

# EAST TIMOR

## The Inside Story

April 1993 NO. 7

### UN victory for Timor

*Indonesia suffered a double humiliation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights this year. An East Timor resolution, resoundingly adopted by 23 votes to 12 with 15 abstentions, is a disaster for Indonesia. It calls for investigation of the human rights situation by four special rapporteurs who should visit the territory this year. This is a serious blow for newly re-elected Suharto and ABRI.*

Despite all Indonesia's attempts to remove the "stone from its shoe", East Timor remains firmly on the UN agenda. In the resolution on the situation in the territory, the Commission expresses its "deep concern" at the reports of continuing human rights abuses in East Timor.

The resolution follows the Consensus Statement agreed at last year's Commission. The Commission acknowledges the failure of Indonesia to honour its commitments and:

- \* calls on it to ensure all East Timorese in custody are treated in accordance with international humanitarian law and to expand NGO access;

- \* expresses its concern about the investigations of the 12 November 1991 massacre; and

- \* urges the government to invite four special rapporteurs & working groups to the territory (this is thought to be unprecedented).

The Commission also invites the Secretary-General to release the report of his special envoy, Amos Wako. Wako will return to East Timor in March or April this year: his report from 1992 remains secret but informed sources describe it as "horrific".

The last resolution on East Timor was in 1983 and dealt with the right to self-determination for East Timor.

#### Hardline mistake

The draft resolution, proposed and supported by the European Community under the Presidency of Denmark, was finally voted after 48 hours delay.

Indonesia maintained a hardline approach throughout, repeatedly breaking off negotiations, then re-opening them. Everybody expected a consensus statement: the damage for Indonesia from a resolution going against them was far too great. Yet, despite 5 redrafts of the consensus statement proposed by the co-sponsors of the resolution and meetings between Denmark, United States and Indonesia, the regime refused to budge. They claimed that there was no further need for investigations in East Timor and that, rather than expecting them to do more, a consensus should congratulate them on the steps they had taken since last year.

Clearly the Indonesian delegation knew this would be unacceptable to the majority but they were determined that East Timor should be taken off the UN agenda.

#### Military pressure

The main stumbling block to negotiations on a consensus was the provision for a continuing investigation into the massacre. The line taken by the Indonesian delegation was that in 1992 the Commission had adopted a consensus in the wake of the massacre: this year there was no massacre so there should be no action! This argument smacks of military involvement.

Also the Indonesian delegation refused to accept that the reports of the special rapporteurs should be ready for the next session of the Commission.

#### UK and Germany favour guns

Indonesia was confident that a resolution on East Timor would be defeated. And maybe they had reason to be, as vice-chair of the Commission this year and chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (of whom 10 were voting Commission members this year) as well as being a member of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and co-sponsor with France of the peace talks in Cambodia. In addition, there is their economic hold over Latin American and European countries.

Indonesia even tried to break up the EC block vote for the resolution by pulling on their economic ties. And they nearly succeeded. Britain, and later Germany, terrified of losing their lucrative arms deals with Indonesia, played a disgraceful role trying to bully the EC into accepting Indonesia's self-congratulatory statement. Showing itself as a state without any morals, the United Kingdom was guided only by politics and economics.

Thanks to a strong statement by the Portuguese president warning of a break up of political cooperation in Europe should the EC not back the East Timorese resolution, together with a principled stance by Denmark, the UK and Germany could not afford to dissociate themselves from their EC partners.

#### Country voting on East Timor Resolution:

**For:** Angola, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Guinea Bissau, Mauritius, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay (late registration) and Zambia (23)

**Against:** Bangladesh, China, Cuba, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Syrian Arab Republic (12).

**Abstentions:** Argentina, Burundi, Colombia, Cyprus, Gabon, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Tunisia and Venezuela (15)

**Absent:** Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Romania and Togo.



# The trial of Xanana Gusmao

*In violation of international humanitarian law, the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, has been on trial in Dili since 1 February, facing charges of rebellion and undermining national stability which carry a possible life sentence, and of being in illegal possession of firearms, which could incur the death sentence.*

For reasons best known to themselves, the regime decided not to charge Xanana under the anti-subversion law although East Timorese tried last year for participating in demonstrations in Dili and Jakarta received harsh sentences, including life imprisonment, on anti-subversion charges.

## Defence counsel

Xanana is being defended by a Jakarta-based lawyer, Sudjono, whose appointment was clearly foisted on him by the authorities. The Legal Aid Institute (LBH), which handled most of the East Timorese trials in 1992, offered to defend him but sources in Jakarta say that when Xanana was held at the Jakarta police headquarters, the police prevented communication between him and the LBH.

It is obvious that Sudjono and Xanana are not following an agreed line. It is not even certain that they fully understand each other as they can communicate only in English, a language which neither speaks very well. Responding to testimony from prosecution witnesses, Xanana has confirmed almost everything they have said, concurring with claims that he himself led actions against Indonesian troops and taking responsibility for everything reportedly done by his troops. After one hearing when Xanana accepted responsibility for killing Indonesian troops, Sudjono who was clearly exasperated, said he could not understand Xanana's position and would consider his own representations a success if his client escaped execution and received life imprisonment on the charges he faces. [*The Age*, 17.II.1993]

## Xanana in court

For the first few hearings, six Portuguese journalists were in Dili to attend the hearings. They were not allowed to be present however when witnesses began to appear. Several Australian journalists have also been in Dili to follow the trial. Some embassies in Jakarta, including the US and Australian embassies as well as one of the EC embassies, have also sent diplomats to Dili for the trial. The International Commission of Jurists was given permission to send a jurist but he was only granted a six-day visa and probably did not attend more than a single hearing.

A request by Amnesty International for its representative, Geoffrey Robinson, who was in Jakarta at the end of January for the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Workshop, to proceed to Dili and observe the trial, was rejected. The authorities flatly refused to extend his five-day visa.

Xanana himself has been very reluctant to speak to anyone and appears to be under strict orders not to approach anyone at all.

## Trial timetable revised

When the trial began, the court announced a detailed timetable with the verdict due on 20 March. Then, after a couple of weeks of so-called 'marathon' hearings, the proceedings slowed down, at first to twice a week, then once a week. As a result, witnesses were still being heard right up to late March. In a change of plans, it was announced on 19 March that the trial would end at the earliest by the end of April. The revised timetable suggests that Jakarta is now manipulating the trial to dovetail with plans for a move at the UN-sponsored talks due to take place in Rome on 20 April. ★

## Witness's defiant stand

When Saturnino da Costa Belo, a young East Timorese now serving a nine-year sentence, appeared in court on 4 March to testify on behalf of the prosecution, he suddenly stood up and began to shout, "Viva independencia! Viva Timor Leste! Viva Xanana!" The judge ordered him to sit down but instead he continued with his defiance, saying: "I ask the government of Indonesia to respect human rights in East Timor."

The court hearing was thereupon suspended; Saturnino was removed and an army doctor was called in to examine him. Forty-five minutes later, the doctor told the court that the witness had "a mental disorder" and was not fit to appear.

It is widely feared that Saturnino, known to be a man of courage and daring, will have been seriously mal-treated for this act of defiance and there have been calls for special attention to him by the International Red Cross.

Saturnino was arrested on 30 November 1991 in Baucau, along with his brothers, Alcino Vital Freitas and Custodio Freitas. They were accused of being in contact with the guerrillas. All three were tortured and badly beaten. The brothers were later released but Saturnino remained in custody. He later went on trial in Baucau, on charges connected with the demonstration in Dili on 12 November 1991. Little is known about the trial, except that he refused to be defended by an Indonesian lawyer, saying he would only accept a "Fretilin lawyer". He was found guilty, given a nine-year sentence and has since spent most of the time in a prison in Baucau.

During an incident in Baucau on 5 October last year, his brother Alcino, was wounded. After being taken to hospital, Alcino was dragged away by soldiers and shot dead three days later in cold blood. Like so many East Timorese, Saturnino is burning with anger at the atrocities inflicted on them and their families.

**"Big countries cannot  
invade little countries  
and get away with it."**

— The Prime Minister of Australia  
Bob Hawke  
September 30, 1990



'Development is for the human person, so human rights are important. We agree. We have no problems with people discussing and trying to resolve these issues. We have always said that human rights have a

universal relevance but, as I told the recent Asean-EC Foreign Ministers' meeting, there is a degree of national competence in the expression and interpretation of human rights. There are various types of human rights — civil and political, economic and social, individual rights and the rights of society. I said, if you want to evaluate us, do it in the totality, not just civil and political rights.'

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, July 1991

In the defence trials early this year arising from the Dili massacre one year ago, lawyers sought to raise a range of issues that gave context to the anger and frustration of the East Timorese people. As well as civil and political rights, social and economic issues related to the presence of the Indonesian military in East Timor were aired. Of some significance was the continuing involvement of the Indonesian military in East Timor's coffee production. If the annexation of East Timorese land and the denial of civil rights are a blatant abuse of basic human rights, the monopolization by the Indonesian military of East Timor's coffee production adds another dimension to the continuing discontent of the East Timorese. Far from the much-touted promise of Indonesian development aid transforming a 'backward' East Timor, the military has plundered East Timor's few resources. It has contributed to its economic stagnation, and an enduring sense that the indigenous population has no place in Indonesia's '27th province'.

The first indication of Indonesia's involvement in East Timor's coffee production emerged in the early 1980s. East Timor had been laid waste by the bitter warfare waged since 1975. Up to 8,000 soldiers were stationed there, and with the diminution of hostilities, were increasingly engaged in garrison duties. The journalist David Jenkins reported in 1980 that the Army had been using the revenues from expropriated coffee to offset the cost of its military operations against the Fretilin guerrillas, and that it may have recouped up to \$US20 million in that way. At this time it was planned that the first of one hundred coffee plantations would be returned to local owners. As much as \$US4-5 million in recurrent revenue would be lost each year to the military.

Coffee had been the principal cash crop in East Timor in the years preceding the Indonesian invasion, with production recorded at 5,584 tonnes in 1973. Output had predictably declined as a result of the years of fighting and in 1980 was said to be about one-quarter of the former total. It was also said that the provincial government, acting through a company called PT Denok Hernandez International, controlled all coffee exports from East Timor. *The Far Eastern Economic Review* reported sources that suggested the generals in Jakarta were behind PT Denok, a claim, it said, 'that few in Jakarta would bother to deny'.

In 1982 the *Review* carried another article on the economy of East Timor, this time connected with claims of brutality and corruption against the Indonesian army and administration. The article focussed on a report of the Provincial Assembly which stated that the Indonesian authorities were ignoring local laws and behaving as 'conquerors', and that the economic interests of the East Timorese people were in the hands of a select and powerful group. Financial assistance received from the central government in Jakarta bore no benefits for the local population, and PT Denok was named as holding a monopoly over East Timor's two main export commodities — coffee and sandalwood, for which prices were artificially depressed.

The continuing monopolization of East Timor's commodity production opens onto the whole issue of Indonesia's claim to be developing East Timor and integrating it as an equal part of the Indonesian nation. This was a central theme in criticisms made in 1988 by the Provincial Governor, Mario Carrascalao. Indonesia's development programme was said in fact to be depriving East Timorese people of jobs and creating unemployment and dissatisfaction. Jobs go to Indonesians, and especially the new



Rockpile graves, East Timor (left). Graveyards are an unusually common landmark the length and breadth of the territory. It is forbidden to photograph any of the many military cemeteries.

### 'Outlook' and JOSE RAMOS-HORTA

**Horta:** A few years ago I read *Let History Judge* by Roy Medvedev, which was about the Stalinist trials and purges. I have read some of the chapters again over the last few days. The parallels and similarities are striking. Medvedev talks about how some of the staunchest revolutionaries suddenly appeared in public and in the courts set up by Stalin, as totally broken people. They had been subjected to some of the grossest forms of psychological torture, while others had been given drugs which changed their personalities.

This is what happened to Xanana after he was captured. They knew that only torture would bend someone like him. And not only physical torture. I have known Xanana for a long time, and when I saw the video the Indonesians presented of him, it was obvious he had been subjected to horrendous psychological torture and also that he had been injected with medications, as Medvedev mentioned.

# END the OCCUPATION



# The Coffee Monopoly . . .

arrivals who see East Timor as an opportunity to make easy money. Private capital was said to stay only long enough to chase the profits available through work on Government projects. There was no investment occurring, and there was no job creation: 'They take their profits and run'.

The operation of the coffee monopoly is the strongest example of the economic disenfranchisement of the East Timorese. The Clandestine Commission of National Resistance which comprises East Timorese Catholic students reported in 1987 the ongoing monopolization of coffee by the Indonesian generals and their families, stating that coffee was the prime source of the profit they enjoyed. According to this organization, all military commands — from the sub-regional military command based in Dili down through the Kodims or district commands and further down the chain of command — have been employed in the control of the production and movement of coffee on behalf of DT Denok. The group also alleged that the company was owned by the veteran generals Benny Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Sahala Rajagukguk. And the connections to the rich and powerful would seem to go higher still. In 1987 the Bakrie group (connected to President Soeharto's eldest son Sigit by Abu Rizal, a school friend of Sigit's) and the Probosutedjo group (President Soeharto's half brother) apparently made bids to control the export of East Timor's coffee and clove crops. The deal seems to have been that PT Denok, aided by the local military command would continue to monopolize the purchase of coffee and cloves from local East Timorese while Bakrie and Probosutedjo, each with well-established networks in trading centres like Singapore, would take charge of exporting.

It is no wonder that in a recent report commissioned by the Bank of Indonesia, and carried out by the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, the East Timorese are described as 'unco-operative, apathetic and constantly suspicious'. The report highlights Indonesian economic and development models as contributing to such a state of affairs, which many Indonesians, it would seem, find hard to understand. It notes that a 'characteristically "top-down" planning, the implementation of "model projects" and the haemorrhaging of development funds are all problems which contribute to a reduced level of popular participation'. In East Timor, this lamentable model familiar in other parts of Indonesia, with which the unrestrained activity of the military and entrepreneurs is linked, has the added potential to promote secessionist sentiment and marginalize East Timor's subsistence society.

Of course the Bank of Indonesia sees the problem in terms of the processes of integration which, if better handled, would make the passage of the East Timorese into Indonesian society smoother, and no doubt make capital accumulation in the future less likely to be disrupted. But the report provides clear evidence from any point of view that one very significant aspect of the suppression of the East Timorese people goes under the guise of economic development. The report makes it clear that the East Timorese hold the military responsible for East Timor's economic stagnation, that East Timorese farmers see 'the village co-operatives not belonging to them but rather as private enterprise institutions' and that the pricing system for coffee, determined by a single party, is a market manipulation which operates to the detriment of the East Timorese. The report specifically recommends the disbanding of the coffee monopoly, and an approach that would develop the indigenous coffee industry.

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas wants the critics of Indonesia's human rights record to 'look at the totality' of Indonesia's involvement in East Timor. He seems to suggest that in doing so we might find mitigating circumstances on the question of human rights abuses. But clearly there are few or none when we look at the economic plight, or as he would put it the 'economic rights', as they are currently evidenced, of the East Timorese. Indeed there is evidence with regard to the monopoly of East Timor's primary crops which suggests that the Indonesian military is in breach of Indonesian law. Two of the Dili protestors brought to trial earlier this year were charged under Indonesia's infamous Anti-subversion Laws. Yet it is these laws which specifically outlaw activities which 'disturb, obstruct or disrupt ... production, distribution, commerce' in such a way as to 'exert a widespread influence on the livelihood of the people'. The activities of the Indonesian generals and the military in the monopolization of East Timor's key industries is an abuse of power which, contributing to protests such as that in Dili, could fall under the very same sanctions as have been used against the East Timorese.

RODNEY LEWIS

**Outlook:** Is there any evidence that they are moving against his family?

**Horta:** Absolutely. His closest aides were arrested, one of his sisters — the one who is closest to him and who is married — was arrested and raped in front of her husband and children. This happened within days of his capture. I would not repeat the description I was given of the incident, because it was too gross. His old father was arrested, children of the family were arrested, everyone in the family.

**Outlook:** And he would have known about these arrests?

**Horta:** Oh yes. These were the same tactics used by the Gestapo in World War II, and by Stalin. They are not unusual; they have been practised on East Timorese prisoners and their families for the past 17 years.

**Outlook:** I understand there has been an increase in the number of detentions since Xanana was captured. Who are the people who have been taken?

**Horta:** The first thing to say about these people is that none of them were involved in the underground network. They were humble, hard-working people who were taken at random by the Indonesian security forces after Xanana's capture. They hoped that they might find among them members of the underground network. Many of them were tortured.

But I know many of these people and I can say that none of them are members of the underground.

**Outlook:** What sort of torture have they been subjected to?

**Horta:** What I tell you is based on stories which I have heard over and over again. Like Victor da Costa, who I have interviewed for a book, they are subjected first of all to beatings, kicking, and punching. Then comes the whipping, then they put the legs of a chair on the victim's toes, and jump on it. Next, there are electric shocks. One of my informants said: "When you see them start playing with the electrical equipment, it's enough to break you." There is also some savage sexual torture. For instance, they have often forced a male prisoner to perform oral sex on an Indonesia soldier, with all the other soldiers watching.

— NATIONAL OUTLOOK, MARCH



# The true aim of territorial operations

*The military commander of East Timor, Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei, claims that Indonesian troops in East Timor are being reduced to eight territorial and two local battalions, a total of 6,000 men, while western military analysts believe the number of troops there is twice that. Syafei hopes to defuse worldwide concern about human rights in East Timor. But he has recently explained that his territorial troops are doing much more than building roads and bridges.*

In an article entitled "Building a new civilisation", Syafei's views on creating a totally new social structure at the base of East Timorese society are set out. As he sees it, the role of the army in the project is pivotal.

Syafei says that the "civil war" which, he alleges, occurred before East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia and cost one hundred thousand lives (his figure), resulted in the total destruction of indigenous social structures. This has made it extremely difficult for government institutions to function at the lowest levels of society. "Structures such as the RT/RW [residential units] and LKMD [village social organs] exist on paper but are not linked to any indigenous structures," he told *Kompas*. [1.III.1993]

What Syafei refers to as the "civil war" is of course, Indonesia's war of invasion and annexation from 1975 to 1979, in which he personally fought for several years. Indigenous structures were indeed gravely damaged. Almost the entire population in the countryside was uprooted and forced to re-settle in areas designated by the army of occupation. This led not only to massive physical annihilation – at least two hundred thousand deaths – but to a social trauma from which the people of East Timor have still not recovered.

The trauma inflicted on East Timorese society was described at some length in a sociological survey produced by academics from Yogyakarta's Gajah Mada university, led by Dr Mubyarto. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 99, June 1990] The study spoke about the 'trauma of war', the 'culture shock' suffered by the East Timorese as well as by the Catholic church and the 'overdose' of military presence not only in their physical presence but in their 'dominating role'. The Gajah Mada team undertook its survey in early 1990. Since then, things in East Timor have got steadily worse following the Santa Cruz massacre, the appointment of Theo Syafei and the fiercer-than-ever clampdown on all forms of resistance to Indonesian rule.

## Territorial operations and village society

It has become an integral part of Syafei's policy of control to undermine the role of the church and its priests who today are the only remaining buffer to protect the population from the depravities of the army. Syafei is now bent on using his troops to impose a new set of social structures and a new value system on the entire population. He complains about the absence of a network of organs of authority through which the people's loyalties can flow. The fact is, according to Syafei, that people's participation in any kind of activity can occur only if ABRI brings it about. Thus, whenever a community needs some organ of authority through which to channel its loyalties, the only option is ABRI. All leaders, from Governor Abilio Soares down, according to the military commander, agree that the army's territorial operations are still needed. The aim of these territorial operations, said Pak Theo, is to close the gap between the new social values and society's aspirations. Come what may, East Timorese society must be guided towards a new village culture, bringing it in line with other parts of Indonesia. This process is needed to fill the gaps and cracks in social and political life.

The project Syafei envisages entails the constant presence of Indonesian troops and their assertion of control in all centres of population. But can he and his jack-booted assassins succeed? It was Bishop Belo, head of East Timor's Catholic church, who said recently, when asked whether Xanana Gusmao's capture would end the people's resistance: "I don't believe so. Xanana is only a man. The armed resistance can end but the psychology and cultural resistance of the people will continue. As long as the people exist, resistance will continue. They have their own identity, their own legends, traditions and way of life." [The Age, 13.II.1993]

## ARMS SALES

### Clinching German arms deals


Chancellor Kohl and Suharto shook hands on lucrative arms contracts during the German leader's two-week Asian tour in February. Indonesia is getting 39 frigates, minesweepers and coastguard vessels from the arsenal of former East Germany plus three new submarines. The East German vessels were given almost free of charge, with Indonesia only incurring costs for refurbishing the ships. Authorisation for the deal was given last year by a top-secret government panel in time for Kohl's visit.

Germany is having problems getting rid of the weapons inherited on unification, which by law it cannot deliver outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) if the client lies in a "region of tension."

### Demonstrating against British Aerospace

Members of *British Aerospace/Ploughshares* in Oxford who call themselves the Oxford Diggers, held a protest outside a British Aerospace factory in Stevenage, north of London, on 6 March. The banners and posters rang with angry condemnation of the company's deal to sell Hawk aircraft to Indonesia. Their slogans included: "No BAe Hawks to Indonesia!", "Remember Dili!" and "Hands off East Timor".

This was the factory which peace activist Chris Cole managed to penetrate, inflicting considerable damage on aircraft nose-cones and a computer system. He is still in custody in Bedford Prison, having been refused bail.

<b>FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR</b>	 <p>A map showing the location of East Timor in Southeast Asia. It is bordered by Indonesia to the west and south, and Papua New Guinea to the east. The Indian Ocean is to the south. A scale bar indicates 0 to 1000 Kilometres. Labels include 'Java', 'N', 'D', 'O', 'N', 'E', 'S', 'I', 'A', 'INDONESIA', 'PAPUA NEW GUINEA', 'Port Moresby', 'AUSTRALIA', and 'Darwin'.</p>	<b>P.O. BOX 661 DOUBLEVIEW 6018 WEST AUSTRALIA</b>
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# UN Resolution on East Timor

## Surprises for East Timor

The decision by the United States to support and even co-sponsor the East Timor resolution marks a major turning point for the campaign. In the past, the US State Department has never followed Congress in taking a positive stand on East Timor. At the commission, in 1983, the US voted against a resolution on East Timor.

The turn-around in the stand of the Clinton administration marks a positive step in US foreign policy and shows that the Clinton administration's claims to put human rights at the top of the agenda may have some substance.

Even more startling was the support from Australia. Australia regards East Timor as integrated with Indonesia both *de jure* and *de facto*. They even have a oil treaty with Indonesia to exploit East Timor's oil. From the beginning of the Commission, the delegation had shown its clear intent to vote against any resolution on East Timor.

Yet they voted with the people of East Timor. Australian friends saw this as a "goodbye kiss to East Timor" from Gareth Evans, since Labour seemed certain to lose the Australian elections in March, leaving the conservatives to deal with the policy anomaly. In fact Labour won and they are now trying to backtrack on their stand by saying that it was only the inflexibility of the Indonesians which forced them to vote with East Timor.

Japan was another unexpected decision. While voting in favour of no action, the delegation stressed over and over how difficult the decision was. When they abstained on the resolution it became clear that this country, with huge economic links with Indonesia, allowed their concern about human rights to override their economic interests.

It is unclear whether the same is true for Pakistan. In voting trends, they always vote in the opposite lobby to India which invariably supports Indonesia.




## Future implications

In Indonesia, there are implications in the short and medium term. The hardline approach sponsored by the military failed and has led to defeat for Indonesia in front of the world. The embarrassment of not being able to silence a tiny nation of people, after 17 years, may well be blamed on the inflexibility imposed on the delegation in Geneva by the military.

Responses in Jakarta following the UN defeat point to a major row between the foreign ministry and the army over who is responsible for the debacle. Although Ali Alatas has kept his portfolio in Suharto's new cabinet and several generals have lost theirs, the army still calls the shots in East Timor. This means that the hardliners may continue to enforce their will when talks between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor resume in Rome on 20 April.

However, the press in Indonesia have had extensive reports on the outcome of the Commission. An article in the Jakarta Post, which led with the headline "Indonesia defeated", reflects a growing concern within Indonesia for the situation of the Timorese people and the role of their government in perpetrating the crimes against humanity in that territory. This awareness among Indonesian people, which has increased dramatically since the massacre in Dili, is taking on more and more of a role in forcing the regime to allow a just and satisfactory outcome to the East Timorese struggle.

☆



## AVAILABLE FROM FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR

### BOOKS

**EAST TIMOR: A WESTERN MADE TRAGEDY** [Mark Aarons & Robert Domm] A concise coverage of the East Timor issue. The Left Book Club, Sydney, 1992, 96 pages. Paperback.

**INDONESIA'S FORGOTTEN WAR: The hidden history of East Timor** [John J. Taylor] Zed Books, Sydney, 1991, 230 pages. Includes 14 page chronology. Highly recommended. Paperback.

**DEATH IN DILI** [Andrew McMillan] Hodder & Stoughton, 1992

**TELLING: EAST TIMOR** [Michelle Turner] Personal stories 1942-1992 NSW U. P. 1992, 218 pages. paperback.

**EAST TIMOR: AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY** C.I.I.R., 1992 28 pages, a brief and concise overview.

### CASSETTES

**EAST TIMOR:** Talk by Helmi Fauzi (90 min.) 1992. Helmi is an Indonesian intellectual and representative of the Indonesian Forum for Human Dignity

**EAST TIMOR 1974-1982:** Talk by Gordon McIntosh (25 min.) 1993. Gordon was an ALP Senator from 1974-1987. He visited East Timor before and after the Indonesian invasion. (Includes notes).

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## DEATH IN DILI

By ANDREW McMILLAN

In January 1990, while holidaying in Dili, Australian writer Andrew McMillan was caught in the middle of a pro-independence demonstration which triggered, as it were, a strong interest in the issue.

His quest to understand the background of the events he had witnessed led him to the the UN, meetings with East Timorese refugees in Europe and Australia, interviews with Australian war veterans, and then onto the contentious Lusitania Expresso peace boat.

This book is the fruit of that journey and research.

Published by Hodder and Stoughton, Sceptre Books, 1992. 235 pages.



H.E. HASEGAWA KUZETOSHI  
EMBASSY OF JAPAN  
112 EMPIRE CIRCUIT  
YARRALUMLA ACT 2600

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

AS A CONCERNED CITIZEN OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, I WISH TO ADD MY VOICE TO THOSE CALLING FOR AN END TO THE WAR IN EAST TIMOR.

THE MASSACRE OF CIVILIAN PROTESTORS IN DILI ON 12 NOVEMBER 1991, THE MASSACRE OF AROUND ANOTHER 90 CIVILIANS THE FOLLOWING WEEK AND THE INCREASINGLY REPRESSIVE MEASURES USED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY SINCE THEN HAVE DEMONSTRATED AGAIN THE DEEP CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS DONE LITTLE TO END.

I FEEL THAT JAPAN AS ONE OF THE MOST ECONOMICALLY POWERFUL NATIONS OF THE WORLD CAN PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE IN EAST TIMOR.

EVERY YEAR FROM 1975 TO 1982, JAPAN AND A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS THAT WERE CRITICAL OF INDONESIA'S OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR.

ONLY WHEN SUCH COUNTRIES AS JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FULLY SUPPORT U.N. PRINCIPLES AND AFFIRM THE RIGHTS OF ALL HUMAN BEINGS CAN INTERNATIONAL BODIES LIKE THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATE EFFECTIVELY TO RESOLVE CONFLICT THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A MILITARY SOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR NOT ONLY UNDERMINES THE AUTHORITY OF THE U.N. BUT ALSO PROLONGS THE AGONY OF A PEOPLE THAT HAS SUFFERED TOO MUCH.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO:

- 1) STRONGLY URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO FULFIL ITS COMMITMENT WHICH WAS MADE OVER 12 MONTHS AGO TO GIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ACCESS TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF EAST TIMOR.
- 2) MAKE A REQUEST TO THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR JAPANESE AID ORGANIZATIONS TO EAST TIMOR IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUAL OPPRESSION THE EAST TIMORESE HAVE TO BEAR;
- 3) ACTIVELY PROMOTE THE 1982 U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION WHICH "AIMS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH ALL PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED". THIS SHOULD INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND LEADER OF THE RESISTANCE - XANANA GUSMAO.

THANKING YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, YOURS SINCERELY,

H.E. MR MELVIN SEMBLER  
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
YARRALUMLA ACT 2600

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

AS A CONCERNED CITIZEN OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, I WISH TO ADD MY VOICE TO THOSE CALLING FOR AN END TO THE WAR IN EAST TIMOR.

THE MASSACRE OF CIVILIAN PROTESTORS IN DILI ON NOVEMBER 12 1991, THE MASSACRE OF AROUND ANOTHER 90 CIVILIANS THE FOLLOWING WEEK AND THE INCREASINGLY REPRESSIVE MEASURES USED BY THE INDONESIAN MILITARY SINCE THEN HAVE DEMONSTRATED AGAIN THE DEEP CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS DONE LITTLE TO END.

I FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AS ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL NATIONS OF THE WORLD, CAN PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE IN EAST TIMOR. EVERY YEAR FROM 1976 TO 1982, AMERICA AND A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS THAT WERE CRITICAL OF INDONESIA'S OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR.

ONLY WHEN SUCH COUNTRIES AS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN FULLY SUPPORT U.N. PRINCIPLES AND AFFIRM THE RIGHTS OF ALL HUMAN BEINGS CAN INTERNATIONAL BODIES LIKE THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATE EFFECTIVELY TO RESOLVE CONFLICT THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS.

THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A MILITARY SOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR NOT ONLY UNDERMINES THE AUTHORITY OF THE U.N. BUT ALSO PROLONGS THE AGONY OF A PEOPLE THAT HAS SUFFERED TOO MUCH.

I WOULD LIKE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO STRONGLY URGE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO

- 1) CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH ALL U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES, INCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERMATH;
- 2) PERMIT THE FREE AND REGULAR MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA BY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS;
- 3) RELEASE IMMEDIATELY ALL THOSE IMPRISONED SOLELY FOR THEIR NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTE THE 1982 U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION WHICH "AIMS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH ALL PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED". THIS SHOULD INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND LEADER OF THE RESISTANCE - XANANA GUSMAO.

THANKING YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, YOURS SINCERELY,



\*\*\*\*\*IN OUR CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE IN EAST TIMOR WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO:

1) SEND THE LETTERS AT THE BACK (OR SOMETHING SIMILAR) TO THE AMERICAN  
AND JAPANESE EMBASSIES:

2) COPY THE LETTERS AND HAVE YOUR FRIENDS SIGN AND SEND THEM,

THANK YOU ...FRIENDS OF EAST TIMOR