Holocaust on the sly

EAST-TIMOR

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Komitee Oost Timor en Pemuda 20 mai


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Komitee Indonesië

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Foreword

"Famine, as widespread and deadly as that destroying Cambodia, threatens at least 400.000 persons still alive in war-torn East Timor. This starvation is no accident ... starvation is a deliberate policy adopted by the Indonesian government to crush opposition to Jakarta's annexation of this former Portugese colony in the East Indies."

This quotation from an article titled 'The Politics of Starvation" by Arnold Kohen and Roberta Quance is an exact appraisal of the real cause of the catastrophic famine in East Timor, which caught the headlines only one year ago. The only relief specialist from the International Committee of the Red Cross allowed in East Timor said that the situation is worse than in Biafra during the civil war in Nigeria and potentially more dangerous than in Cambodia today.

But both the Indonesian government and its supporters in the West have tried to deceive the world by claiming that the famine was not caused by the Indonesian cruel warfare but by the 'extreme backwardness' of traditional agricultural practices prevalent in the Portugese colony before 1975. This is a big lie. A professor of anthropology at the University of Michigan who in 1973/74 has done field work in East Timor observed that

"while hardly achieving an advanced state of technological development and economic output, the native peoples of East Timor have evidenced an ecological adaptability and the technological and economic means of meeting their own needs, the demands of the colonial administration, and generating the surpluses necessary to a sustained external trade."

It is evident that the prevalent mass starvation is exclusively the result of attempts by the Indonesian army to suppress the general popular uprising after the Indonesian invasion in december 1975. Mass bombing of the fields in the mountainous areas where food was grown, were a conscious strategy of the military in order to compel the Fretilin fighters to come down to the plains and surrender.

Worse still was that the American ambassador in Jakarta, Mr.

Masters, who already in 1978, during a visit to East Timor, had observed how terrible the food situation was, waited with his official reports until he had got a green light from the Indonesian government, after great numbers of East Timorese had actually surrendered and either been locked up in concentration camps or killed.

The genocide in East Timor should be publicly denounced as one of the worst instances of infractions upon human rights since the Second World War. Instead, it is being condoned by governments and groups that wish to support the Indonesian military regime for economic or political reasons. If the Western powers will persist in their attitude and actually acknowledge the forcible annexation of East Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia, this would boil down to a recipe for a future agressor: do not stop at conquering the country by military force, but exterminate the whole population! Then you can make sure that the outside world will acknowledge your claims under the pretext that there is no armed resistance any more. Take care that quiet reigns in the conquered territory - the quiet of a cemetery!

The present collection of contributions for the International Conference on East Timor, to be held in Amsterdam on 27/28 september 1980 and organized by the Dutch East Timor Committee, is intended to elucidate the true facts about the holocaust on the sly, conducted by the Indonesian government with the connivance of a hypocritical Western world.

W. F. WERTHEIM

History

When we take it on us to give a survey of anti-colonial resistance in Timor during the four hundred years of Portugese domination, we have to look at the events which brought about the subjection of the Timorese people. It is our conviction that all reticence over these historical facts and even a superficial approach of the subject cannot but play into the hands of the enemies of the Timorese. Their struggle indicates that both their cultural attainments and their position of being oppressed in the colonial society resulted in a common consciousness. It is this common consciousness which has become the corner-stone of a strong sense of national unity, and this, in its turn, has reinforced the figth of the Timorese people against its oppressors.

The coming of colonialism

The exact date that the Portugese arrived is not known. There is, however, a general opinion that before 1515 no Portugese ship sailed as far as Timor. A voyage of Portugese merchants to the Spice Islands occurred after the conquest of Malacca in August 1511. Malacca was a great town and, according to Barros, the principal port in the East. Because of its geographical position it became the pivot of the trade-routes along which cloves, nutmeg, camphor and sandalwood were shipped from India and the Spice Islands and silk, porcelain and brocades from China and Japan.

It was in November 1511 that Antonio de Abreu was committed by Alfonso de Albuquerque to undertake the first voyage to the Spice Islands. According to a contemporary author his fleet did not go beyond the Solor Islands and "as far as Timor is concerned this island could not have been seen". For subsequent expeditions, however, Timor was the major objective since, even before their arrival at Malacca, the Portugese had been informed on this island where the best kinds of white and yellow sandalwood grew that occasionally turned up at India's markets.

The two great periods of resistance
Portugese historians divided the history of their nation's
occupation of Timor into four periods, viz.

- 1515-1642 The period of the initial contacts between Timorese and Portugese merchants, also referred to as the period of "intensive religious activity".
- 1642-1702 The period from the oath of loyalty sworn by the queen of Mena and other kings of Timor to the king of Portugal, until the arrival of the first governor of Timor.
- 1702-1769 The period of the settlement of the capital city at Lifau.
- 1769-1945 The period from the removal of the capital city to Dili until the Japanese occupation; the post-war period is also referred to as "Passion and Delive-rance".

This sort of periodization need not astonish us, since it is based on the point of view of colonialism that is bound to use such dates as to remind the nation of its victories which eventually led to its domination over the entire territory. The Timorese on the other hand have different criteria to analyse the developments under Portugese colonial rule. In their view there are two great periods, namely from 1642 to 1912, and from 1912 until 1975. The first mentioned period is the one of the fierce wars of independence which the Timorese people waged against Portugese domination. The second period covers the phase of a general passive resistance, which was interrupted time and again by rebellions, such as the peasant movement arising during the Second World War and called "black columns" by the Portugese, and the revolt of 1959. This was the period in which a new type of Timorese nationalism emerged: it led to the formation of a liberation movement under the leadership of a national front and it reached its culmination point with the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

The resistance of Behale and Serviao

The history of the Timorese people proves irrefutably that it has always fought against the Portugese intruder. Like other

nations oppressed by foreign domination the Timorese never hesitated to make supreme sacrifices in an attempt to put an end to colonial exploitation and subjection. The powerful kingdoms of Behale and Serviao in particular offered brave resistance to Portugese colonialism. The king of Behale stated that "the continually extending influence of Portugal had to be terminated forever". He threatened those kingdoms which maintained trade relations with the Portugese and at the same time he and the king of Serviao drew up plans to repel the invaders. The defeat of Behale, inflicted by troops under the command of Captain Francisco Fernandes, was clearly the result of a nolicy of divide-and-rule such as colonial powers are usually conducting vis-à-vis subjected nations. The kings of Luca and Camenasse who were under some obligation of loyalty to the kings of Behale and Serviao felt grateful towards the Portugese when these, by their actions against the latter. put all the kingdoms of Timor on an equal footing. The king of Luca. renamed Dom Sebastiao Fernandes, swore an oath of loyalty to the king of Portugal. In this he followed the example given by the king of Viquique, Dom Mateus da Costa, who was won over to the Portugese side in 1698.

To what extent the cunning schemes of the Portugese did their work is shown by the letter which twenty-four kings wrote on August 2nd, 1703 to Dom Pedro II, king of Portugal, declaring their allegiance and obedience to the Portugese Crown. The list of signatures included Dom Antonio Hornay, king of Samoro; Dom Sebastiao Fernandes, king of Luca; Dom Pedro Hornay, king of Fatu Lete Luli; Dom Miguel Tavares, king of Alas and Dom Domingos Soares, king of Manatuto.

The following significant historical events ushered in the beginning of the first phase of colonialism. The Portugese were successful in subjecting the kingdom of Mena by peaceful means, accepting the historically grown importance of Mena but taking advantage of it at the same time. Armed force was used to bring down the two strong kingdoms of Behale and Serviao: their defeat demonstrated the lack of a stabile political leadership necessary to successfully oppose foreign domination. By liberating themselves from the power of Behale and Serviao many Timorese kingdoms recovered their once lost independence,

but they, like Luca and Camenasse and others, were subjected to the king of Portugal. Such was the way colonialism penetrated into Timor.

For the Portugese it was a road full of bends and obstacles. Among the obstacles were doubtlessly the first wars of independence waged by the people of Behale and Serviao. They were the first to take up arms in order to defend their independence against the Portugese usurper. Shortly after, other kingdoms acted likewise: they too used force of arms to free themselves from the intruders and oppressors who changed their tactics of flattery and persuasion into one of plunder and rapaciousness.

By doing so the colonial forces threw off the mask: they now behaved like a treacherous ally attempting to seize the house from its owner who had allowed them to enter.

For the next three centuries a bloody tragedy unrolled in Timor; they were centuries of a bitter and stubborn struggle for the Timorese people. Many of them excessively rejoiced at the defeat inflicted upon Behale and Serviao, but shortly after they were forced to admit that this defeat marked the beginning of a period in which they were to lose their historical rights. Victories and defeats succeeded each other, but eventually the independent development of the Timorese nation was brought to an end.

The final phase of the war of independence 1860-1912

From 1642 until 1860 the colonial power did not play any significant part in the administration of the territory. It is true that the defeat suffered by Behale and Serviao resulted in the gradual collapse of the Timorese social structure as well as in the continuous increase in numbers of vassal-kings which offered the Portugese ample opportunity to use their tactics of divide-and-rule. Yet the colonial authorities were physically present only in the ports along the coast from which shiploads of sandalwood, wax and horses departed.

From roughly 1810 until 1860 the colonial power attempted a new method of economic exploitation. At the same time it applied a different technique of political domination so as

to safeguard the success of its policy of exploitation. Both started during the term of office of Afonso de Castro (1859-1863), who described the new policies in these words:

"To make the masses pay attention to our colours in former times a handful of men with fire-arms and impressive voices was sufficient. Later, however, our power was on the decline and we were capable of having our superiority recognized only in the neighbourhood of Dili and Batugade. In other parts kings and chiefs were in control who failed to appreciate the advantage of law and order and of labour. The lack of troops and material means constituted an obstacle to carry out the law; as a result our domination was in danger. The independent kings in their realms were not the right government officials: they collected taxes to their own advantage and they exercised their judicial authority according to their own rules. They rebelled against the government whenever they were requested to recruit labourers; they fought among each other, and they were eventually completely sovereign rulers in their territories".

According to Afonso de Castro it would be better to create more amenable districts without interfering with the traditional kingdoms: by regulation of August 1860 ten of these were set up. The inviolability of the traditional kingdoms did not mean that the structures of Timorese society had not been pulled down in an earlier period: we have to take into account that "the rebellious kingdoms, once subjected by the loyal kingdoms which had placed troops at (our) disposal, had been split up into districts, whether they had common boundaries or not".

As we see, the interference of the colonial power was directed at promoting agricultural production for the export rather than at improving the food situation of the colonized people. The problems, however, which confronted the colonial power had to be overcome and in order to achieve this one knew of one solution only: force of arms. "Due to their indifference

the inhabitants were not receptive to all arguments and as a result they could be convinced only manu militari".

The colonial power started to take the necessary steps, such as building prisons in various parts of the country, setting up barracks and military posts. Neither did he forget to create an operational military force, stronger than ever and better equipped with arms.

"Without effectively occupying the country the government was powerless and uncapable of holding the territory unless reinforcements arrived from Portugal or Goa. Afonso de Castro's plea was wellreceived in the mothercountry and the Overseas Council was convened by royal decree to discuss the message of April 21st, 1860. It was considered necessary that the metropolitan government came to the rescue of the overseas territory which had already lost much of its former prosperity. Those who received the messages were nevertheless opposed to a military occupation and a complete subjection of the kingdoms, since they feared a general upheaval. Instead they were of opinion that a 300 or 400 strong African corps from Mozambique or Angola be sent (...) It was the task of this force to give any such support that was explicitly requested, be it for the collection of Fintas, for the alienation of land for agricultural enterprise or for the exploitation of the goldmines in the interior of the island."

More than before the colonial power intended to entrench itself in the colony. But the colonized people were decided to oppose and fight it.

Class structure in Timor

The struggle waged by Behale and Serviao upon the Portugese clearly showed that there had been a resistance movement during the period of Portugese domination. Yet, important though it may have been, it did not make the Timorese people regain its independence. The defeat suffered by the two kingdoms showed the lack of political unity which, given good leadership, was

indispensable for success. Without a political leadership capable of maintaining the unity of the people and aware of their needs and wishes no struggle will be able to overthrow the dominating power. There must also be unity among the leaders so as to make sure that the various classes within society will fight the colonial power to a man. In spite of the differences between liberation struggles per country, the experiences of the past have proved beyond doubt that a unified political leadership is a historical condition sine qua.

In East Timor the peasant population was, as a class, hardest hit by colonial domination. In the smaller towns a small proletarian class developed; in addition to this there lived on the skirts of the villages groups of displaced persons who had lost their land and who were waiting for an opportunity to get temporary jobs, like unloading ships: these formed a lumpen proletariat.

To functionally maintain the colonial structure the Portugese authorities had at their disposal small retail-traders, teachers, nurses and civil servants. Thus there emerged a petty bourgeoisie in East Timor which closely collaborated with the colonial authorities. At the same time a middle-class developed which possessed, among other things, saw-mills, distilleries, cattle-farms, larger estates and coffee-, cocos- and rubber-plantations. It was not exceptional in a colonial society that there existed a class which entertained close relations with the colonial power and which also controlled both internal and external trade. In East Timor this compradores class consisted of Chinese merchants.

In their interests the various classes were strongly opposed to each other. The petty bourgeoisie which was indispensable to the colonial power in order to keep up its system of domination realized that under the circumstances the labourers and peasants were to be the natural allies in the struggle against colonialism and the compradores. As a class it stood close to the suffering population of East Timor which in a colonial situation had to bear the brunt of foreign oppression.

It was in this context that the historical task fell upon the petty bourgeoisie to recruit among its midst such people who were to wage the national liberation struggle against the colonial power. Thus emerged the first nationalist party which conducted the struggle by underground activities, issuing agitatorial pamphlets and chalking slogans on the walls. This situation developed in East Timor in the early seventies. The colonial power immediately retaliated by the most primitive and brutal repression, but it was a policy like this that only served to provoking the nationalist forces into continuing with their fight.

April 1974: turning point for East Timor

On April 25, 1974, the fascist regime in Portugal, which had

lasted for decades, came to an end. A coup brought a coalition

of moderate and radical military to power who had turned

against the Caetano government, mainly because of their defeat

in the colonial wars in Africa (Guinea-Bissao, Mocambique and

Angola).

With the political repression largely gone, a broad political discussion about the country's future developed in East Timor. Within a few months a number of political movements came into being, which organised themselves around the three most important groups:

APODETI. In favour of integration with Indonesia; in spite of support from Djakarta it remained rather insignificant; UDT (Uniao Democratica Timorense). A union mainly composed of government officials (indigenous elite) who wanted to protect the status quo and the privileges acquired under Portugese rule. Initially, due to - among others - the active support of the Portugese authorities, it was quite popular. After a coalition with Fretilin on January 21, 1975, however, many of its supporters went over to this latter movement. In frustration it broke the coalition in May and made contacts with Indonesia. Joint plans were made to destroy Fretilin. UDT would be able to retain its position after the subsequent integration with Indonesia. The coup took place on August 10, 1975, Fretilin, however, had known about the contacts for some time and had prepared for the worst. After it had become clear that

there was no point in negotiating, Fretilin called on its followers to take up arms. Reinforced by Timorese soldiers from the Portugese army and supported by almost all of the population, it defeated UDT within two weeks.

On November 28, 1975, Fretilin proclaimed independence; the Democratic Republic of East Timor had been founded.

FRETILIN (until September 12, 1974, the Associao Social Democratica de Timor, ASDT) was founded by a small group of young Timorese in Dili, among them the journalist Jose Ramos Horta, Nicolau Lobato and Mari Alkatiri. Partly inspired by their knowledge of the African liberation movements, they believed in the independence of East Timor. On May 22, 1975, they published their first manifesto. The basis for their political activities would be among others:

- the right to independence
- the rejection of colonialism
- the struggle against corruption
- the abolition of racial discrimination

After a short time Fretilin was the most popular movement, mainly because of its activities among the population: social programs, land reform, alphabetisation. For the first time, the population got access to medical care; the rule of a Portugese-colonial and a Timorese elite had been abolished. Thus, the identity of the East Timorese people was developed and from this it drew its inspiration for the struggle against the Indonesian invaders.

The invasion

After the Portugese withdrawal, Indonesia did everything in its power to annex East Timor as its 27th province. It had several grounds for this annexation:

- an independent and free East Timor would stimulate liberation movements within the Indonesian empire.
- oil had been struck in and around East Timor.
- for the U.S. (East) Timor is in an important strategic spot. Indonesia looked for support for its integration plans in other countries. The most important parties however were divided among themselves:

Australia promised to refrain from diplomatic or military resistance and the U.S. were prepared to increase their military

aid, but Portugal refused to cooperate. More important, the political following of Fretilin in East Timor kept growing, and it clearly opted for independence and freedom. This became evident, among others, in a massive demonstration near the Indonesian consulate in Dili.

Other attempts - an anti-Fretilin campaign on the radio with accusations about communism etc., Apodeti support and the UDT coup - did not produce the desired effect either. An invasion became inevitable and was expected by Fretilin.

It took place on December 7, 1795. The capital of Dili, Baucau and several other towns were bombed; Indonesian navy vessels brought up tanks, other armed vehicles and thousands of armed men. Within several hours Indonesia reported that Dili had been taken. A few days later Fretilin recovered the larger part of the town. Resistance was much stronger than expected and the Indonesians lost many men, especially marines, who landed on the heavily mined beaches. The Indonesian generals began to understand that the whole East Timorese population was their enemy, and that the only "solution" lay in total genocide. Fretilin largely withdrew to the mountains. Although it was but primitively armed it held out, thanks to the enormous dedication and the full support of the people.

Mounting violence, mounting resistance

On December 25 therefore, Indonesia mounted a second, more massive attack on Dili and Baucau. 30 War vessels and a great number of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, tanks and other armed vehicles were brought into action. Resistance was apparently broken. From somewhere in the mountains Radio Maubere reported many casualties. Dili, Baucau and the international airport were once more taken by the Indonesians. Along the mountain road Indonesian soldiers advanced towards Fretilin headquarters in Aileu. Thousands of civilians flee before them and were killed in flight. But then the political character of Fretilin became clear. In a short time it had developed into a modern people's army and resistance movement, mobilising the whole population to fight a liberation war. Fretilin was the people of East Timor. The people, having become aware of

its possibilities and identity in these months of social progress, fought for its freedom. Everybody had their own task: armed struggle, training, food supply, transport, medical aid, social work, etc.

After a short time radio Maubere reported that the Indonesian troops in Aileu and on the airport had been surrounded. The women's division, fighting on the southern border, held its ground. Almost all of Indonesian paratroopers, who landed "behind the Fretilin lines", were killed or captured by local fighters and a tribe which was armed with poisoned arrows only. Many arms were seized.

It was difficult for the Indonesians to land reinforcements and supplies because of heavy gunfire from the mountains over-looking the landing grounds. This invasion was a failure too. The Indonesians only managed to keep Dili and a few small areas in the north, but even there resistance continued.

But in spite of the fact that it controlled at least 80% of the country and could carry out its programme step by step, Fretilins fight became ever more difficult. Indonesia more and more focussed on destruction and isolation. Bombings became more intense, the use of napalm and defoliants was escalated; the whole island was surrounded by an Indonesian naval blockade.

The isolation was heightened when Alarico Fernandes, minister of internal security and communication, committed treason at the end of 1978 by going over to the Indonesians on December 3. Apart from important information for the Indonesians he took along vital parts of the Maubere transmitter and thus robbed Fretilin frome one of its most important means of communication with, among others, the outside world. Australian reports from september 1979 show that the greatest part of the International Red Cross relief goods - the only relief permitted - does not reach its destination or is sold by the Indonesians in East Timor. This is one reason for the acute famine in some areas.

Brief chronological history

- 1520 Portugese traders arrive in Timor.
- 1613 Dutch traders arrive in Timor.
- 1702 Fifty years of rebellion against Portugese rule.
- 1904 Dutch and Portugese governments finalise boundaries between East and West Timor.
- 1912 Large-scale rebellion against Portugese rule.
- 1941 Australian troops despatched to neutral Timor to fight the Japanese.
- 1949 Indonesia (including West Timor) wins independence from the Netherlands.
- 1974, April Military coup in Lisbon against Caetano regime; decolonisation process commenced: ASDT (later Fretilin), UDT and Apodeti parties form in East Timor.
- 1974, Sept. Whitlam tells Suharto independent East Timor unviable and threat to regional security but should decide its own future.
- 1974, Sept. First offences of about 2000 Indonesian soldiers along border of East and West Timor.
- 1975, Jan. UDT and Fretilin enter into a proindependence coalition.

- 1975. Febr./March, First serious reports on Indonesian invasionplan. More active Indonesian support for Apodeti.
- 1975, August UDT coup and civil war resulting in some 3000 deaths, the displacement of refugees to Australia and West Timor, and Fretilin victory.
- 1975, Sept. International Red Cross and ACFOA work in Timor.
- 1975. October. Five Australian newsmen killed at Balibo during Indonesian incursions into East Timor.
- 1975. Nov. 28. Fretilin declares independence and proclaims the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET).
- 1975, Dec. 6. Ford and Kissinger complete visit to Jakarta.
- 1975, Dec. 7. Full-scale Indonesian invasion launched.
- 1975, Dec. 12. U.N. General Assembly (69-11) calls on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. Australia supports the resolution: U.S. and the Netherlands abstain.
- 1976. Jan. UN Special Representative, Winspeare Guicciardi, is frustrated in his attempts to visit Fretilincontrolled areas of East Timor.

- 1976, April, Australia presses for ICRC to be readmitted to Timor.
- 1976, Aug. Conference of Nonaligned countries in Sri Lanka supports independence struggle in East Ti-Indonesian troups.
- 1976, Sept. 1400 refugees evacuated from West Timor to Portugal.
- 1976, Nov. 17, UN General Assembly (61-18) rejects Indonesian takeover of Timor.
- 1976, Nov. 19, Reports that widespread fighting continues in East Timor, that Fretilin controls 85 per 60.000 people have died.
- 1976, dec. 12, Ramos Horta pays minister of development
- 1977. March. US Congressional Hearings hear allegations of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor from Jim Dunn.
- 1977, March 3, Debate in Dutch Parliament on deliverance of 2 corvettes to Indonesia.
- 1977, July, According to Fretilin 1886 Indonesian soldiers were killed from Jan-May, and 3994 from Jan-July.

- 1977, Sept. Xavier do Amaral replaced as President of DRET.
- 1977, Dec. 1, UN General Assembly (68-20) calls on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor.
- mor + demands withdrawal of 1978, Jan. Australia extends de facto recognition to Indonesia's takeover of East Timor.
 - 1978, May, Reports of intensified fighting.
 - 1978, Sept. Foreign Ambassadors, shocked by visit to East Timor, call for urgent humanitarian aid.
 - 1978, Dec. 3, Fretilin radio link with outside world ceases.
- cent of the territory, that 1978, Dec. 6, UN General Assembly asserts East Timor's right to self-determination.
- visit to Holland. Mr. Pronk 1978, Dec. 31, Death of Nicolau Lobato, President of DRET.
- aid refuses to meet Horta. 1979, Sept. Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Cuba supports right to independence of East Timor.
 - 1979, Oct. ICRC says humanitarian situation in East Timor "as bad as Biafra". ICRC and CRS commence 6-month emergency programs.
 - 1979, Nov. UN General Assembly asserts East Timor's right to self-determination.
 - 1980, Jan-April, Diplomatic and some military resistance to Indonesia continues. ICRC and CRS programs extended.

Programme of the revolutionary front of East Timor

I. IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE DEJURE BY THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

Fretilin interprets independence de jure as the formal recognition that the only way for the future of East Timor is total independence. Until this is achieved, Fretilin will have the cooperation of the Portuguese Government to implement the program of reconstruction and development of the country. Fretilin will discuss with the Portuguese Government the best form of this cooperation.

II. RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY

- A. Basic Policies
- 1. Gradual elimination of colonial relations and structures and the active struggle against the establishment of new forms of domination and exploitation.
- 2. Creation of new political, economic and social structures which will serve the interests of the people of East Timor.
- 3. Resort to the Portuguese Government, foreign governments and international organisations to obtain economic, financial and diplomatic support for the implementation of the program of reconstruction and development.
- 4. Fretilin reserves the right to control and orientate the implementation of this program through the existing departments, or other to be created to guarantee its fulfilment.
- 5. Fretilin also reserves the right to administrate independently and without interference of their funds.
- B. Specific Measures
- 1. Economic reconstruction:
 - creation of social economic and technical structures
 - creation of co-operatives. The co-operatives will be the base of the economic and social life of East Timor. Co-operatives of production, distribution and consumption will be set up throughout the country
 - elimination of the excessive dependency on foreign countries. Incentives will be given to the production of goods of basic needs through diversified agriculture. Mono agriculture will be discouraged

- agrarian reform. All large farms will be expropriated and returned to the people and will be used within the co-operative system. Fertile lands not under cultivation will be distributed to the people and will be utilised in co-operatives or by State enterprises
- agricultural mechanisation
- promotion of fishing and cattle
- protection of all flora and fauna. Reafforestation and introduction of new species
- development of food manufacturing industries (milk, cheese, butter, canned meats, fish and fruits), by the utilisation of national resources. Also, the utilisation of forests for timber and the manufacture of timber products, including furniture and paper. Local industry, including native handicrafts and weaving, will be promoted and geared to a rapid economic and social development
- commercial exploitation will be stopped, prices controlled and a new fiscal system introduced. Control of commerce
- internal commerce: co-operatives will ensure the distribu-
- exports will be organised through the Central Co-operative in Dili, which will receive all products and produce from the regional co-operatives for export
- imports: the Central-Co-operative will handle all imports and will distribute them to the regional co-operatives
- balance of payments: imports will be strictly controlled
- introduction of a national currency

2. Education and Culture:

- elimination of the colonialist education system. This will be replaced by a system which will serve all people. At the same time, Timorese culture will be maintained, fostered and encouraged
- an extensive program will be initiated to eliminate illiteracy and ignorance among people of all ages
- a university and technical colleges will be established and scholarships awarded for study in overseas countries.
- the Portuguese language will be retained as the official language of the country
- a program of research and study will be made into the Tetum language, as well as other local languages. A further aim

- is the fostering of literature and art of the various ethnic groups through cultural exchanges for the enrichment not only of Timorense culture as a whole, but also as a contribution of universal culture
- physical education and sports will be encouraged
- all citizens will have free choice of religion. Native religious houses, churches, mosques and temples will be protected

3. Health:

- clinics and hospitals will be established throughout the country. A mobile doctor service also to be formed to serve outling areas
- immediate steps will be taken to eradicate prevalent diseases including leprosy, TB and malaria
- Timorese will be encouraged to train as doctors and nurses in foreign countries. Foreign doctors will be invited to work for varying periods of times
- children, invalids and the aged will be protected
- free medical assistance will be given to all citizens
- all health services will be controlled by the State

4. Social Justice:

- gradual elimination of exploitation
- forced labour will be abolished immediately
- wages will be determined by the State on the basis of equal work, equal pay for both sexes
- women workers will be paid wages during and after pregnancy
- educational programs will be launched to help combat alcoholism, vagrancy, prostitution and gambling
- traditional institutions of justice will be preserved and protected and improved by international law
- organisations for workers, women, students and youths will be established so that every person will actively contribute to the political life of the country

5. Internal Administration:

- abolition of the colonial administrative structure
- division of the territory of East Timor into regions
- the regions to be administered by representatives from both Fretilin and the Portuguese Government. Regional committees of Fretilin will launch the basis for a democrat-

tic administration and will ensure the implementation of the program of reconstruction and development in each region

6. National Defence:

- the defence of the territories of East Timor will be guaranteed by the armed forces, which will serve the people
- the armed forces will protect the rights of people
- the armed forces will defend the rights of the people by securing peace and order necessary for the implementation of this program
- restructure of the armed forces

III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- non-alignment
- good neighbour policy and non-interference
- co-operation with all countries in the world

IV. PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Fretilin reserves the right to decide the date of the proclamation of independence of East Timor

- sovereign and independent state
- republican, democratic, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist government
- general elections for a constitutional assembly through direct and secret universal suffrage
- equality of all citizen before law
- organisations and groups which support the annexation of the country to a foreign power will be forbidden to exercise political activities
- protection of all citizens in foreign countries

The United Nations and East Timor

On 21 November 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the following resolution (34/40) on East Timor:

The General Assembly

- recognising the inalienable right of all peoples to selfdetermination and independence in accordance with the principles
 of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on
 the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
 contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;
 bearing in mind the part of the Political Declaration
 adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government
 of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana from 3 to 9 September
 1979, relating to East Timor;
- having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory;
- having heard the statements by the representatives of Portugal, as the administering Power, and of Indonesia;
- having also heard the statements by the petitioners, including the representative of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independent;
- Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- Declares that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine their own future, under the auspices of the United Nations:
- 3. Expresses its deepest concern at the suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the situation now prevailing in the Territory:
- 4. Calls upon all parties concerned to facilitate the entry into the Territory of international relief aid in order to alleviate the suffering of the people of East Timor;
- 5. Requests the United Nations Children's Fund and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to render, within their respective fields of competence, all possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the

- children and those seeking to leave for another country for purposes of family reunion;
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session, the item entitled 'Question of East Timor'.

Voting on the resolution was as follows: For 62: Against 31; Abstentions 45.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vietnam, Zambia.

Against:

Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zaire.

Abstaining:

Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Samoa, Spain, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Absent:

Bulgaria, Comoros, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, German Democratic Republic, Libya, Malta, Mauritius, Poland, Solomon Islands, Somalia.

EAST TIMOR: NEW FIGHTS

Spokesmen who recently visited East Timor have reported that it is dangerous for Indonesian military to go beyond a 10 km radius around Dili. The town itself, too, does not seem to be safe for them. Street patrols after 10 p.m. have been cancelled.

Fretilin fighters in the Dili area are too far from the agricultural areas controlled by Fretilin to get their supplies there. They buy food in

the Dili market. The Roman Catholic clergy also helps Fretilin with food and information. The main objective of a Fretilin attack 20 km south of Dili, in July of this year, seems to have been the acquisition of food. In the Northeast of the country the food situation is said to be much better for Fretilin; there, they presumably still control agricultural areas with ample livestock.

East Timor: How many people have died?1)

Since the first days of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975, there has been a steady flow of information indicating a large and increasing death toll in the territory. Less than one year after the invasion, church sources in Dili estimated that the number of people killed may have reached 100.000. By the latter half of 1979, Timorese church sources were saying in private conversation that at least 100.000 and perhaps as many as 200.000-300.000 East Timorese have died since the invasion began.

These estimates are not based on population counts. They arise from observations of people who have lived in East Timor during four years of war. The estimates are supported by the many reports from other Timorese (both Fretilin and non-Fretilin) of widespread killing in the early period of the invasion. The findings of an International Red Cross (ICRC) survey in July 1979 and Australian journalist Peter Rodgers in October, back up the 1979 ACFOA report "Aid and East Timor" which showed that a large proportion of East Timor's population was in an emergency situation and many had died of disease and starvation in the countryside and in Indonesian controlled 'refugee' or 'resettlement'camps.

Reports by East Timorese on the number of deaths in their country were given credence in October 1979 when Peter Rodgers calculated that the population had declined by about 100.000. Rodger's estimates ware based on official population figures released by the Indonesian-controlled Provincial government in Dili. In fact, Rodgers appears to have underestimated the number of deaths these figures may indicate.

How many people are missing?

The official Indonesian figures supplied to Rodgers in October 1979 put East Timor's population at 522.433. The exact population of East Timor before the invasion is not known but according to official Portugese and East Timor church figures, it was in the range of 663.000-700.000 in 1975. The short civil war in East Timor during August/September 1975 effectively caused a 7.000 decrease in population (4.000 refugees who never returned and up to 3.000 deaths - see discussion below). If we

subtract this number from the 1975 population figures, we are left with a population in East Timor, after the civil war but before the invasion, of 656.000-693.000.

Comparing those figures with the 523.000 figure supplied to Peter Rodgers, the population in 1979 appears to be about 133.000-170.000 less than it was in 1975 before the invasion. However, there are three obvious reasons why we cannot conclude that this is the number of people who have died since the invasion:

- It is not clear how accurate the Indonesian population estimate actually is. In June 1979, a Timorese source was provided with some official figures which, when totalled, put the population at 523.000, almost the same as that given to Rodgers in October. The June figures, provided on a district by district basis were almost all "rounded-off" to the nearest thousand and, more questionably, eight of the districts were shown to have a population of exactly 30.000. If the figures supplied to Rodgers were these same June figures, there must be some doubt about their accuracy.
- A population census by Indonesian authorities would include only those East Timorese directly accessible to the Indonesian government. When Rodgers was provided with the population figures, he was also told by Indonesian military officials that there were 300-600 "Fretilin members" in the Eastern part of the territory. Given the Indonesian government's record over the last four years of drastically understating the number of Timorese outside their control, there would certainly be many more than 300-600 people not included in the population count. Until it is known how many East Timorese were not counted, it is impossible to determine from these official figures how many people have died.
- Subtracting the 1979 figure from the 1975 population figure to determine the number of missing East Timorese takes no account of births since 1975. In the 1950s and 60s, East Timor's population grew at a rate of 1.7 per cent per year. If life in East Timor during the period 1975-79 had been close to normal, the population should have increased to about 700.000-740.000. Against this figure, the 1979 Indonesian population figures

would indicate that 177.000-217.000 people were missing. However, there is no doubt that conditions in East Timor during 1975-79 were far from 'normal' but information on the effects of killings, starvation and disease on birth rates etc. is not available. Therefore, while it is currently impossible to quantify, 'population growth' after 1975 has to be taken into consideration.

What then, do the 1979 population figures show?

We have seen that there may be some doubt about the accuracy of the Indonesian government's 1979 population figure for East Timor (approx. 523.000). Whether or not it is accurate, if it is compared with the pre-invasion 1975 population level, it leaves 133.000-170.000 East Timorese unaccounted for. Although we are not able to quantify 'population growth' after 1975, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the actual number of 'missing' East Timorese is at least 133.000-170.000 and could be as high as 177.000-217.000. However, until we know how many East Timorese remain outside Indonesian control (and hence not counted in Indonesian population surveys), we cannot deduce from these figures alone, how many East Timorese have actually died since the invasion.

Why are Peter Rodgers' calculations an underestimate?

How is it possible to conclude that the number of people missing may be twice that calculated by Rodgers, given that we have used the same Indonesian population figure? The reasons are simple:

Firstly, Rodgers relies exclusively on Portugese government figures for his 1975 population level. However, there is evidence that these figures underestimate the actual population because some Timorese avoided the Portugese census counts in order to evade colonial taxes. For this reason, we have given the 1975 population as a range between the Portugese figure (663.000) and Catholic Church estimates (700.000). Secondly, Rodgers appears to give credence to reports that there may be as many as 25.000 East Timorese in West Timor, where they fled during the 1975 civil war. Rodgers has not seen these refugees, nor have there been any consistent first-hand accounts of their presence in West Timor since 1976.

According to wellplaced East Timorese, West Timorese and Jakarta church sources, most if not all refugees who went to West Timor in 1975 have returned to East Timor (with the exception of 1400 who went to Portugal in late 1976). Until the presence of East Timorese in West Timor is confirmed, Rodgers' use of them in calculations about population must remain doubtful and, for this reason, we have excluded them from our estimates.

The third reason why Rodgers' calculations are probably an underestimate is that he does not, as we have done here, take into account any 'population growth' after 1975.

More recent Indonesian population figures. Are they credible? Even though Rodgers estimate of 100.000 deaths may be an underestimate, it is a shocking figure in any language. Not surprisingly, the Indonesian government has sought to prove Rodgers' calculations wrong, and has subsequently issued three new sets of population figures in as many months. In November 1979, an Indonesian armed forces newspaper disputed Rodgers' report and claimed that East Timor's population was really 612.017. A month later, the East Timor military commander stated that the population was 592.603. Then, in January 1980, US Congressmen visiting East Timor were presented with a set of figures allegedly showing the population to be 598.603 (in fact, the figures provided totalled 589,782). Why these three sets of figures are different from one another and so different from the figure of 523.000 supplied to Rodgers in late October 1979 as "the results of a survey that has just been carried out", remains unexplained. These recent figures are even more suspect when reports from East Timor indicate that the flow of East Timorese into Indonesian controlled areas has "slowed to a trickle" since April 1979. There have been no reports indicating the movement of 60.000-80.000 Timorese into Indonesian controlled areas since April '79, 1et alone since October 1979.

While these new sets of Indonesian population figures appear to be contrived, they still of course, leave enormous numbers of East Timorese unaccounted for. How many deaths caused by the 1975 civil war?

Since Rodgers' October report, even the Australian government appears to accept the fact that large numbers of Timorese have died. However, at least one of its members, Michael MacKellar, has attempted to lay a significant part of the blame on the 1975 civil war. There is no reliable evidence to support such a claim.

The civil war began in mid-August 1975 and had all but ended within three weeks with occasional clashes occuring until the end of September 1975. According to ACFOA and ICRC estimates at the time, the number of deaths caused by fighting in the 1975 civil war was 1.500-3.000. Approximately 2.600 people fled to Australia at the height of the civil war. Of the thousands of people who crossed the border into West Timor at the same time, all but 1.400 who went to Portugal in 1976, appear to have returned to East Timor. So, the actual known decrease in East Timor's population, directly attributable to the 1975 civil war is only 7.000.

The only military activity in East Timor between late September and December 7, 1975 occurred in the border areas. These events involved incursions by Indonesian troops into, and naval and aerial bombardment of, East Timorese territory. The actual number of casualties sustained by both East Timorese military and civilians at that time was relatively low.

It has also been argued that the widespread starvation and disease seen in East Timor was a direct result of the civil war. It is true that the civil war did cause disruption of food supplies in some areas of East Timor, but according to the ACFOA team which visited the territory in October 1975 (after the civil war), the situation had not reached famine proportions and, in most areas, the 'subsistence economy' had proved war resistant.

By late November 1975, after almost three months of humanitarian aid programmes conducted by the ICRC, ASIAT and later, eight member agencies of ACFOA, the ICRC chief delegate, Andre Pasquier reported that there had been no cases of serious illness through starvation and "nobody in East Timor (was) starving to death".

Indonesian invasion responsible for many deaths

There seems little doubt that an enormous number of East

Timorese have died since 1975. As we have seen, East Timorese
living in the territory believe between 100.000 to 300.000 may
have died in the last four years. Their claims appear to be
supported by official Indonesian population figures released
in Dili in late October 1979. These latter figures, while they
cannot tell us exactly how many people have actually died, do
indicate that at least 133.000-170.000 and perhaps as many as
177.000-217.000 remain unaccounted for. This represents between
one fifth and one third of East Timor's population.

If the 1975 civil war can account for only a relatively small number of deaths, what is the reason for such a big number of deaths since then? People who have lived in East Timor for the past four years are in no doubt:

Since December 7, 1975, a wide spectrum of East Timorese have reported systematic killings, the 'wiping of villages off the map' and destruction of crops during Indonesian military operations in East Timor. Their reports have been publicised, but not widely or consistently in Australian and international media for East Timor has been, and essentially remains, closed to independent observers.

The Indonesian government refused to allow international relief organisations into East Timor for the first 3-3/4 years of its occupation of the territory. The destitute condition of East Timorese in Indonesian 'refugee' or 'resettlement' camps was known to Western governments almost one year before the ICRC and Catholic Relief Services were permitted to begin a relief operation. There seems little doubt that the starvation and disease seen in East Timor by the ICRC and CRS in 1979, was not caused by the civil war. It occurred after the Indonesian invasion and would have been exacerbated by the conscious exclusion of an international relief operation.

There is little point in arguing whether or not the Indonesian government intended to cause the death of a large number of Timorese to effect the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. There seems little doubt that the actions of the Indonesian military, as an invading and occupying force, has caused a large

number of deaths and it is for this reason that East Timorese still do not accept the Indonesian presence in East Timor.

NOTES

1. This article is a summary of the February 1980 issue of Timor Information Service, which concluded that between 133.000 and 217.000 people (that is, between one fifth and one third of the population) are unaccounted for in East Timor. Detailed sourcing is provided in the original material. This summary was produced by T.I.S.

HYPOCRISY

The Suharto regime continuously manifests its concern to raise the economic and cultural level of the East Timorese population. For this purpose new buildings are raised in Dili, the East Timor showcase. Pain nor expense are spared to teach the population the Indonesian language.

As for the population itself, it is allowed to serve as a

shield for the Indonesian military. When these move into a Fretilin-area, the population is driven before them and used as a living shield. Who-ever takes cover is shot on the spot. In the so-called resettlement camps human barricades are used as well.

JAVANESE TEACHERS FLEE EAST TIMOR

3000 recently graduated teachers from Java have been sent to East Timor to teach the Timorese population the Indonesian language. They were recruited on the promise that they would earn ministers' salaries - approximately

of war, however, have frightened off most of them. The army has evacuated them to West Timor. They have been forbidden to return to Java, however, alledgedly because this was a transmigration project.

Timorese family reunions - politics before people

Separations

Australia became the first country of asylum for the first time in its history in 1975 when 2581 Timorese were evacuated to Darwin from East Timor between August and November of that year. The majority of these people left East Timor in August and September when the civil war between UDT and Fretilin was at its height, and were ferried to Darwin by boat and plane. The hijack by 37 Timorese of an RAAF Caribou from Baucau on Timor's north-east coast indicates the atmosphere of panic which prevailed at the time. Many were elderly people, women (some of whom were pregnant) and children (some without their parents). Of this whole group many were Chinese-Timorese and some were indigenous Timorese who had worked as servants in Timor. Some (mostly Portugese nationals) went on to Portugal. But most chose to stay. 1850 were distributed between Darwin and migrant hostels around Australia and given temporary resident visas until December 31, 1975 by which time it was hoped the situation in Timor would be clearer and long-term decisions about the future could be made. Some were under the impression they would soon return to Timor for reunion with their families once the civil war was over. Such hopes were quickly dashed by the Indonesian invasion and sealing-off of their country in December 1975. They had no choice but to stay. They were granted permanent residence in Australia from May 1976 and are now concentrated in Darwin, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. Reports of the war coupled with the loneliness and insecurity of exile heightened the refugees' fears for their families and the matter of family reunions was quickly broached.

First attempts at reunion

The first attempt at family reunification was made in late 1975/early 1976. According to the Timorese welfare officer in Melbourne, Mr. Joao Goncalves, some Timorese in Australia were issued at this time with authority forms from the Australian Immigration Department which would permit family members in West Timor and East Timor to come to Australia without being subject to the normal migration requirements. These forms, which were

valid until June 1976, were ignored by the Indonesian authorities. Hearing of the failures at the Timor end, Timorese in Australia attempted to have the June 30 deadline extended. They were not able to achieve this.

By this time, however, the issue of Timorese family reunion was the subject of frequent comment in the Federal Parliament. In October 1976, during discussions in Jakarta, Mr. Fraser and President Suharto agreed that officials of both countries should meet to resolve the problem. At least 11 meetings were to occur before an 'in principle' agreement on reunions was announced five months later in March 1977. This agreement stated that arrangements were proceeding for a visit to Dili by Australian officials "to take place as early as circumstances permit". Timorese in Australia were invited to nominate relatives for reunion and were informed that the acceptable categories for reunion were: "spouses, minor dependent children and parents of Australian citizens; and relatives who have employment skills and experience recognised and in demand in Australia". They were given three weeks to lodge their nominations "so that the operation can proceed as quickly as possible". By the closing date on 22 April 1977, 2668 relatives had been nominated for admission to Australia. At the same time, the Timorese asked the Australian Government to take two precautions against possible abuse of information on relatives supplied to the Indonesian authorities in Timor. They requested that an international welfare agency such as the International Red Cross (ICRC) be invited to supervise the reunion program, and secondly that a member of the Timorese community in Australia be permitted to accompany the Australian Immigration team to Timor to act as an interpreter. Both proposals were rejected by the Australian Government on the grounds that they would jeopardise the Australian-Indonesian agreement on reunions.

Disappointments

The note of optimism about a speedy resolution of the problem struck by the Government at this time proved to be a hollow one indeed. Despite the urgency of the matter and frequent reports that the Team's visit to Timor was 'imminent', nothing of significance was to happen for a further 14 months. No team went to Dili, and no families were reunited. Even the extension of

de facto recognition by the Australian Government of Indonesia's takeover of Timor announced on January 20, 1978 failed to achieve Indonesian co-operation, despite the fact that it was advanced by Mr.Peacock as one reason for recognition.

A further blow to the hopes of the waiting Timorese was the eventual disclosure that less than a quarter of the relatives nominated in April 1977 would be accepted for admission to Australia. A figure of 625 was apparently arrived at by both Governments in July 1978 "after protracted negotiations". Press reports, however, were making reference to an agreed list of 'about 600' names some time before this date. Though at least 625 out of 2668 are eligible to come, frequent media mention has now fixed this number of 600 in the public mind as the literal figure both distorting public expectations in regard to this group and eliminating from consideration the claims of the

Presumably Indonesian reluctance to allow all the 2668 to leave Timor was a factor in the reduction for it has been reported on a number of occasions that they do not wish to be embarrassed by the exodus of large numbers of people from Timor. Indeed in its own press statements until the end of 1978 the Indonesian Government continually referred to the family reunion program as a repatriation exercise and avoided reference to reunions outside Timor in Australia. The Timorese themselves, both in Australia and Timor, did not see it that way. Only a handful of Timorese have actually returned to East Timor and, with one or two exceptions, these were religious sisters. Timorese in Timor have actively discouraged relatives from returning. One parent wrote in late 1977:

remaining 2000 nominees.

"Tell my son that for nothing on this earth should he return to Timor. As soon as I possibly can, I shall leave here; but I would rather die without seeing him again than to know that he had returned to this hell".

It should be noted, however, that the Australian Government did give some indication on June 2, 1977 after receipt of the 2668 nominations that not all would satisfy the admission criteria. It was also clear that the Australian Government in deference to Indonesian sensitivities though in complete disregard of the reality inside Timor, was treating the reunion of families as

a 'migration exercise' not as the intake of refugees from a war situation.

First reunions

Following a visit to Jakarta early in July 1978 by the then Immigration Minister, Mr. Michael MacKellar, a high level meeting between Indonesian and Australian officials was decided on for July 25-26, 1978 - 14 months after the nominations had been called for in a hurry the previous April. After that meeting the Australian Government announced "that the procedures accepted by both sides will enable the processing and movement of the people involved by Christmas" and that "Indonesian and Australian officials will visit Indonesia (Dili) ... at about the end of October" for selection interviews. Well-founded Timorese scepticism about which Christmas was meant appeared to be confirmed when October passed without the team's departure followed by another Christmas spent in lonely separation from loved ones. A visit to Australia in December 1978 by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar, indicated, however, that at last some action could soon be expected. Following their discussions. Mr. Peacock announced on December 15 that "agreement had been reached for an early visit by an Australian immigration team to East Timor to interview an initial group for reunion with other relatives in Australia. It was also agreed" according to a letter from the Acting Foreign Minister at the time, Mr. Lan Sinclair, "that the remaining eligible nominees would be processed under normal immigration procedures as quickly as possible".

A three-man Immigration team, led by Mr.Norman Hoffmann, arrived in Dili on Christmas Day 1978. There was no matching visit of an Indonesian immigration team to Australia at the same time, though an exchange of teams had previously been agreed to in principle. The visit would not have been warranted as no Timorese in Australia wished to return to an Indonesian-controlled Timor. Following the Hoffmann-team visit to Dili, 99 Timorese arrived in Australia in mid-January 1979 for tearful reunions with their families.

They were the first Timorese to have come from East Timor since the last half of 1975. They were also the last to come in this official, public manner, direct from Dili with their fares wholly paid by the Australian Government.

Since January 1979, a further 196 people on the agreed list have come to Australia for reunion with their families. That is, three years after the official lodging of nominations and five years after their separation, less than half of the agreed family reunions, i.e. 295 out of 625, have occurred. It is to be noted, however, that an estimated 100 other Timorese not on the agreed list have been admitted to Australia from Timor over these years either on the basis of special consideration or because they have met the occupational and other criteria gover-

Discrimination and corruption

ning normal admittance.

With few exceptions, all those who have come from Timor, whether on the agreed list or not, have been Chinese-Timorese, a fact the Australian Government acknowledges. Only one or two mixed or indigenous Timorese have been allowed to leave. And with few exceptions, all have had to pay substantial bribes to Indonesian officials or private citizens in both Dili and Jakarta to obtain the necessary exit permits. Money for these payments, which vary between \$A 1500 and 3000 per head, has been sent from Australia by relatives or raised by the sale of property in Timor. For example, one woman who arrived in Australia in 1975 with two of her children, leaving behind her husband and six children, has already paid \$ 6000 (in bribes, air-fares Dili-Jakarta, and accommodation in Jakarta) to bring her husband and three of the children. She will need at least another \$ 5000 to bring the other three children who are still in East Timor.

To obviate these twin injustices of discrimination and corruption Timorese in Australia have repeatedly called on the Australian Government to send an Immigration team back to Timor to process all eligible nominees on the spot and bring them direct to Australia. In response the Australian Government has been content to make cautious representations through diplomatic channels and appears to accept that nothing more can be done.

On the matter of bribery, for example, Mr.Macphee the current Minister for Immigration has said:

"I am aware of allegations which have been made in this regard and this matter has been raised with the Indonesian authorities. I understand that it has been investigated, but you will appreciate that effective action to eliminate this problem can only be taken by the Indonesian authorities". (Jan. 3, 1980)

A similar attitude of acquiescence is expressed by the Foreign Minister, Mr.Peacock, in his reply to a request to send an immigration team to Dili:

"this possibility has been raised in discussion with the Indonesians but ... there has been no substantive reaction - the question of entry to East Timor is, of course, one for the Indonesian authorities to decide".

(March 20, 1980)

This means, in effect, that the Australian Government accepts it can do nothing for those on the agreed list until they present themselves at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

The situation now

The Timorese in Australia now generally believe that the Indonesian authorities have decided to shut the door on any further departures from Timor - that is, not to honour their side of the 'in principle agreement' any longer. The Australian Government denies this. In reply to a question in the Senate on April 1, 1980 Senator Carrick said:

"The program is continuing, although slowly. Four Timorese on the agreed list have arrived in Australia in the last six weeks. Eight others are currently in Jakarta awaiting issue of Indonesian exit permits".

The implication in this reply that the figures supplied show the program has not ended is fallacious. It does not address the crucial question of whether people are at this point allowed to leave East Timor. Nor does it allow that the only way out of Jakarta for these people at the moment is by subterfuge. Timorese who have negotiated the first leg of the long journey from Dili to Jakarta and been issued there with visas to enter Australia by the Australian embassy are being denied exit permits by the Indonesian authorities — a fact which the Australian Government has elsewhere acknowledged. Those who arrived here recently have

got around this only by forging Indonesian passports and travelling on them to Singapore (which does not require visas of Indonesian citizens) whence they have made their way to Australia.

These people, in one sense, have been the lucky ones. For the majority of those affected - perhaps especially the 20 wives whose husbands are still in Timor - the future looks bleak indeed.

It may well be their only hope for reunion is the direct and strong intervention of an influential third party - for example the United Nations, or the International Red Cross, or a less pusillanimous Australian Government. What chance is there of this?

United Nations

The Timorese have called on the UN to intervene several times. The UN in fact passed a resolution on November 21, 1979 as follows:

"The General Assembly requests the United Nations
Children's Fund and the office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
render, within their respective fields of competence,
all possible assistance to the people of East Timor,
particularly the children and those seeking to leave
for another country for purposes of family reunion
.."

The writer is not aware of any activity to date on the part of these two bodies in response to thies request.

International Red Cross


The agreement drawn up between the International Red Cross (ICRC) and the Indonesian Red Cross on June 19, 1979 covering their current joint operation in East Timor refers only to a food and medical relief operation. No mention is made of the other traditional ICRC works, one of which is family reunions. ICRC's attention was drawn to the problem of family reunions in a document directed to them in September 1979 by Action for World Development. The Director of Operations in Geneva replied on October 5, 1979 that Australia should tackle this problem with Indonesia through diplomatic channels, implying that ICRC itself

would not intervene. The reply added, however, that since Portugal had no diplomatic links with Indonesia ICRC would try to act as an intermediary with Indonesia for those applicants who might be accepted by Portugal. This has been done, and it would appear has some chance of success. Some light has been thrown on ICRC's puzzling reluctance to offer the same service to the family reunion program between Timor and Australia by the Secretary-General of Australian Red Cross, Mr. Leon Stubbings. He reported on January 10, 1980 after discussions with ICRC during a visit to Timor that the ICRC is at present not involved in the family reunion program "as the issue is considered too political". Given the present state of the program and the fact that the ICRC operation in East Timor has been extended for another six months, it may well be time for the ICRC to revise its position and seek to broaden its program inside East Timor to include some more of its traditional works, including family reunions.

The Australian Government

As one would expect, the Australian Government defends its record on family reunions. It argues in its official statements and correspondence that it has done "everything possible in the most difficult circumstances" (Macphee) to reunite Timorese families. It points to its record of admitting 1800 refugees from Timor in mid-1975, paying for their initial settlement, and providing welfare assistance. It claims that its efforts have been responsible for the admission of another 400 people from East Timor since then. The Timorese are sternly reminded by the Minister for Immigration that "Australia's ability to absorb new settlers is not unlimited" (a position the Northern Territory Administration with its new drive to populate the North clearly rejects). The Timorese are even chastised for their alleged "criticism (in the press) ... of efforts being made by the Australian authorities to help them, their relatives and countrymen" (Macphee). No account is taken of Australia's wartime debt to the Timorese, the horrors inflicted on them during recent times, and the special obligations Australia has to them as a neighbour.

Both Mr.Peacock and Mr.Macphee do concede, however, that "the program has not proceeded as quickly as we would have liked".





Indonesian obstructions

The principal responsibility for the slow pace of the program and its present stalemate rests with the Indonesian Government and, in particular, its military. They would like, of course, to repair their bad image by repatriating Timorese from Australia to Timor, but as there are no applicants this is not possible. Australian Foreign Affairs officials give three reasons for Indonesia's reluctance to allow departures from Timor. One, they are concerned that the exodus of a big number of people would reflect badly on their administration; two, they fear that new arrivals from Timor will talk about their experiences since the Indonesian invasion adding to anti-Indonesian sentiment in Australia; and three, they do not wish to add to the growing expatriate community of Timorese in Australia who, they fear, may eventually engage in anti-Indonesian activity similar to the Moluccans in Holland.

Australian officials say they have continually tried to calm Indonesian apprehensions about Timorese 'storytelling' and hypothetical political activity by pointing out there is no evidence to support their fears and that in fact they have more to lose by reneging on their undertaking to reunite families for this will only generate greater antipathy. Privately, however, these officials are far from optimistic about the completion of the reunion program. They believe that some of those on the agreed list who have lived through the Indonesian invasion and been eye-witnesses to particular events or who have been members of UDT or Fretilin may never be reunited with their families in Australia.

It is plausible that the Indonesian method employed to date of allowing Timorese to leave only in ones and twos is intended to enable them to buy time until greater control has been established in Timor and outside visitors can be more freely admitted to offset refugee criticisms. How long this will be is not known; but reports of continued fighting suggest it could be a long time. It is probable that the slow release of family members and intermittent cut-offs of the program are also being used to guarantee the co-operation of the people involved both inside and outside Timor. Certainly Timorese in Australia are reluctant to criticise Indonesia for fear of jeopardising the program or bringing harm to a relative inside Timor. Australian Government

officials reinforce this attitude by repeatedly warning Timorese not to criticise or engage in public activity. In this sense the Timorese in Timor are hostages (or to use the Timorese term 'political prisoners') for their detention is being used to extract concessions out of and exercise control over other Timorese.

Indonesian reluctance to allow an Australian immigration team to return to Timor appears to stem from two factors. They fear that the prolonged presence of such a team would attract mass applications to leave. There have been many reports now that some 15.000-18.000 Timorese filled the streets of Dili last year asking to leave when it became known that ICRC was prepared to act on behalf of Portugese nationals. The Indonesians wish to avoid such a demonstration of dissidence before officials of a Government whom they wish to convince about the normality of life in East Timor. Secondly, the Indonesians seem not to fully trust the Australian Government on Timor. For example, Mr.Norman Hoffmann, the Canberra official who led the only immigration team so far to have visited Timor, reported that during his brief stay in December 1978 he had the feeling the Indonesians did not believe he was an Immigration official.

Good relations with Indonesia the priority The Australian Government's reaction to Indonesian manoeuvres on family reunions is governed above all by foreign policy considerations. This is reflected on the practical plane by the attitudes of Immigration officials in Canberra who consider their role is a limited one; that they are merely the mechanics in the exercise and that real power lies with the Department of Foreign Affairs which has set the parameters and controls the negotiations according to the constraints of foreign policy. These dictate that Australia's trading, political and defence relations with Indonesia are the priority and that nothing must be done to erode this relationship. It follows then that Australia will remain low-key on family reunions and attempt to see that others, including the Timorese, do likewise. It will continue to work quietly behind the scenes for the reunion program because it is in its domestic political interest to do so.

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New procedures will be diplomatically suggested to the Indonesian bureaucracy for their consideration; Mr.Peacock will discreetly raise the matter with Dr.Mochtar from time to time; it will be mentioned during routine talks with the Indonesian ambassador in Canberra; even an extra-low profile attempt at backdoor negotiations courtesy of a private citizen will be tried. But nothing remotely akin to Australia's public statements and activity on behalf of the US hostages in Teheran can be expected. For as a senior official in the Immigration Department, L.W.B. Engledow, has put it recently: "there is little more we can do without risking a deterioration in our relations with that country" (Indonesia).

There have been five years to test the effectiveness of this approach. In that time less than 50 per cent of those eligible have come from Timor. In addition the program now appears to have broken down. And Australian officials are privately admitting it may never be completed. That is a failure in anybody's book and no cause for self-congratulation on the part of the Australian Government. If the Australian Government is not prepared to concede this and do more who is left to safeguard the human rights and futures of the separated Timorese families?

PAT WALSH

Children without parents

There are some 50-60 Timorese minors in Australia who are classified as 'isolated or unattached children'. They fled to Australia in the confusion of mid-1975 leaving their parents behind in Timor. They are now cared for by other Timorese around Australia. An Education Department consultant has commented that despite this care, however, "loss of loved ones by death and/or separation has been the greatest trauma and is a constant source of continuing anxiety as the possibility of family reunion becomes more remote". News about the situation in East Timor and the irregularity and brevity of letters from relatives only add to this anxiety.

Their parents are not on the agreed list of 625. Apart from the few who, in 1976-76, were issued with Letters of Authority to enter Australia, or promises thereof, the only hope of reunion for most of them is to return to East Timor. Understandably neither parents nor children want this. Because of the suffering in Timor their plea is for reunion in Australia. Australian Government policy does not permit minors to sponsor immigrants (though the waiving of this policy in 1975-76 clearly implies there is nothing immutable about it). Nor will the Immigration Department offer a second chance to those children who in the confusion of 1975 failed to nominate their parents. Further some who did nominate in 1975-76 were denied 'promissory letters' because the Department mistakenly assumed that their absence from home at the time of their evacuation from Timor meant they had been 'adopted out'.

Kim Teng, for example, was 11 years old when he arrived in Australia as a refugee in September 1975, accompanied by an aunt with whom he now lives. The aunt learned later her husband had been killed during the Indonesian invasion. Kim left behind his parents and four younger brothers and sisters. He was in Dili at the time of the evacuation where he had been sent to attend Chinese primary school. His parents lived in Manatuto. Kim claims to have nominated his parents late in 1975. The Immigration Department, however, has no record of this nomination and states that his first nomination is dated November

1976. He has written several letters to immigration officials and the Minister pleading for his parents to be allowed to come. These and other representations have all been turned down. One letter of reply read as follows:

"Normal Immigration Policy permits the entry of working age parents provided that the sponsoring son or daughter has been in Australia for at least three years and that:

- a) where the parents have three children at least one is in Australia;
- b) where the parents have four or five children at least two are in Australia; and
- c) where the parents have more than five children at least three must be in Australia.

... Although you have been in Australia for more than three years your application cannot be accepted because your parents have five children and only one of the five, yourself, is in Australia". (30.8.79)

It seems they could come if they had only two other children besides Kim...

Kim's parents are now in Jakarta. They arrived there in June 1979, nine months ago, on the first stage of an attempt to get to Australia. The Australian Government continues to refuse to admit them. Meanwhile the pressure on Kim continues to grow, perhaps, some adult Timorese fear, until breaking point.

Timorese refugees in Portugal - a community in mourning

The two majority parties of the day, UDT and Fretilin, fought a short, sharp civil war in East Timor in August/September 1975. Many thousands of civilians - men, women and children, sought refuge from this conflict by moving first to the eastern border area of East Timor then across into Indonesian Timor as the fighting moved in that direction. At the conclusion of this war in September 1975 they were joined by several hundred defeated UDT troops, bringing the total number of refugees in Indonesian Timor to an estimated 20.000. Some stayed in the border zone but the majority assembled in camps set up by the Indonesian authorities at Atambua.

Twelve months in Indonesian Timor

Early in the civil war, the RAAF and two Portugese vessels had ferried some 2500 refugees to Darwin. But as the civil war ran its course and escape routes by sea and air were cut off. Indonesian Timor provided the only sanctuary. UDT elements in particular expected Indonesia would shelter them because it was anti-Fretilin. Furthermore they expected their stay in Indonesian Timor would be brief as there was a feeling that Portugal would re-assert its authority and enable them to return. They were to be disappointed on both counts. Portugal did not restore its administration and Fretilin ran the territory as its de facto government. And the initial welcome extended to the refugees by the Indonesians soon turned cold when the refugees refused to co-operate with Indonesia's plans for 'integration' - plans that became all too ominous and explicit with the Indonesian invasion of East Timor three months after the refugees' arrival in West Timor. This refusal to co-operate cost the refugees dearly as the following account of their time in West Timor demonstrates.

The Indonesian authorities in West Timor allowed the defeated UDT troops access to Indonesian Timor only on condition that they signed a petition to President Suharto appealing for integration with Indonesia - a course they reluctantly took. Within 48 hours they were disarmed and stripped of any personal

items of value. Otherwise the refugees were generally well treated and provided with facilities and abundant food supplies (though refugees allege there was significant misappropriation of food supplies by Indonesian officials who sold it to local Indonesians and poorly fed Indonesian troops). This was the situation from September 1975 to March 1976.

Hard times at Atambua

In March 1976, however, the attitude of the Indonesian authorities to the refugees took an abrupt change for the worst. This was precipitated by the refusal of the vast majority of the refugees to take part in a pro-Indonesia rally before Adam Malik, then Indonesian Foreign Minister, carrying Indonesian flags and requesting integration. The refugees were told that since East Timor was now part of Indonesia they were no longer 'refugees' and as such not entitled to special assistance. Six months of grinding hardship followed, so severe that a leading refugee from those times now in Australia did not hesitate to call it a 'holocaust' for his people. Food supplies were reduced, then completely cut off. To buy food, people had to sell belongings and carry out hard labour in ricefields and on construction jobs. The small returns these realised were not enough to buy adequate food. Many died. There were few medical facilities and the hospital was not available to the refugees. They were usually asked to pay from their meagre funds for services such as injections. The Catholic Bishop of Atambua and some of the Indonesian Timorese sympathised with their suffering and helped but the military was 'omnipotent' and alone had effective authority. Camps were supervised by armed guards and the Timorese were not allowed to move freely. This contributed to the general atmosphere of powerlessness as it was very difficult to hold meetings or make contact with the outside world. Efforts to contact $\mathtt{Australia}$ to arrange for immigration there failed. Their detention continued long after conditions in Dili and other centres in East Timor were said to be secure. At the end of March the priests at Atambua were told by the Indonesian authorities their Bishop in Dili wished to see them. No such request had been made but their three-week visit to Dili, where they were horrified by what they saw and heard of the Indonesian invasion, was a turning point in their search for

security. They returned to Atambua convinced there was no future for their people under Indonesia, either in West Timor or in Indonesian-controlled East Timor.

Escape to Portugal

Nevertheless the refugees claim they would not have been allowed to leave Indonesian Timor were it not for the intervention of the Portugese Commission led by Heneral Morais-e-Silva and the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta. The Dutch Ambassador agreed to assist in their evacuation after receiving a handcarried letter forwarded by the refugees in May 1976 in which they appealed to him for help as Portugal's acting representative (Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia after the 1975 invasion).

The Portugese Government intervened initially to secure the release of 23 Portugese soldiers who were imprisoned in Atambua by the Indonesians after being brought there as prisoners by the UDT forces. They were used as a political bargaining point by both the Portugese and the Indonesian Governments. The Indonesian Government agreed to sanction the evacuation of the refugees after General Morais-e-Silva argued that they too were Portugese citizens and should be extended the same rights as the Portugese soldiers.

The agreement, however, did not prevent the Indonesian authorities from circulating rumours amongst the refugees that if they applied for evacuation they would be killed. In fact two days before the Dutch Ambassador visited Atambua to finalise the evacuation arrangements, 7000 Timorese were forced to move back into East Timor denying them the opportunity to go to Portugal. They reportedly suffered badly in the harsh conditions at Batugade their destination in East Timor.

Of the estimated 5000 who, despite intimidation, asked to go to Portugal, only those who happened to be at Atambua between June and October 1976 were permitted to leave. This included a small number of Timorese and Chinese (approximately 25) who had paid bribes to travel from Dili to Atambua after the Indonesian invasion. This group of 1400 (the exact figure was 1392 according to the Commissariat for Evacuees of the UNHCR) travelled to Portugal in several contingents during September-October. Some were transported direct to Lisbon by the Portugese airforce.

Others went by boat from Atapupu to Kupang, took planes to Bali, and were then taken to Lisbon by Garuda Indonesian airways. The priests request to stay behind to continue their work was turned down with the warning that their safety could not be guaranteed if they remained behind. 700 Portugese passports were also issued at that time for close relatives of the refugees to be flown to Portugal. Most of these people were in Dili, and have not been allowed to leave. Most of those who either chose not to leave, or were not allowed to, eventually returned to East Timor in one way or another.

Those who did go to Portugal did not want to leave their country. But their 12 month experience had persuaded them that all Atambua and Dili could offer them and their families was continued suffering and insecurity. Attempts to get to Australia had failed. Portugal offered the only realistic, though they hoped temporary, alternative. And so they went into exile 20.000 miles from Timor and Australia, gratefully, but nevertheless under duress as refugees.

The situation in Portugal today

Today, five years after civil war and then invasion caused them to flee their homeland, most of Portugal's 1600 East Timorese still live in refugee camps on the outskirts of Lisbon. The refugees are scattered over eight different centres, all run by Portugese Red Cross. The main concentration is at Balteiro camp, 200 kms from Lisbon, where several hundred Timorese live alongside refugees from Angola and Mozambique. The Red Cross Provides free food and housing for the unemployed, and has recently built new houses within the camp for those who have work and can pay rent — a minority. The rest live in shanty houses. A river polluted by refuse from the camp runs nearby.

Most of them have no future - at least not in Portugal which rates as one of Europe's poorest countries. Inflation and unemployment are rampant, the cost of living high. Some 500.000 'returnees' who fled to Portugal from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau when independence came to these former colonies, have placed added strains on the depressed Portugese economy and because of their better job qualifications they often outbid the Timorese for scarce jobs.

Affilicted by the suffering of their families in Indonesiaoccupied Timor, and living in impoverished social conditions
with only bleak prospects ahead of them in Portugal, they are
sustained by two things: the hope that the Australian Government
will allow them to live and work in Australia, and a highlydeveloped community structure which keeps traditional values
alive and ensures every refugee is cared for.

Most East Timorese receive regular news of the war in Timor, from family letters (usually censored, but some escape the censor) and from the regular stream of new arrivals who have bribed their way out of East Timor. There are few people who have not lost friends or relatives under the Indonesian occupation. Some letters simply list deaths and dates. A person interviewed recently, from a coffee-growing village in the central mountain district, received a letter from friends telling her she was the last surviving member of her family. Huddling with thousands of others in the dark coffee plantations – in fear of the Indonesian army, but out of reach of food supplies – the whole family had died of starvation.

Life in the refugee camps

In this context, the task of keeping alive the spirit of this mourning community is a full-time one. The Timorese Refugee Commission (CRTP) operates from Balteiro camp under the leadership of Father Apolonario Gutteres. Its tasks range from repairing family quarrels, finding work for the many unemployed, organising traditional festivals, ensuring that the most needy refugees (usually single parent families) are receiving adequate relief aid, to issuing press releases about the war in Timor.

The Commission also subsidises Lisbon's only Timorese restaurant, a wholly refugee venture launched on a loan from Caritas, but which has since run into misfortune, including a large robbery from the premises, and is threatened with closure for lack of financial backing. The Commission gives high priority to supporting young people to stay in school - community leaders regard education as an important weapon in the struggle to survive. All hope, despite the ravages of the country under the Indonesian occupation, they will one day return to an independent East Timor.

They have a perspective of training the youth for future national leadership. There is concern about the breakdown of traditional values. Many young people are unemployed, and finding it difficult to cope with an urbanised society drastically different from their own. The Timorese are a crimefree community, but family problems are increasing - pregnant daughters and runaway children are a new problem. In some cases tribal courts still judge family disputes, but for young people traditional values are less meaningful today.

Although most refugees agree that life in Lisbon is privileged compared to the ordeal of their families in East Timor, their hopes for the future do not focus on Portugal in economic or cultural terms. The Timorese do not regard Portugese culture as their own. It is alien and far removed from what they have known. They think of themselves as Timorese and only as Portugese in the technical sense.

Let us come to Australia

The over-riding ambition of most of them is to come to Australia to join the Timorese here who now form the biggest community of Timorese outside East Timor. This has been their aspiration from the beginning. The journalist Cameron Forbes reported in November 1976: "In tent after tent people who are asked simply what they wanted to do say, simply, 'go to Australia'". This was their wish even in Atambua but circumstances then left them no choice but to go to Portugal.

Their reasons for wanting to come to Australia can be summarised as follows:

- 1. reunion with families and friends many have relatives among the 3000 or so Timorese already in Australia and of course value the extended family very highly.
- 2. better prospects for employment and a new life they know Timorese are well-accepted and can find factory work easily here.
- 3. Australia's geographic and climatic affinity to Timor.
- 4. A general wish to live not very far from Timor with a view to reestablishing contact with friends and relatives when access to the territory is eventually permitted by Indonesia. Timor is only 350 miles from Darwin, a short plane trip.

5. a sense of comradeship and feeling that we owe them something because of collaboration in the Second World War against Japan. To quote Fr.Francisco Fernandes, Chairman of the Refugees in Portugal, speaking in May 1978:

"It is natural to want to go there. Not just because it is close to Timor ... but because we have been friends and neighbours in the past. During the war against the Japanese, we helped Australia, especially in the fighting. Thousands of Timorese died. Now we are in a difficult situation and we are asking for Australia to help us".

Australian Government response

What has been the Australian Government's response to this case for admission?

To date the Government has rejected the Timorese argument for special consideration. According to an Australian Government "Green Paper" on immigration and refugee policy, "Australia recognises that people can be in a refugee-type situation and merit sympathetic consideration although their status has not heen officially recognised by the UNHCR (Chap. 5, page 39, emphasis added). It has not, however, extended this "sympathetic consideration" to the Timorese or accepted that it has an obligation to them as refugees. Along with the UN, and Portugal itself, Australia does not classify them as refugees, preferring instead the term "quasi-refugees" or "evacuees". Under the UN charter on refugees, a person cannot be a refugee in his or her own country. Thus the Timorese - who are legally Portugese citizens - cannot be refugees in Portugal, although by any human standard they are clearly refugees and their experience testifies to this. They certainly think of themselves as such.

Second, the Australian Government has applied selective criteria admitting only those with immediate family in Australia or professional job qualifications. The former Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Michael MacKellar, explained it as follows in a letter of 26.4.1977:

- "I have decided that admission of East Timorese in Portugal may be approved if they are:
- a) nominated immediate family members of Australian

residents, i.e. spouses, dependent children, parents and fiance(e)s;

- b) nominated non-dependent sons or daughters and brothers or sisters of Australian residents or applicants where special circumstances are evident. They will be exempted from the normal occupational criteria provided they are able otherwise to meet the remaining migrant requirements; or
- c) applicants able to meet the normal personal and occupational criteria.

The normal health and character requirements must be met and visas will be granted only to persons intending permanent settlement in Australia".

It should be noted that section b) of this quotation which permits the sponsorship of brothers/sisters and adult sons/daughters or applicants where special circumstances are evident, represents a relaxation of the normal criteria. This relaxation was terminated in February 1979 because the Immigration Department considered it had "fulfilled its purpose".

To date about 500 out of the original 1400 who came from West Timor in 1976 have been settled in Australia on the basis of these criteria.

Other refugees have moved out of the camp after finding work or gone as emigrant workers to other parts of Europe. Refugee numbers rose back to the original 1976 total last year with the arrival of around 650 Timorese-Chinese who paid bribes to Indonesian officials to be allowed leave Timor. Some of these new arrivals are eligible for Australia because they have family here, and are merely waiting for applications to be processed. There still remains, however, a hard core of several hundred East Timorese who want to come to Australia but are not eligible.

The immigration dice are loaded against the Timorese being accepted as ordinary immigrants. Coming from underdeveloped East Timor, very few have the skills or qualifications generally sought after in modern, industrial Australia. Some are attempting to acquire these skills. Alberto, for example, although a white-collar worker all his life first in Dili and now in Lisbon,

last year did a bricklayer's course to try and qualify himself for Australia. He is still awaiting acceptance. Rejection on this basis, however, would not seem to take into account the fact that unemployment amongst the Timorese already in Australia is virtually non-existent, despite the state of the labour market, and the fact that few Timorese with good qualifications have managed to find employment here consistent with their skills and previous experience.

The Lypinto family have four children of their own, and custody of two teenage children orphaned by the war. Mr.Lypinto is diabetic and cannot work, and each winter seems colder than the last in their poorly-heated hut. He receives a pension of around \$70 a month, and his wife does embroidery to supplement their income. The eight of them live in a hut ten by seven metres divided into four rooms. They have no running water and the electricity supply from the main camp generator often fails. Mr. and Mrs.Lypinto have many cousins in Australia, but this does not alter their situation — in Australia's eyes they are neither refugees nor eligible to enter Australia as ordinary immigrants.

The Australian Government has rejected the Timorese case for admission to Australia. It has chosen to ignore the reality of their refugee status and the claims that Timorese have on us by reason of our historical and geographical links. It has opted to do things by the book.

The largest community of East Timorese outside Timor is now located in Australia and so it is understandable that the majority of the Timorese in Portugal should wish to come here. In view of their longstanding aspirations which they have clung to with little encouragement, and the terrible reality of their refugee experience from 1975 until today, and in view of the conditions under which they now live and the relatively small numbers involved, it is high time all these unfortunate people were offered the chance to immigrate

JILL JOLLIFFE IN PORTUGAL PAT WALSH

Timorese refugees' plea to be admitted to Australia

Eastern Timor, for the people of that beautiful land, is today a lost Paradise. Peace, rest, tranquility belong to the past. War, hatred and uncertainty have deprived our lovely homeland of all the necessities of life. Now it is a deserted island, abandoned, isolated, solitary. Now, when jet planes, telecommunication and technological power have eliminated distance and isolation.

So, today the people of Timor are doing all in their power, by every means at their disposal to immigrate because the land of their birth is no longer their Paradise.

Invoking the humanitarian principles of Pancasila which the Republic of Indonesia scrupulously adopts as a norm of life, we ask her to respect the life and physical integrity of our brothers as well as the will of those who wish to immigrate.

As for those who are now in Australia we can only offer them our congratulations for having settled down so well in the community of that blessed land while we express our sincere gratitude to the Australians for the friendly welcome and generous hospitality given to our brothers. This generosity has extended even as far as the Timor refugees in Portugal by means of the substantial donation sent to the Service of Catholic Migration and destined in a special way to pay the expenses of the immigration procedures, health assistance and child welfare.

As for the 1.600 Timor people now resident in Portugal, no one can count on security for the future. All live at the expense of the Portugese Government. With half a million coming from the ex-Overseas Colonies the Government is just powerless to cope with the problem of unemployment. For this reason we, about a year ago, appealed to the Australian Government to open their door to us. Our first appeal was made by means of a letter published by the illustrious journalist Cameron Forbes in "THE AGE" of November 1976 and again through the honoured members of the Australian Government who visited us and recalled the happy comradeship and spirit of solidarity shown by our people during the Second World War.

Our desired goal is AUSTRALIA which shelters the greatest community of Timor people now exiled from their native land. It is our preference among many nations not only because of its geo-

graphical affinities but especially because of the exemplary treatment afforded to our brethren already settled down there. These we hope and pray will take care of new arrivals and. in a short time, from their own experience guide and direct them towards a perfect integration. We lament to have to say that of the 1.600 petitions for immigration to Australia. up to today. only a little more than 200 persons who happen to have relations there, were granted. This number constitutes 1/8 of the total. Considering that 7/8 of the refugees do not have the requisites necessary for immigration we now appeal directly to the Christian Families of Australia to take the responsibility with AUSTRALIAN TMMIGRATION for the entrance of Timorese families. The Timor family is profoundly christian and united. There are families who need to educate their children and all desire to reconstruct their way of life. This will only be nossible if they are economically independent. This ambition can only be realised through immigration to Australia. So, we leave this our appeal to the consideration of the Christian Families of Australia and we thank in anticipation all those among the thousands of Christian families in whose generous hearts this appeal will find an echo.

(Signed) Father Francisco Maria Fernandes
PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF TIMOR
REFUGEES IN PORTUGAL
25 March, 1978.

East Timor's independence: a matter of principle for the Indonesian opposition

Since the invasion of East Timor by superior Indonesian forces the issue of East Timor's independence has been on the agenda of international conferences year after year. Time after time Indonesia's actions have been condemned - the most important occasions were the sessions of the General Assembly of the UN and of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

In spite of all the attempts by Indonesian diplomats to bring the rest of the world round to believing that the East Timorese people would love a union with Indonesia under the rule of the generals, a majority of delegates at these conference have seen through this way of presenting things.

What has really happened in East Timor is well-known. One of the most important facts is the proclamation of the independence of the East Timorese people, which had lived for centuries under the yoke of Portugese colonialism, by one of the leaders of Fretilin on November 28, 1975. There is a parallel with the declaration of independence of the Indonesian people in a short statement by Sukarno on August 17, 1945. And just as the Indonesian independence was not a mere private concern of Sukarno and a few "extremists and communists" — as the Dutch colonialists asserted at the time — East Timor's independence is not merely a concern of a few Fretilin-leaders, but the ardent desire of the great majority of the East Timorese population.

The handful of Indonesian individuals which in 1945 opposed the Indonesian independence were quickly exposed as collaborators with the Dutch reaction; those few who opposed East Timor's independence were quickly found out as well. This group consisted of some members of the obscure APODETI-party, generally known to be on the wagelists of the Indonesian secret service, and several UDT-executives who were prepared to put themselves with their fascist ideas at the service of the Indonesian generals, in exchange for dollars and future high offices. These people, e.g. Goncalves and Da Cruz, may be compared with such people as Petain and Mussert, leader of the Dutch fascists.



The independence struggle is so strongly supported by the East Timorese population that until today, five years after the invasion by an overwhelmingly strong and well-equipped army, equipped with arms from countries like the US, the Netherlands and the FRG, resistance is unbroken.

The atrocities the Indonesian army committed against the population of East Timor have not passed world opinion unnoticed. In 1976 Indonesia's conduct was condemned during a session of the General Assembly of the UN. This condemnation rightly stands until this day, and the actions of the Indonesian generals have repeatedly been condemned anew since.

Almost all the Indonesian rank and file sent to East Timor during "Operasi Komodo" and "Operasi Seroja" came from the standing army, but were labelled "volunteers". It soon came out that this was a farce. If one has a look at the army information service pictures published in the Indonesian newspapers in late 1975 and early 1976, the full-length portraits of the "volunteers" show them wearing all their army paraphernalia.

A highly significant interview with general Ali Murtopo - the chief architect of the invasion - was published on November 30, 1975, shortly after the declaration of independence in the Washington Post. In this interview the general declares that Indonesia is preparing for a military invasion. In other words, Indonesia was at that moment preparing a war of agression, an invasion in a neighbouring country, with a 180.000-man army.

The disastrous consequences of this war are known in their main points and will be described in other contributions to this publication. Suffice it to say that the East Timorese population finds itself in a miserable situation.

Although the information available is far from complete, one thing stands out most clearly: the Indonesian army behaves itself very cruelly. Every day the excesses which are part of the behaviour of an invading army in occupied territory are repeated. Little or nothing is written about this in the Indonesian press. Indonesia's condemnation for its invasion by the great majority of delegates at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries is September 1979 however was given conspicuous attention by the press. Only then some members of the Indonesian parliament

started wondering what was happening in East Timor.

This silence surrounding East Timor of course had its consequences for the attitude of the various oppositional groupings. There has not been yet a development akin to the reaction to actions abroad e.g. actions against the flow of money from the West to Jakarta as part of the IGGI agreements. Originally, there was little response to these actions in Indonesia itself, many people still being under the spell of the "construction syndrome". Nowadays the anti-IGGI position is more and more openly proclaimed, also by nationalist and religious leaders. Even dissatisfied sections of the army adhere to it now.

There is also a parallel with the tireless actions abroad for the liberation of political prisoners and for fair treatment of this group. For long years, there was great fear among the Indonesian population to voice these justified demands. Only now these demands meet with a growing response, partly because some former political prisoners have courageously vindicated their rights. However, when compared to these examples, support for and solidarity with the East Timorese people is still limited among the various oppositional groupings in Indonesia. An important factor is the great lack of information on the actual situation in East Timor. Also, those groups of the opposition which fundamentally recognise East Timor's right to independence dare not say it out loud yet.

What part should the East Timor solidarity committees in various continents play? On the one hand the present Indonesian administration's policy should be exposed on all possible occasions; on the other hand there should be growing stream of information and analysis directed towards Indonesia. It will help the truly democratic movement in Indonesia to raise the East Timor question as a fundamental one. It will help this growing movement in Indonesia to make East Timor's independence a cornerstone in the creation of a broad front against the generals. Only then will the support for and the solidarity of the Indonesian people with the struggling and suffering people of the Indonesian people at angible form.

pictures:

- Red Cross personel distributing medicine to the population of Uatolari (December 1979).

 The International Red Cross was admitted into East Timor late in 1979. (Editor's note).
- A ten-year old boy of Uatolari being treated by Red Cross personel for undernourishment, malaria and TB. (December 1979).
- This picture was taken in November 1979 by the Australianjournalist Peter Rodgers. The Indonesian authorities tried to suppress its publication and it had to be smuggled out of East Timor.

