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- "Indonesia fears U.D. aid cut-off on Human Rights" *Pacific News Service* (14.04.1977) | 4 pp.
- Letter to Exmo. Reverendo Padre Francisco M. Fernandes, Presidente da Comissão dos Refugiados de Timor (President of the Commission of refugees in Timor) from Joseph G. Sullivan, Segundo Secretário de Embaixada (25.03.1977) [Portuguese]
- Letter to Exmo Senhor Francisco Mario Fernandes, Presidente da Comissão dos Refugiados de Timor from D.A. Roycroft (1977)
- Letter to the Honorable Fraser, the Chairman of Sub-Committee of the Human Rights from Francisco Lornandes (07.26.1977)
- Letter to the Hon. Donald M. Fraser, U.S Senate, from Douglas J. Bennet, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (21.12.1977)
- Letter to the Hon. Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State from Donald Fraser, Subcommittee on International Organizations, (29.11.1977) | 3 pp.
- Congressional Record - July 20th, 1977
- Information package from the East Timor Information and Research Project that contains documentation concerning Indonesian use of U.S., British, French, Australian and Canadian Military equipment in the invasion of East Timor (1977) | 8 pp.
- Letter to Arnold Kohen from Martin Hatch, one of Ben Anderson's students (20.11.1977)
- Letter to Arnold Kohen from Don Luce, Clergy and Laity Concerned (09.03.1977)
- Letter to Ms. Sue Nichterlein, Republica Democratica de Timor Leste, from Donald M. Fraser, Subcommittee on International Organizations (22.02.1977)
- Rajaratnam: Singapore recognizes the status quo of Timor (01.08.1977)
- Daily Report Annex: Asia & Pacific (18.08.1977) | 2 pp.
- Letter to Dr. Richard W. Franke from David Hicks, StonyBrook (14.06.1977)
- Nation Manuscript that Arnold Kohen wrote, published in November 1977 | 16 pp.
- Document submitted to the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations written by Stephen R. Heder & Arnold Kohen (19.07.1977) Subj.: American Policy and the Issue of East Timor | 5 pp.
- Letter to Arnold Kohen from John P. Salzberg, Staff Consultant of the Subcommittee on International Organizations (05.08.1977)

- Document submitted to the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations, written by Stephen Heder from Arnold Kohen (28.06.1977)
Subj.: East Timor and the Issue of Self-Determination | 11 pp.
- Letter to the Committee for Justice from Richard W. Franke (15.12.1977)
- "Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian" (22.08.1977)
- Notes on Timor hearings in Subcommittee on Inter-National Organizations by Jacqui Chagnon (19.07.1977) | 2 pp.
- "West Timorese flees to Fretilin-held areas" (28.09.1977) ETAN | 2 pp.
- ETAN Press Release: News and Communiques on Radio Maubere September 23 and 25 1977 | 2 pp.
- República Democrática de Timor Leste: News Release that includes three newspaper articles (18.10.1976) | 2 pp. :
 - 40 000 Indonesian armies in East Timor (08.10.1976) *Financial Review*
 - Indons lunch Timor attack
 - Fretilin still strong: Suharto (26.08.1976) *Sydney Morning Herald*
- Letter to Support groups and fraternal organizations from New York Information Office, #45, 35 Claremont Avenue, New York, New York 10027 (Sue Nichterlein) (27.02.1977) | 2 pp.
- Letter to the Members of Congress from Jacqui Chagnon and Mike Connor (03/1977)
Subj.: Ongoing war in East Timor and the use of U.S. Weapons by Indonesia
- Letter to Mr. Blair Clark, The Nation from John Newmann (02.12.1977)
- Letter to Carmel (no last name mentioned) from Lou Wulff (28.03.1977)
- Letter to the Members of the Committee on International Relations from Donald M. Fraser, Subcommittee on International Organizations (29.06.1977) Subj.: Summary of hearing on human rights in East Timor held on June 28, 1977, | 2 pp.
- Letter to Members of the Committee on International Relations from Donald M. Fraser, Subcommittee on International Organizations (21.07.1977) Subj.: Summary of hearing on Human Rights in East Timor, held on July 19, 1977, | 2 pp.
- Radio News Bulletin: Timor Hearings (23.03.1977)
- "East Timor Terrorists surrender to Government" (14.06.1977)
- "Fretilin leader reports victories to Cuban news service" (15.06.1977)

SPECTRUM

Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

MURRAY KEMPTON
CBS RADIO NETWORK
DECEMBER 17, 1977

I'm Murray Kempton.

Mr. Carter's campaign for human rights seems to have been left as exhausted by the realities of the world as his energy program has been by the realities of the Congress.

I confess to having been among those whose hearts were uplifted by the vision of America as bearer of light to the unenlightened. When any government takes to preaching, even what begins as honest fervor swiftly and inevitably declines into hypocrisy.

The substantial roster of foreign despotisms that were objects of Mr. Carter's outrage a year ago seems to have shrunk to South Africa alone. South Africa is, to be sure, among the worthier candidates for international obloquy; but she would not have achieved its unique possession if there were not as much national self-interest as morality in disliking her. Until Portugal abandoned Angola, Secretary of State Kissinger looked most benignly upon white colonialism; and only when there were no more European colonies left did he discover their perfidies and proclaim that the future of Africa belongs to black Africa. Official morality cannot long exist unaccompanied by perceived utility.

The case of Indonesia is a splendid illustration of this rule. Until Cambodia arose to suggest Communism's superiority in these matters, Indonesia was the most savage government in Southeast Asia. Amnesty International reports that it is currently tormenting anywhere from 55,000 to 100,000 political prisoners, most of them without trial for at least a decade. All the same Indonesia has never lost our high favor.

When Portugal freed neighboring East Timor, Indonesia roused to its duty to preserve East Timor's destiny as a province of foreign domination and offered itself as substitute imperialism. The details of this adventure were presented by Arnold S. Kohen in a recent issue of *The Nation*. An Indonesian expeditionary force has occupied East Timor's capital, and is punishing its inhabitants with every refinement of cruelty. These prodigies of terror are being wrought with arms provided by our government, which has added to its material support the compliment of recognizing that East Timor is henceforth forever Indonesian.

But then those of us who had such high hopes for America's redemption as champion of human rights ought to have recognized that for government in the long run, morality can never be more than a matter of convenience.

I'm Murray Kempton with Spectrum.

SPECTRUM

Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
CBS RADIO NETWORK
DECEMBER 17, 1977

I'm Phyllis Schlafly.

When President Carter said he would defend the Panama Canal even if it takes 100,000 American troops, he was indulging in an emotional argument designed to scare us into ratifying the Canal Treaties by conjuring up the threat of rioting, sabotage or military attack.

President Carter has the shoe on the wrong foot. The 100,000 troops are what might be required if we sign the Canal treaties -- not if we reject them. The terms of the treaties require us to give up the non-military assets that now peacefully protect the Canal against violence, and we would be left with only American lives to do the job. On the other hand, if we reject the treaties, we can defend the Canal indefinitely with our existing level of troops there.

The most important asset we now have, but would lose under the treaties, is the buffer Zone of five miles on each side of the Canal that has always enabled us to keep away any troublemakers. Under the treaties, we would surrender this Zone to Panama.

The second non-military asset that keeps Panamanian rioters and troops from doing any damage is their knowledge that, if they get too rambunctious, we could cut off the flow of U.S. dollars by pulling out and building another canal in Nicaragua. That's a much better place for a canal anyway; the climate is better, it's closer, and it has a deep lake that would cut costs. Under the Canal Treaties, we promise not even to talk with any third nation about building another canal.

In addition, the Treaties bind us to consult and cooperate on the defense of the Canal with a combined military board on which an equal number of Americans and Panamanians will serve.

A threat to the Canal could come from several sources: from Torrijos who might decide to nationalize the Canal; from Communist agitators with or without the complicity of Torrijos; or from Cuban troops returning from Angola.

American soldiers would then be called upon to defend the Canal without the advantage of the five-mile buffer Zone, and with the Panamanians. Our diplomats would have no ace up their sleeves to threaten to build another canal elsewhere.

The Panama Canal Treaties deprive us of the several ways we could defend the Canal without expending American lives. To sign the treaties means risking American blood for a dictator's paper promise.

I'm Phyllis Schlafly for Spectrum.

M E M O R A N D U M

April 25, 1977

To: Ed Luidens & Hank Lacy, East Asia
Fred Wilson, Southern Asia
William Wipfler, Human Rights

RECEIVED
OVERSEAS ADMINISTRATION

From: Frank Cooley, Indonesia Liaison

JUL 1

Subject: Reflections on the East Timor Tragedy

1. On March 28 members of the East Asia/Pacific and Southern Asia Committees and the International Affairs Interunit Working Group were invited to a lunch meeting to hear Mr. James Dunn, Director of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Parliamentary Research Service of the Australian Parliament, present the results of his investigations on the situation in East Timor, where, in his view, the Government of Indonesia is largely if not wholly responsible for the military action that caused the death of from 55,000 to 100,000 East Timorese from August 1975 to the present. One manifestation of Indonesia's interference in the decolonization process and the independence struggle of the East Timorese people has been the integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia on July 17, 1976, an event deplored by the United Nations on several occasions. According to Mr. Dunn, hostilities continue, as do human suffering and death, since the Indonesian Armed Forces have only succeeded in bringing 20% of the territory of E. Timor under control. The Fretelin forces are reported to be continuing their revolutionary struggle until the goal of full independence is achieved.
2. On March 31 some of us attended a meeting hosted by the Indonesian Embassy at the Ramayana Restaurant in New York to hear two East Timorese in the provincial government brought to testify before the Frazer Committee, reply to Dunn's allegations. Their picture of the situation in E. Timor and their interpretation of how and why things transpired as they did were in sharp contrast to that of James Dunn. They admitted that probably less than 20,000 people had been killed as a result of the fighting, saying that many of them died not from wounds but from hunger, especially small children, due to the disruption and isolation caused by the military action. They affirmed that the only remaining fighting was in the form of bandit activities, and that the provincial government was actively engaged in rebuilding the region and development projects.
3. Thus we are presented with reports and interpretations from both sides, incidentally with eloquent, purportedly knowledgeable, Australians (Dunn and Sydell) speaking "on behalf of the East Timorese people," that seemed diametrically opposed. Each side tried to discredit both the reporters and their interpretation from the other side. There seem to be a dearth of "neutral" or third party reports that help in arriving at a clear picture of the state of affairs presently, as well as the reasons for the situation developing as it did. An Indonesian Catholic report, clearly not pro-Fretelin in sympathies, gives more support to the Australian (Dunn) than to the Indonesian (Carascalao and Goncalves) version. The report of the International Committee of the Red Cross visiting

delegation prior to the Indonesian intervention on December 7, 1975 has never been published. Nor does the report of the UN Secretary General's representative, Gucciardi, give much help in ascertaining the actual state of affairs throughout the process and currently. Material from the US State Department appears very general and uncritical. The report of the Consultation between Indonesian and Australian Councils of Churches in Jakarta in December 1976 provides no detailed information or analysis that is helpful to us in ascertaining the true state of affairs.

4. Thinking we might have an opportunity to get more complete facts and broader interpretation if we could talk with them privately we asked the Indonesian Embassy to make the two East Timorese available for a meeting with us on April 1 in which no Embassy people were present and with interpreters provided by us. This was readily agreed to and a small group met with them for three hours exploring the situation more in depth to discover if there might be some role church groups might play in alleviating the tragic suffering and in reconciling the conflict, perhaps. In that session a couple of things emerged more clearly, though their interpretation was not substantially different than that presented the previous day. One was that the attitudes and acts of Portuguese authorities in Dili in August were quite influential in making the conflict between Fretelin and UDT possible and probable. This reflected the radically opposing positions taken in Portugal as between right and left proponents. The other interesting element that emerged was the opinion expressed two or three times in different ways. One was "we are happy with the situation today, but if things change we will fight against Indonesia, and we wouldn't be happy to see American weapons used." Another was, "we must see the positive aspects of this war, despite all the horror of it. Now we can build perhaps. But what is now integration with Indonesia may become a divided island. We will fight if we must. We don't want to go from one colonial situation to another." At another point it was said, "All the people in the civil government are Timoreans. It must continue that way, or I will oppose."

In response to the question whether they saw any role for the Church in mediating or reconciling the continuing hostilities "I think so. There is a mission for the Church as long as it does not take a political position. Maybe because of the noise and interest of the churches, the situation is better there now." They said they would take up this idea with their provincial government when they returned.

5. On April 11 I had a couple of hours with Mr. Charles Runyon, Assistant Director for Human Rights in the State Department, and found him actively interested in the possibility of a role for the Church in human rights in Indonesia in general and regarding East Timor in particular. He assured me that as the new administration placed its people in the Department - so far a slow process there would be more interest and activity in this field, especially in the office of the Deputy Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the State Department. He introduced me to Mr. Kenneth Hill in that office. Mr. Hill promised to send me any

reports resulting from the current visit of a Congressional delegation to Indonesia on human rights questions.

Mr. Runyon was very much in sympathy with the idea of a fact-finding visit to East Timor on the part of the churches, and any further steps that such a visit might suggest in the direction of reconciling the conflict and assisting with the human suffering resulting from the situation.

6. It seems to me we are faced with two options:

- a. In view of the unclear situation as regards the facts and interpretation of events in East Timor, the matter should be kept on the back burner and no steps be taken beyond trying to monitor continuing reports and materials that become available.
- b. Because of the unclear situation as regards the facts and interpretation of events in East Timor, the NCCCUSA and its constituent units (possibly together with the Roman Catholic agencies) take steps to ascertain the true state of affairs, possibly by sending a small delegation to Jakarta and East Timor. Subsequent actions would depend on the results and recommendations of this visiting delegation.

If a visit were proposed, a small task force would be required to make preparations which would include the following:

- a. seeking a prior reading of the reactions of the Indonesia Council of Churches and their suggestions and assistance in proceeding;
- b. idem as far as the CCA and the Australian NCC is concerned;
- c. consulting with Catholic agencies;
- d. preparation of action supporting the proposal by the three NCCCUSA committees concerned: East Asia and Southern Asia DOM and the Human Rights Committee;
- e. suggestions regarding funding and constituting of the delegation;

Because of the consultation and committee process that would be required, it would not seem realistic to hope that a visit could be mounted before early or middle summer at the earliest.

I will be leaving for Indonesia on May 2, and expect to be back by early June. The Southern Asia Committee has a scheduled meeting for June 15. The Chairperson of Southern Asia and members of East Asia Committee will be in Indonesia middle June and could explore the matter with Indonesian, and possibly Australian and CCA colleagues, if that were desirable.

Please let me have your preliminary reactions to this by Thursday 2 PM when I leave the office.

June 14, 1977 RECEIVED
ADMINISTRATIVE

JUL 1

5. Further Reflections on the East Timor Tragedy

1. I had numerous opportunities while in Indonesia to talk with people who had first or second hand information on the situation in East Timor, and used the same as effectively as I could to try and obtain a clear picture of the current status of hostilities and development in East Timor. In addition there was a special session scheduled on May 18, during the Central Committee meeting of the Council of Churches, at the request of the Evangelical Church of Timor, which included a report from that Church on

1. What has happened in East Timor?
2. What has been done by the churches?
3. What is currently happening?
4. What does East Timor need, and what can be done as churches?

This was followed by what was probably the most intense and involved discussion of the entire 8 day meeting. The comments made showed that there was deep interest and concern about the situation. Some were reminded of earlier times of tribulation in the South Moluccas (1950-56), Minahasa and Sumatra (1958-60) and West Irian (1961-1971), and expressed the hope that the Indonesian government would do better this time in understanding and responding to the feelings and aspirations of the local people.

2. As my visit was drawing to a close I felt that a much clearer picture was emerging, one that fell somewhat between the two extreme pictures presented by the protagonists, the Fretelin, largely via Australian channels, and the Indonesian Government. However, conversations during the last 48 hours in Jakarta raised again all the questions already formulated in the first "reflections", and I no longer feel at all confident that I know what the current situation really is or what the needs are or how they might be met. Had I been able to extend my visit another week, which was not possible, to probe more deeply into the matter with informants with first hand experience as well as American and Indonesian government officials, it might have been possible to resolve some of the doubts and uncertainties I felt when I left Jakarta on May 29th, among others:

1. Just how much of the area and population are really under the control of the Indonesian Government? And how extensive is the "no man's land" between the two sides?
2. How strong are the "rebel" forces and how long can they be expected to mount substantial resistance? How true is it that they are being supplied from the outside by speed boats entering from the south?
3. How heavy are the casualties on both sides, both from military action and from illness due to lack of proper food, medicines, etc.?

3. I picked up a general impression that the "flying visit" of the American congressional delegation (Lester Wolff and Helen Meyner) produced little but a further "whitewash" of the Indonesian Government's interpretation. Except that some initiatives have been taken by the State Department/American Embassy in Jakarta to ascertain whether CRS and CWS (Private Voluntary Organizations having PL 480 Title II) desire and are in a position to provide relief and development assistance in East Timor. CWS Indonesian Director is reported to be "interested in providing humanitarian assistance and is willing to submit proposal to GOI expressing CWS interest and requesting permission to visit East Timor to determine type of aid required and methods for administration of such aid." To the present all assistance rendered by the Protestant churches has been limited to East Timorese refugees along the border in West Timor.

4. I found the leadership of the I.C.C. more open to initiatives both from within Indonesia and from the American churches to provide humanitarian assistance as needed and possible. It is my conviction that SA DOM should pursue this vigorously in cooperation with East Asia and others similarly related. It seems to me that a visit on the spot and substantial discussions with the I.C.C., the Timorese Church, and the government (provincial and national) should precede determination of the nature and scope of the program.

SPECTRUM

Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

MURRAY KEMPTON
CBS RADIO NETWORK
DECEMBER 17, 1977

I'm Murray Kempton.

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I'm Murray Kempton with Spectrum.



PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE

ASIA-- 800

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INSIDE ASIA

EDITOR'S NOTE: INSIDE ASIA is compiled from on-the-spot sources. It is designed to give readers a quick sense of the dominant moods and trends in this region.

INDONESIA FEARS U.S. AID CUT-OFF ON HUMAN RIGHTS

JAKARTA, April 14 (PNS)--

The U.S. Congress' refusal to accept a softened Carter Administration stance on human rights has caused particular apprehension for the financially troubled Indonesian government, the object of mounting criticism for gross violations of human rights. Despite its wealth of petroleum and natural gas resources, the regime of Gen. Suharto is caught in a tight financial squeeze. Its national oil company is \$6.7 billion in debt, and Indonesia's continuing war against East Timor's Fretilin guerrillas has likewise drained the treasury.

Carter's new budget would increase military aid to Indonesia from \$47 million to \$58.1 million and economic assistance from \$125.8 million to \$147.8 million. Both items, however, require congressional approval.

Meanwhile, Amnesty International (AI), the London-based human rights organization, has challenged the Indonesian government's admitted figure of 30,934 political prisoners, the majority imprisoned without trial for more than 11 years. Basing its report on sources in Indonesia, AI claims the actual number is more than 55,000. Another report recently published by James Dunn, former

-more-

ASIA--2222

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Australian consul to East Timor (annexed by Indonesia in 1975), declared that the plight of the East Timorese population "might well constitute . . . the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time."

POLITICS KEY FACTOR IN VIET OIL DEALS

ROME, April 14 (PNS)--

An Italian oil firm has won the first major oil exploration deal in Vietnam, largely because of Italy's strong Communist Party.

Vietnam has signed a letter of intent with Agip, a division of Italy's state-owned oil company ENI, to explore and develop two choice offshore locations near the Mekong Delta.

Vietnam's resource Minister Dinh Duc Thien said the Italian firm was chosen partly because of Italy's independent Communist Party and partly because the government-owned company has a consistent record of dealing fairly with the Third World.

Observers predict a French oil firm will win the next exploration contract from Hanoi, thanks to the French Socialist-Communist alliance's 51 percent victory in recent municipal elections.

OIL SPILLS SPUR NEW TANKER REGULATIONS, HURT JAPAN

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, April 14 (PNS)--

New tanker regulations in the congested Malacca and Singapore Straits--inspired by the rising threat of oil spills--could add as much as \$270 million to Japan's oil import bill, which has already strained the national economy. The regulations, imposed by Malaysia,

--more--

Singapore and Indonesia, are aimed specifically at supertankers. All tankers weighing more than 280,000 deadweight tons will have to either reduce their loads before entering the Straits or detour 1,200 miles through the Lombok Straits, adding three days to the Mideast-Japan voyage.

TAIWAN'S 'DARKIE TOOTHPASTE' DRAWING BLACK PROTEST

TAIPEI, TAIWAN, April 14 (PNS)--

"Darkie Toothpaste," a major Taiwanese brand featuring the wide-eyed, grinning face of a black man on its tube and box, has triggered an angry reaction from black Americans here. In one of several protest letters to the local China Post, black U.S. Embassy official Edward Oliver called the trademark "an affront to every black American."

A spokesman for the company that produced the toothpaste said it had no intention of dropping the trademark because "the teeth of black people are considered beautiful." Grand Justice Fan Hsin Hsiang of the Taiwan Supreme Court also defended the officially registered trademark as a "simplicity of beauty with no implication of insult."

JAPAN USING SOUTH KOREAN WORKERS TO WIN CONTRACTS

Tokyo, April 14 (PNS)--

The Japanese, using their unique system of Japanese supervisors and cheap South Korean workers, have captured another lucrative construction contract in the Mideast. The new project, an iron works in Qatar, will call on South Koreans for 90 percent of its 300-man workforce.

"The skilled labor force of South Korea has nearly twice the productivity of Japanese workers in some fields and the wage level is one-third that of Japan," a Taisei Construction Co. executive explained.

Similar arrangements are used in road building, harbor facilities and plant construction projects in Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Ecuador. The work usually involves a hierarchy of some dozen Japanese supervisors or engineers at the top, skilled South Korean workers in the middle and local workers at the bottom. Such pay and status divisions have occasionally caused problems, as when Korean laborers on an Ecuadorian construction site assaulted Japanese workers a year ago.

Despite the problems, an executive of the company involved said he did not plan to change employment policies. "We cannot win international competition without Korean workers," he declared.

NUCLEAR POWER THREATENS LOSS OF HOMES

MANILA, April 14 (PNS)--

The 11,000 residents of Morong, Bataan, in the Philippines are worried that construction of the nation's first nuclear plant may bring the forced relocation of their town. Critics of the plant not only fear the resulting loss of farm land and fishing grounds, but charge that the plant's \$1.1 billion estimated cost is disproportionate to the needs of the country, already struggling with a \$5.5 billion foreign debt.

Current martial law, however, prohibits public protest by local citizens or environmental groups. The nuclear plant is expected to be operational by 1984.

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lisboa, 25 de Março de 1977

Exmo. Reverendo
Padre Francisco M. Fernandes
Presidente da Comissão dos Refugiados de Timor
Acampamento da Quinta da Graça
Cruz Quebrada, Lisboa.

Reverendo Padre Fernandes:

Em nome do Senhor Embaixador agradeço os cumprimentos que lhe foram enviados, bem como ao Senhor Presidente Carter nas suas cartas de 11 de Março de 1977.

Desejo assegurar a V. Exa. que os sentimentos manifestados em relação a Timor Oriental foram transmitidos ao Governo dos Estados Unidos para sua consideração.

Sempre ao dispor de V. Exa., aproveito o ensejo para apresentar os meus melhores cumprimentos.

Muito Atenciosamente,

Joseph G. Sullivan
Segundo Secretário de Embaixada

Exmo Senhor
Francisco Maria Fernandes
Presidente da Comissão dos
Refugiados de Timor
Quinta da Graça
CRUZ QUEBRADA

Exmo Senhor,

Incumbiu-me Sua Excelência o Embaixador de acusar e agradecer a carta de V. Exa. de 31 de Dezembro, de cujo teor tomámos devida nota.

Aproveito esta oportunidade para apresentar os melhores cumprimentos e subscrevo-me,

Atenciosamente



D.A. Roycroft
1º. Secretário (Informação)

Hon. DONALD FRAZER

Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Human Rights
US Congress Washington D.C.

ON OCASION OF DEBATING EAST TIMOR CASE IN US CONGRESS
WE SEEK YOUR GOOD OFFICES TO ACHIEVE SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR OUR PEOPLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES,
CALLING FOR RETURNING OF PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION TO
FULFIL DESCOLONIZATION RESPONSABILITIES Stop

Best regards

Telegrama dirigido ao Presidente de Comité dos Direitos Humanos
no Congresso Americano

Versão Portuguesa

Comissão dos Refugiados de Timor
CRT
Quinta da Graça, Cruz Quebrada
26th, 7, 1977

CONGRESSO
USA

Dear Honorable Fraser,
The Chairman of Sub-Committee of the Human Rights.

We are sincerely trusting in US policy on behalf of the alleged violation of Human Rights in East Timor. We are deeply convinced that this policy is not a mere propaganda but it is a real way to save those who are victims of the Human Rights violation.

Therefore we are particularly concerned to directly contact Your Excellency and the Members of the Committee in order to express our repulsion and to provide you facts and reports about the so called Human Rights violation in East Timor. We suppose you already have got information from Indonesian sides as well as ~~well as~~ from Fretilin ones.

But little in this concerns the Timorese Refugees in Portugal, who are free now from Indonesian annexation or Fretilin domination; who represents the feeling of majority; who can say freely what is true; who are the eye-witnesses and the first hand informants of what Your Excellency and the Members of Committee are unable to know by other means.

We suppose that Your Excellency and the Members of the Committee desire to know the truth, in order to have an accurate picture of what went on before and what is going on now in East Timor.


As soon as we have saved enough money to pay our travel and accommodation we will fly to Washington.

We would be pleased to hear from You concerning this.

Yours sincerely

Fr. Francisco Maria Fernandes

(The Chairman of Timorese Refugees Committee)
in Portugal.



APPENDIX - C

C O N F I D E N T I A L

For Representatives of Congress only

In view of the sensitive nature of this report,
recipients are asked not to disclose its source.

THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

THE TIMOR SITUATION - REPORT FROM INDONESIA

A brief report, entitled "Notes on East Timor", has been received from a Catholic organization in Indonesia, which is concerned with humanitarian relief operations. Although the report is couched in guarded language and provides few details about the situation in East Timor, it is a significant and disturbing document. In general the picture which emerges from this report is consistent with other recent reports on the situation in East Timor from both Fretilin and non-Fretilin sources. The document presents a grim picture of the situation in East Timor. Particularly disturbing, is the account of the death toll. The authors of the report stated that they had considered the initial reports that 60,000 people had been killed in East Timor to be "rather high", but in Dili two priests told them that the fact the figure of people killed in Timor may have reached 100,000. If we accept the International Red Cross assessment that before the Indonesian invasion only some 2,000 people had been killed in the fighting in the territory, it follows that since 7 December last year the Indonesians have been responsible for the killing of perhaps as much as 15% of the population of the territory. True, Fretilin would have been responsible for some killing, but any suggestion that Fretilin might have been responsible for more than a small fraction of the total, is inconsistent with the popularity the resistance movement evidently enjoys. The report from Indonesia notes, by way of example, that of the 5,000 people who welcomed Indonesian troops at Ermera, only 1,000 now remain in the town, the others having joined Fretilin in the mountains.

The report states that all villages and towns in East Timor are occupied by Indonesian military forces, but that beyond the villages and towns the territory is not under their control. It notes that land communication "had been disrupted" and that the only means of transportation was by helicopter or by sea around the coast. It is stated that "80% of the territory is not under the direct control of the Indonesian military forces". The report

refers to the misbehaviour of the Indonesian occupying forces, whom it accuses of "stealing, robbery, burning houses, violating girls, etc., etc.". It notes that there has been a decline in support for "integration" because of these excesses. This information accords with another report received late in August in which the Catholic bishop of Timor, Bishop Ribeiro commented on the misbehaviour of the Indonesian troops and the fact that the Timorese were very "sceptical and anxious about completing integration". The report under study mentioned that many of the population have moved into the mountains to evade Indonesian control. It suggested that 500,000 people were not under their control and that this made it extremely difficult to initiate a rehabilitation program. The report noted that the East Timor Government (i.e. the administration under Governor Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo) is "without any authority" and is merely a "puppet government for the military commander".

Fretilin was referred to by the report as a Communist Party, perhaps reflecting the description given the authors by authorities in Dili. They noted, however, that Fretilin "treated the people well now and do not offend them in their believe (sic)". It was reported that Fretilin attempted to maintain a high level of discipline and that the Timorese soldiers were working the farms. This was interpreted as tactics designed to win over the people. The report recorded some comments heard in Timor. They included: "In the Fretilin there are Communists, but among the Indonesian troops there are more Communists"; and: "If there should be held a real referendum the people will choose Fretilin".

Fretilin's military tactics were briefly referred to in this report. It was stated that Fretilin troops avoided frontal attack or engagements with the Indonesian forces, and they sought not to raid villages where Indonesian troops were stationed. Fretilin troops were carrying out a guerrilla war. Another interesting point was that Fretilin still had access to the sea on the south coast. The report stated that it was "rumoured that (Fretilin) got supplies (men and material) from Australia". The report referred to a rumour that Indonesia would start using Napalm "because they cannot win the war otherwise". It also reported that Indonesia had instructed that the "Stalin organ", a multiple

rocket launcher, be used in Timor. In fact, during the past two months, Fretilin messages have referred to rocket attacks by Indonesian troops.

The report gives some information on political parties but it may be that this refers to an earlier period, as officially parties no longer exist in East Timor. It suggests that UDT has the support of about 40% of the people, Apodeti 20% and Fretilin 25%. It speaks of about 20 or 30 real Communists among the leadership of Fretilin and refers to them as men who came from "the Lisbon University in Portugal". In fact only one or two of the 45 member central committee of Fretilin had been to Lisbon University and none of the leaders were members of the Communist Party.

This report referred briefly to the Church in East Timor. It said there were 31 priests in the Territory, 15 of them native priests. It also stated that 6 priests, 2 Portuguese, 1 Indian and 3 native, were "known to be held by the Fretilin in the mountains". A number of priests are believed to be with Fretilin, but this does not of course mean that they are being held against their will. In fact, recent information from Darwin suggested that an ordained Timorese priest had emerged as one of the leaders of the Fretilin organization. The "Indian priest" referred to in the report could be a Goan, Father Monteiro, who was very popular with Fretilin leaders. The report from Indonesia also referred to "domestic refugees" who were said to be peasants from border regions in West Timor, who had been forced to flee because of Fretilin raids into Indonesian Timor. This report gives credence to information contained in Fretilin messages during the past two months or so, which have suggested that the Indonesian troops were doing badly in their attempt to gain control of territories near the border, particularly the area between Bobonaro and Suai.

The information contained in this report adds substantially to the mounting evidence that the Indonesians have been carrying out a brutal operation in East Timor, involving indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post World War II history, and that they are continuing to meet extensive resistance, despite their overwhelming superiority in numbers and weapons. With monsoon conditions having returned to Timor (and these will continue until May next year) it will now be very difficult for the Indonesians to extend the areas under their control, let alone destroy Fretilin. The suggestion in this report that Indonesians are considering the use of napalm is a matter of particular concern. In a land of palapa villages the effect of napalm on the already suffering population would be devastating. As the situation stands, if the figure of 100,000 deaths is accurate, Indonesia's "integration" of East Timor must go on record as, relatively speaking, the bloodiest act of annexation since the second World War. The fact that this report has been obtained from a responsible organization in Jakarta, which would have little sympathy for Fretilin as a party, suggests that there is much disquiet in Indonesia about the Timor affair. Indeed, the possibility that the full story will eventually be disclosed by the Indonesians themselves cannot be ruled out - perhaps as part of a political move by one military group against the Suharto Government, or more specifically against Ali Moertopo and General Moerdani, the architects of "Operasi Komodo". The information contained in this report from Jakarta, and other reports received from similar sources during the past three months, present a grim picture of the humanitarian situation in East Timor, resulting from the territory's "integration". It may be that the rights of the Timorese to determine their own future is an irretrievably lost cause, but, if other basic human rights have been disregarded as inhumanly and blatant/as this and other reports suggest, the Indonesian Government would be wrong to assume that world reaction to "Operasi Komodo" has now subsided.

NOTES ON EAST TIMOR

1. THE PRIEST

There are 31 priests in East Timor :

- 15 Native priests
- 16 Priests of foreign nationalities

Note : 2 Portuguese, 1 Indian and 3 native priest are known to be held by the Fretelin in the mountain. Nobody knows about their well being.

Whether priests of foreign nationalities will stay and work in East-Timor is an open question but it is believed that some priests will leave for Portugal.

2. THE PEOPLE

One third of the population had been baptized Catholic. The rest, however, claimed themselves to be Catholic. At the moment many are to be baptized because they heard in the other parts of Indonesia, everybody must have a religion.

3. DILLI

The total town people of Dilli is 30,000. 20,000 of them have now registered themselves for passage to Portugal. Others are with the Fretelin in the mountains so that in fact the real town people of Dilli numbers only a couple of thousands not counting the Indonesian soldiers.

4. POLITICAL SITUATION

- All villages and towns in East Timor are occupied by the Indonesian military forces. Beyond the villages and towns there is no main land. And the safety is not guaranteed because of the Fretelin raids.
- The total population of villages and towns occupied by the Indonesian forces amounts to 150,000 people. Taking the total population of East Timor of 650,000 people into consideration it means that 500,000 people is not under their control.
- Land communication has been disrupted. The only means of transportation is helicopter or sea route.
- About the territory : 80% of the territory is not under direct control of the Indonesian military forces.

5. DEAD TOLL

According to report, 60,000 people had been killed during the war. We found this figure rather high, because it means 10% of the total population of East Timor. But when I asked two Fathers in Dilli they replied that according to their estimate the figure of people killed may reach to 100,000.

6. POLITICAL PARTIES

As Dilli sees it :

+ 25% are members of Fretelin. (But the top leaders who are the real Communist are only 20 - 30 in numbers. They all came from the Lisbon University in Portugal).

+ 10.50 % are U.D.T. (Democratic Party)

+ 20.25 % are Apodeti.

When the Fretelin came into force the UDT and Apodeti joined together for integration with Indonesia. The Fretelin was at that time an independent party although most of their leaders are Communists. Later it become real Communist.

7. INTEGRATION

- The desire to integrate with Indonesia is beginning to cool off because of bad experience with the occupying forces. (stealing, robbery, burning houses, violating girls etc.).

- An example :
5000 people welcome the Indonesian troops in Guilva (Demonstration for integration). Now there are only 1000 people in Amaru, others joined the Fretelin in the mountains.

- If this is an exceptional case, then it will be not so bad, but if this is a symptom of the real situation, than it is very bad.

8. REHABILITATION

- At present it is very difficult to start rehabilitation program because the people we intended to help are still in the mountains.

- A teacher school might be an important subject but there are no pupils or only a very few.

- The other possibility that looks promising is the language course. Father da Costa plans to open the language course in September or December. But the house that Father da Costa has kept ready for the course was taken by the military.

9. THE GOVERNMENT

- The East Timor government is without any authority. It is only a puppet government for the military commander.
- The new Governor promised to build a big new mosque for the few Moslem in Dilli. Before the war their number was about 300. Now there a lot of Moslem soldiers.

10. THE FRETILIN

It appeared that the Fretelin has changed its tactic to win the people. They treated the people well now and do not offend them in their beliefs. They tried to keep their discipline high. The Fretelin soldiers are cultivating land now and make gardens.
Some comments heard in passing :

- " In the Fretelin there are Communists, but among the Indonesian troops there are more Communists. " -
- " There are good people in the Indonesian troops, but many of them are bad soldiers " -
- " If there should be held a real referendum people will choose Fretelin " -

11. WEAPON

- It is rumoured that Indonesia will start using napalm , because they can not win the war otherwise.
- Last week Indonesia ordered Stalin organ to back their purpose.

12. THE FRETILIN STRATEGY

They evade frontal attack or engagement with the Indonesian troops, or raid village where there are Indonesian troops. They employ guerilla war pattern. When they are out on raid for food and material they often send mothers with children first, followed by older people then young villagers and at the rear the Fretelin, as much as six or ten. The Fretelin keep watch while the villagers steal and rob.

The Fretelin has access to the sea on the south coast, facing Australia. It is rumoured that they get supply (men and material) from Australia.

Cont'd.....



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 21, 1977

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked that I respond to your letter of November 29 regarding the United States position on the recent United Nations resolutions concerning East Timor and Belize.


We voted against the resolution on East Timor because we did not believe it would serve a constructive purpose. As you know, the Administration has acknowledged Indonesian annexation of East Timor as a fact, though it has not asserted that self-determination has been exercised. We consider our vote in the Fourth Committee to be consistent with testimony by Department of State officials to your Subcommittee. We also voted against the resolution when it came up in Plenary November 28. We did not change our vote because we continue to believe the resolution will not promote the foreign policy and human rights goals we are pursuing.

As Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert B. Oakley said during his testimony before your Subcommittee on October 18, our primary concern is to encourage actions that will realistically serve the interests and well-being of the inhabitants of East Timor. We seek to encourage the Government of Indonesia to administer East Timor fairly and to provide access to recognized international humanitarian organizations which will assist the Timorese inhabitants. We have on several occasions stressed to the Indonesian Government the importance of granting representatives of such organizations access to East Timor. We are continuing to explore this possibility, and believe that our efforts may bear fruit in the near future.

The Honorable
Donald M. Fraser, Chairman,
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Committee on International Relations,
United States Senate.

Regarding Belize, as you indicated in your letter we are actively supporting efforts to reach a negotiated solution acceptable to the interested parties, and we consider it important to avoid the appearance of favoring one party or another. The two resolutions considered in Fourth Committee were supported alternately by Great Britain and Guatemala, with each opposing the draft supported by the other. A United States vote in support of either resolution would have reduced our ability to be helpful in encouraging a negotiated solution. Therefore, we abstained.

Sincerely,



Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

Correspondence Returned.

L. M. FOUNTAIN, M.C.
DANTE B. PASCELL, FLA.
CHARLES C. DODD, JR., MICH.
ROBERT W. C. NIX, PA.
DONALD M. FRASER, MINN.
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, N.Y.
LYC H. HAMILTON, IND.
LESTER L. WOLFF, N.Y.
JONATHAN S. BINGHAM, N.Y.
GUS VATHON, PA.
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, MASS.
LEO J. RYAN, CALIF.
CAROLIS COLLINS, ILL.
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, N.Y.
HELEN S. MEYER, N.J.
DON BONKER, WASH.
GERRY E. STUDOS, MASS.
ANDY IRELAND, FLA.
DONALD J. FEASE, OHIO
ANTHONY C. BELENSON, CALIF.
WYCKE FOWLER, JR., CA.
E (KIKI) DE LA GARZA, TEX.
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CALIF.
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, NEBR.

WILLIAM S. BROOKFIELD, MICH.
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, ILL.
PAUL FINDLEY, ILL.
JOHN W. BUCHANAN, JR., ALA.
J. HERBERT BURKE, FLA.
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., OHIO
LARRY WINN, JR., KANS.
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, N.Y.
TENNYSON CUTER, OHIO
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, CALIF.
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PA.
SHIRLEY N. FETTIS, CALIF.

Congress of the United States Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

November 29, 1977

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to you in connection with resolutions adopted by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly concerning East Timor and Belize.

The resolution on the question of East Timor (A/C.4/32/L.9) reaffirms the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, rejects the claim that East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia, calls for a visiting mission to East Timor to implement the resolution, and requests the Secretary General to appoint a special representative for the purpose of preparing the groundwork for a visit by the visiting mission.

I very much regret the negative vote by the United States on this resolution. During the subcommittee hearings on the East Timor question earlier this year, I made plain my disagreement with the Department's position on this matter. However, even on the basis of the Department's position on East Timor, it is not clear to me why it was necessary for the U.S. delegation to vote against the Assembly resolution on East Timor. An abstention, I submit, would have been consistent with the testimony provided to the subcommittee by the State Department. I refer particularly to the testimony by Deputy Legal Advisor George Aldrich, who responded affirmatively that the Department does not claim that there has been a valid exercise of the right of the people of East Timor to determine their own future. Mr. Aldrich stated that "our position is that we recognize that they have a right of self-determination and that it has not been exercised."

Committee on International Relations

Honorable Cyrus R. Vance

Page Two

Given our recognition that the Timorese people have not been given the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination, it seems incumbent upon us to have abstained on the resolution. Since the resolution has not yet been adopted in plenary, I urge the Department to reconsider its position and abstain on the resolution in plenary. An abstention would give us more flexibility in terms of encouraging the Indonesian government to meet its obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to self-determination. If it is not possible for us to change our position, I would appreciate knowing what paragraphs in the resolution the United States finds objectionable. Also, I would appreciate knowing what kind of United Nations consideration or action regarding the East Timor question would be acceptable to the Department.

The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly considered two resolutions on the question of Belize. The United States abstained on both of them. One resolution offered by Guatemala and several other Latin American countries was defeated by the Fourth Committee. The other resolution, which was offered by the United Kingdom and many other countries, was adopted. The United Kingdom draft (A/C.4/32.L.24) resolution reaffirms the right of Belize to self-determination and the inviolability and territorial integrity of Belize, and calls upon the United Kingdom, the government of Belize, and the government of Guatemala to pursue their negotiations. On the face of the resolution, I would have thought that the United States should have voted in favor of this resolution. I would appreciate knowing what factors prevented us from voting in favor of this resolution. I recognize that the United States may be performing some kind of conciliatory role in the process of negotiations; however, I think regardless of this role the United States should make clear that there can be no compromising of the right of the people of Belize to self-determination. A favorable vote on this resolution would have had that effect.

Committee on International Relations


Honorable Cyrus R. Vance

Page Three

The Carter Administration has taken bold and creative initiatives in the field of human rights and foreign policy-- many of which I have commended. However, in the case of self-determination with respect to small territories, I regret to say that the administration has remained silent on some of the particularly egregious violations of this right. I sincerely hope that the administration will take the opportunity to reassess its position on the issues of self-determination for Belize and East Timor.

Your kind attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,



Donald M. Fraser, Chairman
Subcommittee on International
Organizations

cc: Warren Christopher
Andrew Young
William Maynes
Patt Derian
George Aldrich
Edward Mezvinsky
Mark Schneider
Sally Shelton
Ann Swift
Brady Tyson

DMF:jsc

**EAST TIMOR HEARINGS—
JULY 19, 1977**

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BURKE) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BURKE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have asked to address the House today on a subject of concern to me because it has involved this body in the machinations of foreign, even hostile interests with regard to an important American ally in Asia. I refer Mr. Speaker to the events of the past several months in a remote corner of the Republic of Indonesia—East Timor, formerly Portuguese Timor. As this last outpost of Portugal's colonial empire finally slipped from Lisbon's weakening grasp, a local struggle erupted in which inevitably the Government of Indonesia had to involve itself. However, by the time matters were put to rights by the Indonesians and their supporters in East Timor the situation has become a cat-paw of Communist conspiracy, designed to embarrass and weaken the Government of Indonesia, erode the necessary and peaceful ties between Indonesia and Australia, and finally, to embarrass the current conservative government in Australia. In this last effort, Mr. Speaker, this House of Representatives has been involved.

We have assisted, directly at the behest of the Australian opposition, in elevating the relatively insignificant question of East Timor to an attention it does not

altogether deserve. To prove my point, Mr. Speaker, let me explain, briefly, a little history.

The East Timor question began, appropriately enough, with the leftist coup in Portugal in April 1974. Thereafter virulent Marxism, which had been spreading like a low-grade infection through the Portuguese military, expanded rapidly into the Portuguese garrisons in Mozambique, Angola, and Timor. Between April 1974, and December 1975, the Portuguese in effect abandoned East Timor to the armed factions which were emerging among the various village and tribal units. One of the local groups had been adopted by the Marxists in the Portuguese garrison, and under that influence became Marxist. This group, the Fretilin, or Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, enjoyed support of the Portuguese garrison to the extent that when the garrison withdrew it opened its arsenal to them. Armed with these weapons the Fretilin decimated its opponents, raising the prospect of a Marxist state in Timor. Indeed, the Fretilin called the government which they later proclaimed the "Democratic Republic of East Timor."

After considerable fratricidal conflict, during which many tribal and familial feuds were pursued in the name of political struggle, and unknown numbers of Timorese died, the Indonesian Government acted to gain control. On December 7, 1975, Indonesian—and, Jakarta claims, indigenous Timorese—elements invested the capital, Dili, and other coastal towns. In the course of the civil war and the Indonesian action, there were no doubt many casualties. This fact made the matter of Timor a political issue in Australia, and as such fit for exploitation in the press. I quote from a letter from an Australian, Mr. Anthony Staunton of Brunswick, Victoria, Australia:

War is an atrocity and atrocities always occur in war. One of the games played by certain groups is large-scale atrocity stories.

On 1 September 1976 a minor pro-Soviet paper the Socialist reported that 60,000 people had been murdered by Indonesia in East Timor. The story was picked up by the Melbourne daily, The Age, on 19 November 1976. The Age said it had a highly confidential report handed to the Australian Government. The Communist Tribune on 1 December 1976 reported that the document was sent to Australian Foreign Minister Peacock "two weeks ago" by the church organization which received it and was leaked to The Age. It would seem that the story was planted. The Age repeated the story and anonymous source on 8 December 1976 and The Sun, the major daily in Melbourne, upped the figure to 100,000 on 1 January 1977.

In March of 1977 a group of Australian opposition members of Parliament wrote the chairman of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Mr. DONALD FRASER, asking him to hold hearings on human rights in East Timor. The hearings were held the same week, indeed, the same day, as the visit of Australian Foreign Minister Peacock to Washington. Among the witnesses was an Australian Government employee, Mr. James Dunn, a self-appointed publicist for the benighted Timorese, who had permitted himself to be quoted that

100,000 Timorese had died at Indonesian hands.

Over the past several months the opposition party in Australia has made at least two efforts to obtain votes of no confidence against Prime Minister Fraser on the Timor issue. Many interested parties, Mr. Speaker, have sought and still seek to make political and ideological capital of the unfortunate situation which prevailed for a time in East Timor. There was even a case where Leftist Australians posing as representatives of an Australian philanthropic organization actually assisted the Fretilin to obtain weapons during the civil strife, which the Timorese have not forgotten. The Leftist Fretilin still obtain aid from Communist sources and Leftist sympathizers. How else could a handful of guerrillas maintain an information office in high-priced New York, and send their representatives around the world in search of sympathy and assistance?

Mr. Speaker, all this to me is clearly the result of an operation and I for one am not happy that by having hearings and suggesting the legitimacy of an independent East Timor, the remnants of the Fretilin forces are encouraged to continue killing other Timorese and Indonesians.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, I am also disturbed that this last hearing on the international status of East Timor clearly infringes the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. This issue is a case of the wrong hearing by the wrong subcommittee on the wrong subject. There is no right time for such a hearing.

In short, Mr. Speaker, the Congress has been manipulated to further the cause of groups whose purposes are sharply inimical to the interests of the United States. I regret that this has occurred.

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

THE FOLLOWING LETTER AND DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING INDONESIAN USE OF U.S., BRITISH, FRENCH, AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE INVASION OF EAST TIMOR WAS CIRCULATED TO MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HEADED BY REPRESENTATIVE DONALD FRASER. WE PROVIDE IT FOR YOUR USE AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION. SUPPORT GROUPS IN THE U.S., BRITAIN, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, AND CANADA SHOULD MAKE NOTE OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS IN THE EQUIPPING AND SUPPLYING OF INDONESIA'S INVASION FORCE.

THE EAST TIMOR INFORMATION AND

RESEARCH PROJECT

410 STEWART AVE.

ITHACA, N.Y. 14850

U.S.A.

Enclosed with this letter are the various materials that I promised to send to you. I hope you will find them useful. I believe they are mainly self-explanatory, but in the case of the IISS data I have added a notetrying to clarify the military terminology. I have also included some press clippings which may be relevant to the question of Indonesian use of U.S. military equipment for aggression in East Timor. After thinking about all this material I believe that there are five points worth bringing out, namely:

1. The Institute of Strategic Studies (London) listings show very clearly that virtually all the Soviet materiel acquired by Indonesia during the Sukarno era has been unusable for a good many years, mainly due to the lack of spare parts. It is therefore impossible that the invasion of East Timor and subsequent operations there could have been carried out by means of Warsaw Pact type equipment.

2. East Timor lies on the remote periphery of the Indonesian archipelago, and any military operations launched against it by Jakarta would require a very complex logistical back-up (to say nothing of sustaining a naval blockade). The IISS data show very clearly that the movement of troops, over long distances and for actual combat operations, would be virtually impossible without the use of big U.S. transport planes and helicopters.

3. Given the decomposition of Soviet naval supplies, it has always been rather puzzling how Indonesia was able to conduct amphibious landings on Timor and sustain a partial naval blockade. The data provided by SIPRI (Swedish Institutional Peace Research Institute) Yearbooks for 1974 and 1975 suggest part of the answer: Australia has been donating a number of fast "Attack" patrol boats, and the United States a frigate. In addition, Michael Klare of Princeton University has learned from DOD, under the Freedom of Information Act, that Indonesia received at least 2 destroyers from the U.S. Navy in 1975.

4. A sizeable amount of U.S. military aid in recent years has been in the form of spare parts -- to enable the Indonesians to recondition a wide variety of equipment given or sold by the U.S. in the 1950's. For a picture of the kinds of equipment involved, see Register 3 of The Arms Trade with the Third World appended.

5. The U.S. has recently been supplying Indonesia with equipment of particular value in counter-guerrilla operations. Michael Klare's DOD data reveal the supplying of:

- a. 36 V-150 Commando Armored Cars, delivered May 1975, costing \$7.5 million.
- b. 1500 AN/PRC-77 radios, delivered January 1975, costing \$1.5 million.
- c. 11 Bell UH-1 and 3 S-61 helicopters scheduled for delivery in 1976 (actual delivery date uncertain).

Most revealing of all are the OV-10s mentioned in the latest IISS report. These planes, equipped with infra-red detectors, bombs, rockets and napalm, are specially designed for close combat support against an enemy without effective anti-aircraft guns (they are piston-engined and quite slow). Such planes would be totally useless against any imaginable external enemy of Indonesia.

2 fighter sqns with 30 F-5A (40 F-5E on order).
 4 interceptor sqns with 63 F-104A/G.
 1 recce sqn with 8 RF-104G and 4 RF-101C.
 1 SAR sqn with 9 S-2A and 6 HU-16B.
 40 C-46, 30 C-47, 50 C-119 and 10 C-123 tpts.
 100 trainers.
 6 Hughes 500, 7 UH-19 and 10 Bell 47G hel (24 UH-1H on order).

RESERVES: 130,000.

Para-Military Forces: 175,000 militia.

INDIA

Population: 578,000,000.
 Military service: voluntary.
 Total armed forces: 948,000.
 Estimated GNP 1972: \$61.53 billion.
 Defence budget 1973-74: 17,296 million rupees (\$2,386 million).
 7.75 rupees = \$1 1 July 1972.
 7.25 rupees = \$1 1 July 1973.

Army: 826,000.

1 armoured division (a second is being formed).
 5 independent armoured brigades.
 14 infantry divisions.
 11 mountain divisions.
 6 independent infantry brigades.
 1 parachute brigade.
 About 20 AA artillery units.
 200 Centurion Mk 5/7, 1,000 T-54 and T-55 and 500 Vijayanta med tks; 150 PT-76 and 140 AMX-13 lt tks; OT-62 and Mk 2/4A APC; about 3,000 guns, mostly towed and SP 25-pounders, but incl Model 56 105mm pack how, Abbott 105mm SP and about 350 100mm and 350 130mm guns; RL; SS-11 and Entac ATGW; AA guns; 40 Tigercat SAM.

RESERVES: 100,000. Territorial Army 4,000;
 Reserves 55,000.

Navy: 30,000 (including naval air).

1 16,000-ton aircraft carrier.
 4 submarines (ex-Soviet F-class).
 2 cruisers.
 1 destroyer.
 8 destroyer escorts (incl 7 ex-Soviet Petya-class).
 9 frigates (2 GP with Seacat SAM, 3 AA, 4 ASW).
 8 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
 9 patrol boats (4 less than 100 tons).
 8 minesweepers (4 inshore).
 1 landing ship.
 3 landing craft.

10 seaward defence boats (6 less than 100 tons).

NAVAL AIR FORCE: 1,500.

35 Sea Hawk attack, 11 Alizé MR ac; 2 Sea King, 18 Alouette III, 2 Alouette II and 10 Hughes 269 hel. 10 Sea Hawk, 5 Alizé and 2 Alouette can be carried in the aircraft carrier at any one time. (17 IIS 748 MR ac and 3 Sea King are on order.)

Air Force: 92,000; 842 combat aircraft.

4 light bomber squadrons with 80 Canberra.
 6 fighter-bomber squadrons with 96 Su-7.
 2 fighter-bomber sqns with 50 IIF-24 Marut 1A.
 7 fighter-bomber squadrons with 150 Hunter F-56.
 2 fighter-bomber squadrons with 30 Mystère IV.
 8 interceptor squadrons with 220 MiG-21PFM.
 8 interceptor squadrons with 200 Gnat F.1.
 1 reconnaissance squadron with 8 Canberra PR-57.
 1 maritime recce sqn of 8 L-1049 Super Constellation.
 13 tpt sqns with 55 C-47, 60 C-119G, 20 Il-14, 34 An-12, 30 Otter, 27 HS-748 and 20 Caribou.
 About 12 sqns with Mi-4, Alouette III, 16 Mi-8, SA 315 Cheetah, S-62 and Bell 47 hel.
 About 20 SA-2 SAM sites.

Para-Military Forces: About 100,000, in Border Security Force (not on Defence budget).

INDONESIA

Population: 132,400,000.
 Military service: selective.
 Total armed forces: 322,000.
 Estimated GNP 1972: \$10.73 billion.
 Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 119 billion rupiahs (\$286,700,000).
 378 rupiahs = \$1 1 July 1971.
 415 rupiahs = \$1 1 July 1972.

Army: 250,000.

15 inf bdes, with over 100 inf bns and some para and armd units.
 8 armoured battalions.
 1 paracommando regiment (RPKAD).
 The KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command) consists of about six bdes and includes paratroops and armour. About one-third of the army is engaged in civil and administrative duties.
 Stuart, AMX-13 and PT-76 lt tks; Saladin armd cars; Ferret scout cars; Saracen and DTR-40 APC; artillery includes 76mm, 105mm and 25-pdr; Soviet 57mm AA guns and associated radar; Alouette III hel.

Navy: 39,000 (incl naval air and 16,000 Marines).

* Only a very small part of the navy is operational.

IISS: The Military Balance 1974-1975

NAVAL AIR FORCE: 1,500.

33 *Sea Hawk* attack, 10 *Alizé* MR ac: 6 *Sea King*, 14 *Alouette III* hel (6 *Sea King* on order). (10 *Sea Hawk*, 5 *Alizé* and 2 *Alouette* can be carried in the aircraft carrier.)

Air Force: 100,000: 731 combat aircraft.
 3 light bomber squadrons with 60 *Canberra*.
 6 FGA sqns with 77 Su-7BKL.
 3 fighter-bomber sqns with 50 HF-24 *Marut* 1A.
 6 fighter-bomber squadrons with 130 *Hunter* F-56.
 9 interceptor squadrons with 220 MiG-21FL/M with *Atoll* AAM.
 8 interceptor squadrons with 180 *Gnat* F-1.
 1 reconnaissance squadron with 8 *Canberra* PR-57.
 1 MR squadron with 6 L-1049 *Super Constellation*.
 11 tpt sqns with 45 HS-748, 50 C-47, 52 C-119G, 18 Il-14, 34 An-12, 30 *Otter* and 16 *Caribou*.
 About 12 sqns with 80 Mi-4, 80 *Alouette III*, 30 Mi-8 and *Sionx* hel.
 22 HJT-16 *Kirin* trainers.
 20 SA-2 SAM sites.
 (17 HS-748 on order.)

Para-Military Forces: About 100,000, in Border Security Force (not on Defence budget).

INDONESIA

Population: 126,780,000.
 Military service: selective.
 Total armed forces: 270,000.
 Estimated GNP 1973: \$14.3 billion.
 Defence expenditure 1973-74: 188 billion rupiahs (\$452 million).
 \$1 = 415 rupiahs (1974), 415 rupiahs (1973).

Army: 200,000.*
 1 cavalry brigade.
 15 infantry brigades.
 2 airborne infantry brigades.
 8 armoured battalions.
 1 paracommando regiment.
 6 artillery regiments.
 4 air defence regiments.
 Six of the above brigades are in the ROSTRAU (Strategic Reserve Command).
Stuart, AMX-13 and PT-76 lt tks; *Saladin* armd cars; *Ferret* scout cars; *Saracen* and BTR-40 APC; artillery includes 76mm, 105mm and 25-pdr; 20mm, 40mm and Soviet 57mm AA guns and associated radar; *Alouette III* hel.

DEPLOYMENT: Egypt (UNEP), 1 battalion, 551 men.

* About one-third of the army is engaged in civil and administrative duties.

Navy: 40,000 (incl naval air and 5,000 Marines).*
 5 submarines (ex-Soviet W-class).
 2 destroyers (ex-Soviet *Skory*-class).
 7 frigates (ex-Soviet *Riga*-class).
 18 coastal escorts (14 ex-Soviet, 4 ex-US).
 9 *Komar*-class patrol boats with *Styx* ssm.
 30 patrol craft.
 5 fleet minesweepers (ex-Soviet T-43 class).
 20 coastal minesweepers (6 ex-US).
 17 MGB (ex-Soviet BK-class).
 35 seaward defence boats (less than 100 tons).
 4 HQ/support ships.
 10 amphibious warfare vessels.
 2 Marine brigades.

NAVAL AIR: 1,000.

6 C-47; 3 *Alouette III* and 4 Bell 47G hel: (4 *Nomadic* MR ac on order).

Air Force: 30,000: 106 combat aircraft.†
 22 Tu-16 and 10 Il-28 bombers.
 1 light bomber sqn with 2 B-26 *Invader*.
 1 FGA sqn with 11 F-51D *Mustang*.
 1 FGA sqn with 17 CA-27 *Avon-Sabre* and 17 T-33.
 4 MiG-15, 8 MiG-17 and 15 MiG-21 interceptors.
 70 tpts, incl 4 Il-14, 8 C-130B, 37 C-47 and *Skyyan*.
 2 hel sqns with 12 UH-1H, 5 Bell 204B and 7 others.
 Trainers include L-29, T-34 and T-41.

Para-Military Forces: A police Mobile Brigade of about 12,000; about 100,000 Militia.

JAPAN

Population: 109,330,000.
 Military service: voluntary.
 Total armed forces: 233,000.
 Estimated GNP 1973: \$439.4 billion.
 Defence budget 1974-75: 1,093 billion yen (\$3,835 million).
 \$1 = 285 yen (1974), 265 yen (1973).

Army: 154,000.
 1 mechanized division.
 12 infantry divisions (7,000-9,000 men each).
 1 airborne brigade.
 1 mixed brigade.
 1 artillery brigade.
 1 signal and 5 engineer brigades.
 1 helicopter brigade.
 6 SAM groups (each of 4 btys) with 140 *HAWK*.

* Only a very small part of the navy is operational.
 † Most of the Soviet-supplied combat aircraft have not been used for some years. Few of these aircraft can be regarded as operational.

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25 C-47, 100 C-119 and 5 C-123 tpts.
125 trainers, incl PL-1B *Chien Shou*, T-28, T-33,
T-38, F-5BF, F-100, F-104B.
6 Hughes 500, 7 UH-19, 10 Bell 47G, 50 UH-1H
hel.

RESERVES: 90,000.

Para-Military Forces: 100,000 militia.

INDIA

Population: 610,930,000.
Military service: voluntary.
Total armed forces: 1,055,500.
Estimated GNP 1975: \$89.7 bn.
Defence expenditure 1976-77: 25,250 m rupees
(\$2,812 m).
\$1 = 8.98 rupees (1976), 8.55 rupees (1975).

Army: 913,000.
2 armoured divisions.
15 infantry divisions.
10 mountain divisions.
5 independent armoured brigades.
6 independent infantry brigades.
1 parachute brigade.
9 indep arty bdes, incl about 20 AA arty regts, 4
observation sqns and indep flights.
180 *Centurion* Mk 5/7, 1,000 T-54/55, some 700
Vijayanta med, 150 PT-76 lt tks; 700 OT-62/
-64(2A) and Mk 2/4A APC; about 2,000 75mm,
76mm and 25-pdr (mostly towed), about 300
100mm, 105mm (incl pack how) and *Abbott*
105mm sp, 550 130mm and 5.5-in guns and how;
500 120mm, 160mm mor; 57mm, 106mm RCL;
SS-11 and *ENTAC* ATGW; 100mm ATK guns;
30mm, 40mm AA guns; 40 *Tigercat* SAM; 40
Krishak, 20 *Auster* AOP9 lt ac, some *Alouette* III,
25 SA-315 *Cheetah* hel (75 more on order).

RESERVES: 200,000. Territorial Army 40,000.

Navy: 42,500, incl Naval Air.
8 submarines (Soviet F-class).
1 aircraft carrier (capacity 25 ac, incl 18 *Sea Hawk*,
4 *Alizé*, 2 *Alouette* III).
2 cruisers.
3 destroyers.
26 frigates (3 *Leander*-class with 2 *Seacat* SAM, 10
Petya-class, 9 GP, 1 AA, 3 trg).
8 *Osa*-class FPG with *Syx* SSM (8 more on order).
15 patrol boats (14 coastal, incl 5 *Poluchat*-class).
8 minesweepers (4 inshore).
1 landing ship, 6 landing craft (5 *Polnocny*-class).

NAVAL AIR FORCE: 2,000.

1 attack sqn with 25 *Sea Hawk* (10 in carrier).
1 MR sqn with 12 *Alizé* (4 in carrier).
1 MR sqn with 3 *Super Constellation*, 3 H-38.
2 hel sqns with 22 *Alouette* III.
2 ASW sqns with 12 *Sea King* hel.

2 *Devon*, 7 HJT-16 *Kiran*, 5 BN *Islander*, 4 *Vampire*
T55 ac, 4 Hughes 300 hel.

Air Force: 100,000; about 950 combat aircraft.
3 lt bbr sqns with 80 *Canberra* B(1)58, B(1)12.
13 FGA sqns: 5 with 130 Su-7B, 3 with 80 HIF-24
Marut 1A, 5 with 130 *Hunter* F56.
11 interceptor sqns with 275 MiG-21PFMA/FL/
MF.
8 interceptor squadrons with 250 *Gnat* Mk 1.
1 reconnaissance squadron with 12 *Canberra* PR57.
14 tpt sqns: 1 with 12 H-14; 1 with 28 HS-748, 3
Tu-124; 2 with 40 C-119G; 2 with 30 An-12; 1
with 29 *Otter*; 3 with 40 C-47; 1 with 21 *Caribou*.
12 hel sqns: 6 with 100 Mi-4; 3 with 35 Mi-8; 3
with 120 *Chetek* (*Alouette* III); 12 AB-47.
Mystère IV, *Kiran*, HT-2, *Hunter*, *Canberra*,
MiG-21U, Su-7U, C-47 trainers.
20 SAM sites with 120 SA-2.
(110 MiG-21MF, 100 *Ajeet* (*Gnat*), 10 HS-748,
55 *Marut*, 90 *Iskra* on order.)

Para-Military Forces: About 80,000 Border Secur-
ity Force, about 100,000 in other organizations.

INDONESIA

Population: 133,110,000.
Military service: selective.
Total armed forces: 246,000.
Estimated GNP 1975: \$29.2 bn.
Defence expenditure 1975-76: 460 bn rupiahs
(\$1,108 m).
\$1 = 415 rupiahs (1975).

Army: 180,000.*

1 armd cavalry bde (1 tk bn, support units).†
14 infantry brigades (90 inf, 1 para, 9 arty, 11 AA,
9 engr bns) 3 in KOSTRAD.†
2 airborne brigades (6 bns).†
1 independent tank battalion.
7 independent armoured cavalry battalions.
4 independent para-commando battalions.
Stuart, 50 AMX-13, 75 PT-76 lt tks; 78 *Saladin*, 58
Ferret armd cars; *Saracen*, 130 BTR-40 APC; 50
76mm, 40 105mm, 122mm guns/how; 200 120mm
mor; *ENTAC* ATGW; 20mm, 37mm, 40mm, 200
57mm AA guns; 1 *Beaver*, 6 *Otter*, 2 C-47, 2 *Aero*
Commander, Cessna 185, Piper L-4, some PZL
Wilga 32 ac; 7 *Alouette* III hel.‡
DEPLOYMENT: *Egypt* (UNEF): 1 battalion, 447 men.

Navy: 38,000, incl Naval Air and 5,000 Marines.‡
3 submarines (ex-Soviet W-class).
9 frigates (3 ex-Soviet *Riga*-, 4 ex-US *Jones*-class).

* About one-third of the army is engaged in civil and
administrative duties.

† In KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command).

‡ Some equipment and ships are non-operational for
lack of spares.

200 130 mm gun

Out of a requested 250
75lb. shell, 17-mile range

June 1968
(June 1968)

1969
1969

Arms Trade Register

SIPRI Yrbk 1970/71

Far East	Turkey	100	Patron	Tank	Displacement:	1970: 1	
France	3	Submarine, "Daphne" class	850 t.	1967	Probably under consideration by US Government, and not delivered by end-1969	1970: 1	
UK	1	Westland Wessex Series 50	Helicopter	(1968)		Autumn 1969	
USA	..	Cessna T-37C	Trainer	1968	For training and COIN; MAP	(1969)	
France	12	Sud Horizon	Light plane	..	For initial training	1968-69	
	50	Military vehicles		..		1969	
	..	Landing craft		..		(1969)	
France	7	Sud Alouette III	Helicopter	(March 1969)	\$1.4 mn approximately	1969	
Australia	5	Cessna 401A	Transport	}	\$1.2 mn, including spares and servicing equipment. For liaison and VIP transport	(July 1969)	
	6	Cessna 402A	Transport			(May 1969)	(July 1969)
	..	Cessna 310P	Cabin monoplane			..	(Sept. 1969)
Korea, South	USA	18	McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom	Fighter	\$52 mn in \$100 mn military aid agreement	Feb. 1968	
		..	Bell UH-1D Iroquois	Helicopter	Being built under MAP	Aug.-Sept. 1969	
		2	Coastal minesweeper	Displacement: 320 t.		(1969)	
		700,000	M-1 and other	Rifle		..	
USA/South Korea		..	M-16	Rifle	\$10 mn factory; will take several years to put in operation	(1969)	
Malaysia	UK	2	HS 125	Transport	For VIP transport and communications	..	
		1	Frigate, "Yarrow" type	Displacement: 1 600 t.	\$10 mn, approximate. Armed with Scatcat missile	(Nov. 1969)	
		..	Short Scatcat missile	S-A		1969	
		1	Survey vessel, "Ton" class	Displacement: 360 t.	Ex-UK coastal minesweeper	(Feb. 1966)	
		13	Anti-aircraft gun		Radar-controlled; under 1963 defence aid	1970	
		..	Small arms		Rifles and automatic weapons for three infantry battalions	(April 1969)	
		2	Marconi S600	Mobile radar unit	For joint Malaysia-Singapore defence system	..	
France		5	Sud Alouette III	Helicopter		May 1969	
Canada		8	DHC-4A Caribou	STOL transport		June 1969	
Supplier					\$8.5 mn; Canada provides loan covering 90% of purchase price	Dec. 1968	
Recipient						(March 1968)	

1970: 1
1969
1969

Trade in major weapons

US I.G.II. Continued *Supri* Preliminary estimates for January to June 1971

Recipient	Supplier	Number	Item	Description	Comment	Date ordered	Date delivered
Far East							
Brunei	UK/Singapore	2	Fast patrol boat		Built by Vosper Thornycroft of Singapore	(Feb. 1970)	End-1970
Cambodia	USA	10,000	M-2 Turbo-Skyscraper	Carbine	Also to receive mortars, recoilless rifles and small arms	..	April-May 1970
Indonesia	Australia	5	Cessna T-207	Utility aircraft	\$332 000 including spares	..	1970
Laos	USA	..	Douglas AC-47 Mi-16	Rifle	For ground attack	..	(1970)
Taiwan	USA	6	Hughes OH-6A	Helicopter	To receive under MAP; option for further deliveries	..	(1970)
Central America							
Dominican Republic	USA	7	Hughes OH-6A	Helicopter	To receive under MAP
Nicaragua	USA	4	Hughes OH-6A	Helicopter	To receive under MAP
South America							
Argentina	UK	2	Westland WG.13	Helicopter	For the guided missile destroyers, for ASW	(May 1970)	(1973)
Brazil	France	12	Mirage IIIE	} Fighter/ground attack	\$2 mn, u.c., favourable credit terms	May 1970	1972
		4	Mirage IIIB				
Chile	USA	9	Beechcraft	Light transport	\$7.1 mn, including spares	March 1970	June-Aug. 1970
Peru	UK	2	Frigate, "Leander" class	Displacement: 2 450 L	\$7.2 mn, including submarines ordered 1969	(Jan. 1970)	..
	USA	6	Lockheed C-130 Hercules Helicopters	Transport	\$76 mn, letter of intent signed but some doubt whether credits will be available	(March 1970)	..
Europe							
Turkey	Canada	16	DIIC-5 Buffalo	STOL transport	\$60 mn, including spares	(March 1970)	..

Sipri Yearbk 1975

UK 3 Westland Sea King ASW helicopter built in Sweden and fitted out in India in addition to 3 delivered in 1973

Country	Quantity	Model	Description	Date
USSR	50	Short Sea-ral MiG-23 "Flogger" YAK-36	S-S missile Sinker/interceptor VTOL strike fighter	1974
	1	SAM-6 Frigate, "Petva"-class	S-A missile system Displ: 1 050 t	1974
	4	Submarine, "Foxtrot"-class	Displ: 2 000 t	1974: 2 1968-70
Nepal	1	HAL Alouette III HS 748	Helicopter Transport	1974 Jan 1975
China	1 squad.	Shenyang MiG-19	Fighter	1973
	159	SAM-6	S-A missile system	1973
	3	T-59	Tank	1974
France	28	Breguet Atlantic Dassault Mirage 5	ASW plane Fighter	March 1971
Iran	..	Lockheed C-130E Hercules	Transport	1973
Sweden	45	Saab Supporter	Primary trainer	1974
UK	6	Westland (Sikorsky) Sea King	ASW helicopter	1974-75
	2	Frigate, "Whitby"-class	Displ: 2 560 t	1974
USA	1	Lockheed C-130B Hercules	Transport	1973
Far East				
Brunei	1	Coastal patrol boat, Vosper Thornycroft type	Displ: 25 t	1974
	2	Fast patrol boat, Vosper Thornycroft "71 ft"-type		1973
	2	Bell 212 Twin Pac	Helicopter	Mid-1973
Indonesia	4	GAF Nomad	STOL/transport	1973
Australia	1	Fast patrol boat, "Attack"-class	Displ: 166 t full load	1972

Register of third world arms trade, 1974

Date: Number of items ordered delivered

Recipient Supplier Units Item Description

1-th. JX

SE Asia concern countered

20/VII/77

Tues July 19, 1977

P.2

Arnold,

Thought you'd like to see this. Sounds like mc thugh was not whistling in the dark. Kabin felt that he couldn't respond to such a "main-stream" position but Bill O'Mally is writing a letter in his official position, offering the services of the Setra program members to brief congressmen (such as mc thugh) who will be going to SE Asia.

That seems like a "balanced" response, though it doesn't solve the problem of the overall attitude that this article represents. I ~~think~~ ^{feel} things are going to get a lot worse before they get better.

Best,
Marty

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Carter administration is trying to counter a widespread impression among non-communist nations of Southeast Asia that it is taking them for granted while pursuing friendly relations with communist states.

Misgivings about U.S. policy have been voiced both privately and publicly by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

Their concern stems from the administration's human rights campaign, its interest in establishing normal relations with China and Vietnam and its plans to withdraw ground troops from South Korea.

The U.S. troop presence in recent years has been cut back sharply from Taiwan and nearly eliminated from Thailand and some ASEAN officials fear a continuation of such cutbacks could create a power vacuum that the Chinese or the Soviets may try to exploit.

Attempting to dispel such concerns, the State Department persuaded the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to restore \$15 million in grant military aid to Indo-

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resources available to other Southeast Asia states. But U.S. officials have passed the word that this is not a likely prospect, in part because congressional support remains strong for retaining a law that prohibits direct aid to any of the communist countries of Southeast Asia.



CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED

198 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10038 212-964-8730

March 9 - 77

Dear Arnold,

Thanks for the materials. I'm passing them on to Jacqui Chagnon. She + Dick Franke are doing a broadcast on Wed the 16th March on Indonesia over Australian Broadcast

I've been doing a lot lately on the whole ASEAN stuff + trying to understand the "security ties between the countries. I think it might be interesting to think of a seminar at one of our prestigious universities on US military aid and its effect on stability in the area and ~~the~~ human rights situation. Do you think Cornell would be interested. I would be interested in working on + promoting the idea.

From Don Luce

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, WIS., CHAIRMAN

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Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

February 22, 1977

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF


Ms Sue Nichterlein
Republica Democratica de Timor Leste
New York Information Office
#4S, 35 Claremont Avenue
New York, New York 10027

Dear Ms Nichterlein:

Thank you for your letter of January 28 concerning alleged atrocities in East Timor. An inquiry is being made with the Department of State concerning these charges and a request for a review of military aid to Indonesia.

Thank you very much for bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely yours,



Donald M. Fraser, Chairman
Subcommittee on International
Organizations

DMF:jsl

SINGAPORE

RAJARATNAM: SINGAPORE RECOGNIZES STATUS QUO OF TIMOR

HK010954Y Hong Kong AFP in English 0501 GMT 1 Aug 77 BK

[Excerpts] Kuala Lumpur, Aug 1 (AFP)--Singapore Foreign Minister Mr. S. Rajaratnam said here today that his government recognised the status quo of East Timor. "We know the people of Timor (a former Portuguese colony) have expressed their desire to remain with Indonesia and we accept this choice as their right," he said.

Mr. Rajaratnam, who is here attending the pre-summit ASEAN foreign ministers conference, was commenting on a report that Indonesian Foreign Minister Mr. Adam Malik would seek "active support" of all ASEAN countries in the East Timor question to prove to the world that the issue has been settled.

Mr. Malik was reported to have discussed the matter with Mr. Rajaratnam when he stopped over in Singapore on Saturday night enroute to Kuala Lumpur. Both Mr. Malik and Mr. Rajaratnam denied the report. Mr. Malik said Timor is Indonesian territory and there was no question of discussing it.

Jakarta was said to be very upset over Singapore's abstention in December 1976 in a United Nations resolution rejecting the claim that East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand were among the 20 countries which voted against the resolution.

ASEAN sources said that Indonesia would like to have Singapore's support in this issue, as the other three members have voted against the UN resolution.

Despite the denials by the two foreign ministers, territorial claims are expected to feature in unofficial discussions among ASEAN leaders this week when they gather here for the summit.

Another thorny problem is that Indonesia is disputing Australia's claim to the island of Pasir, between Timor and Australia. Australia is believed to be using the island as a patrol post. The Indonesian Navy is reported to be keeping a close watch on the disputed island.

ASEAN sources said that Mr. Malik might take up the dispute with Mr. Andrew Peacock who will be accompanying Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser for the post-summit talks in Kuala Lumpur. The sources did not rule out the possibility of the dispute being raised even at a meeting between President Suharto and Mr. Fraser, while they are in Kuala Lumpur.

Thursday
18 August 1977
Vol IV No 160
Annex No 84

DAILY REPORT

ANNEX

ASIA & PACIFIC

The information printed on these Annex pages preceding and following the standard Daily Report cover bears the caveat FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Users may detach the outer pages and treat the Daily Report as unclassified and unrestricted.

ADDITIONAL REPORTS ON SUHARTO INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH

On Fretilin Amnesty, PKI Detainees

BK180931Y Jakarta ANTARA in English 0719 GMT 18 Aug 77 BK

[Text] Jakarta, Aug 17 (ANTARA)--President Suharto yesterday announced a general amnesty to remnants of armed bands of the Fretilin in East Timor if they voluntarily surrender to the Indonesian Armed Forces on December 31 at the latest.

In a state address on the occasion of Indonesia's 32d Independence Day before parliament Tuesday the president said that "coinciding with the observance of our historic independence anniversary the government is offering this amnesty with an open heart in the full realization that in the past they were unaware of being led astray by a few irresponsible individuals. I hope this gesture will not be in vain. There is no use for them to remain in the mountains because the people of East Timor are anxious to embark immediately on development and to enjoy tranquility".

East Timorese have joined their blood brothers in the Republic of Indonesia for 1 year and a month now. During that relatively short period, security has substantially improved and development efforts are becoming more tangible to the people.

There prevails an atmosphere of brotherhood. The boys and girls from East Timor participated in the national jamboree at Sibolangit. East Timorese athletes took part and were warmly welcomed in the recent 9th national sports week. Civil servants from the province are attending courses and trainings, and former indigenous members of the Tropes soldiers [Portuguese colonial army] and Portuguese police are getting military and police training.

The outbreak of disturbances instigated by irresponsible elements in North Sumatra, South Sumatra and Irian Jaya have been brought under control by security forces, preventing the undermining of stability, the president said. In spite of this, however, Indonesians should remain vigilant because they are not yet free from the dormant danger coming from either the remnants of the "September 30th Movement/ Indonesian Communist Party" or other extremist elements.

The government, he said, intends to accelerate the solution of PKI detainees. We are going to settle the problem of the "A" category detainees in 1978 at the latest. Ten thousand "B" category detainees will be returned to society this year, another 10,000 in 1978, and the remainder in 1979. Through these gradual releases we shall liberate ourselves from the national burdens which we have been carrying so far as best as we could".

On Development, Elections, Freedoms

BK171156Y Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1500 GMT 16 Aug 77 BK

[Text] President Suharto is confident that with continued economic growth and development activities equitably spread throughout the country, nobody in Indonesia will be living below the poverty level by the end of the third 5-year development plan.

In a state message covering all aspects of life in the social, political, economic and cultural fields, which was presented at a plenary session of parliament today, the head of state said that in 1967, 9 out of every 10 Indonesians were living below the poverty level. However, since 1970, growing numbers of people have been freed from poverty.

For the
irrelevancy file.

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June 14, 1977

Dr. Richard W. Franke
16 Fainwood Circle
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Dear Dr. Franke:

In going through a great pile of material which I've laid to one side for too long, I see your letter dated September 20th, last year. Please forgive my disgraceful delay, but perhaps I can make some amends by replying now and informing you that I have requested my publishers -- Mayfield Publishing Company -- to send you a copy of my first book. This came out last November, and is entitled, Tetum Ghosts and Kin: fieldwork in an Indonesian community. I trust you will find it useful and worth reading when you get it. I am exceedingly interested in the things you write about, and would like (if you can spare the time) to keep informed of the situation as it evolves in East Timor. I know Shep quite well, and he realizes my opinion on the terrible things that have been happening to the people there. But frankly I don't want to find myself in a situation where it would be impossible to go back to Timor some time in the future. I also have the problem of having no wish to be thought sympathetic to left-wing ideologies, even if they are of the mild type espoused by Fretlin. What I would like is the people of East Timor to be completely independent (I know this is exactly what you want, too), but I want the individuals on that island to live their lives exactly as they want to, without being hustled into adopting any overall system of politics or economics based upon what they imagine goes on in industrialized countries. My views are in disaccord with most persons, of course, and can never be put into practice; but I still refuse to support any policy which would replace one orthodoxy by another. I lived in a principedom (Camaubalo) for 15 months, among the kind of person that makes up the vast majority of the Timorese; and I know that all a villager wants is to be left alone and live his life surrounded by his kin and affines, and not to be troubled with anything outside his small communal world. It is with people of this kind I can, to some extent, as an outsider, identify myself, and it is them with whom I most sympathize. I don't like the idea of nation-state in any shape or form, and hence I find Fretlin (like the other political parties in East Timor) uncongenial to my tastes.

Should you wish a list of my publications, I shall be very pleased indeed to send them to you, and it would be nice, if you come to this area, for us to get together. Or perhaps I shall one day be in Massachusetts. Anyway, many thanks for your letter, and the very best of luck in your efforts to do what you are doing for the people of Timor.

Yours sincerely,



David Hicks
Ph.D., D.Phil.

DH: mw

Nation Manuscript.
Published Nov. 77

Arnold D. Kohen

Earlier this year, the Carter administration quietly requested and received from Congress a major increase in military aid to Indonesia, a country internally characterized by Amnesty International as an "Asian Gulag," and externally conducting an internationally-condemned two-year old war with American-supplied weapons. Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975, nine days after the former Portugese colony had declared its independence. On December 6, Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger had concluded a State visit to Indonesia, with an announcement of the continuation of US "security assistance". When questioned by newsmen about the impending invasion, Kissinger replied that "the United States understands Indonesia's position" on East Timor. Yet when reports of bloody fighting and the indiscriminate execution of East Timorese civilians by Indonesian forces appeared in the world press, both Kissinger and the State Department declined to comment. Even when members of an Indonesian Catholic relief group released in November 1976 a hitherto secret report describing continuing widespread atrocities, and warning that fighting in East Timor was not likely to die down, the Ford Administration, in keeping with Kissinger policy, remained silent. At the same time, the United States voted against a UN General Assembly resolution calling upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor.

When the new Administration came into office, observers in the US and Australia--where traditional ties and proximity have made East Timor a prominent issue--wondered what bearing Carter's human rights pronouncements would have on American policy towards the conflict. During the 1976 election

campaign Carter had often stated his intention of breaking with the cynical realpolitik of the Kissinger era. Yet there is no evidence of this promise being fulfilled in either of the recent Congressional hearings that have focused on Indonesia and East Timor. In fact, the Carter Administration has made it clear that its policy on East Timor will not only be a continuation of the Ford-Kissinger policy, but, as a consequence of its greatly increased military and political support for Jakarta, will deepen American support of Indonesia's military intervention.

* * * *

Indonesia's domestic record on human rights is one of the worst in the world. Amnesty International vividly described the situation in 1976: "Growing within the fertile Indonesian archipelago is another archipelago-- an archipelago of prisons and penal colonies, an archipelago assuming the frightening aspects of the Gulag. Islands of prisons hidden within islands; prison provinces being welded into abnormal societies, perpetually isolated and quarantined from the mainstream of Indonesian life. . ."

The Indonesian Government itself claims that "no more" than 29,000 political prisoners are presently being held. Amnesty International, however, believes that the true number ranges from 55,000 to 100,000--the large majority having been held for more than ten years without trial. Most of the prisoners, who are confined for a variety of reasons, ranging from membership in previously legal Communist or left-wing organizations to any type of relationship with the members of such groups, suffer from an appalling lack of medical facilities and nourishing food. As witnesses have testified in hearings before Representative Fraser's Subcommittee on Inter-

national Organizations in 1975 and 1976, Indonesian political prisoners inhabit a frightening netherworld. If they are released, it may be only to face the danger of rearrest. Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff of KOPKAMTIB (the main internal security apparatus), has stated that 500 new political arrests are now made each year, of which an unspecified number involve previously released prisoners. Once on the outside, former prisoners often find that, even if they escape re-arrest, their political background still effectively bars them from obtaining employment or leading a normal life. The vast majority, however, will probably never have to face the hazards of the outside, for as of now they stand little chance of ever being released.

The Indonesian prisoner situation obviously deserved notice when, on March 10, 1977, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard C. Holbrooke, presented the Carter Administration's proposals for security assistance to East Asia before the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee. While insisting that security assistance to South Korea and the Philippines should not be reduced, he did at least note serious violations of human rights in these countries, especially the Philippines, where he deplored "detentions without trial, in some cases for as long as four years." When he turned to Indonesia, however, he made no mention of any human rights violations of any kind. Noting that "since the Communist victories in Indochina, the Indonesians have become more concerned about their security and are making modest efforts to upgrade their own defenses," he argued that US security assistance is an "appropriate contribution" to allaying Indonesia's fears in the "still-

uncertain post-Vietnam period." Yet there is little evidence of insurgency within Indonesia's sprawling island chain, and it is absurd to imagine Vietnam, preoccupied with internal reconstruction, sending an armada to invade Indonesia across the South China Sea. The only significant fighting currently taking place is on the far eastern periphery of the archipelago, in East Timor--which is not part of Indonesia.

Timor island was first colonized in the late 16th century and became part of Portugal's then-flourishing Asian empire. By 1769, Holland had dislodged Portugal from the Indies, with the sole exception of the eastern half of Timor and three small areas around the island, territory totalling the size of New Jersey. The Dutch ruled over Western Timor until 1949, when the Netherlands East Indies achieved independence as the Republic of Indonesia.

The Portugese were in East Timor continuously until August 1975, except for the period between 1941 and 1945, when Japan occupied the territory. During Indonesia's first sixteen years of independence under the strongly--some would say belligerently--anti-colonial President Sukarno, no attempt was made to oust the Portugese from the archipelago. Similarly, President Suharto's military regime showed no interest in East Timor for seven years--until April 1974 when the Salazarist dictatorship in Portugal overthrown.

The fall of the old regime in Portugal and the subsequent announcement of a decolonization plan held out the promise that East Timor would become independent after more than 400 years of harsh colonial rule. Although the Indonesian government initially seemed open to the idea of an independent East Timor, it soon adopted a posture of hostility. A major factor in the

shift was the need to distract attention from a colossal corruption scandal within Indonesia's military-run state oil enterprise, Pertamina, which in 1976 went effectively bankrupt with over \$10 billion in debts. In addition, because of its extreme anti-communist paranoia the military regime apparently feared that an independent East Timor could become a haven for exiled Indonesian communists and other dissidents. It is, however, a little difficult to understand how East Timor, with a population of only 650,000, would want to provoke huge Indonesia, 140 million strong. With anti-communist Australia lying immediately to the south, it becomes even harder to imagine how a small country seeking independence could threaten Indonesia.

In East Timor itself, as most observers noted, the overwhelming sentiment was for independence, as advocated by a coalition of the territory's two major political organizations--the UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), a conservative nationalist party composed of ex-colonial civil servants, merchants, and a few wealthy landowners, and FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), a populist party favouring broad social reforms especially in rural living conditions. The popularity of this pro-independence coalition was such that it would easily have won power in a free election. But by August 1975, the coalition had broken down and UDT initiated what would be a month-long civil war.

Many have attributed the UDT-FRETILIN conflict to tensions then existing between right-wing and left-wing forces in Portugal itself. But whatever effect the spillover from the Portuguese domestic politics may have had, few knowledgeable observers believe that civil war would have erupted in East Timor had it not been for Indonesia's covert intervention. In early 1975,

the Indonesian military started to spread false rumors designed to foster suspicion of FRETILIN within the UDT group. To cite one example, a story was circulated that the North Vietnamese had sent in military instructors to train FRETILIN members in the mountains of East Timor. But these rumors proved insufficient to achieve the generals' goals. Accordingly, they made ever more open threats of armed intervention unless the coalition were broken up. In March 1975, the war of nerves started with reports of an imminent invasion. In May, directly after a meeting with the generals in Jakarta, the UDT unilaterally abandoned the coalition with FRETILIN. Finally, days before the August 1975 civil war, UDT leaders once more travelled to Jakarta, where, in the judgment of many regional specialists, the Indonesian military intelligence chiefs gave UDT an ultimatum: either seize power and crush FRETILIN, or expect an Indonesian invasion.

FRETILIN's increasing popularity, based in part on its energetic organization of literacy schools and agricultural co-operatives among an essentially rural people long oppressed by Portugal, proved the decisive factor in the civil war. Timorese conscripts in the Portugese army--mainly the sons of the rural poor--captured the colonial arsenal and rallied to FRETILIN, defeating a UDT force armed by the Portugese police. Most UDT leaders crossed the border into Indonesian Timor, where, according to recent disclosures, they were disarmed and made virtual prisoners of the Indonesians. Western journalists who in late September 1975 visited the UDT encampment in Indonesian Timor reported that UDT had ceased to exist as a fighting force and that the civil war had ended.

Shortly thereafter Indonesia barred all journalists from the vicinity.

In late September, Indonesian troops began to launch attacks on East Timor through the border area. There soon followed an intensive Indonesian propaganda campaign--still actively pursued--calculated to legitimize the assault. The Indonesian state press agency Antara proclaimed that the invading troops were "pro-Indonesian" East Timorese who were "making a comeback," a version of events at that time uncritically accepted by most of the Western press. Although it has from the start had compelling evidence to the contrary, the Carter State Department has publicly preferred to credit this version, too. Eyewitness accounts by Australian journalists who were stationed near the border inside East Timor confirm that Indonesia attacked well before December. In fact, available evidence leaves little doubt that when, on October 16, 1975, five Australian television journalists died while filming Indonesian operations in East Timor, three--and perhaps all five--were deliberately executed in order to conceal Indonesian operations.

As Indonesia stepped up its attacks, it became clear to FRETILIN that Indonesia's Western arms-suppliers--chief among them the U.S.--placed a higher value on their strategic and trade relationships with Indonesia than on principles of human rights or of international law. Portugal, wracked by domestic crises, was unable to resume the decolonization process, while Indonesia, despite statements made for world consumption, showed no interest in negotiating. In an effort to bring the issue of Indonesian aggression before the United Nations, FRETILIN, which had administered a de facto government since the rout of UDT in the civil war, declared East Timor's independence from Portugal on November 28, 1975. Three days later,

on December 1, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik all but announced an imminent full-scale invasion. On December 5, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger arrived in the Indonesian capital. These men knew very well that the impending operation would rely heavily on U.S.-supplied equipment (a State Department legal advisor admitted in July 1977 that in the invasion the Indonesian forces "were armed roughly 90% with our equipment"), and that Congress had specifically forbidden the use of U.S. military aid for external aggression. Yet there is so far no public evidence that either man attempted to dissuade Indonesia from attacking East Timor. It is worth noting, too, that the Carter Administration has thus far refused to comply with the Fraser Subcommittee's April 1977 request for "any written account or summary or report on the conversation between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger with Indonesian officials during their visit to Jakarta in December 1975." Twelve hours after Ford and Kissinger departed, the threatened full-scale invasion commenced.

Indonesia appears to have expected a quick military victory. But even during the period of Indonesia's "covert" border warfare FRETILIN's first-rate military performance had impressed journalists covering the fighting. Most FRETILIN soldiers were armed with high quality NATO weapons captured from the Portugese arsenal and had received 36 months of training in compulsory military service under the colonial regime. Significantly, the example of Australia's earlier successful guerrilla warfare in East Timor--when 400 Australian commandos held off 18,000 Japanese troops for almost two years-- convinced many that indigenous forces with strong popular support would drag Indonesia into a quagmire if Indonesia should try to occupy the territory.

Recognizing the futility of any attempt to defend Dili, the capital, or other towns close by the sea, FRETILIN, well before the December 7 invasion, moved men, arms and supplies into strongholds in the rugged mountain region which makes up most of East Timor. The people remaining in Dili were almost entirely non-combatants--women, children and the elderly. Yet, the Indonesian invaders treated these non-combatants with great brutality. The London Times reported gruesome massacres and many media published what was to be the final broadcast over Radio Dili: "The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately. Women and children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be killed. I repeat, we are all going to be killed..... This is an appeal for international help.....Please help us...."

The Portuguese government immediately broke diplomatic relations with Indonesia and called for an urgent United Nations meeting on the East Timor situation. The United Nations General Assembly voted on December 12, 1975 to condemn the Indonesian intervention and called on Indonesia to withdraw from the territory. The United States abstained on this resolution^{*}, although the U.S. voted for a somewhat weaker resolution unanimously adopted by the U.N. Security Council on December 22.

Despite the State Department's reticence, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, David Newsom, told a Berkeley seminar in January, 1976, that the United States "had not disapproved of" the Indonesian invasion. That same

* In late January 1976, the New York Times published the text of a diplomatic cable written by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., in which he boasted that his arm-twisting had been successful in influencing several countries' votes at this session.

month, the respected Sydney daily, The Australian, quoted an unnamed State Department official as saying that "the United States was more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor." In April 1976, the U.N. Security Council again took up the Timor issue, with Indonesia's position, according to the April 23, 1976 issue of the New York Times, being "discreetly backed by the United States." While the U.S. neither attended nor publicly acknowledged an Indonesian-staged "People's Assembly" held in the East Timor capital on May 31, 1976 (widely seen as a clumsy Indonesian attempt to legitimize its invasion), it voted against a December 1976 General Assembly resolution that rejected the Indonesian government's claim to have annexed East Timor.

Following the invasion, Indonesia, controlling air and sea access to East Timor, imposed a news blackout and allowed no independent journalists to travel freely in the territory. Disclosures of real conditions in East Timor came only from Australian intelligence leaks and other indirect sources. By late 1976, FRETILIN radio had been broadcasting from the East Timor hinterland on a regular basis for nearly a year and confirmation of the general outline of FRETILIN reports came in November 1976, when an Indonesian Catholic relief group released a secret report based on a trip to East Timor during which local priests were interviewed. The report stated that perhaps as many as 100,000 East Timorese had been killed since the Indonesian invasion; that FRETILIN military operations had effectively limited Indonesian control to only 15 per cent of the territory; that atrocities against the civilian population had become characteristic of the Indonesian occupation; and that FRETILIN would win any plebiscite.

The contents of the Indonesian Catholic report stimulated further investigations. In January 1977, James Dunn, the highly regarded former Australian consul in East Timor (currently head of the Parliamentary Library's Foreign Affairs research unit), was asked by church and relief organizations to interview East Timorese refugees newly arrived in Portugal. After conducting the interviews, Dunn told the London Times that Indonesian actions in East Timor could justly be compared with the brutality of American troops at My Lai. The Dunn report, dated February 11, 1977, painted a horrifying picture of Indonesia's December invasion and subsequent attempt to occupy the country. "In the mountain areas," the refugees claimed, "whole villages were wiped out as Indonesian troops advanced into the interior." Families were shot, according to the refugee account, "when the Indonesians discovered a FRETILIN flag in their house;" and when the Indonesians captured certain villages, "all the Timorese in the village except children under the age of three were shot," because, it was said, "they were infected with the seeds of FRETILIN." Dunn concluded that the East Timor situation "may well constitute. . . the most serious contravention of human rights facing the world at this time." The Dunn report did not claim to be more than a sketch of the situation, and he stressed that he wrote his report to encourage others to make a more exhaustive inquiry into the Timor situation. But lending particular weight to the Dunn report is the fact that the refugees who were interviewed had either been adherents of the UDT group defeated by FRETILIN, or had hitherto taken no part in the politics of East Timor.

In Australia the Dunn report set off a political furore. Parliamentarians of all major parties immediately cabled President Carter and Representative

Donald M. Fraser, recognizing that the United States could use its considerable clout to rein in Indonesia, the recipient of large amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance, especially if the Carter Administration honored its oft-repeated statements on human rights. Carter apparently did not respond to the cable, but Fraser soon scheduled a hearing on East Timor before his subcommittee, and asked James Dunn to testify.

By the time that Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke appeared on March 10 before the House Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee, the Dunn report--as well as a significant body of evidence from other reputable sources--had been available for consideration. Yet the situation in East Timor, like the issue of political prisoners, was not broached at all. At the same time, the Carter Administration was requesting a record \$58.1 million in military aid to Indonesia for fiscal 1978, a 28 per cent increase over the \$46 million granted in fiscal 1977--which, in turn, was double the amount given in fiscal 1976.

After his presentation, Holbrooke was questioned by a subcommittee member, Representative Helen Meyner (D-NJ), about his views on East Timor "and how that affects the whole security assistance picture." He replied:

Let me be frank about the Timor problem, Mrs. Meyner. I am unable to answer your question directly. I have heard the stories. I have read them. They really disturb me very much. I have been unable to make a personal determination. I could obtain for you a fairly formal statement from the Department and I will submit that, if you wish, immediately. But I would like to know more about it personally. I have read the reports and I feel very uncomfortable about them without knowing enough to make any final comment. . .if things like that are going on, they involve such a tremendous number of lives with such bloodshed that it would deserve much more attention than it has gotten subsequently.

Holbrooke's response seemed to vindicate the Carter Administration's claimed concern for human rights; it does not explain, however, why military aid to Indonesia was sharply increased when, clearly, such aid would only exacerbate existing human rights violations. In fact, high-level policy-makers apparently have placed Indonesia in a "not-to-be criticized" category. American oil companies and multinationals have enjoyed a bonanza since the military regime came to power in this OPEC country in 1965; Indonesia has a host of other important natural resources, such as rubber, tin, and timber. Strategically located at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia is undoubtedly one of the real tests of the authenticity of the Carter human rights policy. Like the Ford Administration before it, the Carter Administration has put strategic interests ahead of human rights, effectively endorsing official Indonesian statements on East Timor and the political prisoners, and presenting them to Americans as fact.

It has long been known that the Indonesians had relied chiefly on American arms to carry out the December 1975 invasion, but since then other sophisticated and lethal equipment has been delivered to the Indonesian military. For example, the United States provided Indonesia with a squadron of OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft, beginning in September 1976. (In February 1977 a leading Australian daily, The Age, reported that one of these planes had crashed off East Timor.) These Broncos, equipped with infra-red detectors, rockets, bombs, and napalm, appreciably raise the destructive capacity of the Indonesian forces. In a move clearly intended to forestall Congressional criticism, the Carter Administration on March 17 this year made the initially startling disclosure that the Ford Administration

had secretly stopped taking Indonesia's orders for military equipment for a six-month period between the December 1975 invasion and June 1976 (though it had never informed the Indonesians of this!) In July, the Indonesian government claimed that East Timor had been annexed. Since the Ford Administration had then tacitly recognized Indonesian's claim, the Carter Administration, speaking through ^{deputy} Assistant Secretary of State ~~William Brown~~ ^{Robert Oakley}, stated on March 10, 1977 that it could see "no useful purpose in reopening an issue already decided." Therefore, the statement concluded, if Indonesia were now to use any of the \$58.1 million in U.S. military assistance in the East Timor operation, it would not be conducting an aggressive foreign war; it would merely be defending its own territory. In the meantime, the United Nations, led by Portugal, has rejected Indonesia's case for annexation. Public opinion in Australia has made it impossible for the highly conservative government to recognize Indonesia's claimed annexation. In the United Nations, repudiation of Indonesia's claim has been broadbased; it has the backing even of the Brazilian military regime, which points out that the U.N. resolution is weakened only through lack of American cooperation. As for the situation inside East Timor itself, Australian intelligence disclosures indicate that heavy fighting continues.

Although the Carter Administration basically ignored James Dunn, his findings prompted two additional hearings before the Fraser Subcommittee and the visit in mid-April 1977 to East Timor of a Congressional fact-finding mission. The Congressional trip, unfortunately, could uncover little pertinent data. Not only was the itinerary strictly controlled by the Indonesian military but the fact-finding group was neither allowed independent interpreters nor the opportunity to meet with specific individuals. A leaked Australian

intelligence report later revealed that the four Indonesian-occupied towns visited had been cleared of troops and military equipment just before the Congressional mission arrived.

When the Fraser subcommittee continued its hearings to determine whether the East Timorese had been denied the "fundamental human right" of self-determination--"elaborated in two international covenants on human rights as well as the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," the State Department Legal Advisor, George Aldrich, conceded that East Timor's right to self-determination had been violated but declined to commit the Administration to any firm stand on a future United Nations vote; he merely reiterated the Carter Administration policy on East Timor. Representative Fraser, concluding the July 19 hearing, summed up his impressions:

the United States was apprised, at least in general, perhaps specifically because. . .Secretary Kissinger was in Jakarta the day before the invasion. . .of the intention of the Indonesian Government, but we made no serious objection to what they proposed to do; [after] what I would regard as a facade of self-determination was expressed, the United States immediately indicated it was satisfied with what had transpired and resumed shipments of military assistance it never told Indonesia it was suspending. U.S. arms were used in all that and continue to be used today--there is a degree of complicity here by the United States that I really find to be quite disturbing. Even if one sets that aside, to write off 600,000 people, because we are friends with the country which forcibly annexed them, does real violence to any profession of adherence to principle of human rights.

In late August of this year, major Australian dailies reported the beginning of a new Indonesian offensive against Timor, involving 10,000 fresh troops. Whether Indonesia has the capability to defeat what is by

now a seasoned guerrilla army is debatable, but there is little doubt that the civilian toll will be high. Reports that napalm and defoliants are being used are impossible to verify, but they are not at all improbable.

The United Nations will take up the question of East Timor later this fall. President Carter has on several occasions expressed a desire to work within the framework of the United Nations on issues of human rights and the peaceful settlement of disputes. On March 17, in a speech before the General Assembly, Carter affirmed that "there must be a wider effort to reduce the flow of weapons to all troubled spots of this globe." He went on to reaffirm that, with regard to human rights, "ours is a commitment, and not just a political posture." Yet on the same day, State Department officials issued a policy statement which implicitly rejected the U.N. resolution denying Indonesia's claim to have annexed East Timor. This fall, the United Nations will be watching American initiatives--or lack of them--on the East Timor question. If the United States should fail to take decisive, principled action on East Timor, it would signal a new low in American hypocrisy.

American Policy and the Issue of East Timor

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The principle of self-determination of nations has been expressed by America's leaders since the founding of this country. The concept of human rights has similarly been of fundamental importance to Americans for over two centuries. In view of these traditions, American policy toward Indonesian actions in East Timor warrants critical examination: although Indonesian violation of East Timor's right of self-determination is undeniable, and although Indonesia's violations of human rights in East Timor have been of a widespread and continuing nature, American policy, originally formulated by the Ford Administration, has been ^{either} to evade or to minimize these issues.

On December 5, 1975, less than 48 hours before Indonesian paratroopers and marines launched a full-scale air and sea attack against the East Timorese capital of Dili, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. By the time of the Ford-Kissinger visit, Indonesian forces had been fighting inside East Timorese border territory for more than two months. Indeed, immediately before the Presidential delegation arrived in Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik had stated that the Timor situation had "gone beyond diplomacy and can only be resolved on the battlefield". Regional observers believed an invasion to be imminent. Australian citizens had been evacuated from Dili on December 2 in expectation of the Indonesian attack. It is inconceivable that American intelligence and diplomatic personnel had no inkling of the gravity of the situation. This is especially certain given the fact that American military equipment was essential to the preparations for and launching of the invasion of Dili. Thus there could be no doubt that in the event of an all-out Indonesian assault on Dili,

the United States would find itself indirectly involved, because of the use of U.S. weaponry and the presence of the Presidential party during the final preparations for the assault.

This state of affairs, however, did not disturb the Presidential party to any demonstrable degree: there is no public evidence that either President Ford or Secretary Kissinger attempted to dissuade Indonesia from attacking Dili. Twelve hours after the Presidential party departed, on December 7, 1975, the attack commenced.

The brutal nature of the Indonesian invasion of Dili was immediately evident. Reports in the world press - - ranging from the London Times to Time magazine - - noted that the invasion was extremely bloody. Australian media published the following final broadcast over Radio Dili: "The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately. Women and children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be killed. I repeat, we are all going to be killed This is an appeal for international help. We appeal to the Australian people. Please help us"

Faced with the reports of widespread killing taking place in Dili, the Ford administration participated in world condemnation of the Indonesian action. Thus the United States voted for the unanimous December 22, 1975 United Nations Security Council Resolution calling for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal. However, as the fighting spread to the countryside and as Indonesia imposed a news blackout on events in Dili, the Administration's stance seemed to shift. In January 1976, the American Ambassador to Indonesia, David Newsome, stated that the United States had "not disapproved of" the Indonesian assault.

That same month, the ^{Sydney} ~~Canberra~~-based daily, The Australian,
quoted a State Department official as saying that the United
States was "more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor".
Then, with chilling reports of Indonesian massacres persisting
despite the Indonesian news barrier, the Ford Administration
assumed, for the balance of its tenure, a position of studied
silence. Accordingly, The United States neither attended nor
publicly acknowledged the May 31, 1976 "Peoples' Assembly",
hastily convened in Dili by Indonesian occupation forces,
which purported^{ly} requested "integration" with Indonesia. (Aus-
tralia, other western nations, and Japan also boycotted the
"Peoples' Assembly".)

The Carter Administration found itself in the awkward posi-
tion of being heir to the Ford-Kissinger policies on ^{East} Timor
and, unfortunately, appears to have uncritically adopted them
together with all of their contradictions. Thus, in March 1977
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Oakley made a series of
conflicting statements concerning President Ford's and President
Carter's policies on East Timor. In mid-March he revealed
that the Ford Administration had stopped taking Indonesian orders
for weapons during the period from December 1975 to June 1976,
because of reports of barbarity by Indonesian troops in East Timor.
Then, on March 23 Secretary Oakley stated that the Ford Admini-
stration had ultimately "accepted" Indonesian "integration" of ^{East}
Timor and that "this Administration sees no useful purpose in
reopening an issue already decided". He concluded that "this
Admini^{str}ation does take seriously human rights problems" and
that "we have been following the situation in Timor and will
continue to do so". Yet, while it is clear that Indonesian

atrocities in Timor constitute a gross violation of human rights - - and that the atrocities continue - - the policies of President Carter have thus far evidenced no more effective concern for East Timorese human and political rights than did those of President Ford. The United States must realize that the killing will not stop until the conflict is over and that the conflict will not be over until Indonesia withdraws completely from the territory.

The Carter Administration need not be any more bound to Ford-Kissinger policies in ^{East} Timor than in any other area of the world. It need not - - and should not - - be as indifferent to the issues of East Timorese human rights and self-determination as the previous Administration. It must not allow diplomatic and bureaucratic inertia to render meaningless its foreign policy principles.

American initiatives, on several levels, can help bring the Indonesian war against East Timor to a close. It is in American - - and Indonesian - - interests to put an end to Indonesia's domestically unpopular and financially wasteful operations in East Timor. These operations can only further strain the already deeply indebted Indonesian government's budget and bring about more political instability at home.

The Carter Administration can repudiate the Ford-Kissinger policy on ^{East} Timor. It can support United Nations initiatives calling for free elections in East Timor and for an immediate and unconditional Indonesian withdrawal. It can let Indonesia know that its continued presence in East Timor is not consonant with the Carter human rights policy; if necessary, by a public statement.

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Congress of the United States Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 5, 1977

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF

Mr. Arnold S. Kohen
410 Stewart Avenue
Ithaca, New York 14850

Dear Mr. Kohen:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 24 and the very useful document entitled "East Timor and the Issue to Self-Determination." Enclosed, for your information, is a copy of the first hearing which was held on East Timor. Additional hearings were held on June 28 and July 19th. As soon as that series of hearings is published a copy will be sent to you.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,



John P. Salzberg
Staff Consultant
Subcommittee on International
Organizations

JPS:mp

EAST TIMOR AND THE ISSUE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Stephen R. Heder

Doctoral Student, Government Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

Arnold S. Kohen

Researcher in Southeast Asian Affairs, Ithaca, N. Y.

Document submitted to the Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives,
June 28, 1977

Any discussion of the issue of self-determination for East Timor must begin by focusing on the current situation and the pertinent recent history of the territory.

Internationally, the United Nations General Assembly, in November 1976, rejected Indonesia's claim to have incorporated East Timor; the U.N. Committee on Decolonization continues to list the country as a non-self-governing territory. Portugal, which ruled East Timor for more than four hundred years, has also refused to recognize the Indonesian claim. On December 7, 1975, the day of Indonesia's full-scale invasion of East Timor, the Portuguese severed all diplomatic ties with Indonesia, and the moderate Soares government shows no sign of changing its position.

Within Indonesia, the government continues to enforce strict press censorship to suppress all news of the conflict. In fact, the Indonesian government has, to date, refused to acknowledge publicly that a war is being fought. It was only on Armed Forces Day (October 5) that President Suharto paid tribute to "volunteers" who had died in East Timor. Some have seen Suharto's statement as a response to pressure from widows and families of fallen soldiers to acknowledge the sacrifices made in the continuing conflict. Unofficially, knowledgeable Indonesian sources agree that the war in East Timor has proved to be a military and diplomatic disaster for Indonesia.

Because independent journalists have been denied free access to the territory, it is difficult to determine the precise situation in East Timor. Nevertheless, in November 1976 a confidential report was released to the Australian press by a group of Indonesian Catholic bishops who had visited

East Timor as part of a relief team. The bishops' report states that two-thirds of East Timor's population are living in territory administered by the FRETILIN independence movement, an area they say comprises 80% of East Timor. The report cites the effective and extensive resistance being carried out against the Indonesian troops. Also noted is FRETILIN's wide popularity: if a free election were to be held, say the bishops, FRETILIN would easily emerge the winner. The interviews conducted with Timorese refugees in Portugal by the former Australian consul to East Timor, James Dunn, essentially corroborate the bishops' findings. In addition, a recent report by Australian Intelligence (described in the Australian daily The Melbourne Age), although cautious in its prognosis, confirms that resistance to the Indonesian invasion is strong. Several leading members of the Australian Parliament, including Deputy Labor Party leader Tom Uren, consider the Australian intelligence statement a further confirmation of FRETILIN's success. Significantly, support for this view in Australia is bi-partisan.

To account fully for the violation of East Timor's right to self-determination, one must review the events of the past three years leading up to the December invasion. Within a month of the April 25, 1974 fall of the dictatorship in Portugal, three political associations had formed in Portuguese Timor. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), at that time, favored continuing association with Portugal. The Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT, later FRETILIN), a party similar in outlook to the Portuguese Socialist Party of Mario Soares, favored independence within five years. The third party, by far the weakest, was the Timorese Popular Democratic Association

(APODETI), whose few members felt that union with Indonesia offered the best possibilities for personal gain.

In June of 1974, the secretary of the ASDT political committee, José Ramos Horta, travelled to Jakarta to obtain support from the Indonesian government for East Timor's right to independence. Horta departed with a letter from Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik affirming that "the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor." Malik's letter went on to say: "whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence can be assured that the government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations."

But a September 1974 meeting between Indonesian President Suharto and Australia's Prime Minister Whitlam opened the way for a change in Indonesia's public attitude. After the meeting, a Whitlam spokesman declared that "an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the region."* The Whitlam spokesman added, nevertheless, that "the people of the colony should have the ultimate decision on their future."

The Whitlam-Suharto meeting was seen by ASDT as a clear indication that the regional powers were not prepared to accept the independence of East Timor, despite Whitlam's and Malik's professed support for the principle of self-

*East Timor has a greater economic potential than is generally realized; the alleged "unviability" of East Timor has been repeatedly emphasized by those who would undercut the basic validity of the Timorese independence forces. At present prices, Timor's high-quality coffee exports alone would earn ample foreign exchange for purposes of economic development. Unfortunately, the heavy fighting has brought production down drastically from pre-1975 levels. East Timor also "possesses significant quantities of oil, gold, manganese, chromium, and possibly iron, and has the potential for rubber and palm oil plantations, timber farming, cattle and sheep ranches, and smallholder agriculture and animal husbandry." (J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, March 1975.)

determination.

One week after the Whitlam-Suharto meeting, ASDT voted to change the association name to FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). Behind the change was the idea that FRETILIN would expand to become a broad coalition encompassing all pro-independence forces in East Timor, whatever their political philosophy. FRETILIN's hopes for a strong coalition were soon realized. In January 1975, FRETILIN formed a pro-independence coalition with UDT.

Even before the coalition was formed, however, the Indonesians were attempting to discredit all pro-independence forces in Timor. In the aftermath of the Whitlam-Suharto meeting, the Indonesian radio in West Timor began nightly broadcasts in the local East Timor languages that called UDT "more fascist than the Portuguese colonialists" and branded FRETILIN "communist".

The Indonesian propaganda broadcasts made it clear that the Indonesians were stepping up their interference in the political process in East Timor, in clear disregard for Timorese sentiment in favor of independence. Indonesia's intentions became common knowledge; Anthony Goldstone wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review on November 1, 1974 that there had been "no shift by the Indonesians in their determination to incorporate the province (sic) into their country."

II

FROM THE STATEMENT BY ROBERT B. OAKLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEES ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

The recent history of (East Timor) is itself very complicated, involving primarily an upheaval in Portugal and its African colonies, which caused Portugal to abandon in late August 1975 the half of Timor it administered. This chaotic situation led eventually to an Indonesian intervention in East Timor.

Contrary to Secretary Oakley's assertions, the political situation in East Timor following the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal was far from "complicated". A stable pro-independence coalition including the UDT and FRETILIN, formed precisely because of unease concerning the Indonesian's true intentions, had already emerged. Foreign observers were convinced that this coalition had overwhelming and growing support in Timor and would easily win any free election. The "chaotic situation" to which Oakley refers was the direct result of Indonesian political (and later military) intervention. Chaos was manufactured by Indonesia in order to provide a pretext for invasion. The doctor came to cure a "disease" which he himself had spread.

In February and March of 1975, the Indonesians fomented "instability" by floating rumors of an invasion--rumors designed to unnerve coalition members. In April 1975, the Indonesians issued invitations to UDT and FRETILIN leaders to meet with them in separate delegations, apparently in order to create mutual suspicion between the two coalition partners. At the same time, Indonesian radio increased its broadcast charges that FRETILIN leaders were "communists", while dropping previous vehement charges that UDT leaders were "fascists".

The Indonesian splitting tactics bore fruit in mid-May when UDT unilaterally announced it was leaving the coalition. UDT did not state its reason for this move, but most observers believe that its leaders had been convinced by

the Indonesians that Jakarta would tolerate Timorese independence only if FRETILIN, by this time clearly more popular than UDT, was excluded from the independence government. Later events would show just how sincere the Indonesians were in making such assertions.

In the ensuing months, FRETILIN leaders consistently called for talks with UDT to re-establish the coalition, refusing only to participate in meetings that included Indonesia's anti-independence stalking horse in Timor, the tiny APODETI. Meanwhile, UDT leaders made repeated trips to Jakarta. On August 11, 1975, three days after one such meeting, UDT staged a violent coup against FRETILIN, with the backing of the Portuguese colonial police. Among UDT's first moves was the execution of several relatives of FRETILIN's leaders. Despite this, FRETILIN continued to call on UDT to negotiate an end to the strife. FRETILIN also requested that the Portuguese act as mediators in an effort to restore peace. Only when these calls proved to be of no avail did FRETILIN, on the 20th of August, turn to military measures.

By early September, UDT had been defeated and FRETILIN had restored order throughout the territory. At FRETILIN's request, Australian humanitarian organizations and the International Red Cross assisted in FRETILIN's relief efforts. Visiting Australian parliamentarians from both major parties reported that FRETILIN had restored the economy and that administration was running smoothly, given the circumstances. They also reported that FRETILIN was not carrying out reprisals against UDT members. If the earlier period had been one of chaos, that chaos had now come to an end. However, it was--and still is--in Indonesia's interest to obscure this important fact.

Secretary Oakley also asserted that "throughout this period Indonesia called for the resumption of political talks between the various Timorese factions."

In fact, the Indonesians began, in late September 1975, a covert war across the border from West Timor. The resulting fighting was portrayed by Indonesian government outlets as a "civil war". As pointed out above, however, the domestic conflict had, in reality, ended by early September and life in Timor had returned to normal. The Indonesians soon stepped up their border attacks and in mid-October, five Australian television journalists were killed by Indonesian troops operating well inside East Timorese territory. Their executions apparently resulted from the fact that they were filming evidence of the Indonesian intervention. Unfortunately for the Indonesians, however, other Australian citizens, including Members of Parliament and churchmen, as well as journalists, also witnessed the early Indonesian armed incursions. These on-the-scene observers rendered ludicrous Indonesia's pious denials of all involvement in Timor. These impartial observers further confirmed that only a very few East Timorese were cooperating with the Indonesian troops, and that even fewer were actually fighting on the Indonesian side. This was while the Indonesian news agency, Antara, continued to talk of a "civil war between rival Timorese factions."

Indonesia never made any effort to resolve the Timor "conflict" peacefully. Statements making such claims were made solely as a part of Indonesia's international public relations effort. Given Indonesia's escalating border attacks, all calls for "talks" were quite hollow.

Secretary Oakley further stated that:

In late November 1975, FRETILIN unilaterally declared the colony independent from Portugal under the title of "Democratic Republic of East Timor". . . Other Timorese factions hostile to FRETILIN refused to accept this situation and continued to fight on. At the request of certain of these groups, Indonesia intervened in December 1975.

In reality, the FRETILIN declaration of independence was precipitated by the intensifying Indonesian war against Timor, which now included heavier and more frequent Indonesian bombing of Timorese territory. The turning point, according to James Dunn, was the Indonesian assault on the town of Atabai, twelve miles inside East Timor: "Its implications were indisputable. Indonesia was determined to destroy FRETILIN and with it the prospect of independence for East Timor."

FRETILIN reasoning in the face of this threatening situation was based upon diplomatic considerations: to establish immediately a juridical basis for taking the East Timor issue to the world. FRETILIN felt it necessary to declare Timorese independence in hopes of bringing international pressure to bear on the Indonesians and thus to slow their military campaign.

Secretary Oakley's two additional assertions--that "other Timorese groups hostile to FRETILIN....continued to fight on", and that "certain Timorese groups requested (Indonesian) intervention"--ignore the fact that these unnamed groups had long since been discredited in the eyes of most Timorese and had suffered both political and military defeat in the open competition with FRETILIN up to September 1975. In this connection it should be noted that Indonesia's claim of intervention by invitation has been completely rejected by the United Nations.

Finally, Secretary Oakley assures us: "Following a referendum, Indonesia formally incorporated East Timor on July 17, 1976." In fact, no referendum, in the true sense of that word, ever took place in East Timor. Secretary Oakley is apparently referring to a "People's Assembly" held in Dili on May 31, 1976, a spectacle which Michael Richardson of The Melbourne Age described

as "so obviously a sham that it must have made even the handful of foreign Government representatives who attended wince." This "referendum", in which no one except a few of Indonesia's hand-picked protégés voted, was little more than a hastily arranged attempt to defuse international protest.

The present situation in East Timor is one of clear and continuing Indonesian violation of the right of the East Timorese to determine their own political future. This right will undoubtedly continue to receive the overwhelming backing of the United Nations. The democratic Portuguese government of Mario Soares will continue to fulfill Portugal's legal and moral obligation to oppose Indonesia's unprovoked and vicious attacks on East Timor, and to refuse to recognize Indonesia's attempted annexation of that nation. Portugal's position vis-a-vis East Timor is exactly analogous to that of Great Britain vis-a-vis Rhodesia. In both cases, the colonial power is faced with an illegal government which has not come to power as a result of an electoral act expressing the will of a democratic majority. In Australia, a large bi-partisan group of parliamentarians continue to voice strong support for the right of East Timor to self-determination. The Australian and United States governments, on the other hand, prefer to maintain an embarrassed silence on the issue, for they recognize that Indonesia's actions cannot easily be justified.

The leadership of UDT, now in exile in Portugal, refuses to accept the legitimacy of Indonesia's actions in East Timor. These men have not only witnessed Indonesian duplicity in the form of broken promises of Timorese independence under UDT administration, but have also witnessed numerous Indonesian massacres of their compatriots.

East Timor was never a part of the Dutch East Indies from which Indonesia was formed. No previous Indonesian government ever attempted to assert a legal claim to East Timor. Former Indonesian President Sukarno's anti-colonial campaign against the Dutch presence in West Irian, which had always been an integral part of the Dutch East Indies empire, was never extended to the Portuguese presence in Timor.

Diplomatic avoidance of the issue of East Timorese independence cannot transform Indonesia's invasion into a success. The war in East Timor is continuing, with no sign of abatement. Ironically, the instability which Indonesia fomented in East Timor to provide a pretext for its invasion now threatens Indonesia itself. The longer the war continues, the less stable Indonesia will become. The longer the Indonesian government, already faced with billions of dollars in foreign debts, wastes hundreds of millions of dollars in massive military operations in East Timor, and the longer it tries to hide the fact of the war from an already disillusioned Indonesian public, the more serious its political problems will become. It is evident, then, that the Timor war is not in the true best interests of Indonesia. On the contrary, the interests not only of Indonesia and the region as a whole, but also, of course, of the East Timorese themselves, would best be served by all parties' sincere recognition of East Timor's right to independence and self-determination, in accordance with the United Nations' resolutions on the matter. An essential first step in this direction, without which peace can never be restored, is the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East Timor.

Tapol

U.S. Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

P. O. Box 609, Montclair, N.J. 07042

December 15, 1977

Committee for Justice
P.O. Box 54
Charlotte, Michigan 48813

Dear friend,

Many thanks for your kind letter of November 27, 1977. Tapol--USA, like similar organizations working for human rights, depends heavily on the good will of persons in a position to make financial contributions, and we would of course be most grateful for any assistance which you can offer.

Tapol--USA and Tapol--UK are separate organizationally, and we would suggest that you divide any contributions between the two organizations on a 50-50 basis. You can be certain of maintaining your confidentiality by sending any contributions for the US Campaign, directly to our treasurer:

Mr. John Newmann
The Ford Foundation
320 E. 43rd St.
New York, N.Y. 10017 Tel. 212-573-4895

May I mention also, that Tapol--USA has nearly completed a funding request which we intend to circulate to various foundations and other possible sources and we shall send you a copy of this proposal as soon as it is ready. It explains our needs and plans for expanding the informational work of the campaign both to the U.S. Congress and Administration and to the American public. Your contribution, no matter what the amount, will come at a particularly important time in the work we are doing.

Finally, let me assure you that your contribution will be used directly for the work of releasing the political prisoners, and solely for that purpose. Nearly all tapol work is done on a volunteer basis, though we are attempting to raise funds to take on one part-time or full-time organizer as will be explained in the proposal.

Again, our sincerest appreciation for your kind offer, and please be in contact directly with Mr. Newmann for working out of details.

For tapol--USA,

Richard W. Franke

Richard W. Franke

cc. John Newmann
Carmel Budiardjo

SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER REPORTS SUMABAWA EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE

BK221039Y Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 0700 GMT 22 Aug 77 BK

[Excerpts] Social Affairs Minister Mintaredja has said that as of 1100 today [0400 GMT] 70 persons have been killed by the earthquake in Nusatenggara and 2 in Bali. No reports have yet been received in Jakarta about people killed in East Nusatenggara.

In an effort to ease the sufferings of the people, the Social Affairs Department has sent 400 tons of rice, including 200 tons for West Nusatenggara and the rest for East Nusatenggara. The department has also sent 7.5 million rupiah to Nusatenggara for the purchase of secondary foodstuffs. The minister said that a search and rescue team which left for Nusatenggara today will drop food and medicines to villagers who are suffering from the earthquake and cannot be reached by motor vehicles.

The minister said the recent earthquake was more devastating than the one which took place in Bali recently, because the area hit by the earthquake this time was quite vast, covering West Nusatenggara, East Nusatenggara, Bali and part of Java. The epicenter of the earthquake was located 150 kilometers from Lombok and Sumbawa.

The Social Affairs Office in West Nusatenggara has sent 4 tons of rice and 100,000 rupiah for earthquake victims in central Lombok.

DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES AMNESTY TO FRETILIN MEMBERS

BK211532Y Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 20 Aug 77 BK

[Text] Defense and Security Minister and Armed Forces Commander General Panggabean has said that the offer of amnesty to Fretilin remnants was based on the sense of brotherhood among fellow nationals, for their strength has become meaningless and their total destruction is merely a matter of time. General Panggabean said this after reporting to President Suharto on security restoration operations and the maintenance of security in the country today.

General Panggabean pointed out that the main purpose of the offer of amnesty was not to obtain foreign support for the Indonesian Government regarding East Timor's integration with the Indonesian Republic, as this merger is Indonesia's domestic affair.

The text of President Suharto's 16 August state message, which among other things included the offer of amnesty, has been sent to the military commander and the regional government of East Timor for distribution to the rebel remnants. The amnesty is also valid for detained Fretilin members and those who have fled abroad. Even the self-styled foreign minister of Fretilin, Ramos Horta, will be pardoned if he repents and is willing to join in the development of East Timor according to the Indonesian Government's (?plan).

General Panggabean declined to disclose the number of detained Fretilin members, but he said that many Fretilin members have been accepted by the armed forces after receiving training. The general said that he discussed the purchase of advanced training aircraft with President Suharto. This plan is now being studied. He said President Suharto has directed him to explore the possibility of purchasing aircraft from (?India). On this occasion General Panggabean also reported on security restoration operation in sensitive areas in Irian Jaya, East Timor, North Sumatra and other places. He said these operations have been successful.

NOTES ON TIMOR HEARINGS, JULY 19, 1977 IN SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

George Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department and Leonard Meeker, Director of the Center for Law and Social Policy and a former State Dept. Legal Adviser, submitted written testimony. Prof. Thomas Franck of New York University School of Law, presented a synopsis of his article in the NYU Law Review (Dec. 1976) "Self-Determination of Very Small Places."

Summary of Prof. Franck's comments:

- Based on the case studies of the Spanish Sahara and East Timor, Prof. Frank made the following points: 1.) the U.S. supports heavily Indonesia and Morocco with substantial bilateral and multi-lateral aid programs.
- 2.) Such support is inconsistent in light of these two countries annexation of other territories and U.S. espoused human rights policy.
- 3.) The oldest human right is that of self-determination and extremely basic to human rights concerns today and thus there is a discrepancy between our policy and actions.
- 4.) As an important element of world order, self-determination is a strategic policy.

He pointed out the defense of Israel as a small nation. Since 1954, the UN has set forth an orderly process for resolving the status of non-self governing territories: British Togoland, French Togoland, No. and So. Camerons, W. Samoa, Papua New Guinea, No. Marianas (1975) and Equatorial Guinea. Thus there is a consistent pattern of internationally supervised UN referendums. However, the situations in East Timor and Spanish Sahara have broken this tradition, placing in great jeopardy the norm of self-determination.

60,000 East Timorese were killed during the invasion of Indonesia and subsequent months.

Listed the UN Resolution, pointing out that the failure of 53 countries to approve the UN Resolution was a strong force in motivating a complete incorporation without self-determination. From virtually every world order perspective, East Timor's case is a highly destabilizing precedent. Strong precedent for UN Commission role has been set in the Namibia case.

U.S. bears tremendous responsibility for the failure of self-determination violations, because U.S. ~~XXXX~~ augmented Indonesia's power to invade and continues to encourage the occupation. U.S. is adding ~~XXXX~~ blatant hypocrisy to earlier ~~XXXX~~ malevolence. We can change this trend by acting uniformly and consistently on the human rights of self-determination.

Questions and Answers:

Fraser: I gather you (Mr. Aldrich) feel that a proper determination of the feelings of the East Timorese on self-determination has not occurred.

Aldrich: Yes, sir, I do.

Fraser: Did we know in advance about the invasion?

Aldrich: We had a pretty good idea that the Indonesians would invade. Probably did not know exact date. Made Indons aware of U.S. laws vis-a-vis assistance and external aggression.

Fraser: Do we have one standard for our friends and one for our not-so-friendly countries? (e.g. We still have not recognized the incorporation of Baltic States into Soviet Union.)

Aldrich: What we've done in the Baltic States has not particularly been helpful to the people of the Baltics. What do we do in a situation we did not create?

Fraser: Not true, Indonesians used our arms.

Aldrich: We did not know very much (about the situation), maybe we did not want to know.

Aldreich: (Referring to the Arms Export Control Act, which restricts our assistance to be used for external aggression) the law was changed in June, 1976. The law previously required an automatic cut-off, but now only a report to the Congress must be made, whereupon Congress can take action.

Fraser: Were Indonesians aware of the suspension of arms for the six month period?

Aldrich: No, they were not aware of it.

Aldrich: The thing that we feel is most helpful to the East Timorese people is to insure that Indonesia treats them humanitarially. We certainly do recognize that East Timorese still have a right to self-determination and that that right has not been recognized.

Fraser pointed out the contradiction of recognizing the rights of self-determination and also accepting Indonesia's annexation without a true referendum. Is the U.S. willing to ~~XXX~~ raise the issue of East Timor's self-determination at the UN this fall?

Aldrich: We would not wish to raise that question on our own, but our present position would not be consistent if we supported such a resolution for self-determination. Our view is that annexation has occurred but does not wipe away the right of self-determination of the people. As a legal theory, the right of self-determination cannot be ~~XXXXX~~ extinguished.

Fraser: Isn't the seizure of E. Timor in violation of international standards?

Aldrich: Indonesians were only entering to put an end to the considerable amount of turmoil going on.

Cong. Goodling: Gen. Murdani told me last week that two invitations were made by the Indonesians to the UN to visit East Timor. Both were refused. (No one knew anything about such invitations.)

Fraser's summary: The U.S. was appraised of the invasion because Ford and Kissinger were there a few hours before. The suspension of aid was not told to the Indonesians. The degree of U.S. complicity I find quite disturbing in this whole affair. And I am deeply disappointed that this Administration has assumed the same position taken by the Ford Admin.

Meeker: It's not too late to take a fresh look at our East Timor position. We could raise the issue at the UN. We could take steps to discuss the matter with Indonesia. The Carter Admin. has a true opportunity to make a really genuine effort of good faith.

Fraser: Is it reasonable for the U.S. to take a new position now?

Franck: Yes, but not only the Admin. Congress can take up the matter under Sec. 502/B of the Human Rights laws, which cover the right of self-determination. Congress must be consistent in application of law, and exert pressure on the Admin.

Fraser: The government of Indonesia through their Washington ambassador has expressed its feelings about these E. Timor hearings to Secretary Vance. The Indonesians feel the hearings are an interference of their internal affairs.

Meeker: That surely indicates their sensitivity and vulnerability.

NOTE: NOT A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT BUT A SUMMARY OF COMMENTS.

Jacqui Chagnon

EAST TIMOR NEWS AGENCY

fourth floor, 232 Castlereagh St., Sydney NSW 2000 . September 28, 1977

WEST TIMORESE FLEES TO FRETILIN-HELD AREAS

The following communique was read in English over Radio Maubere on September 23, 1977 .It is reproduced as read, with comments by ETNA in brackets :

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR
FRETILIN -- DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The war in East Timor also awakes the brother people of West Timor . West Timor is also another Javanese colony. The revolution of the Maubere people, heroically on march in East Timor is strongly sounding in West Timor.

In the last month, one Indonesian element has escaped from the Javanese concentration camp at Atambua (1) to Fretilin-controlled areas near Bobonaro (2), whose identification we do not reveal for security reasons. He has reported that all over West Timor the civilian population are highly unsatisfied and living under a terrible climate of terror imposed by Javanese colonial troops.

Many people in Atambua have already been arrested ,punished and tortured in Javanese special concentration camps from (which) he has escaped and is still showing along the body recent marks of beating and burning inflicted by the Javanese colonial troops.

He has also reported that the situation of East Timor is grandly discussed in West Timor. Finally, he has reassured that sooner or later the people of West Timor will be free from Javanese colonial domination.

Independence of Death. To Annihilate is to win. Armed struggle is still on.
Long Live internationalist militancy

23/9/77

Signed: Alarico Jorge Fernandes, Minister for Information and National Security

(1) Atambua is in West Timor near northern border of East Timor

(2) Bobonaro is in East Timor, near West Timor border.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR
FRETILIN -- DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

MESSAGE TO AUSTRALIAN WORKERS ACROSS AUSTRALIA

It was (has been ?) two years that the heroic Maubere people, wisely led by their fearless and intrepid vanguard -- the glorious Fretilin Central Committee -- are carrying out the armed struggle for their true liberation, for the liberation of their country from the strangers' aggression yoke .The most frightful puppets of the imperialists, the common enemy of all the oppressed people, of the working class all over the world, and of all forces lovers of peace and progress.

Around this time, the people of East Timor have learned to distinguish their friends from their enemies and to differentiate their true friends and allies from their false friends. These are not all the agents of the enemy who infiltrated in our revolutionary ranks.

The numerous (1) speakers supported by the imperialists in order to buy off, sabotage, mediate and to (under)mine the combative solidarity among the people, solidarity among the people, at last, to suffocate the normal and just struggle of the oppressed people against the colonialists, neo-colonialists and imperialists, in defence of the integrity of the country and the national independence.

It is in the fighting and consequently through the practice that we should correctly make such distinctions and separate the good friends from the bad ones, and it's been told by our beloved and martyred people of East Timor.

Imperialists count with the national and international power to suffocate the struggle of the working class of the entire world, more and more intense oppression. However, also the people determined to fight, always find firm support from certain friends and allies which are highly numerous and in constant growing.

The people of East Timor highly appreciate the effective support given by the Australian workers to their struggle against the Javanese colonialists, as well as the building of these support will easily draw more and more strengthening the militant solidarity and already increasing between the two people -- the people of East Timor and the Australian people.

Independence or death. To annihilate is to win. Armed struggle is continuing. Long live the militant solidarity. The victory is certain.

24/9/77

Signed: Alarico Jorge Fernandes, Minister for Information and National Security.

Notes: (1) This is derived from a Portuguese word, meaning "very fluent". This communique was read by Mr Fernandes over Radio Maubere on September 25, in English. The text is produced as read, with comments by ETNA added in brackets.

MINISTER MARI ALKATIRI MEETS WITH MOZAMBICAN
PRESIDENT SOMORA MACHEL AND GUINE-BISSAU PRESIDENT LUIS CABRAL

Minister for External Relations in the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Mari Alkatiri met President Samora Moises Machel of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique, in Maputo on September 24, 1977 in a very cordial and highly fraternal discussion that lasted two hours. Also present were Military Adviser Rogerio Lobato, and DRET Ambassador to Mozambique, Roque Rodrigues, and Mozambican Minister of State of the Presidency, Oscar Monteiro. President Machel reaffirmed personal and official unconditional and total support and revolutionary solidarity from FRELIMO and the P.R. of Mozambique to the Revolutionary Government of DRET and Fretilin.

Mari Alkatiri on September 23, held an important press conference in Maputo attended by Mozambican Government officials and representatives in Maputo including those from the USSR, PR of China, Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, other socialist countries, and some West European countries. The press conference was broadcast in full over Angola's Radio Luanda. On September 25, Minister Alkatiri met with President of the Republic of Guine-Bissau, Luis Cabral, in a very fruitful and fraternal meeting, in the Angolan capital of Luanda. Minister Alkatiri was invited to the next PAIGC Congress in November. Minister Alkatiri also met with Angolan External Relations Minister Paulo Jorge, and will meet President Agostinho Neto shortly. The President of Benin, Col. Mathieu Kerekou also sent a message of solidarity and support with the DRET.

EAST TIMOR NEWS AGENCY

fourth floor, 232 Castlereagh St., Sydney NSW 2000 Phone: 617089 September-28

PRESS RELEASE

NEWS AND COMMUNIQUE ON RADIO MAUBERE SEPTEMBER 23 and 25

Radio Maubere news September 23

LIKICA: On September 17, the enemy has massively advanced over one Fretilin position, supported by bombardment from a warship. The enemy occupied that position, but Fretilin later that day counter-attacked and fierce fighting went on all day. In the evening the enemy withdrew to VATO-VOU mountain, where bloody fighting went on. There, Fretilin eliminated 80 Indonesian soldiers and wounded a lot. Meanwhile, very intense fighting is still going on.

BAZARTETE: On September 20, the enemy advanced over one Fretilin position. After fierce fighting the enemy was repelled to its former position. Fretilin revolutionary forces have killed 10 Indonesian soldiers. Fretilin forces suffered no casualties.

DILI: The situation in Dili is deteriorating more and more. Its highly discouraging, the shortage of medical supplies, starvation and climate of terror imposed by the Javanese colonial troops on the pacific population. It's still (imposing) very bad treatment and acute tortures of all kinds. Recently the enemy have indiscriminately and materially affected a high number of the civilian population, who after suffering brutalities were exiled to Atauro Island.

Radio Maubere news, September 25.

LIKICA: 80 enemy were killed, and enemy fled away to Maubara lagoon, where they were bombarded by Fretilin mortars. Fretilin suffered four dead and six wounded.

BOBONARO: September 22 -- enemy launched a strong new offensive over one Fretilin position supported by heavy artillery. The glorious Falintil are heroically resisting and fierce fighting is going on.

SOIBADA : The enemy is hiding in Soibada village. Supplies can only be got to them by air, thanks to the action of Fretilin forces. So on September 13 and 17 the enemy has dropped four lots of supplies by parachute. On September 17, Fretilin forces killed two Indonesian soldiers and wounded three. Fretilin forces didn't suffer any casualties.

COMMUNIQUE TO THE CAMPAIGN FOR INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR FOR CIRCULATION AROUND THE WORLD

Democratic Republic of East Timor
FRETILIN- Department of Information and National Security

A new wave of Indonesian offensives on East Timor is about (taking place?). Against the heroic armed struggle of the Maubere people, all the enemy pathetic attempts to suffocate our struggle for national liberation and building the new society have always failed. For this reason the enemy is concentrating

a high number of Indonesian troops along the border line, particularly in Maliana, Atapupu and Atambua (1) in order to launch a new, stronger offensive over Fretilin large controlled areas. Besides, the enemy is using Batugade (1) as a military training centre for the selected captured population and for those ones in West Timor forced to it.

It's simply ridiculous, the statement of the puppet Paggabeau (2) about the mobilisation of 16 battalions to East Timor to crush just only 200 Fretilin remaining forces still resisting in the mountains.

The people of East Timor are politically and militarily prepared to face a hard and long term struggle and materialising in practice the strategy decided by the Higher Council of Struggle of Fretilin Central Committee -- the historic meeting held in Lalini (between March and May 1977 --ETNA).

In this way, in the battlefield, we have already brought success, such as the special annihilation inflicted by Fretilin revolutionary forces to the enemy on September 11, 1977 in Matabean Mountain (near Quelicai --ETNA), which details are the following :

On September 11, the enemy made an offensive over Fretilin positions in Matabean Mountain with an effective of eight companies being three of them Red Berets. Fretilin forces have counter-attacked and annihilated over 200 Indonesian soldiers, being 150 confirmed (killed --ETNA) and wounded a lot of them. The rest have been withdrawn to their former positions.

Fretilin forces have captured from the enemy the following war materials: ten machine guns of Belgian brand; 10 automatic rifles; eight M15 automatic rifles of American make; two mortars of 60 mm.; one automatic rifle Kashilokov; one automatic rifle 7.7 mm; three compasses; two binoculars; a lot of ammunition of several calibres; a lot of hand grenades and several war equipment.

Finally, Fretilin forces have captured four Indonesian military elements, being three sergeants and one corporal. Unfortunately, one of the three sergeants died shortly after due to the injuries. Fretilin forces have suffered eight dead. This Indonesian offensive was commanded by Marine Lt-Colonel named Soar Soisu.

September 23, 1977

Signed : Alarico Jorge Fernandes, Minister for Information and National Security.

NOTE: (1) Maliana and Batugade are in East Timor, a few miles from the border. Atambua and Atapupu are a few miles on the West Timor side of the border.

(2) Indonesian Defence Minister.

THIS COMMUNIQUE IS REPRODUCED AS READ OVER RADIO MAUBERE ON SEPTEMBER 23. Corrections and comments in brackets by ETNA.



October 18, 1976

REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR LESTE

PRESS RELEASE

212 864-7986

* FRETILIN CONTINUES TO RESIST INDONESIAN OFFENSIVES

NEWS RELEASE

14/10/1976.

FRETILIN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR ARE ATTACKING INDONESIAN TROOPS IN VILLAGES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, RADIO MAUBERE SAID IN A BROADCAST ON OCTOBER 8, MONITORED IN DARWIN BY CAMPAIGN FOR INDEPENDENCE OF EAST TIMOR.

IN LOSPALOS, THE ENEMY ARE COMPLETELY BLOCKED IN THE TOWN AND ARE HIGHLY DEMORALISED, RADIO MAUBERE SAID. INTENSE FIGHTING IS TAKING PLACE THERE AND FALINTIL ARE ON THE OFFENSIVE.

IN OSSU, THE ENEMY ARE ALSO BLOCKED IN THE VILLAGE AND ARE TOTALLY IMPOTENT, THE RADIO SAID. THE ENEMY ARE INTENSELY SHELLING THE VILLAGE AREA.

THERE IS ALSO INTENSE FIGHTING IN THE VILLAGE OF LAKLURAR AND MAUBARA, WHILE ALSO IN VENILALE THE ENEMY ARE UNDER HEAVY ATTACK. IN AINARO, THE ENEMY ARE SHELLING THE SURROUNDING AREAS.

RADIO MAUBERE ALSO DEVOTED MUCH TIME TO DESCRIBING THE SHOKING CONDITIONS IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS WHERE THE ENEMY ARE HOLDING THE CAPTURED POPULATION. BETWEEN 2000 AND 3000 TIMORESE ARE DYING EACH DAY IN EACH OF THE CAMPS THROUGH STARVATION. A SMALL BAG OF MANDIAC FLOUR COST THE EQUIVALENT OF 12 AMERICAN DOLLARS IN THE CAMPS. EXECUTIONS AND OTHER BARBARITIES CONTINUE THERE, WHILE WOMEN ARE FORCED TO DANCE NAKED FOR THE TROOPS AND ARE DAILY RAPED BY THE INVADING FORCES.

40,000 Indonesian army in East Timor

While the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, and President Soeharto move to patch over their differences on Timor, Indonesia is already establishing a tight administrative and military infrastructure in its new Province.

Pacification of East Timor is being carried out by an Indonesian army of nearly 40,000 men, according to informed estimates.

The Fretilin forces are believed to be concentrated in the central mountains south of the capital Dili and in a smaller group operating around Baucau at the eastern end of the island.

The war has been a costly one for Indonesia, even though Fretilin has not managed seriously to threaten the Indonesian hold on the territory.

FINANCIAL REVIEW
(Australia)
October 8, 1976

Global Telegram

REMI Gioi

Indons launch

Timor attack

JAKARTA, Thurs., AAP. — Indonesia has launched a major offensive in East Timor in a bid to wipe out pockets of Fretilin resistance, according to reports in Jakarta.

And for the first time, the military command in East Timor has acknowledged that groups of Fretilin forces are still causing disturbances in the former Portuguese colony.

Indonesian Brigadier General Soeweno, army commander in Timor, said in a Jakarta newspaper today that Fretilin members were still distributing propaganda and plundering

homes for food.

"We are striving to crush the Fretilin remnants," General Soeweno said.

An Army spokesman in Jakarta said the situation in East Timor was generally quiet as Fretilin was avoiding any encounter with Indonesian troops.

The message was attributed to the Fretilin Information and National Security Ministry, Mr Alarico Fernandes.

Mr Fernandes said Indonesian planes had heavily bombed the Sual Bobonaro and Lolotoe areas.

This followed heavy fighting in the areas where Fretilin claimed the Indonesians suffered heavy troop losses.

Mr Fernandes called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Indonesian troops.

AS HAS BEEN LARGELY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES, INDONESIA MAINTAINS OVER 40,000 TROOPS IN EAST TIMOR IN DEFIANCE OF VARIOUS UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. IN SPITE OF INDONESIAN CLAIMS THAT RESISTANCE HAS CEASED THE FACT THAT THEY NEED TO MAINTAIN MANY THOUSANDS OF TROOPS IS CLEAR PROOF TO THE CONTRARY. THE REALITY IS THAT THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION CONTINUES SUCCESSFULLY, SO MUCH SO THAT AFTER A YEAR OF INDONESIAN INTERVENTION IN EAST TIMOR THE INDONESIAN GENERALS CONTINUE TO VOW TO CRUSH FRETILIN...THAT THEY HAVE SO OFTEN ALREADY CLAIM TO HAVE ANNIHILATED.

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Australia) August 26, 1976.

Fretilin still strong: Suharto

JAKARTA, Wednesday (AAP-Reuters). — President Suharto was quoted today as having said that the Fretilin independence movement in East Timor still possesses some strength in areas of the former Portuguese colony.

The influential daily newspaper Kompas quoted General Suharto as having told university students in Bandung, West Java, yesterday that

for this reason Indonesia must try to convince members of the movement to join the government side as soon as possible.

General Suharto's remarks were the first public admission that Fretilin was still a force to be reckoned with in the territory, which was officially taken over by Indonesia in July.



February 27, 1977

REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR LESTE

TO: Support groups and fraternal organizations

FROM: New York Information Office, #4S, 35 Claremont Avenue,
New York, New York 10027

As most of you will be well aware by now, the reports on atrocities committed by the Indonesian occupation forces prepared by Australian Legislative Research Officer (and former Australian Consul in Dili) Jim Dunn have received attention throughout the world. The documentation of these atrocities has provoked the following initiatives:

AUSTRALIA: Nearly 100 members of Parliament from both sides of the House have petitioned President Carter of the United States, congratulating him on his stand on Human Rights and drawing his attention to the violations constituted by Indonesian actions in Timor;

There is underway an initiative to call for a parliamentary enquiry into the deaths of five Australian and British journalists in Timor and the reports of the violations of human rights by Indonesian forces; this will take the form of a Senate Enquiry or a Joint House Inquiry.

USA: Congressman Fraser has undertaken to seek a review of military aid to Indonesia as per the attached letter. This is a significant breakthrough for the Timor issue here in the US; it still remains to make it stick, but the prospect of Congressional enquiry must frighten the Jakarta Generals more than United Nations resolutions. Carter has said that some countries are too strategically important to the US to have their military aid substantially cut because of violations of human rights (this covers every US client state of course) but there is considerable chance that pressure can be brought on the Indonesians to quit Timor in this year of IGGI and elections.

HOLLAND: At the time of writing, Jose Ramos-Horta is in Holland, where he reports that Minister Pronk has promised to use his veto in the current Dutch Parliamentary debate on economic aid to Indonesia to ensure a quid pro quo on human rights, including those of the Timorese. The meeting of Indonesia's creditors, IGGI, will take place in Amsterdam in April, and it was there last year that Minister Pronk began the insistence on human rights restitution as condition of continued Western European underwriting of the massive Indonesian debt. Australian Broadcasting Commission journalist Peter Monckton reported this week that 100 Indonesian Ambassadors



REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR LESTE

-2-

have been recalled to Jakarta, and the speculation is that this is in anticipation of problems at IGGI.

So the next few months, especially until the May 2 election, will be months of intensive work for all groups in different countries.

Different countries have achieved the following in their campaigns:

AUSTRALIA: CIET Sydney is preparing to re-activate ETNA, the East Timor News Agency originally directed in Dili by Roger East who was executed apparently on the day of the Indonesian invasion of Dili. Enquiries to Denis Freney, CIET. 232 Castlereagh Street Sydney.

AETA Melbourne is continuing production of the Timor Information Service; their anniversary issue was particularly good. There is also a Melbourne-based initiative to prepare a widely-based humanitarian mission to East Timor. The organisers would be interested in recommendations from country groupings about Church and Community Leaders who could be approached to endorse this project. Enquiries to Adrian Harris, Community Aid Abroad, 67 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, Victoria Australia.

USA: The Cornell-Ithaca Timor Defense Committee has produced a valuable Chronology/Fact Sheet which is very suitable for lobbying; requests to Arnold Kohen, 410 Stewart Street, Ithaca, New York 14850 USA -- donations at about 10c a copy gratefully received. The New York Timor Defense Committee is setting up a panel on Timor at the March conf. of Concerned A.S.

MAPUTO: The Ministry of Information and Propaganda of the DRET has produced a very useful poster and trilingual pamphlet with many photographs of the struggle -- enquiries to the Ministry, c/- Dept Foreign Affairs, Maputo, Mozambique (East Africa).

GERMANY: have produced as usual beautiful posters, newsheets and other printed material. As a member of the Security Council this year, the movement of Support in West Germany is of particular importance: see Postfach 6026, Freiburg, West Germany.

Concentration for lobbying is currently on the ICJ, WCC, UN Commission on Human Rights and other humanitarian organisations. Any suggestions on contacts and national representatives in these organisations gratefully received.

In solidarity, *Sue* Sue Nichterlein.

March, 1977

TO: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

FROM: JACQUI CHAGNON and MIKE CONNOR
Clergy & Laity Concerned, Human Rights Office, (546-8985)

RE: ONGOING WAR IN EAST TIMOR AND THE USE OF U.S. WEAPONS BY INDONESIA

1. Since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975, up to 100,000 East Timorese reportedly have been killed by Indonesian forces. Although the Indonesian government has blocked the International Red Cross, foreign observers, and journalists from examining the situation in East Timor, indisputable reports from Indonesia, East Timor and Australia indicate that the war is waging quite strongly, resulting in continued deaths and deprivations for the Timorese people. (See attached news clippings and reports.)
2. In contrast to official Indonesian government statements and despite the presence of an estimated 30,000 Indonesia troops, the independence movement in East Timor, Fretilin, reported controls 80% of the territory and has the support of 85% of the population. In the towns and villages under Indonesian control, the populations have dwindled drastically (e.g. Dili, the capital from 20,000 to 2,000.) Most people are either joining the Fretilin in the mountains or fleeing overseas.
3. The United States is one of the prime suppliers of arms to Indonesia. Military aid to Indonesia has been steadily climbing: FY 1975 \$20 million; FY 1976 \$46.1; FY 1977 \$47 million; FY 1978 \$58.1. (proposed). This latest figure is an \$11.1 million increase (26%).
4. Press reports since the invasion mention continually the use of U.S. weapons in East Timor by Indonesia. The latest reports (see clippings) states that an OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency attack plane, given to Indonesia in late 1976 was recently shot down in East Timor. Four U.S. warships given to Indonesia were also used in the initial attacks on East Timor. Since 1970 the U.S. has supplied Indonesia with: \$3 million in M-16, light machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers; 10 naval vessels; 16 T-33 trainer planes, 10 Sikorsky S-55 helicopters; 16 OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency planes.
5. The U.S. policy to date has been to ignore the war, even though reports of deaths, human rights violations and utilization of U.S.-supplied equipment are increasing. The State Department has even criticized Australia for opposing the Indonesian invasion. Subsequently

State said "The United States understands Indonesia's position (in East Timor.) We wouldn't recognize (the Democratic Republic of) East Timor anyway." A State Dept. official further elaborated "We are more or less condoning the (Indonesia) invasion into East Timor." (The Australian, Jan 22, 1976.)

6. The U.S. voted against a Nov. 12, 1976 United Nations Resolution calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor and additional investigation of the situation by the UN. Previously the U.S. abstained on similar resolutions.

BACKGROUND ON EAST TIMOR WAR

East Timor is a small island nation near Indonesia and Australia. Its land size approximates Israel's and its population equals Cyprus. For 446 years, East Timor was a Portugese colony. In April, 1974, when Portugese colonialism was breaking apart, three political groups emerged in East Timor: FRETILIN, favoring independence; UDT, favoring continued association with Portugal; and APODETI, favoring Timor's incorporation into Indonesia. APODETI and UDT had limited popular support compared to FRETILIN's :

In September, 1975, Indonesian troops covertly infiltrated the island, in an attempt to divert the growing independence movement. The FRETILIN, however, continued to be very popular. Finally Indonesia resorted to an invasion on December 7, 1975, expecting a very quick war. Instead FRETILIN, using former Portugese weapons, has been able to sustain a strong guerrilla war for nearly 1½ years. Indonesian forces are reportedly using heavy artillery, bombs, napalm, incendiary bombs and defoliants. In July, 1976, Indonesia claimed E. Timor as its 27th province.

As early as Feb, 1976, reports from Indonesian sources indicated that as many as 60,000 East Timorese had been killed by Indonesian forces. (NYT, Feb. 14, 1976) Current figures now go as high as 100,000. With a population of 650,000, these figures could mean that one-sixth of the population has been killed.

BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, WE BELIEVE CONGRESS SHOULD:

1. Schedule immediately hearings on Indonesia's use of U.S. weapons in the East Timor war and alledged human rights violations in East Timor.
2. Introduce immediately a joint resolution to terminate Indonesian military aid based on a) the use of U.S.-supplied weapons by Indonesia for aggression (Sec. 505 and Sec. 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Sec. 4, Chapter I of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968,) and b) violations of human rights in East Timor (Sec. 502-B.)
3. Request the State Department to make a written report on the use of U.S. weapons in East Timor, on human rights violations in East Timor and on its position on the UN resolutions on East Timor.
4. Introduce a joint resolution urging U.S. support of continued United Nations efforts on the issue of self-determination in East Timor.

FRETILIN STATEMENTS CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT REPORT

Recent statements by Fretilin on the situation in East Timor have been confirmed by a report drawn up by a group of priests who visited East Timor with Indonesian 'relief workers'. The report was smuggled out of Indonesia via Europe before being sent to the Australian Catholic Commission for Peace, who passed on a copy to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The document, which has received wide coverage in the Australian press, is generally regarded as being authentic. Compiled in October of 1976, it concurs almost entirely with Fretilin statements, although the assertion that Indonesia controls all the towns and villages is far from accurate. The priests are not sympathetic to Fretilin and never question the presence of Indonesian troops in East Timor. The following is a summary of the main points made in the document

- ** Of Dili's original population of 30,000, 20,000 have registered for passage to Portugal. Only 2,000 Timorese now remain in the capital, the rest having taken to the hills.
- ** All towns and villages are occupied by the Indonesian forces. Outside the towns, Indonesian troops can not move in safety. Land communication has been totally disrupted: the only means of transportation are by helicopters or by sea. The total population of the Indonesian-held areas is 150,000. The rest of the population is in Fretilin controlled areas. (Before the invasion, the population of East Timor was 650,000) Commenting on the estimate that 60,000 people have died since the invasion, local priests stated that the real figure may be closer to 100,000.
- ** The desire to intergrate with Indonesia is beginning to cool off because of bad experiences with the occupying forces (stealing, robbery, burning of houses, violating young girls, etc.). Indonesian forces have recently begun using a multi-barrelled rocket launcher known as a Stalin organ and are rumoured to be contemplating the use of napalm, as they cannot win the war without it.
- ** Fretilin moral is high. The soldiers are cultivating land and making gardens. Fretilin has access to the sea on the south coast. In the event of a true referendum, most of the population would support Fretilin.
- ** 'Relief' organised by the Indonesian Red Cross is inefficient and very little food or money is getting to the civilian population, most of it is being siphoned off by the military. Attempts to start a 'rehabilitation scheme' are hampered by the fact that the people have taken to the hills. Thus, the writers of the document suggest that a school would be useful, but immediately add that there are no pupils for such a school.

An assessment of this report has been made for the Australian Government by the Federal Parliament Legislative Research Service, which describes the document as significant and disturbing. It states that 'as the situation stands, if the figure of 100,000 deaths is accurate, Indonesia's integration of East Timor must go on record as one of the bloodiest annexations since World War II.' The assessment accepts the document as genuine and comments that it is consistent with other reports on the current situation in East Timor. It adds that 'with monsoon conditions having returned to Timor, it will now be very difficult for the Indonesians to extend the areas of their control, let alone destroy Fretilin.'

This report was made by the Australian Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in October of 1976.

Amie -
Here it is. I hope they
choose to put it in print.
John

Mr. Blair Clark
The Nation
333 Sixth Avenue
New York, New York 10014


December 2, 1977

To the Editor:

I found Arnold S. Kohen's "Human Rights in Indonesia" (November 26, 1977) to be a very useful account of the deplorable human rights situation in Indonesia concerning the issues of prolonged detention without charge or trial, and the half-hearted and heavily controlled attempt at self-determination (in East Timor). The information Mr. Kohen presented is a poignant reminder to us all of the inconsistency of the Carter administration's implementation of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 (Title III, Section 502b) which clearly states: "...a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries...no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights...the term 'gross violations of internationally recognized human rights' includes torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person...."

There is an absence of information provided to the American public by the Department of State explaining what it is or is not doing concerning the human rights provisions of official U.S. foreign policy (as stated above) with respect to Indonesia. This leaves American citizenry which is interested in the progress of the developing countries (aided by our foreign assistance) in serious doubt of the sincerity of our present government's commitment to its publicly announced foreign policy goals.

Sincerely yours,


John Newmann
333 East 41st Street
New York, N.Y. 10017

P.S. For your information this letter is written as an expression of my personal concerns. I am a Program Officer in the office for Asia and the Pacific of the Ford Foundation. I lived in Jakarta for three and a half years (1967-1971) and have visited Indonesia for a few weeks at a time in 1965, 1975, and 1976. My work involves participating in the development of the Ford Foundation's programs concerned with human rights, development planning, economic training and research, and public and private management. The views expressed in the above letter are my own and not to be attributed to the Ford Foundation.

-- 28 March 1977

Dear Carmel:

First of all, many thanks for your letter of the 21st w/enclosures! As usual, they were gratefully recvd., esp. as they came the day before the TAPOL mtg. at John N's in NYC. Needless to say, all are happy about the visa and tour and Jacqui and Dick (w/a little help from me) are carrying the arrangements. The I share your question about possible Malik intervention, I think it wouldn't go down well right now in this town, esp. after recent press on Ind. and the hearing. This can't be a full report on the hearing proceedings, just some highlights (the prepared speeches of all participants are on their way to you, tho of course these exclude the questions and answers). The official transcript probably may be a while before completion, esp. because Fraser has said he wants now to hold another hearing on E. Timor, w/the refugees in Portugal (who told Jim D. they're prepared to testify, and who last week were interviewed on Aust. Broadctg. Co. on-screen). We have a complete tape of the hearing -- 2 cassettes long (5+ hours).

The hearing was like a circus really. Held in one of the smaller hearing rooms, the hall was packed w/folk outside unable to enter. Packed with press, at least 17 Indonesian Embassy personnel listening, (taking notes, and taping, and a lot of sundry people who probably came as a result of press reports. The State Dept. witness (Oakley) is really a blankhead with almost zero knowledge of Ind., Timor or the rest of SEA. He comes from a background in the Middle East, most recently with the Natl Security Council. His speech and answers to questions reveal a deep ignorance of the overall situation and obviously based upon much last-minute cramming on his part. General Howard M. Fish (Defense Security Assistance Agency) relies upon his sheaf of briefing papers plus strong acquaintance w/Asia in general (military-wise). Jim D. was the first to testify after them (David Kenney of State also came to Oakley's rescue from the Ind. Desk); the room was hushed as he read his statement to Congresspeople present (Fraser, Wolff, Meyner -- on our side, and Burke, Goodling, Derwinski plus one on the other side). As a press conference was held in the A.M., where a lot of very good questions were asked (esp. by the Aust. press) of both Dunn and Carascalao, the Republicans (who were not invited) charged Wolff and Fraser of ill motives for the press conf. and for the hearing in general. Carascalao followed with an incredible and at times laughable review of the events since 1974 and Dec. 1975. "There was no invasion" and said there were only 'volunteers' from 7 Dec. 1975 until the annexation was official. This he claimed even under questioning and even after Oakley and Fish had disclosed the suspension of new military shipments on 23 Dec. because of the illegal use by Ind. forces of U.S. weapons (C-130 Hercules planes and other unspecified weaponry supplied under the mil. assistance and foreign mil. sales programs). Illegal because such use in a 3rd country is prohibited. Please note that the suspension alleged was only of new requests and excluded "those items already in the pipeline", which effectively means that there wasn't much cut off. Carascalao said there were no aircraft in the invasion, and denied that Timorese were killed except by Fretilin forces. Jose Goncalves (formerly Fretilin's chief economic planner) testified w/Carascalao as well.

One really must record the fact that State Dept. Ind. desk officers (esp. your old friend Edward Ingraham, and also Kenney) were observed during recesses having very chummy and secretive conferences with various GoI people present. Also, it was kind of pathetic to see Carascalao and Goncalves in the hallways not speaking with GoI people at all but, seemingly feeling very much isolated and on-the-spot. Naturally, there were some friendly (pro-Indonesian) Congresspeople (esp. Burke and Goodling) who expressed anger and suspicion at Dunn and Fraser and Wolff, alleging 'motives' which weren't specified. The Ind. Embassy had distributed fat envelopes with explanatory (sic) documentation including a new pamphlet purporting to be a Provisional Govt publication but is both very glossy and contains photos (one that Aust. Br. Co. enlarged showed a corpse with a watch that was stopped on 7 Dec. -- the caption says these were Fretilin massacres) and Portuguese mis-spellings that give it away as a publication by the Ind. Govt. "Massacre in Timor" is doubtless being distributed there too by the Embassy. The packet is so thick we decided to let it await your arrival rather than to send it on. There were also some dark threats

From Lou Wulff

USA/22c

P.S. -- You can see how well acquainted I am with these airgrams. I typed on the rear side, and as I think it's not too wise to let all and sundry read about Malik's

bluster, etc., I'm re-enclosing the letter in an envelope. Sorry 'bout that. Oh yes, would leave 10 copies of the Bulletin at the Labour Party bookshop. I did keep a record of all items left on sale-or-return at all the shops, but the little notebook is buried somewhere at my flat I'm afraid. I thought I'd brought it to you before I left (it's a small red lined 4" X 6" lined booklet), but I guess you would recall if I had. I am sorry for the trouble.

Ms Carmel Budiardjo
1 Cleghow Gardens
London, SW5
United Kingdom

**AEROGRAMME
VIA AIRMAIL
PAR AVION**

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- page 2 -

made to the Fraser Cmtee. (you can see these when you come). There was of course the Malik bluster about mobilising 140 million Indns. to be anti-Australian. It was of course purely coincidental that Foreign Min. Peacock arrived the evening of Dunn's testimony (this was planned some time ago I understand). We hear that during a press. conf. after he met Andy Young, Young was asked about E. Timor, and he replied that if the reports of massacres were proven true, we should exercise sanctions against Ind. like with S. Africa. Dunn may be meeting with a close asst. of Young in the next 48 hours.

Jacqui, Dick and I attended the CCAS conf. in NYC. There was a very good panel w/John N., Ann G., Deirdre and a 50-minute presentation by Dunn. I believe that several commitments for you to speak were made there by Jacqui, as there were CCAS people from all over the country. (I saw Malcolm briefly). I had a very good session with Deirdre and will go to NYC this Friday again. Fred Bunnell said he received a letter from Cheryl saying that she's soon leaving for Ind., and will thereafter be "dropping out" of Ind. work altogether. News to me! Had you heard from her to this effect?

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③ Seal top flap last

Do not use tape or suckers to seal. No enclosures permitted

① Fold first at notches

Additional message area

Did you ever receive the xeroxes of State and CIA cables (originally copied at the IEFJ Library in Texas) which I sent 2+ months ago? I was surprised that you hadn't shown them to Deirdre, and am disturbed if you didn't. If you didn't, there is fortunately one more set though you were sent the best copies. It was some 200 pages altogether.

So Sunny Jim managed to hang on with a little help from the Liberals. I'd heard him speak a week earlier at the Nat'l Press Club, and he sounded altogether sanguine about the future and certainly didn't let on that a crisis was near. Yet, Thatcher and the Nat. Assn. for Freedom are not going to get weaker now; no, I believe there will be much blood shed in the near future in Gt. Britain (not only in N. Ireland) because of the gross differences in these forces and the working class and its allies. And you can imagine which side of the barracks the Wilsons, Reeses and Callaghans will be then....

P.A. has won a provisional victory w/the announcement last week that they won't prosecute (except unless "some new evidence" comes to light) -- a big and very ominous except. There's still much about that case to be discovered.

All for now, except that we so look forward to you on approx. the 11th.

LOVE TO YOU AND EVERYONE - *Lu.*

Carmel, this is a P.S. as I forgot to mention some significant things of interest both to you and to BCJET.

First, present at the press conference, the hearing, the CCAS mtg., and the Ramayana mtg. (see details below) were a very large number of Embassy personnel. They were not only listening and taking notes assiduously, but were taping and photographing Jim Dunn at every possible opportunity. One of these 'gentlemen' who only will give his first name "Achmad" who once told Jacqui he is a student (he used this as a cover for trying to obtain your itinerary before) and then as a businessman in NYC (where he has an office and secretary) was taping every word. In answer to a query, he said "I'm writing about it and I have a great interest in the subject..." When asked who he writes for, he stuttered out "Oh, just for myself".

Present also at all occasions has been that noted luminary, Rex Seidel, chicken-s--- farmer. At the hearing, he made himself obvious by shouting "Here, Here" when the UDT men spoke. He alleged that Jim D, "is a drunkard" and that he had killed a Timorese and had been ousted from East Timor and was trying to get back at them now. Of course, this is total fantasy. In 3 days here, he drank only coffee and water, sometimes with ice.

The Embassy has seen it necessary to hold meetings here in D.C. at the Bali Restaurant (attended by Jacqui, Ed Snyder and other informed people) and at the Ramayana Restaurant in NYC next Thurs., all for religious leaders in order to try and give Indonesia's case to them. At the mtg. here, ~~the~~ the Indonesians significantly let on that they had not been notified of the alleged suspension of new military assistance from 23 Dec. to end of June 1976. There is some reason now to believe that the State Dept. may have conjured this one up in the last few weeks to try and deal with the whole illegality question. There may be an effort thru FOI to get at any precise documentation there may be on this; it should be exciting and may well tell what's really going on here in the frantic Indon.-U.S. joint effort to stave off the writing on the wall over E. Timor.

That is all now. Warmest regards to all. Pls. ask Sarah to send with you her assessment of my own immigration status, post-Agee and Rosenball. Thanks to you and her.

h.

... were also some dark threats

From Lou Wulff

Committee on International Relations

June 29, 1977

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FROM: Donald M. Frazer, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations

RE: Summary of hearing on human rights in East Timor held on June 28, 1977 at 10:00 AM

Witnesses:

--Honorable Helen S. Meyner, Representative in Congress from New Jersey
--Honorable William F. Goodling, Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania
--Dr. Shepard Forman, Professor Anthropology, University of Michigan
--Dr. Elizabeth Traube, Professor of Anthropology, Wesleyan University
Midletown, Connecticut

Congresswoman Helen Meyner: testified on the basis of her recent visit to East Timor. She emphasized that she was on East Timor for only 23 hours. She also stated that the trip "was obviously structured by our Indonesian escorts. However, I believe that the restrictions imposed by the Indonesians were largely motivated by legitimate concerns for the security of our delegation."

She visited four towns in East Timor. At each town she was met by large friendly crowds of people. At each town the delegation would proceed to a meeting hall where it was addressed by village leaders. She left these meetings with a strong impression that the people were not being forced to express their views contrary to what they truly felt.

She reached four conclusions based on her trip.

(1) That because of restrictions placed upon her visit it is difficult to reach firm conclusions on (a) the question as whether the East Timorese had freely chosen integration with Indonesia and (b) the question of alleged atrocities by Indonesian or Fretilin forces.

(2) She received the impression that the Timorese people were satisfied with Indonesian integration and that integration of East Timor into Indonesia is a fait accompli. It appeared as though the Indonesian government was making a determined effort to assist the Timorese people in their economic development.

(3) There was no evidence of on-going repression in the territory.

(4) There was no opportunity to investigate the extent of current or past use of U.S. military equipment by the Indonesians in their conflict with Fretilin forces.

She recommended that the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to undertake visiting missions to East Timor both to survey the situation and provide humanitarian relief.

Professor Shepard Forman: stated that the peoples of East Timor are capable of decisively exercising their right of self-determination. However the people have not been permitted to freely exercise this right. He also noted that the peoples of East Timor have been able in the past to meet their own needs; thus he refuted the argument that East Timor is too small to be an independent state.

The peoples of East Timor have resisted foreign incursions for centuries. The Timorese consider the Indonesians foreigners. He noted that Timorese people accepted the Portugese as traders but not as colonizers. He noted that when the Portugese tried to colonize East Timor as opposed to simply providing a trading relationship there was often rebellion.

As proof of the ability of the Timorese people to exercise self-determination and make political choices, he referred to the Makassae people. These were the people with whom Professor Forman lived for approximately 15 months. For 30 years they sought to obtain autonomy from the Portugese.

Committee on International Relations

After the Portuguese Revolution in 1974, the new government permitted the Makassae people to determine their future course. A referendum was held and they chose autonomy.

Professor Forman indicated that the Indonesians have ignored criticism because the United States has acquiesced in the situation. He suggested that our aid could be coupled with a request for plebescite in East Timor. He said that the Indonesians have no grounds for fearing that an independent East Timor would be a threat to Indonesia.

Professor Elizabeth Traube: lived in East Timor from October 1972 through November 1974. She lived with the Mambai people who inhabit a mountainous area south of Dili.

Regarding the recent congressional visit to East Timor she cautioned against interpreting the reception received by the delegation as implying support for one party or government over another. She noted that "under the Portuguese regime it was customary to convene the populace for the reception of a visiting dignitary. The Timorese who made up the obligatory throngs of welcomers rarely had any clear idea as to the identity of the personage nor the motive behind his or her visit. To gauge Timorese sentiments by such formal displays is naive. On Timor, such occasions of pomp and circumstance are governed by a strict etiquette. Once it was the Portuguese who initiated such affairs of state; now it is the Indonesians. Yet, the opinions, sentiments, and the longings of the native welcomers remain as obscure under the one regime as the other"

Regarding the issue of self-determination she indicated that Mambai had concluded that a Portuguese withdrawal was inevitable. However, they wished to have time to calmly discuss the situation, weigh the various alternatives, and reach a consensual solution. "Such a period of reflection, as those mountain farmers knew so well, is the essential precondition for the Timorese to exercise their right of self-determination." They were denied that opportunity.

Honorable William F. Goodling: deferred from testifying in view of his late arrival. He did make a few comments. Regarding his visit he said he was not denied the opportunity to meet people. Regarding several allegations that have been made in the previous hearing he had the following impressions:

- (1) He did not see any war destruction although he did note that during the wet season such destruction could be hidden.
- (2) He did not obtain evidence concerning massive atrocities. He did indicate that both sides have been responsible for atrocities. Mr. Goodling's report indicates that perhaps 40 to 60 thousand people died in the civil conflict.
- (3) He did not see any evidence of large scale Indonesian armed forces, but he recognized that they might have been there but simply not present in the areas which he visited.
- (4) He indicated that the Indonesian leadership is trying to do their very best to improve the situation of the Timorese people

Committee on International Relations

July 21, 1977

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FROM: Donald M. Fraser, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations

RE: Summary of hearing on Human Rights in East Timor, held on July 19, 1977 at 2:00 PM

Witnesses: --George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State
--Leonard Meeker, former Legal Advisor, Department of State; Member, Center for Law and Social Policy
--Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

Mr. Aldrich: noted that Indonesia's military intervention in East Timor in December 1975 and the subsequent incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia "raised a number of difficult legal questions" such as the permissible uses of force under the UN Charter and uses of U.S.-furnished equipment under applicable U.S. law as well as the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.

He noted that as a result of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in December 1975, the Department deferred further military sales and grants to Indonesia in December 1975. In June 1976 the military assistance was resumed "for a variety of reasons" including Congressional authorization of military assistance for Indonesia for fiscal years 1976 and 1977, and the defeat of an amendment which would have cut off such assistance to Indonesia on account of its actions in Timor.

On July 19, 1976 Indonesia formally incorporated East Timor into Indonesia. This followed unanimous approval by the People's Council of East Timor for incorporation. Mr. Aldrich stated that we know little about the selection process for the Council delegates and noted that the process took place at a time of military occupation by Indonesia during which considerable fighting was going on. Later in the discussion, Mr. Aldrich stated that the Department considered the Timorese people not to have exercised their right of self-determination. Nevertheless, the Department recognizes that Indonesia currently has sovereignty over East Timor. However, recognizing East Timor's integration into Indonesia does not vitiate the Timorese people's right of self-determination. When asked whether the Department would support a UN resolution asserting that right, Mr. Aldrich said that it would depend on the text of the resolution. Moreover, in his prepared statement he indicated that even when the right of self-determination has not been exercised, efforts by us to change the situation are not required if such efforts "would be futile and injurious to other national interests of the United States."

Mr. Meeker: described the events leading to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia and concluded that the "political processes ... cannot be said to have constituted a meaningful self-determination by the people of East Timor." The choices apparently made could not be said to have been freely made, and the action by the People's Representative Council "cannot be characterized as self-determination".

The Department of State's recognition of the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia is not inevitable. It could decide that since the incorporation was not in conformity with important substantive provisions of the United Nations Charter (Article 73 on self-determination), that it therefore does not recognize the incorporation.

Mr. Meeker suggested that the United Nations calls for an immediate cease fire in East Timor and ask Indonesia to suspend the incorporation of the territory as a province of Indonesia. The UN could appoint a small commission for East Timor which would monitor the

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cease-fire, and make arrangements for the holding of a referendum on the future of East Timor. The UN would provide observers to ensure that the referendum was carried out freely and fairly. He urged the United States to discuss this proposal with Indonesia and other UN Members.

Professor Franck: considered both the East Timor situation and the Spanish Sahara situations as ones fraught with serious implications both for human rights as well as world order and stability. (Spanish Sahara was annexed by Morocco and Mauritania in contravention of UN resolutions. A group favoring independence, Front Polisario, continues to fight a guerilla war assisted by Algeria. The OAU has demanded the withdrawal from Spanish Sahara of all occupying armies.) He noted that if it is permissible for states to violate the principle of self-determination and claim territory on the basis of historical, ethnic or other grounds, a number of territorial disputes may arise. He cited such situations as the British territory of Belize, Djibouti, the Falkland Islands and many others.

He noted that with respect to Timor and Spanish Sahara that territorial aggrandizement was achieved with significant use of U.S. supplied arms. He supported proposals similar to Mr. Meeker's for a UN initiative to provide the Timorese people the right of self-determination. If Indonesia does not cooperate, he suggested enforcement of Section 502B (security assistance and human rights) provision of the Foreign Assistance Act since self-determination is a fundamental human right.

Correction to summary of June 28th hearing on East Timor:

Regarding Congressman William Goodling's testimony, he indicated that between 40,000 and 60,000 people were affected by the war. That figure includes people who were killed as well as those who fled the country. Regarding the extent of Indonesian military presence in East Timor during his visit, he said there was very little evidence of any military presence.

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RADIO NEWS BULLETIN**TIMOR HEARINGS

WEDNESDAY MARCH 23, 1977

AN AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY OFFICIAL, JAMES DUNN, TOLD A CONGRESSIONAL HEARING IN WASHINGTON TODAY THAT INDONESIAN FORCES ENGAGED IN WIDESPREAD KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS DURING AND AFTER THEIR DECEMBER 1975 INVASION OF EAST TIMOR, AND THAT REPORTS OF 100,000 CIVILIANS KILLED MAY BE TRUE. DUNN WAS ASKED TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE U.S. CONGRESS AFTER HE PREPARED A REPORT ON EAST TIMOR LAST MONTH BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH TIMORESE REFUGEES WHO SAID THE FIGURE OF 100,000 CIVILIANS KILLED WAS CREDIBLE. THAT FIGURE -- WHICH REPRESENTS NEARLY ONE-SIXTH OF THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY'S POPULATION -- WAS REPORTED BY THE CONSERVATIVE INDONESIAN CATHOLIC RELIEF AGENCY OPERATING IN EAST TIMOR. DUNN SAYS INDONESIA'S ACTIONS IN EAST TIMOR MAY BE THE "MOST SERIOUS CASE OF CONTRAVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACING THE WORLD AT THIS TIME." REFUGEES TOLD DUNN THAT INDONESIAN SOLDIERS HAVE INDISCRIMINATELY GUNNED DOWN CIVILIANS IN EAST TIMOR'S MAJOR TOWNS, WIPED OUT ENTIRE VILLAGES IN THE MOUNTAINS, ENGAGED IN WIDESPREAD RAPE AND LOOTING, REGULARLY USED TORTURE TO GATHER INFORMATION, AND BOMBED VILLAGES WITH NAPALM. INDONESIA OFFICIALLY ANNEXED EAST TIMOR LAST JULY, BUT REPORTEDLY CONTROLS LESS THAN TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TERRITORY AND LESS THAN HALF THE POPULATION. ITS OCCUPATION IS BEING RESISTED BY GUERRILLAS OF THE FRETILIN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

TODAY'S JOINT HEARINGS BY HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEES HEADED BY REPRESENTATIVES DONALD FRASER AND LESTER WOLFF ARE EXAMINING CHARGES OF INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EAST TIMOR AND INVESTIGATING WHETHER THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IS ILLEGALLY USING U.S. SUPPLIED WEAPONS IN ITS OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY. LAST WEEK A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TESTIFIED THAT INDONESIA DID USE U.S. SUPPLIED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN ITS INITIAL INVASION OF EAST TIMOR. THE UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERS INDONESIA'S TAKEOVER OF EAST TIMOR ILLEGAL AND HAS CALLED ON INDONESIA TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND. BUT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SAYS IT CONSIDERS EAST TIMOR AS PART OF INDONESIA AND IS REQUESTING \$58 MILLION IN MILITARY AID TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, ABOUT \$20 MILLION MORE THAN

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EAST TIMOR TERRORISTS SURRENDER TO GOVERNMENT

BR141552Y Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 14 Jun 77 EK

[Text] Since early May, about 2,600 terrorist remnants have returned to the fold of the motherland and pledged loyalty to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. This was the result of their awareness of the progress of the East Timor people's development, the people's peaceful and secure life and the educational progress enjoyed by students in East Timor towns. Many among them surrendered their weapons, while the government gave them food, clothing and medicines.

IV. 15 Jun 77

N 2

INDONESIA

According to the commandant of the East Timor Defense Command, Brig Gen Dading Kalibudat, there have been splits among the (terrorist groups) as the majority no longer could stand their sufferings.

FL151455Y Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1408 GMT 15 Jun 77 FL

[Text] The people of East Timor have had important military victories over the Indonesian occupation troops in their struggle for independence of the former Portuguese colony in the Pacific Ocean. (Avelio Araujo), economy and social affairs minister of the Democratic Republic of East Timor and leader of the national liberation front, Fretilin, made this assertion in Bonn, West Germany, in an exclusive interview with PRELA.

(Araujo) said Fretilin controls 80 percent of the 15,000 sqkm of East Timor and this forces the Indonesian army to move by air only. The Fretilin leader added that the front recently occupied two villages near the capital of the island and that Indonesians have suffered thousands of casualties and the loss of much military equipment.

IV. 16 Jun 77

N 2

INDONESI

(Avelio Araujo) told PRELA that in addition to military successes, advances have been made on the diplomatic field and many countries have recognized East Timor. The Fretilin leader stressed that the UN General Assembly tacitly recognized Fretilin during the last session by defining it as representative of the people of East Timor. (Araujo) added that the biggest agricultural production of all times was obtained last year due to the good functioning of cooperatives, and that important progress has been made in the struggle against individual cultivation of coffee.

The Fretilin Central Committee member asserted that objectives in the literacy, public health and hygiene campaign have been reached and that progress is being made toward reviving the traditions of the people.