

EAST TIMOR

The Inside Story

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East Timorese refused diplomatic protection

On 23 June, seven East Timorese who have been on the run from the army since the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 sought protection at the Finnish and Swedish embassies in Jakarta but both embassies were anxious to get them off the premises as quickly as possible so as not to endanger their profitable business ties with Indonesia.

Four of the men, Clementino Faria, Manuel Brito Ximenes, Oscar Goncalves da Silva and Venture Valentino de Conceicao, sought protection at the Finnish embassy, while the other three, Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes, Profirio da Costa Oliveira and Jose Manuel de Oliveira Sousa went into the Swedish embassy. All are between the ages of 20 and 27.

The two embassies are situated in the same office block in central Jakarta, on different floors. Access is by lift to the respective corridors, with glass walls enclosing the front reception rooms. Throughout the asylum bids, there were troops on guard in the corridors where extra-territorial rights do not apply.

Although the Timorese took documents explaining why they had decided in desperation to seek protection and help to leave Indonesia as quickly as possible, the staff in both embassies showed no sympathy for their plight. From the start, they did everything possible to persuade them to leave their premises. The East Timorese were told that Finland and Sweden could not, by law, grant asylum at their embassies; they could only do so once a refugee had arrived on their home territory.

In actual fact, the East Timorese did not need political asylum as they are all Portuguese citizens. They needed safe passage out of the country; once abroad, they are entitled to Portuguese passports. But even this turned out to be too much to ask of their unwilling Finnish and Swedish hosts. Considering that Sweden in particular has granted political asylum to so many people facing persecution, including Acehnese and West Papuans, their hostile attitude towards these young fugitives from Indonesian terror is hard to comprehend. Swedish protestations about not granting asylum on embassy premises sounded hollow; a very large number of Chileans on the run from the Pinochet regime in the 1970s were helped out of the country after taking refuge at the Swedish embassy in Santiago.

Worthless military 'assurances'

As soon as the Timorese arrived at the embassies, the Indonesian authorities started exerting pressure, in the person of Major-General Hendro Priyono, military commander of the Jakarta military commander. He was a frequent visitor to the embassies, spending as long as four hours at a stretch, persuading the staff of the army's good intentions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were nowhere to be seen. Suharto's recently-appointed 'roving ambassador' for East Timor affairs, Lopes da Cruz, was also recruited to put pressure on the seven. Acting as a mediator was Indonesian human rights activist, Haji J.C. Princen.

Conditions for the four at the Finnish embassy were particularly oppressive. They were prevented from entering the embassy proper and kept in a reception-room, separated only by a glass wall from troops who were on guard. Within 24 hours, the four East Timorese had been prevailed



The three in the Swedish Embassy: From L to R: Profirio da Costa Oliveira, Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes and Jose Manuel da Oliveira Sousa.

upon to leave. They were given no written assurances of any kind. The document they signed says merely, "We are leaving the embassy of our own free will" after joint discussions with the above-mentioned officials and the Finnish ambassador. They were taken to the Jakarta home of Lopes da Cruz, whose role as top-ranking Indonesian collaborator goes back to the days when he signed the treacherous 'Balibo Statement' on 30 November 1975, begging Indonesia to take over East Timor.

The three at the Swedish embassy held out for ten days, insisting all the time that they wanted to leave Indonesia. Throughout their stay, the Swedish embassy staff were under strict instructions not to permit the East Timorese to communicate with the outside world or to receive phone-calls. While Princen acted as mediator, Hendro Priyono and the Swedish chargé d'affaires collaborated closely to force the men to leave the embassy, jointly drafting a statement that they would be required to sign. The extent of this collaboration was revealed in a letter addressed to TAPOL, signed by the three, which was smuggled out of the embassy halfway through their stay there:

Since we have been at the embassy, several intelligence agents have been intimidating us and threatening us outside the door... with offensive words like 'Timur inananhuir cukimai'.... We are not being treated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the Universal Declar-

ation of Human Rights. All the time the military and the Swedish embassy are insisting that we sign a statement that they have drawn up but we have persisted in refusing to do so.

After saying that they were not in good health, they ended with the words: "Please do all you can to try to get us out of Indonesia safely."

The UNHCR's unhelpful role

The three also accused the local UN High Commission for Refugees representative of putting pressure on them to sign a statement prepared by the embassy staff and the military. In an interview later with a Jakarta daily, the agency's representative in Jakarta, David Jamieson, insisted that the UNHCR has no role to play in such an affair, arguing that it could not intervene on behalf of persons claiming refugee status "when they are in their own country". This contradicts the UN's official position which has never accepted Indonesia's claim to have integrated East Timor; the UN's position means that East Timorese in Indonesia are in a foreign country and are therefore eligible for consideration as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees.

A change in UNHCR policy is certainly called for and is understood to be under consideration.

Although they remained resolute, the three in the end decided to leave the Swedish embassy, primarily because they were given to believe that they would be able to leave Indonesia with the assistance the International Red Cross (ICRC) which has helped many East Timorese go abroad either for family re-unification or for humanitarian reasons.

The statement they were required to sign guarantees that they will "not be subject to any persecution, interrogation, intimidation or arrest or similar action as a consequence of (a) their stay at the Swedish embassy, or (b) their actions in the past, with the exception of any criminal offence covered by the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP) such as theft, rape or the like". It was also agreed that the three "shall have full freedom to contact Mr Princen and the Swedish embassy at any time with a view to assuring the proper functioning of this agreement".

The three were taken to the home of Haji Princen and have been under his protection ever since. The tiny house where Princen lives has been under constant surveillance by 'intel' agents who have made many intrusions into the house. One intrusion occurred when an Australian television cameraman went there to interview the three Timorese; the troops tried unsuccessfully to confiscate the tape. On another occasion, the three returned home from an outing with Princen to find a soldier in their room. Although complaints have been made to the Swedish embassy, it has led only to a temporary relaxation, with the spies moving a short distance away but still lurking in the vicinity.

In July, Princen was able to take the four Timorese away from the home of Lopes da Cruz where they were living like prisoners and moved them to Cililitan, under the protection of a Dutch Catholic priest.

All seven have registered their names at the Jakarta office of the ICRC to leave Indonesia and the agency has accepted responsibility to work towards that goal. As in all cases of departure under the ICRC programme, approval of the Indonesian government is required. All seven, along with Princen, are resigned to the fact that this will take time. In the meanwhile, they are living a very precarious existence.

Business interests take precedence

After the Swedish embassy had rid itself of the three Timorese, the chargé d'affaires went out of his way to thank the Jakarta military commander for his "cooperative collaboration even to the extent that the military commander himself took a personal hand in the matter". [*Media Indonesia*, 6.VII.1993]

The unseemly eagerness of the Swedish and Finnish embassies to get rid of their unwanted guests can only be explained by the two countries' extensive business interests in Indonesia. According to Stockholm-based journalist Alfred de Tavares, the asylum bid could hardly have come at a more embarrassing moment for Sweden whose government had just been celebrating a deal with Indonesia worth \$1.5 billion for the Swedish multinational, ABB, to build three power stations in Indonesia. Sweden's leading weapons producer, Bofors, has longstanding links with Indonesia, in particular for the supply of guided missiles.

Last September, the two countries signed an agreement on the protection and promotion of investment. Direct economic aid to Indonesia has been small because of the controversy surrounding financing a regime that is disqualified under Swedish law from getting aid because of its human rights record. The government gets round this by channelling aid through the Nordic Investment Bank owned by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland, which has provided \$150 million in aid to Indonesia since 1978.

Finland's business interests in Indonesia are related mainly to timber and the paper and pulp industry. This includes funding through FINNIDA, the government's overseas aid agency of the supply of seedlings for timber estate projects and consultancy agreements for paper and pulp projects. A joint investment project in Cirebon, Central Java, will provide a market for Finnish equipment to a newsprint mill. [*Pulping the Rainforest*, Special Report No. 1 of Down to Earth, July 1991]

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Seven persecuted men

* **Clementino Faria Oliveira** was arrested in October 1989 after taking part in the demonstration during the Pope's visit to East Timor. Released three months later, he was under constant surveillance and had several close shaves with the security forces trying to re-arrest him. After participating in the 12 November demonstration, his home was raided by troops hunting for him. He decided to leave for Jakarta where he was in hiding until he entered the Finnish embassy on 23 June.

* **Mateus Brito Ximenes** took part in a demonstration when the US ambassador visited Dili in January 1990, following which he had to give up his studies at a technical high school in Dili. He suffered gunshot wounds during the Santa Cruz massacre; along with seven others, he went to the Motael clinic for treatment but left the next day fearing an army attack and went into hiding. After recovering, he travelled to Jakarta in July 1992.

* **Oscar Goncalves da Silva's** entire family has been under threat ever since the 1975 invasion of East Timor. After attending the Santa Cruz demonstration, his family came under even greater danger so he decided to escape to Jakarta.

* **Profilio da Costa Oliveira** took part in the demonstration when US ambassador was in Dili, and had to leave school as he was being sought by the Joint Intelligence Unit (SGI). He was badly wounded at the massacre and escaped, covered in blood. He then fled from the Motael clinic and was taken in by nuns somewhere safe where they treated him for eight months. He left East Timor in July 1992 and in Jakarta continued to be hounded by 'intel'.

* **Florencio Anunciacao Fernandes** was cared for from the age of eight by a priest. He took a course at the University of East Timor and became assistant manager of Hotel Turismo. He abandoned his studies after taking part in the Santa Cruz demonstration. Feeling under threat after that, he and two brothers fled to Kupang. The house where they were taking refuge was surrounded by troops and their host, Luis Xavier Gaspar, was arrested and has not been heard of since. The next day Florencio fled to Jakarta.

* **Ventura Valentim** demonstrated when the Pope visited East Timor and was subsequently arrested, imprisoned and tortured for three months. Later with other school pupils on 19 September 1990, he unfurled a Fretilin banner at school and was again arrested. Again for two months, he underwent beatings and torture and was often denied food. His sister and her husband who live in Los Palos were often intimidated while he was under arrest. After his release, his every move was monitored by the security. This forced him to leave for Kupang in May 1992 and then go to Jakarta in July. He is the only one of the seven who did not take part in the Santa Cruz demonstration.

* **Jose Manuel de Oliveira Sousa** escaped from the Santa Cruz massacre without being wounded. Later, troops burst into his home to arrest him and his brother. They both escaped but got separated. He lost contact with his brother and has had no news from him ever since.

UK-Indonesia ties surge ahead

In June 1993, Britain's relations with Indonesia reached an unprecedented level. Britain became that country's largest arms supplier, with the final contract for 24 Hawks signed with British Aerospace. It also agreed to an unparalleled increase in its annual aid commitment to Indonesia.

While the issue of human rights was being trampled on at the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna, it was being downgraded more concretely by developments in Britain's relations with Indonesia. On June 10, British Aerospace finally announced its contract with Indonesia for 24 Hawk trainer/ground attack aircraft, worth £500 million including spare parts and technical training. Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, after visiting Jakarta in May to seal the deal, said it was 'splendid news for British Aerospace'.

Many British press reports focused on the controversy sparked by the deal. "*Hawk deal promotes human rights row - Britain accused of 'cheering on' Indonesian military as Rifkind hails £500m order*" ran the *Guardian* headline. *The Independent* pointed out that in 1989 as foreign secretary, John Major prevented the sale of Hawks to Iraq for fear they would be used against the Kurds. This time, however, he said he was "delighted" at the deal. Yet the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union recently passed a resolution calling for a complete halt to all arms sales to Indonesia.

The British government gave further support to Suharto at the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) of donor countries and organisations. While several countries reduced their aid commitments for the coming year, Britain pledged 250 per cent more in aid, offering £81 million, the largest percentage rise given by any country.

The increase was met with derision in the House of Lords. Leading the debate was Lord Judd, Opposition spokesperson on overseas aid: "Will the minister come clean? Is this not a sad story in which trade and arms export interests have taken precedence over human rights? ... When will the government change their rhetoric into tangible, effective pressure on the regime?" [*Hansard*, 21.VII.93]. For the government, Baroness Chalker argued that British aid was 'helping the poor in Indonesia'. The truth lies somewhat nearer home. The government's declared policy is to consider a country's human rights record when deciding on aid. When it comes to Indonesia, however, there has always been a readiness to ignore this.

Business interests

While the UK's higher aid commitment was dressed up as a reward to Indonesia for pursuing a tight fiscal policy and reducing poverty levels, it is in fact a promotion for British economic interests in Indonesia. A growing proportion of British aid to Indonesia is made up of Aid and Trade Provisions (ATP) - concessionary loans and mixed credits for the purchase of British goods. In 1991/2, around half was ATP. This year, 80 per cent will be ATP in the form of a £65 million concessionary loan for the construction of a power station in East Kalimantan, to be contracted to British companies. East Kalimantan is where major mining projects will need a plentiful power supply. Kaltim Prima Coal, which will double its output over the next few years for the export market, is half owned by a subsidiary of British Petroleum. The Kelian gold mine, operated by an Australian subsidiary of the British RTZ company, plans to divert the Kelian River to exploit its recent discovery of gold reserves.

The power sector is one of several sectors to which Aid and Trade Provisions have been channelled. It is also one in which, the Department of Trade and Industry says, 'there are continuing good prospects for trade'. British Gas has just won a contract to instal a generator in Serpong, West Java, where a 72-hole golf link is no doubt making heavy demands on the region's power supply.

The other area targeted by Britain's ATP is Indonesia's communications infrastructure, such roads, rail, radio, bridges and airports. British exports to Indonesia are dominated by components for such projects: heavy machinery, transport and power generating equipment.

Improving a country's infrastructure is a sure way of laying the groundwork for foreign investment. The other ingredient - political stability - is something which the British government has put much effort into developing. Selling ground-attack aircraft to a military regime not only strengthens its oppressive might, it serves as a public symbol of what Britain usually does through silent diplomacy, sending a clear message of support for the nature and power of the Suharto regime.

Fifth conference on East Timor in Portugal

For the fifth year running, the University of Oporto organised a conference on East Timor. This year, the focus was on developments in Indonesia. The Timorese leader José Ramos-Horta who was among the speakers, announced the new structure of the resistance.

Prof. Antonio Barbedo Magelhaes has been convener of all five conferences. A dedicated activist, he has become known affectionately as Mr. East Timor. This time he invited several top Indonesianists, Ben Anderson, Daniel Lev, Akihisa Matsuno and Ingrid Wessel while noted East Timor specialists like Roger Clark, John Taylor, Michel Robert, Masao Yamagushi, Artur Teodoro de Matos. Adriano Moreira MP and Pedro Pinto Leite were also present. TAPOL was represented by Liem Soei Liong who gave a talk on Indonesia's *Orde Baru*. Besides Portuguese politicians, Lord Avebury (UK) and Gary Gibson (Australian MP) were among the speakers; human rights activists came from five continents: Asia, America, Africa, Australia and Europe also participated in the conference.

These conferences are particularly interesting because of the active participation of the East Timorese community.

Because of the special focus on Indonesia, a large delegation came from Indonesia, including Indonesian exiles, Indonesian activists living abroad and a number of Indonesians who made a special (and risky) effort to travel from Indonesia to Portugal. As there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries, there are complications for Indonesians travelling to Portugal. Indonesian participation was very active; for the first time the East Timorese refugee community was able to share thoughts with Indonesian dissidents. The Oporto conference (this time held in Estoril, just outside Lisbon) has become a unique meeting place for East Timorese, Indonesians, Portuguese and the international community. Here is international solidarity with East Timor in action.

The new structure of the resistance

José Ramos-Horta told the conference of the new structure of CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance), the umbrella organisation of the resistance. He denied that there was a vacuum in the leadership after the arrest of Xanana Gusmao and Mau Huno. Konis Santana immediately took over and after a period of consolidation, a new structure

was created.

The resistance is now represented by a troika: Konis Santana for the Executive Council of the armed resistance (CEL), José Ramos-Horta as CNRM special representative abroad and a third person representing the Executive Council of the clandestine front (CEFC) not identified by name. The CEL and CEFC each have five members. The CEL is divided into commissions, one of which is a Political and Military Commission (PMC) which includes political party structures like the Fretilin Directive Committee and the chief-of-staff of Falintil, the armed wing of the resistance.

Abroad, CNRM is rapidly building its own structure with representatives in different countries. CNRM representatives include: Jose Antonio Amorim Dias at the European Community, Luis Cardoso in Portugal, Alexandrina Corte Real in the South Pacific, Lay Konen in Melbourne, Filomeno Andrade in Sidney and Abé Barreto in Canada. Other appointments will follow. An Information and Documentation Centre has been set up with experienced activists like Agio Pereira, Ines Almeida, Lola Reis and Geraldo Magno.


The new structure differs in many respects from the structure under Xanana. Recognising the importance of political work in the towns and among Indonesians, the Clandestine Front is now more prominent. Second, politics have taken a commanding position as the Falintil chief-of-staff is now under the Political and Military Commission. As he is in captivity, Xanana Gusmao occupies no formal position in the new structure but is acknowledged as the nominal leader and a source of inspiration for the resistance. He is definitely not written off by the new CNRM leadership. ★

For more information and papers from the Fifth Oporto Conference, contact Prof. A. Barbedo de Magelhaes, Engineering Faculty, Oporto University, Rua dos Bragas, 4099 Porto Codex, Portugal.

Timor at UN Decolonisation Committee

The UN Decolonisation Committee meeting in New York on 13 July this year heard petitions on East Timor from 21 NGOs and individuals. Besides four Portuguese MPs from all the main parties, the following spoke at the Committee:

The National Council for Maubere Resistance, Dan Heap MP (Canada), East Timor Action Network-USA, TAPOL, Agir pour Timor, Amnesty International, Asia Watch, Komitée Indonésie, Prof. Roger Clark, International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, East Timor Alert Network-Canada, FRETILIN, Pax Christi, British Coalition for East Timor, Free East Timor Japan Coalition, Bishop Soma (Japan) and the Catholic Institute for International Relations.



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EAST TIMOR - THE INSIDE STORY

"I met no-one who supports the occupation"

A US journalist who visited East Timor in mid-June was deeply impressed by the strength of feeling in the country against the Indonesian forces of occupation. He expressed amazement at the continued strength of the resistance despite the heavy hand of repression. The nature of the repression had become a recruiting ground for the armed resistance in the interior.

In an interview with TAPOL, Reese Erlich, a freelance journalist from Oakland, California, said he spent three days in East Timor without the authorities paying any apparent attention to his presence. This enabled him to move round freely, talk to people – using Spanish – and visit several villages and towns. At the end of the third day, he was approached by an official, accused of carrying out 'unauthorised journalistic activities' and told to leave for Jakarta the next morning.

Erlich said he chatted to many people – in the streets, in the markets and on buses – but did not meet a single Timorese who supported the Indonesian occupation. The moment the conversation turned to anything serious, people were unanimous in their opposition to integration.

He was particularly struck by his interview of Father Domingus Soares in Ermera who agreed to talk on the record. Other priests were not willing to be quoted but all expressed opposition to the Indonesians and were in general sympathy with the resistance.

Resistance confident of victory

Erlich was able to meet a number of middle and upper-level activists attached to the resistance in the central region and interviewed Ramon, a middle-level resistance council leader. "We want Christian socialism because all the Timorese are Catholics," said Ramon, adding that the independent East Timor envisioned by the resistance would adopt the principles of European-style social democracy.

Ramon told Erlich that the movement has about a thousand people in the hills, 350 of whom bear arms. The resistance has twenty-four groups active in Dili, mostly among students and workers. It no longer hopes for a military victory. "In the military struggle alone, Indonesia will win. But in the political struggle, the victory is ours." They pin their hopes on international pressure to force concessions from Jakarta. Commenting on US support for the UN Human Rights Commission resolution condemning Indonesia, Ramon hoped Clinton would back up its vote with action. "We don't need support in words but in deeds." [San Francisco Chronicle, 13.VII.1993]

Erlich told TAPOL that although the military presence was not over-conspicuous in Dili, as soon as one goes along the country roads and villages, soldiers are to be seen everywhere. He had come away from East Timor with the sense of a pervasive fear of spies and police everywhere. It was hard to find anywhere safe from the prying eyes of the security.

"We all fear for our safety"

These excerpts are from Reese Erlich's interview of Father Domingus Soares of the parish of Ermera:

Q: What is the state of the coffee trade?

Ermera is the richest district in East Timor mainly because of coffee. Before it was economically well off but now the region is disadvantaged because of the low price of coffee. Our coffee is exported by DENOK which I hear belongs to generals with stars. People are very upset. We have talked to those responsible about introducing a free market but this is very difficult to achieve because we are living under the monopolistic generals and in Indonesia, it's very difficult to oppose those who are higher up.

Q: What is the impact of the arrest of Xanana Gusmao and his second-in-command on morale?

Above all Xanana Gusmao is a leader of the Timorese people. He has always been seen as their leader. His 17 years of work in the jungle put him in a very favourable position with the Timorese who are hoping for their freedom. The people see them as heroes who have fulfilled their duties and are now at the mercy of the enemy. The resistance has not died down and has a new leader, Konis Santana.

Q: Do you fear for your own safety, given the outspokenness of your views?

Here in Timor we all fear for our safety and security. We see that when a Timorese has the opportunity to leave, they do so either through the International Red Cross, or as business people with a lot of money. I myself am not afraid of death – today or tomorrow, it's all the same. The important thing is to defend justice for our people who have suffered enough. Dying today or tomorrow is of no consequence to a priest; that's the least of my concerns.


Q: What is the situation with the extent of the military presence?

Here in Timor, their presence has always been a big problem. It was supposed to be the way in which they could control the Timorese as we have seen in the November 12 saga. They retreated when the world cried 'foul' so they tried other means.

At the moment they are using a network of territorial command all over East Timor. In the villages they build houses, work on the rice-fields and visit vegetable gardens. They aim at conquering the people through their hearts but they are just seen as an army presence who are armed even when they go to the fields. Their caring strategy does not melt our hearts because we are people of strong will who won't be bought. What we want is our freedom. ★

[Interview on ABC Radio, Indian Pacific, 5.VII.1993. Also broadcast on BBC Dateline East Asia.]

**FRIENDS
OF
EAST
TIMOR**



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ICRC forced to stop prison visits

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a statement in June deploring the difficulties it has had in the conduct of prison visits in East Timor. This outspoken condemnation of the behaviour of a host government means that independent observation of the condition of prisoners in East Timor has reached a new low.

The ICRC has maintained an office in East Timor since 1979, one of its tasks being to conduct visits to political prisoners on a regular basis. It is well known that the humanitarian agency has access to only a limited number of detention places. Detention centres run by local military commands are excluded, as are many places where people are taken in for intense interrogation, almost invariably to the accompaniment of torture.

The ICRC's presence in East Timor is based on the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the protection of populations in occupied territories. The Geneva Conventions relate to the humanitarian laws of war and the ICRC has responsibility for safeguarding adherence to these laws.

The agency had an office in East Timor in 1975 but was forced to leave in the wake of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. It was not allowed to return until March 1979, following an international outcry over reports of huge loss of life during the Indonesian army's large-scale operations to gain control of the territory.

Visiting political prisoners became one of the main activities of the ICRC in East Timor. In 1992, ICRC delegates visited 110 East Timorese prisoners in 20 places of detention in Dili and Jakarta, but since the beginning of this year, the military authorities have made it impossible for the agency to continue with this programme.

Theo Syafei wants to end ICRC presence

Major-General Theo Syafei who was recently promoted from being commander of the now-disbanded special operations command, *Kolakops* to becoming commander of the Udayana/IXth regional military command based in Bali, is still personally directing army operations in East Timor. He has repeatedly displayed contempt for all international agencies, from the UN down, which are seeking to monitor the situation in East Timor.

In May this year he announced that it was no longer necessary for the ICRC to maintain an office in East Timor. The announcement came as ICRC President, Cornelio Sommaruga was in Jakarta to complain about difficulties the agency was having in the conduct of prison visits in East Timor. But Syafei's call for it to quit did not seem to have the approval of President Suharto who told the ICRC President that the office in East Timor would remain open. After a brief trip to East Timor, he expressed satisfaction that things would improve, but this was not to be.

A programme of visits which began on 25 May was abandoned amid angry denunciations by Pierre Pont, the ICRC chief delegate in Indonesia, who told the press in Jakarta that the agency had been forced to take a "very complex, serious and heavy decision (because) the necessary conditions for Red Cross have not been met".

Soon after, international pressure intensified for independent observers to meet Xanana Gusmao who had been given a life sentence on 21 May and was believed to be on

hunger strike. The only agency likely to carry out this mission with not too much difficulty was the Red Cross so it appears that Ali Alatas, under pressure regarding Xanana's state of health, prevailed upon the military to provide the necessary conditions for Red Cross visits to resume. The ICRC announced a new programme of visits starting on 17 June while Major-General Theo Syafei made it clear that he would not make things easy for them. "They will be here for two days but they had better not try to disrupt or influence interrogations, or I'll send them home," he said. [*Republika*, 17.VI.1993]

Although the ICRC refrained from saying who they met when the programme of visits began, Syafei says that they did meet Xanana. A few other prisoners were visited but when the team complained about many prisoners being moved before they could be visited, the team was told it would have to go to Bali for discussions with the military commander before the scheduled visits could continue. This made its work impossible, forcing the team once again to abandon the programme of visits. This time, the agency delivered a sharp public rebuke of the government [see box].

Since then, the position has not changed and prisoners in East Timor have been deprived of the minimal protection that the ICRC has been able to provide. ★

Dili demonstrators arrested

For the first time since November 1991 when hundreds of peaceful demonstrators were shot dead by Indonesian troops inside and outside the Santa Cruz cemetery, a group of young East Timorese organised a demonstration in Dili on Thursday 22 July.

In Dili at the time and officiating as a Mass in the Dili Cathedral was Mgr Pietro Sambri, the Vatican ambassador to Jakarta. As in earlier days, the East Timorese had apparently decided to take advantage of a visit by a foreign dignitary to give vent to their opposition to Indonesian rule.

Forty youths gathered outside the Cathedral in Dili. As those attending the Mass were leaving, some shouted in Portuguese, "Viva Timor Leste!", "Viva Xanana!" while others unfurled banners written in English "Integration, No! Independence, Yes!"

Within minutes, troops were on the scene to disperse the demonstration. Twenty-six demonstrators were arrested and taken away for questioning by the troops, church sources contacted later said. Twenty-four were later released but two brothers, Pedro Fatima Ferreira, 25, and Estevao Ferreira, 23, were still in detention four days later. [*Publico*, 25.VII.1993]

‘Whoever is afraid of a referendum (in East Timor) is afraid of the truth.’

Xanana Gusmao (Defence Plea, 27 March 1993)

Suharto's clemency hoax

A massive hoax has been mounted by the Indonesian regime which alleges that Xanana Gusmao, the resistance leader sentenced to life in May, has lodged a plea to President Suharto for clemency. While this 'plea' could break all records in procedural swiftness, the appeals procedure for other convicted East Timorese political prisoners have been grossly mishandled by the courts.

The forces of occupation in East Timor seem set on a strategy of obliterating the figure of Xanana Gusmao as the symbol of resistance to Indonesian rule. This is not to say they will physically exterminate him, but they will turn him into a non-person. They hope also to obliterate East Timor's resistance movement, the CNRM, hoping in this way to remove both him and it from living memory.

One part of this strategy is to fabricate a story that Xanana Gusmao has lodged a plea for presidential clemency, meaning that he acknowledges guilt. This is totally at variance with the position he adopted in his defence plea and is simply not credible. In his defence plea, Xanana declared:

I reject the competence of any Indonesian court to try me, and in particular the jurisdiction of this court which has been implanted by force of arms and crimes committed against my homeland, East Timor.

If, as is expected, President Suharto announces a deduction in Xanana's life sentence within the next few weeks, the regime expects to curry favour with many of its trading partners for its display of 'generosity and goodwill'. International pressure against the unjust and illegal sentencing of Xanana Gusmao has steered clear of denouncing the trial as unlawful and concentrated instead on calling for 'leniency' or clemency. To its discredit, this was the position officially taken by the European Community's Council of Ministers, despite Portugal's strong condemnation of the trial as not only unjust but also unlawful.

Mystery surrounds Xanana


Since he was bundled into an army truck, blindfolded, after being sentenced to life by an Indonesian court in Dili on 21 May 1993, Xanana Gusmao, leader of the East Timorese resistance movement has been held incommunicado. Neither his parents nor his sisters have been allowed to visit him and nothing is known about his present whereabouts.

"INDONISATION" OF EAST-TIMOR

Physical and cultural genocide is the policy that Indonesia has imposed in Timor since the country was annexed.

There are more than sufficient grounds to support the view that physical genocide is a fact of everyday life in East-Timor, not only by way of massacre but also through the enforcement of other practices such as the widely reported "Forced Sterilization Program" that the women of East-Timor are being subjected to, with the view of reducing the country's birth rate.

When Xanana revealed that his alleged compliance with his captors was only a ruse to enable him to speak out in court, the army's strategy exploded in their faces. This will certainly have led the BAIS (intelligence) and Kopassus (elite troops) units in whose hands he has been held since his capture last November, to punish him with unimaginable severity. There have already been reports from clandestine sources that Xanana has been severely beaten since the verdict. A report from a reliable source that cannot be named says that Xanana is in a state of mental disorientation and 'unable to speak coherently'. This suggests that he has been given drugs capable of destroying his ability to act of his own free will.




'Clemency plea'

On 4 June, the Indonesian lawyer Sudjono, who was foisted on Xanana when he was in police custody in Jakarta (at the hearing on 5 May, Xanana announced that he no longer wanted Sudjono to defend him), announced that he had lodged a plea for presidential clemency on Xanana's behalf and with Xanana's permission. There is nothing to show that Xanana knows anything about this. Indeed, according to the BBC World Service, none of the plea documents lodged with the Dili district court by Sudjono bore Xanana's signature. The lawyer said he had done this because it was the quickest way to resolve the case, as appeals through the courts take months if not years to complete.

There are many other relevant practises currently being imposed on East Timor, which although seemingly insignificant, are in essence, part of Jakarta's plans. Those practices interfere with the very existence of the people, since they are, at a slow pace, destroying and tampering with our customs, resulting in the distortion of the original norms of our cultural heritage. Changes affecting people's names, are examples: from Henrique to Hendrykus, Carvalho-Tcharfaliu, José-Yusuf, Joao-Youhanes, Alfredo-Alprendikus, and alien names such as Ali, Mohamed, Hudi, Dewi, Sodomio and Amir have been added to the list; the Timorese Lingua Franca, TETUM, has "borrowed" several words from the Indonesians, in its spoken form.



BOYCOTT BALI



● About 70 people gathered in protest on August 17 outside Sempati Air. Organised by the East Timor Action Group the day was Indonesian Independence Day and marked the launch of the national campaign: "Free Xanana, Free East Timor, Boycott Bali". Anyone wishing to help or find out more about the campaign can contact Denis Yuen on 325 1022.

• BALI is the headquarters and centre for Indonesian military operations in East Timor. BALI is also notorious for its prisons which detain and torture East Timorese political prisoners. Boycotting BALI as a tourist destination will send the message to the Indonesian Government that Australians are informed and concerned.

FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR 3251022

AVAILABLE FROM FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR

BOOKS

	PRICE
<u>EAST TIMOR: A WESTERN MADE TRAGEDY</u> [Mark Aarons & Robert Domm] A concise coverage of the East Timor issue. The Left Book Club, Sydney, 1992, 96 pages. Paperback.	\$6.00
<u>INDONESIA'S FORGOTTEN WAR: The hidden history of East Timor</u> [John J. Taylor] Zed Books, Sydney, 1991, 230 pages. Includes 14 page chronology. Highly recommended. Paperback.	\$25.00
<u>DEATH IN DILI</u> [Andrew McMillan] Hodder & Stoughton, 1992	\$15.00
<u>TELLING: EAST TIMOR</u> [Michelle Turner] Personal stories 1942-1992 NSW U. P. 1992, 218 pages, paperback.	\$20.00
<u>EAST TIMOR: AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY</u> C.I.I.R., 1992 28 pages, a brief and concise overview.	\$3.00

CASSETTES

- EAST TIMOR: Talk by Helmi Fauzi (90 min.) 1992. Helmi is an Indonesian intellectual and representative of the Indonesian Forum for Human Dignity
- EAST TIMOR 1974-1982: Talk by Gordon McIntosh (25 min.) 1993. Gordon was an ALP Senator from 1974-1987. He visited East Timor before and after the Indonesian invasion. (Includes notes).

NO CHARGE for cassettes - send SAE and blank cassette
For a full book list contact Friends of East Timor
CHEQUES PAYABLE TO: EAST TIMOR - THE INSIDE STORY

DEATH IN DILI

By ANDREW McMILLAN

In January 1990, while holidaying in Dili, Australian writer Andrew McMillan was caught in the middle of a pro-independence demonstration which triggered, as it were, a strong interest in the issue.

His quest to understand the background of the events he had witnessed led him to the the UN, meetings with East Timorese refugees in Europe and Australia, interviews with Australian war veterans, and then onto the contentious Lusitania Expresso peace boat.

This book is the fruit of that journey and research.

Published by Hodder and Stoughton, Sceptre Books, 1992. 235 pages.