

PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE

TIMOR--1000

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EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE

THE WAR NOBODY WANTED

By Helen Hill*

*Helen Hill is an Australian free lance journalist who covered the Security Council debate on East Timor last April for the Australian-based Nation Review. Ms. Hill spent two months last year in East Timor.

NEW YORK, June 14 (PNS)--

The U.S.-backed military government of Indonesia--sagging under the weight of economic problems, government indifference and a population time bomb--is pitching its resources against a nemesis which it claims doesn't even exist: the Fretilin independence movement in the tiny half-island nation of East Timor.

The battle against Fretilin -- even more than the economic and population problems -- could be the straw that breaks Indonesia's back. Already, the first casualty of the six-month-old war is Australia's once-tacit support for the annexation of Timor.

Even more important in the long run is waning U.S. confidence in the staunchly anti-communist Suharto government at a time when the Pentagon has been seeking to double U.S. military aid to Suharto.

The invasion of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony which shares an island with the Indonesian province of West Timor, began in the early hours of Dec. 7, scarcely 12 hours after President Ford and Henry

Kissinger had left Jakarta, Indonesia's capital.

Warships circled the island, paratroops landed and the Timorese capital, Dili, was bombarded from the air. After taking the town, the 6,000 Indonesian troops found themselves bogged down in a guerrilla-type war in mountains where some 400 Australian commandos had managed to hold off more than 20,000 Japanese soldiers for 18 months during World War II, with the support of local people.

The Indonesian government had obviously hoped for a swift military takeover of the territory which since September had been ruled effectively by the nationalist movement, Fretilin, following Portugal's abandonment of the colony.

Indonesia and its allies had hoped the world would look the other way long enough for its "armed volunteers" to complete their takeover. Last December's UN condemnation of the invasion was in fact little more than a slap on the wrist for Indonesia, which ignored it and launched a second, larger attack on East Timor two weeks later.

But in the months since then, Fretilin leaders have travelled extensively, particularly in Third World countries, to gather support and offer evidence that their movement still exists. Four African countries now recognize Fretilin as the government of East Timor and many other African countries, as well as Vietnam, China, North Korea and Cuba, have welcomed its representatives.

From the mountains of East Timor, Fretilin radio broadcasts regularly reach supporters in Australia, where public opinion had been aroused by the revelation in April that five Australian TV newsmen -- reported missing -- had in fact been shot on orders from the Indonesian military. Amateur radio operators in Darwin, northern Australia pick up national radio programs produced three times a week featuring speeches by Fretilin leaders, including President Francisco Xavier d'Amaral.

An estimated 2,000 Indonesian soldiers have already died in the effort to drive Fretilin out of the mountains, and thousands more have been wounded.

Hoping to minimize the impact of such casualty rates, Suharto's government has forbidden military funerals for the dead, and discourages relatives of the wounded from visiting them in hospitals. While this prevents widespread recognition of the level of the ongoing war, families of the casualties are bitter, and soldiers are reported increasingly reluctant to go to Timor. Australian intelligence sources monitoring troop movements in the area say upwards of 30,000 Indonesian troops have been maintained in Timor.

The official Indonesian version of its invasion of Timor is that it was invited by the Provisional Government of Timor--hastily organized from two small pro-Indonesian parties under Indonesian sponsorship--to help fight Fretilin insurgents. The operation was expected to be swift and thorough.

But in February, the provisional government's Deputy Governor Lopez da Cruz announced that 50-60,000 people had been killed in East Timor since December. If this figure--nearly 10 percent of the total population--is accurate, it suggests indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, confirming charges leveled in Fretilin broadcasts.

Indonesia's international image received a worse blow in April when Provisional Government representative to the UN Jose Martins defected to Fretilin. In a statement to the UN Secretary General, he accused Indonesia of keeping the Provisional Government delegation to the UN prisoners in New York.

He also described Indonesian behavior in Dili, the capital of East Timor. "They took away everything they could find," he said. "Leaders of the pro-Indonesian parties were deeply shocked by such behavior, even the long-term supporters of integration (with Indonesia) were

-more-

disillusioned and many are now openly opposing Indonesian presence in the territory."

Indonesia's claim that the provisional government is in uncontested control of East Timor and that Indonesian troops there are simply giving aid has been weakened by its refusal to allow any foreign journalists to visit the island.

Suharto's failure to present his case convincingly became clear May 31, when his government organized a Timorese petition requesting integration with Indonesia. The petition came from a People's Government Council composed of 28 Timorese, five of them elected, according to Provisional Government member Domingos Oliveira.

Despite Indonesian efforts to make the occasion satisfy UN standards for an internationally acceptable act of self-determination, Suharto's most important backers stayed away. The U.S., Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Singapore all declined invitations to send representatives to the event, and the UN did not recognize it at all.

Only a month ago, the U.S. and Japan were the only members of the UN Security Council to vote against a resolution calling for Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor.

For Suharto, the invasion of Timor--intended to eradicate a radical and popular nationalist movement uncomfortably close to Indonesia's borders--appears to have shown up weaknesses in his own government instead.

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InterNews

P.O. BOX 4400 • BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 845-7220

3 March 1976

Dear Jacqui,

Please forgive me for the long delay in answering your letter. I much appreciate the materials you sent, although it is getting a bit discouraging since the news from Fretilin on East Timor seems completely blacked out. Have you heard anything in the last month?

On David Newsome: I heard him speak to a small seminar sponsored by and held at U.C. Berkeley's Institute for International Studies on Dec. 12, 1975. He said there was no direct U.S. involvement, but that the U.S. knew about troop movements. His line~~xx~~ was that the U.S. embassy did not want to know exactly what those troop movements were about -- he said they intentionally did not want to know, and just shrugged when asked about responsibility to Congress to ~~know~~ if U.S. arms are to be used in an invasion by recipient country. He said that U.S. made it clear to the Indonesians what the implications were of using the U.S. arms in the invasion, though he indicated that the U.S. position was simply to help Indonesia get around Congress rather than to warn Suharto that the executive branch would take punitive action against Jakarta. He said U.S. policy was to "see the logic of Indonesia's position." Asked directly if the U.S. disapproved of the takeover, he said "no." & It would be very interesting for Congress to question the man. The administration could be nailed on this one, if anyone cared to. Newsome said that Indonesia "may have used U.S. arms", but he clearly indicated that he knew they did. It would be difficult to explain, on his part, why it was U.S. policy "not to know" about the invasion which was to take place 12 hours after the U.S. president left Jakarta.

W I hope this is still helpful. ~~Rxxxx~~ Please keep up the good work.


By the way, Internews reports are on WHUR and WGTB news every week night (6:15 and 6:30 respectively).

Take care, and again I'm sorry about the inexcusable tardiness of my reply.

Barry

PS. I also managed to lose your address,
so I'll have it forwarded

"Barry" is editor
of Inter News
Elizabeth Fernsworth
Only media paying attn
Helen Hill saw them



Timor Defense Committee

Dear friend,

As you have probably seen in the news recently, Indonesian troops, backed with tanks, helicopters, naval artillery, and other heavy equipment, have invaded the tiny new nation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. The Indonesian military leaders who organized this invasion are the very same who, in 1965, massacred hundreds of thousands of people and today continue policies of large-scale imprisonment and repression. The danger to the people of East Timor is great.

Despite the apparently overwhelming force of the Indonesian military, the people of East Timor, under the leadership of Fretilin, The Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor, have offered tremendously strong resistance, so strong in fact that as of February, 1976, two months after the massive Indonesian assault, 80% of East Timor remains firmly in the hands of Fretilin forces while up to 30,000 Indonesian troops attempt to hold coastal enclaves and isolated -- and surrounded -- mountain outposts.

In response to the attacks, and to the heroic resistance of the East Timor people, some of us have formed an ad-hoc Timor Defense Committee to educate people in this country about the struggle in East Timor. We have organized several press conferences for Fretilin representatives in New York, and participated as a contingent in the January 17 demonstration in support of the Angolan MPLA, one of Fretilin's strongest diplomatic allies.

We hope that members of the progressive community in the U.S. will want to become more familiar with the East Timor struggle. Towards this end, we wish to invite you to an informal briefing on the background, development, and current situation in East Timor. The person who will give this briefing is Mr. José Ramos Horta, Minister for External Relations of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. A member of the Timor Defense Committee will give a very short summary of the Committee's plans for the immediate future. There will be plenty of time for informal discussion. We hope you will want to attend.

More information:

Richard W. Franke 201-783-5083

Richard Tanter 212-864-7986

Please see other side for time and place.

Sincerely yours,

Richard W. Franke
Timor Defense Committee

Timor: Island of Fear, Island of Hope

Those who have not followed the development of the situation in East Timor will need to know more about certain figures and events shown in this film.

1) The first speaker in the film is Ken Fry, a member of the Australian Parliament (Fry appears before the U.N. Security Council). The reason for Fry's appearance is that the issue of East Timor has taken on Vietnam proportions in Australia. A broadbased movement (that includes the Trade Unions) in support of FRETILIN is still growing. Fry visited East Timor as part of a parliamentary delegation in both March and September of 1975. From his firsthand observation, Mr. Fry outlines the relative strength of the three political parties in East Timor.

2) Information on the right-wing parties in East Timor:

APODETI - The leader of APODETI was convicted of collaborating with the Japanese during the Second World War; he was held responsible for the murder of several thousand East Timorese. Of course, The New York Times never mentioned this fact in their coverage.

UDT - The President of UDT fought as a volunteer with the Portuguese army in Angola. Other members of UDT included former fascist officials in the Portuguese colonial administration, former members of the secret police, coffee plantation owners, and other businessmen. With the encouragement of Indonesia, UDT staged a coup on August 11, 1975. UDT was also helped by the Portuguese police and the pro-American Portuguese governor, Lemos Pires. Pires had been decorated by the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal for "service to America".

At the time of the UDT coup, hundreds of FRETILIN militants were rounded up by right-wing forces and executed; FRETILIN then rallied the army which consisted of East Timorese conscripts, and totally defeated UDT. The U.S. media, in particular The New York Times and Time Magazine, ignored the UDT massacre and called FRETILIN's counterattack "a leftist military takeover".

3) The FRETILIN minister who appears twice in the film is José Ramos Horta, Secretary General and a founder of FRETILIN. Horta left East Timor two days before the full-scale invasion, along with two other FRETILIN leaders, to inform the world about the U.S.-backed invasion. Horta appears in the film in both East Timor and the U.N. Security Council. In East Timor Horta reports on the initial attack on East Timor's border.

There will be plenty of time for questions and discussion after the film. American involvement in the war will be fully covered.

Cornell-Ithaca East Timor Defense Committee



*RK started with
'Rest of the News'*

June 3, 1976

Ithaca Rest of the News
306 East State Street
Ithaca, New York 14850

Dear Sirs:

I am writing in regard to your tape aired June 2nd, evening. In this tape you accuse WVBR news, and UPI, of purposely airing misleading information about the situation in East Timor.

I must honestly say I am shocked by the poor quality of the investigation done for this tape. One June 1st I received a call from someone at ROTN, asking for information about the story. I told the caller that I did not have a copy of the story at hand, but I could give him the number of UPI, where he could get a full transcript. The caller said he didn't want this information.

Obviously then the only knowledge you have of this story is from hearing it aired once. Yet from this, you assume that you have enough information to accuse WVBR news and UPI of criminal action. The sorry fact is, you have your facts all wrong. Obviously the person who heard the story only heard what he wanted to hear.

After hearing your tape, I have gone to the trouble of phoning UPI and getting the transcript of the story, something you should have done in the first place. I have enclosed quotes from transcripts of two copies of the UPI story.

Lets go over some of the facts brought up in your tape. I have also enclosed transcripts of these claims from your tapes. You claim that the UPI report says that the people of East Timor have voted to become a part of Indonesia. There is no such statement in either story. What is said is that a "So called Quote Peoples Assembly unquote" asked for the merger. The use of the words so called and quote unquote imply that some people may not see this as a true people's assembly. UPI would never print "the so called government of the United States."

You claim that UPI does not mention the Indonesian invasion. In fact it does.

You claim that UPI talks of an East Timor rebellion in October of 1975. There is no mention of October...however one of the stories does use the word rebellion. However as the other story uses the words independence movement, it is obvious that this is a mistake of a copywriter somewhere.

You claim that the mention of a "rebellion" implies that East Timor is a part of Indonesia. It is obvious from the UPI stories that this is not implied.

You claim that the story is distorted, full of omissions, factual errors and fabrications. In my opinion, that description fits your tape.

You claim that the UPI report is part of the official account syndrome. Why then would the story call the people's assembly "so called", why would it speak of the fact that 18 nations declined to attend the event because of the debate about Indonesia's intervention, why would it say that Indonesia crushed an independence movement, and why would it cast doubts on the legitimacy of the vote?

You claim that the story was written by the Indonesian military government, and refuses to give other points of view. It is obvious from the above points that this is not so.

You claim that the story refuses to give other points of view. Again it is obvious that this is not so. However it appears that it is true of your tape, you charge UPI of a criminal activity, yet you don't seem too interested in getting their side of the story, or even the facts.

You claim that the story tells of a perfumed election that never took place. There is no mention of an election in either story, only a vote in a "so called" assembly.

One of these stories is more complete than the other, and the shorter story is regrettable in the fact that it uses the word rebellion. However, it in no way merits the criticism you have heaped upon it. I doubt very much that the reporter that originally filed the story had any intention of supporting the suppression of liberties of the people of East Timor.



I am very sorry that you have chosen to take the actions you have. I wish you would have been more careful in finding out the facts before making unfounded charges. You may have some important things to say, but if you make factual errors in a story like this, where the facts would have been very easy to check, I will have trouble believing anything else you have to say. You are just working against yourselves in a case like this.

I am also sorry about the fact that this will probably strain relations' between WVBR News and the Rest of the News. In the past I have done the best to try and work in a spirit of cooperation with you, often lending you tapes when you did not have a reporter at an event, or giving any information I could.

Again, I'm sorry this has happened, but it is only a result of your sloppiness.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Joel D. Meltzer". The signature is stylized and somewhat cursive.

Joel D. Meltzer
News Director

enc.

JDM/lkt



wvbr fm
93 stereoithaca

227 Linden Avenue
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 273-4000

June 2nd ROTN tape

"(THE UPI REPORT) SAID THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR HAVE VOTED TO BECOME PART OF INDONESIA. THIS NEWS REPORT IS A BLATANT FABRICATION"

"AN ANALYSIS OF THIS NEWS REPORT WILL GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF EXACTLY HOW THE NEWS MEDIA SPREADS FALSEHOOD IN THE GUISE OF FACTS"

"(THE REPORT) DOES NOT MENTION THE INDONESIAN INVASION. UPI TALKS OF AN EAST TIMORESE REBELLION IN OCTOBER 1975, WHICH WAS CRUSHED BY INDONESIAN FORCES. UPI CLAIM OF A REBELLION IS QUITE INCREDIBLE, CONSIDERING THAT NO REBELLION AS SUCH EVER TOOK PLACE IN OCTOBER"

"THE MENTION OF REBELLION IMPLIES THAT EAST TIMOR IS PART OF INDONESIA, THAT INDONESIA HAS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ACT MILITARILY IN EAST TIMOR"

"(THE UPI STORY IS) ONLY THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF NEWS COVERAGE THAT IS DISTORTED, FULL OF OMISSIONS, FACTUAL ERRORS AND FABRICATIONS"

"THE REPORT IS A SYMPTOM OF THE 'OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF EVENTS SYNDROME'"

"(UPI IS) IN COMPLICITY WITH THIS CRIMINAL ACTION. THEY DON'T CHECK THEIR FACTS, THEY PRESENT STORIES WRITTEN BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENTS NEWS SERVICE AS TRUTH AND THEY REFUSE TO GIVE OTHER POINTS OF VIEW"

"THE US MEDIA IN GENERAL FEEDS LOCAL RADIO STATIONS A PERFUMED STORY OF AN ELECTION THAT NEVER TOOK PLACE"



wvbr
93 stereoithaca fm

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
May 31st UPI story 1

"INDONESIA, WHOSE TROOPS CRUSHED THE LEFTIST INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN THE 400 YEAR OLD PORTUGUESE COLONY LAST DECEMBER..."

"WITH INDONESIA'S INTERVENTION UNDER DEBATE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, ONLY 7 NATIONS SENT DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES. U.S. AND BRITAIN WERE AMONG 18 NATIONS DECLINING THE INVITATION."

"FIGHTING BROKE OUT LAST AUGUST AFTER PORTUGAL SAID IT WOULD GRANT THE COLONY INDEPENDENCE. THE BULK OF PORTUGUESE BASED TROOPS, MILITARY, AND POLICE JOINED THE LEFTIST PARTY WHICH FAVORED BREAKING TIES WITH PORTUGAL OR UNION WITH INDONESIA. FEARFUL OF HAVING A NEW, POSSIBLY MARXIST NEIGHBOR, INDONESIA ARMED AND TRAINED REFUGEES FROM EAST TIMOR AND SENT THEM BACK INTO ACTION WITH INDONESIAN AIRBORNE AND MARINE REGULARS"

(THE ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT) CALLED FOR AND GOT A UNANIMOUS VOTE BY SHOW OF HANDS, SO QUICKLY THAT MOST INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS MISSED IT"



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May 31st UPI story 2

"THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY OF EAST TIMOR HAS ASKED FOR UNION WITH NEIGHBORING INDONESIA. INDONESIAN TROOPS CRUSHED A LEFTIST REBELLION ON THE ISLAND LAST YEAR BECAUSE JAKARTA FEARED THAT IT MIGHT END UP WITH A MARXIST REGIME NEXT DOOR. CEREMONIES WERE CAREFULLY ARRANGED IN THE PORT TOWN OF DELI TODAY AND 26 JOURNALISTS WERE FLOWN IN SO THEY COULD HEAR AND VIEW THE DECISION OF THE SO CALLED "PEOPLES ASSEMBLY" TO ASK FOR A MERGER WITH INDONESIA.



wvbr fm
93 stereoithaca

227 Linden Avenue
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 273-4000
June 3, 1976

United Press International
National Broadcast Desk
Chicago, Ill.

Dear Sirs:

I am writing you in regard to a story you ran on May 31st in one of your afternoon "World in Briefs" that deals with the situation in East Timor. In this story you say "Indonesian troops crushed a leftist rebellion on the island last year...". However, the original story, as cabled in by the reporter, says "Indonesia, whose troops crushed the leftist independence movement..." In this case the two words just don't mean the same thing.

I hope you will be more careful in your writing in the future. This may seem like a minor point to you, but the situation in East Timor is of much importance to many people in this country.

Sincerely,

Joel D. Meltzer
News Director

JDM/lkt

THE INDONESIAN TAKEOVER OF EAST TIMOR

Robert Lawless

Reuben Hill, RACE AND CLASS etc.

THE RECENT HISTORIES of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa are well publicized, especially those of Mozambique and Angola, but the events in Portuguese Timor (East Timor) from 1974-76 are little known except for some newspaper accounts, mainly published in Australia. This story is filled with the modern tactics of struggles for self-determination by small ethnic groups against the hegemony of artificial nation-states, the disorderly collapse of European colonialism into regional imperialism (the often self-deceiving idealism engendered by the United Nations), and the manipulative evasion of responsibility by some, the irresponsible use of power by others.

J. Stephen Healey provides a nice exposition of recent events in East Timor up to February 1975,² so in this article I will concentrate on what happened from then until July 1975—with a brief summary of significant events in 1974. There is some logic to these temporal divisions. The current history of East Timor began in mid-1974 when the Portuguese junta de Salvação Nacional (Junta of National Salvation), established after the change of regime in Portugal on April 25, 1974, made clear that the new government intended to relinquish control over all Portuguese overseas territories. The first few months of 1975, with the short-lived coalition of the two major Timorese parties, saw the best opportunity for the establishment of an independent East Timor. The breakup of this coalition sealed the fate of East Timor and ensured the subsequent invasion and attempted takeover by Indonesia. The end of May 1976 saw an ill-attended, Indonesian-sponsored Peoples Assembly held in Dili, the capital of East Timor, come to an unanimous decision—after a short discussion—to formally request integration with Indonesia.

¹ For a brief historical survey and introduction see Donald E. Weatherbee, "Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, VI.12 (December 1966), pp. 683-695.

² J. Stephen Healey, *The Future of Portuguese Timor* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), p. 10.

Recent Developments

Soon after the April 1974 change of regime in Portugal three political parties were organized in East Timor. The Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin—originally Associação Social Democrática Timorese) demanded immediate independence and had support from junior civil servants, teachers, urban workers, and students. The União Democrática de Timor (UDT, originally Partido de União Democrática) wanted "progressive autonomy" but "always under the Portuguese flag."³ UDT consisted of the "higher civil servants (such as the mayor of Dili, Costa Moutinho), the native chiefs who serve as petty territorial officers, villagers who regard the Portuguese flag as a mystical symbol, some Chinese businessmen, and of course the Portuguese community."⁴ The Associação Popular Democrática de Timor (Apodeti—originally Associação para a Integração de Timor na Índia) called for "an autonomous integration into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with international law" on the grounds of ethnic and historical links.⁵

The leader of Fretilin is Francisco Xavier do Amaral, who had trained in Macao for the priesthood and was a customs officer in the Portuguese administration in East Timor before entering the political struggle. The founder of UDT was João Carrascalão, a wealthy planter who soon resigned his leadership due to his well-known association with unpopular Portuguese. He was replaced by Francisco Lopes da Cruz (who had fought for Portugal in Africa), though reportedly Carrascalão still wielded considerable influence in UDT behind the scenes. Apodeti was headed by Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo. Later in 1974 two other parties were formed: the Kilbur Oan Timor Aswain (KOTA), which advocated independence but with the continuation of the traditional princelton leaders, and the Partido Trabalhista, which favored independence under a Portuguese commonwealth system.

Gauging the relative popularity of political parties in undeveloped areas is difficult, but apparently UDT was initially popular since it represented legitimate authority in terms of village chiefs and town elites. But UDT's popularity rapidly diminished due to its continued identification with non-Timorese elements and to the energetic and persuasive recruitment campaigns of the fast-rising Fretilin movement. Funded from Indonesian Timor, Apodeti always ran a poor third, and its "fortunes . . . declined significantly when it became known that Indonesia would not grant autonomous status to Timor, but would integrate it as a province"⁶—meaning that Indonesians, not Timorese, would get administrative and civil service positions. Neither KOTA nor Trabalhista has demonstrated a following of any significant numbers.

³ *Manifesto*, UDT (Dili, May 11, 1974), p. 1.

⁴ Hoalley, p. 3.

⁵ *Manifesto*, Apodeti (Dili, May 27, 1974), p. 1.

⁶ Hoalley, p. 6.

Initially Fretilin did not view itself as one of three (or five) parties but "as the only legitimate representative of the people of Timor,"⁷ and for several months after their formation little cooperation existed between the parties. For example, in late 1974 Colonel Mario Lemos Pires, Portuguese governor of Timor, tried to set up an advisory government council including representatives of the three major parties. However, Apodeti refused to participate because it said it would negotiate only with Indonesia. Later Fretilin declined stating that the council already was packed with members from the former regime.

In the last few months of 1974 Fretilin began pragmatically altering its demands and reaching for wider acceptance of its legitimacy, especially by Portugal, Indonesia, and Australia. Fretilin announced its willingness to accept a Portuguese presence and a politicoeconomic tutelage for five to ten years before independence. It further stated that it would introduce Bahasa Indonesia as a school subject and would promote contacts between the peoples of the two sections of the island. José Ramos Horta, one of the founders of Fretilin, began spending considerable amounts of time in Australia, where he was successful in gaining the support of some trade unions, church groups, and members of parliament.

The more nationalistic leaders in UDT, such as Domingues Oliveira, decided their fortunes lay with Fretilin and persuaded the others to form a coalition, announced on January 22, 1975. Their program rejected Apodeti and integration with Indonesia, but they stated their desire for good relations with Indonesia and sent a delegation to the Indonesian Consul to reassure him on this point.

Indonesia, nevertheless, continued to set the stage for a takeover of East Timor and to prepare the Indonesian public for the forthcoming invasion. Hoadley's reading of the Indonesian press through 1974 (and mine through 1975) support his conclusion that "it would be only a slight exaggeration to say that the Indonesian public can see annexation of [East] Timor as an act of generosity, one which would save the Timorese from Portuguese colonialism, domination by outside powers, infiltration by communists, subversion by Chinese, deception by Fretilin, political instability, poverty and general backwardness."⁸

Martoro Kati, deputy chief of mission at the Indonesian Embassy in Australia, told a delegation from the Australian Union of Students in February 1975 that Indonesia feared a communist coup in East Timor. General R. Saron, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, stated in New Zealand in the same month that Indonesia was willing to annex Portuguese Timor if that was what its people wanted. And in March *Suara Karya*, the official organ of the Golkar, the ruling political party, warned that Indonesia would not

who was he?
why didn't you try to find out who he was?

SARAH, MACAO, HONG KONG
* explain!

tolerate Portuguese Timor becoming a communist trouble spot.

Fretilin correctly read Indonesian intentions, and Fretilin-associated Timorese in Portugal sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the UN as early as March 9, 1975, warning that Indonesia planned to invade East Timor.⁹ Nevertheless, the Fretilin-UDT coalition proceeded to prepare for some kind of transfer of power from Portugal and on March 2, 1975, announced its willingness to negotiate with Portuguese officials. Pires conferred with the Committee on Decolonization in Lisbon, and by the end of the month events seemed to be moving toward a peaceful transition of power from the Portuguese to the Timorese.

On May 7, 1975, Fretilin-UDT, Apodeti, and the Decolonization Committee met and proposed elections for a popular assembly in Timor in October 1976. This proposal, which provided for Portuguese rule until 1978, subsequently became Portuguese law in July. Later in May the Portuguese government proposed a meeting in Macao of all interested Timorese parties.

All prospects for the peaceful transfer of power became moot on May 29, however, when UDT announced its withdrawal from the coalition with Fretilin. In UDT's words, Fretilin threatened the political stability of the geo-political context of Timor.¹⁰ The actual reasons for the split are not entirely clear. UDT leaders were receiving advice from various quarters just before they decided to withdraw, especially from the Portuguese and then in April from visits in Indonesia and with the Portuguese elements in Australia.¹¹ They had seen Fretilin take away their initial popularity, and perhaps they wanted to negotiate in Macao as a more independent force, not part of a coalition. At any rate, Fretilin now refused to go to Macao because of the appearance there of Apodeti, which was regarded simply as a puppet of the Indonesian government.

The Macao meeting nevertheless was held on June 26-28, 1975, with the Portuguese (led by Major Vitor Alves), UDT, and Apodeti participating in a doomed effort to outline the mechanics of a transitional government for East Timor. However, after the meeting Portuguese Minister of Interterritorial Coordination Almeida Santos said that the decisions there could not be considered definite because of the absence of Fretilin.¹²

Meanwhile, events were heating up back in East Timor. After the Fretilin-UDT split, Fretilin leaders joined others who had given up their regular jobs, organized "Revolutionary Brigades" (mainly with Dili students), and began intensive activities in the interior in the form

⁹ Showa, to me by diplomatic sources.

¹⁰ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), May 29, 1975.

¹¹ Denis Freney, *Timor: Freedom Caught Between the Powers* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), pp. 38-41.

¹² *Diário de Notícias* (Lisbon), July 2, 1975.

of literacy campaigns and in setting up agricultural cooperatives. Fretilin was obviously preparing a base that could be used to win the proposed October 1976 elections or to conduct guerrilla warfare against Indonesia.

^{why haven't} Early in June official Indonesian newspapers began reporting ^{you} "thousands" of refugees crossing into Indonesian Timor to escape ^{what} atrocities by Fretilin. On June 12 work officially started in Indonesian East Timor on the construction of a 170-kilometer road to East Timor that had obvious strategic importance. In a visit to Jakarta on July 4, 1975, UDT leader de Cruz said that he would not reject the wishes of the East Timorese if they wanted to join Indonesia.¹³ Soon afterward there were reports for the first time of armed clashes between Fretilin and UDT factions in Dili, in which six people were killed and 21 wounded.¹⁴ Then in early August, after several days of meetings with Indonesian officials, including Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo, Deputy Head of Indonesian Intelligence, and Brigadier El Tari, governor of Indonesian Timor,¹⁵ the leaders of UDT announced that they had decided to follow a political line acceptable to Indonesia.

A few days later in a coup on August 11, 1975, UDT seized key installations in Dili, including the radio station, airport, and some administrative buildings, and demanded immediate independence for East Timor and imprisonment of Fretilin members. By August 13 the Portuguese government, after an initial denial, reported fighting in Timor. Some news reports said 100 people had been killed and 300 Portuguese women and children had been evacuated on a Portuguese freighter.

^{what} UDT's ultimatum was rejected by Portuguese authorities, and by ^{about} August 22 Fretilin's counter-offensive had taken an ordinance depot held and many headquarters in Dili. Portuguese forces virtually collapsed, ^{for} and all Timorese member deserted to join the warring factions, most apparently joining Fretilin.¹⁶

Curcascalão claimed that the aim of the UDT coup was to rid East Timor of the communists,¹⁷ but Indonesia did not immediately come to UDT's aid since it did not yet want to appear to be involved, and UDT's military situation rapidly deteriorated. After a five-day battle, Fretilin gained complete control of Dili. It was reported that Indonesian President Sniaturo "asked Portugal for assurances that Lisbon won't oppose Indonesian takeover of Timor."¹⁸ In words to be often paraphrased by other Indonesian officials, Murtopo told reporters in Jakarta that "we do not want to be a naughty boy in this case. We are willing to help to

¹³ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), July 8, 1975.

¹⁴ *Serita Yutha*, July 7, 1975.

¹⁵ *Sunday Morning Herald*, August 15, 1975.

¹⁶ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), August 22, 1975.

¹⁷ *The Australian*, August 20, 1975.

¹⁸ *McLourie Age*, August 26, 1975.

bring about peace there, but I can assure you that we will not use force to settle the problem. But neither does Indonesia want to sacrifice its stability over the issue. In fact, it is a simple problem: the people there belong to the same clan as those on Indonesian islands around Timor."¹⁹

Meanwhile fighting increased throughout East Timor, and hundreds of refugees concentrated in Dili's port zone, still tenuously held by Portuguese authorities. Although the Portuguese called upon the International Red Cross, Australia, and Macao to help with evacuation efforts, little could be done to ease the suffering of the people. On August 27, 1975, Pires and his remaining garrison withdrew to the island of Atauro, and for all practical purposes Portuguese control of Timor had ended after some 450 years. Indonesia offered to move in and restore order, but on September 1 Portugal rejected this proposal. The month of September saw a high level of diplomatic activity, mostly by Portugal in the person of Santos, but decisions could not be made as Portugal was undergoing a cabinet crisis. In October UDT and Apodeti, along with Kota and Trabalista and under the tutelage of Indonesia, joined together in a coalition called Movimento Anti-comunista (MAC, Anti-Communist Movement) and announced their program—from Indonesian territory.

Meanwhile Fretilin, seemingly in effective control of most of East Timor, set up a "transitional administration," and Indonesia complained of Fretilin attacks on Indonesian Timor border villages. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Malaysia's Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak began issuing statements about Timor's becoming a base for communist subversion.

By the middle of October there were reports of bombardments from Indonesian warships at Balibó, Baucau, the second largest town^{to look} in East Timor, and at Atacae. However, MAC forces, heavily supported by Indonesian troops, had difficulty moving under these barrages. Citing the lack of legal order from Portugal and the Indonesian bombardments (which resulted in the loss of Atacae to MAC), Fretilin announced on November 28, 1975, the independence of East Timor from Portugal and renamed the territory the Republic of East Timor. The new regime was denounced in Lisbon but recognized as a government by Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Guinea, and Albania, China, Vietnam, and Angola all recognized Fretilin as the representative party of the East Timorese people.

One day after Fretilin declared independence MAC declared East Timor a part of Indonesia. On December 1, 1975, Malik said that the solution to the Timor question now "lay on the field of battle." And on December 7 Jakarta radio reported that Dili had been "liberated" by the "people's resistance spearheaded by the Apodeti, UDT, Kota

¹⁹ *The Press* (Christchurch), August 27, 1975.

and "Trahahista" and "supported by Indonesian volunteers." The Indonesian government claimed to have found it difficult to "prevent these volunteers from supporting their brothers in liberating Dili from oppression and Fretilin's terror."²⁰ On the same day Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia, receiving Jakarta of military aggression against East Timor.

In a letter dated December 7 Portugal informed the UN of the invasion and said, "In the present circumstances, Portugal is unable to restore peace in Timor or to ensure that the decolonization process is accomplished through peaceful and negotiated means" and urged a meeting of the Security Council. Discussions in the 13th Session of the Fourth Committee of the UN held on December 10 indicate that Indonesia tended to place blame on Portugal for not discharging its obligations as administering power, for withdrawing to Aturo, and for leaving firearms to certain political parties, claiming that only Indonesia was there to ease the terror and famine and restore order.

As a result of the December 7 Portuguese letter the UN Security Council met five times between December 15 and 22. In these debates Amrã Sani of Indonesia emphasized that when fighting broke out in East Timor, Portugal was unable to restore order, that local parties asked for Indonesian help (claiming that Apodeti, Kota, UDT, and Tribalista—i.e., MAC—represented the majority of the people), that over 50,000 refugees had poured into Indonesian Timor, and that the potential of a prolonged civil war in East Timor would invite outside interference.²¹ However, on December 22, 1975, the Security Council called on Indonesia to withdraw troops from East Timor and requested that a Special Representative of the Secretary-General be sent to assess the situation. Vittorio Vinspeare Guicciardi, the Under-Secretary-General and Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva, was appointed and arrived in Jakarta on January 15, 1976, on route to Timor.

Meanwhile an East Timor radio station seized by pro-Indonesian forces said in a December 8 broadcast, "If you see where the Communists are, you must show them to our Indonesian brothers who are here." It promised to "tear out the liver" of Fretilin president do Amaral.²² Fretilin sources said the Indonesian invasion of Dili consisted of 2,000 Indonesian paratroopers and marines supported by 20 warships and had resulted in over 500 casualties. Australian sources gave much higher figures.²³ In his first interview after the Indonesian invasion, Malik admitted that Indonesian marines had been used in the initial operation but denied that Indonesian troops were still there, saying, "If we had our forces there, there would be no problem to withdraw them, but these are volunteers and it is up to them to withdraw."²⁴

²⁰ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), December 4, 1975.

²¹ EN Chronicle, January 1976, pp. 6-14.

²² Financial Times (London), December 10, 1975.

²³ Guardian (Manchester), January 9, 1976.

²⁴ Reuters, December 12, 1975.

Throughout the rest of December and the first half of 1976 East Timor was a battleground. Reliable sources on the war are not immediately available. Indonesian reports are infrequent and not detailed. They usually claim complete control of the entire island and downplay the Fretilin resistance as a ragtag group of a few hundred soldiers. One would suspect, however, that Indonesia was surprised by the stout resistance of Fretilin and considerably disappointed that MAC forces were not able to take over the territory with only token Indonesian help. The ferocity of the initial Indonesian onslaught in Dili suggests that they had hoped for a quick knockout. In fact, they had to stage a second invasion on December 25 (*what then?*).

After their initial plans failed to materialize Indonesia and MAC moved quickly on political and military fronts. Oé-Oéussi Ambeno was officially incorporated into Indonesia in a ceremony in the Indonesian capital of Kupang on December 15, 1975. On December 17 MAC named Araijo of Apodeti as the Chief Executive Officer with a full mandate to govern the newly created Provisional Government of East Timor.²⁵ In early January he presided over a ceremony on Aturo Island lowering the Portuguese flag and raising the red and white flag of Indonesia. Speaking in Baucem on January 8, 1976, Araijo declared that the future of East Timor lay with Indonesia. He reminded the people that the island of Timor was one and inseparable and was located within the Indonesian Archipelago. He further said that since it was clear that the people of East Timor wanted integration with Indonesia, it was not necessary to hold a plebiscite.²⁶ The next day Malik left Jakarta for a brief visit to Dili. And a week later Malik also declared that since the Provisional Government of East Timor had invited Indonesia to declare its sovereignty over the territory, there was no longer any need for an election to decide the future of East Timor. Malik said integration could be done simply by a presidential decision, a special session of the Indonesian Parliament, or by a people's consultative assembly.²⁷

In late January the Provisional Government of East Timor dissolved the existing political parties, and merged them into an organization apparently called the Functional Corps of the Provisional Government. And in a letter that took effect on February 1, 1976, Araijo officially banned the formation of all political parties,²⁸ thus ending the only period in modern history—about 20 months—when East Timor had experienced free political activity.

The military picture remains unclear, but apparently Indonesian forces are not winning all the battles since official Indonesian reports have claimed the capture of the same towns at various different times, suggesting that Fretilin has been able to recapture territory. Indonesia

²⁵ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), December 17 and 30, 1975.

²⁶ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), January 10, 1976.

²⁷ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), January 15, 1976.

²⁸ Stown to me by diplomatic sources.

launched a major offensive in late December 1975 with 15,000 to 20,000 troops from Java. They took Baucau in the north and attacked Liquiçá to the west of Dili. On December 29 Fretilin announced that Aileu, a Fretilin stronghold south of Dili, had fallen to Indonesian troops. According to Horta, the Fretilin government then established headquarters in the mountain town of Ainaro.²⁹

Australian intelligence analysis report that more than 450 Indonesian troops were killed in the first four weeks of the Indonesian invasion, and that the 15,000 to 20,000 Indonesian force failed to subdue large areas of East Timor or to find and destroy the 3,000 or so Fretilin troops.³⁰ Beginning in late January and continuing at least through May, Indonesia intensified its bombardments of coastal towns, especially along the southern coast at Suai, Betano, and Tionar. In February, Indonesian troops apparently landed at Betano, took the town, and advanced toward Same, which has an airstrip. In March, Indonesia took Same and in April Lospalos in the eastern part of the island. By July 1976, when East Timor was formally merged with Indonesia, the Pro-Indonesian forces controlled the entire coastal area but not much of the interior highlands (see map).

In February, da Cruz, then deputy chairman of the provisional government, said that about 66,000 persons had been killed in East Timor since August 1975.³¹ Although this figure may well be inflated, this admission by a member of the pro-Indonesian government triggered a major policy statement by Fretilin. In a letter to the President of the UN Security Council dated March 4, 1976, Horta cited reports from Fretilin of the Indonesian use of napalm and biological warfare, saying "hundreds of people have died in the region of Lospalos as a consequence of the deployment of biological bombs which cause intense diarrhea and diseases as yet unidentified by Fretilin health authorities." The letter claimed that as of March 1, three months after the Indonesian invasion, Fretilin held 80% of the territory and had the loyalty of 95% of the population, and "Indonesian forces control only town-centers, the small permanent populations of which either fled from the invaders or have been massacred."³² Horta declared that Fretilin "will fight wherever we find support, and that includes Indonesian Timor, where there is tremendous reaction against the Javanese troops."³³

Throughout these activities a minor sideshow in the person of UN Special Representative Winifred entertained the international legal community on the periphery of the action. In late January, under tight security, Winifred visited towns in East Timor that the Indonesians


²⁹ Personal interview with José Ramos-Horta, March 6, 1976.

³⁰ *Guardian* (Manchester), January 19, 1976.

³¹ *New York Times*, February 17, 1976.

³² Letter dated March 4, 1976, shown to me by diplomatic sources.

³³ Personal interview with Horta, March 6, 1976.



had held for several months, such as Dili and Manatuto. Fretilin was anxious to have Winspeare visit its territories, but the Australian government first seized the Fretilin radio transmitter in Darwin, making communications difficult, and then refused on the grounds of safety to fly Winspeare to Fretilin-held territories of East Timor, though Fretilin then held four airstrips in Con on the northwest coast, and in Same, Suai, and Viqueque.

The pre-Indonesian Provisional Government of East Timor also refused to guarantee the UN envoy's safety to Fretilin territories. The Portuguese—still in the eyes of the UN the legal administrative authority in East Timor—had offered two corvettes, the Oliveira e Cano and the João Roby, along with a radio transmitter to make contact with Fretilin, but Malik warned that any ship carrying the UN envoy risked being sunk if it attempted to enter disputed areas of East Timor.³⁴ In fact, Indonesia immediately bombarded all areas suggested by Fretilin as landing places for Winspeare.

Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrew Peacock said that he deeply regretted that Winspeare had been unable to talk with Fretilin in their territories of East Timor,³⁵ but claimed the mission was a success since Winspeare had met with Horta in Darwin. Answering questions at the Press Club in Canberra during a three-day visit to Australia ending February 11, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim said that the UN had been presented with a "fait accompli" in East Timor. And in early March 1976 Winspeare returned to Geneva, and the remainder of the UN mission to New York City. It was reported that Arafat had told Winspeare that the integration of East Timor with Indonesia was "already a tangible fact."

Meanwhile the war goes on in East Timor. Fretilin radio is still monitored in Darwin. According to a report on May 21, 1976, Fretilin and Indonesian troops had clashed on the road between Ermera and Aileu, in the Ermera region itself, around Baucau, along the Indonesian-East Timor border, and on the road between Same and Maubisse (see map). By mid-year, the Indonesian dry season (April-November) offensive apparently had resulted only in the capture of Aiahae and Ermera,³⁶ and in some areas the Indonesian penetration of the interior of East Timor seems to be limited to the range of its naval guns.

On the political front the Indonesian-sponsored Provisional Government of East Timor invited the 23 embassies in Jakarta to send observers to a Peoples Assembly held in Dili on May 31. Only seven embassies accepted—New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria—and the absence of the United States, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Papua New Guinea must

³⁴ *The Times* (London), February 4, 1976.

³⁵ Photocopied text released by the Australian Mission to the United Nations, February 8, 1976.

³⁶ Personal interview with Fretilin sources, June 8, 1976.

May 2, report contains INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR: have been embarrassing for Indonesia. * June 1, 1976 report in the Washington Post expressed skepticism about the authenticity of the Peoples Assembly and said that the diplomats and journalists were allowed only three hours in East Timor and could not meet any of the 28 representatives to the Assembly—which voted unanimously to request integration with Indonesia. On July 17, 1976, President Suharto signed a bill incorporating East Timor into Indonesia, two days after the Indonesian parliament had passed the bill.

International Response

Reactions in Australia: The Australian government and some trade unions differed widely in their views of events in East Timor. The Labor government under former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and the caretaker and the new conservative government installed in December, both under Peacock, have avoided antagonizing their large neighbor to the north. A glance at the map showing Indonesia spread like an umbrella over Australia suggests that this timidity is probably well advised since Indonesia could conceivably easily harass Australia by banning Australian aircraft from Indonesian airspace.

However, Australia's policy of non-interference assumed a quick, silent Indonesian takeover—which did not occur. Instead Timorese movements, especially Fretilin, stirred up Australian interest and support, partly by reminding Australians that the Timorese had been instrumental in stopping the Japanese just short of invading Darwin in World War II. The Australian press headlined the government's timidity in dealing with Indonesia along with graphic stories of the brutality of Javanese troops in East Timor. Indeed, casualties among Australian journalists themselves were high. It has been reported that the five Australian journalists killed in October 1975 in Balibo were executed by the UDT or by Indonesians after they had obtained evidence of Jakarta's direct involvement. They were reported as accidentally killed; the bodies were burnt beyond recognition and were handed over to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The Australian government did not pursue the matter.

In contrast some Australian trade unions supported Fretilin and opposed Indonesian moves. In March 1975 the trade unions sent a delegation to East Timor to assess the situation. As early as August 1975 the Waterside Workers' Federation in Darwin refused to load the Timorese evicue ship Macdill because of the likelihood of the cargo going to UDT. Perhaps in response to trade union pressures, the Labor government in August moved reconnaissance aircraft and long-range transport to an isolated World War II airstrip near Darwin, dispatched two destroyers from Perth to Timorese waters, and the Australian ambassador in Jakarta warned Indonesia not to act prematurely.³⁷ These

³⁷ *The Australian* and *Guardian*, August 25, 1975.

moves, however, seem designed primarily for consumption by the Australian public.

Indeed, the Australian public was well aware of events in East Timor: in August and September 1975 about 2,500 refugees from East Timor flowed through Darwin. And in late October 1975 an Australian fact finding mission of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid spent ten days in East Timor, reporting that Indonesian helicopters were guiding artillery attacks against Fretilin and that Indonesian soldiers had been captured in East Timor. The mission further reported that Fretilin effectively controlled East Timor.³⁸ Finally, on October 30, 1975, Don Willessee, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Labor government, said in Parliament that the government condemned the use of armed force and objected to Indonesian intervention.³⁹ This was the first open criticism by the Australian government. But no further criticisms were forthcoming from the caretaker or the new government.

Meanwhile, following the Indonesian takeover of Ahabae, a meeting of national maritime unions in Sydney on November 27, 1975, banned all Indonesian-registered ships in Australia and any ships carrying war materials to Indonesia. Nevertheless, on December 1, 1975, the Australian government refused to recognize the newly formed Democratic Republic of East Timor under Fretilin. In reaction Horta said, "All Australia had to do was to warn the Indonesian Government against invading Timor. It's unbelievable that such a wealthy country as Australia has done so little."⁴⁰ And the president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions said that the government should stop providing military assistance to Indonesia. (It had promised to supply Indonesia with \$26,000,000 worth of military equipment over the next three years.) Consequently the Metal Workers Union employed at the government aircraft factory in Melbourne banned all work on Sabre jet engines bound for the Indonesian air force. And as of mid-July 1976, the Postal Workers Union, the Seaman's Union, and the National Waterside Workers Federation were still maintaining a ban on all goods and services to and from Indonesia.

One of the most explicit acts of the Australian government was the seizure on January 25, 1976, of the Fretilin radio transmitter in Darwin which was a licensed but which had been in undisturbed operation for seven weeks. It was seized at the time it was being used to try to arrange a visit by the UN envoy to Fretilin-held areas of East Timor. Tony Bello, the radio operator, said in a newspaper interview that he had spoken by radio to Winspeare in Jakarta on the night before and that Winspeare had said he was willing to meet Fretilin leaders and

asked whether it would be possible for an Australian pilot to fly him from Darwin to Fretilin East Timor. Bello was on his way to transmit the envoy's message to Fretilin when he was stopped. The Australian Foreign Affairs Department claimed they were not informed about the pending seizure.⁴¹

Peacock reportedly said that he "deeply regretted" the course of events in Timor, but he made it clear that Australia would play no major role in the situation. Peacock, in refusing to risk Australian airplanes to fly Winspeare to Fretilin East Timor, said that since Portugal had legal control of East Timor, it should take responsibility for getting Winspeare there.⁴² Nevertheless, trade union pressure apparently prompted Peacock on February 11, 1976, to blame former Prime Minister Whitlam for the bloodshed in East Timor. Also, Fretilin began using another radio transmitter again. According to Horta, the police are not expected to confiscate this one because to do so would cause trouble with the trade union.⁴³ Indeed, in mid-1976 the Australian government seemed to cool its attitude toward Indonesia, as indicated by its declining to send any diplomatic observers to the Peoples Assembly in Dili on May 31.

Reactions in Indonesia: Hoadley discounts the possibility that an independent East Timor could pose a threat to Indonesia, especially as a conduit for communism.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, this is the major reason the Indonesian government offered to its own people for the annexation of East Timor. (It is true that if Portugal had recognized China, the Chinese communist government would have demanded the Republic of China's [Taiwanese] General office in Dili). Perhaps the clearest official Indonesian statement on East Timor is provided by a letter in the *New York Times* from Sami Abdullah, Counselor of the Indonesian Embassy: "Indonesia has no territorial claim on Portuguese Timor (despite the fact that it is in the heart of Indonesian territory). . . . The Portuguese exploited their colony thoroughly; there is nothing left for Indonesia to 'exploit.' There is, however, much for Indonesia to give to a people that is ethnically and culturally Indonesian. Indonesia will not take over Portuguese Timor but will accept integration, should the people of the area democratically, and without terrorists' guns pointed at their heads, choose this course."⁴⁵

Indonesia emphasizes the cultural similarities between the two halves of the island, and Fretilin emphasizes the differences, pointing out that 450 years of different colonial histories have surely had their

³⁸ *Reuter*, October 28, 1975.

³⁹ *The Australian*, October 31, 1975.

⁴⁰ *The Australian*, December 6, 1975.

⁴¹ *The Australian*, January 27, 1976.

⁴² *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB), January 28, 1976.

⁴³ Personal interview with Horta, March 6, 1976.

⁴⁴ Hoadley, p. 24.

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, January 11, 1976.

impact and that Bahasa Indonesia is unknown in East Timor. The argument focuses on a matter of degree and unfortunately cannot be settled by any empirical measurement. The empirical situation is that for Indonesia the possibility of a protracted guerrilla war in East Timor must be repelling; in 1912 some 400 Australian commandos, with Timorese support, pinned down more than 20,000 Japanese troops in these same mountains. And Indonesia already has its problems with secessionist movements in Sumatra, West Irian, and South Moluccas.

This is the first time that Indonesia has seized territory outside the original Netherlands East Indies, and it may prove to be a long-term problem. Despite the discouraging effect that the Indonesian government has on public debate there is apparently some Indonesian criticism of the takeover of East Timor. An article in the January 13, 1976, *Daily Merdeka*, for instance, charged that Jakarta had too quickly branded Fretilin as communist without considering that it might be nationalistic.

Reactions in Southeast Asian and Pacific Nations: In the UN General Assembly vote exploring Indonesian actions, Thailand and Malaysia voted with Indonesia while Singapore and Papua New Guinea abstained. Malaysia even broadcast support for the decision of Indonesia to send troops to East Timor.⁴⁸ The only official support for Fretilin came in the form of a letter of solidarity from Ton Duc Thang, president of Vietnam.⁴⁷

The only other nation in the area that could conceivably support Fretilin is Papua New Guinea, which is having difficulties of its own, especially with secessionist movements in New Britain Island and copprich Bougainville Island. The Minister for Corrective Institutions Pita Ias denounced Indonesia's intervention in East Timor as "imperialist expansion," and asserted that the people in Irian Jaya, the Indonesian western part of the island of New Guinea, were living a nightmare under Javanese rule.⁴⁹ On January 29, 1976, in Sydney Horta claimed, "Papua New Guinea is the next objective of Indonesia's expansion after its virtual takeover of East Timor. Fretilin troops in Timor have captured documents which prove Indonesia [is] behind the Bougainville secessionist movement and other civil unrest in Papua New Guinea."⁴⁹

Reactions Among World Powers: The response to events in East Timor in the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union has been rather muted. The U.S. typically has been accused of intervention through the CIA and the oil companies, but even the most radical critics have been able to do little else except place John Baker, an American executive of the

⁴³ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), December 15, 1975.

⁴⁴ Showa to me by Horta, March 6, 1976.

⁴⁵ Reuters, December 18, 1975.

⁴⁶ The Press (Christchurch), January 30, 1976.

* Who? Freney?

Why don't you do research first & write later.

INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR
The scholarly Schmuck, 1963

U.S. Oceanic Exploration Company, in Dili both at the time of the UDT split with Fretilin and during the UDT coup.⁵⁰ A conspiracy theory is unconvincing here. It is a fact, however, that the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia commenced only twelve hours after President Gerald Ford had ended a two-day state visit to Jakarta. The White House said that President Suharto did not inform Ford of the impending action in East Timor, but the invasion force was partly equipped with American weapons and a proposal for more military aid to Indonesia was pending in the U.S. Congress. Also, according to Jakarta radio, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had assured Indonesia that the U.S. government would not recognize Fretilin's proclamation of independence.⁵¹

On March 3, 1976, the U.S. House of Representatives did approve a \$4.8 billion foreign aid authorization bill and in so doing voted down an amendment that sought to cut aid to Indonesia, both for its takeover of East Timor and the lack of civil rights in Indonesia. The amendment, by Tom Harkin of Iowa, would have eliminated the \$19.4 million grant military assistance authorization to Indonesia, though this would still have left \$23.1 in foreign military sales credits, \$2 million in the Foreign Military Training Program, and \$13 million in excess defense articles. Military assistance to Indonesia then is expected to increase in fiscal year 1976 to \$57 million over the actual expenditure in fiscal year 1975 of \$23.8 million.

China condemned Jakarta in a December 9 article in the *People's Daily*, saying, "The struggle of the people of East Timor for national liberation and independence is an integral part of the 'third world' people's struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism."⁵² This tough stance is apparently a matter of principle since Peking has wanted to improve relations with Indonesia. Although it makes a distinction between state-to-state ties and moral support for liberation struggles, China knows how warily Southeast Asian governments view Chinese support for subversive movements. Nevertheless, Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Qunhua gave a banquet in Peking on December 19, 1975, for the delegation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor led by Rogério Tiago de Fatima Lobato, head of the Fretilin armed forces. As for the Soviet Union, Pravda only expressed "concern" over the affair and support for Timorese self-determination—without openly denouncing Jakarta.

Conclusions

There are few heroes in this tale. Perhaps nothing would have prevented an eventual Indonesian takeover; it may be the inevitable continuation of Javanese expansion. However, the longer the Indo-

⁵⁰ Freney, pp. 30-31.

⁵¹ Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), December 8, 1975.

⁵² Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, January 28, 1976.

nerians would have had to wait the more powerful and legitimate would have become the East Timorese entity. If "wrong" steps were taken (for the East Timorese), it was the UDT leaders who took them. Ill-advised at best, self-destructive at worst, these leaders at first seemed to be playing a minor role in a situation controlled by Indonesians and their Apodeti cohorts. By May even former Apodeti leader Araújo had been replaced as head of the Provisional Government of East Timor by Romodão, former Indonesian consul in Dili, and it was reported that former UDT leaders had been imprisoned.

Nothing Portugal could have done would have redeemed its 450 years of exploitation and neglect in East Timor, but one might have reasonably expected some sort of act of gallantry from the new, relatively progressive government. Instead what was forthcoming was va-tation, favoritism to UDT, withdrawal, and finally inaction.

At the end of its long, sad colonial adventure in Southeast Asia Portugal's only contribution was to fulfill the legal fiction of the legacy of the nation-state—a concept strongly fostered by U.N. actions. So while Portugal had no power and all the responsibility, Australia and Indonesia, who had all the power but could conveniently evade "legal" responsibility, manipulated the situation to satisfy only their own internal needs. And Australia once again walked away from its obvious status as a major Southeast Asian power.

Meanwhile the East Timorese have disappeared into the bureaucratic labyrinth that passes as the Republic of Indonesia. Under the modern concept of the nation-state, where only legal structures exist, not people, it seems doubtful that the world will ever again have an opportunity to closely examine the struggles and sufferings of the Timorese.

as Canberra Times, May 21, 1976.

Article hungry, melodramatic
puck!

That means that you won't get to
write another back article.

What a pity!
I love Eastima!

ROBERT LAWLESS is Assistant Professor of Anthropology and the Social Sciences at the University of Florida, Gainesville

CHINESE WORLD STRATEGY AND SOUTH ASIA: THE CHINA FACTOR IN INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

Mohammad Habib Sidky

When THE PAKISTANI ARMY under General Niazi surrendered unconditionally to the Indians in December 1971, the India-Pakistan War was officially terminated. As a direct outcome of the Pakistani defeat East Pakistan gained its independence and 75,000,000 people found themselves with an independent, sovereign nation of their own—the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The war itself had lasted for only twelve days, a period during which the armies of India surprised the world when, with creative military organization and strategy, they expeditionarily vanquished a formidable enemy in a vigorous operation which was described as "an achievement reminiscent of the German blitzkrieg across France in 1940."

The war and the resultant emergence of a new Asian state was not only the most important event to transpire in South Asia since the inception of Pakistan, but it had a profound impact upon the sensitive arena of international affairs as well. Moreover, beyond the general regional ramifications of the developments born out of the clash between two Third World nations, the individual global strategies of the great contemporary international powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), were by no means left unaffected.

The war between India and Pakistan in 1971 was cause for much concern on the part of the Government of the PRC, which for most of the 1960s had nursed a steadily growing friendship with Pakistan while, for a number of reasons, China-India relations subsequent to the 1962 border flare-up between the latter two powers had undergone a process of virtual deterioration and collapse. By mid-1971, the future of the Indian subcontinent was at stake. The East Pakistan crisis which so violently culminated in the India-Pakistan War was a matter which



MISSÃO PERMANENTE DE PORTUGAL
JUNTO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS
NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation had the opportunity, at the 30th session of the General Assembly, and before this Committee to expose in detail the evolution of the decolonization process of the territory of Timor.

During the Security Council sessions held on the question of Timor, my delegation had again the opportunity to define the Portuguese Government's position on the events which took place in the territory, and which prevented my Government from completing the process leading to a genuine exercise, by the Timorese people, of their right to self-determination and independence.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I need not to recapitulate today, before this Committee, the facts that led to the present situation and to recall the attitudes adopted by my Government to face them, since they are known to all.

My Government had also the occasion to explain to the Special Committee, on September 8, 1976, its position concerning the most recent phase of the situation prevailing

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the Portuguese policy on this question and it is enshrined in article 307 of my country's new Constitution.

It seems to me, nevertheless, that the main problem at stake in this question is not that one concerning the principles applicable to the situation, but rather, the manner in which they were or should be concretely applied to it, that is, the criteria effectively adopted or to be adopted to allow the Timorese people to exercise those fundamental rights.

In this respect, Portugal faces the difficulties arising from its extremely limited practical capacity of dealing effectively with the territory's present political situation. Its limitations were, as a matter of fact, recognized by the General Assembly itself and by the Security Council. The latter, taking also into account the "de facto" situation created in the territory by its military occupation by a third power, tried to set up a mechanism for its solution, which clearly conferred to the United Nations an essential role to resolve the question of Timor.

My Government - according to the policy it had always followed with respect to the decolonization process of the territory under consideration, for it has soon recognized

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Nations bodies to withdraw without delay all its forces from Timor and to respect its territorial integrity and the right of its people to self-determination. Those actions were undertaken outside the United Nations, without the latter's supervision and, as yet, without its approval.

The Portuguese Government declares that it does not recognize "de jure" that integration as having resulted from the effective exercise of the right to self-determination by the Timorese people and considers that the criteria adopted to evaluate that effectiveness do not fall under the unilateral and exclusive jurisdiction of the Indonesian Government, for this matter is committed to the control and supervision of the United Nations, according to its relevant resolutions on decolonization affairs.

My Government upholds the principle that the United Nations should, in the case of Timor, decide whether the solutions concretely adopted or to be adopted to decolonize the territory are or would be in conformity with the fundamental principles of the Charter and with the resolutions applicable to this question.

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In this connection, allow me to quote what my Minister of Foreign Affairs said, on October 7, 1976, before the Plenary of the General Assembly:

" The question of Timor is, at the moment, before the United Nations, with which Portugal has fully cooperated in the efforts undertaken to apply the internationally accepted principles of self-determination and the right of peoples to determine their own futures. The Portuguese Constitution also upholds these principles specifically in the case of Timor.

The problem is now within the purview of the effective application of the rights and duties recognized by the specialized organs of the United Nations, it being certain that the Portuguese Government remains undisposed to recognize de jure the integration of East Timor within the territory of another State as a result of a unilateral decision. We are, meanwhile, ready to accept a consensus of the United Nations regarding this matter, for we are sure that it would be in accordance with the principles that have always guided the United Nations".

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Portugal deeply regrets the continuous loss of lives and property due to the fighting which, as reported, is still waging in East Timor and we hope the United Nations can take effective and appropriate action to stop the suffering of the timorese people and to assure its fundamental rights.

I thank you, Sir

generous credits granted by the GDR's new diplomatic partners. Trade with the Federal Republic, which has long been one of the GDR's principal trading associates, has grown too. In view of its policy of *Abgrenzung*, it is not surprising that the Honecker leadership has concentrated on agreements which are economically beneficial and neglected most of the other topics listed as negotiable in the Basic Treaty. A further limitation to East Germany's trade, not just with West Germany, but with the West in general, is the degree of her economic integration with Comecon, her payments deficit with the capitalist countries, and the need to pay the increased prices for Soviet raw materials.

Meanwhile the basic problem facing Honecker—the need to win the active loyalty of the population—remains unresolved. Indeed, its solution seems less tractable today than it did in 1971. In the early part of the decade Honecker was able to offer his fellow citizens a deal which earned him considerable initial goodwill: on the one hand, a faster growth of living standards; on the other, an opening to the West in the form of visits from friends and relatives from outside. The gloss has worn off this deal. The working population are now being asked to work harder in exchange for a slower increase in real incomes. The visits from the West have become a part of everyday life in the GDR, leaving East Germans painfully aware that they themselves are still barred from visiting the West. At present the only exceptions to this restriction are pensioners, who are, crudely speaking, economically dispensable, and, since the Basic Treaty came into force in 1973, a small number of East Germans who are allowed to make short trips in the event of a death, birth, marriage or special wedding anniversaries among their relatives in the Federal Republic. Last year the number of GDR citizens who were able to visit the West was just over 40,000—a paltry figure in comparison with the seven million Westerners who crossed the frontier the other way.

Any substantial enlargement of the numbers of East Germans 'allowed out' would be risky. Many might stay away, thus undermining morale at home and depleting the work force. As it is, over five thousand East Germans escape each year by one route or another and many others make unsuccessful attempts. Honecker must know that the travel restrictions are bitterly resented by large sections of the population. Yet just as Honecker could not prevent the increased prices of Soviet raw materials, so too can he do little to undermine the attraction of his Western neighbour for his fellow countrymen. Like Ulbricht before him, Honecker is discovering that his room for manoeuvre between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic is limited.

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Indonesia and the incorporation of East Timor

MICHAEL LEIFER

THE incorporation by force and by ceremonial of the eastern half of the island of Timor within the Indonesian state aroused a relatively short-lived controversy. It centred on the absence of an acceptable act of self-determination in the former Portuguese colony and on the conduct there of the government which had recourse to *force majeure*. The controversy has been relatively short-lived producing ritual disapproval in the United Nations, because the annexation of East Timor was hardly an episode of global import bearing on central adversary relationships. And even within South-East Asia, it was of limited significance, especially given the proximity in time of preceding political change in Indochina. The process and manner of incorporation of East Timor in Indonesia is of interest none the less for what it reveals about the strategic perspective of the Indonesian Government. Noteworthy also is how the rudimentary politics of the eastern half of the island followed a course which served Indonesian interests, especially in providing a justification for intervention that was absent at the outset.

It became apparent shortly after the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon had issued a general licence for liberation in Portugal's colonies that the Indonesian Government wished to assume control of the vestige of empire at the eastern extremity of the Lesser Sundas. At this time, without a legitimate excuse to intervene decisively in a territory where Portuguese sovereignty was recognized and Portugal's decolonization policy approved, and also when internal circumstances did not warrant any so-called police action to restore order, Indonesia cloaked an evident interest in studied ambivalence. Indeed, such ambivalence persisted in declaratory policy even after overt military intervention had virtually decided the political future of East Timor.¹

The Indonesian interest in incorporating East Timor was not an expression of territorial acquisitiveness as such. Portuguese Timor had remained a political backwater from the outset of Indonesian indepen-

¹ See President Suharto's New Year message on the eve of 1976, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, FE/5008/C.12.

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dence until the initiative of the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon in April 1974 disturbed its dormant condition. It had escaped the romantic political lusts of Sukarno slaked against the Dutch over their refusal until August 1962 to relinquish control of the western half of the island of New Guinea and against Malaysia because of her allegedly spurious identity. As East Timor was a Portuguese possession, it was politically inviolate while Indonesian governments argued the Irian Barat claim on the ground that all and only the territories of the former Netherlands East Indies constituted the Republic of Indonesia. And given its size, population, location and economic circumstances, Portuguese Timor did not provide a suitable focus for promoting solidarity with which to shore up the destructive political competitiveness inherent in Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Indeed, in a succinct survey of its colonial condition, one observer commented 'Economically, it might be said that Portuguese Timor has not yet reached the stage of underdevelopment'.²

Indonesian apprehensions

The Indonesian Government's interest in East Timor was aroused when radical change within Portugal served to transform the stable administrative context of the colony into a political one fraught with uncertainty as perceived from Jakarta. An appropriate analogy would be to represent colonial East Timor as an unheated pot with Portuguese control as its firmly attached lid. With the expectation of the removal of that lid, combined with sanction from Lisbon for raising the political temperature within the colony, political opportunity in East Timor was matched in Indonesia by apprehension at what might be the consequences of a new and independent entity sharing a common border at the extremity of a fissiparous archipelago. Such apprehension was reinforced by the actual emergence of political organizations within the colony in May 1974. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), representing in the main the urban beneficiaries of Portuguese rule, advocated autonomy within a continuing political association with Lisbon, but the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin), representing a lower income constituency, demanded early and complete independence. The radical rhetoric of this body and its intentional acronymic similarity to Frelimo in Mozambique caused consternation in Jakarta. A probable Indonesian response was the formation of a third political grouping, the Popular Association for a Democratic Timor (Apodeti), which sought integration for the colony in the neighbouring Republic and received financial and propaganda support from across the border.³

² Bob Reece, 'Portuguese Timor: 1974', *Australian Neighbourhood*, April-June 1974, p. 5.

³ A brief account of the emergence and constituencies of support of the political groupings which appeared within East Timor can be found in J. Stephen Hoadley, 'Portuguese Timor and Regional stability', *South-East Asian Spectrum*, July 1975.

Indonesian encouragement for the political disposition of Apodeti was not determined by crude territorial appetite but by an excessive concern with national security. To explain the course of events in East Timor in terms of 'geographic tidiness and Javanese imperialism' would be an oversimplification. East Timor was coveted and eventually seized not because the Portuguese half of the island was perceived as an asset but because it was thought necessary to secure it in order to deny its uncertain utility to others. East Timor, at the very periphery of archipelago Indonesia, attracted attention in Jakarta because of a fundamental sense of territorial vulnerability, arising from geographic fragmentation and ethno-religious diversity, made acute by the dominant influence of the military and their perspective in government. Thus, the augury of internal political change in East Timor after April 1974 conjured up a variety of worst possible cases around both the prospect of a point of entry for hostile forces being opened into the soft exterior of the Indonesian state and encouragement being provided for separatism within the archipelago. It may be of some importance to note that these apprehensions emerged barely three months after a major political upheaval in Jakarta in January 1974 which had been construed by President Suharto as a subversive challenge to a legitimately constituted political order endorsed by electoral process. Subsequently, the events which culminated in Indonesian annexation occurred within months of the dramatic Communist victories in Indochina which were a matter for considerable concern in Jakarta.

Indonesia's interest in East Timor was evident from the outset, if ambivalently projected. But the prospect for incorporation without major political and other opportunity costs was most uncertain for many months. In these circumstances, the Indonesian Government pursued a policy characterized by patience, if not always by internal consensus and political skill. Forcible incorporation was deemed the instrument of last resort because Indonesia did not want to be seen to violate the sovereignty of Portugal as long as it was being exercised visibly within a stable context and on the basis of a firm commitment to orderly decolonization. There existed a concern not to tarnish the international reputation of Indonesia under President Suharto in the eyes of her benefactors among the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) aid consortium as the moderate opposite of the country under President Sukarno. In addition, there was no desire to produce a sense of alarm among her regional neighbours, especially her partners within the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia's plans for the management of regional order on a co-operative basis were predicated on maintaining and expanding the store of goodwill built up so assiduously within non-Communist South-East Asia since the formal termination of confrontation with Malaysia in 1966.

Fragile coalition

Political skill was less than evident on Indonesia's part during the remaining months of 1974 in so far as crude attempts to enhance the position of Apodeti confirmed its client identity and served the immediate cause of the other two major political groupings who solicited support on the basis of rejecting the substitution of one form of alien domination for another. Thus, the blatant support of the Indonesian media for Apodeti did not improve the prospects of what was then the least popular of the three political organizations which had emerged since April 1974. And apprehension at possible Indonesian intervention served to bring together in coalition UDT and Fretilin who between them commanded the vast support of the urban literate. A convergence of political positions on the transfer of sovereignty and the pace of its ultimate attainment paved the way for a political alliance in January 1975, whereupon the two parties claimed an exclusive right to negotiate with the Portuguese authorities on the terms for eventual independence.⁴

At this juncture the prospects for the realization of Indonesia's aims were bleak. The UDT-Fretilin coalition had been founded on a common opposition to the Indonesian solution to the Timor problem. As one observer commented while the coalition endured, 'But this solution is now a non-starter because the Timorese people, in so far as they are represented by the UDT-Fretilin coalition, seem to have expressed their opposition to this option.' It was argued, in addition, that 'Indonesia at present has no credible justification for stepping in uninvited. The Communist menace has not yet materialized and Fretilin has not lived up to its radical reputation. Neither has internal political violence accompanied the decolonization process...'

Indonesia's political fortunes improved, however, when Fretilin, which had become more radical in outlook concurrently with the drift of politics within Portugal, played into the hands of the Government in Jakarta. The coalition between UDT and Fretilin broke down in consequence of this radicalism after less than six months. Indeed, its formation had influenced the Indonesians to moderate their proprietary attitude and to try to mend political fences with UDT on the basis of a common concern at the leftist orientation of Fretilin. Initial discussions between all three political parties within East Timor and representatives of the Portuguese authorities began in May 1975 and, if Fretilin had sustained its association with UDT, the logical outcome would have been an agreement to hold elections, as a result of which Apodeti and thus Indonesia would probably have been eliminated as principal parties to the political destiny of East Timor. In the event, Fretilin refused to proceed to the

⁴ For an account of the establishment and subsequent breakdown of the UDT-Fretilin coalition, see J. S. Dunn, 'Portuguese Timor—The Independence Movement from Coalition to Conflict', *Dyason House Papers* (formerly *Australia's Neighbour*), August 1975.

⁵ Hoadley, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

next stage of negotiations in Macao in June on the ground that it was not prepared to participate in them with Apodeti because it advocated an alternative colonialism.

Fretilin boycotted the discussions in Macao where, ironically, agreement was reached on holding elections to a popular assembly in October 1976, with the date for the ultimate transfer of sovereignty set for October 1978. With the coalition broken and Apodeti a principal party to the process of independence, Indonesia was still in the game. And her opportunity for ensuring an eventual incorporation increased on 11 August 1975 when the extent of the antagonism between UDT and Fretilin manifested itself in an inept attempt by the former to seize power, justified as a preemptive act.⁶ The UDT show of force was shortlived. From 20 August Fretilin loyalists among Timorese forces in the Portuguese garrison rallied with effect and by the end of the month Fretilin had established control in the administrative capital, Dili. The outbreak of violence not only disrupted Portugal's plans for decolonization but also led to the complete abdication of responsibility by the reluctant colonial power with the retreat of its officials to the neighbouring island of Atauro.

Towards Intervention

In the changed circumstances, Indonesia did not exploit the opportunity to fill the political vacuum. Her Government abided by a self-denying ordinance, continued to recognize Portuguese sovereignty and reiterated support for popular self-determination, although reserving the right to act unilaterally to protect her declared interests. The likelihood of direct intervention was indicated explicitly by the statement of the Defence Minister, General Panggabean, that his country would act if its stability were threatened by events in the neighbouring colony. At this stage, however, unilateral action was set aside, while an abortive attempt was made to promote a collective police action whereby Indonesian interests might be secured under the auspices of Portuguese sovereignty. Thus, at the end of August, Dr Almeida Santos, an envoy from Lisbon, visited Jakarta and a proposal was discussed to form an international supervisory force to restore public order in the colony. But differences of opinion arose over the composition and hence the role of the force. Portugal was willing only to accept a force made up in part of local states and excluding Indonesia, whereas Indonesia insisted on participation. Irrespective of Indonesian and Portuguese differences, any plan for joint intervention would have foundered also on the reluctance of the Australian Government to involve itself in the undertaking. In September 1974, the then Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, had journeyed to Jakarta where he apparently accepted the practicality of the incorporation of East Timor into the Indonesian state in the interests of regional

⁶ For an assessment of UDT motives, see Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

stability. But a year later, domestic circumstances within Australia, including a growing vocal support for Fretilin, precluded Whitlam from openly countenancing an intervention with Australian participation, whether designed to restore public order or to secure Indonesia's objectives.

After the failure of this initiative which coincided with the evident consolidation of control by Fretilin, Indonesia began more direct efforts to protect her interests. In early September, Fretilin claimed that unidentified forces had crossed into East Timor from the Indonesian half of the island.⁷ At this juncture, Fretilin dropped its initial demand for immediate independence and instead advocated the formula which it had rejected the previous June, namely that agreed at the Macao conference. The purpose underlying Fretilin's change of position was to obtain endorsement of its exercise of political control from Portugal, in principle the sovereign power, in order to hold a legal shield against Indonesian intervention. Naturally, the Indonesian Government set its face against any transfer of sovereignty from Portugal to Fretilin alone. It refused to accept the apparent *fait accompli* in the colony and demanded that both Apodeti and UDT be principal parties to any act of decolonization. It secured support in this position from Australia, whose Ambassador in Jakarta let it be known that a transfer of authority by Portugal to Fretilin would definitely prejudice stability in the region.

The Portuguese Government went through the formalities of trying to reconcile the three internal parties and sought without success to promote fresh discussions between them. In the meantime, Indonesian military support for Apodeti became more evident and by mid-October the Indonesian Ministry of Information claimed that Apodeti with UDT controlled large areas of the eastern half of Timor. It was reported that by this stage regular units of the Indonesian Army had crossed into East Timor and had been 'responsible for virtually all of the fighting presented to the world as a "counter-attack" by Timorese freedom fighters'.⁸ By challenging covertly the position of Fretilin within East Timor, Indonesia sought to frustrate any claim which the Front might present to the outside world for recognition of its sovereign position.

At the beginning of November, talks were held in Rome between the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes, and his Indonesian counterpart, Adam Malik. In a joint statement issued on 3 November, Portugal was confirmed as 'the legitimate authority' in East Timor. The two ministers agreed also on the necessity of convening 'a meeting between Portugal and all political parties in Portuguese Timor simultaneously and aimed at ending armed strife and bringing about a peaceful

⁷ *The Times*, 9 September 1975.

⁸ Martin Woolacott in *The Guardian*, 13 November 1975. Five Australian Television journalists met their death in East Timor in October 1975 in circumstances which suggest that they had secured evidence of Indonesia's military involvement.

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and orderly process of decolonization in Portuguese Timor'. In addition, The two ministers shared the view that in the implementation of decolonization of Portuguese Timor it would be essential also to safeguard the legitimate interests of the countries of the region, particularly the interests of Indonesia as the closest neighbouring country.⁹

This statement was significant in that it not only indicated Portugal's refusal to recognize any exclusive claims by Fretilin but also that it confirmed Indonesia's status as a principal party to the conflict. From this time on the die appeared to be cast, as Fretilin became obliged to take the inevitable step of asserting unilaterally an independence which Indonesia could legitimately deny on the ground that it had violated the rights of UDT and Apodeti, accorded them by the sovereign power. In September 1975 these former adversaries had entered into an alliance on the basis of a common support for the integration of the eastern half of Timor into Indonesia. They had been joined then by two other political groups calling themselves Trabalhista and Kota which enabled the Indonesian Government to proclaim with even greater assurance that it supported the majority parties to the conflict, all of which favoured integration.

Fretilin proclaimed the independence of the People's Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November after it had become evident that an agreement could not be reached on an acceptable venue for talks between the rival parties. The following day its four antagonists declared East Timor an integral part of Indonesia and on 1 December their representatives met in the western part of the island with Adam Malik who promised his Government's support and said that the solution now lay on the battlefield. An authoritative statement by Indonesia's Information Minister, Mr Mashuri, was issued on 4 December in which the prospect of decisive intervention was signalled.¹⁰ Overt intervention did not follow immediately but was almost certainly delayed for four days because of the impending brief visit to Jakarta by President Ford. His presence in the Indonesian capital raised all kinds of speculation about the extent of consultation and even collusion with the American President and his advisers on the imminent military enterprise. In the event, President Ford was spared the embarrassment of being in Jakarta while the invasion of East Timor was proceeding. It began on 7 December, the day after his departure, and was defended as a response to requests from within East Timor to restore order there. An Indonesian Government statement argued that it could not prevent 'Indonesian volunteers from helping their brothers in East Timor in their struggle to liberate themselves from Fretilin oppression'.¹¹ The intervention by 'volunteers' resolved the issue of the political future of East Timor. Although it was

⁹ Full text of Joint Statement in *Indonesian News*, London, November 1975, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰ BBC, *loc. cit.*, FE/5078/B11-12. ¹¹ *The Times*, 8 December 1975.

less than a model military exercise and the initial resistance was vigorous, the balance of military resources, given the total absence of any significant external support for Fretilin, put the incorporation of the eastern half of the island into Indonesia beyond any doubt. A provisional government headed by the chairman of Apodeti and recognized by Indonesia was set up in Dili on 17 December and by the middle of February 1976, it was claimed that the island was under its effective control. The rest was sheer ceremony. On 31 May, a plenary session of a newly created East Timor People's Representative Council resolved to integrate the once Portuguese half of the island into Indonesia. This resolution was presented as a petition to President Suharto on 7 June who accepted it as an expression of brothers joining with brothers. This ceremonial process was extended with the despatch of an Indonesian mission 'to ascertain the wishes of the people of East Timor', whose work was completed in good time for the formal admission of the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia on 17 July 1976, a month before the anniversary of the proclamation of independence.

The human and material costs of Indonesia's decisive intervention have not been revealed; the attendant political consequences, including Portugal's decision to break diplomatic relations, Australia's affirmative vote and Papua New Guinea's and Singapore's abstention in the United Nations, have been received with surprise if not with major concern. Regionally, the impact of the episode of East Timor, in which the imperatives of force and order have not necessarily been matched by justice, has been mixed. Virtually all of Indonesia's neighbours were alarmed at the prospect of an independent East Timor less than viable economically and in the charge of a government drawn from Fretilin. Yet, they were less than pleased at the manner of Indonesia's resolution of the conflict. In the past, governments within and on the periphery of South-East Asia, in particular those of Australia, have lived with the problem of coexisting and co-operating with a volatile and even expansionist Indonesia. By her action in East Timor, she conjured up, if only temporarily, the spectre of their having to deal in the future with a similar phenomenon. In the event, her neighbours who are part of the same general political alignment have been obliged at least privately to come to terms with Indonesia's way of securing her and their priorities. They have deferred to President Suharto, who, unmoved by United Nations resolutions or Australian public anger, has enjoyed the last, if still ambivalent, words in accepting the petition for integration presented by the East Timor delegation. He commented then, 'We do not have any territorial ambition and we do not have the inclination to dominate other people, but our stand on the question of self-determination is clear: we will help those peoples who want to determine their own destiny and future.'

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Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples

ALGIERS, 4 JULY, 1976

Preamble

We live at a time of great hopes and deep despair;
a time of conflicts and contradictions;
a time when liberation struggles have succeeded in arousing the peoples of the world against the domestic and international structures of imperialism and in overturning colonial systems;
a time of struggle and victory in which new ideals of justice among and within nations have been adopted;
a time when the General Assembly of the United Nations has given increasing expression, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, to the quest for a new international, political and economic order.

But this is also a time of frustration and defeat, as new forms of imperialism evolve to oppress and exploit the peoples of the world.

Imperialism, using vicious methods with the complicity of governments that it has itself often installed, continues to dominate a part of the world. Through direct or indirect intervention, through multi-national enterprises, through manipulation of corrupt local politicians, with the assistance of military regimes based on police repression, torture and physical extermination of opponents, through a set of practices that has become known as neo-colonialism, imperialism extends its stranglehold over many peoples.

Aware of expressing the aspirations of our era, we met in Algiers to proclaim that all the peoples of the world have an equal right to liberty, the right to free themselves from any foreign interference and to choose their own government, the right if they are under subjection to fight for their liberation and the right to benefit from other people's assistance in their struggle.

Convinced that the effective respect for human rights necessarily implies respect for the rights of peoples, we have adopted the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples.

May all those who, throughout the world, are fighting the great battle, at times through armed struggle, for the freedom of all peoples, find in this Declaration the assurance of the legitimacy of their struggle.

Section I - RIGHT TO EXISTENCE

Article 1.
Every people has the right to existence.

Article 2
Every people has the right to the respect of its national and cultural identity.

Article 3
Every people has the right to retain peaceful possession of its territory and to return to it if it is expelled.

Article 4
None shall be subjected, because of his national or cultural identity, to massacre, torture, persecution, deportation, expulsion or living conditions such as may compromise the identity or integrity of the people to which he belongs.

Section II - RIGHT TO POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION

Article 5
Every people has an imprescriptible and unalienable right to self-determination. It shall determine its political status freely and without any foreign interference.

Article 6
Every people has the right to break free from any colonial or foreign domination, whether direct or indirect, and from any racist regime.

Article 7
Every people has the right to have a democratic government representing all the citizens without distinction as to race, sex, belief or colour, and capable of ensuring effective respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

Section III - ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF PEOPLES

Article 8
Every people has an exclusive right over its natural wealth and resources. It has the right to recover them if they have been despoiled, as well as any unjustly paid indemnities.

Article 9
Scientific and technical progress being part of the common heritage of mankind, every people has the right to participate in it.

Article 10
Every people has the right to a fair evaluation of its labour and to equal and just terms in international trade.

Article 11
Every people has the right to choose its own economic and social system and pursue its own path to economic development freely and without any foreign interference.

Article 12
The economic rights set forth above shall be exercised in a spirit of solidarity amongst the peoples of the world and with due regard for their respective interests.

Section IV - RIGHT TO CULTURE

Article 13
Every people has the right to speak its own language and preserve and develop its own culture, thereby contributing to the enrichment of the culture of mankind.

Article 14
Every people has the right to its artistic, historical and cultural wealth.

Article 15
Every people has the right not to have any alien culture imposed upon it.

Section V - RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT AND COMMON RESOURCES

Article 16
Every people has the right to the conservation, protection and improvement of its environment.

Article 17
Every people has the right to make use of the common heritage of mankind, such as the high seas, the sea-bed and outer space.

Article 18
In the exercise of the preceding rights every people shall take account of the necessities for

coordinating the requirements of its economic development with solidarity amongst all the peoples of the world.

Section VI - RIGHTS OF MINORITIES

Article 19
When a people constitutes a minority within a State it has the right to respect for its identity, traditions, language and cultural heritage.

Article 20
The members of a minority shall enjoy without discrimination the same rights as the other citizens of the State and shall participate on an equal footing with them in public life.

Article 21
These rights shall be exercised with due respect for the legitimate interest of the community as a whole and cannot authorise impairing the territorial integrity and political unity of the State, provided the State acts in accordance with all the principles set forth in this Declaration.

Section VII - GUARANTEES AND SANCTIONS

Article 22
Any disregard for the provisions of this Declaration constitutes a breach of obligations towards the international community as a whole.

Article 23
Any prejudice resulting from disregard for this Declaration must be totally compensated by whoever cause it.

Article 24
Any enrichment to the detriment of the people in violation of the provisions of this Declaration shall give rise to the restitution of profits thus obtained.

The same shall be applied to all excessive profits on investment of foreign origin.

Article 25
Any unequal treaties, agreements or contracts concluded in disregard of the fundamental rights of peoples shall have no effect.

Article 26
External financial charges which become excessive and unbearable for the people shall cease to be due.

Article 27
The gravest violations of the fundamental rights of peoples, especially of their right to existence, constitute international crimes for which their perpetrators shall carry personal penal liability.

Article 28
Any people whose fundamental rights are seriously disregarded has the right to enforce them, especially by political or trade union struggle and even, in the last resort, by the use of force.

Article 29
Liberation movements shall have access to international organizations and their combatants are entitled to the protection of the humanitarian law of war.

Article 30
The re-establishment of the fundamental rights of peoples, when they are seriously disregarded, is a duty incumbent upon all members of the

Democratic Republic Of East Timor

New York Information Office,
#4S. 35 Claremont Avenue, -
New York, 10027, N.Y. USA.
212-864-7986

~~November~~ December 5, 1976.

MEMO TO: Support groups,
Fraternal organisations,
of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

United Nations: The Plenary Session of the General Assembly ratified the resolution on East Timor on December 1; the vote was 68 for, 20 against, 49 abstentions. The increase in support from the Fourth Committee represents the presence of delegations that were absent at the earlier (committee) vote; the Indonesians picked up Nicaragua and Uruguay, and the abstentions stayed the same although Pakistan reverted to abstention after initially supporting the resolution in Committee.

All in all a good show for a country "with no liberation fighters left; no popular support; no territory; no international support".

New York: The New York East Timor Defense Committee held a very successful celebration of the first ~~independence anniversary~~ anniversary of the declaration of independence; over 300 people present heard speeches on Timor and Indonesia and saw films about the struggle - they contributed generously to the call for funds, and confirmed the organiser's confidence that awareness of the issue is intensifying in the US and will be a major asset in the forthcoming Washington campaign.

Britain: The BCIET won an excellent victory in succeeding to force a high level Indonesian mission to London to abandon its intention to hold a "Liaison seminar" at LSE; among those barricaded in the building for several hours until rescued by the bobbies were Murdani, Emil Salim, Mohammed Sadli. It's not clear whether Ali Murtopo was with the party or not. The action by the BCIET gained prominent coverage in the Times, Guardian, et al. The significance of the achievement of the British group will be appreciated by those who remember the purposes of similar Indonesian missions to Australia and Washington in 1975/74. The reverberations in Jakarta may be muted by the censorship on the press, but they will be intense at this "unstable" moment in Indonesian politics.

Jakarta: The leakage of a report confirming all FRETILIN claims from Indonesian welfare workers who recently returned from East Timor had an important impact in the United Nations last week. Leakages are rarely the work of powerless individuals, and some Indonesianologists see this, coming on top of two recent incidents in Jakarta, as a factional/elite backed move. A luta continua.

Sue Nichterlein, Information Officer,
New York.

Democratic Republic Of East Timor

Information Office, New York.

(212) 864-7986

THE MILITARY SITUATION

IN

EAST TIMOR, JUNE 1976

Richard Tanter.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR - AN EVALUATION. JUNE 1976.

On December 7, 1975 ten thousand elite Indonesian troops invaded the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, which ten days earlier had been unilaterally proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor by the popular nationalist de facto administration of the FRETILIN party. Operation Komodo, as it was named by the Indonesians, envisioned victory in a matter of days; six months later, after an enormous death toll, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor has bogged down. This paper attempts to evaluate the conflicting reports about the military situation in East Timor at this stage of the conflict.

The truth of the military situation in East Timor, while it is not easy to ascertain, is very different to the reports emanating from Jakarta, and reporters writing from Jakarta (1). Regular reports from FRETILIN's Radio Maubere are received in Australia and transmitted to the United States (2). A careful analysis of these reports corroborates evidence from other sources that FRETILIN forces still control the greater part of the countryside and that Indonesian occupation forces remain limited to coastal areas and to a few depopulated town centres. The map attached gives an approximate depiction of the position of DRET and Indonesian forces, based on considerations discussed below. However, after Vietnam, such maps are difficult to interpret. In this case, it seems that Indonesian control in the areas attributed to it may be limited.

D.R.E.T, forces

The military wing of the Democratic Republic of East Timor FALANTIL, the East Timor Liberation Army, is based on the former Portuguese army in the territory. From the beginnings of the Indonesian incursions in September, 1975, the D.R.E.T. forces were mobilised and demonstrating their ability to resist the invasion. An Australian journalist, Michael Richardson, described the make-up of the 30,000 man army:

"At the time of the UDT's short-lived putsch in August there were about 2,500 full-time Timorese regulars in the army led by about 150 Timorese sergeants, some of whom were veterans of the Portuguese colonial wars in Africa, and a handful of lieutenants. Behind this first-line army there were 7,000 part-time militia men and 20,000 reservists, each with up to 36 months of military training". (4)

Richardson and other commentators agree that at the time of the coup. the great majority of the Portuguese army in Timor swung behind FRETILIN and forced the UDT leaders out of the country.(5) The morale and military competence of FALANTIL appears to have been high, and its successful and continuing resistance to Indonesian elite units is proof of this.

- red berets (RPKAD)
- orange berets (kopsagat)
- violet berets (marines)
- Siliwangi division (West Java)
- Brawijaya division (East Java).

Reports from both Australian sources and FRETILIN sources indicated that troops from the Brawijaya division had been exceptionally brutal during the invasion and that officers had difficulty maintaining discipline; as a consequence, many were removed in January. (11)

FRETILIN radio claims that in the most recent troop movements, many of these elite Javanese soldiers have been replaced by less well trained troops from Flores, an island close to Timor. This change, if correct, is significant in terms of the cultural and ethnic conflict between the dominant Javanese and the many other groups in Indonesia.

The importance of the naval support is indicated by the map and the FRETILIN reports mentioned above. To a large extent, the range of the naval guns determines the penetration of the Indonesian forces. It is not known how many warships are operating in the area. However, Indonesia has a total of 86 sea-going warships of all types. The May 21 Radio Maubere broadcast mentions six ships being used in one north coast bombardment alone. At the same time, the blockade of the entire island is being maintained.

Since the total Indonesian naval fleet consists of 86 ships, it appears that between one-sixth and one-fifth of Indonesia's naval capacity is being deployed. Similarly, assuming that 32,000-40,000 Indonesian ground troops are involved, plus air and naval personnel, about one sixth of Indonesia's total military forces of 266,000 are committed to the Timor campaign. (12)

The naval blockade is the greatest advantage Indonesia has, because it can maintain the relative communications isolation and full material isolation of the D.R.E.T. from the rest of the world. But it would appear to be doing so at very great cost. The author of the Jakarta letter comments:

"According to military sources, this 'Operasi Komodo' is the biggest military operation after independence. I'm wondering who actually pays for this big military adventure, because if it is really paid from our national funds it would be a very big burden for the national economy, already suffering from the \$10 billion Pertamina/Ibnu Sutowo debts."

	(number)	
	Armored Cars	13
	Trucks	209
	Carbines and Rifles	1,148
	Machine Guns and	44
5.	Submachine Guns	
	Recoilless Rifles	12

American involvement in the actual invasion appears to be in the role of anxious indirect supporter. Undoubtedly Defence Department planners knew of the existence of Operation Komodo. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger left Jakarta just twelve hours before the invasion on December 7: It is very difficult to believe that the US was not consulted on such a large operation. Neither Ford nor Kissinger expressed any embarrassment about the conjunction of their visit and the invasion.

On the other hand, it is doubtful that prior to the failure of the invasion Washington had any particular interest in the fate of Timor. It quite probably accepted the official Indonesian and Australian assumption that FRETILIN would crumble;

In December, in the early days of the invasion, a State Department spokesman gave the official US position:

"In terms of the bilateral relations between the US and Indonesia, we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor." (17)

Now the matter has become very much more serious for the US as relations between Australia and Indonesia deteriorate, and the regional fears of Indonesian expansion rise again in Southeast Asia.

POST-COUP U.S. MILITARY AID TO INDONESIA (\$ THOUSANDS)

Fiscal Year	Grants ^a	Sales Orders	Commercial Sales Credits	Sales Deliveries	Excess Deliveries ^b
1966		1		116	
1967	2508	1		23	1
1968	4594	24		2730	98
1969	4908			760	201
1970	5405	c		233	1333
1971	16164	18		412	2347
1972	16982	c		51	1925
1973	18666	148		68	8380
1974	14010	148	3500	859	5541
1975	15850	48514	5000		1221
1976 ^d	19400		23100		

a) Does not include ship loans and other miscellaneous programs

b) original acquisition cost

c) less than \$500

d) proposed

Source: "Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts," November, 1975, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

FY 1976 SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA (thousands of dollars)

Categories	FMS Credits	MAP Grants	Total
Aircraft (incl. spares)	12,560	4,758	17,318
Ships (incl. spares)	6,000	2,840	8,840
Communications Equip. (incl. spares)	4,540	2,994	7,534
Technical Assistance & Special Services		3,684	3,684
Supply Operations		2,400	2,400
Vehicles & Weapons (incl. spares)		1,376	1,376
Repair & Rehabilitation of Equipment		450	450
Ammunition		80	80
Other Equipment & Supplies		818	818
Total	23,100	19,400	42,500


TRAINING PROGRAM

	thousands of dollars	number of students
Actual FY 1974	1,700	234
Actual FY 1975	2,800	280
Proposed FY 1976	2,000	238

A. From Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram, Nov.-Dec. 1975

B. From Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram, Jan.-Feb. 1976

TIMOR



From: J.S.Dunn ; "The Timor Affair - From Civil War to Invasion By Indonesia"
(Australian Parliamentary Library: Legislative Research Service, Canberra,
February 27, 1976).

The Jakarta letter indicates that one of the columns attacking Dili on December 7 was commanded to proceed on the mountain route from Bobanaro to Atsabe to Aileu and from there to Dili. This contingent of the invaders lacked coastal naval bombardment support and completely failed, even though it was very close to the supply bases in the border areas.

Indonesian reports are infrequent and not detailed. Government spokesmen continue to claim control of the entire island and maintain that only a few hundred FRETILIN soldiers remain. (20) On the other hand, the high level of troop deployment, the various reports of high casualty rates as reflected in the hospital populations in Denpasar, Surabaya and Jakarta, the continuous naval blockade and, most importantly, the refusal of the Indonesian Government to allow foreign observers any kind of free access to the territory belie this claim. Hamish McDonald (Washington Post, June 1, 1976) states that witnesses to the May 31 "Peoples' Assembly" were flown into Dili for three hours only and were not allowed "to test the authenticity" of the proceedings. The Indonesian Government threatened to sink relief ships carrying only humanitarian food supplies and medical aid attempting to reach FRETILIN areas when two such proposals were mounted by the Australian Catholic Bishops and the Australian Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union. (21) At the time of writing the Indonesian Government has not offered the United Nations Special Representative, Mr Winspeare Gucciardi, any greater assistance in reaching FRETILIN controlled areas than it did in January 1976, when Indonesian planes and artillery and naval forces actively impeded his attempts to reach FRETILIN lines. The author of the Jakarta letter says that the Indonesian military administrative division of East Timor in itself admits the continuation of serious FRETILIN resistance, and that soldiers posted to East Timor dread being assigned to infantry units.

How long can the Indonesians last?

There is no doubt that the Indonesian invasion has failed to come close to its military objective. Commenting on what it called Indonesian and Australian "miscalculation", the Institute for Strategic Studies (London) in its latest survey said that

"if FRETILIN can find the psychological resources, the military skills and popular support to sustain guerilla warfare, Indonesian forces may find themselves engaged in a lengthy and difficult campaign." (22)

FRETILIN certainly has the popular support required; many observers of the last half of 1975 agree that FRETILIN held the allegiance of the great majority of the East Timorese people. To date, it has demonstrated a military capacity adequate to resist the largest army in Southeast Asia outside Vietnam, and one receiving large amounts of US military aid.

On the FRETILIN side, estimation is more difficult still. However, the ruinous and horrifying consequences of the war on the general Timorese population cannot be underestimated. Even before the main invasion, observers believed that the suffering in the coming war would be enormous. The President of the Provisional Government, Francisco Lopez da Cruz said on February 13 that 60,000 East Timorese had been killed in six months of fighting; this figure included the dead on both sides, and was mainly composed of women and children.(25) There is no way of knowing how many more have died since then, and how many will do so more slowly both in the fighting and as a consequence of the economic and ecological devastation wrought by the invasion.

Internationally, Indonesia's position has deteriorated a great deal, and this will begin to affect its capacity to prosecute the war. Relations between Australia and Indonesia have turned from close cooperation to estrangement, and almost antagonism. FRETILIN supporters in Australia hold the former Labor Prime Minister personally culpable for the invasion because of his acquiescence to President Suharto's proposal to annex the territory, allegedly by peaceful means.(26). The Indonesian invasion was executed in the midst of the chaos of the downfall of the Whitlam government. The Liberal (conservative) government headed by Malcolm Fraser has taken an increasingly cool approach to Indonesia to the point where Australia has voted to condemn Indonesia at the United Nations, and declined to send any diplomatic observers to the "Peoples' Assembly" in Dili on May 31 which called for integration with Indonesia.

The Fraser government's increasingly anti-Indonesian stand has contradictory motivations. There is a longstanding racist fear of Asia which the Indonesian invasion has probably revived amongst part of the Australian population. (Similarly, conservative claims that FRETILIN is communist have revived the Vietnam combination of anti-communism and racism). The Fraser Government seems also to have been motivated by straightforward defence concerns: particularly in relation to Papua-New Guinea, which shares a border with Indonesia.

The most powerful influence on the Fraser Government is probably the articulate and well organised opposition to the Indonesian invasion, whose support has swelled rather than diminished since the invasion. Maritime, stevedoring and postal workers' unions have placed black bans on Indonesia; the powerful Australian Council of Trade Unions sent a high level delegation headed by its President, Bob Hawke, to Jakarta to protest the invasion; unions, aid organisations and church groups have plans to send relief ships to Timor; nation-wide demonstrations have been held; and the press keeps up a constant criticism of government inaction on the Indonesian killings of five Australian, British and New Zealand television journalists in October, 197

Obviously, the increasing bitterness between Indonesia and Australia is of concern to the United States Government. American post-Vietnam strategy has placed great weight on Indonesia as shown above. Indonesia and the Philippines are the new bulwarks of American policy in Southeast Asia. A major article in the Washington Post commented:

FRETILIN has performed very well on the diplomatic front, mainly due to the efforts of the three D.R.E.T. ministers sent out for this purpose from Timor on the eve of the invasion: Minister of State for Political Affairs, Mari Alkatiri; Minister for External Relations and Information, Jose Ramos-Horta and Defence Minister Rogerio Lobato. About a dozen countries have recognised the Democratic Republic of East timor; more are reported to be about to do so.

At the United Nations, Horta and Alkatiri have won on three consecutive occasions, and each time have shown greater political sophistication. The United Nations, of course, is a secondary arena; resolutions will not shift Indonesia. However, the efforts of Indonesia to win have been very substantial, and each session has seen them more isolated. A victory for Indonesia at the United Nations would be extremely costly for D.R.E.T. At present there is no possibility of either the Security Council or the Decolonisation Committee ratifying any part of the attempted Indonesian integration in the wake of the military aggression.

Recently it has been suggested that Indonesia may not attend the forthcoming Non-aligned Congress in Sri Lanka.

Contrary to conventional suggestions, the time count seems to be against Indonesia rather than FRETILIN. The protracted guerilla war conceivably could go on for many years; the price paid by the East Timorese for their freedom is already enormous. It is difficult to see them relenting in their struggle for liberation now. So often Jakarta-based observers have reported the Indonesian claim that FRETILIN is dead; this particular Phoenix arises from the ashes so regularly that it would seem to be more a case of wishful thinking on the part of the rueful Indonesians.

4. Michael Richardson, "FRETILIN ready for a long war of resistance", The Age, December ?, 1975.
5. Richardson's assertions are confirmed by J.S.Dunn, a former Australian consul in Dili, who returned to Dili and other parts of Timor in October 1975 as a member an Australian Council for Overseas Aid Task Force. See the Report on Visit to East Timor (Canberra: ACFOA, October 1975) and Dunn's earlier paper "Portuguese Timor - the Independence Movement from Coalition to Conflict" (Australian Parliamentary Library: Legislative Research Service, 8 October 1975) and his "The Timor Affair - From Civil War to Invasion by Indonesia" (Australian Parliamentary Library: Legislative Research Service, 27 February 1976).
6. Fry addressed the Security Council as an independent witness on behalf of the Democratic Republic on April 14, 1976. His speech was based on two parliamentary visits to East Timor in March and September 1975. See the relevant Security Council proceedings and also Senator Arthur Gietzelt and Ken Fry M.H.R. Report on Visit to East Timor (Canberra, September 1975)
7. This letter is published in the Timor Information Service, No. 9/10. The author is described there as a reliable Indonesian source; a D.R.E.T. press release described the author as a prominent Indonesian politician opposed to the invasion, who cannot be named for obvious [reasons.
8. For example, the New York Times reported (March 20, 1976) a military spokesman as saying that 350 troops had left Timor for Java. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik was reported (New York Times, April 18) as claiming that "three hundred Indonesian soldiers have been withdrawn from Eastern Timor because peace has been restored there." The claims of the Indonesian Government on this point did not convince a majority of members of the Security Council; on April 22 1976, a Japanese amendment implicitly acknowledging this claim failed to pass.
9. See Jose Martins, op.cit.
10. To date there is no detailed analysis of the use of American arms by the Indonesian forces in East Timor, although D.R.E.T. representatives have made this claim. David Andelman (New York Times, December 8, 1975) states that U.S. built warships were used in the invasion. Martins supports the FRETILIN claim that an attempt was made to use only old, Soviet-supplied equipment in the early stages; the conflict has become too large for this policy to be sustained. Martins notes that much civilian equipment was used in the invasion, e.g. Pertamina helicopters. Given the large levels of U.S. military aid discussed below, it is to be expected that predominantly U.S. equipment is being used. Information on the naval forces being employed would be particularly useful, given the U.S. interest in this (see Pauker, in note 12 below).
11. The Age (February 14, 1976) reported from Jakarta: "Most of the 'excesses are thought to have occurred close to the initial attack when Indonesian troops were ordered to brook no resistance. The Indonesian military

21. The two main relief ships pending are discussed extensively in the Australian press throughout April and May 1976. It seems that both projects are stalled because of the absolute opposition of the Australian Government to allow the ships to leave without assurance of safe conduct from the Indonesian Government and its allies.
22. The Australian, May 4, 1976.
23. Jose Martins (op. cit.) details the well-planned operation to deceive the Indonesian public about the political and military realities of the war. See also B.N.Diah, Merdeka, January 14 and 15, 1976.
24. Timor Information Service, no. 9/10, p.16. An early indication of very substantial Indonesian casualties was a Washington Post, (January 9, 1976) report that Australian intelligence sources estimated that more than 450 Indonesian troops had been killed up to that date in East Timor.
25. New York Times, February 15, 1976; The Age, February 14, 1976 for a fuller account, (see note 11 above).
26. Whitlam's acquiescence in the proposal is clear. What is not clear, and which is causing great bitterness in the Australian Labor Party, is whether or not Whitlam knew of the invasion proposal when he met with Suharto in Townsville in 1975. Gregory Clarke, a former diplomat and advisor to Whitlam at the time of the Townsville talks, said (National Times, March 22-27, 1976) that a copy of the plans of Operation Komodo was circulating in Canberra well before the invasion. In a later seminar, Clarke stated that Whitlam did know of the invasion plans at Townsville. Whitlam's opposition to an independent Timor was based on his opposition to "unviable" states.

For a full description of the background of the Labor Government policy, see Helen Hill, "Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor: from principles to pragmatism", Australian Political Science Association Conference, August 1975
27. Washington Post, May 2, 1976.
28. Siegel (op. cit.) and Pauker (op. cit.) both cite or express U.S. intentions and hopes for Indonesia as a regional stabilizing force.
29. The Australian delegates present as observers largely accepted the Indonesian presentation of the facts of the matter, and were visibly surprised at the outcome of the vote.
30. Washington Post, June 1, 1976.
31. One politically ominous consequence of the Pertamina debacle for the regime is a greatly increased foreign dependence. One political reaction to this registered by B.N.Diah in his Merdaka articles. Diah links the Timor affair with the undesirable increase in dependence.

Helen Hill. April 30, 1976. On Developments in East Timor.

Pre-1974

In precolonial times Timor was already heavily involved in external commerce. There was a big trade in sandalwood with China and elsewhere, mostly handled by Chinese and Arab dealers. Later the Portuguese and Dutch competed to control the sandalwood business which eventually conked out due to overexploitation. Local Timorese fought on both sides, thanks to splits among royalty. The traditional social structure ran from royalty through nobles and commoners to slaves. The Portuguese messed things up a bit by giving power and titles to nouveaux who aided them, so some royal families remained with a 'nationalist' anti-P tradition. All through there were periodic revolts, especially in last 15 years.

The population came to very mixed thanks to Portuguese policy of deportations from colony to colony and from Portugal to colony. E. Timor population came to have admixtures of Irianese, ~~Baxix~~ Black Africans, Goanese, Papuans, Arabs, Chinese, Eurasians. The Chinese however dominated the local economy. Till quite recently 95% of the population was in subsistence agriculture. No cash except what was needed to pay the poll-tax imposed by the Portuguese on all males over 18. To get the cash the locals had to sell food. Other element in the economy was coffee, which was generally plantation-organized and in the hands of a few Lisboa families. If one could not pay taxes, one was liable for unpaid corvee labor for the state. This persisted, though actually outlawed by ILO.

In 1959, some (who?) PRRI-Pemresta rebels took refuge in E. Timor and made contacts with local population hoping to find a base for a comeback. Took up with people of anti-P leanings who later became part of Apodeti. Small rebellion which was put down with between 500-1,000 deaths. Apodeti claims to have been starter of liberation movement, though pro-fusion with Indonesia. Fretelin ~~xxxx~~ fusion aims show Apodeti people not the first for true independence, rather ~~xxxx~~ Fretelin itself. Note that Sukarno broke relations with Lisboa in 1963, and full ambassadorial relations were not restored till 1974.

Portuguese colonial policy was typically assimilative. Timorese could move up and be accepted if they would abandon their culture and become culturally Portuguese. Split less black vs white than Portuguese vs indigenes. Intermarriage quite high. Portuguese regarded all colonies as part of Portugal, so could quite calmly say highest mountain in Portugal was Mt. Ramelan (in E. Timor). Timor kept as a sort of enclave in which tourists were encouraged, but journalists prohibited.

The coup of April 25, 1974.

First consequence was dissolution of the PIDE. A big issue was who had been PIDE informers. In Portugal accusation was that CP took files and used them for their own purposes. In Timor ex-informers seem to have succeeded in destroying most files, so hard to know. But lots of accusations and enquiries. Fretelin felt that many UDT and others were informers, but accusation went the other way too. When the Armed Forces Movement wanted to set up an Advisory Council with Apodeti, UDT and Fret participation, Fret refused to sit with UDT because felt there were PIDE informers among them.

Note that Fret was then still Social Democratic Party. Fret tried to insist that anyone proven to be part of PIDE should lose their jobs, so became a very heated issue. It was this that caused the first really bad blood between UDT and Fret. (Note that still an issue, the Indonesians have accused D'Amaral and Horta of being former PIDE agents).

UDT. Tended to be government service people in the cities. Leaders included _____, former mayor of Dili; and _____

_____ ex-editor of a government controlled newspaper in Dili. Local administration in territories was also a recruiting ground. Till September 1974 UDT followed the Spinoza line of strong links with Portugal. Two leaders had represented the Caetanist fascist party in the Portuguese parliament. Some UDT were mestizo but a lot of Timorese too. Mestizos were widely distributed across the parties. After Spinoza's fall UDT began to talk about independence. Reason for their being anti-Indonesian then was fear of loss of jobs, wanted to hold on to their existing advantages. Initially they got a lot of support from peasants and uplanders because of use of magically-tinged Portuguese flag. In September 1974 the Minister of Overseas Territories came to Timor and all the parties came out to greet him. At this point UDT (??) still far the largest turnout.

(Note Ps had sign covenants of "equality" with some chiefs during colonial period, and this meant that P flag, not culture, was widely revered).

(Note too that P schools were all taught in Portuguese. Kids learned to read and write in Portuguese, but own languages had no written form. So actually about 95% illiteracy. Fret's literacy drive was a big success later. Also great varieties not just of languages - no common language but Portuguese - but also of land tenure from smallholding to some collective systems in the South. When Fret started to think about land reform they had to do a lot of localized research).

UDT was older. If Fret CC was avg age c 28, UDT was about 40. Some UDT were WWII vets and so had Australian connections. Horta only Fret to have such good Australian contacts). Generally Chinese stayed clear and supported all parties financially to assure future; but mistrusted Apodeti mainly because of stories of anti-Chinese pogroms in Indonesia.

Apodeti. Based on personalities, one or two, including the Raja of Atsabe. Also Arnaldo _____ (Portuguese ?), big businessman who owned lands in W. Timor as a rancher of cattle. Long had Indonesian contacts and, for collaborating with Js in WWII, had been jailed 19 years by Ps on _____ island. V. bitter and anti-P as a result. Raja of Atsabe _____ Goncalves was in part of Timor where feudalism strongest. He persuaded many of his clients to cross the border, where beginning in Oct 1974 Indonesians began giving these people military training, in preparation for trans-border raids. Key backers were El Tari and Radio Kupang. A good deal of support from business circles in Kupang. Content of the radio was violently anti-communist, and anti-UDT-Fret at the start, when they were still in coalition. Broadcasts would open with sound of machinegun fire, and claims that communists beheaded babies etc. Clear accusations that Fret was communist only came a bit later. In Timor Apodeti claimed to have no connections with Radio Kupang. On its own local broadcasts on Radio Timor (each party was given one hour a week) it did not take strong anti-communist line then. Note that timing of Kupang campaign is coincident with fall of Spinoza and leftwards shift in Lisboa.

The new Governor did not come till November-December 1974. In effect the old regime stayed in place minus the PIDE. Col. Pires was the AMF man who came in bringing the AMF with him. Was new governor. Tried to bring all 3 parties together in a coalition and tried to be neutral between them. Some AMF people did favor Fret but this wasn't general policy line. Thought that all three parties could form elected transitional govt. In fact in the following period Fret cooperated very closely with AMF. Was especially active in so-called decolonization committees - which Apodeti boycotted. AMF upset about this as wary of being 'accused by Is of discriminating against Apodeti. Apodeti now early 1975 began sending cables to UN demanding help against the communists. Also spoke this way on radio which led to 60-day ban by military. At this point Apodeti pulled out. Fretelin also set up its own decolonization committees and pushed hard on this front. Formed the National Union of Timorese Students, which were then sent out to villages for anti-illiteracy campaign aimed mainly at adults. i.e. Fret worked with AMF but also worked on its own. UDT had fewer people, was less active and had to spread its people around more thinly. This all corresponds to era of UDT-Fret coalition Dec 74 - spring of 1975. Fret used the time well to expand its support base while UDT began to sink.

Fretelin, most leaders have some post-secondary educ. This was not available actually in Timor but there were Jesuit seminaries there and in Macao. Xavier d'Amaral and Lobato both in seminary in Macao (Rogerio - the Min Defence of Fret later). ~~Alarico~~ Alarico Fernandez (sekden ?) had radio course in Darwin. Horta himself the only one with no post-secondary educ. His political educ was 1 year of exile in Mozambique for underground work while journalist. Govt schools generally worse than Catholic. Fretelin are generally Catholic school products. Fretelin was aware from start of big gap between selves and the villages. So had a program of returning to villages and living with the people. Relearn local culture but educate locals at the same time too. Not clear how far this program got. Xavier d'A joined Fretelin rather late, older had been a rebel against the church. Very popular and man of the people type.

Maubermism already existed prior to 1974. Fretelin simply took it over. Mario Alkatiri (Min for Political Affairs) recently in NY is only Moslem leader. Has claimed he is most hated by Is etc because he is Moslem. Very active in Arab world. Only one with non-Portuguese name and probably most leftist Marxist.

Fretelin's original Social Democrat label was designed in part to get support of Aussie Labor party then in power. Hope was to get Indo and Aussie support for independence. See the famous Malik letter. Later idea was to make a broad front on lines of Frelimo, including developing support from local rulers. Change from SocDem to Fretelin was actually an expansion of the party to left and right. For example many of the army people who joined after UDT coup were well to right of Fretelin originals. Fret used radio to promote Timorese culture. Created Timor style songs which were very popular.

Note that Apo had built itself by dishing out radios (from Indonesia) to chiefs for tuning in to Radio Kupang (everyone would come listen at chief's place) and issuing membership cards. If man had got rid of cards could get radio and so forth. Fretelin ended with 100s of Apo cards. All radios have to be shortwave even for Dili. Radio Kupang by the way broadcast every day and much longer hours than radio Dili, where parties got 1 hr a week. UDT style here was solemn literary proclamation and Apo's claims for Indonesia's hegemony. But all broadcasts by all groups in Portuguese.

Helen Hill - 4

Coalition set up in Feb 75 with agreement between parties not to attack each other. Never attacked Indonesia either, only Apodeti as traitors. Note that in Soc Dem period Fret leaders seriously thought to make Indonesian the national language and Horta himself took 1 lessons at the consulate.

Domingo Oliveira, sekden UDT and pal of Horta, pushed the coalition idea and sold it to his party. Portuguese supported this too. But after coalition Fret began to attract members out of UDT and this caused annoyance and alarm.

Nicolai Lobato, now Vice-Pres, had long been very interested in agrarian matters, landreform and coops. Found that many Timorese had to walk for miles to markets and then sell at v low price to Chinese.

Some Lisbon students influenced by Freire wrote up literacy textbooks with strong political message. Printed in Lisbon in Tettu and sent back for use.

General feature of Feb-Aug was Fret activity to prepare themselves for successful maintenance and running of govt. And after September set up their own local govt. Portuguese administrators left when they were not paid, and so local govt collapsed. Then Fret set up elected local councils, divided along 7 functional groups in the Fretelin coalition.

Note that in Feb 75 Indonesians tried their first trial balloon with invasion scare. Big Australian headlines from Defence Dept leaks. When Australian MPs and TU delegations came about that time, huge crowds greeted them, but Fretelin flags far outnumbered UDT and this scared UDT.

In this period Is invited UDT and Fretelin separately and treated them differently. Is told UDT to break the coalition and link up w Apo. UDT people then travelled on to Australia where they told all. Some Aussies gave UDT same advice. In Jakarta UDT got heavy dose of anti-communist propaganda. On return UDT took strong anti-comm line for first time and then broke the coalition on anti-comm grounds. Frenandex and Horta found on their return from Jakarta big photos everywhere of them living it up in Jakarta (written in Portuguese).

After split Macao talks held by Ps to work out 3-party arrangement. Wd by 3-party govt u Portuguese High Commissioner. Fret refused to go and this was cause of big internal debate. Horta was disappointed. Reason was Ps still talked about three alternatives - Indonesian merger, independence, assoc with Portugal. Fret disliked this and really hated Apo by this time.

The UDT coup was justified as preemptive. Fr knew it was coming. Told Gov but he did nothing, bec annoyed over Macao. Police supported UDT esp police chief. He gave UDT weapons for the coup. UDT called for independence but Portugal refused to recog this. Fret had army support and weapons. Apodeti was out of it. Was some tribal fighting in villages. UDT hoped Is would come in fact with help, but Is miscalculated thought UDT cd hack it on its own. Maybe wd have accepted Indep E Timor if under UDT-Apo power with Fretelin out. Failure of coup meant UDT and Apo fled over border. Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement formed from Kupang by Indonesians out of Apo-UDT and two smaller parties. The change of UDT to pro-I caused a split in party. Some went to Indonesia, some to Austr, some to Lisbon. Pro-Is in UDT were actually from their radical-nationalist wing anehnja. Dec 7 invasion. Early 76 formation of Provisional Govt u Apo figure. PG dissolves all parties as not needed any more, and no referendum. Kotta party upset by this and withdrew from PG. Actually now many UDT virtual prisoners with wives as hostages in Jakarta OVER

Fewer Catholics in ET than in WTimor actually. Bishop in Dili was Portuguese and pro-Apodeti. But some local priests supported Fretelin too. Generally Catholics anti-communist and with strong connections to West Timor and Flores. Progressive Catholics usually Spanish and Italian priests.



April 29, 1976.

His Excellency,
The Secretary-General,
United Nations Organisation.

Excellency,

On the 16th of December 1975, I addressed the Security Council of the United Nations as President of the KOTA party. I was requested to do so by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, in connection with the item "The Situation in East Timor".

I was a member of a three man delegation. The others were Mr. Guilherme Goncalves and Mr Mario Carrascalao, as representatives of APODETI and U.D.T. respectively. Our parties were in a coalition opposing the FRETILIN movement.

I came in December not as a free man. I was forced, like the others then, as a prisoner, to read what the Indonesians had written. Now I am a free man. I do not wish to give details of how I managed to escape from the evil Indonesian hands. I have been entrusted by my people in East Timor to tell the truth of our situation.

I am writing to Your Excellency as President of KOTA Party and as an East Timorese who has witnessed and experienced Indonesian bloody intervention in East Timor which has already cost many thousands of lives.

My views reflect the feelings and sufferings of my countrymen and women who are now struggling for self determination and the independence of East Timor. Those who like me were forced by circumstances to cross the border into Indonesian territory are prisoners and realise now the evil nature of the Indonesian military. The very moment we entered Indonesian territory in the first week of September 1975, fleeing from advancing FRETILIN forces, we became instruments of the Indonesian government. The dismembered leadership of APODETI, U.D.T., KOTA and TRabalhista soon realised that while looking for "freedom" we fell into the hands of the Indonesian military.

With the leaders about 10,000 people also entered into Indonesian territory. I wish to stress the fact that while the Indonesian authorities claimed that over 40,000 East Timorese sought refuge in West Timor, the real figure was no more than 20,000. It is also necessary to stress that these people did not flee to Indonesian territory because they wanted to join Indonesia. They were just looking for a safe place until they could return to their homes. But they also fell into the hands of the Indonesian authorities; they soon realised that while seeking peace they found only maltreatment and misery. The refugees were either forced to take military training and fight against FRETILIN or to work without pay for the Indonesians. Their belongings were confiscated, such as money, jewelry and so on. As early as October the refugees wanted to return to East Timor, but the Indonesian authorities did not allow them to do so. Obviously the Indonesian government was using the "40,000 refugees" as a political weapon against FRETILIN. This was also a trick to get funds and aid from the

International Red Cross and foreign governments!

The Declaration of Integration in Indonesia:


This is a farce! The declaration of integration of East Timor into Indonesia was a farce because it was made in Bali in Indonesia on December 2, 1975. While FRETILIN made the unilateral declaration of independence of East Timor on November 28, 1975, in Dili, the capital of the territory, our "Anti-Communist Movement" declared "integration" some 1,000 kilometers away in Bali, in the luxurious Peneda View Hotel which belongs to Colonel Sugianto, General Ali Moertopo's assistant. It was a real farce, the whole thing, without a mandate of our people.

The Invasion of Dili:

On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian Government ordered the invasion of Dili. Fifteen "Hercules" aircraft carrying "red berets" headed to East Timor; nine landed in Dili and six in Bacau. Warships also landed hundreds of marines in two places. After the fall of Dili a puppet "Provisional Government" was set up. The minority APODETI Party was in prominence. The other parties were banned. Many thousands of people, including supporters of KOTA, U.D.T. and APODETI, were machine-gunned. Houses were sacked. The Indonesian soldiers took away everything they could find: refrigerators, fans, beds, windows, cars, bicycles and so on. Leaders of the pro-Indonesian parties were deeply shocked by such behaviour. Even the long-term supporters of the "integration" were disillusioned and many are now openly opposing Indonesian presence in the territory. The so-called Provisional Government is a one man band. Arnaldo Araujo is the only one who is still loyal to the Indonesians.

Excellency, I do not wish to make further comments on the subject, as I understand that during the various Security Council sessions, the FRETILIN representative made a lengthy report concerning the situation in the territory. However, I am available if your Excellency wishes to learn more details about what has happened in East Timor. As President of the KOTA Party, but above all as an East Timorese, I appeal to your Excellency to use your good offices to end the Indonesian military presence in East Timor. I must assure your Excellency that all parties in East Timor are anxious to stop the fighting and to reconcile. Therefore I believe that the Indonesian forces must withdraw and let the United Nations mediate and organise an act of self determination in the territory, with international observers, including the Indonesian government. If the Indonesian forces do not withdraw immediately, many people will continue to die each day.

Cordially yours,



Jose Martins,
President of KOTA.