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LETTER FROM EAST TIMOR

This letter was received in Australia in mid-September, 1981. It comes from a Church source in Timor. The author's name has been removed for security reasons. It was carried out of Timor by hand. The following rough translation from the Portuguese was prepared in Melbourne. Patrick Walsh has the original.

The letter, which came separately and later, is graphic confirmation *in part* of the recent Timor Church memo which reported an extensive military offensive in Timor and Church fears of a new famine.

It reads in part:

".... Timor is now in a situation much worse than the one in previous years. All the people, either men or women, are forced to take part in patrols into the bush. The aim of this business of patrolling is to force us to fight Fretilin, who are our brothers in the bush.

In Manatuto and other villages as well, all the schools are closed, the public departments are closed because the people have to go and take part in the "operation". Starting with children aged 9 and over to elderly people up to 60, everyone is forced to go into the bush.....

Besides that there are constantly imprisonments of people who are deported to Atauro. In Atauro there are now about 60 thousand people.

Well, it's a big tragedy that's striking our people and our land.

With God's will peace will return to our country as there are already six years since our people have lived under extreme misery and great suffering. To tell you all it will take a lot of time and we will never get to an end. Now I wish to go into another matter...."

The writer goes on to ask for financial help.

Too Esoteric to Fit the Print

Noam Chomsky hardly needs an introduction. He is a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he has been an outspoken critic of U.S. foreign policy for more than a dozen years. He has written and spoken extensively on East Timor, testifying several times on the issue before the United Nations. The text that follows are excerpts from an earlier statement that Prof. Chomsky had written for the Asian Center, rather than the speech he gave at the conference, as he did not speak from a prepared statement. Just two weeks after the conference Prof. Chomsky joined forces with James Dunn to speak before a large crowd in Boston.

Why should we devote attention to East Timor, small and remote place that most Americans have never even heard of? There are two reasons, each more than sufficient. The first is that East Timor has been, and still is, the scene of enormous massacres and suffering. Many of the terrible things that happen in the world are out of our control. We may deplore them, but we cannot do very much about them. This case is quite different, hence far more important. What has happened and what lies ahead are very much under our control, so directly that the blood is on our hands. The second reason is that by considering what has happened in East Timor since 1975, we can learn some important things about ourselves, about our society and our institutions. If we do not like what we find when we look at the facts—and few will fail to be appalled if they take an honest look—we can work to bring about changes in the practices and structure of institutions that cause terrible suffering and slaughter. To the extent that we see ourselves as citizens in a democratic community, we have a responsibility to devote our energies to these ends. The recent history of Timor provides a revealing insight into the policies of the U.S. government, the factors that enter into determining them, and the ways in which our ideological system functions.

On December 7, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion, capturing the capital city of Dili. Her attack took place a few hours after the departure of President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger from Jakarta. There is no serious doubt that the U.S. knew of the impending invasion and specifically authorized it. Ford has conceded as much in an interview with Jack Anderson, 9 November 1979 while claiming ignorance of the exact circumstances (*Washington Post*).

The invading Indonesian army was 90%—applied with U.S. arms. In Congressional hearings, government representatives testified that

the U.S. had imposed a 6-month arms ban in response to the invasion, but this was so secret that Indonesia knew nothing about it. Arms continued to flow, and in fact new offers of arms were made, including counterinsurgency equipment, during the period of the "arms ban," as was conceded by administration spokesmen when the facts were exposed by Cornell University Indonesian specialist Ben Anderson. The invasion was bloody and brutal. Subsequently Indonesia extended its aggression to other parts of the territory, and by 1977-8 was engaged in a program of wholesale destruction including massive bombardment, forced-population removal, destruction of villages and crops, and all the familiar techniques used by modern armies to subjugate a resisting population.

TROUBLE IS,
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Brickman

The precise scale of the atrocities is difficult to assess, in part because Indonesia refused to admit outside observers, for reasons that are readily understood. If the facts were not known in the West, it was the result of the decision not to let them be known. It appears that of the pre-war population of about 700,000, perhaps one quarter have succumbed to outright slaughter or starvation caused by the Indonesian attack, and that the remaining population, much of which is herded into military-run concentration camps, may suffer a similar fate unless properly supervised international

assistance is forthcoming on a substantial scale. Relief officials who were finally permitted limited access to the territory after almost four years describe the prevailing situation as comparable to Cambodia in 1979. The world reaction has been somewhat different in the two cases.

The U.S. government continued to provide the military and diplomatic support that was required for the slaughter to continue. By late 1977, Indonesian supplies had been depleted. The Human Rights Administration dramatically increased the flow of military equipment, enabling Indonesia to undertake the fierce offensives that reduced East Timor to the level of Cambodia. The U.N. General Assembly met immediately after the invasion, but was unable to react in a meaningful way. The reasons are explained by U.N. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan in his memoirs: "...the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations proved utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."

Ambassador Moynihan was presumably aware of the nature of his success. He cites a February 1976 estimate by the deputy Chairman of the provisional government installed by Indonesian force "that some sixty thousand persons had been killed since the outbreak of civil war"—recall that 2-3000 had been killed during the civil war itself—"10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War." Thus in effect he is claiming credit for "success" in helping to cause a massacre that he compares to the consequences of Nazi aggression, not to speak of the growing number of victims in the subsequent period. Ambassador Moynihan commented further that the Indonesian invasion must have been successful by March 1976, since "the subject disappeared from the press and from the United Nations after that time."

It did virtually disappear from the press, though not from the United Nations, which has regularly condemned Indonesian aggression (most recently in December 1979). The curtain of silence drawn by the press in the United States and much of the West for four years hardly demonstrates the success of Indonesian arms, though it does stand as a remarkable testimonial to the effectiveness of Western propaganda systems.

Throughout, the U.S. government has pretended that it knew very little about events in East Timor, an obvious fabrication. Or else government representatives claimed at each stage

that though there might have been some atrocities at the outset, the situation is now calm and the sensible course is to recognize Indonesian control. This was, for example, the stance taken by the government in 1977 Congressional Hearings, at exactly the time when Indonesia was preparing the murderous offensives of 1977-8 and when the Human Rights Administration was accelerating the flow of arms for use in these military operations. The U.S. government persists in its policy of supporting Indonesian terror while denying its existence, and as long as the media loyally refrain from exposing the facts. This report is typical not only in its claim that "now" things are finally improving (the constant plea throughout) but also in its failure to concede that questions even arise about the period after March 1976.


The picture is a bit different when we turn to Timorese witnesses. One of the most impressive of these is Father Leoneto Vierira do Rego, a 63-year-old Portuguese priest who spent 3 years in the mountains with Fretilin before surrendering to Indonesian forces in January 1979, suffering from malaria and starvation. After imprisonment and interrogation, he was permitted to return to Portugal in June. His accounts of what he had observed were then widely reported in the world press, outside of the United States. Shortly after the appearance of the government report cited above, Father Leoneto was interviewed by the *New York Times*.

Refugees continue to report large-scale atrocities. By 1979, some foreign aid was reaching the territory, but distribution is largely under Indonesian military control. A report in the *London Observer* (20 January, 1980) notes that "All relief work in the former Portuguese colony is being supervised by only four foreign field workers." The U.S. government is trying to stem the increasing flow of exposures and to guarantee Indonesian control over the miserable remnants of the U.S. backed Indonesian assault.

For four long and bloody years, the U.S. media, with very rare exceptions, kept close to the U.S. government propaganda line. During 1975, there was considerable coverage of East Timor, a reflection of the concern over decolonization in the former Portuguese empire. An Australian journalist, the first to enter East Timor after the August civil war, wrote a lengthy report in the *London Times* in which he rejected allegations of Fretilin atrocities, which he attributed to Indonesian and other propaganda services. His report appeared in the *N. Y. Times*, edited to make it appear that the charges were accurate, as *Newsweek*

reported, basing itself on the *N.Y. Times* account. After the Indonesian invasion, reporting in the U.S. diminished rapidly, approaching zero (apart from occasional U.S. government and Indonesian propaganda handouts).

By late 1979, the truth was beginning to break through, even in the U.S. press, and a number of congressman, notably Tom Harkin of Iowa had become aware of the true nature of what had been concealed by the media. The *N.Y. Times* ran an honest editorial on December 24, 1979, and James Markham filed the first report on the many Timorese refugees in Lisbon (28 January, 1980).



The *Christian Science Monitor* had published several accurate reports by January 1980, and other journals too have begun to present some of the information that has been available for four years, though much distortion persists and the crucial U.S. role is generally ignored or downplayed.

The importance of the behavior of the media and journals of opinion during these years cannot be overemphasized. The events described by Father Leoneto and many others, and the horrendous consequences that are now at last widely conceded, are the direct responsibility of the United States government, and to a lesser extent, its Western allies. Correspondingly, these monstrous acts could have been—and still can be—brought to an end by withdrawal of direct U.S. support for them. The U.S. government has been backing the Indonesian military not because it takes pleasure in massacre and starvation, but because the fate of Timorese is simply a matter of no significance when measured against higher goals. Since 1965, when the Indonesian military took power in a coup that led to the slaughter of perhaps 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, mostly landless peasants, Indonesia has been a valued ally. In comparison with these overriding considerations, it is natural that the Human Rights Administration, like its predecessor, will pour arms into Indonesia to enable it to achieve its ends in East

Timor, and will attempt in every way to conceal the truth.

The importance of the deception becomes clear when we observe what happens when the system of indoctrination begins to unravel. However institutions may function, individuals are not prepared to support actions that verge on genocide. As the truth has begun to break through, a number of members of Congress and increasing segments of the population are beginning to demand an end to these atrocious acts. One result has been that some aid is being sent, though without adequate international supervision it is doubtful that it will reach those who need it, given the corruption of the Indonesian military. There is, for the first time, a real possibility that pressure will be put on the U.S. government to stop providing the military supplies that Indonesia requires, and that international efforts may be organized to induce Indonesia to withdraw, so that the remnants of the population that survive may have the opportunity to realize their long-sought right to self-determination.

It is intriguing to see how some segments of the media are reacting to the fact that information about East Timor is now beginning to reach the public. In the *Washington Journalism Review* (March 1980), Richard Valeriani of NBC and Asia specialist and former foreign correspondent Stanley Karnow discussed one of the reports on East Timor that appeared in the *N.Y. Times* in late January 1980. Valeriani said that he read it, thought "I don't care about Timor." Karnow couldn't bring himself even to read the story: "I just didn't have time...There was no connection; it didn't have anything to do with me." Their point was that the *Times* was giving *too much coverage* to the insignificant fact that massacres in Timor rival those of Cambodia and that the population has been reduced to the state of the miserable victims on the Thai-Cambodian border as a direct result of U.S. policies.

Their reactions are not unique. The U.N. correspondent of the *New York Times*, Bernard Nossiter, refused an invitation to a press conference on East Timor in October 1979 on the grounds that the issue was "rather esoteric," and in fact reported not a word on the U.N. debate, which included testimony from Timorese refugees and others on the continuing atrocities and the U.S. responsibility for them.

Perhaps the most intriguing response to the recent breakdown of media suppression is that of the *Wall Street Journal*, which devoted an editorial to the topic (6 February 1980). The *Journal* takes note of "an interesting campaign" that "has been

shaping up over the past few weeks on the issue of East Timor." It observes that 100,000 people may have died during the war, adding that

It sounds suspiciously like Cambodia, some people are saying. And this one is ours: Indonesia is our ally and oil supplier, it's American arms that the Indonesians used to perpetrate their atrocities.



But this charge, the *Journal* continues, "tells less about Timor than it does about certain varieties of American political thinking." There are two factors that crucially distinguish Timor from Cambodia. The first is that the U.S. is sending some aid to Timor and the Indonesians, "however grudgingly and imperfectly," are letting the food in, whereas "the Cambodians would be in considerably better shape if the Soviet Union undertook comparable behavior for itself and its ally"—the editors choose to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union provided aid to starving Cambodians long before the U.S. did, and, it appears, in far larger quantities, as well as the fact, reported by international aid workers, that their aid was let in not at all grudgingly. But the crucial distinction, which deserves quotation in full, is this:

But more important, it's self-deluding to talk as if the U.S. had the power any longer to determine the outcome of a situation like Timor. The violence that has cursed the place is the wholly unsurprising mark of a disintegrating world order; talk about the evils of U.S. power is likely to hasten that disintegration, not arrest it. Those worried about the human costs of such chaos might do well to start facing up to that connection.

The reasoning is not without interest for students of contemporary propaganda. The editors are trying to tell us that when U.S. supplied helicopter gunships demolish villages, destroy crops, massacre mountain tribesmen and drive them to concentration camps, we are to understand these facts as "the mark of a disintegrating world order," not the results of U.S. actions, consciously undertaken. And if the U.S. were to withhold the crucial military and diplomatic support that enables Indonesia to carry out these policies, the terror would be even worse, since its cause is purely abstract. One wonders whether *Pravda* rises to such intellectual heights when it justifies Soviet support for the Ethiopian war in Eritrea.

It is easy enough to make fun of *Wall Street Journal*, but that would be to overlook the more significant point. The slight exposure of U.S.-backed Indonesian atrocities during the past several months has frightened the Indonesian military, the U.S. government, and the business circles represented by the *Wall Street Journal*, all of whom want to play their games with people's lives in secret. The message is clear. By significantly extending the pressure on the U.S. government to abandon its appalling policies, and continuing to work to bring the facts to a larger public, one can contribute materially to the survival of the people of East Timor. It is rare that an opportunity arises in which a relatively small amount of effort may save thousands of lives, and it would be criminal to allow it to pass.

RESOLUTION ON EAST TIMOR UNITED STATES STUDENT ASSOCIATION 1980-1981 PLATFORM

The USSA is opposed to the United States role in support of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. Direct support has included Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger supporting the invasion the day before it began while in Indonesia. It includes paying 90% of the cost of the invasion, helicopters that strafe and napalm villages.

Since 200,000 of 700,000 East Timorese have been killed, international observers and relief have been banned, and the U.S. media have blacked out the whole tragedy. USSA supports Rep. Tom Harkin's resolution with 55 cosponsors to investigate the U.S. role in the invasion.

The USSA also supports the efforts of the Red Cross, the United Nations and many church relief agencies to observe, supervise a ceasefire, and provide food relief.

The USSA insists the U.S. cut-off all aid to Indonesia until such time all rights of self-determination are established for the East Timorese, and cut all complicity with the destruction of that society. And we criticize the U.S. media for their virtual blackout of all these facts.

A History of the War

- 74 April 5 Military coup in Lisbon ends a 50 year dictatorship, its overseas territories are granted the ability to decolonize. East Timor begins forming the structures for this.
- October Indonesia begins radio broadcasts expressing hostility to East Timorese independence.
- 75 January UDT and FRETILIN enter into a pro-independence coalition.
- June After a visit to Indonesia to meet with government and military officials, UDT breaks the coalition with FRETILIN.
- August 10-30 Immediately after a visit to Indonesia's capital, UDT stages a "show of force," arresting and executing FRETILIN members. FRETILIN is defended by Timorese soldiers from the Portuguese garrison.
- September 7 The "Civil War" ends, leaving FRETILIN in *de facto* control after the Portuguese Governor had withdrawn.
- September 11 Overseas journalists and aid teams visit and report widespread support for FRETILIN which acknowledges Portugal's continuing sovereignty.
- October 16 Five Australian journalists reportedly slain by Indonesian troops during an attack on East Timor from Kupang (Indonesian Timor).
- November 28 FRETILIN declares East Timor's independence after resisting 2 months of Indonesian aggression with little outside support.
- December 4 General Ali Murtopo states that Indonesia is preparing to intervene.
- December 5 President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger arrive in Indonesia on a State visit. During discussions with Indonesian President Suharto, "tacit approval" is given for the invasion.
- December 7 Indonesia launches an air, sea, and land invasion of East Timor, during which Australian journalist Roger East is executed: killing is indiscriminant. Many Timorese follow FRETILIN into the mountainous interior.
- December 8 The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council call for Indonesia's withdrawal without delay. The *N. Y. Times* and *Washington Post* call on Congress to weigh heavily Indonesia's "felonious and forcible" invasion. Portugal breaks relations with Indonesia. Indonesia responds by claiming it has no troops in East Timor.
- December 25 Indonesia launches a 2nd offensive, Australian Intelligence is reported as putting the Indonesian troop size at 15-20,000. U.S. press coverage dries up.
- 6 January 9 London *Guardian* cites Australian Intelligence monitoring information as reporting widespread killing of non-combatants by the Indonesian forces.
- February 15 Lopez da Cruz, Vice President of the Indonesian created "Provisional Government of East Timor," says that 60,000 are dead from the fighting.
- March 3 Rep. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) proposes the first Congressional amendment calling for the eliminating of military assistance to Indonesia in light of the East Timor invasion. (Defeated).
- April 22 U.N. reaffirms resolutions calling for Indonesia's withdrawal.
- July 17 Indonesia announces the formal incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia as its 27th province.

	September	The U.S. delivers the first of the 16 Rockwell OV-10 Broncos it is to supply Indonesia.
	December 1	U.N. reaffirms resolutions calling for Indonesia's withdrawal.
1977	February 11	James Dunn, former Australian Consul to East Timor, reports that East Timor "might well constitute ... the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time."
	March 4	The U.S. State Department claims, during Congressional hearings, that atrocities by Indonesia in East Timor have ended; days later, Australian Intelligence is reported as putting the death toll in East Timor at 70-80 Timorese per day.
	July	U.S. State Department admits in Congressional hearings that Indonesia's troops are supplied "roughly 90%" with U.S. arms.
	September	New Indonesian offensives are reported by Australian Intelligence. A French journalist who 'slipped into' East Timor reports Indonesian troops are "systematically wiping out villages." The U.S. State Department denies these reports.
1978	January	There are renewed offensives including aerial bombardment of the interior regions. Crop growing is seriously disrupted.
	September	Diplomats and journalists are allowed to visit with Indonesian guides. Journalists report an urgent need for relief; the visiting U.S. Ambassador Masters remains silent. Indonesia refuses requests to allow the International Red Cross (ICRC) and other such groups entry after three years of absence.
	December 31	FRETILIN President Nicolau Labato is killed in combat.
1979	April	Indonesian military allows the ICRC to conduct a preliminary survey. A subsequent report says that "tens of thousands of people displaced by military operations were facing starvation." Indonesia fails to expedite relief programs to East Timor.
	July	The ICRC returns for a second survey of 13 villages. Although the ICRC did not visit the areas described as the hardest hit by starvation, it reported that 60,000 of the 75,000 people it visited were in "an alarming state of malnutrition;" 20,000 were in "a calamitous condition" and would die whether aid reached them or not.
	September 10	The ICRC and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) begin relief programs to about 300,000 people, but have a limited foreign staff (four). Local staff are reportedly under the influence of the Indonesian military.
	November	ICRC officials say the situation may be worse than Biafra and potentially worse than Kampuchea. Photographs taken by an Australian journalist support this.
	December 4	Renewed Congressional hearings, in which the systematic diversion of aid by Indonesia's military is noted by Rep. Harkin, demands an accountability from our aid programs in East Timor.
	December	Father Leoneto do Rego (Portuguese-Catholic Priest) discounts U.S. State Department and Indonesian Government claims that "geoclimactic and environmental factors" caused the famine. He states that massive bombings of the mountainous regions, where he lived in 1978, uprooted the population and prevented crop growth.
1980	January	The <i>N.Y. Times</i> , <i>Washington Post</i> and <i>Christian Science Monitor</i> have printed editorials and articles pointing out recent refugee reports of continuing Indonesian atrocities and a continuing famine. Refugees reportedly are paying \$2,000-2,500 in bribes to leave East Timor; the Indonesians are only allowing the ethnic Chinese to leave.
	March 23	London <i>Observer</i> reports that the ICRC and CRS were not being allowed sufficient access to assess the relief operations. One relief official, who had recently visited

Kampuchea, said that "medically the East Timorese are in a worse state than the Khmers," and noted that the relationship between the Indonesians and the Timorese were as "master and slave."

April *Manchester Guardian* reports a regrouping of Timorese nationalist forces and a growth in active resistance. The Center for Defense Information reports that East Timor is the most violent conflict taking place in the world in terms of proportions of the population killed.

June 10 Congress hears testimony from Amnesty International, the Center for Defense Information and the Chairperson of the East Timor Refugee Commission on East Timor. The U.S. State Department denies that executions and disappearances are still occurring. Contrary to State Department claims of stability throughout East Timor, FRETILIN forces launch coordinated attacks on the capital city, Dili.

June-July Indonesia responds to FRETILIN's attacks by arresting hundreds of Timorese, many of whom were tortured. Executions were reported by the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, which cited church sources. Further fighting is reported.

July 25 *N.Y. Times* again condemns Indonesia's occupation and war, calling for a political settlement through Portugal with eventual independence for East Timor.

September 17 Portuguese government issues a communique calling for diplomatic consultations and a resolution to the East Timor question.

November 11 The U.N. reaffirms its 8th resolution calling for a recognition of East Timor's right to self-determination.

11 The Sydney Morning Herald, Wed, Oct 22, 1980 11

Refugee saw reporter shot

CANBERRA.—A Timorese refugee has told Australian Embassy officials in Lisbon that he saw the Australian freelance journalist Roger East put against a wall and shot by Indonesian troops in Dili in 1975.

A Foreign Affairs spokesman said in Canberra that the refugee was interviewed after embassy staff talked to another refugee, Mr Pedro Lai, about statements made to journalists last week concerning Mr East.

The spokesman said the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peacock, had instructed the Australian Embassy in Jakarta to pass on the new claims to the Indonesian Government.

He said the new account was consistent with that given by Mr Lai, who said he saw Mr East's hands tied with wire before Indonesian troops led him from a park where people had been taken by Indonesian forces.

Mr Lai also said he had heard machine-gun fire after Mr East was led away, struggling and spitting at his captors.



The Issue Remains and So Does the Resistance



Milton Grant - U.N.

The case of East Timor is a most tragic one. On 7 December 1975, East Timor was invaded by the armed forces of Indonesia, under the pretext of "liberating" the East Timorese people from "Portuguese colonialism" at a time when the new Government in Lisbon decided to grant self-determination and independence to the people of the territory. Indonesia's military intervention was carried out with a clear purpose: to challenge the process of decolonization initiated by the Portuguese Government. No one in East Timor solicited Indonesia's intervention to "liberate" us from "Portuguese colonialism". All the East Timorese political groupings in the territory were cooperating with the Portuguese authorities in order to work out a comprehensive programme of decolonization, leading to free elections, with direct participation of the entire population, without external interference. Regardless of the excuses and arguments, the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor was a clear-cut act of military aggression, a gross violation of the

United Nations Charter, and of International Law.

Indonesia ignored calls by the United Nations to withdraw from East Timor and instead increased its military aggression against the people of East Timor. Thousands of people were killed, tens of thousands of families were left homeless. Entire villages were razed, and crops destroyed. The crimes committed by the Government of Indonesia, and the destruction perpetrated by its invading army, turned East Timor, once a bountiful land, into a prairie of fire and destruction, with no precedent in the entire history of the island.

The United Nations has adopted a total of seven resolutions on the question of East Timor, reaffirming the right of the people of the territory to self-determination and independence, and calling upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor. The Non-Aligned Countries reaffirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence in 1976 and 1979. Throughout the world, governments, political parties in the Western countries,

religious organizations, such as the World Council of Churches, trade unions, student's organizations, human rights groups, have repeatedly condemned Indonesia's military intervention in East Timor and demanded the withdrawal of its troops from the territory. However, the Government of Indonesia has defied the entire international community in an arrogant manner and has continued its military operations.

Five years after Indonesia's invasion of East Timor or of Indonesia's "liberation" of the East Timorese people from "Portuguese colonialism," the result speaks for itself: one-third of the population of the territory have died from the war, famine caused by deliberate destruction of crops, by diseases due to and lack of medical assistance, mass executions, and weapons, such as napalm, defoliants and poison gas.

The Government of Indonesia has claimed that a "people's assembly" voted to incorporate East Timor into Indonesia on 31 May 1976, a futile attempt to win some sort of legitimacy to its annexation

Jose Ramos-Horta has been instrumental in keeping his country's cause from being forgotten in international and diplomatic circles. Mr. Horta, who has been involved with Fretilin since its founding, is now Fretilin's Minister for External Affairs and their representative to the United Nations. In his handling of East Timor's international affairs Mr. Horta has received wide respect throughout the international community and he has worked tirelessly to find a solution for his fellow Timorese.

of East Timor. The Government of Indonesia had picked puppets in Dili, and through them it set up a so-called "people's assembly." No elections took place even in Dili itself. Suffice it to say that even the U.S. State Department refuses to accept Indonesian claims that the people of East Timor have decided freely to accept Indonesia's incorporation of their territory. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke acknowledged that no act of self-determination took place in East Timor during congressional hearings last June.

The United Nations did not take part in any proceedings leading up to the formation of the so-called "people's assembly," and the Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) had not—and have not—been complied with by the Government of Indonesia. Therefore, any claim by the Government of Indonesia that the people of East Timor has decided to accept the annexation of their territory, other than by force of arms, is absurd and ridiculous. We should all be aware by now of the many tricks played by illegal and repressive regimes to cover up their neo-colonial designs. It is too fresh in our mind, the futile attempts by the now defunct regime of Ian Smith-Muzorewa to win international legitimacy with an "internal settlement." In Namibia, the racist regime of Pretoria has been trying for years to deny the Namibian people their sacred right to self-determination. It is ironic to hear Indonesia of decolonization hear Indonesia speak on matters of decolonization when it is denying the people of East Timor their right to self-determination? Where is the morality of the Government of Indonesia to criticise the racist regime of South Africa when both Pretoria and Jakarta are guilty of the same arrogant defiance of the United Nations resolutions? Where is the morality of the Government of Indonesia to talk about Israeli

annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip while it annexed East Timor by brutal force and annihilated one third of the population of the territory? How can Indonesia speak on the principles of self-determination and independence when Indonesia has trampled upon the rights of East Timor, and has been responsible for the death of one third of the entire population of the territory, a tragedy which is of greater magnitude than the tragedy of the South African people or the Namibian, or the Palestinian people, in terms of number of people killed?



We have also heard the Indonesian Representatives claiming "achievements" in East Timor. Few more roads were built, one or two schools were inaugurated, a soccer field and a new football team ready for a good shows; "boys-scouts" have been established, etc. All this would serve to justify Indonesian annexation of East Timor and the slaughter of tens of thousands of East Timorese people. The Government of Indonesia seems to want to make a mockery of human rights and the sacred rights of peoples to determine their own future.

For five years the people of East Timor have been fighting heroically for their sacred rights and they are continuing to wage a heroic resistance against the foreign

aggressors. In spite of some difficulties, in terms of military supplies, the people of East Timor, under FRETILIN leadership, have achieved great victories. In the course of this year, the East Timorese National Liberation Army—FALINTIL—inflicted heavy casualties on the Indonesia army, and destroyed a large number of armored cars, trucks, and military installations.

On January 5 a major FRETILIN attack against an Indonesian military convoy on the road from Dili to Manatuto left 20 Indonesian soliders dead. During the month of February, several

mutinies took place in Indonesian military barracks. A shoot-out ensued when some soldiers refused to obey an order to march into a FRETILIN stronghold in the Lospalos region. Several soldiers were killed or wounded, while others fled into the bush and joined FRETILIN forces. During the month of March, the resistance forces launched a series of small-scale attacks against Indonesian positions in four separate areas. On April 25 another Indonesian post was the target of mortar barrage. The shells exploded inside an Indonesian military barrack, killing and wounding 50 soldiers. The same day, an Indonesian helicopter was shot down nearby. On May 1st, an Indonesian convoy of three trucks, one armoured car, one armoured

car, and 20 soldiers were ambushed on the road from Dili to Aileu. FRETILIN forces recovered all the available weaponry. On May 20, the sixth anniversary of the independence struggle, FALINTIL soldiers marked this historical date with several attacks against Indonesian military units located in four cities. A total of 100 Indonesian soldiers were killed.

The most serious FRETILIN operation was carried out on the night of June 9th to 10th against Indonesian positions in the occupied capital, Dili. More than 200 FRETILIN soldiers took part in a three-pronged attack against an Indonesian military unit stationed in the outskirts of the capital and a

local TV station, while another group blocked the exits of the city. An Indonesian military unit six miles south of Dili was also overrun by FRETILIN forces and held for several hours. Hundreds of villagers who came from the mountains with the freedom-fighters carried away boxes of ammunition, rifles, hand grenades, and other types of weaponry. In the meantime, the local TV station was destroyed.

This attack launched against Indonesian forces right in the occupied capital, caught the Indonesians completely by surprise. The next day, top Indonesian officers from the Bali Regional Division flew to East Timor to assess the situation and to boost the

morale of the army. Three days later, warships arrived from Lombok, an Indonesian naval base, with a reinforcement of 40 tanks and 2,000 "marines." In retaliation, hundreds of villagers were rounded up and tortured. All the houses in the hills surrounding the capital were burnt to ground.

Several major Western newspapers—Le Monde of Paris, Manchester Guardian of Great Britain, the New York Times—have published several reports, confirming the revigoration of FRETILIN forces and the increase in military clashes this year. The New York Times, in an editorial on July 25, 1980, says: "Despite claims (by Indonesia) that the territory has

United Nations and East Timor

The General Assembly

Recognizing the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Considering that the international community is celebrating in 1980 the twentieth anniversary of the Declaration,

Bearing in mind that the Fifth and Sixth Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo and Havana in 1976 and 1979, respectively, reaffirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence,

Having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other relevant documents relating to the Territory,

Taking into consideration the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of Portugal with a view September 1980, in which the administering Power reaffirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination,

Taking also into consideration the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of Portugal with a view to finding a comprehensive solution to the problem of East Timor,

Deeply concerned at the continued suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the hostilities still prevailing in the Territory,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Portugal, as the administering Power, and Indonesia,

Having also heard the statements of various East Timorese petitioners and representatives of non-governmental organizations, as well as the representative of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente,

In favor: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao P.D.R., Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint-Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Absent: Bulgaria, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mexico, Paraguay, Saint Vincent-Grenadines, Solomon Islands, South Africa

been 'pacified,' FRETILIN leaders credibly assert that guerrillas have resumed their fight and have been able to strike at Dili, Timor's capital." On July 29, New York Times published a story from its correspondent, James Markham, who writes: "The Indonesian casualties which ran as high as 50 to 100 a week were reportedly ferried to Dili from the countryside by helicopter and evacuated by Hercules C-130 to Java...Most suffer from bullet and mortar wounds..."

The struggle of the people of East Timor is gaining international sympathy. Here in United States public opinion opposing U.S. military support to Indonesia is

growing. We believe that United States best interests are not served by supporting Indonesia's military aggression against our country and our people. United States supported Indonesia's own struggle for independence in the forties. Today, United States should play the same constructive role by encouraging the Government of Indonesia to comply with the international community calls for an end to the war in East Timor, and for self-determination for the people of the territory.

The people of East Timor have been fighting and dying for their most sacred rights. Tens of thousands of East Timorese have died heroically so that East Timor will be free, independent, and

sovereign.

Although the war in East Timor has been sustained by United States, and although tens of thousands of East Timorese have been killed by weapons supplied by the American Administration, we have faith in the generosity, humanity and goodness of the American people. We are confident that the East Timor solidarity movement in this country will grow stronger and stronger. And the United States will then have to reconsider its military support to a repressive regime which is alienated from its own people, a regime which, in the long run, will also alienate the United States from the Indonesian people.

**ON NOVEMBER 11, 1980, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION (35/598) ON EAST TIMOR.**

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)
2. *Declares* that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine their own future within the framework of the United Nations;
3. *Welcomes* the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of Portugal as a first step towards the free exercise by the people of East Timor of their right to self-determination and independence, and urges all parties directly concerned to co-operate fully with a view to creating the conditions necessary for the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
4. *Expresses its deepest concern* at the continued suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the situation still prevailing in the Territory;
5. *Requests* the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to render, within their respective fields of competence, all possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the children;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session on all aspects of the situation in East Timor, in particular, the political developments concerning the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 above;
7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Question of East Timor".

Voting on the resolution was as follows: For 58; Against 35; Abstentions 46.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dem. Kampuchea, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Uruguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Yemen

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Burma, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Samoa, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, U.K., United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

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
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AN APPEAL

It is not often that we ask for contributions. We do so now because we need them. When we decided to publish this Report, we were planning on 24 pages. To include everything we thought useful, we had to double the size — and thus, double the cost. We are sure the bills for this Report will be around \$2,000. When we learned that our expected grant money had not come through, we decided to print the Report anyway using our own money. We hope you will agree that the materials published in this Report are useful. If you do, we would appreciate it if you would help us out — even if only to cover the cost of our sending you a copy of the Report (\$2.00 plus 50 cents postage).

Please send all contributions to:

EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Box 363 Clinton Station
Syracuse, New York 13201

Enclosed is my contribution of _____.

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Please send me _____ additional copies of this report. Enclosed is \$2.00 (plus 75 cents first class postage) for each copy. (Bulk rates — 10 to 99 copies 25% off, 100 or more 40% off.)

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Against the People of East Timor**

Yale University

February 27th, 1981

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see index,
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The Editor
The National Times
GPO Box 506
Sydney
NSW 2001

Politics Department
16 February 1981

Dear Sir,

Nowhere in Peter Rodgers' discussion of the effects of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor (Feb 15) is there any consideration of the aims or the means of the Indonesian project. His underlying logic is uncritical support; what is ought to be.

Rodgers' fast, loose play with the figures concerning deaths follows from this uncritical acceptance of the methods and aims of the criminal Indonesian exercise. Mr Rodgers seems to believe that atrocious crimes in principle are somehow justified by the precise number of victims.

As for the facts, Rodgers is content with unsupported assertion: "Allegations discredited"; "No solid evidence has been produced.....independent observers."

These assertions are not just unsupported and question-begging. They are demonstrably false. (See Flanagan, East Timor Apologetics, forthcoming Zed Press London 1981).

We challenge The National Times to allow us 1000 words to provide the detailed demonstration.


Yours sincerely,

Pat Flanagan

Julie Southwood



A mother holding her child at a food-distribution site in Baucau, East Timor, in September 1979. Right: East Timorese waiting last June for a Red Cross helicopter delivering



food. Now under Indonesian control, Timor has advanced from starvation to malnutrition.

Since it was abandoned by Portugal in 1975, East Timor has undergone revolution, civil war, invasion by neighboring Indonesia and famine. The tragic toll of Timorese lives lost is estimated to be upward of 100,000.

By **Henry Kamm**

No doubt there are more remote places, particularly on Timor, an island on the eastern fringe of the far-flung Indonesian archipelago [see map below], but on a Sunday morning last year, the village of Uatolare, inland from East Timor's southern coast, could have served as a metaphor for the end of the world.

I walked among thousands of people huddled together, from the outskirts of the village to its ravaged center. Men, women, children — all shared the look of deprivation to the limits of endurance: frail bodies clothed in tattered, gaunt faces uttering mute prayers, bloated bellies of children protruding over waists so scrawny that the smallest ones had to hold up their shorts or lose them.

Through the open doors of the village church, the chants of prayer could be heard. Recently patched holes showed how heavily the church had been hit by naval shellfire during the Indonesian invasion of December 1975. Inside, a large congregation sat on the bare floor, singing in Portuguese the Roman Catholic liturgy. But no priest officiated; the fervent prayers were offered in the face of an empty altar. Standing at an open side door, a girl as emaciated as the others, no older than 12 years, intoned a new chant whenever the chorus thinned and faltered.

The deserted schoolhouse, also marked by the bombardment, stood across the square. On one wall, someone had scrawled, "Death to the traitors," also in Portuguese. By now, however, after years of civil war among East Timorese and war against Indonesia, no one recalled which faction the words applied to.

The war was over at the time of my visit in January 1980, despite sporadic guerrilla action against the Indonesian occupiers that continues to this day. Dismal and melancholy as the scenes I saw were, it (Continued on Page 56)

Henry Kamm is The New York Times's chief Asian diplomatic correspondent.



East and West Timor (see inset) form an island in the Indonesian archipelago.

THE SILENT SUFFERING OF

EAST TIMOR

TIMOR

Continued from Page 35

was really not the end of the world. Those whom I saw were survivors, those who had graduated from starvation to malnutrition. The great dying was ending. Indonesia's belated call to the world community for help had been answered, largely by the United States, which had also furnished most of the weapons that Indonesia used for its invasion — although the United States intended that these weapons be used only for Indonesia's self-defense.

Indonesia's hold on East Timor is secure, but its annexation of the former Portuguese colony has not been recognized by a majority of members of the United Nations. In last year's voting on the annual question in the United Nations General Assembly, only 35 countries, including the United States, sided with Jakarta. But there is no fire in the annual debate; East Timor is too remote, it seems, to deserve serious attention. It was a backwater even of the Portuguese empire that collapsed after the Lisbon revolution of 1974. An island divided when the Portuguese and Dutch clashed there in the 17th century, Timor had remained colonized — if not pacified — more from force of habit than for any benefit it offered to its conquerors. West Timor became part of independent Indonesia with the rest of the Dutch East Indies in 1949.

Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, occurring in the same year as the Communist victories in Indochina, never became a major issue in the world, but in the United States and Australia small groups centered in universities continue to protest their Governments' acquiescence in the act of force.

There is substance to these protests, even if, at their most extreme, they degenerate into hyperbole — accusations of "genocide" rather than mass deaths from cruel warfare and the starvation that accompanied it on this historically food-short island, of American complicity rather than acquiescence. True, President Gerald R. Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger visited President Suharto in Jakarta on the eve of the airborne and naval invasion, but there is no evidence that they discussed with him the impending attack. Indonesia, vast, populous, rich in petroleum and strategic minerals, and emphatically anti-Communist, is deemed too valuable a friend by the West to risk offending it for having committed aggression and *Anschluss* against so minor a land and people.

The progress toward obliv-

left it, with only a minute fraction of its preannexation population of about 650,000 educated in the colonizer's language and fewer still in any other. Little is known about events in East Timor since the invasion, because Indonesia has reinforced its newest province's isolation, and the bulk of the testimony has come from highly partisan members or supporters of Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front of East Timor, which governed for four months until the Indonesian onslaught and whose armed resistance lingers on. The vast majority of East Timorese have suffered mutely and passively.

□

East Timor's descent into the abyss began on Aug. 11, 1975, when the people of Dili awoke to the sight of armed men patrolling the streets of their torpid colonial capital. The Timorese Democratic Union (U.D.T.) had staged a coup against the colonial Government. Four days later, the Central Committee of Fretilin, U.D.T.'s principal rival, announced from the mountains behind Dili, to which most of its members had fled, "a general armed insurrection against all traitors and enemies of the people."

In the final act of futility that had marked more than four centuries of Portuguese rule, the Governor and his administration abandoned the East Timorese to chaos and civil war and embarked, under the cover of the waning night of Aug. 26-27, for the safety of the offshore island of Atauro. Their arms remained to fuel the battle — most of the army's weapons going to Fretilin, the most left-wing of the three parties formed in the heady aftermath of Portugal's revolution, and those of the police to U.D.T., the gradualists who ostensibly favored slow progress to independence under Portugal's aegis.

What followed U.D.T.'s disastrous "whiff of grapeshot" can be summarized: Fretilin made good its armed insurrection. By the end of August it had gained control of Dili. Before September ended, it had driven most of the U.D.T. forces into Indonesian West Timor in disarray. Indonesia made clear its unwillingness to accept Fretilin rule by early October, striking with full military force to seize three towns across the international border. But except for this strip, Fretilin controlled East Timor insofar as any central force can exercise a hold over the forbiddingly mountainous and largely roadless interior.

In mid-November, Indonesian forces once more began to edge eastward. Late on the afternoon of Nov. 28, when the sea breeze usually light-

Portuguese flag that it had left flying despite the Government's desertion, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

Two days later, on the Indonesian side of the border, leaders of U.D.T. and Apodeti — the third major party that sprang up after the revolution in Portugal, and which espoused joining Indonesia — presented Adam Malik, then Jakarta's Foreign Minister, with a declaration of integration. On the morning of Dec. 7, Indonesian paratroopers landed in Dili and Baucau, the territory's second largest town, landing craft discharged waves of soldiers on the beaches and troops poured across the frontier. Fretilin resistance was heavy, and on Christmas Day, Indonesia, a nation of 135 million, brought ashore massive reinforcements.

When 1975 ended, Fretilin had been driven into the interior with much of the civilian population, but it had salvaged much of its fighting strength and leadership. A new phase of warfare began, witnessed only by those who did battle and by their victims. Indonesia banned the press — this continues with rare and closely shadowed exceptions to this day — as it proceeded with the task of "pacifying" its new possession. Word filtered back to Jakarta that fighting and casualties were heavy, that much of the population remained in the mountains with Fretilin and that the East Timorese were suffering.

Early in 1978, reports began to circulate in the Indonesian capital that a possibly decisive turn had occurred and large numbers of East Timorese were fleeing to Indonesian-held areas, telling of waning Fretilin control and, more importantly, critical shortages of food and medicines. Their physical appearance bore witness to this.

By September of that year, Indonesia felt the tide had turned sufficiently in its favor to invite a large party of ambassadors and journalists to visit Dili and nearby sites where recent refugees from the mountains had been gathered. What the group saw and heard convinced most of its members that famine and illness of frightening proportions were abroad in East Timor.

Fully a year later, the first international aid shipments reached the island. Tens of thousands had died, before and during that wasted year. How many? Figures as frightful as 200,000 have been advanced. An Indonesian census, recently completed but not made public, puts the population at 552,000. This would be more than 100,000 fewer East Timorese than the last published Portuguese statistics, dating to 1974, showed.

The belated relief effort, by all accounts, has been effective, and East Timorese are no longer dying of hunger or untreated ills. Indonesia ordered the two international relief groups that it allowed to work in East Timor to wind up their emergency operations at the end of last year.

□

Those are the bare bones of the East Timor story — but crucial questions remain unanswered. Why did the East Timorese elite, whatever its political differences, drive the colony so quickly into murderous civil war? Why did Portugal abandon East

Timor before any pressure had been exerted on its administration and forces? Why did Indonesia intervene

roundings presented an aspect reminiscent of the other Portuguese colonies in the aftermath of the Lisbon revolution. I saw in Dili, as I had in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, gross underdevelopment, unrelieved as it was in Angola and Mozambique by glossy capital cities with huge slums. The paved roads of the capital petered out into dirt tracks even closer to the dusty town than in the larger African possessions. Instead of slums, there were clusters of flimsy shacks, grafted onto the edges of Dili, that housed the indigenous population.

When I visited one of these at mid-day, families were eating their meal, a mash of boiled tubers topped with some greens and spiced with chilies. What had they eaten in the morning? The same, they said through my interpreter. And what would the next meal be? The same. On the Indonesian side of the island, I had been told by a West German doctor who had been there for two years that the population was chronically malnourished, living on a diet very short on proteins, although on both sides of the border cattle were plentiful and the unfished ocean swarmed with protein-rich seafood. It is a measure of Dutch and Portuguese colonial neglect that the East Timorese were never taught to take advantage, in any systematic way, of the food sources available. Even in times of peace, with the populations pursuing their generally seminomadic way of life, Timor and the other islands of the Lesser Sunda group are victims of frequent crop failures and spells of hunger.

The Portuguese Governor of East Timor, Col. Mario Lemos Pires, received me graciously in a comfortable corner of his huge office, guarded by two East Timorese in glistening white uniforms and feathered headdresses who flashed swords and smiles. He was of the new breed, a military man sent after the revolution to oversee decolonization. It would not be easy here, he said. In East Timor, there was not just one liberation movement to which Portugal could hand over its authority, but three relatively large ones and two minor groups, all newly formed.

East Timor had three options and would have to exercise a choice, Colonel Pires's assistant for political affairs, Maj. Francisco Mota, said. They were immediate independence, gradual progression toward freedom under Portuguese guidance or integration with Indonesia. He did not think the last had much support. The Portuguese Army's last remaining task was to maintain order and educate the East Timorese to exercise their choice before many more months.

I was directed to Fretilin headquarters to look for some of its leaders. They were in the countryside educating villagers, I was informed by a group of friendly youths in their teens and 20's, milling about a hut under a big tree at the edge of town. The boys inquired about my nationality and expressed admiration for the United States based largely on Muhammad Ali and blue jeans, which some were proudly wearing. They sheepishly sang a song when asked about Fretilin, and my interpreter, a man sympathetic to the Portuguese revolution, said he could not follow its meaning. One teen-ager had the names of Marx and Lenin tattooed on his forearm. He and his friends giggled when asked about their significance, and giggled

again when asked why they were giggling.

I had met the U.D.T. leadership at the airport in Kupang, the capital of West Timor, awaiting the plane that took them and me to Dili. Surprising-

ly, for an independence movement committed to a residual Portuguese role until East Timor eventually gained its freedom, the three leaders seemed in close harmony with the senior, uniformed Indonesian officials

The faces of those in the large resettlement areas, where perhaps half of East Timor's population has been gathered — to provide necessary services, say the Indonesian authorities, to keep the people under control, say others — reflect the horrors of war, famine and occupation.

seeing them off. They had been to Jakarta, they told me on the plane, and had been cordially received by a number of ministers. They had also visited Macao, Taiwan, Japan and Australia. The 34-year-old U.D.T. president, Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz, a grave and heavily bearded man, asked me to dinner at his house the following night.

His house was simple, befitting a minor customs official. He explained his movement and the others, discounting Apodeti because, he said, integration, although he would accept it if it were the people's choice, was unpopular. He described Fretilin as a divided movement. The established leaders, Francisco Xavier do Amaral (his senior in the customs department, who had completed his education for the priesthood and whom he described as a friend) and Nicolau Lobato, were Roman Catholics, but others, students who had returned from Lisbon after the revolution, were full of Communist, even Maoist, ideas and rhetoric. A coalition between Fretilin and U.D.T. had broken apart, said Mr. Lopes, and Fretilin people in the hills had taken to beating up U.D.T. members and breaking up their rallies. "Maybe we'll have to teach them a lesson," he said as a parting remark.



Two days later, Mr. Lopes staged his futile coup, providing the impulse for the Fretilin counter-coup and the Indonesian intervention. In November, Mr. Lopes was among those petitioning Indonesia to accept East Timor into its republic. When I visited Dili last year, Mr. Lopes was Deputy Governor, living in a luxurious house, and the new owner of a 20-acre coffee plantation. I wondered, after the fact, whether he had struck a deal with Jakarta to create the conditions for annexation.

The recent publication in Australia of a series of secret

diplomatic documents — later suppressed by the Government — sheds some light on this question. In a situation summary for the Australian Foreign Minister, senior aides wrote: "Other very delicate sources (which are being brought to your attention separately) suggest that U.D.T. acted with at least some foreknowledge of the [Indonesian] state intelligence coordination body."

The summary continues by noting that the Dili radio under U.D.T. control was appealing to Southeast Asian nations to send help, including armed forces, and it concludes: "The broadcasts provide the pretext for Indonesian intervention in Portuguese Timor. All this stops well short of proof of Indonesian collusion with U.D.T. But if the Indonesians were intending to intervene, they could have hardly stage-managed the scene any better."

The presumption of a link between Indonesian military intelligence and U.D.T. is paralleled by the persistent allegation, made by East Timorese hostile to Indonesia but not affiliated with Fretilin, that Major Mota and a colleague from the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement, Maj. Silverio Jonatas, collaborated with Fretilin in order to bring about immediate independence, thus freeing Lisbon from costly further responsibility in the decolonization process. Friends of Fretilin do not deny the closeness between the most radical Fretilin leaders and the two Portuguese majors, and Fretilin's quick access to most of the arms and munitions stores of the Portuguese military provides additional evidence.

Dispatches from Australia's Ambassador in Jakarta, Richard A. Woolcott, provide the most revealing insights into the American position as Indonesian intervention drew near. Reporting on Aug. 17, the envoy cabled: "[United States Ambassador to Indonesia David D.] Newsom told me last night that he is under in-

structions from Kissinger personally not to involve himself with the Indonesians on the grounds that the United States is involved in enough problems of greater importance overseas at present. The State Department has, we understand, instructed the embassy to cut down its reporting on Timor.

"I will be seeing Newsom on Monday but his present attitude is that the United States should keep out of the Portuguese Timor situation and allow events to take their course. His somewhat cynical comment to me was that if Indonesia were to intervene the United States would hope they would do so 'effectively, quickly and not use our equipment.'"

The Australian dispatches also illustrate what was probably Indonesia's principal motivation for intervention: the fear of President Suharto, and the military officers around him, of Communism. The cables report conversations with Ambassador Newsom, in which Gen. Yoga Sugama, director of state intelligence, suggested that U.D.T. was pro-Moscow and Fretilin pro-Peking. Mr. Newsom tried, and failed, to persuade General Sugama that Portuguese socialism, with which the general linked U.D.T., was strongly anti-Communist.

The cables also report that Ambassador Newsom warned General Sugama that the use of American arms in East Timor could endanger future military assistance, and that he hinted it would provoke a negative reaction in Congress. Mr. Newsom's analysis proved correct. Such criticism of the invasion as was heard from the United States arose in Congress, where committee hearings continue to provide a forum for views critical of Indonesia. From the outset, the Administration of President Ford declared its acceptance of the Indonesian action, while conceding that the East Timorese had not been given an opportunity for an act of self-determination.

Officials at the American Embassy in Jakarta, now headed by Ambassador Edward E. Masters, profess not to remember or never to have known what their predecessors reported in 1975. Explaining the American position, which was limited to halting the weapons flow for six months, embassy officials cite reasons of state. Indonesia, they point out, is a valued ally, a third-world country that takes pro-Western positions, a founder-member of the non-aligned movement that is

sternly anti-Communist, and an important petroleum producer (accounting for 5 percent of American imports) that does not, they say, use the commodity as a political weapon. Indonesia is also described as a Moslem nation that is not hostile, a reliable supplier of several raw materials, a country in which American investment exceeds \$4 billion and which is strategically situated athwart vital air and sea routes between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

American officials show signs of embarrassment when asked why the United States takes so lenient a view of the annexation of East Timor when Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and creation of a puppet government, stopping short of outright annexation, have met with such strong American opposition on the ground of violation of principles of international conduct.



As in Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia, the East Timorese use every possible occasion to make a foreigner aware of their unhappiness over foreign occupation. In the more than four years since my previous visit, East Timor had become a country broken in body and spirit. The 1978 Indonesian offensive — in which American-supplied aircraft played a major role — had reduced Fretilin to a handful of guerrillas and brought the people down from the hills to the coast, famished, sick, naked or in rags.

Indonesia initially turned a deaf ear to Western requests to be allowed to bring in aid. Finally, in January 1979, Adam Malik, now Indonesia's Vice President, told Bishop Edwin Broderick, executive director of the American organization, Catholic Relief Services, that it could begin a program of food and medical assistance.

But bureaucratic delays, typical in Indonesia, put off the first survey of needs by Francis X. Carlin, Catholic Relief's director in that country, until May. What he saw continues to haunt Mr. Carlin, a Philadelphian with long experience in Asia.

"The first group I saw... about 120 of them... were just down on the floor with all that they owned, which didn't amount to anything. The military had given them some corn. Their bellies were bloated, their eyes huge and empty, their limbs scrawny. Their skin was dry and scaly, and they were unbelievably dirty.

"Hunger was killing not just

the very young or the very old, but it was so bad there it was killing those in the prime of life. Many of that first group were definitely beyond recovery. Wherever we went afterward, people were skeletal and totally deprived of food and clothing. The Indonesian colonel with me said, 'Move fast.' I couldn't move fast enough."

The Moslem fasting month, when many services cease functioning in Indonesia, and what Mr. Carlin termed "internal delays" between Catholic Relief and the United States Government (which underwrote most of the assistance), kept aid from arriving until September, a year after the ambassadors, including Mr. Masters, had seen the first victims.

The ill and the starved were on their way to recovery when I saw them because, Mr. Carlin said, those who could not be saved had died by then. But their spirits seemed permanently wounded. The faces of those in the large resettlement areas, where perhaps half of East Timor's population has been gathered — to provide necessary services, say the Indonesian authorities, to keep the people under control, say others — reflect the horrors of war, famine and military occupation.


The stories of some East Timorese who oppose Indonesian rule but are not affiliated with any of the East Timorese parties suggest a typical Southeast Asian war — in which cruelty knew few bounds and both sides pushed and pulled a largely unpolitical people in order to deny them to the "enemy." Eventually, the superior numbers and equipment of the invader succeeded in reducing Fretilin to perhaps 600 guerrillas who are still in the mountains — and still capable of sporadic attacks and thus of provoking Indonesian reprisals, arrests and mistreatment of innocent East Timorese.

"Above all, the people want more justice," a Timorese priest said recently. "They feel the moral injustice. Their rights are not respected. No one can talk. And they are worried about food. There is not enough land in the villages where they have to stay, and they haven't the health or the strength to make new fields. You have to eat to have strength."

The priest hesitated, then sadly resumed. "I think it is a situation beyond our force. I think it is the destiny of small countries. We have to accept." ■

Compliments of

Don Edwards



Kompas/Ag.
LATGAB ABRI '81. Hari pertama Latihan Gabungan ABRI '81, Rabu kemarin berlangsung di Baucau dan Los Palos. Di Baucau latihan berupa gerakan merebut Baucau yang diduduki musuh dengan cara "mobud" (mobil udara) oleh pasukan Kopassandha yang diturunkan dari Helikopter setelah sebelumnya diadakan tembakan-tembakan roket oleh pesawat buru-sergap OV-10 "Bronco". Setelah Baucau direbut, kemudian diadakan latihan "air landed" oleh pasukan Kopasgat. Di Los Palos, latihan berupa "linud" (lintas udara) oleh pasukan Kostrad. Satu batalyon pasukan pada pukul 08.00 diterjunkan dari delapan pesawat Hercules dalam waktu bersamaan sekaligus, sementara buru sergap OV-10 memuntahkan tembakan-tembakan untuk "pembersihan". Hari Kamis ini latihan berupa pendaratan amfibi di Laga, juga di Timor-Timur. Gambar menunjukkan pasukan diterjunkan dalam latihan "Linud" di Los Palos.

KOMPAS March 26, 1981

Photo caption

ARMED FORCES JOINT EXERCISES '81. Wednesday was the first day of the Armed Forces Joint Exercises '81 held in Baucau and Los Palos. In Baucau the exercises took the form of an assault on enemy occupied Baucau using airborne Kopassandha units dropped from helicopters in the wake of a rocket bombardment by counter-insurgency OV-10 "Broncos". After the seizure of Baucau, further exercises were undertaken by Kopasgat troops landed from the air. In Los Palos, exercises were carried out by airborne Kostrad troops. At 8.00 am one battalion was dropped simultaneously from eight Hercules aircraft backed up by counter-insurgency OV-10 "Broncos" pouring in fire-power for "mopping-up" purposes. Today, Thursday, the exercises will take the form of amphibious landings in Laga, also in East Timor. The picture shows troops being dropped during the airborne operation at Los Palos.

AB Thursday March 26, 1981

THE RE-OCCUPATION OF BAUCAU EAST TIMOR

Baucau, Wednesday

At dawn on Wednesday, March 25, the Armed Forces Joint Exercises '81 were launched with an attack on Baucau which for the purposes was considered occupied by the enemy. The event was witnessed by the Minister for Defence and Armed Forces Commander, M. Jusuf accompanied by observers comprising senior officials of Hankam, Pangkowlhan, members of Parliament, the local Governor, editors, PWI, journalists, the Head of Dharma Pertiwi, Mrs E. Jusuf, and other Armed Forces leaders.

The attack on Baucau was carried out by an airborne invasion of a Para-commando unit dropped by helicopter following a rocket bombardment on the target below by counter-insurgency OV-10 "Broncos" which continued to provide air cover. Meanwhile Karsa Yudha conducted an offensive smashing enemy positions around Baucau with a view to preparing an area for an airborne landing. In a short time Baucau was secured and the Indonesian flag successfully hoisted in place of the enemy flag. After the capture of Baucau a 'rapid-strike' company flown in from Dili conducted an airborne landing to occupy positions around Baucau.

During the morning airborne battalion 502 also landed following an air strike into the paratroopers landing target. After the successful capture of the target area, forward enemy positions around Los Palos were smashed. Los Palos was successfully seized and occupied.

An operation designed to coordinate Sandhi Yudha troops and the local territorial apparatus followed resulting in the formation of the Udara Tahap I base.

The Armed Forces Joint Exercises '81 covered two-thirds of our country and served to evaluate the Minister of Defence's policy of forming a strong, preventative force.

The Armed Forces Joint Exercises '81 provided a means of measuring the capacity, skills and integrity of troops as well as testing the supply of equipment and new Armed Forces weapons.

Today, Thursday, the Armed Forces Joint Exercises '81 will be continued with amphibious landings in Laga, East Timor.

Photo caption

The picture above is one part of the Armed Forces Joint Exercises '81 showing paratroopers attacking Baucau East Timor to capture it from enemy invaders.



Pendudukan kembali Lanu Baucau Timor Timur

Baucau, Rabu

Latihan Gabungan ABRI tahun 1981 Hari Rabu tanggal 25 Maret dinihari telah dimulai dengan perebutan Lanu Baucau yang didalam scenario digambarkan seolah olah telah diduduki musuh. Peristiwa ini disaksikan oleh Menteri Hankam/Pangab Jenderal TNI M Jusuf beserta para peninjau yang terdiri dari para pejabat teras Hankam, Pangkowlhan, Kepala Staf Angkatan dan Kapolri, Pangdam, para anggota DPR, Gubernur Kepala Daerah, Pimpinan Redaksi penerbitan, PWI, Wartawan serta Ketua Umum Dharma Pertiwi Ny. EJusuf dan pimpinan pimpinan ABRI lainnya.

Perebutan Lanu Baucau ini dilakukan dengan serbuan mobud (mobil udara) sepasukan Para Komando yang diturunkan dari helikopter, setelah sebelumnya dilakukan tembakan tembakan roket dari pesawat buru sergap OV-10 Bronco ke sasaran dibawah yang dilanjutkan dengan perlindungan dari udara.

Sementara itu dilakukan pula serangan Karsa Yudha, penghancuran terhadap pos pos musuh disekitar Lanu Baucau dalam rangka penyiapan daerah pendaratan mobud. Dalam waktu singkat Lanu Baucau telah dapat direbut dan Sang Saka Merah Putih berhasil dinaikkan setelah menurunkan bendera musuh.

Setelah Lanu Baucau dapat direbut dilakukan pendaratan udara Kompi Pasukan Gerak Cepat yang diterbangkan dari Dili untuk pengisian pos pos disekitar Lanu Baucau. Pagi hari itu telah pula dilakukan pendaratan Batalyon Lintas Udara 502 dimana sebelumnya dilakukan

tembakan tembakan dari udara kedaerah sasaran penerjunan pasukan. Setelah sasaran berhasil direbut, selanjutnya eselon serbuan melakukan penghancuran pos-pos depan musuh disekitar Los Palos. Los Palos berhasil direbut dan diduduki.

Gerakan selanjutnya adalah mengadakan koordinasi dengan pasukan Sandhi Yudha dan aparat aparat territorial setempat yang berarti dengan demikian Tumpuan Udara Tahap I telah dapat dibentuk.

Latihan Gabungan ABRI tahun 1981 yang mencakup daerah seluas meliputi dua

pertiga wilayah tanah air kita, merupakan evaluasi dari hasil kebijaksanaan Menhankam/Pangab dalam membentuk kekuatan penangkal yang tangguh.

Latgab ABRI tahun 81 ini merupakan upaya mengukur kemampuan dan ketrampilan perorangan dan ketangguhan pasukan serta uji coba berbagai peralatan perlengkapan maupun persenjataan ABRI yang baru.

Hari Kamis ini Latihan Gabungan ABRI tahun 1981 dilanjutkan dengan pendaratan Amphibi di Laga Timor Timur. (AB/C)

Gambar di atas adalah satu bagian dari Latgab ABRI '81 dimana nampak penerjun payung untuk merebut Baucau Timor Timur dari serbuan lawan. (Photo : AB/Meliala).



Kompas/mm
PENDARATAN AMPHIBI Pasukan Korps Marinir TNI-AL dalam latihan pendaratan amfibi di Laga hari Kamis pagi. Dalam latihan ini telah diikuti sertakan tank amfibi AMX buatan Perancis yang merupakan tank terbaru ABRI.

KOMPAS Saturday March 28, 1981

Photo caption

Amphibious landing. TNI-AL marine corp troops on a landing exercise at Laga on Thursday morning. Also involved in the exercise were French made amphibious AMX tanks which make up the Armed Forces newest tanks.

Excerpts from accompanying article

The exercises involved more than 10.000 troops, 90% of them young graduates from military school.

Operations were also conducted in Biak (West Irian) and Maluku. The whole program of exercises will finish on April 1, 1981.

New FNC weapons will replace the M-16 weapons currently used by the special units.

Modern French made AMX tanks, of greater capacity and range, will replace the obsolete Russian tanks now in service.

The exercises were followed by a meeting of Armed Forces heads in Ambon.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

APRIL 8 1981

Dear Senator Jackson:

I am pleased to reply to your inquiry of March 18 on behalf of Arthur Spingarn and Sara Cate requesting information concerning the current situation in East Timor.

We share their humanitarian concerns: the primary foreign policy objective of the United States with regard to East Timor has been to improve the welfare of the Timorese people. However, much of the information contained in the letter is inaccurate or out-of-date.

In mid-1979, the Indonesian Government granted permission for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) to begin a program of emergency food and medical assistance in East Timor. The relief effort was designed to address the deterioration in the nutritional and health situation that occurred as a result of civil war and the accompanying economic dislocations. The U.S. has contributed approximately \$14 million in cash and commodities to this program. The result of these efforts has been a significant improvement in the situation of the Timorese people. This improvement has been noted by journalists, diplomats, international humanitarian organizations, and U.S. officials who have visited the island. The famine conditions described in Mr. Spingarn's and Ms. Cates' letter no longer exist in East Timor. The Red Cross situation report of August 1980 states, "The action (East Timor relief) is going on in the best of conditions, cooperation between Indonesian Red Cross personnel and ICRC delegates being excellent...The population's general situation has improved substantially."

Improvements in the situation have also been reflected in the progressive opening of East Timor to foreign observers by the Indonesian Government. Among the visitors were foreign correspondents from the Sydney Morning Herald, the New York Times, and the Far Eastern Economic Review, as

The Honorable
Henry Jackson,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.

well as a French television team. All were free to write articles on the situation. In addition to foreign journalists, there have been numerous diplomatic visitors and several U.S. Congressmen. The ICRC stationed two resident personnel in Dili, the capital of East Timor, to administer the relief program. Thus, there has been a significant increase in the ability of the rest of the world to make an independent assessment of current developments in East Timor.

As a result of the success of the relief effort, the international agencies believe that the emphasis should begin to be shifted from emergency relief to development projects designed to meet the long-term needs of the Timorese people. In this second phase of humanitarian assistance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is currently funding a \$3.6 million malaria control project in Timor. USAID is also committed to providing \$1.5 million annually over the next three years to support a CRS administered development project currently under discussion with the Indonesian Government.

We have looked closely into the allegations of massive reductions in population in East Timor. Unfortunately, authoritative population figures are not available. The 1970 Portuguese census stated East Timor had a population of 609,000. Estimates of the 1975 population vary from 620,000 to 690,000 and are of questionable accuracy. The Indonesian Government estimates the current population as approximately 580,000, a figure substantially verified by the ICRC in conjunction with the establishment of the relief program. In addition, an undetermined number of East Timorese fled to West Timor during the fighting that occurred in 1975-76 or have subsequently immigrated to other countries. Undoubtedly a tragic loss of life occurred as a result of civil war, armed conflict between Timorese guerillas and Indonesian armed forces, and massive economic disruption caused by the fighting. There is no way of knowing the exact losses, but allegations that Indonesia has pursued a policy of genocide against the Timorese are not substantiated by the available evidence.

Regarding the use of U.S. supplied military equipment in East Timor, the United States conducted a review of our military assistance to Indonesia following the Indonesian intervention into East Timor in late 1975. During the review, no new Indonesian requests for military assistance

were processed. While the review was continuing, Congress authorized additional military assistance for Indonesia, rejecting an amendment that would have eliminated such assistance. A significant reduction in the hostilities in East Timor also occurred. Under these circumstances, it was deemed appropriate to resume security assistance to Indonesia in June 1976. Currently, the level of military activity there is minimal. The opposition Fretilin guerilla movement appears to number no more than a few hundred persons and poses no serious threat to government control. Material purchased by the Indonesians through our current security assistance program is primarily for air and sea defense and thus not appropriate for use in Timor.

The United States accepts the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. We believe that concentration on humanitarian issues offers the best chance of achieving real benefits for the Timorese people. We intend to continue this course of action.

I hope this information will be useful in answering the questions raised by Mr. Spingarn and Ms. Cate.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

Correspondence Returned

coupled with a sound monetary policy—I am confident that we can turn this Nation around and regain our competitive position in the world economy.

DRINKING AND DRIVING

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I should like to share with my colleagues an excellent editorial which appeared in the Boston Sunday Globe on April 26. This editorial, entitled "Drinking and Driving," is as fine a statement as I have seen on the need for strong deterrent legislation to combat drunken drivers. It drives home the point that the certainty of facing an embarrassing penalty—such as five weekends in jail, or an equivalent period of community service—is what is needed to reverse the total acceptance of drinking and driving which pervades our society today.

Last month, along with Senators GLENN, GOLDWATER, and HUDDLESTON, I introduced S. 671, a bill which would provide mandatory penalties for convicted drunken drivers. Persons convicted of this offense for the first time would face a minimum penalty of 10 days of community service, in addition to a restricted driving privilege and other sanctions which may be imposed under State law. I am pleased that the Globe has endorsed the concepts underlying my legislation, and I would like to commend this discussion of the problem to my colleagues.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Globe editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DRINKING AND DRIVING

Some announce themselves by the way they go for speed, rumbling and jockeying through a pack. Others have a telltale, lary drift . . . now in this lane . . . now in the other. Sometimes one will take the wrong ramp onto an expressway, and that's when the killing's nearly certain: screaming head-on pileups, north in the southbound lane. Other times, though, they do it solo—just to themselves—around a tree or a phone pole deep in the country. Drivers under-the-influence.

For random death and destruction nothing beats drunken driving, nothing even comes close. There were 206 murders in Massachusetts in 1979. In that same year there were 920 deaths on the highway, of which about three quarters—say 700—were the work of drunks. These are stupid deaths, cause for anger as much as grief among the survivors.

Drunken driving flourishes here because we tolerate it. In Norway and Sweden if a blood test indicates more than a trace of alcohol in the blood stream, the driver knows he's going to jail. The jail term for a first offender is not long, but it's as certain as the cold north wind. Fancy lawyers and fashionable addresses don't help, and as a result people pay attention to the law. Scandinavians drive and many drink, plenty, but they very rarely do both at the same time, instead, by habit and without apparent difficulty, most simply make other arrangements—car-pooling, a taxi or whatever—so that after serious drinking, there's no need to get behind the wheel.

In Massachusetts and most of the rest of the United States it's a different story. There are over 25,000 "driving under" arrests in the commonwealth each year. In theory, con-

viction under current Massachusetts law brings automatic revocation of a driver's license for at least a year, but since 1975 for virtually all first offenses—and frequently for subsequent offenses—most District Court judges have "continued without a finding," assigning (or reassigning) defendants to 10-week, one-evening-a-week "re-education" programs. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Richard E. McLaughlin dismisses these programs as a "standing joke." Even Dr. Edward Blacker, who heads the state division of alcohol and is a main defender of the programs, acknowledges that nearly half of those arrested are too deeply involved with alcohol to be reached with the resources at hand.

Fuzzy thinking abounds on drunken driving, among the public, among lawmakers and on the bench. One common line begins, "Let's face it, we all take a drink now and then." Yet, properly administered tests give an objective measurement of alcohol content in the bloodstream, and 0.1 percent, the widely accepted threshold for flunking such a test, is sufficiently high so that a 160-pound person has to put away five drinks in an hour to become legally under the influence. Moderate drinkers simply don't exceed the 0.1 percent threshold, nor is anything short of ostentatious drunkenness or involvement in a wreck likely to prompt a policeman to order an alcohol test. It takes certain effort to be charged with "driving under."

It's clear that many judges and lawmakers believe that because a drunken driver doesn't fit the stereotyped image of a "criminal," it's not appropriate to invoke serious penalties. Hence even drunks who have killed frequently get nominal, suspended sentences. The issue, though, should not be the suitability of the arbitrary label "criminal," but rather the capacity of the law to deter a specific life-threatening behavior that is common among otherwise solid citizens. As the Scandinavian experience shows, the certainty of facing an embarrassing penalty gives special pause to people who are not accustomed to severe treatment by the law.

Other than the isolated case of the East Norfolk District Court in Quincy, where judges, prosecutors and probation officers instituted a tough three-weekends-in-jail sentencing program a year ago (and have since seen it bog down because other officials and other courts have not cooperated), most public officials in Massachusetts have not shown that they're serious about drunken driving. If they ever do, a first step should be to study both the Quincy experience and the Pell-Barnes bill recently introduced in the U.S. Senate by Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.). Both approaches stress the use of the law as a deterrent, and both illustrate common-sense measures that are feasible and effective.

The key to rebuilding the deterrent potential of the law is to create certainty that even a first offense will bring down real and unpleasant sanctions. The punishment prescribed by law does not have to be severe for a first offender—indeed if it's too severe judges and prosecutors won't invoke it—but the sanction must sting and embarrass.

Strange as it may seem, yanking the driver's license as a first step is not necessarily the answer. This is a car-bound society in which many people are genuinely dependent on the automobile for their livelihood, or at least for the essentials of everyday life. If a guilty finding automatically triggers a lengthy loss of license which could cost a defendant his job, judges and juries will balk. This reality helps explain the current Massachusetts practice of "continuing without a finding" and prescribing slap-on-the-wrist "re-education."

But there are alternatives, and the Pell-Barnes bill suggests a good one. Pell proposes that in lieu of outright revocation, first offenders have licenses "restricted" to essen-

tial travel. Such restrictions could be made enforceable by the issuance of readily identifiable special marker plates. The public embarrassment of having to drive with such plates would be a powerful incentive not to run the risk of being caught.

Some argue that the whole question of license suspensions or restrictions should be left to separate administrative hearings at the Registry. If that were the case, sanctions freely invoked by judges should include (1) stiff fines—up to, say, the equivalent of a month's wages—and (2) brief jail terms—perhaps served on weekends between Friday nights and Monday mornings so as not to disrupt livelihoods. Causing a defendant to miss his standing golf or poker game because he's weekendending in the house of correction is just the kind of sanction judges need: light enough to be readily invoked, real enough to make an impression. And appropriate, because nice guy though he may otherwise be, a drunken driver is as much a public menace as a hophead with a sawed-off shotgun.

Whether or not Gov. King and the Legislature accept their responsibilities to deal more seriously with drunken driving, the 150 District Court judges, who heard 25,875 "driving under" complaints last year, have work of their own to do to catch up with their colleagues in Quincy. The courts need a record-keeping system that keeps track of defendants' prior offenses state-wide, so that revolving door "re-education" rulings are plainly visible. Moreover, in dialogue among themselves, judges must face up to the inevitable trade-off between leniency and inconsistency in sentencing, and the law's ability to deter.

If both bar and State House did what should be done on this issue, it's likely that hundreds of Massachusetts lives could be saved each year, and without any important loss of personal freedom. True, there would be an added reason for those of us who both drink and drive to arrange our lives—like the Scandinavians—so we didn't do both at the same time.

But, surely that would be a modest price to pay, considering the alternative.

SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, last October, nine of my colleagues joined me in expressing concern over the tragic situation in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. In a letter to then Secretary of State Munkie, we spoke of the need to maintain and expand an independent international presence in that territory, in light of continuing reports of armed conflict and the jailing of large numbers of political prisoners.

Our letter also emphasized the plight of families that have been separated by the conflict as well as those who wish to leave East Timor but have not been allowed to do so. Our concern over human rights conditions in East Timor was heightened by Amnesty International's 1980 testimony before Congress and the United Nations of this situation.

A December 9, 1981, article in the New York Times by Henry Kamm provided graphic confirmation of the need to maintain an independent presence on the island. I have continued to follow the situation closely, and read with great interest a February 15, 1981, article on this subject in the New York Times Magazine, also by Henry Kamm. In a letter to the editor in response to the article, I called for American diplomatic efforts to achieve a solution to the conflict.

Recently, I have received a copy of a letter sent by a Roman Catholic priest living in East Timor, detailing conditions on the island as of late last year. If anything, the letter underscores the need to maintain and expand an independent international presence in East Timor, to open the island to additional nongovernmental organizations and the news media, and to find diplomatic means to bring this tragedy to an end.

Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues I ask unanimous consent that the following excerpts from the priest's letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

(From a letter by a Roman Catholic priest)

The military struggle between the FRETELIN guerrillas and the Indonesia Army still continues in East Timor, but the presence of the International Committee of the Red Cross has apparently had a moderating influence on the level of violence: the Indonesian Air Force has stopped its policy of heavy bombardments of areas where FRETELIN is active.

From June 10, 1980 to the present, the prisons have been overflowing. The island of Atauro, in particular, has been turned into a penal colony for political prisoners. Almost all the teachers from Baucau-Patunaca have been imprisoned. Dozens of prisoners are reported to have disappeared.

Despite five years of Indonesian occupation, the Timorese people have not lost their determination to be a free people. Nevertheless, their material situation is little short of desperate. Hunger and disease continue to decimate the population. Several villages have been burned to the ground and their inhabitants sent to concentration camps.

In the resettlement camps people do not have the freedom to cultivate their crops or take care of their livestock. In these camps, the Indonesian military authorities sell food, clothing and medicines at high prices instead of freely distributing these supplies which had been donated to Indonesia for use in East Timor by the ICRC and Catholic Relief Service, CRS.

All public employees in East Timor have been forced to accept naturalization as Indonesian citizens. Those unwilling to do so have lost their jobs and cannot find new ones because the government has forbidden any employer to hire them. Since emigration from East Timor is forbidden by the Indonesian authorities, these people will pay dearly for their acts of defiance. The vast majority have accepted naturalization as Indonesian citizens, but only because they were forced to accept it.

Traveling in the interior of East Timor is strictly controlled by the Indonesian military. Prohibitive tolls are levied on all travelers—rich and poor alike. Because of corruption and exploitation, life in Timor is very expensive. Only the rich can emigrate, due to the large bribes that are demanded by the Indonesian authorities.

Freedom of speech and association do not exist in East Timor. All mail is censored. The torture in the prisons is indescribable, especially for women and children. The confiscation of property belonging to prisoners is commonplace.

The Indonesians appear determined to destroy the educated class in East Timor. Almost all the educated Timorese have been killed or are in constant danger. All high schools are closed. After five years of Indonesian occupation, the highest level of education does not surpass the primary school

level. Students are allowed to study abroad, but there are no scholarships available to them.

NATIONAL DRAFTING WEEK

Mr. FELL. Mr. President, the week of April 27 through May 1 has been designated as National Drafting Week by the American Institute for Design and Drafting. This is the ninth year that a week has been set aside so that we may honor the over 360,000 designers and draftsmen in America.

Within 40 years, the equivalent of another America will be built in this country, but before a single building can be built, there must be precise, accurate plans and drawings. Builders need highly skilled drafters before they can turn dreams into solid reality.

This week, we honor the men and women who enable the lines, arrows, and circles on paper to be transformed into new homes for our citizens, new schools for our children, and new commercial structures to help us sustain economic growth. The foundation for the highly skilled and important field of drafting is the quality of education provided by the various professional institutes in this area. In Rhode Island, we are fortunate to have one of the Nation's foremost drafting schools, the Hall Institute of Pawtucket, R.I. The Hall Institute has given hundreds of New Englanders the opportunity to discover their capabilities in drafting, and assume positions in a challenging and important field.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to commend the dedicated professionals in the drafting field, as well as their mentors at places like the Hall Institute.

COASTAL BARRIERS RESOURCES ACT

Mr. CHAPPEE. Mr. President, yesterday I introduced S. 1018, the Coastal Barriers Resources Act, which serves to protect and conserve fish and wildlife resources.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of this legislation be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the text was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 1018

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Coastal Barriers Resources Act."

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—
(1) habitats which are essential spawning, nursery, nesting, and feeding areas for migratory birds, aquatic organisms, and other wildlife are provided within the coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States and the adjacent wetlands, marshes, estuaries, inlets and nearshore waters;

(2) these fish and wildlife resources and their habitats are being irretrievably damaged and lost due to development on, among, and adjacent to, such coastal barriers;

(3) certain actions and programs of the Federal Government have subsidized and encouraged such development; and

(4) a program of coordinated action by Federal, State, and local governments is critical to the more appropriate use and conservation of fish and wildlife resources and habitats within the coastal barriers.

(b) PURPOSE.—The Congress declares that it is the purpose of this Act to minimize the damage to fish, wildlife and other natural resources associated with the coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts by restricting future Federal expenditures and financial assistance which have the effect of encouraging development of coastal barriers, by establishing a Coastal Barrier Resources System, and by considering the means and measures by which the long-term conservation of these fish, wildlife and other natural resources may be achieved.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this Act—

(1) The term "coastal barrier" means—

(A) a depositional geologic feature (such as a bay barrier, tombolo, barrier spit, or barrier island) that—

(i) consists of unconsolidated sedimentary materials,

(ii) is subject to wave, tidal, and wind energies, and

(iii) protects landward aquatic habitats from direct wave attack; and

(B) all associated aquatic habitats, including the adjacent wetlands, marshes, estuaries, inlets, and nearshore waters.

(2) The term "Committee" refers to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Environment and Public Works of the Senate.

(3) The term "financial assistance" means any form of loan, grant, guaranty, insurance, payment, rebate, subsidy, or any other form of direct or indirect Federal assistance other than deposit or account insurance for customers of banks savings and loan associations, credit unions, or similar institutions.

(4) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior.

(5) The term "System unit" means any coastal barrier, or combination of closely-related coastal barriers, included within the Coastal Barrier Resources System established by section 4 of this Act.

SEC. 4. THE COASTAL BARRIERS RESOURCES SYSTEM.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—(1) There is established the Coastal Barriers Resources System which shall consist of those undeveloped coastal barrier located on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States that are identified and generally depicted on the maps that are entitled "Coastal Barriers Resources System", consecutively numbered 001 and through 128, and dated _____.

(2) A coastal barrier was treated as an undeveloped coastal barrier for purposes of paragraph (1) only if there were few man-made structures on the barrier and these structures, and man's activities on the barrier, did not significantly impede geomorphic and ecological processes.

(3) A coastal barrier which was included within the boundaries of an area established under Federal, State, or local law or held by a qualified organization (as defined in paragraph (3) of section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), primarily for wildlife refuge, sanctuary, or natural resource conservation purposes was not included within the Coastal Barriers Resources System.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF MAPS.—(1) The maps referred to in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall be available for public inspection at the offices of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in the District of Columbia and in other appropriate offices of the Service.

Korinna Horta
Travessa das Isabéis 9-39
1200 Lisboa
Portugal


Lisbon, May 10, 1985

Mr. Tom Johnston
C.C.O.D.P.
3028 Danfordth Ave.
Toronto, Ontario M4C1N2
Canada

Dear Mr. Johnston,

Arnold Kohen of the East Timor Research Project asked me to send you the enclosed translation of this new report from the Church in East Timor as well as a letter of Mgr. Lopes to President Reagan on the occasion of his visit to Portugal.

Kind regards

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Korinna Horta', written in a cursive style.

Korinna Horta
Travessa das Isabéis 9-39
1200 Lisbon, Portugal

Lisbon, May 10, 1985

Ms. Maryann Cadojan
TROCEIRE
169 Booterstown Ave.
County Dublin
Ireland

Dear Ms. Cadojan,

Arnold Kohen of the East Timor Research Project asked me to send you the enclosed translation of this new report from the Church in East Timor as well as a letter of Mgr. Lopes to President Reagan on the occasion of his Portugal visit.

Kind regards

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John H. Horta". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "John" and last name "Horta" clearly distinguishable.

- Q. Can you make some comment on how you see the future and on the future role of the East Timorese Church?
- A. As we have already emphasized, the Catholic Church will be in the near future the spiritual and material help of value in East Timor.
- Q. What types of action in solidarity with the people of East Timor by Church/development agencies and organisations would you like to see?
- A. We would like the solidarity.

JUNE 1982

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 8, 1981

St. Louis Clergy & Laity Concerned
3753 West Pine Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63108

Dear Members of St. Louis Clergy & Laity Concerned:

I wish to reply to your letter of April 30 concerning U.S. policy towards East Timor.

The United States accepts the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. We believe that concentration on humanitarian issues offer the best chance of achieving real benefits for the Timorese people. From the material enclosed with your letter, it is clear that you have only received information which is critical of U.S. policy with regard to the East Timor. This is a complex issue and I would like to take this opportunity to bring to your attention some additional facts.

Let me begin by reviewing the historical record. Discussions between the Portuguese government and the three principal Timorese political factions concerning the future political status of East Timor begin in 1974. The three factions disagreed as to the best future course for Timor. Fretilin advocated full independence, while another group, Apodeti, advocated union with Indonesia. As discussions with Portugal continued, the third group, the Union of Democratic Timor (UDT), seized control of the Timorese capital city of Dili on August 11, 1975, claiming that Fretilin was preparing to unilaterally carry out an armed coup against the Portuguese. The Portuguese authorities subsequently withdrew from Timor as fighting between Fretilin and the other factions escalated into civil war. By late November, Fretilin had gained control of most of East Timor and proclaimed the island's independence. Neither Portugal nor the majority of the rest of the world recognized this declaration of independence.

Indonesia, on the basis that it was responding to an appeal by non-Fretilin political elements and that the unsettled political situation posed a security threat to neighboring Indonesian provinces, sent troops into East Timor in December. The Provisional Government of East Timor was established and in June 1976 an Indonesian-appointed Timorese Assembly voted

to integrate East Timor into Indonesia. Since that time, Indonesia has governed East Timor as its twenty-seventh province and considers the question of the political status of the island to be resolved.

In mid-1979, the Indonesian Government granted permission for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) to begin a program of emergency food and medical assistance in East Timor to address the deterioration in the nutritional and health situation that occurred as a result of civil war and the accompanying economic dislocation. The U.S. has contributed approximately \$14 million in cash and commodities to this relief effort. The result of these programs has been a significant improvement in the welfare of the Timorese people. As a result of this improvement, the international agencies believe that the emphasis should be shifted from emergency relief to development projects designed to meet the long-term needs of the Timorese people. In this second phase of humanitarian assistance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is currently funding a \$3.6 million malaria control project in Timor. USAID is also committed to providing \$1.5 million annually over the next three years to support a CRS administered development project currently under discussion with the Indonesian Government. The U.S. government has contributed to a special appeal by the International Red Cross which has already begun to expand its operation into areas of traditional humanitarian concern, such as a tracing operation for missing persons in East Timor.

The allegations of significant misuse of relief funds provided to benefit the Timorese people are, we believe, greatly exaggerated. Both the ICRC and the CRS have stated that their total loss rate from theft, destruction, mis-handling, and other losses is less than fifteen percent, which is considered very good for a complex operation in a remote area of the world. Officials from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta have also investigated these allegations and confirm the ICRC and CRS reports. The best evidence that there has not been a significant misuse of relief aid is the dramatic improvement in the condition of the Timorese people that occurred since the relief programs began. This improvement in food and health conditions has been noted by journalists, diplomats and U.S. officials who have visited the

island. Such an improvement could not have occurred had there been substantial abuses in the administration of the program.

Improvements in the situation have also been reflected in the progressive opening of East Timor to foreign observers by the Indonesian Government. Among the visitors were foreign correspondents from the Sydney Morning Herald, New York Times, and the Far Eastern Economic Review, as well as a French television team. All were free to write articles on the situation, including criticism of the Indonesian Government. In addition to foreign journalists, there have been numerous diplomatic visitors and several U.S. Congressmen. The ICRC stationed two resident personnel in Dili, the capital of East Timor, to administer the relief program. Thus, there has been a significant increase in the ability of the rest of the world to make an independent assessment of current developments in East Timor.

We have also looked closely into the allegations of massive reductions in population in East Timor. Unfortunately, authoritative population figures are not available. The 1970 Portuguese census stated East Timor had a population of 609,000. Estimates of the 1975 population vary from 620,00 to 690,000 and are of questionable accuracy. The Indonesian Government counted the current population as approximately 560,000. The ICRC survey conducted in conjunction with the establishment of the relief programs roughly confirms Indonesian population statistics. In addition, an undetermined number of East Timorese fled to West Timor during the fighting that occurred in 1975-76 or have subsequently immigrated to other countries. Undoubtedly a tragic loss of life occurred as a result of civil war, armed conflict between Timorese guerillas and Indonesian armed forces, and massive economic disruption caused by the fighting. There is no way of knowing the exact losses, but allegations that Indonesia has pursued a policy of genocide against the Timorese people are not substantiated by the available evidence.


Regarding the use of U.S. supplied military equipment in East Timor, the United States conducted a review of our military assistance to Indonesia following the Indonesian intervention into East Timor in late 1975. During the review no new Indonesian requests for military assistance were processed. While the review was continuing, Congress authorized additional military assistance for Indonesia, rejecting an amendment that would have eliminated such

assistance. A significant reduction in the hostilities in East Timor also occurred. Under these circumstances, it was deemed appropriate to resume security assistance to Indonesia in June 1976.

Currently, the level of military activity is minimal. The opposition Fretilin guerilla movement appears to number no more than a few hundred persons and poses no serious threat to Indonesian control of East Timor. Material purchased by the Indonesians through our current security assistance program is primarily for air and sea defense and thus not appropriate for use in Timor.

I hope the above information has been useful to you in understanding the situation in East Timor.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Frederick Z. Brown", written over the typed name.

Frederick Z. Brown
Director of the Office of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma
and Singapore Affairs

Sept 8, 1981

Action for World
Development

Melbourne

Dear Friends,

Herewith, I am mailing to you a memorandum about the latest developments in East Timor. The news is very saddening. Our endeavours to promote socio-economic activities have come to a dead end. Ten thousands of men are going through new hardships. Another famine and starvation is most likely forthcoming in the foreseeable future.

A number of agencies that received our information sheets in the past months have offered assistance, when it was needed.

I think the time has come to appeal to you for further help for our East Timor Emergency and Rehabilitation Program.


Yours sincerely,

EAST TIMOR

1. In accordance with an instruction of the Military Commander (General Radjaguguk) all over East Timor practically all men between 15 - 5- years have to join the army in its effort to chase the Fretelin (and the families with them) hiding in the mountains and the forest more particularly in the surroundings of Mt. Matabian. The operation, called "Operasi Keamanan" (Operation Security), is carried out with the intention to wipe out all Fretelin by dislodging them from their hiding places and forcing them to keep moving from one place to another. The objective of the operation is to push the Fretelin from the eastern and western districts to the district of Manatuto in the middle of East Timor, where they will be rounded up by the army. The tactics of the operation are derived from the traditional volunteer service for combatting banditry in a village. It is called "pagar betis", fence of skin bones or fence of legs. The military mixed with the local people form a closed front and constantly move forward and making their presence known by shouting. Some Fretelin have been arrested, some sneaked through the fence of legs. Some Fretelin and some Indonesian military were killed. The action is supposed to be completed at the middle of September. Success or failure will be decisive for the position and career of the Commander.
2. The central army command have shipped supplies for the people participating in the action. But many cases, depending on the local commander, the supplies are manipulated, so that the men in action must be supplied by the women in the villages. If they are too far away from their villages (sometimes one hundred kilometers) they eat everything they can get in the woods or in the gardens of the villages they pass through. Many of these men get sick and some die from malnutrition and hunger. The sick are permitted to go back to their villages. More than often they have to seek for replacements. People are scared to death. They keep silent, but they increasingly dislike and hate their lot.
3. As the raining season is starting in October/November, September-October is the time to prepare (dig up) the land for the planting of corn. However, the villages are deprived of their normal labour force, the men. If they come back in the middle of September many of them will be too weak to work.

This will be very detrimental as it may bring about another famine towards the end of this year or the beginning of next year. Since the International Commission of the Red Cross and CRS have closed down their food/medecine programmes, the Apostolic Administrator and a number of priests have appealed to LFPS to raise funds for a subsequent emergency programme. LFPS is now gathering more detailed information in order to come to a decision about future action. Naturally, we would prefer to ship agricultural tools and seedlings, but we doubt whether that will be of any help in the current situation.

Note : All the relatives of the Fretelin are presently rounded up by the military. By trucks and by boats they are transported to Atauro and two other small islands



Trkané, Aug. 20, 1981

Following my letter dated July 25 you may find enclosed a copy DGI latest report on the service program in East Timor.

I just want to add that 2 weeks ago the chairperson of Karya Kasih (Dili) visited me at DGI and we discussed about the situation and conditions in T2. Actually, is not favorable yet for the church service and rehabilitation program. You know that CRS and IERC have pulled out from T2, while Karya Kasih is ~~not~~ not in the position yet to take over rehabilitation and emergencies work in the area.

The East part of T2 is still dangerous. Even around Dili the situation is not as peaceful as it seems to be. According to reliable resources some people (9 women and 13 men) escaped recently from Dili taking with them weapons. And some illegal amunitions were also found in the city.

Due to security reasons Karya Kasih operates only in Dili and suburb areas. A workshop has been established in Baucau, but it is hard to gather people for development efforts.

I hope I will shortly get some news from you about self-reliance projects for the ETs. When will you visit Indonesia again?

Warm regards.

Yours sincerely,

PRESIDENT SUHARTO ASKS HIERARCHY TO JOIN DILI DIOCESE TO INDON BISHOPS' CONFERENCE

JAKARTA (UCAN) - President Suharto has asked the Catholic hierarchy here to follow the government's lead of incorporating East Timor as part of the country and join the Diocese of Dili to the Indonesian Catholic Church.

Mr. Suharto made his request when he met the former Archbishop of Semarang, Cardinal Justinus Darmojuwono, on August 20. The cardinal, who retired as Archbishop on July 3 and who was head of the Indonesian Catholic Bishops' Conference, attended the meeting with the current secretary general of the conference, Archbishop Leo Soekoto of Jakarta.

However, in a press conference after the meeting, Archbishop Soekoto said that it was for the Pope rather than the Indonesian Church to decide the status of the Dili diocese. One Church source indicated the diocese is independent of any episcopal conference, and that, with an apostolic administrator in charge, it presently is attached directly to the Holy See.

The President also asked the Church leaders how the process of Indonesian naturalization was progressing among priests in East Timor. Archbishop Soekoto reported that, although naturalization of foreign clergy was a policy of the Indonesian Church, the process had not gone very smoothly in the former Portuguese colony.

Observers saw in Mr. Suharto's concern over the territory a polite request that the Indonesian hierarchy follow the political annexation of East Timor with the Church's parallel incorporation of its only Catholic diocese.

Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975 and formally annexed East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. The United Nation's General Assembly has several times rejected Indonesia's claim over the territory, most recently last November.

Archbishop Soekoto told the press conference that some Indonesian priests privately visit East Timor and that a dozen seminarians from the territory are studying philosophy and theology in several Indonesian seminaries.

The Archbishop also reported a suggestion from the president that Indonesia's Church turn to the Dharmais Foundation for funds for East Timor orphans. President Suharto is chairman of the foundation.

Scared to go home

Red tape strands Timorese children

ABOUT 20 Timorese children have been stranded in the slums of Jakarta for almost a year in the tangle of Australian Government red-tape and the repercussions of their country's invasion by Indonesia.

The children were sent out of East Timor by their parents in the middle of last year in the hope of joining relatives in Australia who had fled the country during hostilities early in 1975.

However, Australian immigration officials will not allow the children to come to Australia because it would separate them from their parents.

The officials assert that the policy under which the children want to come to Australia only related to people who were disrupted by the civil war early in 1975 and not those who wanted to get away from the later Indonesian invasion.

One official said there was nothing to stop the children — mainly ethnic Chinese — from returning to their parents in East Timor. They were not regarded as refugees.

An international welfare worker, Mr Pat Walsh, who visited the children in Jakarta two months ago, said they were frightened to go back.

One of the children had told him: "We have escaped from the jaws of the tiger

By PAUL MURRAY

and we don't want to return".

Mr Walsh said the children were anxious about their future. None were going to school and the adults who were looking after them did not have jobs.

They were living in overcrowded, unhygienic rooming houses in Jakarta's slum areas and were being supported by small amounts of money coming from their parents and relatives in Australia.

The Indonesian Government's refusal to allow international observers into East Timor since the invasion in December, 1975, has not allowed any examination of the relationships between the new Government and the residents.

However, the world-wide human rights group, Amnesty International, believes there is still resistance from the Timorese and that eight Indonesian battalions are involved in "clean-up" operations in the east of the island.

Amnesty International's 1980 report expressed concern about what it called reliable reports of severe violations of human rights in East Timor, including executions and imprisonment without

*The Western Mail (Perth)
Sept 5, 1981*

The Immigration Department's ruling on the Jakarta children is in apparent conflict with the handling of some children who were evacuated to Portugal, leaving their parents in East Timor.

Some of the children with relatives in Australia have been allowed to migrate.

Mr Walsh, works for the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, a Canberra-based secretariat which co-ordinates about 40 Australian church and private aid organisations.

Under the Government's special humanitarian programme, East Timorese who were outside the country before September 30, 1980, and had relatives in Australia could become migrants.

CONTINUED PAGE 24

Invasion probe likely this year

THE Senate seems certain to undertake an inquiry later this year into the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975.

The Australian Democrats believe they have sufficient support to force a Senate investigation of Australia's stance on East Timor.

International aid agencies have begun lobbying senators to get backing for the inquiry.

The investigation has the potential to embarrass both the Government and the ALP. The Whitlam and Fraser governments both followed policies of not ruffling the Indonesian Government in the period leading up to and after the invasion in December, 1975.

The deputy leader of the Democrats, Senator Colin Mason, yesterday described East Timor as a dark blot on Australia's national conscience.

He said he intended to move for the inquiry later in this session.

Senator Mason said he had continuing contact with nine US senators who were also pushing for an examination of the invasion.

Even if there was no chance of gaining self-determination for the Timorese, it was necessary to draw attention to the fact that they were being treated as enemies in their own country by the Indonesians, he said.

Children stranded

FROM PAGE 3

Mr Walsh said that when the Government announced the programme in October last year it said the guidelines would be interpreted broadly. Since then strict controls had been imposed.

The aid agencies rejected the Government's reasons for not allowing the children to migrate because it was clear that their parents did not object to some short-term separation.

The head of the Immigration Department's special programmes and refugees section, Mr R. Ratnam, said it was against Government policy to accept children as migrants when their

parents were living elsewhere.

There was some evidence that children were used in an attempt to get a whole family into Australia. There had been reports of falsified travel documents purporting to show that people had left Timor before September 30, 1980.

The East Timorese did not fall into the UN description of refugees. They were evacuees.

The special humanitarian programme had already received 2000 applications and 1200 migrants had been approved.

East Timor

(Question No. 2387)

Dr Everingham asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon notice, on 3 June 1981:

(1) Did Australian observers attend exercises by 10,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor in March 1981.

(2) Is he able to say whether (a) 18,000 troops are engaged in a clean-up/offensive to wipe out Fretilin dissenters, (b) 5000 political prisoners are confined to Atauro Island and (c) army atrocities are continuing in East Timor.

(3) Does Australia support the Portuguese proposal for a United Nations Commission to negotiate a peaceful settlement in East Timor despite Indonesia's opposition; if not, why not.

Mr Street—The answer to the honourable member's question is as follows:

(1) The Australian Defence Attache, together with a number of military attaches from other countries resident in

Jakarta, observed a recent major Indonesian joint exercise which involved the development of some 35,000 men together with naval ships and aircraft, in eastern Indonesia. The exercise was held from 18 March to 1 April 1981 in three separate exercise locations: Timor, Maluku and Irian Jaya.

(2) (a) Fretilin guerrilla remnants are reported to be still actively hostile towards the authorities in the Indonesian Province of East Timor. It is for the Indonesian Government to decide how to deal with this threat to security there.

(b) The Government is aware of press reports that 5,000 prisoners are being held on Atauro Island but has no information to substantiate this allegation.

(c) The Government is aware of recent reports of Indonesian army atrocities in East Timor, but has no evidence to substantiate them. The Australian Government's position on violations of internationally-accepted standards of human rights is of course well known. The Indonesian Government is aware of Australia's views.

(3) The Government is closely watching developments relating to the Portuguese proposal. The proposal is however in the early stages of its development. In considering its approach, the Government will need to take account of the attitudes of both the Indonesian and Portuguese Governments.



ACTION FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT

SPONSORED BY THE AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA

1st Floor,
183 Gertrude Street,
FITZROY,
Victoria, 3065.
Phone: 419.5588

September 23, 1981

Dear *Arnold,*

URGENT MEMORANDUM ON THE SITUATION INSIDE EAST TIMOR

The enclosed material is the most recent information to hand on the situation in East Timor. Church authorities there are predicting a new famine as a result of the current military offensive.

Five items are enclosed:

- i. A Church memorandum written in September with covering letter and map. The map shows the pincer movement being executed from the east and west to drive Fretilin like cattle onto the open plains around Manatuto on the north coast. (I assume the words "15 - 5- years" are meant to read "15 - 50 years").
- ii. An August letter from an Indonesian Protestant source which broadly confirms the memorandum above, adding a detail about resistance.
- iii. A report from the Christian Conference of Asia (Protestant) News detailing recent moves by the Indonesian Government to pull the East Timor Catholic Church into line.
- iv. A recent press report in Australia telling of teenage Timorese children in Jakarta being denied admission to Australia by the Australian Government.
- v. The Australian Foreign Minister's reply to a question on Timor showing Australia's passive acceptance of Indonesian repression in Timor.
- vi. A poster advertising a large public function to be held in Melbourne during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

Of these, item one (the Church memorandum) is the most important. You will agree, I am sure, it is both stark and depressing and must be publicised wherever possible, in the hope that Indonesia may respond to public opinion.

I am sending it in its original form but, to protect its author, I have removed the address and signature. I would suggest that when publicising its contents you attribute it to "Church sources in East Timor", from whom in fact the original news derives. Paradoxically, the Church in Timor is perhaps less vulnerable because of its influence there. You will appreciate, I am sure, the need for these precautions in dealing with these sensitive matters.

Some additional points

1. The mass conscription of Timorese civilians has been independently confirmed in letters from East Timor and by refugees in Jakarta. One family of ten, whose case I am presently dealing with, fled to Jakarta from Dili because they were afraid their children might be picked up from the street in Dili by the Indonesian military and taken to the bush to carry ammunition and work for the army. They feared the children would get caught up in the fighting and be killed. These auxiliaries are called Pasukan Bantuan Operasi by the Indonesian military.

2. The human rabbit drive referred to in the memorandum has been underway for several months. It began in March this year when, under the guise of widely-publicised military 'exercises', 8000 fresh Indonesian troops were injected into the Timor campaign. Obviously the resistance is still a formidable obstacle to Indonesian hegemony.
3. It should be noted that Australia has increased its military aid to Indonesia during the years Indonesia has conducted its war of annexation in Timor. The 1981-82 budget allocated military aid worth c. \$11 million to Jakarta. While there is virtually no evidence this aid has been used directly in Timor, there can be no doubt it has increased Jakarta's ability to wage war.
4. Timorese refugees in Australia from the Matabian region say that natural foods are plentiful in the area and that the terrain lends itself easily to hiding and ambushes. However, they are inclined to think that the close involvement in the campaign of Timorese who know the area well would favour the Indonesian military. The Manatuto district is particularly dry and difficult at this time of the year. If Operasi Keamanan is successful and people, as the memorandum says, are 'rounded up' in this district, the Melbourne refugees would fear for their well-being should they be detained there in camps for any prolonged period.
5. There have been many independent confirmations of large-scale arrests and imprisonment in Timor. Indeed, this form of repression is a central feature of life there. Church sources have reported several times this year the existence of at least 8 prisons. These are: the off-shore islands of Atauro, Alor, Lisar and Jaco; and in East Timor itself, a prison at Comarca in Dili, another at Liquica, and a strong suspicion of two others in the interior. Numbers are difficult to estimate as the prisons are off-limits and prisoners are moved around. Church sources, however, believe many hundreds are involved. Many of these have been detained during the course of this year, and a significant proportion of these have been teachers and civil servants, arrested to pre-empt possible rebellion. In a recent communication, the US State Department implicitly acknowledged the existence of prisons when it reported on-going efforts by International Red Cross to obtain permission to visit prisons in East Timor.
6. According to the memorandum, Church authorities in Timor believe the current offensive will result in another famine. It should be remembered that East Timor has barely emerged from the 1978-80 famine which the International Red Cross described as being as "bad as Biafra and potentially as serious as Kampuchea". ICRC only wound down its massive feeding program in April, roughly the time Operation Security began. It is fair to predict then that any major interference in this fragile situation would have disastrous consequences. The Church is asking: who will feed the people now that the International Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Services' food and medical programs have ended?
7. The DGI (Indonesian Council of Protestant Churches) program in East Timor has been at a virtual standstill for the last 12 months; one, because the DGI does not have any infrastructure in East Timor comparable to that of the Catholic Church; two, because of the security situation outside Dili; and three, because the international Protestant community has refused to supply the finance requested by the DGI - it is widely felt the DGI has been too supportive of the military's role in East Timor.
8. It is of some concern that the Indonesian Bishops Conference, under pressure from President Suharto, may well advise the Vatican that it should declare the East Timor diocese part of the Indonesian Church, that is, effectively recognise integration. At present the Dili diocese is directly

responsible to the Vatican. Vatican authorities informed me in Rome last year that the Vatican does not recognise integration, regards East Timor as an occupied country and will not recognise it as part of Indonesia until the people and/or the UN indicate that is their wish. The head of the Dili diocese, Mgr da Costa Lopes, is a nationalist. He has called for a UN supervised act of self-determination. He has friendly, though limited, contacts with the Indonesian church but is refusing to integrate the East Timor church saying that would not be acceptable to the people. Many of the clergy support him in that. Were he to change his attitude (and the Indonesian military are constantly manipulating to that end) this would be a significant victory for Indonesia as over half the population of East Timor are now believed to be Catholic.

9. The enclosures make no mention of the refugee/family reunion problem. This is still far from resolved.

The Australian Government has two programs:

i. Of the 600 immediate family approved for reunion in 1978 by Australia and Indonesia, 350 have come. 250 are still waiting in East Timor, the official program notwithstanding. It is now six years since the separations occurred.

ii. Processing of applications under the Special Humanitarian Program established by the Australian Government in October 1980 are well advanced. Two problems, however, affect this program. One, people in Jakarta are being obstructed from leaving Indonesia by the military authorities who are extremely slow to issue exit permits; and two, the Australian Government has gone back on its original commitment to interpret the program liberally and some families and isolated children in Jakarta are being denied admission to Australia.

Large bribes continue to be taken from those eligible under both programs. It is conservatively estimated that a select group of Indonesian military have so far profited to the tune of \$2 million from this racket.

RAFT (the Campaign to Reunite in Australia the Families of Timor) and ACFOA (the Australian Council for Overseas Aid) have petitioned the Australian Government

1. to send an Australian Immigration team to Dili (the main problems lie in Timor; at the moment the Australian Government can/will do nothing until refugees present themselves at the Embassy in Jakarta);
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10. It should be noted that East Timor is still totally off-limits. If everything is OK there, why are international visitors kept out?
11. The UN will again discuss the question of East Timor during October and November this year.
12. The East Timor Solidarity Night (refer poster) which will be held in Melbourne on October 4, is being directed at CHOGM, well over half of whose members support the UN resolution on East Timor. It is also hoped it will demonstrate to the Australian Government that Timor has not been forgotten in Australia and that strong, new initiatives are required.

Yours sincerely,

Pat Walsh

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(Secretary, ACFOA East Timor Sub-Committee)



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September 23, 1981

Dear Gill,

*Can you do something with this?
Hope you are well. I'll be home in a while. I've sent you a letter. Wash. Hope you are well & this finds you OK. Pat.*

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Five items are enclosed:

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Yours sincerely,

1 KIV 1112
Notes taken during an interview with a Cape-Verdian family on March 24th and 25th, 1982.

This family, consisting of father, mother and 2 little sons, managed to leave East Timor in February 1982. They were part of a group of 14 Cape-Verdians who were allowed to emigrate to Cape-Verde (due to negotiations between the Government of Cape-Verde with the ICRC - as the head of the family put it). None of the 14 people was supposed to have an individual passport, the Indonesians had passed a travel document for all of them and all of them were supposed to go directly to Cape-Verde and to stay there. The family was holding Portuguese passports secretly, they had never thought of living in Cape-Verde and their plan from the beginning was to arrive in Cape-Verde and immediately take the next plane to Lisbon. They feel as being Portuguese citizens - even though they had never been to Portugal before.

Both, husband and wife, had been functionaries of the Portuguese colonial administration and were forced to quit their jobs after the Indonesian invasion because they refused to adopt Indonesian citizenship. They had managed to survive by running a small business by themselves. For them the Portuguese colonial rule had meant respect, justice and reason and the Indonesian occupation has meant exactly the contrary of this, i.e. a total lack of respect for the Timorese population, a regime of constant fear and atrocities. Since the invasion in 1975 the family never managed to leave the capital of Dili. They say that their decision not to flee to the mountains - as a large part of their family and friends did - was right, because in the mountains everyone was starving, if not dead already. To stay in Dili had taken all their courage - but they said that they had been prepared to die if it were necessary.

A., the father of the family, said:

There are about 4.000 people in Dili - former Portuguese functionaries and their families - living in identical conditions as his own family. They have no rights at all and hardly manage to subsist - growing their own food and sometimes running a small business as for example driving a taxi (which is considered to be a very dangerous job, because if caught in an accident, the Indonesian soldiers are 'allowed' to do with you whatever they want). Many of the 4.000 people managed to receive Portuguese passports

D. Martinho also denounced that the Timorese People never had received any of the foreign aid - medicaments, clothes, etc. everything being stored in Dili but not being distributed to the people who so badly need it.

D. Martinho was after this procession interrogated by the Indonesian Secret Police. He was asked why he told lies in public.

D. Martinho - as the people in Dili say - replied that he was not afraid of dying.

A. estimates that about 10.000 people are now 'living' on the Island of Ataúro. They are mainly people from the districts of Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque and Lospallos - who are accused of continuing to have family ties with people in the mountains. There are no structures for them on Ataúro - the only aid they get is given by Father Monteiro - who visits them once a week (by boat or by helicopter) in order to hold a church service.

At the beginning of this year, Mrs. Suharto visited East-Timor in order to inaugurate a womens' organization (for the wives of the soldiers and the public functionaries). She only stayed in Timor - this is in Dili - for two hours, but a heavy military plane (Hermes) had flown in for the occasion her bullet proof car. Besides the car - for the 2 hours visit - she had also brought with her her private cook and an astonishing security system had been mounted for this short visit.

Informations on recent executions (V.G. lamented that he himself had only very view informations to give, due to the fact that it was terribly dangerous to talk about the events even with his own neighbours).

However V.G. had a couple of concrete facts to tell:

MARIA GORETTI JOAQUIM (a 17 year old girl from Dili was taken by Indonesian soldiers in a helicopter and then thrown down to earth, she was accused of possessing a list of persons who were contributing with money - for buying medicine for the people in the mountains - all the people mentioned on this list were imprisoned) This happened at the beginning of 1980.

Also at the beginning of 1980 3 members of the well-known music group "OS CINCO DO ORIENTE" were shot, they were

Filomeno Alves
Onório Pereira
Manuel Exposto.

People who were executed immediately after having surrendered to the Indonesians:

Lito Gusmão Guterres (surrendered in Viqueque at the beginning of 1980
Moises da Costa Sarmento (brother-in-law of Nicolau Lobato) and his wife Mariazinha Lobato, a teacher; they both surrendered in Venilale and were immediately shot.

Notes taken during the interview with VICENTE GUTERRES
on Sept. 5th, 1981

At the time of the Indonesian invasion V.G. was a sergeant stationed at the enclave of Oe-cussi. His military unit did not use any flag (nor Portuguese, nor Indonesian). The unit was divided into two groups, one with 32 soldiers, the other one with 80 soldiers. 2 soldiers of the first group and 8 of the second group succeeded in fleeing to the mountain areas. Both groups refused to enter the Indonesian army, because they did not want to fight against their country-men in the interior of East Timor. Both groups were first sent to the prison-camp on the island of Lombok and afterwards they were brought back to Dili and imprisoned in a former Portuguese military quarter due to the fact that the prison of the COMARCA (which is only for militaries) was more than full up. They remained in prison until November 1976 (now V.G. is only referring to the group of the 32 of which he made part). Only 5 of them continued in prison until the date of V.G.'s departure from East Timor (April 26th, 1981), these 5 are:

- 1) Venceslau de Carvalho (sergeant)
- 2) José Agapito (soldier and a baker before he
had to join the Portuguese army)

These two were accused to have plans to flee to the mountains.

- 3) Vicente (soldier , formerly shop-assistant)
- 4) Espírito Santo (soldier)
- 5) José Conceição (soldier)

They were accused of having weapons.

Analysing of what happened to the group of the 32 we see that:

- | | |
|----|---|
| 2 | managed to flee to the mountains |
| 5 | continue in prison |
| 15 | joined the Indonesian army |
| 10 | refused to do so and left prison but
were obliged to make a daily check-in
(after a couple of months a weekly
check-in at the Indonesian General
Head-Quarters in Dili - among them V.G.) |

V.G. mentioned that the best known prison-islands are now besides Atauro (only for civilians) the islands of

Jaco
Flores
Sumba
Sumbawa
Roti.

The FRETILIN-attack on June 10th, 1980 was not only on the capital-city of Dili, at more or less the same time there were attacks on the towns of Līquica, Lospallos and Same. Due to communication problems among the FRETILIN forces the attacks were not perfectly coordinated.

All of the Timorese soldiers who had joined the Indonesian army (of the 32 group) were implicated in these attacks and sent to prison-camps or executed.

V.G. remembers namely :

Sergeant Freitas (who was caught in Līquica)
and Lino Batista (caught in Lospallos)

V.G. thinks that they were deported but does not know to which island.

After the 10th of June hundreds of civilians in Dili were imprisoned, submitted to interrogatories, tortured, many of them were freed afterwards, others were sent to the Island of Atauro among them V.G.'s brother

Josē Manuel Gomes Guterres (worker at a Chinese
coffee-drying shop, 18 years old)

and Mr. Luciano (a former official at the Municipality
of Dili) - he was sent to Atauro with
his whole family.

In Feb. 1981 plenty of civilians from Vemasse, Laleia and Baucau also were sent to Atauro. Among them all the teachers of the Fatumaca College in Baucau - they were sent there because the Italian priest LOCOTELLI, who was their head master, was accused of maintaining communication with FRETILIN forces in the mountains. The priest Locotelli was beaten up but could stay at the college (due to his Italian citizenship).

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Nicolau Lobato) and his wife
Mariazinha Lobato, a teacher;
they both surrendered in Venilale and were
immediately shot.

Lists of persons who urgently wish to leave East-Timor:

1) V.G.'s family : (V.G. brought for each of them the necessary documents with him so that they can obtain Portuguese passports, with the exception of a 3-year-old girl, who still does not have any documents at all)

- José Raimundo Guterres
- Margarida Gomes Guterres
- Maria Manuela Guterres
- Maria de Fatima Gomes Guterres
- Maria Filomena Gomes Guterres
- José Manuel Gomes Guterres (imprisoned on Atauro)
- Maria Eugênia Guterres
- Alberto Guterres Marques
- Vicente Guterres Marques
- + his wife and four children

2) V.G.' friends:

- Claudino Valadares
- Edite Madeira Valadares
- Rui Antônio Valadares

Portuguese socialists seek inquiry into TV report

From JILL JOLLIFFE, in Lisbon

The Portuguese Socialist Party has called for a government inquiry into the screening of a television documentary in which Dr Mario Soares and other left-wing leaders were accused of accommodating the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

The claims were made in a program presented by journalists Artur Albarran and Barata Feyo. They alleged that Dr Soares and fellow-socialist Mr Jorge Caminhos, pro-communist former Prime Minister Mr Goncalves, former President Gomes and revolutionary councillor Mr Victor Alves held secret talks with Indonesian security chief Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo in Lisbon in October, 1974, and in London in March, 1975, during which they made concessions to Indonesia's intention to annexe East Timor.

The Socialist Party has responded vehemently to the charges, denying any basis of truth. "All Lies", the headlines of the

party newspaper said next day, while the right-wing press made capital from it. The Christian Democrat daily *O Dia* followed up with "Australian socialists also collaborated in the [Timor] holocaust".

The controversy is heightened by the fact that politicisation of the State-run television has long been an issue between the Democratic Alliance Government and the Socialist Opposition, which accuses the Government of censorship and bias in its programming. The liberty which the producers of the Timor program enjoyed is seen as evidence that it was made to discredit the Socialists.

The two journalists say they hold irrefutable proof of their accusations, from sources independent of others who have made similar, but less well-publicised claims. They say also in defence to the strong attack to which they have been subjected, that they invited three key figures in the Timor affair to present their views — former Prime Ministers Mr Goncalves and Admiral Pinheiro, and former

President Gomes, but that only Admiral Pinheiro agreed to appear.

The admiral, the last Portuguese Prime Minister from the revolutionary period, said on the program that his Government and preceding Government had "taken the line of least resistance" over Timor. During his term of office he had been visited by a NATO official who had warned him that NATO did not look kindly on the prospect of a left-leaning Independent regime in Timor after Portuguese withdrawal.

The Socialist Party has called on President Eanes to reveal the results of a 1976 military inquiry into the decolonisation of East Timor, which they say will clear its name. The President has refused to issue it on the grounds that the Portuguese public is not ready for the decolonisation issue to be reopened. His fear echoes that of other politicians, who believe the Timor furore may lead to new demands for an investigation into the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola.

Tanzania still 'unconvinced' of Indonesian annexation

JAKARTA, Monday (AAP-Reuters). — The Tanzanian President, Dr Nyerere, said in Jakarta today that black Africa remained unconvinced over Indonesian arguments for annexing the former Portuguese colony of East Timor.

He told a news conference at the end of a four-day official visit that his talks with the Indonesian President, Mr Suharto, had not resulted in any change in Tanzania's position on East Timor.

"We remain unconvinced", he said. "It is not necessary that for Indonesia and Tanzania to remain friends we should agree on all principles".

He realised the importance of East Timor for Indonesia but Tanzania and the other members of the Organisation of African Unity wanted the territory to become independent, based on the principle that neither geography nor history should be used to deny independence to a former colony.

East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia in 1976 after Jakarta sent in troops to put down Fretilin guerillas fighting for independence. Indonesia said the people of East Timor wanted a merger with Indonesia.

Dr Nyerere said the African-sponsored resolution

on East Timor in the UN General Assembly was based on general principles and not directed against Indonesia.

Tanzania withdrew from co-sponsorship of the resolution last year because of "our respect for Indonesia".

"But this has not changed our position", he said. "It is not intended to change. I realise how important East Timor is to Indonesia. It is also important that our position is understood".

Dr Nyerere was asked about his views on President Reagan's recent statement that Third World countries should rely on themselves and on trade for their development needs instead of aid from rich nations.

"It is a humiliation", he said. "Third World countries do not enjoy seeking aid and they do not want to be beggars. They want to be self-reliant and they prefer trade."

"But trade as it is organised now is the transfer of wealth from poor to rich nations. Let's agree on a fair system of trade and then we can forget about aid".

The exploitation of poor countries by the developed world must change for the establishment of a new international economic order.



ACTION FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT

SPONSORED BY THE AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA

1st Floor,
183 Gertrude Street,
FITZROY,
Victoria, 3065.
Phone: 419.5588

10.9.81

Arnie Kohen,
WASHINGTON.

Dear Arnie,

Greetings. Hope the included documents are useful. I'll make some comments re them and our activities in point form for the sake of order.

1. Thanks for the material you forwarded. I noted the Lisbon postmark. How did the visit go?
2. Senator Colin Mason, who is Deputy Leader of the Australian Democrats, has made direct contact by letter with Paul Tsongas, as his (Mason's) initiative. This sort of thing is to be encouraged. Mason, we hope, will spearhead a call for a Senate Enquiry here. The Democrats (with an Independent, Harradine) hold the balance of power in the new Senate, so there is some movement in the Upper House on a number of matters.
3. Ed Doherty may be interested in the Zegwaard letter to Michael Whiteley. It has been sent to a Bishop here with the suggestion that he may ask the Australian Bishops to forward a different point of view to the Vatican.
4. The Indonesian Bishops are to hold their Conference in November. A Jesuit friend of mine in Jakarta told me that Mgr. da Costa Lopes from Dili will attend as an observer. My friend further suggested that we try to get an Australian Bishop to be in Jakarta at the time so that a private meeting can be arranged between the two. Ed Doherty may be interested in trying a similar initiative. I'd be happy to advise further if he's interested. We haven't done much about it yet but plan to.
5. Sorry to state the obvious: but both the Zegwaard and Dupe letters are strictly confidential. Dupe's is still further confirmation that an-out effort is underway in Timor to crush the resistance. I have tried to get publicity about it here with limited success. Have you people been able to get anything further on the allegation from "a UN source" that some US Green Berets are advising the Indonesians in Timor.
6. You will know from my letter to Veronica that we are planning a big Timor function here in Melbourne for October 4. We are very hopeful that Mugabe and/or Walter Lini (Vanuatu) will speak. We have invited many Australian MPs and some 28 Governments from within the Commonwealth to attend. As well some 1500 journos will be looking for news, so all in all there's a good chance we'll get something from it. There may be spinoff in terms of the UN vote too.
7. There's still a lot of work here in regard to family reunions. The Western Mail article included gives some idea. A big family of 10 (8 school age children) were rejected by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta yesterday. The people are scared to tell them much when interviewed so the Embassy 'concludes' they are not very desperate...

I can't remember who I have told and who I have not told. But I am getting married in November. Nov. 7 to be exact. Anne Keogh. Many hassles and some



TIMOR continua na ordem do dia, por mérito do programa televisivo de

Joana Ruas, por sua vez, analisa o já famoso programa tele-
que ainda vai continuar a agitar a opinião pública. E analisa-o

are being held in other places, both on the mainland of Timor and on other offshore islands. Although it cannot confirm these reports, Amnesty International considers that, together with the recent well-founded reports of imprisonment in Dili and Atauro, they give urgency to its earlier recommendation that the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to undertake tracing and prison visitation programs in East Timor.

Amnesty International has now accumulated considerable evidence that East Timorese taken into the custody of Indonesian occupation forces have been and continue to be treated in violation of international standards, whether their fate be imprisonment without trial, extra-judicial execution or "disappearance". Amnesty International remains concerned that the Indonesian Government still has not responded to the recommendations made to it in April 1980 for the protection of the human rights of the people of East Timor.

Amnesty International presents these findings to the Committee in the belief that they are relevant and important to your consideration of the question of East Timor.

[From the Boston Globe, Nov. 28, 1981]

PORTUGUESE NEGLIGENCE CITED IN EAST TIMOR WAR

(By Peter Wise)

LISBON.—Military documents released last month by the Lisbon government show that the negligence and lack of discipline of Portuguese troops stationed on the former Portuguese colony of East Timor nourished the outbreak of civil strife between rival independence movements and facilitated the 1975 invasion by Indonesia. More than 200,000 died in these hostilities and the ensuing famine.

The controversial documents, kept secret since they were compiled in 1975 and 1976, were disclosed by the center-right Democratic Alliance coalition government to end speculation touched off by a recent documentary on the state-run television network. In the program, left-wing leaders of the 1974 "Revolution of Flowers" were accused of vacillating during secret talks with the Indonesians, thus easing the way for Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor, a remote island 300 miles off the northwestern tip of Australia.

Three prominent Socialists and several other persons are filing defamation suits against the authors of the program. They claim the program deliberately set out to discredit the left. But the two journalists concerned and the government-appointed head of the television network maintain that the documentary was an objective narrative of events, compiled after four months of research.

The controversial documentary has finally brought the question of Timor—up until now known here as the "silent Vietnam"—to the forefront of Portuguese politics, sparking a bitter, three-way confrontation between the center-right Democratic Alliance, the opposition Socialist Party and the military Council of Revolution, a left-wing constitutional watchdog and a holdover from the early days of the revolution.

The documents released by the government indicate that two factors created the climate of instability in East Timor that led to civil war and later served as a pretext for the invasion by Indonesia—an operation carried out with US-supplied arms and endorsed by successive Washington administrations.

First, following the overthrow of the Salazar dictatorship in Lisbon in April 1974, revolutionary euphoria spread quickly from Portugal to troops on Timor. Several Portuguese officers and their troops defected to Timorese independence movements while several other units were so undependable that they were taken off the island. Political

differences among Portuguese military commanders had "serious repercussions both at civilian and military levels," the report says.

By August 1975, "The Portuguese army no longer held decisive power on Timor," the documents conclude. "This breakdown of military command created the conditions for civil war" when fighting broke out between rival independence movements last month. "The colonial armed forces did not have the capacity to intervene" and the Portuguese withdrew to an offshore island where they maintained a "symbolic presence" until the invasion by Indonesia five months later.

Second, the indifference of political parties in Lisbon toward the decolonization of remote East Timor worsened the insecurity of the traditionally anti-Indonesian islanders, leaving them "convinced that Portugal would abandon the territory" and exacerbating the struggles between rival groups. The documents say the pressing problem of decolonization of the richer, more densely populated African colonies, where Portugal had been at war for several years, relegated the question of Timor to a minor priority.

Portugal's post-revolutionary governments were against maintaining a link with Timor, disapproving the financial aid necessary to develop the island, while diplomatic efforts by successive Lisbon governments were not able to pressure other powers into opposing the Jakarta aggression towards Timor, the reports conclude.

The principal document released by the government was written by Col. Lemos Pires, who was appointed military governor of the island by the revolutionary government in November 1974. His 700-page report to his military chiefs in Lisbon describes how the political and military situation on the island slipped out of his control, forcing him to withdraw his troops in August 1975.

Another of the hitherto secret documents is a 200-page report on the conduct of the Portuguese military in East Timor compiled in 1976 by a four-man military commission at the orders of left-leaning President Antonio Ramalho Eanes, then chief of the armed forces. The commission is strongly critical of Col. Pires for not using force to halt the fighting between rival Timorese factions.

The release of the dossiers is highly compromising for the Socialists, and in particular for the left-wing soldier-politicians who led the 1974 Portuguese revolution. The government maintains that its only motive for publication was "the public's right to know."

But the Council of Revolution says that by declassifying secret military documents that discredit the left, the government is using the case of East Timor for political ends.

Although the present dispute is about where the blame lies for the tragedy of Timor and is centered on the events of 1975, the furor has also cast a harsh light on the present government's unsuccessful attempts to do something about the plight of the East Timorese today.

Catholic Church sources in East Timor report that an Indonesian army "cleanup" operation against nationalist guerrillas still holding out in mountain areas could lead to renewed famine.

Since mid-September, security forces have been sweeping east and west through the island in a pincer movement aimed at driving out resistance fighters, says the Australian-based organization, Action for World Development.

All male islanders between 15 and 50 and many women and children have been conscripted to help round up their countrymen. Schools and public departments have been closed, say the church reports.

This mobilization has taken the Timorese away from their lands during the vital crop-sowing season and threatens a serious food shortage, the church contacts say.

In the wake of the Indonesian invasion in

1975, thousands died from starvation and disease when crops were destroyed.

Timorese refugees recently arrived in Lisbon say one of the factors holding back thousands who wish to flee the island is the difficulty in obtaining Portuguese passports. Meanwhile, the Portuguese diplomatic initiative launched a year ago with the aim of securing self-determination for the islanders and a rapid solution to their vast humanitarian problems has so far shown no results. ●

NUCLEAR MORALITY

● Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I have always taken with utmost seriousness the injunction that the safety of the people is the first obligation of the public servant. In insuring that safety, we cannot play games, we can not play fast and loose, we must look at the world as it is. Sometimes, unfortunately, we get sidetracked from the central issues, as for instance when some among us speak of nuclear morality in such a way as to infer that all the moral decisions about having nuclear weaponry are made on our side of the issue.

The fact of the matter, of course, is that the other side possesses the same instruments of nuclear destruction, and we must then assess whether self-denial or unilateral restraints serve the cause of avoiding nuclear terror. If the history of this century shows anything, it is that conceding the field to our adversaries only encourages aggression and the worst kind of destruction that contemporary weapons are capable of.

The best of our moral philosophers, aware of the problem, are also aware of the solution. The great Augustine said:

To maintain peace within the natural order of men, rulers require the power and decision to declare war.

He went on to argue that those rulers must "defend the State against external war weapons."

The above quote, as well as a cogent analysis of this whole problem, is from a recent column written by George F. Will. Always incisive and penetrating, Will shows his mastery again in the December 21 issue of Newsweek.

Avoiding the temptation to synopsise that which Mr. Will has already reduced to brevity, I ask that this worthy column be printed in the Record.

The article follows:

NUCLEAR MORALITY

(By George F. Will)

Among the sundry and manifold changes in the world (the words are from the prayer book; a theological tone is apposite this week) is a political message from the portions of the clergy, especially the Roman Catholic clergy.

The bishop of Corpus Christi has protested the naming of a submarine for that city. This has drawn from the Navy Secretary (a Catholic) a starchy letter rejecting the implication that "naval ships and even military service are somehow profane." He says church teachings recognize the need for deterrent systems for the virtuous task of peace-keeping. "To maintain peace within the natural order of men," Augustine said, "rulers require the power and decision to declare war." They must, Aquinas said, "defend the state against external war weapons."

Do nuclear weapons invalidate that? When an Indianapolis parish votes to protest nu-

For these reasons I would like to consider whether there should be lower standards of evidence for reasonable basis than for claims once they have been challenged. And even in the extreme, I think we should reevaluate whether the Commission should impose any requirement for substantiation prior to the making of claims. I hasten to add, however, that even if the Commission were to revise its policy, this would not mean the end of ad substantiation. Indeed, for the reasons mentioned above—preservation of reputation, avoidance of lawsuits, and meeting industry self-regulatory standards—I would expect most firms to continue their substantiation programs, especially in view of effective Commission policy of prosecuting false and deceptive advertising.

Over the coming months, I will have much to say on this and other issues before the Commission. I want you to know, however, that in each case I will be guided by the statutes we are responsible for administering and by my assessment of the evidence. Like most academics, I consider vital a willingness to question conventional wisdom. I promise you an open mind and a careful weighing of the facts.

Thank you very much. ●

EAST TIMOR

● Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, on past occasions I have expressed concern over the tragic situation in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, and have suggested steps that might be taken to help remedy the situation. Last year nine of my colleagues joined me in expressing some of these concerns in a letter to then Secretary of State Muskie. We spoke of the need to maintain and expand an independent international presence in the territory, in light of continuing reports of armed conflict and the jailing of large numbers of political prisoners. Our letter also underscored the plight of families who have been separated by the conflict—of those who have wished to leave East Timor for Portugal and Australia but have been prevented from doing so.

I have reiterated these points several times and have also stressed the need to open East Timor to the news media and, ultimately, to find diplomatic means to bring this conflict to an end. Last week marked 6 years since Indonesia invaded East Timor.

Recent information I have received only confirms the necessity of these and other measures. In October, Amnesty International released a report on the Timor situation that once again drew attention to accounts of summary executions and "disappearances" carried out by the Indonesian forces, as well as to arbitrary imprisonment, primarily but not exclusively on the offshore island of Atauro. For 6 years these prisons have been closed to inspection by neutral international humanitarian agencies.

Reports from Roman Catholic sources in East Timor have indicated that a recent Indonesian military offensive in the territory could lead to serious food shortages in the coming months, among a civilian population still recovering from the Cambodia-like catastrophe of 1978-80. A similar report appeared in the November 26 edition of the Boston Globe. International relief agencies should be allowed to establish sufficient food stockpiles in East Timor to avert further disasters.

Only a few days ago, I received a copy of a letter, dated November 19, from a distinguished Roman Catholic cleric in East Timor. The letter details the most gruesome of atrocities, and warrants our closest attention. Unfortunately, I have not been able to adequately substantiate the number of people killed as reported in the letter. It is very clear, however, that the conflict continues and that innocent Timorese people are being killed.

Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues I ask that the excerpts from the priest's letter be printed in the RECORD, followed by the above mentioned Amnesty International document and the article from the Boston Globe.

The material follows:

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(Dated November 19, 1981)

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With the military operation that took place in July, August, and September, it seems as if a cyclone had swept Timor from end to end, leaving the island in a true tragedy: The death of innocent children of two to three years of age, pregnant women and defenseless people massacred only because they did not want to lose their identity among the nations of the world. Approximately 500 people were accused and killed without hesitation or pity, exclusively for the crime of not wanting to integrate into the Republic of Indonesia, preferring above all to be slaves in their own independence to being well-off under the paw of others. After all this we come to the conclusion that the military operation undertaken by Indonesia in Timor not only did not produce the desired effect, but was actually counterproductive. The question of Timor cannot be resolved by shooting, only through dialogue.

But let us leave this to the politicians, considering that the policies adopted until now have been an authentic disaster. The Indonesians would like to excuse themselves with material development which they would like to undertake. However, how can there be authentic development without the participation of the Timorese people, who are now reeling from hunger, disease and all kinds of physical misery? The greatest wealth of Timor is the Timorese people, without which everything else would have no sense. Let me ask God to enlighten men so that they can understand that above all it is human dignity that should be valued, in accordance with the teachings of the last Papal Encyclicals.

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to present Amnesty International's concerns in connection with the Committee's consideration of the question of East Timor.

The areas addressed in this statement are those which fall within the specific mandate of the organization: Amnesty International seeks the release of "prisoners of conscience"—persons who have been imprisoned for the non-violent exercise of their beliefs, for their ethnic origin, colour, sex, language or religion. It works for fair and early trials for all political prisoners and on behalf of prisoners detained without charge or trial. It opposes without reservation the death penalty and torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

As Amnesty International noted in a statement before this committee last year and again in a statement to the Special Committee on Decolonization's Sub-Committee

on Petitions, Information and Assistance in June 1981, it was evident that violations of the human rights within the mandate of Amnesty International continued to take place in East Timor. To summarize Amnesty International's concerns in East Timor as presented on those occasions: Amnesty International has been concerned that Timorese have "disappeared" after surrendering under the terms of amnesty guaranteeing their personal safety after being captured; that others who had surrendered to or been captured by Indonesian forces have been summarily executed; that large numbers of persons have been detained without trial, some for the full period since the invasion, and held in harsh prison conditions which constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

Information received by Amnesty International since June indicates that grounds for grave concern remain.

Since June, Amnesty International has received reports that a number of persons who had "disappeared" were in fact killed shortly after being taken into the custody of Indonesian troops. These include three persons who were reported to have "disappeared" in early 1979: a 17-year-old student named Maria Gorete Joaquim, who "disappeared" with her uncle, Leopoldo Joaquim, and two young men, Filomeno Alves and Manuel Exposto, who had been well known in Dili before the Indonesian invasion as members of the popular musical group, Os Cinco do Oriente. A third member of the musical group, Onorio Pereira, about whose fate Amnesty International had previously received information, is now reported also to have been shot and killed by Indonesian troops in early 1979. Amnesty International feels that the circumstances of these deaths must be investigated thoroughly.

In recent months Amnesty International has received more extensive reports about the imprisonment without trial of large numbers of East Timorese. These reports indicate that in two places of detention, the former Dili District Prison (Cadeia Comarca under the Portuguese administration and still known as the Comarca) and the island of Atauro off the main island of Timor, at least 2,000 persons are detained. Those held in the Comarca are reported to be predominantly former combatants, although an unknown number of them are former Timorese soldiers of the Portuguese Army who did not engage in combat against the Indonesians, while others, believed to have taken part in fighting the Indonesian invasion, have been imprisoned without trial since immediately after the invasion in December 1975. Amnesty International drew the Committee's attention last year to the harsh conditions and poor diet in the Comarca which seriously endanger prisoners' health.

Since June 1980 Amnesty International has received continual reports of persons being held on the island of Atauro to the North of the main island of Timor. According to information received by the organization, those taken to the island are civilians held simply on suspicion of being sympathetic to the independence cause. In some cases, their families have been compelled to accompany them. Once on Atauro, they are required to build their own quarters and grow their own food. There are reported to be grave shortages of some essential foodstuffs. Information on the conditions in which they are held is sparse and hard to obtain.

Amnesty International would again like to stress, as it has on previous occasions, that it cannot regard the information available to it on the human rights situation in East Timor as complete, primarily because of the strict prohibition imposed by the Indonesian occupation forces which prevents unhindered access to the territory and the free flow of information from it. The organization has received other reports indicating detainees

11th November, 1981.

Mgr. da Costa Lopes,
C/- Rm. R. Hardoputranto SJ
Bahagian B
Kantor Walligereja Indonesia
Taman Cut Mutiah 10
JAKARTA
INDONESIA

Your Excellency,

May I introduce myself. I am the Secretary of the Episcopal Committee for Development and Peace of the Australian Episcopal Conference and Chairman of Australian Catholic Relief. (Fr. Zegwaard could explain the activities of Australian Catholic Relief; we are assisting in some of his programmes.) Please pardon my English. I am unable to write freely in Latin ...

I presume to approach you for information that could guide us in Australia with regard to projects or influence to assist the Episcopal Conference of Indonesia and/or the Church and people of East Timor.

Any information or suggestions that you were willing to give me would be used only in the way that you approved.

We hear conflicting reports about the situation in East Timor - about pacification, about present and future famine, about ease or difficulty in providing aid to East Timor, about the most effective channels for transmitting aid or relief, about reunification of families with members in Australia

Would you be willing, please, to advise me on the following matters:

How does the Church see the social and political situation in East Timor at present?

What stand would they like the Australian Church-related Agencies to take?

What is their reaction to what has been covered in the Australian press and through Agency publications in recent weeks?

What sort of assistance would they hope for from Australian Church Agencies?

What are the most viable channels of communication at present?

What channels will be available in the case of the expected famine over the New Year?

I write now because I believe the Bishops are gathering for their Conference. I would not wish to add to your heavy work load with the above questions.

Mgr. da Costa Lopes,

11th November, 1981

However, I would appreciate any information that you think could make an Australian stance on action vis a vis the needs of Indonesia and East Timor effective.

With kind regards and every best wish,

Yours fraternally in Christ,

+Bishop J.J. Gerry D.D.

Secretary,
Australian Episcopal Conference .

Jakarta, 19 November 1981.

Mgr. J.J. Gerry D.D.
Secretary
Australian Episcopal Conference

Your Excellency,

I was indeed very delighted with your kind letter addressed to us, as the Secretary of the Australian Bishop's Conference in order to help the people of East Timor and to encourage us in the present circumstances. Therefore many thanks to Your Excellency. I have been here in Jakarta a couple of days to attend the Indonesian Bishop's Conference, as an observer and not as a full member of MAWI, because the Diocese of Dili has been under the Holy See, through the Nunciature of Indonesia in Jakarta.

I will do my best to answer your questions you proposed to me:
1. At present, the social and political situation in East Timor is indeed tragic. With the military operation of cleaning FRETELIN during July, August and September 1981 many Timorese people were killed, including the innocent children, the pregnant women and the defenceless people without any crime except the willing to be independent from all oppression. Therefore, the Catholic Church, running all risks, had to denounce to the world the atrocities committed during four days of the siege near the famous rock of S. Anthony in Lacluta, where more than five hundred Timorese were killed.

2. In my private opinion the support we need very much at the present moment is money with which we can get in Dilly some food, rice and corn for the survival of the people. Of course you could send money to me, to the Diocese of Dili through "The Chase Manhattan Bank Jakarta, R.C. K.W.I No. 665-0-00450-7-179 with the destination to the Diocese of Dili. The number is the account of MAWI.

3. The reaction was negative and perhaps emotional in the first moment, but afterwards... it will be also positive.

4. From Australian Church Agencies we hope, if possible, the food assistance, as well as money.

5. About the answer, it would be better to have before a good connection with the Central Government in Jakarta.

6. In the case of the expected famine the most available channels of communication will be by sea with ship from Australia to Dilly.

With my best regards to Your Excellency,

I remain Yours in J.C.

P.S. Please send the letter to me
Through the Nunciature of Jakarta
where I have been as a guest.
The Nunciature will take care of
my correspondence and send to Dilly.

+ *[Signature]*
+ *[Signature]*
Apostolic Administrator



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 97th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 127

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1981

Senate

EAST TIMOR

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on Petitions, Information and Assistance in June 1981, it was evident that violations of the human rights within the mandate of Amnesty International continued to take place in East Timor. To summarize Amnesty International's concerns in East Timor as presented on those occasions: Amnesty International has been concerned that Timorese have "disappeared" after surrendering under the terms of amnesty guaranteeing their personal safety after being captured; that others who had surrendered to or been captured by Indonesian forces have been summarily executed; that large numbers of persons have been detained without trial, some for the full period since the invasion, and held in harsh prison conditions which constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

Information received by Amnesty International since June indicates that grounds for grave concern remain.

Since June, Amnesty International has received reports that a number of persons who had "disappeared" were in fact killed shortly after being taken into the custody of Indonesian troops. These include three persons who were reported to have "disappeared" in early 1979: a 17-year-old student named Maria Gorete Joaquim, who "disappeared" with her uncle, Leopoldo Joaquim, and two young men, Filomeno Alves and Manuel Exposto, who had been well known in Dili before the Indonesian invasion as members of the popular musical group, Os Cinco do Oriente. A third member of the musical group, Onorio Pereira, about whose fate Amnesty International had previously received information, is now reported also to have been shot and killed by Indonesian troops in early 1979. Amnesty International feels that the circumstances of these deaths must be investigated thoroughly.

In recent months Amnesty International has received more extensive reports about the imprisonment without trial of large numbers of East Timorese. These reports indicate that in two places of detention, the former Dili District Prison (Cadeia Comarca under the Portuguese administration and still known as the Comarca) and the island of Atauro off the main island of Timor, at least 2,000 persons are detained. Those held in the Comarca are reported to be predominantly former combatants, although an unknown number of them are former Timorese soldiers of the Portuguese Army who did not engage

in combat against the Indonesians, while others, believed to have taken part in fighting the Indonesian invasion, have been imprisoned without trial since immediately after the invasion in December 1975. Amnesty International drew the Committee's attention last year to the harsh conditions and poor diet in the Comarca which seriously endanger prisoners' health.

Since June 1980 Amnesty International has received continual reports of persons being held on the island of Atauro to the North of the main island of Timor. According to information received by the organization, those taken to the island are civilians held simply on suspicion of being sympathetic to the independence cause. In some cases, their families have been compelled to accompany them. Once on Atauro, they are required to build their own quarters and grow their own food. There are reported to be grave shortages of some essential foodstuffs. Information on the conditions in which they are held is sparse and hard to obtain.

Amnesty International would again like to stress, as it has on previous occasions, that it cannot regard the information available to it on the human rights situation in East Timor as complete, primarily because of the strict prohibition imposed by the Indonesian occupation forces which prevents unhindered access to the territory and the free flow of information from it. The organization has received other reports indicating detainees are being held in other places, both on the mainland of Timor and on other offshore islands. Although it cannot confirm these reports, Amnesty International considers that, together with the recent well-founded reports of imprisonment in Dili and Atauro, they give urgency to its earlier recommendation that the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to undertake tracing and prison visitation programs in East Timor.

Amnesty International has now accumulated considerable evidence that East Timorese taken into the custody of Indonesian occupation forces have been and continue to be treated in violation of international standards, whether their fate be imprisonment without trial, extra-judicial execution or "disappearance". Amnesty International remains concerned that the Indonesian Government still has not responded to the recommendations made to it in April 1980 for the protection of the human rights of the people of East Timor.

Amnesty International presents these findings to the Committee in the belief that they are relevant and important to your consideration of the question of East Timor.

[From the Boston Globe, Nov. 26, 1981]

**PORTUGUESE NEGLIGENCE CITED IN EAST TIMOR
WAR**

(By Peter Wise)

LISBON.—Military documents released last month by the Lisbon government show that the negligence and lack of discipline of Portuguese troops stationed on the former Portuguese colony of East Timor nourished the outbreak of civil strife between rival independence movements and facilitated the 1975 invasion by Indonesia. More than 200,000 died in these hostilities and the ensuing famine.

The controversial documents, kept secret since they were compiled in 1975 and 1976, were disclosed by the center-right Democratic Alliance coalition government to end speculation touched off by a recent docu-

mentary on the state-run television network. In the program, left-wing leaders of the 1974 "Revolution of Flowers" were accused of vacillating during secret talks with the Indonesians, thus easing the way for Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor, a remote island 300 miles off the northwestern tip of Australia.

Three prominent Socialists and several other persons are filing defamation suits against the authors of the program. They claim the program deliberately set out to discredit the left. But the two journalists concerned and the government-appointed head of the television network maintain that the documentary was an objective narrative of events, compiled after four months of research.

The controversial documentary has finally brought the question of Timor—up until now known here as the "silent Vietnam"—to the forefront of Portuguese politics, sparking a bitter, three-way confrontation between the center-right Democratic Alliance, the opposition Socialist Party and the military Council of Revolution, a left-wing constitutional watchdog and a holdover from the early days of the revolution.

The documents released by the government indicate that two factors created the climate of instability in East Timor that led to civil war and later served as a pretext for the invasion by Indonesia—an operation carried out with US-supplied arms and endorsed by successive Washington administrations.

First, following the overthrow of the Salazar dictatorship in Lisbon in April 1974, revolutionary euphoria spread quickly from Portugal to troops on Timor. Several Portuguese officers and their troops defected to Timorese independence movements while several other units were so undependable that they were taken off the island. Political differences among Portuguese military commanders had "serious repercussions both at civilian and military levels," the report says.

By August 1975, "The Portuguese army no longer held decisive power on Timor," the documents conclude. "This breakdown of military command created the conditions for civil war" when fighting broke out between rival independence movements last month. "The colonial armed forces did not have the capacity to intervene" and the Portuguese withdrew to an offshore island where they maintained a "symbolic presence" until the invasion by Indonesia five months later.

Second, the indifference of political parties in Lisbon toward the decolonization of remote East Timor worsened the insecurity of the traditionally anti-Indonesian islanders, leaving them "convinced that Portugal would abandon the territory" and exacerbating the struggles between rival groups. The documents say the pressing problem of decolonization of the richer, more densely populated African colonies, where Portugal had been at war for several years, relegated the question of Timor to a minor priority.

Portugal's post-revolutionary governments were against maintaining a link with Timor, disapproving the financial aid necessary to develop the island, while diplomatic efforts by successive Lisbon governments were not able to pressure other powers into opposing the Jakarta aggression towards Timor, the reports conclude.

The principal document released by the government was written by Col. Lemos Pires, who was appointed military governor of the island by the revolutionary government in November 1974. His 700-page report to his military chiefs in Lisbon describes how the

political and military situation on the island slipped out of his control, forcing him to withdraw his troops in August 1975.

Another of the hitherto secret documents is a 200-page report on the conduct of the Portuguese military in East Timor compiled in 1976 by a four-man military commission at the orders of left-leaning President Antonio Ramalho Eanes, then chief of the armed forces. The commission is strongly critical of Col. Pires for not using force to halt the fighting between rival Timorese factions.

The release of the dossiers is highly compromising for the Socialists, and in particular for the left-wing soldier-politicians who led the 1974 Portuguese revolution. The government maintains that its only motive for publication was "the public's right to know."

But the Council of Revolution says that by declassifying secret military documents that discredit the left, the government is using the case of East Timor for political ends.

Although the present dispute is about where the blame lies for the tragedy of Timor and is centered on the events of 1975, the furor has also cast a harsh light on the present government's unsuccessful attempts to do something about the plight of the East Timorese today.

Catholic Church sources in East Timor report that an Indonesian army "cleanup" operation against nationalist guerrillas still holding out in mountain areas could lead to renewed famine.

Since mid-September, security forces have been sweeping east and west through the island in a pincer movement aimed at driving out resistance fighters, says the Australian-based organization, Action for World Development.

All male islanders between 15 and 50 and many women and children have been conscripted to help round up their countrymen. Schools and public departments have been closed, say the church reports.

This mobilization has taken the Timorese away from their lands during the vital crop-sowing season and threatens a serious food shortage, the church contacts say.

In the wake of the Indonesian invasion in 1975, thousands died from starvation and disease when crops were destroyed.

Timorese refugees recently arrived in Lisbon say one of the factors holding back thousands who wish to flee the island is the difficulty in obtaining Portuguese passports. Meanwhile, the Portuguese diplomatic initiative launched a year ago with the aim of securing self determination for the islanders and a rapid solution to their vast humanitarian problems has so far shown no results.
