CIVIL LIBERTIES DEFENCE FUND SUB COMMITTEE

Nr R. Wesley-S-1th,

1010 han,

Dear Rotert,

Thank you for your last letter. The points you raise were discussed int the last committee meeting and it was agreed that they fall into two main categories:

- 1. A vice to lawyers on how to run civil liberties cases;
- and 2. Criticisms of the whole police-magistrate system.

To take these in order:

1. We are just beginning in this briefin of lawyers usiness and have discovered that it is "unprofessional" to request that a legal.

In run a case in a certain way. When we handed particular defendants to particular lawyers we were leaving them to hammer out the way in which particular cases were to be fought. Lawyers are very insistent on the individual rights of each defendent to fight the cases in adia ways. For instance some of the arrested wished to make political issues in the courtroom whilst others were anxious to fight simply on the facts of their particular charges. This seems an insoluble problem. Thinking about it now I would advise those who wish to make political points to study courtroom techniques a la Albert Langer and handle it themselves.

Perhaps when this group of cases is finished we will issue a detailed or tie sm of the whole system, with a few suggested improvements - for press release and the attention of the Minister the the Commissioner.

You may have read that the political nature of the whole group of & hearings has been underlined by the comin by election contest between Enderby (A.L.P. and our most active C.L.C. lawyer) and Hermes - the magistrate. Heremes refuses to give a decision in one Case - that of Michael Kahan - apparently under Attorney General's instruction.

So far your hearing has been the most glaring case of injustice and the committee was most sympathetic. Incidentally did you personally pay for the photographer's fare? If so would you forward that account immediately as that is one we are prepared to pay immediately - a drop in the bucket I know.

Thenks for your subscription - enclosed is a receipt.

Three weeks so we held out Annual Coneral Resting (enclosed is the president's Report) and I resigned as Secretary because we are sping abroad at the end of the year. However I a still convenor of the Defence Fun SubCommittee so I shall continue to handle to liaison in these matters. If you re stuck for a bed when coming to Cenberra you are always most welcome here,

Yours slacerely,

Song - Hergot new see has them. Will forward one later.

\*

Timor Relief -- Defence. Thoughts RNWS 8/10/76

- I. Prime need is to save boat. But, if this can be achieved by court defence, that is best. If not confident, bargain.

  I think that our defence and Manny's should be considered together.

  e.g. our bargaining will deepend a fair bit on D Averey's view of the risks.
- 2. I won't tell blatant lies in court . If necessary, I'll refuse to answer.
- a. I won't be in any bargain that involves forfeiture of the medicines, unless it is the only way of saving the boat. If the bastards get the medicines, let them take them by force.
- 4. The political nature of the whole thing should be exposed at every chance. There will be a lot of interest in this trial.
- e.g. M. Fraser's involvement from the night of the arrest.
- e.g. Use of the court to convey false impressions (gun-running) and to stifle discussion. Not saying Timor.
- e.g. Burglary of R.C.S.D.office and seizure of Kombi, and determination to get Tommo as well as me.
- e.g. Bugging of the Don phone.
- 5. Expose at every chance the moral issues. Don't let any-one do a Fontius without being exposed.
- 5. The gun charges are now an embarassment to them, and a point of strength to us.
- 7. We should bear in mind to do nothing unless totally necessary to proclude costs claims, return of all property etc.
- By Neal ordered the boat to return almost immediately. I was refused all identification, was forcibly carried off the DASH, and was then told by Neal that I was under arrest for assault. (I replied that there was a difference between assault and non-violent non-cooperation.) Neal and Botes in fact assaulted me as they walked me to trair car. Work pressing a bargaining?
- 6. I want my fractom over the weekend, and I insist on the bail being highly reduced, and only on my recognisance.
- Iv. we must be ready to take them on no matter what on 15/10/15. Delay is only in mr their interest.

11. The route, the himing, the unloading, were not determined. This could have been a test mun again, in all hondsty. Final discussions were to be at 2 thust bland, ag If Patrol Sout These

Georg / John

Surely they can only get us for possession.

The uncertainties of the trip, (false starts, test runs, turning back from previous trips, the yet-to-be-reserved issues of route and stope on the way, num-in Marie island??

Dathurst Island, going east around Nathurst/melville??,

the acknowledged need for final disussions, ) etc,

now has even so uncertain of it all.

They have no a evidence to prove that this trip was the one.

We could admit in 00%-all honoaty that & good of the goods (not finally determined which) were ultimately destined for the people of most fimor, but not necessarily on that trip.

After all, they never even gave us a chance to get out of the harbour and set a course!

Surely these points could be crucial logally.

Yours conspiratorially,

## W-

## East Timobs

## "AN UNQUENCHABLE THIRST FOR LIBERTY"

by Denis Freney

Bucoli is a village in East Timor, 18 miles from the second biggest town Baucau and close to the International Airport. When I visited Bucoli last October, the whole village was pro-FRETILIN. The cooperative was in the planning stage, while the village school was integrated in FRETILIN's anti-illiteracy program. (See Tribune, November 26, 1974).

Bucoli was a study in miniature of hundreds of villages throughout Timor. Everywhere FRETILIN was opening anti-illiteracy schools, forming cooperatives and health centres, preparing the people for independence in June this year, all FRETILIN leaders gave up their jobs and scattered to villages throughout the country, along with virtually the whole student population, to develop the different campaigns.

Having won 90 percent of village chiefs stections held by the Portuguese, they were prepared to wait confidently for the general elections due in October 1976.

The FRETILIN leaders are dedicated nationalists, wanting nothing more than to see mainutrition, illiteracy and exploitation abolished. Their devotion is shown by their decision to leave the creature comforts of Dili behind, give up relatively well paid jobs and go to the mountain villages to work in the fields, growing their own food, unpaid and devoting their spare time to educating and organising the villagers.

The FRETILIN leaders were that minority in the island's educated elite who turned their backs on the privileges and prospect of considerable wealth if they had collaborated with Indonesia and imperialism, and instead chose to help the people.

The UDT leaders are cut from a different cloth. UDT vice-President Costa Mouzinho was the official fascist party representative for East Timor in the "parliament" in Portugal before the overthrow of fascism in April 1974. He was Mayor of Dill and had over the years as a top administrator in East Timor become very wealthy through corruption.

UDT President Lopez da Cruz fought with the Portuguese in Africa and boasted of his slaughter of Africans there. When he returned to Timor he joined the fascist party.

In the early morning of August 11, a UDT armed gang from Baucau arrived at Bucoli. They dragged two FRETILIN political committee members Antonio Barbosa and Antonio Nascimento from their beds and murdered them, along with Ali Alkatiri, an assistant to the Political Committee.

All's brother, Mari Alkatin is today the victorious FRETILIN military commander in Dill and assistant secretary-general of FRETILIN's political committee.

His forces have gone into battle singing the FRETILIN song FOHO RAMALEU, fighting for an ideal, for their future. I heard FOHO RAMALEU in Bucoli sung continuously by the children as they played in the dusty basketball court. The song calls

on the Timorese people to no longer bow their heads, to act as mules for the colonialists, but to take their future into their own hands.

FOHO RAMALEU symbolises the new spirit and unquenchable thirst for liberty that will finally liberate East Timor and that will make any Indonesian invasion a costly affair not only for the Timorese, but also the indonesians. And just as the same spirit sustained the Vietnamese people in thirty years of war, so too will it sustain the East Timorese.

But they like the Vietnamese need and deserve the strong support of progressive forces throughout the world.

East Timor would not be a "viable" country if it became independent, Whitlam said in Djakarta in August last year. But in one sense it is because it could be viable that East Timor today faces the combined might of Indonesia and Australian and worldwide reaction.

In parts of East Timor, gas flares from the ground in a continuous flame. Elsewhere, oil bubbles to the surface of streams.

Timor Oil and Woodside-Burmah have drilled off-shore. They have not disclosed their finds, but postponed further drilling in the hope UDT would take control.

BHP has had geologists prospecting in the mountains for years. Talking to their Timorese assistants last October, I was given gold samples that BHP had found in good quantities in the island's rivers. Other minerals are there too, in abundant supply.

Certainly, Portuguese colonialism has

left East Timor with a hornfying legacy of under-development. Not a single all-weather road exists. All roads are nothing better than appalling bush tracks. Bridges over wide rivers do not exist or have been washed away. There is no industry and even in Baucau, the second city - or rather overgrown village - the electricity is turned off at 10 pm.

But the Island has no over-population problems and is self-sufficient in food at the present consumption level. Its soil is rich but untouched. It has rich fishing potential. FRETILIN believe that they could transform the country in five years. With some small outside aid, there is no doubt they could do so by a mass mobilisation of the people.

Whitlam's other main argument for handing East Timor to Indonesia is that it would be a "potential threat to regional stability" if independent. How could a small (population 650,000) half island, poverty stricken and with no ambitions beyond letting their people live decently, threaten anyone?

FRETILIN on numerous occasions has pledged neutrality and close cooperation with its neighbours, particularly Australia and Indonesia, so why the scare talk of Russian or Chinese bases?

How could it be a threat? Perhaps Whitlam and Suharto fear the modest example FRETILIN wants to set. Perhaps a rapid increase in the well-being of the people, a nation without corrupt elites, would be too much of an example for the people of Indonesia, ground down by a monstrously corrupt regime whose hands are red with the blood of over half a million of their own people.

#### The Arnham Hinhway

## REVIEWS

#### The Last Hours of Free Timor

TIMOR: Isle of Fear, Isle of Hope. 16mm., color, 20 mins., for hire from Sydney Filmmakers' Co-operative.

This deeply moving film was made by Algerian documentary film maker Adjili from film shot in East Timor last year. It includes the final film shot by the Australian journalists before their murder by the Indonesian invaders at the small border village of Balibo in October 1975.

The film begins with a brief historical introduction to East Timor. Then Australian Labor MHR Ken Fry is shown speaking to the United Nations Security Council last April, explaining the strength of the different political parties he met in East Timor.

We are shown brief interviews with APODETI and UDT leaders after the defeat of the UDT coup attempt in August 1975. Finally, a huge Fretilin rally on May 20, 1975, the first anniversary of Fretilin, shows the real mass strength of this movement.

The film moves to Balibo, a few miles from the Indonesian border, as Fretilin forces prepare for an Indonesian attack.

This is interspersed with film of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Jose Ramos-Horta, presenting his country's case to the UN Security Council in April 1976, and denouncing Indonesia's aggression.

Finally, Greg Shackleton, one of the murdered Australian journalists, tells of his



•The house which became a tomb for four Australian journalists at Balibo, Timor - the last film shot by them is included in Adjili's film (reviewed).

discussions with Fretilin guerrillas two days before his death.

The film has a background of Timorese revolutionary songs.

This film, along with For More Than a Million Years (on Indonesian political prisoners); Visitors in Time (Timor while still a colony); and Indonesia Calling (Jors Ivens film of wharfies' solidarity with the Indonesia; on people in the post-World War II period) will by showing at the Sydney Filmmakers' Cinema of Saturday and Sunday, October 16 and 17, at pm.

Denis Frene

## 

#### Australian Coalition for East Timor

23 March 1985

Dear Friends.

After much delay a date has finally been set for an ACET conference. We apologise for the short notice but it was felt that the opportunity to hold the conference when two Fretilin representatives were in Australia could not be allowed to pass.

The conference will be held in Sydney over the Saturday and Sunday of the Easter weekend, that is on 6 & 7 April.

Both Jose Ramos Horta and Abilio Araujo will be in attendance.

Establishing an agenda will be the first task of the conference but we would propose the following items.

- 1. Discussion of Agenda
- 2 Reports
  - . Group reports
  - . Report from Fretilin representatives
- 3. Assessment of the current situation
  - . in Timor
  - . in Australia
  - . internationally (esp. Asia-pacific region, UN)
- 3. Major tasks/priorities
- . Information distribution
  - links with Fretilin
  - dissemination of current info from ET
  - . Influencing the political process in Australia
  - . International campaigns
  - . New initiatives
- 4. Organisation of ACET . Structure

  - . Finances
- 5. Methods/ideas for campaigning
- . Work with other Asia/Pacific solidarity groups
- . Culture as propaganda visits by Timorese artists . sources of funds
- . Specific Campaign prospects
  - Labor government

- Labor party 1986 conference etc
- media
- anniversaries of Suharto coup and Indon independence
  - 10th anniversary of invasion
  - regional conference on East Timor

Details of the venue will be forwarded once arrangements have been made. In the interim information on arrangements for the conference, such as accommodation, can be obtained from Denis Freney on (02)692 9573.

Once again we apologise for the late notice, but we hope to see you in Sydney.

Yours in solidarity

John M Linnett

John Sinnott

pref



### PRENTE REVOLUCIONARIA DE TIMOR-LESTE INDEPENDENTE

#### FRETILIN

MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM EAST TIMOR by Radio in DARWIN, 13/10/85

from FRETILIN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE

Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades and Friends,

On this day 13/10/85 on which in Melbourne is marked the 10th anniversary of the death of 5 journalists by vile and cowardly assination in Balibo on the 16th October 1975 by the aggressors of our dear country - we won't allow our voice not to join yours, the voices of all their relatives and friends as well as every one present who came to publically show their repudiation of that criminal action.

Also we would like to say that the day of invasion covered our small defenceless homeland with a dark mantle of heavy mourning equalling the mourning of the relatives and friends of another Australian journalist Roger East, whose life was also cut off by the assassin bullets of the Indonesian aggressor side by side with dozens of patriots and militants of Fretilin on the Dili wharf.

However, before anything, we would like to send our affectionate greetings to Mrs Shirley Shackelton as well as to the relatives of the other journalists massacred in Balibo and Dili. Despite the distance that separates us, I believe that we join you in the heartache that has afflicted you from 10 years ago in the remembrance of your beloved.

We also want to greet all the representatives of the Australian Press present, and express our sentiments of solidarity for the fact that 6 of your colleagues to remember and to lament.

We use this occasion to warmly greet all our Australian friends and supporters, all those internationalist fighters in the struggle, who unselfishly are able to transform our just cause into their just cause, and who have expressed to us withfirmness and kindness their loyalty for their indispensable support for our struggle.

On this day we also greet the friendly people of Australia, who remember the struggle of World War II where the people of Australia fought together with the people of East Timor in the mountains of East Timor against Nipponese fascism, and died side by side for the liberty of all the peoples of the world.

During the violent and cowardly Indonesian aggression against our small and defenceless country, the sons of the friendly people of Australia died in the search for truth about our struggle side by side withour soldiers who fought in the defence of our homeland.

Ladies and gentlemen, Comrades and Friends, it is and it will be appropriate that we condemn the criminal action that ended in a dramatic way the lives of 5 Australian journalists in Ealibo, and the other one in Dili.

\*\*\* - 3 - 13/10/85

on this day particularly related to the professionals of the press, it was useful to reunite the relatives of the victims with all who with their participation in this commemoration are willing to pay homage to the memory of their compatriots assassinated by the Indonesian aggression to our homeland.

We wish also that this day can be useful in awakening the attention of those who have always been indifferent to the sufferings of our people, and in the same way, a warning to the Australian government not to continue to be an accomplice to the crimes committed in East Timor by the genocidal regime of Jakarta.

To all the journalists present, we want to thank you for the attention that you have always been able to give in the telling of our just cause.

We also sincerely wish that this day can be equally useful to unite a little bit more the friendly people of Australia to the martyred people of East "imor, under the banner of struggle for justice, liberty, and democracy, and for the peaceful rights of all peoples.

We want to highlight here that the resolution taken in the Congress of the A.C. ... is a spring of warmness to us in our struggle. It is a stimulus to our martyrised people, and also an encouragement to our brave fighters, and we are confident the A.C. ... will carry out and be able to implement the policy passed in relation to our cause.

The Taubere people of East Timor is determined to carry out its struggle with the same determination at all times, and is fully confident that the friendly people of Australia, our friends and Australian supporters, and all the internationalist fighters for justice, will do whatever is possible to press the Australian overnment to change its position in relation to our people. We highlight that its present position is not a dignified one for a democratic government. It is simply too much of a dark stain on Australian people who have large democratic traditions and have always known how to support us.

Shirley Shackelton and the relatives of the 5 Australian journalists assassinated in alibo, as well as relatives of loger East.

We also want to reaffirm to all our friends and Australian supporters our deep gratitude for all the support and solidarity and warmness that we have always the flag for thestruggle for lational biberation of our small, weak and defenceless people.

United in this way in one thought and deed, we are sure to continue to hold high the Universal Principles of the Fights of Peoples, achieved at the price of so much blood and sacrifice of the whole world - for Peace, for Justice, for Liberty, and for Lemocracy.

The Struggle Continues in the villages and mountains of East Timor

To Pesist is to Win

Deneral 1.0. of the Fevolutionary Council of National Resistance, on 13/10/85, by the Fevolutionary Council of National Pesistance, Permanent Committee.

TODU PARKADALAK Tember of the Central Committee of Iretilin

for further information please contact:
Darwin 278435 or 817639

has been 10 years that the weapons of our guerillas have continued to claim for justice and for revenge with justice all the horrible crimes committed by the aggressors, the occupring Indonesians. The tragic scenario of the 5 journalists which took place 10 years ago in the border village of alibo, and the massacre of oger East on Tili wharf, is a direct consequence of another even bigger crime, the vile and cowardly aggression to our small and defenceless homeland and the violation of our borders. This invasion and the subsequent military occupation denies to the people of East imor their sacred right to self-determination and notional independence. The deaths of the Australian journalists constitutes real and incontestable proof of violations by Jakarta's military government of International Law, and is a repudiation by the Indonesian generals of the Universal Principles and of the ights of other peoples - an unequivocal precedent of the criminal practices of these barbaric occupationists of our homeland. Ten years ago the assasin bullets of the Indonesian invaders placed the mantle of mourning over the homes of the Australian journalists assassinated in alibo. For ten years our people have been slowly decimated by the genocidal regime of Jakarta. For ten years our people continue to be victims of thousands of tortures, massacres, persecutions, indiscriminate imprisonments and other sufferings. It has been ten years that our people have lived under the most cruel oppression, and as a result live in hunger, poverty, misery and terror. It has also been ten years that we resist! For ten years the retilin guerillas have continued to struggle bravely against the powerful occupation, and continued without wavering to sacrifice their lives in a difficult war in defence of the sacred right of their people to self-determination. It has also been ten years that the people have been resisting firmly and heroically in ways compatible with their concrete and difficult conditions of the criminal occupation and domination of Indonesia. They have been able to cope with tortures, prison, massacres & persecutions, which have become more refined in ways that only the criminal intelligence of Indonesia is able to, with the strict and rigorous control over the movements of the population. this has been done with singular courage and clarity of purpose, a heroic participation of the people in the lesistance! We have continually insisted that the international community should press Jakarta to allow groups of independent observers, and Amnesty International, to come to verify the truth of the situation. The intransigent refusal of Jakarta only demonstrates that the Indonesian generals are afraid that the truth will be confirmed. The visit of Ir ill Morrison cannot guarantee a true image of the real situation of our homeland and our peoples, because "r Torrison is a favourite instrument of the propaganda of Jakarta. The recognition of the so-called Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor is a denial of the principles established in the United lations, principles allegedly recognised by the Australian Government . These principles that democratic governments claim to defend, after all have no value whatsoever to the lawke Labor Covernment when it is more concerned with "fishing" our barrels of petrol from our south coast. And even further, with the recognition of the so-called Indonesian sovereignty over our homeland, which is an attitude like those above, the trip by 'r ill Torrison is to give complicity in hiding the crimes of the occupiers of our homeland. ... 3

INVITES YOU

TO ATTEND A RECEPTION TO WELCOME

MR ABILIO ARAUJO AND MR ROQUE RODRIGUEZ

REPRESENTATIVES OF

## FRETILIN

WHO WILL SPEAK ABOUT THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE IN

## EAST TIMOR

SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE OF EAST TIMORESE PEOPLE

TIME : 5.30 - 7.30 PM

DATE : WEDNESDAY, 27TH JULY 1983

PLACE : BISTRO ANU STUDENTS UNION DOWNSTAIRS

THIS MEETING HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE ACT BRANCH COUNCIL OF THE ALP

ACET

Australian Coalition for East Timor

CIET, PO Box A716 Sydney South NSW 2000 August 29

TO CIET/AETA etc.

A hurried update for you all.

1) Radio contact: After a silence of four weeks the ET end, a message was received last Sunday (25th). Previous to the silence for the previous four weeks, we had four weeks of very bad atmospheric interference with the result that virtually nothing was understandable. In the material received on Aug 25, there was a reply to Hawke on recognition of ET integration. We hope this material can be translated and released to the media at least today (if not on August 25) but as it was addressed to Abilio we must first get his approval for such release, as this is the agreement reached with the Fretilin External Delegation which we must adhere to strictly.

silence and receiving nothing we could use the presious month -- effectively two months without knowing what was happening. It was naturally a very big relief to get the messages yesterday after a month's months without knowing what was happening. Hopefully, the news will flow much more people fighting a guerrilla war. regularly in coming weeks but such breaks in communications must be expected from

2. ACTU congress: This begins on September 9(a Monday). We will distribute East Timor News with a covering letter and attempt to hold a small picket with placards etc. However, it will be difficult to get numbers because the congress is held in weekdays, making it diffuclt for Timorese to come. It is doubtful, from what I hear, that East Timor will actually be discussed. There will be very little time for international issues and what time will be devoted will be taken up with South Africa and possibly New Caledonia/French tests/ Pacific issues. I hear that Kelty and Crean don't want anything on the agenda where there could be major blow-ups (although of course there will be some) -- or at least on "smaller" issues like Timor...whcih would differentiate the ACTU from the Hawke govt.

We in Sydney will seek to press Timor at the ACTU left caucuses due the weekend befo before the conference. Could all AETA/CIET groups in their different centres try to do likewise among left and any other sympathetic unions in ? Unfortunately, and as part of the manipulation, we will not know the actual agenda until a few days before the wax congress begins (ie the order for example of international agenda items) or when the international section will be discussed. We also will not know all the resolutions sent in on East Timor ( other than the South Coast Labor Council item I sent out earlier). Could you lobby union officials going to the congress fr from your centre and press the Timor issue, as well as giving them an update on late est events? Please let me know how you go ...

3. Radio Licence : Advice is that it is virtually impossible to appeal under current old Wireless and elegraphy Act under whic Duffyrejected licence. We intend to reapply when the Radio Communications Act is proclaimed, as it specifies appeal procedures. Brian has written to OTC asking them to provide communications with Fretilin (enclosed) and received an acknowledgement. He has also received response to request under Freedom of Information Act for his file with THE Dept of Communications re: application for licence and has made \$35 deposit as required.

- 4. Finance: Most personal debts owing to individuals (Brian, myself and Gil) have been repaid but some should still go to Gil and we need fome in reserve. If you have collected any money please send it ASAP. If you have outstanding debts to CIET or East Timor News please pay them !
- 4. Hawke and lack of response: I think the main reason Hawke came out finally with de jure recognition in parliament was the lack of response from the Left and particu larly Labor Left politicians to his statement on Indonesian TV. He was in fact in

## ACET

#### Australian Coalition for East Timor

retreat at first after news of his TV interview became public (see his spokesperson's statement) but when there was no uproar (as media predicted there would be) and only Gordon McIntosh to my knowedge spoke out (alongside Chipp who was being opportunistic), then Hawke felt strong enough to make his statement in parliament.

There's no room here to analyse in detail where we are at this point of time.

It seems to me however that continuing radio contact and thus the demonstration for all to see that the genocide, and equally important, the resistance continues is the way we can try to reverse the position, as difficult as it may seem.

Hope all goes well

In solidarity

enis Freney

PS: We have delayed ET NEWS a little in hope that we will very soon get a translation of the parts of today's (25th) message that can be used. Otherwise thematerial would be old -- ie. dating from June.

The text of the leaflet for the Let East Timor Speak Fund is typeset but will now have to be amended following Hawke's statement and response from Xanana.



## FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIA DE TIMOR-LESTE INDEPENDENTE

#### FRETILIN

PRESS STATEMENT by ABILIO AFAUJO, Head of the Fretilin Overseas Mission issued Darwin NT Australia, 24/4/85

Mr Abilio Araujo, Head of the Fretilin Overseas Mission, in Parwin for A ZAC Pay 1985, said that the day is rightfully celebrated to honour those who fought for the right of ordinary Australians and indeed the free world to live in relative peace and freedom.

"Over 50,000 East Timorese were slaughtered by the Japanese as reprisals for the support given to Australian Commandos in World War II. We East Timorese would appreciate a little more recognition from the ANZACS and Australia generally of our right also to live in peace and freedom," Mr Araujo said.

- "Unfortunately, up to 300,000 of our people have died and continue to die since the Indonesian invasiom of 1975," he continued. "How much more do we have to endure to prove our determination to fight for independence?
- "Why can't we expect our closest friendly neighbour Australia to support our basic human rights, guaranteed by the United Nations Charter which Austrlia has signed. We need and have a right to expect positive actions on our behalf, at the least to facilitate U.N. mediated ceasefire as requested by the Fretilin leadership.
- "Or will Australia and the world continue to sit back and watch Indonesia continue to apply its genocidal policies in East Timor and our neighbouring Melanesian country West Papua?," he asked.

It is ironical that in Darwin this year the 3 Service chiefs will be a celebrating ANZAC DAY in Indonesia.

Mr Araujo has been in Austrlia in order to promote unity and to give encouragement to the East Timorese Community in Australia.

Horli Just

# 'Please help us represent East Timor in Nairobi'



Emilia Pires, 24 lives in Melbourne. She is a graduate from Latrobe University and works as a financial counsellor with the Aboriginal Legal Service.



Ines de Almeida, 22, lives in Sydney and works in the NSW public service. She is a founding member of the Sydney East Timorese Cultural Centre.



Mimi Ferreira, 30, lives in Darwin. She is a teacher. She was a guest speaker on East Timor at the Christian Conference of Asia Youth Assembly in New Delhi, India, in 1984.

Funds are urgently needed to help three East Timorese women refugees, now resident in Australia, to attend the International Women's Forum to be held in Nairobi, Kenya, July this year.

The Forum is being held in conjunction with the United Nations World Conference to mark the close of the UN decade for women. The purpose of Forum '85, organised by the International Committee of Non-Government Organisations, is to bring together people with varied backgrounds from around the world to exchange information, learn from each other's experience and plan for action to improve the situation of women after 1985. The Forum theme is Equality, Development and Peace.

The three women plan to offer a series of workshops during the Forum on the situation in East Timor and the need for the international community to support the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination.

Endorsing the appeal, the Australian East Timor women's committee, Tulun Feto Timor Sira, writes:

We appeal to all Australians, and women in particular, who share our concern for East Timor, to contribute generously to this appeal. As women are often singled out for particular abuse in war, so the experience of the East Timorese has been shocking, and we feel it is important for these issues to be raised at Nairobi. Too often the East Timorese have suffered the neglect that silence imposes. The contact with other women who have shared in similar experiences of oppression can only encourage and support these women in their work for their sisters in East Timor.

The Appeal target is \$9000.00.

Contributions should be made payable to East Timor Tour East Timor Tour Committee.  183 Gertrude St. Fitzroy Vic. 3065 Australia.	r Committee, and sent to:
I/We wish to contribute to the cost of sending three East Name	Timorese women to Nairobi.
Address	
	Postcode
Amount \$	

PUBLIC MEETING

SELF-DETERMINATION: Australia's Crucial Role

Australia's support for self-determination for East Timor at the UN is absolutely crucial. Show the Hawke government you care by attending this vital public meeting.

#### **ABILIO ARAUJO**

OTHER SPEAKERS INCLUDE

#### BRIAN HOWE SENATOR GORDON McINTOSH

#### SENATOR COLIN MASON

mocrat spokesperson on Foreign Affairs

Representatives from Timorese and other community organisations. Timorese food and dancing.



## PUBLIC MEETING



# SELF DETERMINATION FOR EAST TIME.

SUNDAY JULY 31 DALLAS BROOKS HALL 2PM

## The UN is important

The issue of East Timorese self-determination must remain on the United Nations agenda. This ensures the possibility of international diplomatic activity towards a genuine act of self-determination for the East Timorese.

of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Such

scrutiny does dampen human rights violations.

support at the UN for self-determination will ensure its survival on the UN agenda. Failure to act in this way now will effectively aid Indonesian strategy against the Timorese.

## Join AETA now!

The most effective way of supporting the people of East Timor is through joining the Australia-East Timor Association and participating in its activities.

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TIMOR 85 Supporting Leaflets etc. of Transcripts.

#### Amnesty International East Timor Campaign 1985


Since the invasion of 1975 Indonesian troops have systematically and persistently violated human rights in East Timor.

These human rights violations include

- the "disappearance" and arbitrary killing of noncombatants
- the torture and ill treatment of people taken into custody of Indonesian forces, including their detention in cruel and inhuman conditions
- the imprisonment without charge or trial of people held on suspicion of apposing the Indonesian occupation
- since December 1983, the lack of fairness of the trials of East Timorese charged with political offences.

Estimates from a wide range of sources of the number of people who have died in East Timor since the 1975 invasion directly as a result of the armed conflict are as high as 200,000, about a third of the pre-invasion oppulation.


Annesty International's information on East Timor cannot be regarded as complete and it is impossible to assess the full scale of violations. However the evidence shows a persistent pattern of human rights violations extending over a period of nine years with the most widespread violations occurring in waves generally associated with times of increased military activity.



#### Torture

"It is hoped that interrogation with the use of force will not be implemented except in those situations where the person examined tells the truth with difficulty... The use of force often has the consequence that the person being interrogated under duress confesses faisely because he is afraid and, as a consequence, agrees to everything the interrogater wishes."

"Avoid taking photographs showing forture (penyiksaan) (of someone being given electric shocks, stripped naked and so on)."



Cover of manual on methods of interrogation of prisoners by indonesian troops. Manual is antitled METHODS OF INTERROGATION OF CAPTIVES.

Systematic torture, including the use of electric shocks, has been employed at interrogation centres in Dili and elsewhere to which not only Fretilin leaders but all people thought to have important intelligence information have been taken.

#### Extra-Judicial Executions and Disappearances

"In May 1984, 23 people were arrested in Loi Boro Uai, Baucau. Eight of them later "disappeared". Relatives who brought them food were lold that they had "gone to study in Jakarta". The unfortunate ones were illiterate."



Rosa Bonaparte secretary of a women's organisation. Reportedly executed in Dill on 7 December 1975.



Laopoido Joaquintaken with his nece Maria Gorete from their homes by Indonesian troops, April 1979. "Disappeared"

Amnesty International has the names of more than 350 people who "disappeared" in the period November 1978 to May 1979. It has the names of 73 people reported to have been executed or to have "disappeared" after two querilla attacks in June 1980. Several independent sources have reported the killing by Indonesian troups of up to 200 people in the village of Kraras, Viqueque, in August 1983.

The killings and "disappearances" continue to this day.

# THE ACID TEST FOR LABOR IN GOVERNMENT

Our servility towards Indonesia seems to know no bounds, despite that country's appalling record in Timor and the intimidation and political harrassment of those who fail to support President Suharto. We in the Labor Party do not subscribe to the belief that Indonesia is vitally important to Australia and we are of only marginal importance to it. We are neighbours, we have to live with each other, but we do not have to accept so meekly the contemptuous and offhand treatment now regularly handed out to us.

Mr Hayden - 26 February 1981

Labor in government has yet to take a step to help the East Timorese



#### CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

## From Opposition to Government

The Labor Government came to power with a clear and definite policy on East Timor: recognition of the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence, opposition to defence aid to Indonesia whilst Indonesian troops remain in East Timor, support for the free migration of East Timorese, and support for East Timor at the United Nations.

Mr Hawke claimed that Australia's concern 'must be in the interests of the people of East Timor. No other consideration is relevant.' Yet the pattern of behaviour of the Labor Government has been disturbingly similar to the Fraser Government's disastrous approach.

#### Self-determination not affirmed

Mr Hawke's first statements as Prime Minister emphasised good relations with Indonesia but did not affirm party policy. Not only did Mr Hawke on occasion avoid using the term 'self-determination' (referring instead to 'an act of internationally supervised desire' and an 'act of self-expression'), but went on to say that the lack of such an act was 'in the past (Jakarta, 4 June 1983).

Neither Mr Hayden nor Mr Hawke have affirmed the continuing right of the East Timorese to self-determination.

#### Stalling at the United Nations

The Labor Government has failed to take a stand at the UN in support of East Timor, refusing to commit itself to vote for the East Timorese right to self-determination, and allowing the issue to be deferred. By standing back from activity at the UN, Australia has aided Jakarta's diplomatic strategy to remove East Timor from the UN agenda.

#### Seabed boundary — an East Timor sellout

Negotiations with Indonesia over the Timor-Australia seabed boundary are tantamount to de jure recognition of East Timor's incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia. This is against party policy

Mr Havden has implied that the party may have to accept recognition of integration to secure a seabed boundary favourable to Australia.

However, to date there has been no indication that Indonesia will soften its claims in return for Australian recognition of their annexation of East Timor or that the oil and gas fields will disappear if the negotiations are not concluded swiftly.

#### Military Aid continued

Immediately prior to the elections Mr Hayden declared, "Our party policy is clear. It lays down a number of obligations, including no military aid to Indonesia, while the criteria we have laid down aren't met. I find no problems with that ..." (25 February, 1983).

Despite a clear party policy opposing continued military aid to Indonesia:

May 1983: An Attack class patrol boat was handed over to the Indonesian Navy

August 1983: The Labor Covernment budgeted \$10.3 million in military aid to Indonesia for 1983/84.

#### 'Changed Circumstances'

During Mr Hawke's trip to Jakarta he repeatedly made reference to "changed circumstances" as justification for not implementing Party policy. There have been no changed circumstances in East Timor which would legitimise stepping back from the fundamental issue: East Timorese self-determination. The major events of 1983 — the clear call by the resistance for self-determination and the launching of the new Indonesian offensive — point to the need to maintain and strengthen support for the Timorese.



#### **Beyond Diplomacy**

'Under your Presidency, Indonesia's economy has been transformed. Both in the region and around the world, your nation has established a solid reputation as a reliable partner and a good neighbour...

You, sir, set your hand to the tremendous task of national reconciliation, national recovery and national reconstruction — and by carrying out that task with such fidelity and success, you have won an imperishable place in the history of your country and the hearts of your country-men and women.

"... Australia acknowledges and wishes to encourage the major efforts the Indonesian Covernment has been making to improve the situation and to improve the conditions of life for the people of East Timor."

Mr Hawke, Presidential Dinner, Jakarta, 4 June 1983

#### Four months before Labor took office:

#### Petition to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly

We, the undersigned members of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party of Australia, wish to express our continuing concern at the human rights situation in East Timor and reaffirm our support for moves in the United Nations to uphold the right of the East Timorese people to a genuine act of self-determination.

This situation is presently the subject of an inquiry in the Australian Parliament by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The views set out above are clearly expressed in the platform of the Australian Labor Party and were passed by 48 votes to 1 vote at the National Conference of the Party in 1977, and re-affirmed at the National Conferences in 1979 and 1982. Signed by

Bob Hawke Lionel Bowen John Button Don Grimes Ralph Willis Paul Keating Stewart West Peter Walsh Susan Ryan Careth Evans Peter Morris John Kerin Kim Beazley

Chris Hurford
John Brown
John Dawkins
Neal Blewett
Barry Jones
Michael Duffy
Barry Cohen
Clyde Holding
Arthur Gietzelt
Tom Uren
Brian Howe
and 45 others, October 1982

#### UNCHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

## Timorese still reject integration

Invasion, military offensive, forced resettlement, hearts and minds campaigns, famine, bribes, schools, roads, houses, arbitary imprisonment! All this since late 1975, and still the Indonesian government has been unable to make the Timorese believe that their best interests are served by being part of Indonesia. Not surprisingly, the opposite is the case.

#### Church rejects integration

Much to Jakarta's chagrin, the Catholic Church in East Timor has refused to aid Indonesia's integration processes. Monsignor Lopes, head of the Dili church until May 1983, spoke openly against integration. His successor, Monsignor Carlos Belo, is now speaking out against the behaviour of the Indonesian army in East Timor.

Sydney journalist, Peter Hastings, no supporter of the East Timorese, has conceded that Monsignor Belo's statements "must be heeded".

#### Support For Armed Resistance

Despite East Timor's complete isolation, armed resistance to integration has continued and shows every sign of continuing. This could not happen without considerable East Timorese civilian support.

Debate about the numbers of armed guerillas misses the point:

• The 1983/84 Indonesian offensive is testimony to the existence and strength of the resistance, and

• Captured Indonesian military papers, authenticated by Amnesty International in June 1983, document the existence of Fretilin networks in Indonesian-controlled villages.

Armed resistance and Timorese support for it, is the apparently indestructible symbol of Timorese rejection of integration.

#### 'Economic development' equals counterinsurgency

Much has been made of Indonesian spending in East Timor since 1980. But this is no proof of Jakarta's interest in the welfare of the Timorese:

 Indonesian officials privately admit economic development was begun to placate international criticism of the takeover;

 Indonesian claims of expenditure in Timor have never been scrutinized in detail;

• Economic development is based around the forced settlement of East Timorese into strategic centres called 'resettlement villages'. These are designed to concentrate and control the population and isolate the armed resistance. The initial result for the Timorese was the destruction of the subsistence economy and widespread famine. East Timor remains dependent on food aid because of this 'resettlement'.

#### 1983 talks: a sign of hope

Unable to beat the Timorese into submission or to seduce them with economic development, Jakarta proposed talks with Fretilin in 1983. While dispute remains about Jakarta's aims in these talks, it clearly emerged that Fretilin was not seeking to surrender but



Monsignor Lopes, former head of the Catholic Church in East Timor with the Pope in June 1983. According to Mgr Lopes: 'Only a genuine, completely free act of self-determination will bring peace to East Timor. Australia must understand that the fighting will go on and the issue will continue to trouble Australian-Indonesian relations for as long as natural justice is denied to the East Timorese people.'

rather was clearly proposing a process for an act of self-determination.

The ceasefire and Fretilin-Indonesia dialogue was cruelly halted by the 1983 offensive. The talks were, however, a sign of hope that increasing disquiet about Timor in Indonesia itself may modify Jakarta's behaviour in Timor.

#### Indonesians question their government

After years of silence, prominent Indonesians now question their government's claims about East Timor:

• The former commander of the Indonesian armed forces, General Yusuf, is believed to now say the only solution to Timor is a diplomatic solution;

• Representatives of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta told Australian parliamentarians that Indonesian intellectuals would reject incorporation of East Timor which they find 'shameful and sad':

• While the 1984/84 offensive was raging, the Indonesian Catholic Bishops declared their 'sympathy and solidarity' with the East Timorese whom they described as suffering 'an ocean of pain';

• The prominent Jakarta daily, Merdeka, has called on the Indonesian Government to reveal the truth about what is happening in East Timor.

#### Resistance will continue

Australia turning its back, will not make the Timor issue go away. Events in West Irian are clear proof of that.

According to a military analyst: 'It's a running sore. They (the Indonesians) have tried the hearts and minds approach and it didn't wash. Now they have gone back to the big-stick policy and it doesn't seem to be working much better. This thing is going to go on and on until we all get old.' (Toronto Globe and Mail, 10 February 1984).

Well, that is unless we stand up and do something about it.

#### What the Australian Parliamentary Delegation said

- Real administrative power does not lie with the local administration, but with a committee headed by General Murdani, head of Indonesia's armed forces. (p.66)
- Mail into and out of East Timor is censored. (p.33)
- Movement into and out of Timor is controlled. (p.33)
- Food shortages and malnutrition existed in Quelicai.
   (Quelicai has long been described by Timorese as a serious food shortage area)
- There is a continuing need for food aid programs by international relief agencies.
- The 'resettlement program' caused considerable political,
- social and economic disruption, 'and was a matter of continuing concern.' (pp. 74-75)
- New-styled houses built by Indonesia were occupied by Indonesians, not Timorese. (pp. 46-47)
- Detention without trial on Atauro island is a human rights violation. (pp. 32-33)
- International Red Cross should have access to all detention centres. (p. 33) (ICRC has never had such access.)
- Violations of human rights have continued. (p. 33)
- The refusal of Indonesian authorities to allow some people to rejoin their families outside Indonesia was a denial of their human rights. (p. 33).



This threat by Murdani was the signal for the launching of Indonesia's 1983-84 offensive against the East Timorese. takarta decided on the current drive when it became clear that a ceasefire agreed to in March was being successfully exploited by Fretilin both to extend its network inside Timor and to make political capital abroad. Widely-publicised photographs of the Fretilin guerilla leader, Jose Gusmao (Xanana), holding talks with his Indonesian counterpart Colonel Purwanto - to give only one example - proved enormously embarrassing to Indonesia which for years had maintained Fretilin was a spent force

#### Myth: Fretilin broke ceasefire

Canberra has repeated lakarta's claim that the offensive was a response to Fretilin killing 16 Indonesians in the Vigueque area on August 8, thus breaking the 1983 ceasefire

On 8 November 1983, Mr Havden told parliament. From the information available to the Australian Government, it appears that Indonesian military operations in East Timor have been renewed in response to the killing of 15 Indonesian soldiers on 8 August 1983.

Senator Evans had earlier made the government's position quite clear. The Government believes that, despite Fretilin's breaking of the unofficial ceasefire which had been in operation in East Timor since March (Hansard 22 September 1983)

The evidence does not support the claim.

- \* Almost all media reports indicate villagers were responsible for the deaths and that some of them were former Fretilin under Indonesian control.
- No evidence has been presented to show the killings were Fretilin inspired

#### August 8 incident: pretext for offensive

Sixteen Indonesians were killed near Viqueque, but the most likely explanation for the deaths comes from a highlyplaced Timorese in the Indonesian administration: outraged Timorese turned on Indonesian soldiers who had gatecrashed a festival and waylaid and raped some

The August 8 incident was the pretext, but not the reason for the Indonesian offensive

#### Offensive planned before August

There is good evidence the Indonesian offensive was planned well in advance of August 8, in fact before the Australian Parliamentary delegation arrived in East Timor

\* In June and July Church sources reported an impending troop build-up.

## 1983-84 Indonesian Offensive THE REAL FACE OF INDONESIAN INTEGRATION

The 1981.84 Indonesian offensive was the fourth major military operation in East Timor in 8 years. Whether it is able to temporarily disrupt the resistance as in 1978 or whether it simply fails like the 1981 "fence of legs" operation remains

Whatever the outcome, the 1983-84 offensive demonstrates

- . Timorese armed resistance is a force to be reckoned with: \*Indonesian "economic development" has not seduced the
- Timorese into accepting integration, and \* Jakarta does not have the welfare and interests of the Timorese

moop build up in Timor in August, but then proceeded to

- play down Jakarta's restrictions on the International Red Cross.
- avoid, where possible, any reference to the offensive

The 1983-84 offensive was the acid test for the Hawke Government it came through with flying colours — on the side of the Mr Hayden did express concern at "reports" of Indonesian

- · play down the scale of the offensive;
- play don't give credence to Jakarta's claims but not those of Timorese

Ten battalions in Lospalos alone, August 1983: AAP reports 23 September 1983: militio units defect to the bush and even with these they're with their arms. not winning the war? Indonesian use of A-4 personnel and incendiary Late August 1983: Indonesia's Colonel Purwanto bombs on Timorese targets Monsignor Carlos Belo. replaced as military mander in East Timor by Bishop of Dilli, the hardline Colonel Rudito February 1984 September 1983: Jakono tells Australian embassy of 90 Timorese in Indonesian milita November 1983: Fretilin reports a 12,000 Indonesian December 1983: Church troop cordon sweeping sources report 600 arrests in ugh the eastern zone from Dill, 34 in Vigueque and 125 the Baucau-Vigueque road. August 1983: Timorese December 1983: Catholic August 1983: Timorese report clergy in Dill refuse to attend General Murdani's Christmas arrival of tanks, helicopters refugees report armoured and troops in Baucau and Dilli columns and paratroops near Laga, Lospalos, Baucau and operation scheduled to start Atauro on 2 January 1984 Jaco LAUTEM Baucau\* Laga DILI Liquica Manatuto BAUCAU Quelicai Baguia Lospalos February 1984: Timorese LIQUICA MANATUTO AILEU executions and torture in Bobonaro area. The military Lacluta working from a 'death list' of 167 persons Laclubar ERMERA VIQUEQUE Maubisse. BOBONARO AINARO November-December 1983: Balibo Maliana Viqueque Fretilin reports extensive Ainaro . Indonesian indiscriminate · Alas Bobonaroi bombardment of civilian and SAME economic targets in Laga, Viqueque, Luro, Uatolari /enilale and Fulloro. COVA LIMA Viqueque: 8 schoolchildren December 1983: Timprese Suai \* aged 14-15 arrested and held Church reports food shortages for several days in one small aggravated by a flood of refugees around Viqueque. WEST TIMOR August 1983: Some 200 February 1984: Dili Bishop reports conscription of East Timorese in Covalima, Same, (Indonesia) reprisal for the deaths of 16 Indonesian soldiers near Viqueque on 8 August Manatuto, Baucau and

\* A July 1983 letter from Fretilin leader Xanana to the Australian-East Timor Association forecast the arrival of Indonesian 'reinforcements' for military operations.

\* International Red Cross was told by Jakarta in June/July that it could not have access to mainland villages for the last

#### International Red Cross restricted again

At the very time it was most needed, ICRC was prevented from disbursing aid or visiting prisons throughout mainland Fast Timor These restrictions are not new.

- 1975-79 ICRC was prevented by Jakarta from having any presence in East Timor.
- 1981 No ICRC representatives visited Timor during the July-September 'fence of legs' operation.
- · As of May 1984, ICRC still had no access to mainland villages for aid assessment; it had visited only one prison (in Dili) since November 1982.

Yet on 19 October 1983 Mr Hayden attacked a newspaper report which said Foreign Affairs Department cables showed that the International Red Cross was being prevented by Indonesia from giving aid in East Timor.

Mr Hayden described the report in the Melbourne 'Age' as "mischievous", "provocative" and "inaccurate" and claimed the reporter, Ian Davis, "can be dangerous when he is reporting on foreign affairs". "He gets his facts wrong." (Melbourne Age, 19 October 1983).

The Australian government only admitted its 'concern' at these restrictions in late November 1983 - at least four months after the restrictions were imposed.

#### Armed resistance active

Timorese have certainly suffered from the offensive, but there has been resistance. While Indonesian forces concentrated their early activities in the eastern regions. Fretilin claims to have inflicted losses on its enemy in the central and border zones. As of March 1984, the Timorese army claims to have successfully resisted the offensive.

The offensive has been frustrated by the resistance. According to Monsignor Carlos Belo, head of the East Timor Church, the Indonesian military 'thought to finish things off by the end of December 1983, but we're already in February and there is no end in sight.

'In every district they have arrested people (600 in Dili alone) who are being judged in military trials. Others were made to disappear. In Lospalos, Vigueque, Baucau and Ainaro there is war, and the people are being coralled. They are suffering from illness, hunger, the deprivation of liberty, and persecution.

Not all Indonesians expect the offensive to be successful. The editors of Merdeka observe:

'Armed groups can hold out for a very long time if they have support... Usually the most decisive factor is the support from inside, that is to say, from the people. Experience shows that if this kind of support is to be handled it cannot be done only by military means.

the Indonesian people should be informed of the real situation in East Timor.' (29 December 1983)

'Any resumption of hostilities can only add to the human misery and suffering in East Timor and would represent a step backwards in the search for lasting peace."

Bill Hayden, 'Financial Review', 2 September

## Australia's crucial role

Precisely because of its proximity to Indonesia and East Timot, and its relationship with takarta, Australia is in the best position to insist on justice for the East Timorese.

#### Present policy has failed

By abandoning ALP policy and emulating the disastrous aser Covernment's "quiet diplomacy", the Labor govern-

harmed the Timorese, not helped them,

assisted Jakarta's aim to remove Timor from the interna-

 rendered meaningless Mr Hayden's laudible calls for a recommitment by all members of the UN to its Charter and

 assured Jakarta it would offer no serious opposition to its actions in Timor, and thereby free the Indonesian army's hand in Timor.

#### Why Australia is important

International scrutiny of Indonesian behaviour is crucial to the defence of the East Timorese people. Australia is best placed to promote that scrutiny

· As a neighbour of Indonesia, forthright Australian views

will be taken seriously by Jakarta.

 Australian support at the UN and elsewhere will ensure the issue is kept alive and maintain the possibility of a just resolution.

#### Self determination is in Jakarta's interest

The East Timorese are not going to accept forced integration. Jakarta's continued actions against the Timorese will only:

bring Indonesia into further international disrepute,

- · entrench distrust of Indonesia by its neighbouring coun-
- · raise more questions in Indonesia itself about the cost, in money and lives, of its hold on Timor,

· maintain tensions in the immediate region.

Indonesia has everything to gain by allowing an act of self determination. The only thing that might be lost is the face of a few militarists who got Indonesia into this mess in the first place.

#### East Timor a barrier to 'good relations'

East Timor is not going to go away until the aspirations of the Timorese are acknowledged and respected. Until then East Timor will be a running sore in the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

#### Appeasement breeds contempt

The more Australia makes it plain that it will not make its ce of principle and national interest beyond the point where it could lead to an open breach with Indonesia, the more will (akurta construe this as weakness and the less will Australia's regional attitudes be taken secously. The only relationship worth having with Indonesia — or any other state — is a relationship of imatual respect Achievement of such a relationship has nothing to do with sebre-ratting, but it has a great deal to do with formers of purpose and with the recognition that appearement breeds oday as it bred yesterday, not friendship but contempt Editorial, Sydney Morning Herald. 2 February 1976.

#### 'Treatment of East Timorese shameful'

Options for Indonesians would be wider if (Indonesia's) friends abroad, for example the IGGI countries, would take a firm stand on the subject. Countries should not be looking at the short term benefits of relations. The treatment of the people of East Timor was so shameful and Indonesians were so unable to express criticism. Others should therefore look at it

Representatives of the Legal Aid Institute, Jakarta, July 1983

#### 'Indonesia irresponsible'

Mr Hawke and Mr Hayden, with their emphasis on regionalism, paid early visits to Jakarta after the election and made strenuous efforts to approach Indonesia in the most pragmatic way possible. Their initiative, it is plain to see now despite considerable optimism at the time, has been thrown back in their faces - and in a most irresponsible manner

Editorial, Melbourne 'Age', 1 February 1984 following reports of Indonesian actions in Timor.

- "Cood relations" at the expense of the Timorese means covering up the actions of the Indonesian army in Timor and will only encourage continued or similar actions by the Generals responsible for the Timor crime.
- Australians will not accept that we become accomplices to Jakarta's crimes in East Timor
- The long term result of present Australian policy will be a worsening of the relationships between the peoples of Indonesia and Australia.

#### **Australian Parliamentary Delegation** treated with contempt

The Australian government hoped the findings of the parliamentary delegation in July 1983 would provide a basis for dumping ALP policy. The government had been misled by Jakarta into believing that the then secret Fretilin-Indonesia talks would lead to a

Despite the public disclosure in June of the content of the talks, from which it became clear that Fretilin was strongly pursuing self-determination, Indonesian officials misled the Parliamentary Delegation:

- · Governor Carrascalao said 'negotiations' related only to Fretilin's surrender
- · Colonel Purwanto denied he had talks with Xanana
- The Delegation was not told of Jakarta's restrictions on the Red Cross
- The Delegation was led to believe there was no time limit on the 'amnesty' for Fretilin when in fact the 1983 military offensive had already been scheduled to begin after the delegation's departure.



Fretilin's Xanana (right) with Indonesia's Colonel Purwanto during talks in March 1983. Purwanto told the Parliamentary Delegation in August that he had never held talks with Xanana.

#### What Australia can do

The opportunity for the Timorese to freely express their desires and aspirations is the only realistic solution to the Timor problem.

The April 1984 resolution of the Victorian branch of the ALP provides a basis for principled Australian support for the East Timorese.

Australia should ensure that any bilateral or multilateral diplomatic activity on East Timor includes consultation with the East Timorese.

#### Wishy-washy resolutions useless

Diplomatic expressions of "regret" and weak resolutions on aid and welfare will be a clear signal to Jakarta that it can expect no serious questioning of its actions in Timor.

The very least the government can do, if it is to retain any vestige of a genuine defence of the East Timorese is to:

 Affirm the continuing right of the Timorese to selfdetermination

 Advise the Indonesian government that this cannot be reversed without genuine moves on Jakarta's part to permit such a process.

Any position short of this will close the door on any honest Australian contribution to a just solution.

#### Fretilin Peace Plan

Direct negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and Fretilin, under United Nations auspices, to discuss:

 the constitution of a truly impartial UN Peace Force or Multinational force as the indispensible condition to safeguard and ensure:

- the functioning of a transitional administration

— the proper implementation of decisions reached during dialogue about the stationing of the two beligerent forces, Falantil (Fretilin's armed forces) and the Indonesian armed forces,

• the holding of a free, democratic consultation of the East Timorese people and

fixing the date for the transfer of sovereignty.

The right is reserved for Australia to participate in the negotiations as an observer. Other observers may be chosen on the proposal of Portugal, Indonesia or Fretilin in equal numbers, each of which shall be subject to the approval of the other two parties.'

Should not Australia consider this?

#### Towards a realistic East Timor Policy

The ALP, in accordance with the principles of its foreign policy and the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence as laid down in the United Nations Charter,

• recognises the inalienable right of the East Timorese people to self-determination and independence,

 affirms there has been no genuine act of self-determination in East Timor,

• declares that the right of the East Timorese people to selfdetermination has not been forfeited because of the passage of time, the weight of the Indonesian presence, or material changes in East Timor.

• and asserts that considerations in regard to Australia's relations with Indonesia do not override Australia's obligations to fundamental human rights and international law.

Accordingly, the ALP in Government:

1. will inform the Indonesian Government and the United Nations that Australia does not recognise Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor;

2. will begin a process of consultation concerning Australia's diplomatic role with Fretilin and other East Timorese who support self-determination;

3. will initiate diplomatic action in support of the East Timorese right to self-determination on a Government-to-Government level and at the UN, the Socialist International, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and other relevant forums;

4. will suspend negotiations on the East Timor-Australia sea-bed boundary until a genuine act of self-determination has been held in East Timor.

Programme with Indonesia until Indonesian occupying forces in East Timor have been withdrawn;

6. will work to ensure that: a) no restrictions are placed on international aid organisations in their endeavour to determine the needs of the East Timorese people or to distribute emergency aid; b) all Australian aid to East Timor benefits the East Timorese but does not support Indonesian Government integration processes or military strategy;

7. will work for the free migration of East Timorese from East Timor and will permit the entry of all East Timorese seeking admission to Australia;


8. will facilitate the visit of Fretilin representatives to Australia;

9. will oppose the operations of Australian companies in East Timor until self-determination has been achieved;

10. will work for international scrutiny in East Timor and seek to initiate an independent, international, fully resourced, investigative mission to visit East Timor to ascertain the current situation with particular emphasis on the needs and aspirations of the East Timorese people;

11. will work for the resumption of the ceasefire agreed to in East Timor in March 1983 and support the commencement of negotiations between the Indonesian Government and Fretilin under UN auspices leading to withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the holding of an internationally supervised genuine act of self-determination;

12. will implement the above policies as a matter of urgency to alleviate the continuing suffering and loss of life in East Timor.



## WAR NEXT DOOR

#### 1978 INVASION



Operasi Komodo (Drogon) 7 December

capture the main

#### 1977-79 OFFENSIVE



Operasi Seroja (Latus) Massive offensive by up to 40,000 froups Famine results from indonesian military strategy

#### 1981 OFFENSIVE



Operasi Keamanan 50-80-000 civilions recruited to take exart in military operations as fence of legs in front of indonesian troops

#### 1983 CEASEFIRE




ndunesian commander and Fretilin leader meet and arrange ceasefire

#### 1983-84 OFFENSIVE



Operasi Sapu Bersih (Clean Sweep) Indonesia breaks ceasefire by launohing new

## Soeharto lifts Dili curtain



#### East Timor reports are 'sensational' - Indonesia

By WIO JOUSTINA

THE Indonesian Govern ment has described news to-PORTS about his particularing campaign in East Timor as Auxmalian lik Christian 1981



New Strait Times 3 August 1983

#### Hayden disputes reports of large troop build-up

Newver by Kndis Assemble that Indonesia had increased the member of its proops in East Timor to 20,000 had no self-stance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Navden, said in Canthe last our advice in that

"The number of croops in East Timor this where of helf of their number, and of them probably half are fromline croops. The ness try laying all them."

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War in East Timor will not cease until the national aspirations of the East Timorese are satisfied. Aid and concern for material welfare will not suffice

Contrary to the hopes of the Indonesian regime and its apologists in Australia the fighting will not stop until there is genume self-determination in East Timor

Public opposition in Australia to military aggression. atrocities and abuse of human rights will continue until there is an end to such practices.

ALP Federal conferences in 1977, 1979 and 1982 have

overwhelmingly supported the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. Nothing has happened in East Timor to render that support out of date

Australian diplomacy is the key to a just and lasting peace in East Timor, It is in the interest of the people of Australia and Indonesia that the ALP as a party does not abandon the East Timorese at this time when support is so badly needed. We call on the ALP conference to insist that the Labor government pursues a just end to the Timor war

Published by the Australian Coalition for East Timor, June 1984.

ACET was formed to coordinate the work of East Timor support groups throughout Australia For Author Information or contacts in your State, write to PO Box 93, Filtarcy, Vic. 3065 or phone the East Timor Office on (03) 419 5588.

ACET Australian Coalition for East Timor c/- Australia East Timor Association, PO Box 93, Fitzroy 3065, Australia February 12, 1985 His Excellency Mr Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General United Nations, c/- Lakeside International Hotel, Canberra, ACT Australia.

Your Excellency,

We are a national coalition of some twelve community and Church-based East Timor solidarity groups based in the cities of Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney, Wollongong, Brisbane, Darwin, Perth, Hobart and Adelaide. We are taking the opportunity of your visit to Australia to convey to you personally our firm belief that a much greater effort is required by the international community and the United Nations in particular if there is to be a just and lasting solution to the tragic conflict in East Timor, now in its tenth year.

This conflict has been very costly in terms of human lives lost and the level of physical and spiritual suffering endured. International relations also continue to suffer. A lasting solution is in the interests of all.

We would like to offer the following points for your consideration:

- It seems to us there has been no substantive progress on the Timor issue at any level. The war continues. The pattern of human rights abuses established over many years remains substantially the same. International relief and human rights agencies continue to be denied full access. The Timorese people continue to be resettled, imprisoned and repressed.
- A military solution is neither acceptable nor possible. The war is stalemated with neither side capable of outright victory. A diplomatic, political solution is the only answer.
- In 1982 the United Nations General Assembly requested you as Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem". That directive, we understand, is still operative and has served as the rationale for UN sponsored talks on the issue between Portugal and Indonesia and as the basis of your recent talks in Jakarta.
- To date these talks have produced no tangible benefits for the East Timorese people. Further it concerns us that they have been confined to the UN, Portugal and Indonesia. There have been no consultations with the principal party "directly involved", namely the East Timorese people. For this reason many of us fear that these talks are designed principally to achieve a face-saving formula for Portugal and Indonesia with a view to removing the issue from the UN agenda.

We believe such a manouevre would not be acceptable to the East Timorese people and would not therefore contribute to the cessation of

- The over-riding objective must be a just and lasting settlement of the Timor conflict. To this end a new, bold initiative is required. We respectfully submit that your Excellency should broaden the consultative process to include the Timorese people, including the Fretilin-led resistance. This avenue has not been explored, though both the Catholic Church in East Timor and Fretilin have repeatedly offered to engage in talks. We ask: how can there be any 'comprehensive settlement of the problem', as called for in the 1982 UN resolution, while those most vitally affected are excluded from the UN process? The Timorese people correctly insist on their fundamental right to self-determination. They have not authorised Portugal or Indonesia to negotiate on their behalf. On the contrary, the last ten years dramatically demonstrate that they will reject the imposition of a solution to which they are not a party. In your future dealings with Portugal and Indonesia, therefore, your Excellency should insist, we believe, that these governments agree to the full participation of the Timorese people in the consultative process. The full participation of the Timorese people should be the centre-piece of future UN strategies on the issue.
- 6. We believe the Australian Government has a responsibility in terms of its national interest and as a member of the UN and a near neighbour of East Timor to fully support this peace strategy. We therefore urge your Excellency to press our Government to facilitate in every way the practical implementation of our proposal.
- Finally we would like to comment briefly on the session of the UN Human Rights Commission which commenced in Geneva on February 4 and of which Australia is a member. At its last sitting this body merely decided to keep the situation in East Timor under review. We sincerely hope that during this session the Commission would make a more substantial commitment to the protection of the human rights of the East Timorese people. It is not enough, we submit, for the Commission simply to keep the issue under review. This is no consolation to the victims of abuses and no challenge to those responsible for their perpetration. We submit that at the very least the Commission should call on Indonesia to allow an independent, international, investigative mission to visit the territory to report on the human rights situation. In our view access to East Timor by reputable human rights organisations will achieve a significant reduction in abuses there. Interim progress on this level will contribute to the overall objective of a just and lasting peace in the longer term.

George Prestore

Dr George Preston (Chairperson, Australia East Timor Association) on behalf of The Australian Coalition for East Timor (ACET).

20/12/84

Ten years have elapsed since the East Timorese began a process to take control of their own country. It is almost nine years since Indonesia invaded East Timor. Despite incalculable losses suffered by the Timorese since late 1975, the "Timor story" continues and shows no sign of abating while the aspirations of the East Timorese are not recognised or respected.

There is increasing international non-government concern - including notable statements by Pope John-Paul and the Indonesian and Portuguese Catholic bishops. Portugal continues to pay lip-service to self-determination; the Australian Labor Party has adopted a muted and ambiguous policy which nonetheless recognises East Timor as an issue of international concern; Jakarta continues its military operations and lies and remains very sensitive to scrutiny of its actions in Timor.

All of which poses the question: What has happened to Timor Information Service ?

TIS Newsletter has not been published since May 1983. Pressure of other Timor work, the simple difficulties in producing a regular publication, the appearance of other publications, the new experience of parenthood, occasional plunges in morale - have all played their part in TIS not appearing.

But none of this excuses the fact that you, as a subscriber have not heard from us for so long. So... a note to tell you whats happening:

- O We have decided to suspend the publication of TIS indefinitely.
- O We enclose a copy of ACFOA's very well-produced East Timor Report which has been published in this format since late 1983. Unless otherwise instructed by you, we propose to:
  - (a) place your name on the East Timor Report mailing list;
  - (b) pass to ACFOA money paid by you for TIS to help defray their costs.

If either of these is unacceptable and you wish us to return your unused subscription money, please advise me by the end of October, 1984.

- early " tan ary 1985 O We will review the suspension of publication of TIS if ACFOA ceases East Timor Report.
- O TIS will continue its long-standing "archival project" of collecting data and publications on contemporary East Timor events and continue preparation of occasional detailed papers on specific issues as they arise. We are considering restarting a "subscription service" for important documents about East Timor.

Thanks for your support of TIS over the years. I hope your interest in the plight of this small neighbour of ours will continue.

The struggle goes on .....

John Waddingham

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