet and that became the basis for public protests from Beijing to Los Angeles. General Wiranto announced in June that an army investigation had uncovered no evidence of rape; rights organizations said victims were too frightened or traumatized to come forward or had fled the country. The government appointed a fact-finding team to look into the May violence, including rape, on July 24. (As of late October, the team had not issued its final report.) In August, the Internet photos were conclusively proven false, and questions had arisen about some of the rape data initially collected. Advocacy groups reporting the rapes meanwhile were subjected to harassment and threats from unidentified callers, while racist groups emerging in the new climate of free speech played on the fear of ethnic Chinese by warning of new assaults on the community. The murder in October of Ita Martadinata, a Jakarta woman whose mother was deeply involved in the rape investigation, only increased that fear.

Also in July, a series of pro-independence demonstrations broke out in towns across Irian Jaya on the anniversary of a 1961 proclamation of independence by an armed nationalist group, the Free



Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM). In Jayapura and Biak, the army opened fire after attacks on local security personnel. One student and one police officer died in Jayapura; the death toll in Biak was at least one demonstrator and perhaps more, as the military tried to suppress information on casualties. Rights groups said the demonstrations had been inspired in part by a letter sent on May 22 by members of the U.S. Congress, urging, among other things, a political dialogue on Irian Jaya. The deaths fueled separatist sentiment, coming as they did after revelations in May of grave human rights abuses in the area around Mapunduma, Jayawijaya district, during military operations there in 1996-97 following the army's rescue of hostages taken by the OPM.

These revelations, as well as new evidence on the widespread atrocities in Aceh, a region on the northern tip of Sumatra, during counterinsurgency operations there in 1990-91, generated pressure on the government to look more systematically into past abuses. (The deportation of hundreds of Acehnese "migrants" from Malaysia in late March caused an international outcry, as some of those sent back were clearly refugees who had fled Aceh in the early 1990s and had good reason to fear persecution in Indonesia. (See entry on Malaysia.)

In August, as the National Commission on Human Rights was looking into the possibility of setting up a "truth commission" for Indonesia, a respected Muslim leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, announced the establishment of a non-governmental Commission on Truth and National Reconciliation to look into past abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor. Not to be outdone, the government in early September announced the formation of a National Reconciliation Commission, a body whose mandate did not appear to include exposing the truth or seeking justice.

Attention to past military abuses also led to demands for troop withdrawals in special security zones called "military operation areas" (daerah operasi militer or DOM). Most of Aceh was considered such an area, as were parts of Jayawijaya district in Irian Jaya. In August, General Wiranto apologized to the people of Aceh for the abuses they had suffered and declared the "DOM" status revoked. But on September 2, as troops began to leave from the city of Lhokseumawe, popular anger boiled over.

Violence directed against the departing soldiers soon turned into a more general riot, amid accusations that the rioting had been sparked by the military elements themselves to ensure their continued presence in Aceh (where some had lucrative commercial operations).

On East Timor, the U.N. brokered an agreement between the Habibie government and Portugal on August 5 in which both sides committed themselves to work toward an agreement on "wide-ranging autonomy" for the former Portuguese colony considered by Indonesia to be its twenty-seventh province and by the U.N. to be under Portuguese administration. Indonesia agreed to drop its insistence that a precondition of negotiations must be acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty, although it continued to reject the idea, widely supported inside East Timor, of a referendum on independence. Pro-independence demonstrations took place before and after the agreement, without interference from the army. Shortly before the agreement was signed, Indonesia announced it was pulling combat troops out of the territory, but days after the first 398 were pulled out, another 263 "army health personnel and police" were sent in. By August, some 1,000 soldiers had been sent home, but East Timorese leaders did not consider the withdrawals significant, as thousands of troops, not considered "combat" forces, remained in place.

In September, fresh violence broke out across the country as the impact of the economic collapse became increasingly felt. Riots in Medan and Bagan siapi-api in North Sumatra and in Kebumen and Cilacap,

Central Java was particularly violent, with Chinese shops and homes again targeted. The government's response included allegations that the unrest was due to "communist" forces.

Beginning in July, murders began of suspected practitioners of black magic in East Java by mysterious groups of men called ninjas. By October, over 140 people had been killed, and over ninety of those belonged to one Muslim organization, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU). The NU had aligned itself with popular opposition leaders Megawati Soekarnoputri against President Habibie, and its leaders and the East Java police were among many suggesting the ninjas were linked to the army. By late October, revenge killings against suspected ninjas had begun.

The reform process continued to lurch forward, with a major debate shaping up on the role of the armed forces and the announcement in September of the repeal of the hated Anti-Subversion Law that had been used repeatedly by Soeharto to detain political opponents.



BY LOUISE WILLIAMS, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD

Poor little RICH KIDS



It is almost a pathetic image. Once they were the most powerful family in the land, accustomed to trotting the globe in their private aircraft and slicing up the national economy in their opulent living rooms, squabbling over contracts like children sharing out cake.

Now, insiders say, the Soehartos are virtual prisoners in their own homes, rarely seen in public. Their lifestyle has been reduced to clutching the television remote control, and their homes are sealed off by tanks and troops.

Only the former president of Indonesia's parrot has failed to acknowledge his master's rapid fall from grace, still greeting him every morning as "Bapak [Father] President" at his home in the leafy, colonial suburb of Menteng in central Jakarta.

When the Habibie Government finally announced it would seek "clarification" of the wealth amassed by Soeharto during his 32 years in power, a lone bunch of flowers was carried past the soldiers and the bored journalists camped out

at the roadblocks that ring the complex where much of the extended Soeharto clan live. The note said simply "Perseverance", and was signed by an ordinary family from the city's middle-class outskirts.

But that is where the sympathy ends.

Many of the members of the elite who benefited handsomely under Soeharto have betrayed him, calculating that their own survival depends on distancing themselves from the old man.

"I am very sad to see those who were licking Soeharto's boots are now harassing him and claiming to be reformists just to save themselves," says one former political ally, who himself jumped off the Soeharto ship just weeks before it sank.

A recent survey carried out by the University of Indonesia found that 74.6 per cent of Indonesians believe that Soeharto was lying during a broadcast on his daughter's television station last month in which he claimed to have "not one cent" squirreled away in accounts overseas. And more than 95 per cent of respondents said he should "account" for the "various deviations" during his rule.



Since Soeharto's resignation, amid the chaos and violence of the riots in Jakarta in May, an old taboo has been broken.

For decades public discussion of Soeharto's affairs was tantamount to treason. Now, newly liberated tabloids drool over the latest scandals: this week a popular TV soap opera star said she had given birth to the illegitimate child of Soeharto's socialite grandson, Ari Sigit, when she was only 16. She was, she claims, paid a small fortune for her silence and an agreement to hand over the baby to Sigit's aunt. Now, five years later and burdened by regret, she says the cheque was never cashed and she wants her son back. (In any case, the cheque was drawn on one of the family's banks, which has collapsed).

One insider says that the wife of Soeharto's second son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was snubbed by other mothers when she picked up her children's school report cards recently. Her husband, meanwhile, was lining up to be questioned by police over financial crimes and is banned from leaving the country.

The Soeharto grandchildren, the source says, have been taunted by their former friends and street vendors alike.

"I think they were caught by surprise by the weakness of their friendships. Now, they are very much ignored. I think they are considered a social problem, a liability to be associated with," says Rizal Ramli, an economist.

Some old associates says Soeharto's six children, all of whom built business empires during his rule, are frightened by the almost daily demonstrations against the clan's wealth, despite a deal cut with the armed forces for "protection". Others say the children are furious about the

Government's decision to investigate their father's wealth and are determined to obstruct the proceedings. They are also said to be obsessively collecting articles written about them since their political demise.

They have been forced to resign from all their positions within the ruling Golkar party and the Parliament. But Soeharto still holds the key to the party's war chest, refusing to sign over more than 800 billion rupiah (\$175million) locked inside several of the charitable foundations set up under his government and used to channel political "donations" from business associates.

They have resigned from high-profile positions in their own companies, and domestic and foreign business partners who once considered their signatures gold are now rushing to dump them.

The economic crisis - combined with the end of privileged access to contracts - has wiped out the share values of the former first family's companies. Scores of politically sensitive contracts with Soeharto companies have been cancelled.

From news of what the family has lost since May, a picture is emerging of what they had, and how they obtained it.

The list of deals is overwhelming; land swaps that gave the children valuable blocks of government land in central Jakarta in exchange for rice fields on the city limits, government-owned shares sold at a huge loss to a Soeharto family company, incredible oil trading monopolies which netted profits of between 20 and 70 US cents a barrel in a

country that exports 1.4 million barrels of oil a day - and even monopolies on the processing of driver's licences and the charter rights for the annual Haj pilgrimage.

But in his handful of appearances since May, Soeharto has appeared confident and defiant.

He has repeatedly denied he has any money to hide.

Bambang has joined in, claiming the economic crisis has ruined his extensive businesses and that he can no longer be called a rich man. <<<

Soeharto is a shrewd and intelligent man. Many analysts believe he may not have "even one cent" deposited under his own name. It is also clear that the Soeharto fortune - estimated at anywhere between \$US4 billion and \$US40 billion - has been greatly diminished by the economic downturn and the collapse of the family's biggest economic asset, political power.

"Indonesia's case is unique: the toppled leader is still here," says a noted economist, Syahrir. "In the Philippines the Marcos family fled; so did the Shah of Iran.

"No matter how absurd it seems, Soeharto still thinks he can manage this country in one way or another. Imagine somebody who spent 32 years in power, everything he said became the law of the country, he was surrounded by people who served his will and those he didn't like he just threw away."

Soeharto is a shrewd and intelligent man. Many analysts believe he may not have "even one cent" deposited under his own name. It is also clear that the Soeharto fortune - estimated at anywhere between \$US4 billion and \$US40 billion - has been greatly diminished by the economic downturn and the collapse of the family's biggest economic asset, political power.

How much of the money was moved offshore in advance under powers of attorney remains unknown, despite claims from Austria that the Soehartos may have been behind a sudden \$US7 billion jump in foreign deposits during the first quarter of 1998.

Another mystery surrounds the huge fire in the brand new central bank building earlier this year, in which tens of thousands of financial documents were destroyed.

But perhaps more important is the question of just how determined the Habibie Government is to investigate the Soeharto fortune.

When B.J. Habibie accepted the mantle of leadership from Soeharto, it was like an aging mentor passing the baton to his younger protege, so close were the two men. Habibie, like many of Soeharto's former political allies, benefited greatly during his mentor's rule.

On the one hand Habibie's tenuous hold on power demands that he be seen to be accounting for the excesses of the past; on the other, the business interests of the Habibie family and the Soeharto children overlap in at least three areas.

"Soeharto had a couple of months before the investigation was announced to tie up loose ends. Any cash that could be traced is now untraceable. They covered their tracks very well, is my guess," said one diplomat.

"I think he went on television [denying his wealth] to throw out a challenge to Habibie: "Push me too hard and I will come out with evidence that you benefited too."

One former Soeharto business associate said: "They are just sitting there, trying to look cool, sweating it out, under the protection of the army. They are taking the attitude that "This is my story, I am sticking to it. You think I am a thief, then prove it."

"But the people on the streets will get angrier and angrier. So Soeharto is under a kind of house arrest. Yes, he can go anywhere he likes, but people will throw rocks at him. Remember, these are people who used to fly anywhere they wanted in their own planes - now they are just holding the television remote controls."

Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, or "Mbak [sister] Tutut" as she is better known, is sick from the stress of it all. Just over six months ago Soeharto's eldest daughter was the darling of her father's ruling Golkar party, energetically crisscrossing the country as party chairwoman, head of the Indonesian Red Cross, and then Minister for Social Affairs in her father's last Cabinet.

As Soeharto's eldest child she was often favoured by father, accompanying him at official public functions after her mother died in 1996 and sharing his passion for politics. There was even speculation that he was building a political dynasty, with Tutut his immediate heir.

In public she was careful to project a conservative image, her head covered with a Muslim scarf, albeit fashionably toned to match her modest dress. Those close to her say she fancied herself as the "mother of the nation" and she was genuinely fond of children and concerned for their welfare.

Privately, though, the gossip was less kind. Tutut was widely rumoured to be close to a senior retired general, who was not her husband, and behind the scenes at home she was said to fight viciously with her younger brother, Bambang, over the business opportunities her father could bestow.

When Tutut was just 21, she became a shareholder in Bank Central Asia, controlled by her father's buddy Liem Sioe Liong, who became Indonesia's richest man under Soeharto's patronage. From that humble base grew her own business interests expanding into an empire straddling toll road constructions and operation, finance, oil, petrochemicals, agribusiness, television and banking. In 1997, the book Asia's Wealth Club listed Tutut - now 49 - as worth \$US2 billion.



"Tutut is at home resting. She is ill from all the stress," said another source, mentioning the scandal of Ari Sigit's alleged "love child," whom Tutut has been raising.

She may also be feeling quite unwell over the state of her business affairs.

In July 1997, the shares under her control in her publicly listed toll road company, Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP), were worth about \$US286 million. Last week they were worth about \$US1 million. The collapse in First Family shares goes way beyond the impact of the 75 per cent depreciation in the rupiah, and reflects investors' concern that the company may eventually become the target of corruption investigations.

"If you look at CMNP's balance sheet, their best asset was 'goodwill' from the Government. Now that is gone," said a finance industry source.

Indonesia's drivers were also caught in Tutut's financial net when they processed their licences. According to a police source, only 4,500 rupiah per licence went to the state from the 52,500-rupiah processing fee charged by a company owned by Tutut under a five-year administration contract signed with the national police. That contract is now under review.

In June this year Tutut missed a \$US6.3 million interest payment on \$US175 million worth of bonds. A company spokesman said banks had been "reluctant" to change her rupiah into dollars to meet the deadline. Hong Kong's Peregrine Bank had already collapsed, forced to the wall by a \$US450 million bad debt owed by the Steady Safe taxi and bus company, in which Tutut had an interest.

Her own 17.5 per cent interest in the Bank Central Asia didn't help. A huge run on the bank, as well as the torching of many of the BCA branch offices during anti-Soeharto rioting, emptied its coffers and exhausted the central bank's willingness to print money. Seventeen per cent of all the money within the Indonesian banking system was withdrawn in one week. The Habibie Government took over the management of BCA. Now Liem Sioe Liong is trying to wrest back control by handing over much of his own business empire to the state. None of his assets in which a Soeharto also has an interest are on the payback list, so Tutut's is not part of the recapitalisation.



Her plans, says insiders, are to return quietly to the rural villages of Java and hand out food to the poor and money to the local schools.

Less is known about the emotions of her two most prominent brothers, but a great deal is slowly being revealed about their businesses.

"These are people who always used other people's money. There is no doubt that over the years they became richer and greedier and their father lost control over them. People used to take their businesses to them on a platter," said the former Soeharto associate.

"Now they have to compete, and even if they do have some legitimate businesses to offer no-one wants to deal with them.

"To their credit, they were personally always very polite to deal with."

They were also obsessively private. Said one business consultant: "Deals were done at home. Once the consultant had made the presentation, he left. Even one of my wealthy colleagues was astonished at the number of cars and the opulence. He was even more surprised when a pet tiger came padding through the living room."

Not so polite were the men known as the "underlings". According to Jakarta sources the family's business pimps operated on commission, and would simply report back when another deal was done. An Australian expert on Asian business, Michael Backman, has identified 1,247 separate and active companies in Indonesia alone which count one Soeharto or another as a significant shareholder.

"If you were at the mercy of the underlings they would kick you around something terrible. They applied terrible pressure in the name of Bambang or Tommy and made all sorts of threats to ruin your business if you didn't comply," the former associate said.

Bambang Trihatmodjo, 46, was worth an estimated \$US3 billion last year.

Last week he was called in by police for questioning over banking crimes and has been banned from leaving the country. The charges against him relate to exceeding the legal lending limit at his now liquidated Bank Andromeda, essentially meaning he and his business partners used depositors' money to fund their own big petrochemical project, Chandra Asri.

Bambang's flagship Bimantara Citra has more than 100 subsidiaries with interests in



telecommunications, broadcasting, oil and gas, the automotive industry, infrastructure, finance, electronics and entertainment. Bambang's 388 million shares in the publicly listed slice of his empire were worth \$US759 million in June 1997. Last week they were worth about \$US580,000, trading at only 150 rupiah per share, or 2.5 Australian cents each.

"This is a really, really unprecedented loss on the share value, and that doesn't include the company's performance itself. Bimantara has lost a lot of contracts, the auto division is facing an 80 per cent contraction in the market, the Chandra Asri deal is a financial time bomb," the former Soeharto associate said.

Even his magnificent luxury Dharmawangsa Hotel, set in lush gardens in south Jakarta, is eerily empty, its opening last year coinciding with the economic collapse. Now his luxury Grand Hyatt hotel in the city is being snubbed in favour of hotels with less obvious crony connections.

One of the biggest cash cows for the Soeharto boys was Pertamina, the state oil and gas monopoly.

One senior oil industry executive says Tutut once approached him for a contract.

"I told her to talk to Bambang, and he told her to back off, that is how they divided things up. I didn't hear from her again," he said.

How the First Family, and other cronies, milked the Pertamina system is a long and complicated story. Simply put, they acted as brokers for Pertamina, which has a monopoly on imports and exports of oil. Indonesia is a significant oil producer and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day, but at the same time imports about 350,000 barrels a day of a cheaper oil type for its domestic market.

Pertamina announced it was cancelling trading contracts with two companies, one part-owned by Bambang, the other part-owned by Soeharto's youngest son, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra. The Minister for State Administrative Reform, Hartarto, once a cosy political ally, announced that Pertamina would save \$US82.76 million a year simply by not dealing with the Soehartos.

Arifin Panigoro, head of the Medco group of companies which controls oil fields off Sumatra, believes the family accumulated huge amounts of American dollars after entering oil trading in 1984.

"All the oil goes through family companies assigned by the Government, so they get a fee," he said. "But they also got involved in the spot market. When they made a profit they took it; when they made a loss it was booked to Pertamina. I think now we can reduce the brokerage fee by 30 cents a barrel."

Another executive from a large international oil company found himself assigned to Bambang as a 10 per cent partner. "The rules are that when a field is declared commercial by both Indonesia and the oil company, then an Indonesian interest takes a 10 per cent stake. Pertamina chose the partner, and we got Bimantara."

Technically, such a partner is expected to put up 10 per cent of the capital. But Bimantara didn't pay.

"We had a lot of arguments and we decided to carry them, which means they pay back the money out of their share of the oil, plus a heavy penalty. They still haven't earned any money, so maybe they just wanted to be in oil for the prestige."

Another disaster for Bimantara was Pertamina's insistence that Bimantara be allowed to build the East Java gas pipeline, using a \$US400 million loan from Japanese banks to be paid back using the "tolls" for gas transport. The project was delayed by two and a half years and completed in 1994. The problem now is that the pipeline's biggest gas customer, the

How the First Family, and other cronies, milked the Pertamina system is a long and complicated story. Simply put, they acted as brokers for Pertamina, which has a monopoly on imports and exports of oil. Indonesia is a significant oil producer and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day, but at the same time imports about 350,000 barrels a day of a cheaper oil type for its domestic market.



state electricity company, PLN, is virtually bankrupt and can no longer pay the "toll", so Bimantara can no longer pay the Japanese banks.

For Tommy, the youngest son, business has never been worse. Insiders say he was the family's "lucky charm," and, as such, indulged by his father.

Last week the Habibie Government presented Tommy with a bill for unpaid taxes on his Timor car project. This was the so-called "national car", fully imported from South Korea with exclusive tax concessions in exchange for a promise to increase the local content of the vehicle on an annual timetable.

The project never went beyond stage one. Only \$US200 million of a \$US700 million loan facility arranged through state banks was drawn down, but now the cash-strapped Government wants the tax paid back. One consultant estimated the tax bill at \$US168 million.

Early on in the economic crisis, Tommy also lost Indonesia's main private airline, Sempati, which he ran in conjunction with a foundation controlled by the armed forces. The American dollar leases on the aircraft could not be met, so they were flown back to their owners one by one.

At the same time, demonstrations by airport staff prompted the cancellation of a lucrative cargo handling contract held by Bimantara. At the insistence of the International Monetary Fund, Tommy lost the outrageous clove monopoly under which he had controlled the key ingredient of popular kretek cigarettes.

Tommy was also forced to sell his 60 per cent stake in the luxury Italian sports car company Lamborghini, which fitted the bachelor image he promoted before his recent marriage.

Pertamina has announced the cancellation of a joint venture with Tommy's Humpuss group to operate a petrochemical refinery, and is renegotiating down the cost of using a tanker fleet owned by Tommy and his eldest brother, Sigit Harjoudanto.

According to George Aditjondro, a sociologist who has been compiling an inventory of Soeharto's wealth for years, one of the family's most viable remaining

businesses is the tanker fleet, now based in Singapore and out of reach of Indonesia's zealous reformists.

The fate of Sigit's estimated \$US450 million is far less clear, as is the 1997 valuation of \$US200 million put on assets controlled by Soeharto's second daughter, Siti "Titiek" Hedijanti Harijadi, who has real estate and retail interests, and the \$US100 million estimated for the youngest daughter, Siti "Mimiek" Hutami Endang Adiningsih, who has interests in plantations and transport.

Sigit's name was most frequently heard in connection with "Bob" Hasan, Soeharto's golfing buddy and high-profile deal maker. Hasan lost his own cash cow to the IMF reforms. This was a timber cartel that handled three-quarters of the world's plywood exports for a fee. Both Sigit and Hasan hold a 10 per cent stake in an investment company, known as Nusamba. The remaining 80 per cent is owned by three foundations controlled by Soeharto.

Indonesia's charitable foundations, or yayasans, are the missing links in any investigation of the Soehartos' wealth. Roderick Brazier, of the Castle Group business consultancy in Jakarta, estimated the 13 foundations controlled by the family to be worth about \$US2 billion.

According to Syahrir, the economist, the creation of the foundations in the early 1970s was the beginning of the distortion of the national economy. They were established in the name of certain charities - foundations for asthma, for school and mosque construction, and scholarships, for example - and were not subject to tax or to external audits. The Government then approved the compulsory deduction of a small percentage of the wages of civil servants and members of the armed forces, and deductions from state banks as donations.

"They started taking deductions from the salaries of 3 million civil servants in the 1970s up to the late 1990s, so of course they took a lot of money away. Then, with such huge amounts of money they [the family and other cronies] sometimes used the foundations as banks at a low interest rate to build a project allocated by the state," Syahrir said.

Most of the foundations were used for business investment, and many foundation names appear on projects in Indonesia, according to a senior Golkar source. The accounts were not open to public scrutiny. "So, if you wanted to do business you donated to a yayasan controlled by Soeharto or his friends, then that money could be used for political campaigns or the accumulation of personal wealth," the source said.

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The regulations enforcing compulsory deductions have been abolished, but executives of the four largest foundations controlled by Soeharto have refused to pass their funds to the Government and have insisted they will continue with their charitable work.

The most contentious of these is the Dakab foundation, set up in 1985, to finance Golkar, and now subject to protests over its use for "unfair" political gain. According to a Golkar source the assets of the foundation are at least 800 billion rupiah. The remnants of Soeharto's Golkar group now want the money for their own election campaign next year, but Soeharto is refusing to budge.

How much money do the Soehartos really have left? Up to \$US18 billion, says the Indonesian Business Data Centre. Between \$US8 billion and \$US10 billion, says the Castle Group.

"Anyone who claims to know cannot possibly know," Michael Backman said. "For a start, it is still not clear exactly what they have. Secondly, most of their assets are in Indonesia and all asset prices in Indonesia have collapsed, so this would have a big impact on the family's wealth. Also, many assets were only of real value while Soeharto was in power, and are not tradable. If pressed, I would say well under \$US10 billion."

The Jakarta-based consultant Hidayat Jati said: "Whether he has X billion dollars or not doesn't really matter. Everyone is looking for this lost treasure chest as if everything will be OK when they find it. But, even if Soeharto does have \$US40 billion, this is a structural problem for the economy and confidence won't return unless that is addressed.

"How did a president push around banks and force them to finance questionable projects? How did the Timor car get approved? The way the First Family did business was a structural problem."

Soeharto's old friends in the new government have been careful not to call the recent rounds of questioning "an investigation," but a "clarification", coming almost apologetically to his house with the news.

Within Indonesian society, it is true, there is considerable reluctance to humiliate the former president, both because he presided over long years of economic growth and because the



habit of obedience to such absolute authority dies hard. The same cannot be said for the children. No such public service is tempering the public's demands for accountability.

Can an investigation succeed?

Of course, says Suharsono Hadikusumo, a tax expert and former senior Finance Ministry official. "I worked in the Finance Ministry in 1990. I knew the following: Bambang Trihatmodjo applied to the Finance Minister to take over the shares of PT Intirub, a state-owned tyre company. The minister established a team of experts to assess the value of the 1,000 shares.

"They put the value at 7 million rupiah per share. Some time later the Finance Minister sold the shares to Bambang for 1 million rupiah each, and the state suffered a loss of 6 billion rupiah. Bambang then resold the shares to the Salim group, certainly at a huge profit. It was a very easy money-earner."

Suharsono says the records are still in the Finance Ministry archives and could easily be investigated if the political will were there. He also points to highly profitable land swaps of state land for developments by family members, saying all the records are still available.

"The public pressure for bringing Soeharto to court is increasing," said Rizal Ramli. "I don't think Soeharto and Habibie made a deal, but Habibie knows that it is in everyone's [the elites'] interest to protect each other. But if someone comes to power without emotional and historical connections to Soeharto it might be different." -Oct. 24, 1998





BRI, Indonesia's armed forces, is facing its worst crisis in half a century, but many of its officers still believe it is the only institution that can hold the country together.

Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto was in a reflective mood. It was a Monday morning at the end of March and Prabowo was at his new office in Jakarta, where he had just taken command of the 27,000-strong Army Strategic Reserve, an elite green beret parachute unit.

The President's PROBLEM GENERALS

A gleaming four-wheel-drive vehicle was parked at the front steps, with three gold stars on a red number plate. Officers in camouflage fatigues snapped to attention and shouted "Siap!" (Sir!) whenever he appeared.

Prabowo, 47, was pouring tea and serving Javanese snacks. Two days earlier, on a tropical parade ground, with foreign military attachés in attendance, Prabowo had transferred command of Kopassus, Indonesia's 6,250-strong red beret force, to one of his colleagues.

He was still savouring the moment, commenting on the spit-and-polish turnout of the troops and their esprit de corps.

"They were obviously well-trained and proud," he said. Old soldiers can spot these things immediately.

There was, as it happened, only one thing wrong with that transfer ceremony, although there was no way of knowing it at the time.


As 1,000 soldiers paraded under a sweltering sun, the bugles blowing and the colours raised, some of the nation's leading political dissidents were languishing out the back in the Kopassus torture centre.

They had been kidnapped on Prabowo's orders.

In the event, Prabowo was not long for the army he loved. He was pushed aside - and later cashiered - barely seven weeks later, on May 22, the day after the fall of president Soeharto, who is also his father-in-law. He has since admitted that he ordered the kidnapping of political activists.



Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto



General Wiranto

As ABRI rides out its worst crisis in half a century, its reputation tarnished by claims of appalling human rights abuses across the country, Prabowo's name comes up time and again.

General Wiranto, the Defence Minister and ABRI Commander, likes to say that ABRI has turned over a new leaf in the post-Soeharto era. He points to Prabowo's downfall as evidence that the military is cleaning up its act.

That does not wash with some Indonesians. They believe it was not just Prabowo who was out kidnapping people but other senior officers as well. They say that the men now at the top in ABRI, including Wiranto, must have known what was going on and should now resign.

Others take a more lenient view. Dr Salim Said, a political scientist who is close to many senior officers, said: "This younger generation of officers [grew up in this] system so they did not have experience of other ways of doing business.

"The generation graduating after '65 have served only one supreme commander, which is Soeharto ... So it is very difficult for them. Plus, of course, they have also ambitions. And none of them ever imagined that they

would end up like this. None of us ever imagined that Soeharto would fall."

In short, the Indonesian Army was playing fast and loose with the rules. That is the way the system worked. No one expected to be held accountable for actions taken on behalf of the president. No one foresaw that a recession would bring Soeharto down.

Today, attitudes have changed.

Dr. Franz Magnis-Suseno, a German-born scholar at the Jesuit Driyakara College of Philosophy in Jakarta, said: "The military show an unaccustomed humility, not just because all their dirt comes out. The cruelty was so disgusting, with rapes and killing...

"The military have the problem that they made it possible for Soeharto to rule for 32 years. Yet after 32 years of military government the country is in its worst crisis."

What is to be done?

Few senior ABRI officers want to see Prabowo go on trial, however much some of them dislike him. That, as one insider put it, would "open up a Pandora's box".

Already, as ABRI sees it, there are far too many inquiries into ABRI activities, by military commissions, by Parliament, by the national human rights commission.

That is one reason the recent call in Australia for an Indonesian inquiry into the deaths of five foreign journalists at Balibo in 1975 was never going anywhere.

Instead, ABRI is asking for another chance. Senior officers are saying they were only following orders, that ABRI was used as a tool of Soeharto, as indeed it was.

Five months after the fall of Soeharto, ABRI's image is looking almost as tarnished as that of the Argentinian Army after that nation's "dirty war" against its own citizens. However, the Indonesian Army, unlike its Argentinian counterpart, has no intention of returning to the barracks. ABRI officers believe they have an important contribution to make. They believe in the smack of firm government. They have acquired a taste for power.

Under the dual function, or dwifungsi, doctrine, ABRI has awarded itself a role as both a military and a



social-political (sospol) force. This has given the military a significant number of seats in Parliament, the power to place army officers in key slots in the bureaucracy - at one stage there were no fewer than 20,000 of them - and a strong voice at the provincial, district and village level.

ABRI says it is willing to play a reduced role in politics but adds, in the same breath, that dwifungsi is "eternal".

Under Soeharto, ABRI did not make policy decisions - that was the job of the president and his Cabinet - but was there to guarantee stability. ABRI was a German shepherd, obediently savaging the enemies of its master.

Like many of its Latin American counterparts, the Indonesian Army earned a reputation for brutality during Soeharto's rule, although it would be wrong to imagine that it was brutal in all places at all times.

As the years went by, military service in the outer provinces and in the highly combustible cities of Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi produced a certain kind of officer.

"The best of them have spent their entire life in a system that is entirely brutal," a diplomat said.

"If you look at the careers of the best ABRI people who have graduated since the late 1960s, they have been in operations almost continuously, in Kalimantan, in Irian Jaya, in Timor, in Aceh. When they came home it was to major intelligence or operations jobs within enormous and bubbling cities...

"The pressures in their lives are quite extraordinary. I'm not making excuses. But they had no time to recharge their moral batteries."

Wiranto, a former Soeharto adjutant and a cautious reformer, has a difficult path to tread. He may have seen off Prabowo, his chief rival in ABRI. But he has to work with President B.J. Habibie and with powerful retired officers like Feisal Tanjung, who do not have much time for him but who do have Habibie's ear. Feisal is one of five active or retired generals in

Habibie's Cabinet; all have been criticised over harsh actions taken by troops under their command.

Wiranto also has to work with bright, up-and-coming officers who, while acknowledging that he is better than some of his predecessors, believe he is too much a product of the Soeharto era.

Some younger officers are said to have looked with growing distaste on the way ABRI was behaving in recent years. One source said they were scathing about some of their superiors, conveying the impression that these officers "besmirched their reputation as soldiers and as chivalrous people".

Wiranto, who has what he feels are obligations both to Soeharto and Habibie, wants to keep ABRI in a position where it can play a stabilising role in what is bound to be a tumultuous 12 months as elections loom.

Soeharto laid a thick slab of concrete over Indonesian society, much as the Communists did in the Soviet Union. Now, as the concrete cracks and breaks, all kinds of shoots are appearing, some of them not at all to ABRI's liking.

Many officers believe ABRI is the only institution that can hold Indonesia together.

"This society," a three-star general recently told a colleague, "will rise up and tear itself to bits if ABRI is not there."

For the moment, ABRI is on the back foot.

However, if Indonesia were to descend into chaos, there would be many, especially in the middle class, who would be glad to see ABRI come in and knock a few heads together. There were signs of that during the May riots. In some parts of Jakarta, housewives cheered as tanks rolled through the streets.

That could raise another set of problems.

"If economic life collapses totally," warned Magnis-Suseno, "you will get military dictatorship." - Oct. 29, 1998



JULY

CROCODILE SHOW. About 1,000 Indonesian troops said goodbye to their East Timorese victims in a much-publicized peace gesture by the Habibie government. It's the perfect visual aid to a children's song herein adapted: "The croc winked its eyes as the Timorese said their merry byes, wearing their happy smiles...At the end of the ride, they landed on Timor's west side, and the smile was on the crocodile."

Indeed, for confirmed reports say that actually, those troops who were shipped out were shipped back in on the west side of Timor island and trucked back to East Timor!

FORSAREPETIL. Forsarepetil, a new intellectual group of more than 700 East Timorese members, was formed. The group organizes pro-referendum, pro-independence activities in East Timor.

TALKING THE WAR OVER I. After the blood-letting, finally a talk between East Timor's colonizers, as the East Timorese themselves negotiate from their jail cells.

At the United Nations, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and his Portugal counterpart Jaime Gama discussed Indonesia's proposal for "special status (to East Timor) based on a wide-ranging autonomy". Gama didn't agree but further discussions had been set for October.

SEPTEMBER

WHAT ELSE IS NEW, II. Rumors about a new Indonesian military offensive and a substantial increase in troops in East Timor began.

Despite calls for ceasefire soon after Habibie took over Jakarta's reign in May, clashes between East Timorese resistance fighters and Indonesian troops continued and escalated this month. Thanks to Jakarta's furtive deployment of more troops in the disputed territory.

after Suharto:

AUGUST

NEVER ENOUGH. The sacking of Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto, erstwhile Commander of the dreaded Special Elite force Kopassus would never appease the East Timorese and Acehnese who think human rights violations will not cease until every Indonesian military unit moves out of their territories.

Former President Suharto's son-in-law was found responsible for the abduction and torture of political activists after a military investigation.

WHAT ELSE IS NEW? No big news here about armed forces chief General Wiranto admitting that troops were "involved" in the Jakarta riots in May.

HUNGER STRIKE. Several Becora prison inmates group began a hunger strike on September 28. The prisoners demanded the release of Xanana Gusmao, and all political prisoners and a referendum for East Timor.

OCTOBER

THE CROCODILE NEVER LEFT, SILLY. Habibie and Wiranto apparently failed in Math during college. As of August, there were 17,834 armed forces personnel in East Timor, not 12,000 as they declared. This didn't include 12,000 paramilitary troops under the armed forces command which the military denied having a relationship with.



Authenticated confidential Indonesian documents that have leaked to the press and to East Timor solidarity groups exposed these real figures.

CROCS ATTACK! The croc population has increased! Eight thousand (8,000) are reported to have sneaked inside the territory since August. Their silent footprints bore marks of East Timorese blood as more than a dozen civilians and Falintil fighters were detained, tortured, or killed as they passed.

Already, a Falintil stronghold occupied by Commander Taur Matan Ruak had been encircled by 2,000 troops. The guerrilla fighters, of course, managed to escape unscathed.

The paramilitary group ALFA was resurrected.

TALKING THE WAR OVER II. Again, in New York on October 6, Portuguese and Indonesian senior officials talked the East Timor-Indonesia war over as U.N. special envoy Jamsheed Marker refereed. Indonesian Foreign Ministry's Director General Nugroho Wisnumurti and Portugal's UN permanent representative Fernando Neves resumed the talks started by Ali Alatas and Jaime Gama in August.

How these talks would flourish, no one knows, considering that Jakarta came to the table with guns and a resolute position refusing East Timor's independence. By this time, everybody knew that the

Don't take this power to create "conflict and tension" away from Indonesia, will you? It's their only reason for being.

DON'T GET SACKED. Support autonomy for East Timor, or you'll get sacked, East Timor governor and Jakarta-guy Abilio Osorio threatened all civil servants in East Timor. He demanded that the public servants express their support in writing. He also required all district and department heads to submit to him all the names of those who believe and support otherwise so that proper action will be taken against the latter.

For a 15,000-strong civil servant population, majority of whom are East Timorese, the demand is obviously "absurd."

DON'T GET SACKED YOURSELF. The Governor's infamous statement boomeranged when 25,000 to 60,000 pro-independence East Timorese launched a three-day mass action seeking his ouster.

The people also sought CNRT head Xanana Gusmao's release, the real and final withdrawal of military troops, and East Timor's independence.

Military troops and BRIMOB (police mobile brigade force) were visibly absent - they were all guarding Governor Abilio's house who left for Jakarta on October 11.

In a separate incident, unknown persons attacked CNRT Coordinator Leandro Isaac who sustained minor head injuries.

The three-day protest is one of the biggest mass actions ever launched in East Timor since Soeharto's resignation in May.

PRISON OUTBREAK! On October 10, sixteen East Timorese inmates at Becora state prison in Dili simply "walked out" through the main gate with a group of visitors leaving the prison grounds.

The four prison guards apparently panicked when all 203 East Timorese detainees stormed the main gate, allowing the 16 inmates to jump the fences and escape with the visitors.

You guessed it right - the rest of the inmates were consequently banned from wandering around the prison grounds.

MEN IN BLACK. Some 400 East Timorese students in Kupang, West Timor fled Kupang in fear and arrived in East Timor safely. Apparently, men in black ninja-like clothes terrorized them in their dormitories, schools, and elsewhere.

East Timor Students Association (IMAPTIM) Chairperson Joao Morere said four students had been attacked and one student, Tino Atinus, who was stabbed, was still in intensive care in Kupang General Hospital.

The men in black are popularly called Ninjas (or Nanggala). They are plain hooligans trained by Indonesian special forces to terrorize the East Timorese.

November

CNRT IN CPLP. CNRT expanded its support network, when on November 3, the Trade Union Community of the Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) signed up the East Timorese organization as an Invited Observer.

ABRI VS. ABRI. Several members of Battalion 745 mounted an instant rebellion after a certain Private Suwandi was beaten to death by First Sergeant Totok. Totok beat Suwandi during the inauguration ceremony of the new members of the battalion. In protest, angered friends of Suwandi took hold of the ammunitions dump, and a crossfire between Suwandi's friends and the rest of the battalion began.

The battalion is composed of mostly Indonesian soldiers.

The ensuing gunfire was so heavy that even the deputy chief of the Wira Dharma regional command and the Udayana chief of staff couldn't get off from their chopper to stop the fighting soldiers.

Suwandi's friends demanded that the Battalion Commander be ousted and that the army chief of staff General Subagyo or the Udayana military commander, Major-General Adam Damiri, attend the dead soldier's funeral.

DILI MASSACRE ANNIVERSARY. More than 5,000 people attended an early mass in Balide Church and visited the Santa Cruz cemetery to remember the Dili Massacre of November 12, 1991.

ABRI's shadows were barely noticeable.

Tears flowed, wreaths were laid, stageplays were performed, speeches were made, and messages were read out in what was the first commemoration ever held in the scene of the massacre.

ALAS, ALAS! In early-November, hordes of villagers in the subdistrict of Alas, fled to the forests and local churches in fear for their lives. The exodus occurred immediately after Vicente, the village chief (liurai) of Suku Taitudak village in Alas was killed, along with the religion teacher, and the local priest on November 13. The local church was ransacked and ravaged. Since then,

EAST TIMOR DATELINE

1,000 Indonesian military troops never left East Timor, and that their number was actually increasing.

The diplomats' meeting discussed primarily: the proposal for autonomy, the establishment of Interest Sections between Indonesia and Portugal, and the forthcoming All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) and the implementation of past recommendations.

The Council for National Timorese Resistance (CNRT) welcomed Indonesia's offer of autonomy on the condition that a referendum on independence would be conducted under the UN within three to five years. No way, said Jakarta's Ali Alatas. This would "create potential conflict and tension between East Timorese."

The protest began on October 10 with a "stay-at-home" strike led by civil servants, which left the streets of Dili deserted.

Violence occurred at the Becora prison when inmates clashed against their prison guards and military personnel on October 12.

10,000 demonstrators stormed Becora prison when rumors circulated that two prisoners had been shot dead. Blood threatened to spill as 600 armed police surrounded the rock-throwing protesters, ready to fire. Nuns put themselves between the two forces to calm down the situation. Only until representatives from CNRT were allowed inside the prison to investigate did the tension subside. Turns out one prisoner was shot in the leg but did not die.



BUT I'M EAST TIMORESE! Lay Kon Tji cried out he's East Timorese and so won a hard-fought battle to appeal a decision denying him political asylum in Australia on the grounds he was Portuguese.

More than 1,300 East Timorese refugees in Australia have found new hope in their continuing quest for political asylum in the country.

NO WAY WILL I PAY. Ex-Indonesian general Sintong Panjaitan refuses to pay Helen Todd US\$14 million for his responsibility in the killing of her son Kamal Bamadhaj during the Dili Massacre in 1991. Now with Jakarta backing Panjaitan up, how do you think will the Boston court impose the order?



between 40 to 50 people have been killed purportedly by the Indonesian soldiers of battalions 744 and 745. Several youths were detained and tortured. Around 28 people have been kidnapped and are still missing.

Apparently, it was an ABRI retaliatory attack on the East Timorese resistance movement. The Alas killings occurred a few days after FALINTIL resistance fighters captured two Indonesian officers in Same in which the fighters also seized 36 weapons and ammunition. FALINTIL Vice-Commander Taur Matan Ruak had threatened to execute the officers if ABRI didn't stop its campaign of terror.

SIEGE! It's the people's turn - this time for a noble cause. More than 1,000 East Timorese students besieged the regional assembly (DPRD) building in Dili on November 23 to demand a stop to all ABRI violence in East Timor and the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops. They also called for an investigation into the military operation in Alas and a peaceful resolution to the East Timor question.

A day later, more than 3,000 students marched towards the Governor's Palace. Fifteen student representatives then met with local authorities including Gov. Abilio Osorio Soares, ABRI Commander in East Timor Colonel Tono Suratman, and Police Chief Colonel Timbul Silaen at the Governor's palace. Manuel Carrascalao, president of the Movement for Reconciliation and Unity of East Timor was also present. Outside, the more than 3,000 students waited.



December

INVASION DAY COMMEMORATION. Thousands of East Timorese marched in Dili to commemorate the day Indonesia invaded East Timor. Independence and freedom flags of the FRETILIN were raised and waved.

JAMSHEED MEETS XANANA. U.N. Special envoy Jamsheed Marker met with Xanana in his Cipinang prison in Jakarta on December 17. Xanana reportedly told Marker he was open to autonomy as a step towards independence. Xanana's statement generated mixed reactions.



Later in Dili, Marker was met with a noisy crowd of some 1,000 protesters waving East Timorese flags and chanting anti-Indonesian slogans. Marker's visit was marked with a series of meetings with government and military officials "to find a political solution" to the East Timor question.

NO WAY, SAYS THE BISHOP TO THE KING. What better way to end the year than with wise words from East Timor's spiritual leader. Nobel Laureate Bishop Ximenes Carlos Belo rejected Indonesian President B.J. Habibie's offer to discuss with him peace efforts in East Timor.

Bishop Belo said he gave Jakarta in June a list of "conditions" and "If they're not carried out, I will not come to Jakarta!"



BY LOUISE WILLIAMS, HERALD CORRESPONDENT
IN LOS PALOS, EAST TIMOR

The SECRET TROOPS

betraying
Timor

Less than two weeks after the brass bands and media circus of Indonesia's "goodwill" withdrawal of combat troops from East Timor in July, a big barge slid silently to shore under the cover of darkness on the lonely, distant coast to the east.

Here the locals usually retreat into their scruffy thatch huts as the sun sets over the brilliant turquoise ocean and endless white-sand beaches, their lives long defined by the grinding cycle of poverty, war and military abuse.

But, on the night of August 8 this year, villagers in the coastal settlements of Com and Lautem heard the soldiers coming back. Those who ventured out say at least 20 trucks full of commandos and marines crawled slowly up the winding road into the mountains, their lights off.

Ten days later, another barge of soldiers was seen heading through the crystal waters to the crumbling Portuguese port town of Lore. In May, with the fall of the Soeharto Government, the East Timorese had been buoyed by the first hopes of peace for 23 years, under promises of reform by the incoming President, Dr Jusuf Habibie. By June, talks between their spiritual leader, the Nobel Laureate, Bishop Carlos Belo, and President Habibie had secured a promise of a gradual end to military occupation and a search for a new peace formula.

The East Timorese Governor, Abilio Soares, spoke from the docks of Dili of Indonesia's "honour" as hundreds of troops boarded ships to leave in July.

But this week, Bishop Belo and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, were forced to call again for an end to Indonesian military activity. In Dili, a senior military officer confirmed troop numbers had not been cut. Those withdrawn during July's public relations exercise had been replaced. "It is correct we haven't reduced numbers. This is just a normal troop rotation," said Lieutenant Colonel Supadi, Chief of Staff in Dili, after the city was shut down by three days of protests over the new military operations.

There are reports of paramilitary groups being re-armed, fanning fears of civil war, says an informed Catholic Church source. He adds: "It seems nothing much has changed. The troops were withdrawn for a while, but now they are back. The people were told not to go out into their fields because the soldiers would be carrying out operations in the bush."





UNDER THE INDONESIAN JACKBOOT

In October 1998, a large number of Indonesian army documents found their way out of East Timor and landed on the desk of an East Timor solidarity activist in Australia. The documents, in total more than 100 pages, consist of numerous tables containing details of military personnel in East Timor and covering many aspects of the army's presence in the occupied country.

They provide, for the first time ever, a comprehensive picture of the precise nature of the army's structure in the territory and the extent and depth of its penetration of East Timorese political, economic and social life. The documents originate from the Territorial Military Command IX Udayana, based in Denpasar, Bali. The Regional Military Command in East Timor, Korem 164, falls under the command of the Udayana Military Command. No one, not even military spokesmen, has sought to claim that the documents are not authentic. Press reports have all quoted 'diplomatic sources' as confirming their authenticity.

In general, they confirm what we have known for many years, that East Timor is a heavily militarised country where the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) exercise a tight grip on the everyday lives of the East Timorese people.

They prove that ABRI regard East Timor as a place where they must maintain a pervasive and deep-rooted military presence to deal with people living in the towns, the countryside and in the bush, the vast majority of whom are totally opposed to the occupation. The documents also prove conclusively that:

- ◆ contrary to claims by the military and civilian authorities that the number of troops in East Timor has been reduced this year, the number has actually increased,

- ◆ contrary to claims that combat troops in East Timor have been greatly reduced and are being phased out altogether, combat troops have increased in number and amount to nearly 40 per cent of the total number of troops in the territory,

- ◆ the civil defence, Hansip or Pertahanan Sipil units which are clearly a key element in the control of East Timorese society, is barely mentioned in the documents; they are not part of ABRI but fall under the Department of Home Affairs, the most militarised department. ABRI



provides the training, usually retired officers, and also supplies Hansip units with their weaponry. Hansip is the recruiting ground for Timorese members of ABRI,

- ◆ that the para-military forces in East Timor are under the direct command of ABRI and are not an independent force of vigilantes outside the command structure as is usually claimed, and finally,

- ◆ that army personnel occupy all the key posts within the civilian administration, giving them control over the political, economic and social life of the occupied country.

THE NUMBER OF TROOPS

The tables show that in August this year, the number of troops in East Timor amounted to 17,941 if only regular soldiers are included. The figure rises to 21,620 if we include the armed and trained military personnel from the ranks of civil servants and the so-called 'wanra' or 'people's resistance' units. Since the beginning of Suharto's New Order, the Indonesian state has been heavily militarised. However, the figures show that militarisation of East Timor far exceeds Indonesia as a whole. In 1995, ABRI consisted of 507,137 men for a population of around 200 million, roughly 2,500 troops for one million inhabitants. The ratio in East Timor is nearly 18,000 regular soldiers for less than a million people or even higher as a ratio of the East Timorese people who currently amount to probably no more than 700,000. Put another way, whereas in Indonesia as a whole, there was roughly one member of the armed forces for 400 Indonesians, in East Timor, the ratio is seven times as high - one member for every 56 inhabitants of East Timor.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE TROOPS

The key tables entitled 'Recapitulation of organik and penugasan personnel forces' divide the troops into two categories, organik

or territorial troops who are stationed in the territory on a semi-permanent (usually three months or longer) basis, and penugasan or troops deployed from outside the territory for special duties, ie combat troops which are brought in to fight the guerrillas in the bush and quell the rebellious population in the towns and villages.

The documents in our possession include tables of these two types of troops for November and December 1997 and for July, early August and August this year; tables for the months in between are missing. They might have been helpful to show whether the downfall of Suharto in May this year affected the figures.

The tables show that there has been a marked increase in combat troops with territorial troops remaining almost constant:

November 1997: 9,740 organik troops 6,172 penugasan troops Total: 15,912

July 1998: 9,896 organik troops 7,938 penugasan troops Total: 17,834

August 1998: 9,976 organik troops 7,938 penugasan troops Total: 17,914

that is to say, an increase from November 1997 to August 1998 of 2,029 troops or an increase of 11.3 per cent.

The above figures are for 'August' not 'early August'. The distinction is important because the armed forces invited the foreign press to witness the departure of troops from East Timor on 28 July and announced further reductions in early August, claiming that this had led to a reduction in the number of combat troops. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas alleged in late October that '1,300 battle troops have been withdrawn from East Timor' and that of those remaining 'almost one hundred percent are territorial troops who do not fight but help people in agriculture, road and bridge development' [Reuters, 28 October 1998]. As we can see, there was an increase not a reduction over the period and even a slight increase in August over July. It goes without saying that all the talk about helping people in agriculture and development is nothing more than a smoke-screen. The same tables also include figures for 'non-ABRI' forces itemised as 'civil servants' and 'people's resistance' or wanra forces. While almost all the 'civil servant' forces were attached to the territorial troops, more than 60 per cent of the wanra troops were attached to the combat troops (see next page).

In the Indonesian army's defence structure, the entire population is held to be responsible for defence and security in the form of civil defence (hansip or pertahanan sipil) which consists of wanra and public order units as well as militia (latih, rakyat terlatih or 'trained people'). There is no mention in the documents of latih or civil defence hansip.



Taken together, these 'non-ABRI' forces were just under 4,000 and remained virtually unchanged over the nine-month period. These men are armed personnel who are trained for military duty. Although the tables give no hint of the ethnic composition of these forces, it is likely that a sizeable number consist of immigrant Indonesians. These additional forces brought the total for the three months to:

November 1997 - 19,933
July 1998 - 21,540
August 1998 - 21,620

Incidentally, medical corps personnel, scores of whom were alleged to have been brought in to replace the departing combat troops in August amounted to no more than 84 persons. Separate tables for each of the months give breakdowns of organik and penugasan troops. The breakdown in August 1998 for organik troops show that 4,385 men were attached to the thirteen Kodims or district military commands; the largest kodims were in Baucau (615 men), Lospalos (436 men) and Manatuto (416 men). Police forces spread out to the thirteen districts amounted in all to 2,925 men, with the largest number located at police HQ in Dili (578) and in the Dili (355), Baucau (210) and Bobonaro (204) police commands.

The other major contingent of organik troops are Battalions 744 and 745 with a sizeable number of East Timorese. However, all the command positions down to platoon level (a platoon consists of up to 15 men) are in the hands of Indonesian officers. According to East Timorese sources, this pattern was introduced following desertions by many East Timorese officers holding positions of command in the 1980s. Battalions 744 and 745 were originally not part of the territorial military structure in East

Timor. The first digit, 7, indicates that the battalions were originally part of Military Command VII/Wirabuana based in Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi. Their connection with Sulawesi now appears to have been severed. Back in 1978, the provincial administration of East Timor was run by the Defence Department in Jakarta [see also section on ABRI's domination in the civilian administration] while the military structure was directly answerable to Jakarta. In 1978 a special operational command called Koopskam was set up for East Timor, under the direct supervision of ABRI headquarters. Being a special military project with continuing military operations, troops were dispatched to East Timor from all parts of the archipelago, a tradition which continues to this day. In 1989 Koopskam was re-named Kolakops, with the Dili military commander concurrently holding the post of Kolakops commander. After the Santa Cruz massacre when international pressure reached a new pitch, Kolakops was scrapped and East Timor became a regular resort military command or Korem 164/Wira Dharma under the military command in Bali. However this turns out to have been a cosmetic change as large numbers of penugasan troops continue to be deployed in the colony.

The breakdown of the penugasan troops in August was as follows: They include five infantry battalions, each of around 985 men, from various parts of Indonesia. Battalions 315 (from West Java), 401 (from Central Java) 512 (from East Java), 642 (from Kalimantan) and 144 (from North Sumatra).

The other sizeable contingents are:

Satgas Darat or 'special duty land forces' - 1,458
Satgas Tribuana consisting of Kopassus commandos - 503
Satgas Zipur or 'special duty engineers' - 150

We can draw several important conclusions about the Satgas Tribuana troops:

1. By far the largest number of wanra forces are attached to Satgas Tribuana units, bringing the total to 1,703 and making it the largest single contingent of penugasan troops.
2. The Kopassus units listed (Parako or para-komando 8 and 9 in July 1998 and Parako 6 and 7 in August 1998) are known to be trainee units, which confirms the belief that East Timor is used as a training ground for the army's elite troops.
3. The fact that there was a switch round in Parako troops between July and August confirms reports that the troops which departed on 28 July in a blaze of publicity were replaced by other elite troops a few days later.

There is no mention in any of the documents about the existence of Menwa the student regiments that exist in all universities throughout Indonesia. These units which function under the instructions, and receive training from, the local military commands, have the task of keeping a close watch

on their fellow students. We know for certain that there is a Menwa with about three hundred members in the University of East Timor (UNTIM), whose members include both Indonesian and Timorese students.

BRIMOB, THE RIOT POLICE

The role of the police force has increased in the past few years, in particular the role of Brimob (Brigade Mobil, Mobile Brigade), a special police task force in charge of riot control. In order to bolster the image of East Timor, the Suharto government announced some years ago that the role of the army would be reduced and the police used more widely for maintaining public order. It was now the task of the police to deal with the burgeoning protest movement of youngsters on the streets of Dili and Baucau.

Brimob personnel are trained to deal with mass demonstrations and equipped with weaponry such as water cannon, armoured personnel carriers and high-tech communications equipment. In major cities throughout Indonesia Brimob have been responsible for much of the brutality against peaceful protesters, a role that they have replicated in East Timor.

The Brimob units deployed in East Timor are subdivided into organik and penugasan units. We see from the documents that more than a thousand Brimob personnel are stationed in East Timor. One of the documents dated August 1998 reveals that the organik troops included Brimob Company 5486 consisting of 633 men. The penugasan troops include three Brimob companies, Brimob Company 5127 from

North Sumatra (121 men), Brimob Company 5135 from Riau (128 men) and Brimob Company 5151 from Palembang (131 men), bringing the total of Brimob troops in East Timor to 1,013 men. Fresh Brimob companies continue to arrive in East Timor. At the end of October, three Brimob companies arrived from Bali and Kalimantan 'to help maintain civil order' [AFP, 28 October 1998]. We have no way of knowing whether they were replacing other Brimob troops but it is undoubtedly true that nowhere in Indonesia is there such a high concentration of riot police per head of the population as in East Timor.

THE ARMY'S PRESENCE IN EVERY VILLAGE

One document lists the names of all the babinsa or non-commissioned officers who are stationed in each village, a total of 464 officers. According to East Timor in Figures published by Bappeda and the Bureau of Statistics in 1997, there were 442 villages in East Timor in November 1996. The discrepancy between the two figures may be accounted for by new settlements established since then. With a babinsa post in every village, grassroots surveillance of the population is far more intense in East Timor than in Indonesia where as a rule each babinsa post covers a group of villages.

Most of the babinsa appear to be Timorese, though some names suggest that they are from West not East Timor. Babinsa officers are regarded as the 'eyes and ears' of the occupation forces, collecting intelligence on a regular basis. By using Timorese, ABRI aim to set Timorese against Timorese in line with the classic colonial policy of 'divide and rule', relying on a spying network which should work more effectively than if Indonesian soldiers were used, further intensifying the population's hatred for the occupiers. However, this is likely to be a weak link, since many Timorese babinsas may share the sentiments of the villagers who they supervise.



JOHN MacDOUGALL/AFP



EAST TIMORESE MEMBERS OF ABRI

The armed forces have sought to emphasise their success in recruiting many East Timorese into the armed forces. All ABRI passing out ceremonies at which Timorese graduate invariably turn the spotlight on these men.

There are five tables dealing with East Timorese members of ABRI. Several points are of interest: Timorese soldiers in the lower ranks only.

One table dated 1 August 1998 gives a breakdown of East Timorese members of the armed forces according to rank. There is not a single East Timorese above the rank of major whereas the three majors are all 'ex-Tropas', former members of the Portuguese army which was disbanded in 1975. They are more than likely to be well above active-service age. In any case, they are not located in East Timor. The other East Timorese officers consist of: four captains; five first lieutenants; fifteen second lieutenants; four assistant first lieutenants; three assistant second lieutenants; 46 sergeant majors; 79 top sergeants; 134 first sergeants; and 299 second sergeants. The remainder are corporals or privates who account for 5,505 out of the 6,095 East Timorese members of ABRI, more than 90 per cent of the total.

This is hardly a record to be proud of after 23 years of recruitment efforts. Many East Timorese who trained as officers are known to have deserted over the years, in most cases joining the ranks of the armed resistance.

THE TWO "TIMORESE" BATTALIONS

Battalions 744 and 745 are always referred to as 'East Timorese battalions'. However, several tables dated 1 August 1998 reveal that fewer than one third of these battalions are East Timorese, as the following figures show:

Battalion 744:

609 men of whom 181 are East Timorese	
East Timorese officers	0
Indonesian officers	20
East Timorese NCOs	39
Indonesian NCOs	70

Battalion 745:

663 men of whom 171 are East Timorese	
East Timorese officers	0
Indonesian officers	27
East Timorese NCOs	32
Indonesian NCOs	94



Battalions 744 and 745 are also much smaller than the normal size for army battalions which usually consist of between 950 and 1,000 men. The two battalions were set up in the early 1980s with members mostly recruited from East Timorese hansips. However many officers later deserted, after turning on their 'battalion comrades'.

Battalion 745 is based in Los Palos and Battalion 744 is based in Baucau. Apart from the 1,272 members of the two 'Timorese' battalions, Timorese soldiers are spread out among the territorial troops stationed in the thirteen districts of East Timor, along with the more than 400 East Timorese babinsas who are under the command of the 13 district military commands. We can conclude: that:

1. The smaller size of the two 'Timorese' battalions reflects ABRI's inability to recruit enough East Timorese to create normal-sized battalions.
2. The majority of East Timorese members of ABRI are not concentrated in the so-called 'East Timorese battalions' but are spread out under various commands.
3. That the forces of occupation regard the Timorese under arms as a security risk and prefer them to be diffused among Indonesian soldiers rather than concentrated in two battalions.

PARA-MILITARY TEAMS

The para-military teams which figure so aggressively in intelligence operations, spying on and helping to capture suspects, are listed in a separate document headed: 'Resistance Forces in the Province of East Timor for 1997/1998'. Although no light is shed on the ethnic composition of these teams, they are likely to include a large number of Timorese. They function as counter-insurgency forces, creating an atmosphere of fear among the population and spreading instability. The teams work closely with the intelligence units of the elite forces, Kopassus, known as the SGI, whose brutal



methods of interrogation and torture are widely feared in East Timor.

It is an integral part of the Indonesian army's doctrine to recruit members of the community to serve the interests of the armed forces in so-called 'people's defence'. This explains the use of the term 'resistance forces' for these insidious units set up to spy on and harass their fellow-countrymen.

East Timor has always been an extreme example of ABRI policies. In East Timor, 'people's defence' is aimed at pitting Timorese against Timorese in an attempt to undermine the resistance of the East Timorese people. Like every other document in the set, this is an official document of Korem 164, under the IX Regional Military Command, nailing the lie that these para-military forces are not incorporated as a part of ABRI but are 'independently managed' vigilante units.

The twelve teams listed are: two Saka Baucau Teams, Alfa Lospalos Team, Makikit Viqueque Team, Halilintar Atabae Team, Railakan Ermera Team, Ainaro Team, Suai Team, Same Team, Sakunar Team, Morok Manatuto Team Liquisa Team.

In other words, there is a para-military team for almost every one of the thirteen districts in East Timor. There is no mention of what is thought to be the largest and most infamous para-military group, Gadapaksi. Gadapaksi is the brain-child of former Kopassus commander Lt. General Prabowo, financed from his private funds. Prabowo's recent fall from grace may explain why loyalties are shifting. Recently, some Gadapaksi hirelings were reported to have joined in calls for the resignation of the governor, Osorio Soares, one of Prabowo's closest cronies.

The 13th item on the list of 'resistance forces' consists of 54 'respected citizens and local leaders'. These can be

none other than the traditional or informal leaders, possibly including some pro-Indonesian priests. Their inclusion as 'resistance forces' confirms that the forces of occupation are always trying to rally traditional leaders so as to bolster their control over the community at large. These traditional leaders may also be relied on to 'nurture' members of the para-military teams.

Altogether there are 1,188 para-militaries. The death toll is striking: eleven team members were killed in action (gugur) during the period in question, which suggests that the teams are also used in armed conflict with the guerrillas.

ABRI'S DOMINATION OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

One document dated August 1998 lists 140 executive and legislative posts which are held by members of ABRI, the so-called karyawan appointments. These reflect the implementation of ABRI's dwifungsi or dual function doctrine. Altogether 83 top executive posts are held by ABRI officers, while 57 officers are members of the first and second-level assemblies (DPRD-I and 13 DPRD-II assemblies). These army assembly members are not elected but are appointed to hold seats set aside for the armed forces, four in each of the DPRD-II assemblies and nine in the DPRD-I assembly. As in all regional and district assemblies throughout Indonesia as well as in the national Parliament, the army officers are there to keep control over the activities and decisions of these rubber-stamp legislatures.

As for the executive posts, nineteen key posts are held by karyawan appointees in the first-level regional administration for East Timor (Dati-I), and 64 in the second-level or district (Dati-II) administrations.

The following Dati-I posts are held by army officers:

- A Deputy-governor
Two assistant governors
- B Head, Social-Political Directorate
Chief, Provincial HQ of Civil Defence Head,
BP-7, the State Ideology Directorate
Head, Provincial Inspectorate
Head, Sub-Directorate for Security of the
Social-Political Directorate
Head, Educational Department of the BP-7
Head, Public Order Sub-Directorate of the
Social-Political Directorate
Head, Communications Office Commander,
Among Praja Political Unit which



oversees the appointment and conduct of local government officials known as Pamong Praja
Head of BIA's [army intelligence] Social-Political Affairs Inspector for civil servants

- C Head, Trade and Industry Directorate
Head, Co-operative Affairs Directorate
Head, Regional Logistics Board
Director, Regional Development Bank
- D Head, Provincial Planning Board - Bappeda
Secretary, Provincial Planning Board - Bappeda

The array of army officers holding key regional administration posts is part and parcel of the way in which the forces of occupation manage Indonesia's colonial territory through effective control of the population and resources. As Rui Gomes who, until his defection in 1997 was Head of Research at East Timor Regional Planning Board, told TAPOL, 'the kitchen must be rigorously controlled by means of a system which manages all the colony's physical and human resources'.

Ten of the posts grouped under B above place army officers in strategic positions to exercise control over the populace. They are placed at the head of a range of offices which penetrate down to the lowest levels of society, whose officials have powers to control people in the conduct of their everyday lives and oversee indoctrination. For example, according to Rui Gomes, the Communications Office keeps tabs on all official correspondence between the province and Jakarta, it handles the affairs and vets the East Timorese given scholarships at Indonesian universities or sent on missions abroad and handles the trips to Indonesia or overseas of all local government officials.

Four of the posts grouped under C, the chiefs of trade and industry, co-operatives, and the logistics



TAGOR SIAGIAN/JAKARTA-JAKARTA

agency and the director of the Regional Development Bank are in a strategic position to control all the colony's economic and commercial activities and safeguard the financial resources of army-related business activities, in other words the patronage network for army officers and hangers-on.

The head and secretary of the Regional Planning Board - Bappeda - (group D) occupy the strategic positions from which to control the use of resources and ensure that the proceeds of projects are distributed 'fairly' among officers, officials and business enterprises in East Timor and Jakarta. As a rule, all projects requiring more than Rp. 500 million are assigned to businesses in Java as businesses in East Timor are unable to provide the necessary capital. Bappeda has the power to allocate these projects. These are the executives who determine which funding agencies may operate in East Timor, the types of building projects, and the listing of 'poor villages' which is a way of acquiring additional funds from the centre.

The deputy governor shadows the governor, a post which for political reasons has always been occupied by an East Timorese. Just




as the governor has always been Timorese, so his deputy has always been a senior-ranking military man. Until May 1998, the deputy-governor was Brig-General Haribowo who served in the position for ten years. Haribowo is one of the longest-serving officers in East Timor, having served there for fourteen years. The assistant governors are on hand to ensure that documents relating to the running of the colony are speedily handled and duly signed by the governor; in other words, they must ensure the smooth running of the governor's office to safeguard the vested interests of military and non-military Indonesians.

The 64 Dati-II karyawan appointees include three district heads (bupati), three district secretaries, 13 heads of social-political departments (one for each district), two staff members of social-political departments, 11 heads of district civil defence offices, 31 village heads, and one head of a district co-operative department.

These karyawan executives function as an extension of the military establishment and remain firmly under military discipline. Moreover, although they wear civilian dress, they do not treat their co-workers as equals and expect, and receive, the deference due to army personnel. Their presence is a constant source of friction and fear in the civilian offices which they oversee.

The following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Ten of the thirteen district head posts are occupied by East Timorese. Visiting journalists and diplomats are expected to be duly impressed by the fact that these positions are entrusted to Timorese.
2. Political and social control in all districts is however in the hands of karyawan officers through the 'sos-pol' offices in every district. 'Sos-pol' heads at all levels of the civil administration in Indonesia, from departmental ministries down, are invariably occupied by active-service or retired ABRI officers in order to assert control through the karyawan mechanism of ABRI's dual function.
3. Surprisingly, there are 31 karyawan village heads, positions which, one would have thought, would always be held by East Timorese. The 31 villages are not identified but it is safe to assume that they are in highly sensitive regions where the security situation is particularly unsafe for the forces of occupation.
4. ABRI could lose most of their karyawan positions in East Timor if the Habibie/Alatas duo go ahead with their offer of autonomy for East Timor.



In the Indonesian version of autonomy, all the key positions in the administration should logically be filled by East Timorese which means ABRI will lose a lot of the iron grip they hold over East Timor.

To sum up, the documents show convincingly that army penetration of the provincial and local administration in East Timor is overwhelming. The military's dwifungsi doctrine is enforced with particular vigour in Indonesia's colony of East Timor. It is not enough to call for the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East Timor. We must also call for the demilitarisation of the civil administration and the removal of all army appointees holding executive and legislative positions.

Written by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong of TAPOL, with thanks to George Aditjondro for his comments on the documents transcribed by Andrew McNaughtan, and additional comments by Rui Gomes and John Roosa.



The INDEPENDENCE STAND-OFF

[Andrew Perrin is a Walkley award-winning journalist.]



At 4:32 p.m. (on October 12), David Ximenes and three fellow leaders from the Council of National Timorese Resistance (CNRT) stood at the crossroads.

In front of them stood a familiar symbol of 23 year old Indonesian occupation of East Timor – 600 riot police, bristling in formation, weapons pointed directly at them.

Behind them, thousands of their fellow East Timorese, on their way back from a day of peaceful demonstrations in Dili, tired and now angry at not being allowed through the roadblock that led to their homes. Some of them carried crude weapons, machetes and knives; some of them carried just frustration and bitter memories from a lifetime of such incidents. All of them were baying for a fight.

For Mr. Ximenes, a former political prisoner and now a senior member of the CNRT national political committee, this was a moment that he prayed would never happen. Ximenes knew, like many in East Timor know, that the tense peace of the last four months is only a mirage, ready to evaporate in a moment such as this. A week before this incident, Mr Ximenes had a similar resigned look on his face when the local newspaper reported the province's governor, Jose Abilio Soares calling for the "voluntary" resignation of all civil servants in support of a referendum, or face dismissal.

It was a provocative move that ruffled feathers.

By Wednesday evening, 63 CNRT members, including representatives of the Falintil guerrillas, gathered to discuss what action should be taken.

At that point, Indonesia had promised to review its record in East Timor, encourage a more democratic society, review a heavy military presence in East Timor and gradually withdraw troops.

But by the time CNRT leaders met again on Thursday evening, the situation deteriorated further – they had received word from Falintil resistance fighters who were under attack from Indonesian troops.

The letter confirmed what many had known for weeks: an offensive was taking place, combat troops were still in Timor and the Indonesian military had kept increasing troop numbers in the province, all of which had been consistently denied by the military and Government.

CNRT's course of action was decided. After gaining approval from jailed resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, it called an end to the self-imposed ban on demonstrations and the Falintil cease-fire. Three days of protest were called.

But the CNRT leaders knew the action they had decided upon was fraught with danger. They could sense the anger and impatience in the community and knew that even a peaceful demonstration could trigger a bloody confrontation.

When his mobile phone rang on Monday evening, Mr Ximenes' worst fears had been realized.

He arrived when the demonstrators were within 15m of the blockade, when guns were drawn on one side and knives on the other.

Mr. Ximenes and three other CNRT representatives were able to pull the crowd back from the brink. They then advanced towards the police blockade.

Seeing the unarmed leaders walking towards them, the police lowered their weapons and cleared a path for the delegation.

The crowd cheered and the tension quickly dissipated.

It turned out that the police blockade had been set up to monitor another protest outside Becora jail. The police thought the approaching protestors might incite the prison demonstrators to storm the jail and decided to keep them apart.

But whether the police acted responsibly was not the issue – they were perceived by the demonstrators to be continuing the repressive work of their predecessors.

"I am sick of this," shouted a 17 year-old boy through tears, while clutching a machete. "When is it going to end? We just want to go home. We want to be free in our country."

As long as a high military and police presence remains in Timor, some fear the final resolution, whatever it is, will be written in blood.

- October 17, 1998



Bill Corcoran and Carl O'Brien spent a month in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, where they met one of the leaders of the East Timorese resistance who continues to work for his country's freedom from the oppressive Indonesian military regime.- DIT Examiner



The crowd explodes. The Indonesian soccer commentator trips excitedly over his words. Everyone's eyes are superglued to the World Cup semi-final on the TV set in the corner of the cafe.

Determined to be FREE

Russuo, an East Timorese student in his twenties, hardly notices. He sits in front of a brimful glass of beer which he hasn't touched for the last half hour and continues to talk and gesture forcefully. His attentions are fixed on explaining why he has risked his life for his country and what his hopes, as leader of the country and what his hopes, as leader of the National Resistance of East Timorese Students, and for the future of his homeland.

"Everyone in East Timor has lost someone close to them, some have lost their entire families. Naturally, this is a great emotional factor in our struggle. We fight with commitment and hope. Even if there is no hope for freedom, we have the commitment to free the country. We have stood under 23 years of oppressive regime and we can still resist. We will resist," he says.

Russuo exudes a fierce determination, yet he speaks in soft measured tones and is barely audible at times over the commentary of the frenetic World Cup match in the background.

Situated to the extreme east of Indonesia's vast archipelago of 13,677 islands, in the east of Timor looks an insignificant island, a thousand miles from the bustling Indonesian capital of Jakarta. Yet, it was this insignificant island that Indonesia invaded in 1975, placing its people under a brutal system of repression.

The number of dead is too huge to comprehend. An estimated 200,000 killed in a little

reported war between the Indonesian army and East Timorese guerillas. Countless others kidnapped and tortured for acts as innocent as sending petitions to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.

But things are changing slowly. When former president Suharto was dramatically toppled from power last May, his successor, BJ Habibie, was flung into the presidency of a country on the brink of collapse. In a desperate bid to win the lucrative hearts of the international community, he relaxed his predecessor's dictatorial style and finally decided to open the book on East Timor.

"It's freer to talk now than under Suharto and we have more hope in the new regime, but the difference isn't as good as it seems. We are able to express our ideas freely now, not because we have been granted the freedom but because the government is weak. The military is strong. They are the ones with the real power." Indonesia's invasion of East Timor has never been officially recognised by most of the international community. Now desperate for money to rescue the country's hemorrhaged economy, Indonesia has never needed international support so badly.



"Habibie has never shown any interest in East Timor. But I believe Habibie intends to solve the economic problems in Indonesia. For that reason, he has to put a solution for Timor into his consideration because he is dependent on outside countries to solve his economic problems." Suddenly the subservient Habibie finds that his reforms aren't so much those of his own, but those prompted by the international community.

Already the Indonesian government has offered a form of 'special status' for East Timor with autonomy similar to that already in other areas of the archipelago. This minor change of stature falls far short of Timorese hopes, yet Russuo and other resistance activists would be ready to accept it - only if it was the will of their people.

"The choice of the East Timorese people must be exercised through a referendum. When the people are ready to vote, let them, and if a special status of autonomy or independence is the choice, so be it. Our basic demand is independence, but if the people of East Timor vote against it, we will accept that."

Russuo takes a rare sip of his beer. The muggy, cramped cafe in the middle of Jakarta is a long distance and several time-zones away from his homeland. How then does he find the reaction of Indonesian students to the plight of the East Timorese?

"We have got great support from them despite the strong distortion of information here on East Timor over the years. The Indonesian media has been forced to report all of the things in favour of keeping East Timor illegally integrated in Indonesia. But since 1992, students have begun to discover that the cause of Timor is an international one."

In the background, the TV silences, and the cafe hushed as the match slips into penalties Russuo talks even more quietly.

"Some East Timorese have been used by the Indonesian government and this must be acknowledged. There could be much bad feeling left among East Timorese, so even in a community without Indonesia, it could be very easy for one group to disagree with the other. This makes it all the more important that we have a referendum and that the choice of the majority of the East Timorese is exercised democratically. All we want is for the country to be free from any outside power. Then it's up to the people to decide what they want."

He is interrupted by a roar from the cafe as people jump from their seats and shake their fists triumphantly in the air. His words are smothered by the noise, but it doesn't matter. You can see his eyes widen as he studies the celebrating hordes. His battle is about to enter its final phase and it mightn't be long before he gets to experience the same emotion. **October 23, 1998**



East Timorese students sing songs of freedom

Hopes for referendum

DEFYING GUNS AND GOONS, EAST TIMORESE SPEAK OUT



Dust clouds eddied across the dry sports ground in Aileu as hundreds of local residents listened intently to the speaker in front of them. "Independence is the right of all nations. We want Indonesia to respect the rights of East Timor!" cried the local school-teacher into the mike, as people roared enthusiastically, reveling in their first chance for open public speech since the Indonesian invasion of December 1975.

Dust clouds eddied across the dry sports ground in Aileu as hundreds of local residents listened intently to the speaker in front of them. "Independence is the right of all nations. We want Indonesia to respect the rights of East Timor!" cried the local school-teacher into the mike, as people roared enthusiastically, reveling in their first chance for open public speech since the Indonesian invasion of December 1975.

Unthinkable during the Suharto period, East Timor has in recent months seen a wave of "free speech forums" organized by university students, in which locals are able to publicly air their grievances and articulate their hopes for the future.

While Indonesia and Portugal continue to haggle over a United Nations-sponsored autonomy plan, the East Timorese are taking advantage of the political confusion in Jakarta to step up the pace of their 23-year struggle for independence, calling for a referendum on the future of their country.

HORRORS OF OCCUPATION

The horrors that Aileu, a small town 40 km from the capital Dili, has experienced under the Indonesian occupation are unfortunately not unusual.

At the September forum, one resident testified to a personal tragedy which occurred in 1996.

"My whole family was finished off by Kopassus. Kopassus and Prabowo should be brought to trial for the crimes against my family," he said, referring to the infamous Indonesian special forces who have been implicated in human rights abuses throughout East Timor and Indonesia, and their now discredited commander Prabowo Subianto, the son-in-law of former President Suharto.

Despite the prevalence of such atrocities, and lingering hatred towards a minority of East Timorese recruited by the Indonesians to actively work against their own people as spies or in the notorious paramilitary "ninja" groups, the overwhelming message of the recent public dialogues has not been revenge, but calls for a referendum and for all East Timorese to put the past behind them and work together to build a free and independent country.

Supporters of the autonomy proposal, in which East Timor would remain a part of Indonesia but be given limited control over some areas of government, argue that a referendum could lead to violence and civil war because of continuing divisions in the country.

Andrew McNaughtan, an Australian human rights activist who had spent two months traveling around the



country filming the free speech forums, disagreed. "It's pretty hard to have a civil war when 97 percent of the country want the same thing," he said in an interview in Dili, referring to the level of support for a referendum. "The only way there'd be a civil war is if Indonesia either kept agents here or paid people to fight with the collaborators."

Employing agitators to stir up trouble is a strategy that ABRI (the Indonesian armed forces) has used before in other parts of the archipelago to justify continued military control, and one for which the East Timorese resistance is prepared.

UNARMED MILITIA

A National Defense Militia, which carries no weapons but receives special training from FALINTIL (the East Timorese guerrilla movement) is entrusted with checking people entering public meetings for arms and preventing Indonesian agents from inciting violence at demonstrations. Militia members were present at the Aileu meeting I attended, encircling the sports field in a long human chain and carrying out thorough security checks on those entering.

This group also plays an important role in the ongoing reconciliation process, by identifying the few East Timorese youths still working for ABRI and attempting to peacefully persuade them to join the solidarity movement.

Many are already leaving of their own accord, as they become increasingly isolated from family, friends, and majority opinion, and as the Indonesian intelligence network continues to disintegrate.

A Dili resident active in the East Timorese clandestine movement said that ABRI had recalled all guns and radios from its indigenous spies in September, fearing that they would be used against the Indonesian military itself rather than against the East Timorese. He also claimed that the paramilitary groups organized by Kopassus had been severely weakened since Prabowo's fall from favor.

This is not to say that human rights abuses have ceased or that atrocities like the November 1991 Dili massacre, in which hundreds of peaceful funeral mourners were shot down by the army, are a thing of the past. East Timor is still the most militarized area in the whole of Indonesia, and human rights groups

estimate that 3000 or more troops have entered the territory since the much-publicized withdrawal of 1,000 soldiers in late July and early August.

Cases of arbitrary detention, rape, torture, "disappearance," and extra-judicial execution have continued under the Habibie administration, and major military offensives against the guerrillas in the central part of the island have been reported in recent weeks.

Although the authorities allowed the Aileu meeting and subsequent demonstration of 1,500 people through the town to go ahead, there were ominous signs there, too, that it was still far too early to be taking new-found freedoms for granted.

A banner stretched across the local military headquarters, which had appeared on the day of the meeting, bore the words "We are ready to die for our country", flanked on either side by pictures of crossed guns.

Residents were jubilant as they marched through the town shouting "Timor Leste!" (East Timor!) and "Viva Xanana Gusmao!" (Long Live Xanana Gusmao!) at the soldiers staring sullenly at them from their posts, but the day could just as easily have ended in tragedy as in triumph.

Locals insisted it was now safe to speak out in public and refused to dwell on the dangers they faced, but as one foreign observer pointed out to me, "Is it really safe enough, or are they just brave enough?"

MILITARY INTIMIDATION

In the outlying areas, especially in the east where the concentration of troops is highest, an atmosphere of fear remains. The forums have been stopped or subject to intimidation by the military, moves designed to hinder popular participation and frighten people into supporting either autonomy or the status quo.

As well as organizing at home, the East Timorese resistance has also been strengthening its contacts with students and intellectuals in Indonesia. A joint conference between East Timorese and Indonesian representatives, to be held this November in the Indonesian city of Bandung, is intended to help facilitate an early resolution to the conflict.

Both President Habibie and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas have been invited but have so far declined to reply.

The East Timorese people have made it clear that they want the chance to democratically decide their future through a referendum, but it appears Indonesia will not accept this option unless forced to by international pressure. As the member of the clandestine resistance I spoke to stressed, "The East Timor problem cannot be solved by only East Timor itself. We really need help from people outside." - **October 23, 1998**



Don't lose hope: AIETD MEET FAILS BUT IS "GLOBALLY POSITIVE"

The fourth All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue held from October 31 to November 3 did not bear much fruit but a dialogue is a dialogue - paths are cleared, even while participants do not necessarily follow the same road.

The dialogue, conducted in Krumbach, Austria, was meant to gather Timorese of all colors and persuasions to discover a common understanding of the East Timor question, and thus generate positive moves towards solving the East Timor conflict. Opened by special representative on East Timor Jamsheed Marker, this meet was a sequel to three AIETD meetings in June 1995, March 1996, and October 1997 all also held in Austria. All meetings were sponsored by the office of the U.N. Secretary General.

The Krumbach meet would have been a landmark in that it occurred at a time when East Timor has been witnessing radical changes in its political atmosphere, the result of Suharto's fall. But discussions broke down when pro-integration participants refused to sign a common declaration asking for the release of jailed CNRT President Xanana Gusmao. It was a close call as all 41 East Timorese leaders agreed on 11 out of 12 points. Following are some quotes from newspaper reports on the event:

THE JAKARTA POST, November 3:

.....East Timorese led by Jose Tavaréz, a diplomat at the Indonesian Embassy in Brussels, said an earlier agreement not to discuss political matters related to the province's future should be respected.

But another group which included Nobel Prize co-winner Jose Ramos Manuel Horta tended to push for a discussion on a referendum. Meanwhile, the envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Jamsheed Marker, said the dialog should contribute initiative and help prepare for self-rule even if the political and legal framework of autonomy was still under discussion.

A member of the National Commission on Human Rights, Clementino do Reis Amaral, said he agreed to self-rule "if it could be scientifically proven that is it economically viable for East Timor to have self-rule".

Horta said if the slow pace of negotiations continued, the East Timorese would not wait until the tripartite meetings scheduled for later this month or December. "East Timor's fate will be decided... from the streets in East Timor," he said.

He had insisted on Saturday that he only agreed with transitional autonomy for the province, while his opponents argued that autonomy was a final solution.

....A member of East Timor's legislative council, Florentino Sarmento, said the Indonesian government's plan for special autonomy would be the best alternative because the province might face anarchy and civil war...<<<



CNRT

Krumbach Declaration



he political environment in which the fourth All Inclusive Intra-Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) is taking place in Krumbach, Austria, is dramatically different from that of the prior AIETD meetings.

Many myths and taboos were shattered by the events that occurred over the last few months in Indonesia and the region in general. These events confirmed the eternal truth that tyranny and other forms of oppression, subjugation and armed domination always succumb to the force of reason, justice, the determination and faith of the peoples fighting for freedom and independence.

The economic and financial crisis in Asia demystified the Asian "economic tigers" and the alleged superiority of the "Asian values" that were put forward over the last decade to negate the universality and indivisibility of human rights.

Only one truth remains - freedom, democracy and rule of law are the only guarantees of true peace, stability, social progress and development.

The East Timorese people who have survived some 500 years of colonization, invasion by the Empire of the Rising Sun in 1942-45, and the Indonesian occupation since 1975, have clearly demonstrated its unfailing faith and determination to the world. - Jose Ramos-Horta, November 3, 1998

We, the undersigned, participants to the fourth AIETD, residing in East Timor and abroad, representing a wide and representative spectrum of our people - youth and student movements, women, workers, intellectuals and professionals of the most varied fields, religious confessions and political sensibilities - gathered in Krumbach Kastle from 31 October to 3 November 1998, bearing in mind our people's aspirations and demands, decided to:

A. Reiterate our deep appreciation and gratitude to the Austrian Government for its support which made possible the successive AIETD meetings;

B. Extend the same appreciation and gratitude to all the governments and institutions that have contributed to and thus made these meetings possible;

C. Reaffirm our trust in and sincere appreciation to the UN Secretary General and his

staff for the dynamic, creative and serious way in which they have been dealing with the question, exploring all the possible ways to reach a solution;

D. Reiterate our support to Bishops D. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and D. Basilio do Nascimento in their generous efforts in leading the East Timorese people in the quest for peace, freedom and reconciliation;

E. Register with satisfaction the contents of Bishop Ximenes Belo's message to the fourth AIETD in which the East Timorese prelate and Nobel Peace Laureate welcomes the "new winds of change" that blow in East Timor, saying that "something is moving in the decolonization process of East Timor", and noting that East Timor had ceased to be an "internal issue" for Indonesia. The Bishop of



AFP, November 3 by Michael Thurston:

"We have not (agreed) because some of the pro-Indonesian elements are civil servants of Indonesia," 1996 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Jose Ramos Horta, head of the pro-referendum group, told AFP.

He said agreement had been reached on 11 out of 12 points. But he lamented the pro-integrationists "continue to refuse to sign a demand for the release of the resistance leader Xanana Gusmao," he said.

Delegates had kept talking until dawn Tuesday in a bid to iron out their differences, which focus on a UN autonomy plan for East Timor....

The pro-integration group lamented the failure to agree a joint declaration. "I am very disappointed as I consider it is a failure .. we have just shown a sign of our immaturity," said delegate Abilio Araujo.

UN representative Tamrat Samuel denied the talks were a failure.

"I would not call this meeting a failure because they have exhaustively discussed the key issues," he told AFP. The meeting had "made a very important contribution to the process which is continuing," he added.

LUSA, Nov. 3

Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama has de-dramatized the deadlocked discussions in Austria between pro- and anti-self-determination East Timorese groups, saying the time of "unanimities" is over.

In comments Monday before departing for Austria to meet with the UN special representative for East Timor, Gama said the intra-Timorese talks had been "globally positive."

He underlined the importance of the unprecedented presence in the talks of UN special representative Jamsheed Marker, saying the Timorese had "this great opportunity to dialogue at high level."

"It is important that the Timorese move naturally from the era of unanimities to one of democratic debate," Gama said of the impasse in the latest round of talks.

"The fact that there are differing opinions does not signify a rupture in essential unity, which can only be democratic, of all the Timorese, he added."

Gama, who is meeting with Marker Tuesday, declined to specify what issues he would raise with the UN envoy.

LUSA, Nov. 6:

The leader of the "Third Way Timorese Movement," Abilio Araujo, has asked the secretary-general of the United Nations to convene a meeting of the leaders of East Timor's various political forces to overcome the impasse of the Fourth All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue Meeting.

Araujo made the request during a meeting with Jamsheed Marker, the UN secretary-general's special's envoy for East Timor, in Lisbon on Thursday.

Araujo proposed that the UN set up a "restricted political committee" within the framework of the intra-Timorese meeting that would discuss "issues of political nature." Araujo, a former president of FRETILIN, said the intra-Timorese meetings should continue in spite of the current impasse.



Dili also underlined in his message that "the people is always sovereign in its decisions and would thus have to determine what is best";

F. Support D. Ximenes Belo's proposal that the AETD start thinking about the creation of a transitional government.

G. Register D. Ximenes Belo's affirmation that "without the participation of Mr. Jose Alexandre Gusmão, a.k.a. Xanana Gusmão, the question of East Timor will always remain a problem to be solved".

Bearing this in mind, the undersigned, analyzing the evolution of the question of East Timor, decide to clarify the follow:

I - The demise of dictator Suharto and the empty promises of BJ Habibie

1. We commend effusively the Indonesian pro-democracy movement for bringing about the demise of dictator Suharto and initiating the still fragile and incipient process of economic and political reforms. The Indonesian people has been the victim, just as we have, of the same oppressive, corrupt and authoritarian regime that has imprisoned, tortured and massacred thousands of people in East Timor and Indonesia itself. But the fall of the hateful dictator has not automatically brought about justice for East Timor. Today, as yesterday, the Habibie government continues to ignore the engagement taken before the international community to release all East Timorese political prisoners, as the Suharto government did.

2. Our leader Xanana Gusmão, President of the CNRT, is still in prison.

3. The presence of the Indonesian military in East Timor is violent and in violation of all human values. We commend the removal of general Prabowo Subianto, responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in East Timor throughout his carrier. But General Prabowo and other Indonesian high-ranking officers must be tried and punished for the crimes they committed against the East Timorese people.

4. We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all East Timorese prisoners and our leader Xanana Gusmão, CNRT President.

5. We condemn the new Indonesian military offensives carried out by the Indonesian armed forces stationed in East Timor.

6. We denounce the lack of good faith and honesty on the part of the Indonesian government for not keeping the promises Habibie made to our

esteemed bishops D. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and D. Basilio do Nascimento to withdraw quickly and massively hundreds of Indonesian soldiers in August. By mid-September, just over a month after the August farce, at least ten battalions were introduced in East Timor.

II - Demilitarization and Pacification

We demand the following under the supervision of the United Nations:

1. The cessation of all armed activity.
2. The immediate withdrawal of the majority of the Indonesian forces from East Timor to a number agreed on by all four parties - the UN, Portugal, Indonesia and the East Timorese Resistance.
3. The remaining Indonesian troops should be stationed in uninhabited areas to be identified and agreed upon.
4. All armed and paramilitary groups created by the Indonesian military must be dismantled.
5. The collection of all weapons and ammunitions in the possession of individuals and private groups.

We commend:

The repeated declarations of the FALINTIL Command that they would observe a cease-fired agreed upon in a UN supervised process.

We call on:

1. The international community to establish a special fund to be used as incentive for those who will surrender weapons in exchange for cash, food, agriculture seeds, tools and transport vehicles.
2. The training by the UN of a Timorese police force.
3. The establishment of a UN Peace Keeping Force in East Timor.

III - We demand that the emigration of Indonesians to East Timor be suspended until the promulgation of the Immigration Law by the Timorese Legislative Assembly elected in the context of the transition process agreed upon by all parties.

IV - Development and Humanitarian Aid Programs

We commend:

The meeting of experts that took place in Vilamoura, Portugal from October 21 to 24 to formulate a strategic sustainable development plan for East Timor.

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We call on the World Bank to:

Urgently develop an autonomous aid program specifically for East Timor in the following areas:

- A. Development of the Primary Sector:
Agriculture and animal husbandry, Fishing
- B. Commerce
Aid for the development of small trade and business with credit and loans similar to those established by the Grameen Bank scheme.
- C. Industry
- Aid for the development of small industries
- Aid for the development of traditional crafts for exportation
- D. Human resources: training of human resources in banking and finance through courses, practical training schemes and seminars at the World Bank Headquarters in Washington or in East Timor.
- E. Cultural heritage: through special programs of the World Bank for the recuperation, preservation and revitalization of the historic and cultural heritage of the East Timorese people, particularly its traditional languages such as Tetum, sacred sites and historical monuments, etc.

F. We ask the World Bank, through its Post-Conflict Programme, to undertake an evaluation of the current situation in East Timor with a view towards developing a global reconstruction plan for East Timor.

V - UN Development and Humanitarian Agencies

We commend and thank the Department of Humanitarian Coordination of the United Nations for the interest it manifested in the situation in East Timor.

We call for:

1. immediate assistance to alleviate the suffering of the East Timorese people, in particular of the women and children, silent victims of the occupation, victims of the economic and financial crisis deeply affecting Indonesia and its neighbors.
2. UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, WFP, FAO, UNIFEM to bring humanitarian and development aid quickly to East Timor.

VI - Population Census

As it is necessary and urgent to establish with scientific precision the size and composition of the East Timorese population, we call on the UN to carry out urgently a census of the East Timorese population.

VII - Economic Indexes

As it is always the case with dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, the statistics are manipulated to meet the fancy of whoever is in power. The Soviet Union and Indonesia are two examples of this phenomenon. No rigorous strategic development plan

for East Timor can be established without the collection of accurate data and analysis of all East Timor's economic indexes, namely a census of the population, production indicators in all areas from economy to health, education, etc.

We thus call on the UN Secretary General, the World Bank, UNDP and other competent agencies to coordinate their efforts to undertake a rigorous data collection.

VIII - Human Rights and Justice

We appeal to the High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish urgently a permanent presence in Dili and other places in East Timor to ensure:

1. the promotion and protection of human rights
2. the organization of seminar and training courses for human rights defenders
3. the promotion of a culture of peace, tolerance, dialogue and reconciliation

We demand that the occupying Indonesian authorities:

1. end immediately arbitrary detention
2. cancel the "black list" of East Timorese activists in exile so as to permit their access to the territory
3. cancel the "black list" inside the territory so as to permit the free circulation of the population in East Timor
4. the immediate end of torture, summary and arbitrary executions
5. the end of violations of the East Timorese women, and in this regard, we call on the Committee for the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women to investigate and prepare an urgent report on the condition of women in East Timor
6. the end of the forced prostitution of the East Timorese Woman.

We ask the UN Voluntary Fund to support the victims of torture as well as other competent institutions, included governments, to set up a Rehabilitation Program in East Timor and abroad to assist these victims.

IX - Environment

The East Timorese environment is severely affected as a result of a deliberate strategy of the Indonesian military to destroy the East Timorese forests in its offensive against the armed resistance. As it

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happened in Sumatra and Kalimantan, the extraction of wood and the "transmigrasi" program have contributed to the deterioration of Nature in East Timor.

We thus call on the competent UN bodies and the World Bank to take into account environmental rehabilitation and protection as part of a sustainable development strategy in East Timor.

X - Education

1. The East Timorese education system must be entirely revised to reflect the East Timorese history, tradition and culture and to serve the true interests of East Timor.

2. Bearing this in mind, we demand the amelioration and expansion of the polytechnics, teaching colleges and university, oriented by East Timor's needs, with technical training programs in areas considered as priorities.

3. We demand the introduction of Tetum and the reintroduction of Portuguese in all schools in East Timor, starting at primary school.

4. We ask Portugal to promote - in conjunction with the CPLP member countries, a teachers training program in Portuguese language.

XI - Towards a Political Solution

1. The future of East Timor can only be decided by the people freely, without restriction or coercion in the exercise of their fundamental right to self-determination in an international judicial framework.

2. In this sense, all the relevant UN resolutions on the question of East Timor must be taken into account in so far as these resolutions were adopted by the international community in reaction to actions violating the fundamental and inalienable rights of the East Timorese people.

3. We cannot comment in any depth or details on the autonomy plan proposed by the UN that has already been presented to the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Indonesia as we have not had access to the said document.

4. The East Timorese people as a whole will repudiate any agreement sealed between the two parties without the East Timorese consent.

5. We thus demand the adoption of a new format for the negotiations that would allow the full involvement of the East Timorese people in the negotiation on the future of East Timor. We support a negotiation process involving the direct participation of the CNRT led by Xanana Gusmao aiming at the establishment of a transitional administration for a

specific period of time in keeping with international law, without prejudicing the position of principle of each of the parties involved.

6. We reiterate that any solution for East Timor must be reached through dialogue.

7. We declare our full support to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the search for a solution for East Timor.

8. We believe that only a process that would respect the true aspirations and highest interests of the East Timorese people would viable on the ground.

9. In this framework, we are prepared to take into consideration whichever proposal aiming at a peaceful transition leading to a final solution that, to be valid and internationally acceptable, must be approved by way of a referendum on self-determination under UN supervision.

XII - All Inclusive Intra-Timorese Dialogue

The present format of the AIETD does not correspond to the demands of the current reality. We believe in the virtue of a true intra-Timorese dialogue, but this dialogue will produce palpable results only when it takes place in East Timor and involves the clerical, political hierarchies and traditional authorities among others.

Because we are aware of the necessity of an authentic reconciliation process among the East Timorese, we commend Bishops D. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and D. Basilio do Nascimento for the efforts they have made towards the social and political harmonization of the East Timorese people.

We also commend Rev. Arlindo Marçal, President of the Christian Council of East Timor, for his efforts to raise awareness, foster dialogue and harmony within the East Timorese society.

In keeping with our own convictions and corresponding to the appeal of the UN Secretary General, we call for non-violence, tolerance and respect of private and public property.

We proudly register the discipline demonstrated by our people. We register and recall that since Suharto's fall, and in spite of the provocations of the Indonesian military our people never gave in to the temptation of vengeance and retaliation against the Indonesian migrants and East Timorese collaborators. On the other hand, we condemn the irresponsible and reprehensible behavior of the Indonesian military and other members of the Indonesian repressive regime. - Signed in Krumbach, November 3, 1998



BY ROBERTO SOARES CABRAL, DILI MASSACRE SURVIVOR

DAYS TO Remember

November 12, 1991 and 1998

Seven years ago, we the East Timorese youth gathered together at St. Anthony of Lisbon Church of Motael with only pure intention for a thanksgiving Mass, to commemorate the 12th day of the death of our fellow Sebastiao Gomes who was murdered by our enemy inside the Catholic church.

This occasion was followed by a peaceful procession that moved towards Santa Cruz cemetery where we were going to say our closing prayer and light the candle that stood for truth, justice and peace for the soul of our brethren who were killed by the oppressors.

Our good intentions were disrupted by the Indonesian military who opened fire and killed our fellow compatriots - men and women, young and old. More than 300 innocent people fell victims to the repression, not even including the disappearances.

The worst thing is that until now we do not know where their bodies, their bounds, their souls, and their garbs are.

Today, as we celebrate the seventh anniversary of the Dili massacre, let us salute them as warrior heroes for the liberation of our motherland and remember them in our prayers.

November 28, 1975 and 1998

This day this year marks a great historical moment for national unity with the coalescing of bitter rival parties FRETILIN - UDT, both of which, in 1975, controlled parts of Timor with the former declaring a full independence for a Democratic Republic of East Timor.

This spirit of liberation remains in the heart of many East Timorese peoples who have been fighting against the fascist invasion of Indonesia. The spirit of liberty and a genuine responsibility for the country finally combined all of East Timorese people under the great umbrella of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) - in search for peace, reconciliation, self-determination, and independence.

Today, it is time for us to join hands with all our fellow Maubere people to shout for joy for the victory, national unity, peace and independence for our motherland and people of East Timor.

December 7, 1975 and 1998

This day was a dark history for us. Our giant neighboring country of Indonesia brutally launched a full-scale military invasion of our land. Thousands of our fellow resistance fighters lost their lives because of this brutal inhumanity.

This cruelty, occupation, and annexation was entirely against the fundamental rights of our innocent people. This right is governed and protected by international juridical instruments, such as the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the colonial countries and peoples for self-determination.

Today, let us appeal to the entire world that a proper, democratic, and just solution to settling the East Timor conflict must be rooted on the pure aspirations of the people of East Timor. I believe that there is only one answer and only one mechanism for a peaceful self-determination and that is REFERENDUM.

December 10, 1948 and 1998

This day was one of the most significant days for all peace-loving peoples throughout the world. Peacemakers all over the globe sat together to for ways and means to uphold the inalienable rights of the people.

Today, as we wonderfully prepare to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we call on the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the





video shoot by Max Stahl

Survivors MOURN LOSSES



Alex Santino Da Costa survived by faking death when Indonesian troops opened fire on demonstrators in the East Timor capital Dili seven years ago.

DAYS TO REMEMBER, Cont'd (from p. 43)

Secretary-General of the UN to continue to use their good offices to find a peaceful, just and comprehensive solution to the East Timor conflict. This can be done through the implementation of all the relevant resolutions passed by the United Nations. Above all, this can only be achieved with the inclusion of the President of CNRT Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and the Representatives of the Timorese National Council of Resistance in any negotiations.

January 1, 1999

This is World Peace Day. We pray for all countries torn asunder by armed conflict such as East Timor so that the war-makers may realize the supreme value of justice, equality, and peace.

The word of peace encourages all of us to live the truth of love for justice and freedom and to collaborate with all peacemakers in the world in the fight against fascist invasion and colonialism.

Finally, I would like to appeal to all solidarity formations throughout the world: whatever means and ways you do, whether in faith or in action, help regain our dignity as a free people of God.

Strengthen our unity and insist to the world to have an internationally acceptable solution to the conflict in East Timor.



"Two bullets hit my left leg while another one pierced my left shoulder. I was so scared that I pretended to be dead...I fainted," said the 22-year-old student.

"The army shot us like shooting at goats," said Da Costa, one of the survivors who on Thursday marked the the seventh anniversary of the 1991 killings in the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili.

Locals say 200 people were killed in the incident following a youth's funeral, when thousands of East Timorese staged a protest against Indonesia's 1975 invasion of the former Portuguese colony.

The Indonesian government, which annexed the enclave the following year, put the death toll at 50.

Regardless of the numbers, the mourning continues.

"I lost my best friend Thomas," Da Costa said. "I am still sad when thinking about him. What happened in Santa Cruz keeps coming in my dreams," he told Reuters.

In a bid to reduce tension in the territory of 800,000, the Indonesian government says it has started withdrawing troops from East Timor. About 10,500 troops and police are left in the predominantly Catholic region, the military says.



DILI MASSACRE

Pro-Timorese groups however say the military has increased its presence to about 21,000, including police and local militia.

Indonesia's rule in East Timor is not recognised by the United Nations.

About 1,000 people gathered in Santa Cruz on Thursday to commemorate the killings in an emotional drama portraying the massacre. Many people, actors and spectators, were in tears.

Unlike past years, there was no sign of an increased military presence in Dili, which is usually tense ahead of and during the anniversary of the killings. It was also the first time the anniversary was marked in the cemetery itself.

"I was so emotional when acting in the drama. The killing was such a traumatic experience," said Abe Alim, another survivor of the shooting.

"After the incident, I am always scared of the military. I hate them," said the 25-year-old.

Alim said she carried an anti-Indonesia banner together with some protesters who had already entered the cemetery on November 12, 1991.

Others were still outside and were the first to die because troops opened fire from behind, she said.

"I was in front when the slaughter happened. When I heard the shooting from behind, I thought they were only warning shots. I was wrong," she said.

"I was so scared and I cried. I managed to escape and hid in a nurse's house," said Alim, adding that she sought refuge at the house for about eight hours before going home.

Da Costa said he was brought by a truck to the local military hospital in Dili. "I was there with the dead bodies inside the truck. I regained consciousness in the hospital," he said.


Da Costa said many bodies of the victims were never found. "We will never know where the bodies are. We learned they were dumped into the sea," he said.

Da Costa said he was sent to Jakarta with seven other survivors for surgery to remove the bullets.

Human rights organisations have accused the military of a series of abuses in the territory. They estimate that some 200,000 people have died during the invasion or from hardship and famine in subsequent years.

Inside the Santa Cruz cemetery on Thursday, mourners laid wreaths at a wooden crucifix erected to remember the dead.

"I am so sad...I just can't speak," said another survivor who declined to give her name as she stood near the crucifix. November 12, 1998



LIGHT FOR PEACE

by: Roberto Christobal Santa Maria

When you search for truth,
Many people will hate and not listen to you.
When you build the bridge of peace,
Many people will look away from you.
Yet, truth and love are the fruit of justice.
Peace and freedom are the basis of human rights.
But, you will be put into prison and murdered.
Because you want to see light.
Your perspiration and your blood,
will spread throughout your land.
to wash and wipe away the sufferings of your people.
from the worldly deeds of injustices.
Your struggle and your faith of perseverance,
are the witness and the virtue of your life.

When you search for truth,
When you search for justice,
When you search for light,
When you search for peace to free your peoples.



Once Close Ties With Indonesia TURN VERY FROSTY



ies between Indonesia and Malaysia, long regarded as blood brothers, have now turned so frosty that Malaysian authorities have allowed an open demonstration here against President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie.

While the turning point was Habibie's criticism over the sacking and detention of former Malaysian deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysian police did the unthinkable Thursday night — it stood aside while a protest was staged in front of the Indonesian embassy here against Jakarta's annexation of East Timor.

It is all the more significant because the police have been in full force throughout the capital to break up any gathering of Anwar supporters, no matter how small, and not hesitating to use force when they deem necessary. Any gathering of more than five people is illegal in Malaysia unless it has police permission.

The ethnic Malays of peninsular Malaysia believe they share a common ancestral stock with the Javanese and Sumatrans just across the narrow Straits of Malacca, hence the blood relations that they have always touted.

This in no small way played a part in Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's close relationship with deposed Indonesian president Suharto.

In 1996, when members of some non-governmental organisations held a closed-door conference on East Timor, Jakarta protested and the Malaysian government warned the organisers to call it off.

When the Second Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET II) still got underway, members of the youth wing of Mahathir's ruling coalition broke it up, and the police detained some of the participants for up to six days and deported more than 30 foreign participants.

But on Thursday, the police not only kept away when APCET coordinator Gus Miclat held a press conference but watched from a distance while

some 200 demonstrators gathered outside the Indonesian embassy.

The protesters, both locals and foreigners, sang songs in memory of the 200 people victims of the Dili massacre in East Timor seven years ago to the day. They also lit candles and placed flowers outside the embassy fence. The embassy was closed at that time and its officials declined comment Friday.

The police on duty also did not prevent Miclat from reading aloud a message from jailed East Timor leader Xanana Gusmao.

Among the demonstrators were some participants of the ongoing Asia-Pacific People's Assembly (APPA), organised by NGOs as a prelude to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum here next week. The APEC summit on Nov 17 to 18 will be attended by leaders of 21 economies, including US President Bill Clinton.

Nadia Bamadhaj, a participant in the pre-APEC meetings of NGOs, was quoted as saying the gathering was held to call on the Indonesian government to release the more than 200 East Timor political prisoners.

When Anwar was sacked in early September and then detained on corruption and sodomy charges, Habibie criticised Mahathir's action and, together with Philippine President Joseph Estrada, thought of boycotting the APEC summit in protest.

When Mahathir sent veteran politician and former deputy premier Ghafar Baba to Jakarta to explain the situation in Malaysia, the authorities declined to meet him and some Indonesian NGOs told him to leave the country.

Mahathir, according to officials here, was further irked when Habibie not only declined to have a meeting with him on the sidelines of the APEC conference but decided to shuttle from Jakarta on the two days of the summit rather than stay overnight as Mahathir's guest, as all the other leaders are doing.

The Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor is apparently exploiting this fracture in the traditional relations between the Malaysia and Indonesia. Miclat said that Habibie must be consistent in his call for Anwar's release by freeing Gusmao.

According to Miclat, APCET wants Habibie to show real effort in freeing Gusmao and in allowing East Timor participation in talks between Indonesia and Portugal on the proposal for autonomy for the territory. Self-determination and autonomy are APCET's platforms, he added.

Edwin Gozal, a representative of APCET's Indonesian affiliate, said Habibie has so far not responded to calls for Gusmao's release.

He said APCET hopes the leaders at the APEC summit will raise the East Timor issue with Indonesia and discuss ways to address the problem. "We hope they will use the opportunity to highlight the issue as it has been sidelined for some time," Gozal added.

While Malaysian police seem to have become more accommodating to supporters of the East Timor struggle, it has not spared them from legal action.

The Malaysian police and government are being sued for illegal arrest and wrongful detention over the disruption of the 1996 APCET II meeting.

Damages amounting to almost 23 million U.S. dollars are being sought by 36 of the participants, mostly members of NGOs. One of them, Dr. Sanusi Osman, explained that the lawsuit was not a quest for monetary gain but rather for accountability.

November 11, 1998 - IPS



BY RICHARD LLOYD-PARRY IN EAST TIMOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT



n greeting Commander Lere Anak Timur, deputy chief of staff of Fretilin, the East Timorese guerrilla army, you clap him on both shoulders in a bear hug, but you do not shake his hand for the simple reason that it is not all there. In 1984, during a battle with Indonesian soldiers, the middle finger was shot off.

It was the first of three encounters with an Indonesian bullet: the second, in 1992, grazed his face, the third, in 1996, is still lodged in his leg "In East Timor, we fight with cockerels," says the commander. "And those who have injured fights more bravely."

Fretilin was formed in 1975 when the Indonesian army carried out its invasion of what was then an obscure Portuguese colony, and ever since that time Commander Lere, and hundreds like him, have lived continuously in the jungly hills of East Timor.

Their true names are secret: instead, each is known by a romantic nom deguerre. The top Fretilin commander is called Taur Matan Ruak and the "president" of East Timor, Alexandre Gusmao, a prisoner in Jakarta since 1992, is known by everyone as Xanana.

Commander Lere's name means "Child of the East" after the region of East Timor for which he is, responsible. In the photographs that exist of them, Fretilin commanders sport the same black bushy

My tour began three weeks ago in Jakarta with the young East Timorese exiles who live semi-clandestinely in the Indonesian capital. A friend of a friend introduced me to a friend of his who believed that he could take me into the jungle.

Two days later I flew to the East Timorese capital, Dili. My guide flew over separately. Necessarily, there were complications. But after a few clandestine meetings, a secret pick-up and the most arduous walk I've ever undertaken, I found myself on a jungle plateau where about fifty people, a few of them in uniform, sat in a horseshoe, their faces lit by candles.

At their centre was Commander Lere Anak Timur wearing a green beret, camouflage jacket, a Swiss automatic rifle and bifocals. The commander likes to wind up his guests. "So tell me," he said in Portuguese, "if the Kopassus were to turn up now, what would Signor do?" Kopassus are Indonesia's special forces, notorious throughout Indonesia, and the agents of many of the worst atrocities in East Timor; my response was a nervous simper.

In the Jungle Hills of East Timor,

beards and billowing hair. In East Timor people refer to Fretilin as the orangutan, literally the "men of the forest".

To visit the orangutans of Borneo you contact a travel agent, undertake a long journey, and wait for a lucky sighting. To visit Fretilin, the principle is the same but with three differences: the tour is free, only foreign journalists can make it, and your travel agent risks imprisonment, torture or being murdered by Indonesian intelligence if he is caught.

"Do not worry, my friend!" said the commander, amid general hilarity. "If all the people here are killed, then Signor will be killed too. But as long as I am alive, Signor is quite safe. Ha ha ha!"

Apart from his high rank and the length of his stay in the jungle, Commander Lere's life has been typical of those Timorese young at the time of the invasion - a youth



marked by optimism but suddenly transformed by war, dislocation, and bereavement.

In 1975, he was a 24-year-old student of agriculture in a backward and neglected Portuguese colony that seemed bound to achieve its independence in the next few years. But East Timor's strategic position, close to deep-sea submarine routes, and with potential oil resources, gave it an interest to the rest of the world disproportionate to its tiny size.

After their attempts to foment a coup and a civil war were frustrated, and with the passive support of the US and Australia, Indonesian troops launched a full invasion in December 1975.

As many as 200,000 people, a third of the then population, are said to have died as a result, and it is rare to meet an East Timorese who has not lost several relatives in the fighting, or the hunger, epidemics and purges that it created.

Commander Lere has one living son, who lives in Jakarta, "having happy days" as he puts it. His other son disappeared in the 1980s, permanently. His wife died after

Fretilin remained in the hills, and in two decades the Indonesian military has been helpless to stamp them out.

The number of active fighters has dwindled over the years to what is believed to be no more than a few hundred. "Sometimes there might be 10 of us, sometimes 20 or 80," says Commander Lere. "Sometimes Fretilin uses civilian clothes and works with civilians - we can go to work in the gardens and the rice paddies. It is in the minds of all Timorese to fight against Indonesia and if Indonesia wants to kill Fretilin, they first have to kill the entire East Timorese population."

The guerrillas have never practiced terrorism; since the resignation of President Suharto in May, they have given up actively taking on the Indonesian forces altogether.

Increasingly, Fretilin members, including senior commanders, have been slipping into the town where large pro-independence demonstrations have been held. "The problem of East Timor cannot be solved with guns," says Commander Lere. "Neither side can win. The only solution is a peaceful solution based on international law and based on the support of the international community and the United Nations. Foreign governments say that they want to help us, but still they help Indonesia."

Fretilin have always insisted that the troop "reductions" claimed by Abri were a farce - as The Independent

THE RESISTANCE FIGHTS ON *After 23 Years*

giving birth to the lost boy in 1981. His parents, he believes, were poisoned after being interrogated by the army.

"Out of 100 people who have died in East Timor, you will find five who died naturally," he says. "The rest died from the occupation." Until 1978, Fretilin held out, and tens of thousands of people lived under their protection in the mountains. In that year, the Indonesian Army, Abri, began using supersonic jets, allegedly British-made Hawk fighters, to attack the population in the hills and the battle was lost. "The Indonesians were too strong," says the commander, "so we changed the strategy from the war phase to the guerrilla phase - the war of movement." The civilians returned to the lowlands where they were herded into camps.

revealed last week Indonesia's own secret documents show that, far from reducing the numbers of soldiers to fewer than 12,000, Indonesia maintains 18,000 in East Timor. "We need international attention," says Commander Lere. "We need the UN to come and witness the withdrawals, otherwise they will never happen."

"The Indonesia military has too much business here, too many opportunities for promotion and profit." The danger of a drawn-out solution, he says, is economic: that the poverty of many East Timorese will compromise the population.

"These young men leave school with no jobs and no money, and the only way they can live is as informers. They want freedom, but they cannot live without food. The military know this: they say, 'We cannot shoot the East Timorese with bullets, so we will shoot them with money.' Already it is working." - November 4, 1998



What really happened IN ALAS?



When Vincente Xavier, the village head of Alas, tried to return to his village to look for his wife last Saturday he was shot dead by Indonesian troops of Battalions 744 and 745. His son was badly wounded in the shooting. His two teenage nieces, also accompanying him, were arrested and taken to military headquarters in the nearby regional centre of Same, where it is rumored one has been raped and killed.

The violence was part of a series of reprisals that have claimed the lives of up to 50 people, according to sources who arrived from Alas late last week.

The names of 11 of those killed have been made available for the military to confirm.

The United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, on Friday condemned the killings and demanded confirmation of the situation in the area. The Portuguese Government has withdrawn in protest its participation in the talks to be held on the future of the territory at the United Nations later this month (November).

The killings began with the Falintil pro-independence guerrilla attack on the local military post on Monday November 9. The attack killed three Indonesian soldiers and one villager and resulted in the capture of 13 Indonesian soldiers, the seizure of 36 automatic weapons and a large quantity of ammunition.

Despite the release of 11 of the soldiers last Thursday, the village remains virtually sealed off by Indonesian troops, who have moved into the area in large

numbers from bases in the capital, Dili, and the far eastern town of Los Palos.

In Alas, 175 kilometres south of Dili, most of the population has fled to the surrounding forest. Those who remain are facing a critical shortage of water and food because the military has cut the pipeline and blockaded the village since Monday.

Many have sought refuge in the Catholic church, the convent and the school, fearful of leaving because the military is arresting and beating those it finds in the area in its search for information on the whereabouts of the guerrillas and the captured soldiers.

Soldiers have burnt 30 homes in the town belonging to those they have arrested or killed in connection to the attack.

"People are going to the priest in tears for protection. People are fleeing for Viqueque and Same," said a villager who had recently arrived in Dili.

The local Falintil guerrillas, under the command of Tere Mau Bulak (sic), have been urging the population to flee.

Alas! Does anyone really know the real story of the Alas killings? Till now, the truth is known only to those who have witnessed the actual events, and to those who have died. Only bits and pieces of the whole picture leak out as the whole territory has been sealed off. But here John Martnikus attempts to weave together the various stories into one whole, without changing the pictures given by those who saw and heard, and by those to whom the truth, or some truths were whispered. - Ed

Roadblocks of Indonesian troops continue to stop all traffic in Same, the regional centre closest to Alas.

In Alas, villagers are being led away for questioning. Some of those, such as Octavio Da Costa and Alessandrio Da Costa, who were both arrested at roadblocks last Friday, are still not accounted for.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has offered to negotiate with the rebels for the release of the two Indonesian soldiers and the delivery of food to the besieged villagers.

Large numbers of Indonesian troops have (since) been arriving in Same.

Access to Alas has been denied since the attack.

November 23, 1998



STATEMENT ON THE ALAS MASSACRE

Around 50 East Timorese have again been massacred.

The carnage recently happened in the quiet sub-district of Alas, south of East Timor just as talks between the Indonesian government and their Portuguese counterparts were going on at the UN. It is ironic that the discussions were transpiring without any East Timorese present even as they were precisely deliberating on the fate of those whose lives were snuffed out by the Indonesian military (ABRI).

Among those killed was a village chief suspected of masterminding an East Timorese guerrilla attack on ABRI. Most however were young men and women.

No outsider has been allowed inside Alas to independently determine the extent of the slaughter.

This latest atrocity is utterly despicable and the ABRI-supported Habibie government in Jakarta is ultimately responsible and should pay for this crime.

It only goes to show that Jakarta is unwilling to yield to the just and inevitable aspirations of the East Timorese for a peaceful resolution of their self-determination desires. The Habibie government is hijacked, if not controlled by the fascists of ABRI who have likewise let loose a pattern of terror within Indonesia itself.

The recent killings of more than 20 students in Jakarta, the unrestrained mobs decapitating also almost 20 Ambonese and Christians and running roughshod over their churches, the earlier so-called "Ninja" or black magic killings in Aceh, the killings and rapes of ethnic Chinese women and so on.

We condemn this butchery in the strongest possible terms.

The terror has become widespread, Indonesian-wide and very systematic. Very much like a military operation.

There seems to be a plan to thwart the snowballing calls for a referendum in East Timor and the burgeoning democracy movement in Indonesia. There seems to be a last-ditch design to derail the inevitable march of liberation of the East Timorese. There seems to be a sketch to divert the Indonesian peoples' advance to democracy in their desire to exorcise their body politic of ABRI involvement and in their preparations for a desired peaceful and democratic elections in June.

The Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET) denounces these latest barbaric acts of ABRI both inside East Timor and Indonesia. We demand for an immediate independent investigation of these crimes and a swift meting of justice to those responsible.

We call on our international partners, counterparts, supporters, friends and the entire global community at large to exert extra effort in doing the same. And of more importantly accompanying the East Timorese in their unrelenting struggle for self-determination and the Indonesian people in their stride towards genuine democracy.

Alas for Jakarta, the Alas massacre is but a manifestation of their tottering regime. Its days are inevitably numbered. Amidst the strife and the gore, the killings, the massacres, the anxieties and the fears-there is cause for hope, there is reason for celebration.

The blood of the thousands of East Timorese martyrs along with those at Alas is about to finally cascade down Mt. Matebian to wipe away the occupiers from their blighted, yet brave and gentle land forever.

Gus Miclat
Coordinator
APCET

24 November 1998



ALAS: NAMES TO REMEMBER 1. Vicente Xavier, tribal chief (LIURAI) of Tai Tudak, shot dead; 2. Victor, a young man from Village Tutuluro, Same, shot dead; 3. Adriano Fernandes, a young man from Tai-Tudak, Alas, shot dead; 4. Duarte, village chief of Tutuluro, Same, shot dead; 5. Domingos Mandato, vice secretary of Mhaquidan, Alas, shot dead; 6. Francisco Xavier, killed at Turisca; 7. Cursinu da Costa, 23 yrs old, detained; 8. Bensiola da Costa, 16 yrs old, detained; 9. Januário da Costa Franco, 14 yrs old, detained; 10. Duarte da Costa Fernandes, 23 yrs old, detained; 11. Egidio da Costa, 23 yrs old, detained; 12. Tobias, 28 yrs old, primary school teacher, detained; 13. Jakolo, 35 yrs old, primary school teacher, detained; 14. Alvitto, 29 yrs old, married, primary school teacher, detained. (FROM NEIGHBORING SELIASU/BETANU) 15. Acácio Conceição, 27 yrs old, park ranger, detained; 16. Hermenigildo, teacher, detained; 17. S Alves, 40 yrs old; detained. (information from CNRT-Dili and FRETILIN)



THE FIRST East Timorese Women's Conference



The Student Solidarity Council (SCC) based in Dili are a forward looking group which, in the present post-Suharto climate of Reformasi, is pushing away the barriers of a society in prison. After their success with their Student Dialogues, their next inspiration was the Women's conference which was sponsored by Grupo Feto Fonsae Timor Lorosae (GFFTL) - the young women's group in the SCC. The idea was that women have a chance to develop themselves and to participate more in policy.

No year-long planning for this conference held on November 9-10, 1998 in Dili. They quickly found funding from NGOs, and support from Fokupers (Forum Kommunikas Perempuan or Women's Communication Forum) and OMT (a women's clandestine group in existence for many years). In a country where postal communication and phones are scarce, students went out to their home towns to invite women to attend. They told me that people reacted very well. Some women were too frightened to come in case they got into trouble with the military on their return. But of the 300-400 invited, 200 attended over the two-day conference. Women from Maliana, Suai, Liquica, Ermera, Same, Ainaro, Aileu, Lospalos, Viqueque, Bacau and Manatuto were accommodated on the floor at the two basic houses rented by the SCC. I was told by the organisers that all the women who came had one idea - self determination.

The conference stage was draped with a large banner painted with "Conferencia Loron Rua Kona Sa Lalaok Feto Timor Lorosae". (Today's conference is on the Image of Timorese Women). The main thrust of the conference was the opportunity to discuss what had happened to women over the last 23 years.

One of the women opening the conference had been imprisoned for years for working with the clandestine front and being opposed to the Indonesian military. She quoted from James Dunn book: "The Timorese are born in fear, live in fear and die in fear."

To my western eyes, the sight of a male representative then cutting the ribbon to open the conference was slightly jarring. To the Timorese women, it was natural. They are not angry with their men, they are angry with the invaders. Another contrast to a typical Western women's conference was that all sessions started and ended with prayers as well as ending with melodious singing. It gave the

conference a spiritual presence and power. There were a few Carmelite nuns in attendance and it was good to see them showing sisterhood in a country where nuns are held in the highest respect.

The first speaker was Domingas Alves, the director of Fokupers (Forum Kommunikas Perempuan or Women's Communication Forum). Her husband has been in jail in Java since the Dili massacre in 1991. He was accused of being one of the organisers of the procession to Santa Cruz cemetery. She spoke passionately and at length of the violence that women had suffered because of the military and of the important role women played in working in the clandestine and helping the guerrillas.

The second speaker was Milena Pires. She left East Timor in 1975 for Portugal. She now works for the Catholic Institute of International Relations in Britain. She has organised support for the SCC and GFFTL and



for two of the student leaders' travel to Portugal and London for leadership training. Her session was on sharing experiences, feelings and ideas from the last 23 years.

Women told stories in public for the first time. They spoke in Tetun, Portuguese, bahasa Indonesia and a little English. Stories of rape by the military. Stories of women having children to soldiers who never helped with the raising of the children and left to return to their wives in Indonesia. Stories of the widow's near Viqueque village where there are no men left - they were all killed between 1980 and 1983.

A woman spoke of widespread polygamy. Of men going off to another woman and neglecting their first family. (If a woman has two husbands she is "rubbish"). If the men go to the jungles to fight and leave their families that is hard too, but the women can accept that. Women told how difficult life is with no husband. There is no money to educate the children so they have no future. One woman told how she had been raped at 17 in front of her mother. The mother was told she would be killed if she protested. There were many more stories that I couldn't understand.

One of the Australian women present at the conference was inspired by the women's stories and spent the rest of her time in East Timor collecting women's oral histories of their experiences over the last 23 years. Women were very keen to share their stories with her. These will be interwoven with stories of East Timorese women activists and printed in both English and Tetun early in 1999.

Aureliano Freitas, a lecturer in the department of Planning at the University, spoke of women not being given as much opportunity as boys to go to school. He asked the organisers to visit the villages and

explain why it is important for women to go to school.

Olandina Cairo, a PDI member of the PDR (People's Assembly in East Timor), and on the National Committee Against Violence Against Women, talked about discrimination from men, how men lie to women, how women are physically weaker. She then spoke about how women must take every opportunity to develop all aspects of themselves, including politically and economically.

The women were very pleased to have four Australian women attending the conference. Our views were important to them and they have an enormous desire for the outside world to know how they are suffering. "Tell your government what is happening here. Tell them to make the Indonesians leave." They asked me, Vacy, an activist from the East Timorese Justice Lobby in Sydney, and Fiona, a Ph.D. student from Canberra researching Timorese youth in the Australian diaspora, to talk on the second day. We found ourselves on the stage with a male moderator and male interpreters telling our western feminist points of view. (My interpreter at the conference had difficulty in translating the word feminist).

The audience applauded when Vacy told them of the efforts to make rape an internationally recognised war crime. She also stressed how important it was that they tell their stories. Fiona, in bahasa Indonesia, spoke of her research. I told them what had happened in Australia since my first women's conference in 1975. They clapped on hearing of the anti-discrimination laws, but also clapped on hearing of my Timorese friend in Darwin saying she would have had more than 2 children if she was still in East Timor because there is a custom of more extended family support.

In question time, they asked whether the Timorese women outside

remembered them and what was happening in Timor. I told them of Veronica Pereira in Darwin who had woven six long tais with the names of 271 people killed in the Dili massacre. And of Maria do Ceu Lopes Federer who with her husband had set up ETISC, (East Timor International Support Centre), which had helped fund this conference. I also told them of Cesarina who, as a baby, had sailed to Darwin in 1975 with her family to escape the attempted coup, had grown up in an apolitical household, but who as a young student found herself drawn into activism on East Timor. They applauded.

Lefi from FORTILOS, an Indonesian organisation which supports self-determination for East Timor, spoke next. The women were suspicious of this Indonesian male at first but by the end of his talk were won over. He told them that fighting for women's rights will help bring social and political changes to East Timor.

Olandina was asked later about her views of the conference. She thought it was important because it was the first time that many women from all over East Timor were able to unite and the first time in 23 years that women have been able to speak out courageously of their experiences. Also, it was a chance for women inside to talk with women from outside who work on East Timor. She felt "hearing about Veronica and Ceu and Cesarina gives us women more courage, and without the conference that wouldn't have happened."

For me, the conference was a chance to meet some special East Timorese women, to hear about their stories, and to understand how important it is for the women here in East Timor to know that their stories of suffering are heard by the outside world, and also for them to know that the East Timorese women in the diaspora are remembering them and fighting for their freedom.



BY: MEMEN L. LAUZON, IID NETWORKING COORDINATOR



I had a dream. I dreamt about this as soon as I got back from East Timor. For days since I traveled out of Dili, I had been pre-occupied with thoughts on how to accomplish my recommendations I am including in the report I was writing, thus this dream.

I dreamed about being able to set up a children's center in East Timor. I envisioned this center to be a playhouse and learning place for children of pre-school and school age, mostly from indigent families and children victims of armed conflict and whose parents are victims of human rights violation. The services to be offered by the center would also include scholarship programs and other direct services for children.

As I closely follow the developments in East Timor, I realize that I do so from the perspective of an outsider looking in who once had the opportunity to observe up close the people's lives, to share their thoughts, and to listen to their lamentations and aspirations. Yet, I am very much in solidarity with them in their struggles, an outsider trying to extend myself to East Timor while journeying alongside the people towards the destiny they long for.

My personal JOURNEY

I likened my trip to East Timor as a personal journey to the hidden and unexplored part of myself; a test of courage, tolerance and vulnerability. I traveled to East Timor by myself for the first time and unexpectedly at the historic moment when Indonesia (the invading force in East Timor) was at the height of its political crisis that led to the stepping down of President Suharto. I stayed in the country for a full three weeks among the people as they go on with their daily lives and relatively uncomplicated routines. I shared their interests as they closely followed the events unfolding in central Java. I felt the same way they felt about the changes in the moods of the Indonesian people. They remarked that finally they have been awakened to their senses albeit much delayed compared to the Timorese

who have been up in arms against the Suharto government since the invasion in 1975.

The images of people and places are still fresh in my mind and will probably last longer than usual. I would say that there are so many similarities between the Filipinos and the Timorese. I thought of writing a diary to take note of them, but was not able to put everything down. Thoughts remained stuck in my head to date. I could still very clearly see Timorese faces, hear their voices and feel their presence as I imagine breathing the air, feeling the breeze and seeing the sunset in East Timor.

I think I was most especially touched by one person after hearing the story of his childhood during the war, his family and relatives, his village, his studies and work, his attempt at priesthood (which brought him to Philippines), his immediate plans and dreams for the future. I found him a very deep person, with a caring heart and profound intellect. I felt like wanting to reach out to him and help him work for the realization of his plans and dreams for his country

and people. This became too unrealistic for me (though I have my own dreams for the children of East Timor) so I failed to act on the feeling. The closest I got to it was to express my sincere wishes for his success and to promise to pray for him as I have been doing from then on. Till when? I still do not know.

I specially liked the company of women and children of East Timor. They were able to bring out the happy side of me and make me empathize with them. I spent a few days in a community where I met a woman who heads a



religious congregation. I stayed with her in a Center with members of her congregation and some young school-aged girls being housed by the congregation.

I still have vivid memories of my conversations with her. "I wish that Timorese abroad would talk less and do more concrete actions in helping their people." This was the first striking statement I heard from Sr. Lourdes, fondly called Mana Lu. Her full name is Maria de Lourdes Martins Cruz, founder of the Instituto Secular Maun Alin Iha Kristu, or Instituto Secular for short, a diocesan religious congregation.

I heard about Sr. Lourdes and her work during the third APCET Conference (Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor) in March 1998. I knew immediately that I should meet this woman once I arrive in East Timor. Soon enough I was able to meet her just a few days after I came to Dili. We arranged for my stay in her community and there I was back, spent three full cold days in the Center where about twenty young girls and seven candidates of the Congregation live, learn and work. The Center is closely watched by "friendly" Indonesian military. A detachment was purposely set up right across the Center to "guard" it.

Sister Lourdes spoke few English but fluent Portuguese (aside from Tetum, of course) while I belabored with my very little Spanish. Fortunately, I managed to understand some Portuguese words and the essence of what Sr. Lourdes tried to relate to me. I learned about the poor and difficult beginnings

I stayed in the Center located in Dare, a mountain village of Dili, just about thirty minutes ride, observing and joining the activities of Sister Lourdes, her candidates and the children. Sr. Lourdes also showed me around Dare. I hiked up and down the mountains with her for about 30 minutes to visit a community in Puslawita, a sub-village of Dare, where she gave a lecture to young catechists. In Puslawita, I was introduced to an Indonesian agronomist who works for the Jesuits' animal husbandry project in the community. There was a festive atmosphere in the community when we arrived because the image of the Blessed Virgin Mary was about to be brought to the chapel for the feast day of Our Lady of Fatima. There was Mass to celebrate the occasion and Sr. Lourdes and I attended it; after which we hiked back



Lyca Sarenas

TO EAST TIMOR

of the congregation. She shared her travails, her heartaches, and the pressures that for others were self-imposed in order to help the poor children in the villages and put up a center to house the indigent people. But her motives were so simple and pure, that of being able to relieve the pains of the sick, to give hope to the helpless, and uplift the plight of the poor. She also devoted herself to developing young women by preparing them to perform the tasks she had started, a vocation she hopes to promote.

to the Center only to be caught in the dark and rain. That was my first day in Dare.

The following day was rainy. In the morning, I taught the children how to count in English. Afterwards, I joined the candidates in their sewing activity and in the afternoon, we were visited by a couple of new acquaintances who came looking for me. One person is a member of a Timorese organization I met in APCET III. We talked for more than an hour, exchanging notes and observations. It was a good conversation. As soon



as they left, Sr. Lourdes and I visited the neighbors; the nearest is more or less fifty meters away. I was able to enter a few houses and noticed how orderly the family kept their poorly built houses ranging from 5 x 8 meters in size for the biggest to 3 x 5 meters for the smallest. All are partitioned into rooms. A few houses in the village are made of concrete walls—unlike in Dili where most are made of woven bamboo sheets, with either galvanized irons or the traditional black palm leaves for thatched roofing. After dark we returned and chanced on the girls praying at the mini "grotto" built (with the help of the military) on top of a hill above the Center. I joined them and found the place serene. After the prayer, we came down the hill joyfully singing a religious song "to my Father's house....."

As soon as I got up the following morning I went to the mini grotto and just stayed there to savor its serenity. Thoughts of this country and its people as well as of my own people and family back home came to mind. It was reflection time for me. A few hours later Sr. Lourdes took me to her family's house nearby. We proceeded to the nearest primary school - about 45 minutes walk - took photos along the way and

So then went my very first close-encounter-cum-community integration in East Timor. In the few houses I have been, I noticed that families live by corn, beans and some kind of green leafy vegetables which I assume they take three times a day. Malnutrition is obviously prevalent especially in the rural areas not only among the children but also among adults. Such and more health problems afflict the general population of the country. The health situation is very poor in East Timor. About 40% of the population suffers malaria, followed by tuberculosis, diarrhea, bronchitis, influenza, skin diseases and conjunctivitis. Poor nutrition is also a problem. The people's food intake is very limited, not only in quantity but also in quality.

While the Indonesian government was able to set up a water supply system in the villages, the water tanks that were put up most often turn out to be unhealthy. These tanks become breeding grounds for bacteria and other disease carrying parasites as the water remains stagnant in reservoirs used to accumulate rainwater. Perhaps they should boil the water they drink, so I thought, it seems that they do boil the water except that this prove to be not enough. When I heard Sr.

Lourdes saying education is important; I thought that it should include health. But the problem is that people do not even have access to good education, nor to other basic needs - if at all these are available in the country.

"And you hear the clamor for independence..." I heard Sr. Lourdes remark with a tone that makes one doubt her sense of patriotism. But on the contrary, Sr. Lourdes is indeed very nationalistic. The military and local government once dropped an offer for her to teach in a local public school when she demanded that East Timor history and language be taught.

What struck me from how the statement was said, was the hint of a question - once independence is

achieved, will the people be automatically relieved of their misery and poverty? Of course, we know they will not. But independence could lead to the latter, if the future leaders who will govern this country will take that up as a foremost priority. With independence, the people will be given more opportunity to determine their path to development.



Lyca Sarenas

visited a few other houses as well. In one, we found a bedridden girl.

On my last day at the Center, I had a more informal meeting with the candidates gathered in one of the classrooms. I shared about my work and myself and asked a few questions about their background and their vocation. I learned a few things more and gladly appreciated their warm welcome and hospitality accorded to me. A group picture was taken as a must for posterity.



"After independence there will be more problems and complications to be addressed," Sr. Lourdes continued. I agreed with her given the polarization of ideas, political persuasions and orientations of the Timorese people. But one thing may serve as the unifying motivation: the reality of abject poverty so prevalent all over East Timor. Here I can relate with what the good sister said, that concrete action, not merely politicking, is extremely needed by the people.

I admire the peoples' patriotism, their unrelenting determination, and principled struggle for self-determination and independence. I admire Timorese women, especially those I met from the women's NGO in Dili, one of who is a former political detainee. But my encounters with them also showed the other side of the Timorese. Their thoughtfulness and friendliness touched me. I treasure the gifts and smiles they showered me. I was thrilled by their interest and warmth towards me. Perhaps this was because I was a Filipino and that they could identify with me, and what I represent for them. I am also profoundly grateful to my host organization, Caritas-Dili.

My journey in East Timor would not be complete without meeting fellow Filipinos. They are a significant number in that tiny country and well distributed in different religious congregations. I was impressed by the way Filipino religious missionaries work and develop programs and approaches for the upliftment of the people's lives, providing technical skills, new knowledge, spiritual enlightenment and broader orientations. This is to note the Don Bosco technical school in Komoro, and the Maryknoll sisters in Aileu.

Sr. Chat of Maryknoll said that they sometimes feel drained of everything they know while working in the communities. They share with the people everything they have, and do whatever is needed to be done in their community, including carpentry and plumbing! To them I can only salute.

In the end, I only had these words for the Timorese people whom I have come to know as friends. In an impromptu speech during the despedida party in my honor (I felt so privileged here), I didn't know what to say and didn't want to sound serious and theoretical. I simply said something that struck me about the people of East Timor.

I used to think that Timorese must be an awful lot of unhappy and forlorn people. I imagined them to be unsmiling, with dim faces and lined foreheads, unable to enjoy and celebrate life. But I was wrong. They do smile, even laugh aloud, sing, and dance a lot. In fact, their lives are filled with music. Such made me feel very much at home, and reminded me of Filipinos who are also a happy and fun-loving people who like music, and sing and dance to their hearts' content in spite of travails and problems in life. Because I felt so much at home, I hope to be back and wish it to be soon.

They all laughed and clapped their hands, then they taught me the Timorese dance... which to this day I still haven't forgotten as I will never forget the country and the people where the dance comes from.



Lyca Sarenas



Justice for Tien

INTOLERANCE



The Initiatives for International Dialogue condemns the latest spiral of violence and intolerance in flash-point states of the ASEAN.

On November 21, the Malaysian youthful human rights leader and opposition figure Tien Chua was arrested shortly after chatting to reporters and foreign diplomats during a weekend rally.

On Sunday, six people were killed in Jakarta in the latest flare-up in that blighted land when rioters burned a Christian church and ransacked another during a Catholic wedding ceremony.

Tien was dragged into an unmarked van full of plainclothes agents. He is the chair of an opposition coalition formed in September after the arrest of ousted deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim. He was detained overnight the same month and later complained that he was beaten by police while in custody. The rally that he was attending was likewise dispersed with chemical dye and tear gas.

The ethnic violence in Indonesia is the latest sign that the military-backed Habibie government is hard pushed to maintain order in this seething nation. Just barely a week ago, about 20 people, mostly students, were killed in clashes instigated by police and soldiers against anti-government demonstrators during a government assembly on political reforms.

All these happened after a summit of these countries' leaders in Kuala Lumpur that avowedly promised a rosier path for our peoples to the next century.

Tien was arrested on a weekend and has been denied any legal representation. Two weeks ago, along with 35 others, Tien sued the police for damages during the second anniversary of a similar unlawful detention following the violent break-up of the peaceful closed-door second Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET II) in Kuala Lumpur in 1996. The Malaysian High Court had ruled that the conference was perfectly legal and the subsequent detention of the Malaysian organizers and deportation of foreign delegates were illegal.

There is a pattern to these events. Nay, there is a fundamental flaw in the system that engender these events.

It is the incompatibility of human rights with power. Specially with power of the tottering variety. And power that either rides on macho nationalism or neo-liberalism.

Power that has no tolerance for human rights or dissent is propped up by straw. Straw that is camouflaged by steel and guns and tanks and Sikorskys and unmarked vans. Straw that is masked by faceless, cowardly packs of men who abduct in the dark, who kill when in the company of numbers, who mutilate in the frenzy of a mob.

Yet as all straws are, this kind of power will ultimately fall. Or will be blown away by the inevitable hurricane of change. Change that is perpetually molded by the wisdom and will of the nameless masses, that is being fortified by the tears and hearts of widows and orphans, that is sculpted by the blood of young martyrs. Wherever. In Indonesia, Malaysia, East Timor, Burma, the Philippines.

That change is dawning soon.

Tien Chua should immediately be released and punishment meted for his abductors and their superiors.

Justice should at once be dispensed for the victims of the latest Jakarta carnage as we reiterate our similar call for those of last week's earlier violence.

Of course we also have to do something about the system.

Gus Miclat
Executive Director
23 November 1998

(Tien was freed on police bail on December 5, 1998 - Ed.)



AN OPEN LETTER TO Indonesian President B.J. Habibie AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF ASEAN

Free Xanana Gusmao Now!

It is time to release East Timor's leader Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao!

As the refreshing breeze of democracy wafts over the region sweeping away the vestiges of fascism and colonialism, East Timor's undisputed leader remains in a Jakarta prison. While the vast majority of East Timorese march in the streets of Dili, scour the slopes of Mt. Matebian, pray for freedom in their cathedrals, pound the halls of the United Nations, talk their guts out among themselves in Austria and link arms in solidarity with the democratic aspirations of a still struggling Indonesian people, their leader Xanana Gusmao remains in a Jakarta prison.

Twenty-three years ago, East Timor was brutally invaded by Indonesia. Since then, 200,000 people or more than a quarter of its population have died or have been killed due to the occupation. The United Nations has never recognized the Indonesian annexation. U.N. Security Council resolutions calling on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor "without delay" have repeatedly been defied by Indonesia. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and his special representative, Jamsheed Marker, are paving the way anew for negotiations between Portugal (East Timor's former colonial ruler which remains the "administering power" of the country under international law) and Indonesia. Yet, it is imperative that the East Timorese, through their leader, Xanana Gusmao take part in the on-going negotiations.

Even before his capture in late 1992, Xanana Gusmao has valiantly and creatively led the East Timorese resistance and has not wavered even more so now from inside Indonesia's prisons.

Already Xanana has become the "Nelson Mandela of South East Asia."

While the previous offer of a non-negotiable autonomy of the Habibie government has been virtually rejected, there is need for the East Timorese to all the more speak in unison and negotiate their tortuous path to self-determination. Xanana Gusmao, who is the President of the National Council of Timorese Resistance, is the best person to lead them in this agonizing chapter of their national life. Now the Habibie government is saying that it is open to "granting" independence to East Timor if all else fails. There have been varied receptions to this seeming turnaround but whatever the motives, we welcome and view this as a moral victory for East Timor. Even then, any solution, or even discussion to the aspirations of the East Timorese for their self-determination should include their legitimate leaders, foremost of which is Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao. Other governments specially from the West must go beyond paying lip service to the quest for self-determination in East Timor and more democracy in Indonesia. There can never be just negotiations if the principal party involved, nay, at stake in the negotiations - the East Timorese - are left out in the lurch.

Xanana Gusmao is the recognized leader of East Timor. From the peak of Mt. Ramelau to the plains of Baucau to the coasts of Alas to the diaspora in Macau, Portugal, Australia, to the quiet corners of Resistance offices in Mozambique, Lisbon, Sydney, New York, to the suffocating confines of Cipinang prison in Jakarta the name of Xanana Gusmao evoke the greatest respect among his people.

««

Together with other concerned and peace-loving individuals, groups around the world, the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET) calls on Indonesian President Habibie to effect the unconditional release of Xanana Gusmao and all other political prisoners. Doing so will be a step towards creating the correct atmosphere for a hopefully abbreviated journey to a just, peaceful and internationally acceptable solution to the East Timorese conflict.

APCET likewise calls on the ASEAN governments to also speak out on Indonesia's bloody saga in East Timor and urge the Habibie government in unconditionally releasing Xanana Gusmao. Doing so may be the first step in atonement for their conspiracy of silence about East Timor.

FREE XANANA GUSMAO NOW!

Sgd: ASIA-PACIFIC COALITION FOR EAST TIMOR (APCET)

AFFILIATES: Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor (ASIET-Australia) ♦ Asian Students Association (ASA-Youth Caucus) ♦ Australian Coalition for a Free East Timor (ACET-Australia) ♦ Center for Information and Reformation Action Network (PIJAR-Indonesia) ♦ East Timor Action Network-US (ETAN US-USA) ♦ Free East Timor Coalition (New Zealand) ♦ Free East Timor Japan Coalition (FETJC-Japan) ♦ Friends of the Third World (Sri Lanka) ♦ Hong Kong Round Table on East Timor (Hong Kong) ♦ Indonesian People in Solidarity Struggle with the Maubere People (SPRIM-Indonesia) ♦ Indonesian Solidarity for Peace in East Timor (SOLIDAMOR-Indonesia) ♦ Korean East Timor Solidarity (KETS-South Korea) ♦ Moslem Caucus ♦ Philippine Solidarity for East Timor and Indonesia (PhilSETI-Philippines) ♦ Solidaritas Timor Timur Malaysia (SOLTIMTIM-Malaysia) ♦ Thai Friends of East Timor (TFET-Thailand) ♦ Women Caucus

ORGANIZATIONS: Agir Pour Timour (France) ♦ Australians for a Free East Timor (Australia) ♦ Asian Human Rights Commission ♦ British Coalition for East Timor (Britain) ♦ Canadian Auto Workers (Canada) ♦ East Timor Alert Network (Canada) ♦ East Timor Independence Campaign Otautahi (New Zealand) ♦ East Timor Independence Committee, Auckland (New Zealand) ♦ East Timor International Support Center ♦ East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign ♦ Free East Timor Coalition, Aotearoa/New Zealand (New Zealand) ♦ Friends of East Timor Western Australia (Australia) ♦ International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET) ♦ Japanese Support Committee for Darwin East Timorese School (Japan) ♦ Korea Forum ♦ Minbyun-Lawyers for A Democratic Society (Seoul, Korea) ♦ National Council, Alliance for Democracy (US) ♦ Norwegian Council for East Timor and Indonesia (Norway) ♦ SUARAM Human Rights Centre ♦ World Movement of Christian Workers - ASEAN

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FREE EAST TIMOR FREE XANANA NOW!

The Free Xanana Campaign was re-launched on November 12, 1998. We urge all freedom-lovers to participate directly or indirectly in the world-wide campaign to free East Timorese Leader Xanana Gusmão - unconditionally!



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