

TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN EAST TIMOR



Jose Ramos Horta

East Timor Relief Association

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Towards a Peaceful Solution in East Timor
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jose Ramos Horta is Special Representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) and Personal Representative of Xanana Gusmao, leader of the Timorese National Resistance.

He was born on 26 December, 1949, in Dili, East Timor. Prior to the Indonesian invasion in 1975, Ramos Horta was the Minister for External Relations and Information, in the first provisional government of East Timor. He was the Permanent Representative to the United Nations for the East Timorese independence movement from 1975 onwards for over a decade.

He is a diplomat who has addressed the matter of East Timor to the UN Security Council, the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Council on Foreign Relations, the European Parliament, and others.

Ramos Horta is a Fellow in International Relations at St Anthony's College, Oxford, and holds a Master in Peace Studies from Antioch University, USA. He is the recipient of the Professor Thorof Rafto Human Rights Prize in 1993, the Gleitzman Foundation Award of 1995, and the UNPO Award of 1996. He speaks Tetum as his native tongue, Portuguese (official), French, English, and Spanish.

He is Founder and lecturer at the Diplomacy Training Program, Law Faculty, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.

His previous books include *Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor* (Red Sea Press, Trenton NJ; 1987), and *Timor: Amanha em Dili* (Dom Quixote, 1994).

ABOUT CNRM

The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) was formed in 1988 as the non-partisan body of national unity for national independence of East Timor.

Its aim is to resist the occupation of the homeland of East Timor in a national and nationalist struggle beyond the boundaries of political parties.

The leader of the national resistance of East Timor is Xanana Gusmao. Under the title of Principal Representative of CNRM, Xanana is empowered as leader of the resistance both inside and outside of East Timor. The Special Representative of CNRM and Personal Representative of Xanana Gusmao is Jose Ramos Horta, who represents CNRM abroad together with a team of CNRM representatives based in a number of strategically important countries.

Inside East Timor there are ten members – three from the command of the non-partisan Falintil armed forces, five from the Clandestine Front, and two from the Directive Commission of Fretilin.

Commander Xanana Gusmao has described the nationalistic approach adopted by CNRM:

The present time is an historical moment for every Timorese citizen to find time to think about how to develop the activities, how to support a Companheiro and how to correct mistakes, how to renew surveillance and the tactics of the struggle; how in short, to liberate the country.

Every conscious Timorese citizen must not spare their energies in creating conditions to liberate the country, and must refuse to spend their energy in premature electoral campaigns. This is no time for us to claim for ourselves step-by-step, the respective portions of the cake of the small victories which we are conquering. This is only the time for ALL of us to give ALL we can to win!

ABOUT ETRA

The East Timor Relief Association was formed in 1992 with two main aims: Firstly, to provide resources for the East Timorese community in Australia to effectively campaign about their cause in the wider community; and secondly, to raise funds for humanitarian relief efforts for East Timorese living under Indonesian occupation.

ETRA's objectives are:

To assist the people of East Timor to preserve and enhance their cultural and social conditions, and provide humanitarian assistance to East Timorese, including the provision of medicines, clothing and food.

To carry out educational work among the broad Australian community about the human rights, social and cultural situation in East Timor, including publishing current events in East Timor, and providing speakers to charitable, cultural and educational organisations.

To liaise in the broadest possible way about East Timor with government, and international and Australian aid, church, human rights, and United Nations bodies, including Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, the Australian Catholic Relief, Community Aid Abroad/Freedom from Hunger, and the Australian Third World Health Group.

ETRA will support cultural, sporting and social organisations whose activities are consistent with the aims and objectives of ETRA, and will fund projects that assist East Timor to preserve its unique culture and history.

ETRA assists the people of East Timor wherever the need exists and on an equal basis, including helping the growing number of Timorese political prisoners and their families.

ETRA welcomes members who support their work.

Foreword

by James Dunn

The people of East Timor have produced some inspiring leaders from their midst since their relentless struggle against Indonesia's moves to annex their land began over 20 years ago. They include Nicolau Lobato, a courageous Fretilin leader who was finally caught and killed by Indonesian Special Forces troops in December 1978, and Xanana Gusmao who continues to inspire his suffering people from his Javanese prison cell.

However, no Timorese has done more to bring the tragic story of his people's ordeal to the attention of the international community than Jose Ramos Horta, who fought a different kind of battle, but an equally relentless one, in the international corridors of power. It began as a lonely struggle against the apathy, opportunism, Cold War prejudices and cynicism of those major powers who, in other situations, have demonstrated a capacity to take human rights violations seriously.

In the United Nations it was a constant struggle of a Timorese David against an Indonesian Goliath. Yet Horta again and again outwitted his adversaries, countering the Soeharto regime's facile propaganda with the ugly truth about the situation in East Timor.

Few others can claim Horta's experience and knowledge of the powerplay that transpires in the corridors of power in international forums. His experiences transformed the innocent young Timorese, whom I first met in 1963, into a competent international negotiator, who has played a leading part in keeping the Timor issue on the international agenda, in defiance of Indonesia's many attempts to have removed, and,

not least, in encouraging Portugal to rise up to its responsibility in relation to the decolonisation of its former colony.

It is against the background of his long experience – his frustrations as well as his successes – that Horta's strategies for taking the Timor issue forward have evolved. While his approaches have changed from time to time, on two issues his views have been constant since the 70s: his commitment to a common Timorese front for independence – which led to the formation of the CNRM – and his optimistic belief that, ultimately, a settlement with Indonesia is negotiable.

That process, as Horta himself has acknowledged, is far from uncomplicated. While the ending of the Cold War, and especially the freeing up of the Baltic States, has opened up some important new opportunities, Indonesia remains an influential international player. To break down its stubborn defiance of international pressures for a change of course in relations to East Timor – which itself calls for a more vigorous response from the international community – offers a relentless challenge to Jose Ramos Horta and his colleagues, and to those of us who share their quest for a just settlement of this tragic and cynical violation of international law and human rights.

For Australians, in particular, the search for an alternative to captive nation status is a matter both of conscience, and of atonement for our past governments' complicity in the most serious violation of human rights to have occurred in our region in the past half-century.

James Dunn is a former Australian Consul to Portuguese Timor, who returned to the territory on a fact-finding mission in mid-1974, and again, in late 1975, as the leader of a humanitarian aid mission. He is now a commentator on foreign affairs and human rights.

Introduction

By Dr Keith Suter

'Without vision', we are warned by the Bible, 'the people perish.' This publication sets forth a vision to help end the conflict in East Timor.

The East Timorese resistance leaders have been making suggestions for several years on how the conflict could end. The value of this document is that all the ideas are now together in one publication.

This is a three-phase peace plan. In the first phase, lasting about two years, Indonesia would withdraw all of its forces from East Timor (which it was instructed to do by the UN Security Council two decades ago). Indonesia would also have to release political prisoners and allow the UN to establish a human rights monitoring presence.

In the second phase, East Timor would get full autonomy with a local assembly chosen by elections organised by the UN. This phase would last for five years and could be extended for another five years. Indonesia would therefore get plenty of opportunity to prove to the East Timorese why being a part of Indonesia would be to their advantage.

In the third phase, the final status of East Timor would be determined.

Mr Ramos Horta puts his plan in the context of the Middle East peace negotiations. There are also some procedural similarities with the ending of other conflicts, such as those in Namibia (South-West Africa) and Cambodia, as examples of UN-supervised human rights activities. Therefore, they are some precedents for this East Timorese plan.

This publication presents a challenge to Australia. Australia has been active in other peace initiatives outside its region (such as Namibia and Cambodia). This publication suggests that Australia ought to be more active in ending the one of the longest and – in per capita terms – certainly the most violent conflict in our region.

Dr Keith Suter is the president of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, at the University of Sydney, and the president of the United Nations Association (NSW).

**East Timor:
The Struggle for Self-Determination
and Its Future in Southeast Asia**

*Chatham House Address
to the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 23 April, 1996.*

I am particularly grateful for this opportunity to offer my views on the conflict between the people of my native country, East Timor, and the Republic of Indonesia, since the latter has had a more important person than me, with opposite views to mine, address this forum only three months ago.

I shall not use this forum to level attacks on the Republic of Indonesia or on the persons on whose behalf policies are carried out that profoundly affect my country and people. Nor shall I indulge in the role of judge of the actions of the government of Indonesia. I leave it to you and the international community to form your own judgement on the basis of the abundant written and visual material available from sources much more impartial than this person addressing you today.

I will try to the best of my ability to articulate the views of the man who should be here today as he is the real leader of our struggle and people. He is an outstanding man of courage, determination, generosity, tolerance, vision and statesmanship. Yet, such a man is in prison for no crime other than his ideas and vision of peace, freedom and dignity of his people.

I refer to Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the people of East Timor who remains virtually incommunicado in a prison thousands of miles away from his country in

contravention of the fourth Geneva Convention. His trial in 1993 was universally condemned as a charade and was no more valid than the Dutch imprisonment and trial of the late President Sukarno, founding father of the Indonesian Republic.

The actions of Indonesian leaders and indeed of many others never cease to intrigue me in that they emulate well the policies of their former colonial masters. The Dutch justified their presence in what is today's Indonesia as a civilising necessity to lift their backward colonial subjects. Today, we hear the same claims of a civilising mission in regard to the peoples of West Papua and East Timor by our new colonisers, the same ones who accused the Dutch of colonialism.

Allow me to set the East Timor conflict in its historical and geopolitical context for a better understanding of our struggle and tragedy.

You might recall a picture that made headlines in the spring of 1975. I refer to the picture of an American helicopter landing on the rooftop of the US Embassy in Saigon to rescue remaining diplomats, CIA operatives and a few privileged South Vietnamese stooges as Saigon fell to the Vietcong. Cambodia and Laos followed. This picture illustrated better than a thousand words the ignominious American retreat from Indochina. For the leaders in Moscow it was the beginning of Russian expansion and influence, the execution of the Brezhnev doctrine. In another continent, in the horn of Africa, the longest reigning US ally, emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, had been overthrown a year earlier by radical army officers. Further South, the Portuguese empire had collapsed and Marxist forces gained power in Angola and Mozambique. These events seemed to confirm Lyndon B. Johnson's domino theory which was the rationale for US intervention in Indochina.

It was in this geopolitical context that President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, visited Jakarta in early December 1975 as part of an Asian tour to reassure Asian leaders that the US would continue to honour its security commitments in Asia. The invasion of East Timor which took place within hours of Ford's departure from Jakarta was a mere footnote in the geopolitical events of 1975. Thousands of East Timorese who died in the days, weeks, months and years that followed were mere footnotes to the post-Vietnam and Cold Wars.

We were not unaware of the developments taking place in our region nor were we

insensitive to the concerns of our giant neighbours, Indonesia and Australia.

In June 1974 I visited Jakarta, in my capacity as secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Timorese Social Democratic Association, that had just been created, less than a month earlier. I had the privilege of meeting with the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr Adam Malik. After our third round of talks, Mr Malik addressed to me a letter which read in part:

The independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people of [East] Timor;

...whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence can be assured that the government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and co-operation for the benefit of both countries.

In the course of our discussions, I conveyed to Mr Malik our desire to develop close relations with Indonesia and our intention to seek membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the future after independence. In an effort to appease our neighbour, I went as far as proposing that our future diplomats and security forces be trained in Indonesia. Adam Malik's words were those of a statesman conscious of his country's lack of any valid historical claim to East Timor. He viewed the emergence of an independent East Timor as a natural outcome of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire.

The following year, in April 1975, I again visited Indonesia and met with President Suharto's senior adviser, General Ali Mortopo, to whom I reiterated our collective desire to develop friendly relations with Indonesia. Gen. Mortopo reassured me that Indonesia harboured no territorial ambitions over East Timor. However, we soon learned that the word of an Indonesian general or diplomat can be broken as easily as it is spoken.

The current boundary of the Republic of Indonesia is a product of the Dutch East Indies administration. West New Guinea was absorbed by the Republic not because of any reasonable historical, cultural, ethnic kinship or geographic continuity. The only link that justified its forcible annexation was West New Guinea's brief colonisation by the Dutch.

A strict respect for the colonial boundaries, as unfair as most might be, has provided some peace and stability and kept most of Africa, Latin America and Asia from disintegrating. Some ill-advised attempts to redraw the colonial map have led to war. Siad Barre of Somalia tried to do it in 1977 by invading the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Somalia's problems of the last few years can be traced back to that fateful adventure. Argentina invaded the Falklands in 1982. However, here at least, that audacious military adventure had a positive side effect. The murderous military regime in Buenos Aires did not survive the humiliation of defeat and within months democracy was restored to that great country. World War II was started with attempts by the Third Reich to expand eastwards. This is also what President Soeharto and his many generals, Ali Mortopo, Pangabean and Benny Moerdani, did in 1975.

During the Cold War, Indonesia justified its case for colonising East Timor with the bogus communist threat. Now that the Cold War is over, another argument has to be found and what better than the Yugoslavia scenario to scare off the rest of the world?

Twenty years after the invasion, the problem of East Timor has not disappeared. A video camera in the hands of a courageous cameraman recorded for the first time one of the many massacres that took place in my country. The massacre of 271 Timorese civilians in Dili on 12 November 1991 was not an isolated incident. It followed a well-documented pattern of gross and systematic human rights abuses in many parts of East Timor perpetrated by the members of the Indonesian armed forces with the full knowledge of, and active participation by, the highest ranking officers in the army.

But I shall not elaborate any further on this and on the so many other cases of senseless killing in East Timor. Suffice is to add that the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, of Senegal, a much more authoritative person than me, has detailed at length the circumstances surrounding the 12 November 1991 massacre in Dili and a widespread pattern of abuses. His report was preceded by an earlier one, that of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Prof. Peter Kooijman, of the Netherlands, who happened to be in Dili on 12 November 1991. His report on the torture practices in East Timor and in Indonesia was presented to the UN CHR in February 1992.

Self-Determination

Allow me to elaborate now on the general principle of self-determination and its applicability in the case of East Timor.

The right of the people of East Timor to self-determination is widely recognised. Apart from Australia, the only Western industrialised country to have extended *de jure* recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, no other country has done so. I was pleased to hear in a meeting a year ago with Mr Alistair Goodlad, a Minister in the Foreign Office, that the UK does not recognise Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. In Sweden, I met an old friend, Pierre Scori, Deputy Foreign Minister, who reiterated his country's support for the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. In September 1993 I visited a great little country, Ireland. I was always fascinated by its dramatic history, immensely rich and vibrant culture, and seduced by its natural beauty. For me it was a personal pilgrimage to Ireland when I finally visited that country. I met with the then Foreign Minister, Mr David Andrew, who stated his country's support for our right to self-determination. The EU members as a whole have not accepted Indonesia's illegal annexation of East Timor.

The UN General Assembly and Security Council have adopted a total of 10 resolutions on the question of East Timor all reaffirming this right. In its ruling of 30 June 1995 on the Case Concerning East Timor, Portugal v Australia, the International Court of Justice stated that the right of self-determination has an *erga omnes* character and that the people of East Timorese were still entitled to it.

From the Chittagon Hill Tracts in Bangladesh to Bougainville in the South Pacific, from Sri Lanka to India, from Chechnya to Abkhazia, from the Ogoni in Nigeria to the West Papuans, millions of peoples seek to assert their most fundamental rights and if we attempt to find a common denominator for the problems I have just listed there is one the right of these peoples to self-determination.

Governments must be sensitive and wise to the basic demands of their own people. In most cases these demands are not for secession, they are about their survival as a people with a language and a culture, with their land and environment protected from rapacious multinationals. Only when these basic demands are not met there has been

recourse to other forms of struggle with an escalation in their demands.

While self-determination in the de-colonisation process of the non-self-governing territories almost always led to independence, this is not the case in most of the conflicts of today. Some groups demand full independence, others demand only some measure of self-rule. Hence, self-determination should not be equated only with independence or secession. Rather it should be an informed choice made by people that ranges from limited autonomy that guarantees their native languages, culture, social and economic rights, to full independence.

I understand the legitimate concerns of some developing countries like Indonesia and India in preserving their national unity and territorial integrity. Many developing countries, Indonesia being a prime example, experienced a traumatic nation-building process with numerous attempts from within and without to undermine the unity of the state. Hence the security culture that permeates the military and the Indonesian ruling elite.

The exercise of the right of a people to self-determination never caused the fragmentation of a country. This has been largely the result of artificial arrangements imposed on the people. The break-up of Yugoslavia and the USSR does not lend credibility to the argument that self-determination is the cause of instability and war. Forced amalgamation of peoples without due respect for their history, culture, language, religion, the policies of population transfer practised by states as a means to consolidate that amalgamation, are the causes of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the USSR.

I do not hold the view that an independent state has to be homogenous, ethnically, culturally or religiously. Examples abound of multi-ethnic states that live in peace, based on shared concerns and destiny, on a degree of genuine political and administrative autonomy for each component, and of deep respect for each other's heritage and aspirations.

However, the preservation of the territorial integrity of a country can be achieved only if those in power are sensitive to the basic demands and aspirations of the many indigenous peoples and nationalities that make up the country. Brute force might silence and keep dormant the dreams and aspirations of a people but the anger simmering for decades will inevitably resurface and break up the country.

The events of the last few months in West Papua illustrate my point. If you have a chance I would advise you to see an excellent documentary by Claudio Von Planta on the West Papuan struggle, entitled *Rebels of a Forgotten War*. The documentary records the colonisation of West Papua by its new coloniser, Indonesia, the decades of brutalities and destruction of their environment and wealth, and the threat to their survival as a people by a strategy of population transfer. The problem of West Papua will not go away and the West Papuans are learning to be more effective both on the home front and internationally and will pose an even greater problem for Jakarta than East Timor.

Yet, in spite of the problems of East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, Indonesia is fortunate in that it does not have the kind of powerful ethnic and religious movements that exist in India, Sudan, China, Sri Lanka or the Philippines, where, in some cases, there are powerful regional powers fuelling the conflicts for their own strategic interest. The conflict in West Papua has grown from bad to worse since its annexation in 1969 because the anger in the hearts of the people stems from desperation at seeing their very existence threatened. But no outside force has ever offered that impoverished people any moral or material support. Indonesia must look in East Timor, in Aceh and West Papua for the roots of the problems it faces. Blaming outside instigators does not resolve the problem.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and South Africa's transition to democracy give us renewed hope in that they demonstrate that seemingly intractable problems can be resolved if there is political will and vision by all involved. Our imprisoned leader, Xanana Gusmao, has proposed and reiterated time and again our very basic stance. We remain ready to enter into a process of dialogue with the Indonesian authorities, under the auspices of the United Nations, without pre-conditions, to explore all possible ideas towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The head of the Catholic Church of East Timor, Bishop Ximenes Belo, a leading Nobel Peace Prize candidate, called for a referendum on the future of East Timor. Mr Konis Santana, leader of the armed resistance, has reiterated his full support for the CNRM three-phase Peace Initiative.

CNRM Peace Initiative

Allow me to elaborate on this Peace Initiative. I began to reflect on this modest set of ideas in February 1989 when the then Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked us for some recommendations on how Portugal should proceed in the dialogue with Indonesia. Xanana Gusmao, leader of the resistance, gave his seal of authority after consulting with all his field commanders and political leaders in East Timor before it was formally presented to a meeting of the European Parliament in Brussels on 22 April 1992 and to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on 14 May 1992. The CNRM proposal remains valid as a modest contribution towards finding a solution to the conflict.

Phase One: Humanitarian phase

This phase which should take up to two years to be fully implemented, would involve all three parties working with the UN to implement a wide range of 'confidence building measures', but would not deal with the core of the problem which is the issue of self-determination. This phase of the talks must focus on achieving:

- Immediate end to all armed activities in East Timor;
- Reduction of Indonesian troop presence to a maximum of 1,000 within a six month period;
- Removal of all heavy weapons, tanks, helicopters, combat aircraft, long-range artillery;
- Immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners;
- Reduction by 50 per cent of Indonesian civil servants in East Timor;
- Stationing in the territory of UN Specialised Agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, FAO;
- A comprehensive census of the population;
- Establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission under the Catholic Bishop;
- Lifting of all media control by the army;

- Freedom of political activities;
- Removal of restrictions on the teaching of Portuguese – Portuguese Cultural Institute is set up;
- Appointment of a resident Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

These are some of the ideas which I believe could be implemented immediately without loss of face for Indonesia. On the contrary, its international standing would improve significantly and its presence in the territory would be less resented, thus relieving a very tense situation.

Phase Two: Autonomy, 5-10 years

Phase Two, lasting between five and ten years, would be a period of genuine political autonomy based on ample powers vested in a local, democratically elected Territorial People's Assembly. The following ideas could be explored and effected:

- Political parties, including those advocating independence for East Timor, are legalised;
- The EU sets up a legation in East Timor headed by a senior Portuguese official;
- Elections are held for a Territorial Assembly. The UN to provide technical support and supervision of the entire process;
- Only Timorese identified as such may vote and be eligible;
- The Assembly elects a Governor of the Territory;
- The Assembly and the Governor have a five-year mandate;
- The Territory may enter into trade relations with foreign countries, promulgate its own laws affecting investment, land ownership, property, immigration, etc.;
- Remaining Indonesian troops are withdrawn within three months;
- The Territory will have no army. A police force is trained by the UN and is placed under the elected governor;
- Further reduction of Indonesian civil servants;
- Portugal and Indonesia normalise relations.

At the end of the second phase, the autonomous status of the territory could be extended by mutual accord. Seven years would have elapsed since this Peace Initiative was effected. The East Timorese people, having enjoyed a period of peace and freedom without the presence of the most hated symbol of the occupation, the army, might accept to continue this form of association. Conversely, the changing generation, attitudes and perception in Indonesia might also result in Indonesia accepting as natural that East Timor becomes independent

Phase Three: Self-determination

If all parties agree that Phase Three should enter into effect immediately, then the UN begins to prepare a referendum on self-determination to determine the final status of the territory.

However, a referendum might not be necessary as in the cases of Namibia and Zimbabwe. It is required only when there is some doubt about the will of the people of the colonial territory on the issue of independence. In the cases of Namibia and Zimbabwe there was no question that the two countries should be independent. Instead of a referendum, internationally-supervised elections were held for a Constituent Assembly. In the case of East Timor, most observers believed in 1974-75 that the overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor favoured independence with close links with Portugal. The option of integration with Indonesia was never a serious one. However, the crucial factor here was what Indonesia wanted and not what the East Timorese wanted.

If in the next few years Jakarta considers it in its interest to let East Timor become independent, a referendum to determine the wishes of the people would become redundant. In this case, internationally-supervised elections for a Constituent Assembly should be held, regardless of the results, the East Timorese political contenders should form a government of national unity for a period of five years.

Future Vision

If, God willing, East Timor becomes independent, allow me to share with you, our vision for our country's future and our role in the region.

East Timor is at the cross-roads of three major cultures: Melanesian which binds us to our brothers and sisters of the South Pacific region; Malay-Polynesian binding us to Southeast Asia; and the Latin Catholic influence, a legacy of almost 500 years of Portuguese colonisation. This rich historical and cultural existence place us in a unique position to build bridges of dialogue and co-operation between the peoples of the region.

East Timor will maintain close ties with Portugal, a country which colonised us for almost half a millennium has shown an abiding commitment to our right to self-determination. Portugal and East Timor will be most valuable partners for ASEAN in its relations with the EU, Africa and Latin America.

The majority of the East Timorese residents outside the country are in Australia. We will offer ourselves as a bridge between Australia and the South Pacific island-states as well as between Australia and Southeast Asia.

We are conscious of our geography which compels us to co-exist with our neighbours in this part of the world. We will seek membership in ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum within days of our independence.

We will not have a standing army. For our external security, we will rely on a Treaty of Neutrality to be guaranteed by the permanent members of the Security Council. We will endeavour with the UN and our neighbours to declare the seas surrounding East Timor a Zone of Peace and work towards total demilitarisation of the entire East Asia and Pacific regions.

We will endeavour to build a strong democratic state based on the rule of law which must emanate from the will of the people expressed through free and democratic elections.

We will encourage a free and independent media as the voice of the people, a media that informs and educates, and we believe the media should be as independent as the judiciary. We also believe that there can be no foreign interests controlling the local media.

All international human rights treaties will be submitted to the Parliament for ratification. We believe that human rights transcend boundaries and prevail over state sovereignty. We will introduce into the school curriculum at an early stage the subject of human rights. We will actively work with like-minded countries, NGOs and the media to strengthen the UN human rights machinery. We will actively support the creation of an international human rights court and a penal court to try war crimes and crimes against humanity. We will seek the co-operation of UN human rights agencies as well as NGOs to assist us in our efforts to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law in our country.

East Timorese now serving in the Indonesian administration in East Timor, the security forces and police, should not fear an independent East Timor. They will be invited to stay on, as their full and active involvement in running the country will be necessary to ensure a smooth transition. On day one of independence, we will proclaim a general amnesty and national reconciliation. To be true to ourselves, we will forgive our worst enemies.

Our society will not be based on hatred and revenge. Because of its credibility and standing over the past 20 years, the Catholic Church will be expected to play a major role in the healing process of our society. Our people are fortunate to have two outstanding men, Xanana Gusmao as the political leader, and Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, as the spiritual leader, whose combined moral authority and vision will guarantee that the people of East Timor will heal the wounds of the war and embrace each other and their neighbours.

East Timor is a relatively small country. But, with an area of 18,889 km² and a total population of 700,000 (1974 figures), it is at least equal to, if not larger, in size and population, to some 40 independent states. It is four times the size of Brunei and 40 times larger than Singapore. It is potentially self-sufficient in most agricultural goods, meat and fish. It has large reserves of natural gas, manganese and oil.

The CNRM is developing a three 5-year national reconstruction and development plan for an independent East Timor with a projected budget of US\$1,500 million. We believe that a consortium of governments (US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, Portugal and the EU), UN agencies and other multilateral bodies, the private sector and

regional development banks, can harness the needed financial and human resources.

We will channel our resources into food production in order to feed our people. We will seek the co-operation of UN Specialised Agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Food Program, and the UN Development Program (UNDP). However, all our policies will be a result of close consultation with the people in each region, town and village. In addition, in co-operation with the FAO and other international bodies, we will initiate a massive reforestation program to repair our badly damaged environment.

The invasion up-rooted thousands of people. Properties were abandoned, destroyed or sold at unfair prices. This situation will be redressed. A voluntary resettlement plan will be effected to allow the many tens of thousands of displaced East Timorese to return to their ancestral lands.

We believe in free education and health care for our people. The money saved from not having a standing army will be well used in these areas. At least 40 per cent of our resources will be allocated to our best resource – our people – through massive investment in health, education and food production. With the co-operation of World Health Organisation (WHO) we will seek to eradicate malaria, tuberculosis and other preventable diseases within a decade.

It is estimated that over 100,000 Indonesians are now living in East Timor. Most are poor Indonesians who came to our country looking for a better life. We would not be true to ourselves if we were to turn our backs on our poor neighbours. Indonesian migrants in East Timor will be welcome to stay and with us build a better home for us all. They have brought with them the wealth of their culture which can enrich the whole community.

Prospects

This is in brief our vision for the future of our tortured country. For the past 20 years, our neighbours have turned their back on us. They should offer their Indonesian neighbours a word of wisdom, pleading with them to seize the olive branch we have been offering since 1974 when I met with Adam Malik.

Indonesia is mediating the conflict in Mindanao and is credited along with Australia for the peace process in Cambodia. Shouldn't we expect that the Indonesian government which has shown such willingness in mediating its neighbours' internal problems show also similar vision in negotiating an end to its occupation of East Timor?

We are as determined as we are optimistic about our future. To Indonesia and our other neighbours in the ASEAN we are offering a hand of friendship and appealing to them to help us bring peace and freedom to East Timor. More pain and misery and loss of lives can be spared, more embarrassment in the international fora can be avoided if ASEAN lives up to its responsibilities.

The EU, working with the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Indonesia's partners in ASEAN, can accelerate the on-going dialogue under the auspices of the UN secretary-general, giving it some impetus and real substance. Occasional expressions of concern about the human rights situation in East Timor are no longer enough. The weapons the Western countries have provided the regime in Indonesia have made them accomplices in the on-going suffering. Hence our demand that they live up to their moral responsibility.

No country, no matter how rich and endowed with natural resources, is an island into itself. In an increasingly smaller world and competitive age, where modern electronic communications break the barriers of silence erected by dictators, Indonesia cannot continue to flout the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and the rule of law in Indonesia.

The next two to three years will witness a transition in Indonesia, and the EU can encourage a peaceful, evolutionary transition with a discreet yet firm policy of pushing for democratic reforms and rule of law in Indonesia and for a genuine act of self-determination in East Timor.

The world has changed dramatically in the last few years and the theorists of irreversibility and status quo have been discredited by the collapse of the USSR. Who would have thought it possible that the great Armenian people, persecuted for hundreds of years would regain a country called Armenia? The entire world conspired against the Eritrean people. Americans, Russians and Cubans all connived against that small nation. Today Eritrea is a shining example for the rest of the world. Two great nations, Israelis

and Palestinians, who swore eternal hatred have shown courage and wisdom and begun a painful process of dialogue.

The movement for democracy, human rights and the rule of law is irreversible. Even in our tortured region, Asia, some extraordinary events without precedent are taking place. The events in South Korea are of enormous significance for democracy and the rule of law in the entire Asia region. The brave people of Korea who endured decades of dictatorship and occupation won the struggle for democracy not with guns but with their tenacity in fighting the troops in the streets of Seoul and Kwangju.

For the first time in the history of Asia, former heads of states and other leaders are being prosecuted for their crimes whilst in office. The people of South Korea are challenging the impunity of public office and the sacrosanct myth of national security interest which allows leaders to imprison, torture and murder with impunity. The South Korean struggle is being watched closely in Asia and is sending tremors to Thailand, Burma, China, Indonesia.

We are proud of our relationship with the brave people of Burma and I extend here our solidarity to the people of Burma and their elected leader, Nobel Peace Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in their struggle for democracy, rule of law and human rights. In July 1994 I spent almost two weeks in Mannerplaw meeting with leaders and representatives of all Burma's nationalities. I was overwhelmed by their hardship but also by their resilience and faith. I felt small in the face of their greatness. At a time when the ASEAN rulers are conniving with the SLORC regime to deny the people of Burma their legitimate victory, we must all stand up and redouble our efforts to restore democracy to Burma.

The peoples of Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, the democracy movements in China and Indonesia, are telling the rest of the world that the struggle for democracy and human rights is not an invention of the West or of Western NGOs. The rest of the world owes the peoples of Asia a moral duty to stand by them.

Last but not least, for the prophets of doom, for those in government who counsel us realism, allow me to remind them of a news item in the ever reliable BBC a few years ago. It was sometime in early 1991 and I was driving from the small Swiss town of Nyon, to the Palais des Nations in Geneva, to yet another round of futility in a place

where diplomats pretend to be too busy and important to listen to real problems of real peoples, but are always eager to give us advice on being realistic.

The BBC was telling us the story of a Soviet cosmonaut who had gone into space a few months earlier on one of those record-breaking missions in space. When he was blasted off from somewhere in the Soviet Union he carried a passport and a nationality granted to him by the mightiest and most feared military empire in the world. Once he completed his tour of duty for the pride of the socialist motherland he prepared the spacecraft for its return voyage to earth. But he no longer had a country to return to. The mighty empire had ceased to exist. He was forced to circle the earth a few days longer until people of good will on earth decided to which country he should go.

I hope one day to climb up to the Potala in Lhasa and visit my good friend His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama of Tibet and invite him to visit a free and independent East Timor. The Tibetan people deserve peace and freedom and the whole of humanity will benefit from the peace-making role that an independent Tibet can play. Thousands of years of a philosophy and religion that teach peace should be released from captivity into freedom and put to the service of the world.

With this note, I will end with renewed hope that no matter the level of brute force used against us, our dreams will never die.

God bless you all. Thank you.

A Road to Peace in East Timor: Parallels with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may help bring a solution in East Timor

Article published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 25 January, 1996.

At the recent London talks on East Timor, hosted by the UN Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and bringing together Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and his Portuguese counterpart, Dr Jaime Gama, the latter made an unexpected announcement.

He offered to fly to Jakarta for discussions with his Indonesian colleague if the Indonesian side would allow him to meet the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, who is serving a life sentence in jail after a charade of a trial in May 1993.

This was the seventh round of talks on East Timor between Portugal and Indonesia. Again no tangible progress was made and the basic demand of the people of East Timor for self-determination continues to be rejected.

Instead of scaling down its army presence in East Timor, Jakarta has increased the number of troops and there has been a dramatic deterioration in the overall human rights situation.

Dr Gama's offer held the potential to break this impasse. But, caught off guard, Mr Alatas responded that the two countries had no diplomatic relations.

Neither did Egypt and Israel when, about 15 years ago, the late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt made a dramatic journey to Israel. In fact there was a state of war between the two countries. Sadat was gunned down not long after his historic journey but his courage paved the road to peace in a war-torn region.

As I read the media coverage of the recent Palestinian election, I could not help but

The CNRM Peace Initiative and the Israeli-Palestinian agreement on self-government

*A paper written for the Peacemaking Initiatives for East Timor conference
held at the Australian National University on 10-12 July, 1995.*

wonder why Indonesian hasn't shown the courage and wisdom of Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of far greater importance and complexity. On the one hand there are the East Timorese who were never part of the Dutch East Indies and to which the new Indonesia never laid any claims; on the other side is Indonesia alone. There are no other foreign parties to the dispute, as in the Middle East with its overlapping and conflicting interests pulling in different directions.

I also noticed the similarity between the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and an earlier peace proposal by the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 1982.

In a speech to the European Parliament in Brussels, I outlined a three-phase peace proposal, starting with demilitarisation, release of prisoners, setting up of a UN human rights monitoring presence in East Timor, followed by genuine autonomy based on UN-supervised elections for a Territorial Assembly. A referendum on self-determination after a period of five to 10 years would settle the question of the legal status of the territory.

This peace proposal remains valid. The Indonesian side has rejected it.

It was agreed in London last week that the UN Secretary-General would consult with Jakarta, Lisbon and the East Timorese in order to prepare a package of ideas aimed at a comprehensive settlement to the problem. The two foreign ministers would consider this proposal in the next round of talks in July in Geneva.

The East Timorese resistance will continue to display solid determination to pursue our goal of self-determination. At the same time, we will be flexible in exploring ideas aimed at achieving real peace and freedom.

Instead of mumbling an unconvincing excuse, Mr Alatas should display the same courage and goodwill of his Portuguese counterpart and invite Dr Gama to visit, and allow him to meet with the man the East Timor revere most, Xanana Gusmao.

Like Nelson Mandela, Xanana Gusmao can deliver peace if the other side shows wisdom and courage and enters into a serious dialogue with him.

Who knows, in five years from now, with President Soeharto departed from the scene and a new generation in power in Jakarta, free from the security culture that has dominated the country since its formation, Indonesia may even consider granting East Timor its independence.

First, I must apologise to Dr Michael Sala and everyone involved in this initiative for not keeping my promise to participate in person as I would have liked to. Numerous other initiatives and events in Europe demanded my presence and rendered impossible a trip to Australia. I cannot thank everyone enough for this long overdue initiative at an academic institution that prides itself for its intimate relationship with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and with the Soeharto regime.

It was more than five years ago that the Resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, formally articulated the principle of dialogue without pre-conditions. However, this was not the first time that this peace offer was made. In a letter dated June 1984 to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Bill Hayden, I conveyed to him the willingness of the resistance to enter into direct talks with Indonesia without pre-conditions under UN auspices and asked him to convey this to Jakarta. Mr Hayden declined. In the following months and years I kept hammering on this idea with the UN and Portuguese diplomats.

What is known today as the CNRM peace plan started off as a discussion paper which I prepared for my FRETILIN colleagues overseas and the Portuguese Foreign Minister in February 1989. This discussion paper containing almost all the elements of the 1992 CNRM peace plan was thoroughly debated and adopted by the external wing of FRETILIN in a meeting in Lisbon in July 1989. In September, Mr Abilio Araujo, then

FRETILIN leader overseas, handed over a copy to Mr Paulo Pires, then a senior UDT leader in Lisbon, with a request for comments. Another copy was handed over to Mr Joao Carrascalao, also of UDT, in Sydney. However, UDT never commented on the paper.

The CNRM peace plan which I first and formally presented to the European Parliament in Brussels in April 1992, to the Council on Foreign Relations in May 1992, and to the UN also in May 1992, was in fact the result of a long process of deliberation among all FRETILIN leaders abroad and by Xanana Gusmao.

As this proposal has been widely disseminated and is available for consultation I shall not elaborate on all its details. Rather I shall address only the main points.

Planning for peace

In essence, what is now known as the CNRM peace plan is a modest set of ideas aiming at contributing to an end to the East Timor conflict. The expression 'peace plan' used here and elsewhere is a generous reference to this modest contribution in the search for a solution to the East Timor problem. A peace plan as such in *strictu sensu* entails a declaration of principles initiated by the high contracting parties with additional annexes detailing the mechanisms agreed upon.

The CNRM peace initiative proposes to solve the East Timor conflict within a time frame of five to 10 years in a step-by-step process that takes into consideration the interests of all parties, namely, East Timor, Portugal and Indonesia.

In his treatise, *On War*, Clausewitz argues that war is the continuation of politics by other means and negotiations come about when the parties involved realise that the costs of continuing the conflict are too high. While Clausewitz referred to the land wars of the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe that were confined within the boundaries of the old continent, the wars of today usually have regional if not global consequences because of the modern weapons used or their economic consequences.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict had world-wide implications not only because of the weapons of mass destruction deployed by all sides, but also because of the use of oil as a tool of war. As much as an earthquake in Japan can affect the economies of countries

as far away as Vanuatu or Peru, a war waged by Indonesia in East Timor cannot be insulated from the rest of the world. In this increasingly interdependent world, ever smaller by the fantastic surge of the electronic media and now by the information highway, there is no dictator who can escape world scrutiny. The case of East Timor is one of the most revealing examples of how fruitless are the efforts of dictators and others alike to confine certain events to a restricted area.

For Indonesia, the costs of the East Timor conflict are beginning to exceed the current benefits and future potential dividends. Here costs are defined not only in quantifiable terms (soldiers killed or wounded, loss of material, money disbursed, damage caused by sanctions) but also in subjective terms, namely international embarrassment and diplomatic setbacks. For the East Timorese, the costs are immensely larger in material terms while the unquantifiable element weighs heavily in our favour.

It appears that for the Indonesian regime, the incentives for direct negotiations with the resistance are not strong enough to warrant it. Hence, one question can be asked: what is the use of a CNRM peace initiative if the other side sees no need for negotiations?

The CNRM peace initiative was not aimed only at the Soeharto regime as a means and incentive towards an honourable way out of the East Timor quagmire. It was meant also for the Indonesian society in general and the international community, to show the sense of responsibility, maturity and moderation of the East Timorese resistance leaders. This CNRM objective has been achieved to a limited extent as the peace plan is gaining support world-wide. And this can be translated into costs for the regime if it continues to refuse to enter into dialogue with the resistance.

The Israeli-Palestinian Example

I will try now to look into the similarities and relevance between the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the basic elements of the CNRM peace initiative.

The "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-government Arrangements" (DOP), signed on 30th September 1993 in Washington, resembles in essence the CNRM peace

initiative of 1992 or the earlier document of 1989. However I wish once again to emphasise that the CNRM initiative is a unilateral plan offered as a gesture of good will to the adversary, while the DOP is a formal agreement initiated by the high contracting parties and the result of a long process of bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations conducted by numerous mediators.

What to me is the most salient political element in the two documents is that both the CNRM initiative and the DOP freeze discussion and decision on the final status of the respective territories and postpone a decision to a later stage. The CNRM proposes a settlement of the status of the territory at the end of Phase II of the plan, i.e., at the end of the autonomy phase which would be valid for five years renewable for another five, while the DOP provides also a five year interim period of Palestinian self-rule with discussions on the permanent status beginning no later than the third year of the interim period.

Neither the CNRM peace initiative nor the DOP prejudge the permanent status of East Timor or of the occupied territories of Palestine. Other similarities exist. The DOP establishes the following phases:

- A. Gaza-Jericho: self-rule in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, including withdrawal of Israel forces from those areas.
- B. Early Empowerment: In the rest of the West Bank, responsibilities on education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism are to be transferred to a Palestinian authority.
- C. Interim Agreement and Elections: a Palestinian Council will be elected.
- D. The Permanent Status: negotiations on the permanent status will commence as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period (May 1996).

The CNRM peace initiative calls for demilitarisation, the training by the UN and deployment of an East Timorese police force, stationing of UN specialised agencies and an expanded presence of the ICRC, appointment of a resident representative of the UN Secretary-General, release of prisoners, etc. These are *sine quo non* conditions for phase two to be effected, namely elections for a Territorial Assembly vested with ample powers.

What are the conditions that exist in the Middle East that compelled the two parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to negotiate and do not exist in the case of East Timor?

It is true that the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War weakened the Palestinian-Arab camp vis-a-vis Israel. The Palestinians can no longer count on a militarily powerful patron, the USSR; and the Gulf War divided even more an already divided Arab world. However, Israel cannot go on counting on the US as its unconditional patron. The Middle East remains a region of major strategic importance even in the post-Cold War, and the US is forced to rethink its relationships in the region and is strengthening its ties with Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf States.

In the case of East Timor, the Cold War argument that served as the rationale for Indonesia's invasion ceased to exist. Indonesia's relative importance during the Cold War has been lessened but it retains its economic attraction for the West. Indonesia's stability and security remains a major concern and strategic goal for the West. Having lost the communist ghosts provided by the Cold War to justify its occupation of East Timor, lately Jakarta has resorted to a new scare tactic: the Yugoslavia scenario.

In the case of East Timor, the US remains non-committal and only formally supports the Secretary-General's modest efforts. The USSR which had marginal interest in East and Southeast Asia is now even less interested and capable of influencing events in the region.

It is obvious that the East Timor conflict not even remotely resembles the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the complexity and seeming intractability of the latter. A glance over the map in Annex II will provide a taste of the enormous complexity of the Middle East peace process and it shows how there cannot be a separate Israeli-Palestinian peace without parallel negotiations and peace between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states.

The East Timor conflict is a very simple one to resolve by comparison. It involves only two parties – the people of East Timor and the Indonesian regime. There are no overlapping border claims, no inter-ethnic or inter-religious problems. If the countries of the region that comprise ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand have not shown much interest in the conflict this is partly because none has any particular claim to make and this can in fact work favourably towards resolving the problem.

But then, what is required for an East Timor-Indonesia dialogue to take place? Before I try to answer this question let me restate a number of points:

1. The CNRM recognises Portugal as the Administering power of East Timor, the only State with international legal competence to enter into dialogue, negotiations, agreements, treaties that affects East Timor.
2. The CNRM supports the mandate of the UN Secretary-General in the framework of the General Assembly Resolution 37/30 (1982).
3. The CNRM declares as valid its 1992 peace initiative and remains ready to enter into direct negotiations with the government of Indonesia without prejudice of Portugal's role as administering power of the territory.
4. The CNRM declares that the resistance in East Timor will continue and will escalate until such a time when the CNRM believes that Indonesia has show good faith.
5. The CNRM will continue to endeavour internationally to render Indonesia's occupation increasingly more costly.

The International Response

I will now elaborate on what I believe the international community can do to push all parties to negotiate towards an early resolution of the conflict.

1. The US and the EU enter the peace process as co-presidents with the UN Secretary-General.
2. If all parties agree, the ASEAN Secretary-General or a senior official of this organisation join also as co-president.
3. Once Jakarta agrees with the new framework of negotiations and with a comprehensive package of interim measures to resolve the conflict, Indonesia should benefit from a corresponding package of incentives: establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal; lifting of the Portuguese veto on the EU-ASEAN agreement; substantial increase in the aid, loans and grants to Indonesia by the multilateral agencies along the lines of the incentives offered to the Arab states and Israel involved in the peace process. The interim measures include the elements contained in Phases I and II of the CNRM peace initiative and in the Burg Schlaining Declaration (1995) and its Annexes.

4. The CNRM declares its willingness to help Indonesia resolve its current or potential conflicts within its internationally-recognised boundaries with firm respect for its territorial unity and integrity along the lines of Indonesia's mediation of the Moro conflict in the Philippines.

Gorbachov and Frederick De Klerk were men of the status quo and were part of the dictatorial systems that bankrupted their countries. But they had the courage and vision to change course. Soeharto of Indonesia can be the man who brings democracy for Indonesia and freedom for East Timor. He needs the courage and humility of the great men who can change history. There is a golden opportunity, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Indonesian Republic, for Soeharto to begin a new era in his country's history.

Last but not least, a word about Australia's role. Can Australia play a role and is it willing to play an active role? Notwithstanding, my well-known criticism of Australia's and in particular of its [past] Foreign Minister's policies regarding East Timor, no one denies Australia's successful contributions in resolving other regional problems. Its active involvement in the debate on the reform of the UN is commendable. And now that the Timor Gap saga has ended with small consolation, a procedural victory for Canberra while Portugal and East Timor won the most important victory on the self-determination issue, Australia can rethink its East Timor policy.

Australia has paid a heavy price and has been a victim of Indonesia's brutal occupation of East Timor. Time and again, Australia is accused of hypocrisy, double standards, and betrayal because of its East Timor policies. The spectacle of Australia on the defendant seat in the International Court of Justice in The Hague in February during the three-week long oral proceedings was deeply embarrassing. All because of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. Isn't it time for Australia to demand more flexibility from Indonesia? Or should Australia go on endorsing an immoral policy that has cost Australia so dearly? It is now obvious that the East Timor problem will not go away and as long as it is not resolved it will grow into a rock in Australia-Indonesia relations as Foreign Minister Gareth Evans acknowledged recently.

For the prophets of doom who never believe that our heroic people can survive and win, I will answer only that greater and more powerful empires have evaporated in the face of the will of the people. The people of East Timor, and Indonesia too, will prevail.

The Peace Plan for East Timor

*Address to the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Bangkok
on 19th November, 1993.*

I hope that my interest in addressing you here should highlight our awareness that we are part of this region and that it is high time a concerted regional effort is made to contribute towards a solution to the conflict in East Timor which, I must add with regret, is a festering sore and a black spot in the otherwise impressive ASEAN record.

It is almost 20 years now since that day, December 7, 1975, when East Timor was invaded by the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia. More than 200,000 people died by 1981, entire villages wiped off the face of the Earth, tribes obliterated, thousands of people executed, women raped in front of their husbands and children, men tortured and killed in front their families, the wealth of the country looted, the native languages robbed, the culture suffocated.

This is not a literary form of expression. I talk about real people, about human beings, about my own brothers and sisters who were murdered, about my friends who were abducted and killed, about prisoners thrown off helicopters. I talk about dismembered bodies of children. I talk about families torn apart, about parents, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, children, separated by this war for almost 20 years.

The situation in East Timor is explosive. The youth are restless and resentful. A massive military crack down has been in effect for several months with hundreds of arrests. Torture remains pervasive. The vicious military offensive has been under way since July and with fresh troops being sent to East Timor on a regular basis. Claims that some troops have been withdrawn are pure propaganda.

Xanana Gusmao, our leader, remains incommunicado in a prison thousands of miles away from his beloved country in contravention of the 4th Geneva Convention. His trial early this year was universally condemned as a charade and a travesty of justice. Young Timorese who used peaceful means to express their anger over the occupation are sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10 years to life. Indonesian soldiers and officers who, on 12th November 1991, shot 271 civilians in cold-blood, escaped with almost total impunity.

In June 1974 I visited Jakarta, Indonesia, in my capacity as secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Timorese Social Democratic Association, and met with the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr Adam Malik. After our third round of talks, Mr Malik addressed to me a letter which reads in part:

The independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people of [East] Timor;

...whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence can be assured that the government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and cooperation for the benefit of both countries.

In the course of the discussions, I conveyed to Mr Malik our desire to develop close relations with Indonesia and our intention to seek membership of ASEAN. In an effort to appease our giant neighbour, I went as far as proposing that our future diplomats and security forces be trained in Indonesia.

Adam Malik's words were the words of a statesman who was conscious of his country's lack of any legitimate historical claim to East Timor. He viewed the emergence of an independent East Timor as a natural outcome of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire.

Respect for the colonial boundaries is what has kept most of Africa, Latin America and Asia from disintegrating and I do not believe that any one single regime can take upon itself the task of redrawing a country's boundaries at the expense of its neighbours.

But this is what President Soeharto of Indonesia and the generals around him decided to do in 1975. Today, Indonesia's rulers are eager to talk about the nightmares

of the possible disintegration of Indonesia – the Yugoslavia scenario – if they were to let go of East Timor. Before the end of the Cold War, Indonesia argued its case for colonising East Timor with the bogus communist threat. Now that the 'Cold War' is over, another argument had to be found and nothing better than talking about the Yugoslavia scenario to scare off the rest of the world.

Self-determination is the right of every nation, all peoples, all groups, large and small. I am prepared to argue also that self-determination does not always mean the creation of an independent state out of a non-self-governing territory and people or from an already existing independent state. The outcome of an act of self-determination can be free association, integration within an independent state, full independence or many other treaty arrangements that the parties directly concerned might agree on through consultations, dialogue and negotiations. The use of force has proven that to impose one's view on others has always led to wars beyond anyone's most optimistic predictions.

Our right to self-determination is well established in international law and in ten United Nations' resolutions. In response to the invasion of East Timor, the Security Council adopted two resolutions, Res. 384 (1975) and Res. 389 (1976), calling for Indonesia's withdrawal and affirming the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. The General Assembly adopted no less than eight resolutions along the same lines.

Almost 20 years after the invasion, the problem of East Timor has not disappeared. A fortuitous video camera in the hands of a courageous cameraman recorded for the first time one of the many massacres that have taken place in my country. The massacre of 271 Timorese civilians in Dili on 12 November 1991 was not an isolated incident or an 'aberration'. It followed a well-documented pattern of gross and systematic human rights abuses in many parts of East Timor perpetrated by the members of the Indonesian armed forces with the full knowledge and active participation by the highest officers in the Army. The massacre was ordered by the then chief of the Indonesian armed forces, now Vice-President of the Republic, General Try Sutrisno. This is the same man who ordered the massacre of more than 100 Muslims in Tanjung Priok in September, 1984, the one who ordered the killing of a least 4,000 Muslims in Aceh.

Against this background, as bleak as it is, we begin to see a light at the end of the tunnel. There is a general realisation that the invasion and annexation of East Timor has been a colossal mistake. Editorials in the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Times* of London, and *The Nation* of Bangkok are calling for self-determination in East Timor. In Indonesia itself, voices of moderation are being heard calling for change.

We note with some satisfaction the changing attitude of the US in regard to the East Timor problem. Both the Congress and Administration have taken steps to redress the injustice done to us.

The UN Secretary-General is taking a more personal interest in the issue. I commend the Secretary-General for sending a Personal Envoy to East Timor soon after the 12 November, 1991, massacre and again in March this year when his Envoy, Mr Amos Wako, met with Mr Xanana Gusmao. We also commend the Secretary-General for sending an observer to attend Xanana Gusmao's trial.

The Commission on Human Rights adopted by an overwhelming majority on 11 March, 1993, a comprehensive resolution condemning Indonesia for gross and systematic abuse of human rights in East Timor. This August the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities again condemned Indonesia.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace talks give us renewed hopes in as much as they demonstrate that the seemingly most intractable problems can be resolved if there is political will, courage and vision by all involved.

On our part, we are showing our collective desire to meet the Indonesians half way to reassure them that we are prepared to put our hearts and minds towards finding a solution to this protracted problem which has not served the interests and well-being of our people and the good name of the Republic of Indonesia.

Our imprisoned leader, Xanana Gusmao, has proposed and reiterated time and again our very basic stand. We remain ready to enter into a process of dialogue with the Indonesian authorities, under the auspices of the United Nations, without pre-conditions, to explore all possible ideas towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

The head of the Catholic Church of East Timor, Bishop Ximenes Belo, has

reiterated his appeals for a referendum on the future of East Timor. Mr Konis Santana, the new interim leader of the resistance, conveyed a message to me from inside East Timor, reiterating this basic stand and re-stated his full support for the three-phase Peace Plan I am now unveiling to you.

Phase One: Human rights and humanitarian phase

This Phase which should take up to two years to be fully implemented, would involve all three parties working with the UN to implement a wide range of 'confidence building measures', but would not deal with the 'core' of the problem which is the issue of self-determination. This phase of the talks must focus on achieving:

- Immediate end to all armed activities in East Timor;
- Reduction of Indonesian troop presence to a maximum of 1,000 within a six-month period;
- Removal of all heavy weapons, tanks, helicopters, combat aircraft, long-range artillery;
- Immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners;
- Reduction by 50 per cent of Indonesian civil servants in East Timor;
- Stationing in the territory of UN Specialised Agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, FAO;
- A comprehensive census of the population;
- Establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission under the Catholic Bishop;
- Lifting of all media control by the army;
- Removal of restrictions on the teaching of Portuguese. A Portuguese Cultural Institute is set up;
- Appointment of a resident Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

These are some of the ideas which I believe could be implemented immediately without loss of face for Indonesia. On the contrary, its international standing would improve significantly and its presence in the territory will be less resented, thus relieving a very tense situation.

Phase Two: Autonomy, 5-10 years

Phase Two, lasting between five and ten years, would be a period of genuine political autonomy based on ample powers vested in a local, democratically elected Territorial People's Assembly. The following ideas could be explored and effected:

- Portugal and Indonesia normalise relations;
- Political parties, including those advocating independence for East Timor, are legalised;
- The EC sets up a legation in East Timor headed by a senior Portuguese official;
- Elections are held for a Territorial Assembly. The UN to provide technical support and supervision of the entire process;
- Only Timorese identified as such may vote and be eligible;
- The Assembly elects a Governor of the Territory;
- The Assembly and the Governor have a five year mandate;
- The Territory may enter into trade relations with foreign countries, promulgate its own laws affecting investment, land ownership, property, immigration, etc;
- Remaining Indonesian troops are withdrawn within three months. The Territory will have no army. A police force is trained by the UN and is placed under the elected governor;
- Further reduction of Indonesian civil servants.

At the end of the second phase, the autonomous status of the territory could be extended by mutual accord. Seven years would have elapsed since this Peace Plan was effected and Indonesia, having initiated an entirely new relationship with the Timorese, could have won the trust of the people; the people of East Timor having enjoyed a period of peace and freedom without the presence of the most hated symbol of the occupation, might accept to continue this form of association. The changing generation, and attitudes and perception in Indonesia might also result in Indonesia accepting as very natural that East Timor becomes independent while maintaining strong economic links with Indonesia.

Phase Three: Self-determination

If all parties agree that Phase Three should enter into effect immediately, then the UN begin to prepare a referendum on self-determination to determine the final status of the territory.

Assuming that a referendum will result in an independent East Timor, Timorese political parties would form a government of national unity for the first five years. No matter what the results of the election might be there should be wisdom of the part of the winners to bring into the government all minority parties.

We are conscious of our geography which compels us to co-exist with our neighbours in this part of the world. We can assure everyone that the government of an independent East Timor will seek membership in ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum within days of our independence.

East Timor will maintain close ties with Portugal, a country that having colonised us for almost half a millennium has shown its high moral standing and an abiding commitment to our right to self-determination. Portugal and East Timor will be most valuable partners for the ASEAN in its relations with the EC, Africa and Latin America.

For the past 20 years, our neighbours have turned their back on us. They allowed the largest member of the regional family to bully and invade a small member of the family without a voice of protest. In some cases there was active connivance in the suppression of our very existence. While ASEAN can be proud of its contribution to the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, it cannot be proud of its role on East Timor.

It is time for ASEAN to contribute towards peace and justice in East Timor. We appeal to Thailand as Chairman of the ASEAN, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Brunei to offer words of wisdom to their Indonesian neighbours. Some immediate benefits could be accrued from a flexibilisation of Indonesia's current stand. For instance, the Portuguese veto of a new ASEAN-EC agreement could be lifted. Why should the rest of ASEAN be penalised because of an Indonesian intransigence?

Indonesia is mediating the Moro conflict in the Philippines while Vietnam is mediating between the New People's Army and the Philipino Government, two issues being purely domestic affairs. Shouldn't we all expect that the Indoensian government,

which has shown such willingness in mediating its neighbours internal problems, show also the same willingness in negotiating an end to its occupation of East Timor?

East Timor is at the crossroads of three major cultures and religions: Melanesian which binds us to our brothers and sisters of the South Pacific region; Malay-Polynesian which reminds us that many of our peoples trace their origins to Southeast Asia; and after 500 years of Portuguese-Catholic influence, we are a distinct nation-state in the region with a special understanding and relationship with the EC. Indeed an independent East Timor will be a valuable advocate of the region's interests in that forum. Through our accession to the Rome Conventions, we will build the bridges of dialogue and cooperation between ASEAN and the EC.

The majority of the Timorese residents outside the country, are based in Australia. Timorese have a special understanding of Australians and this will serve as a bridge between Australia and the South Pacific island states as well as between Australia and Southeast Asia.

We will not have a standing army. For our external security, we will rely on a Treaty of Neutrality to be guaranteed by the permanent members of the Security Council. We will endeavour with the UN and our neighbours to declare the seas surrounding East Timor a Zone of Peace and work towards total demilitarisation of the entire Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions.

We will endeavour to build a strong democratic state based on the rule of law which must emanate from the will of the people expressed through free and democratic elections.

We will encourage a free and independent media as the voice of the people: a media that informs and educates. We believe that there can be no foreign interests controlling the local media. We believe the media should be as independent as the judiciary.

All international human rights treaties will be submitted to the Parliament for ratification. We believe that human rights transcend boundaries and prevail over state sovereignty. We would introduce in the school curriculum from very early the subject of human rights. We will actively work with like-minded countries, NGOs and the media to strengthen the UN human rights machinery. We will actively support the creation of an international human rights court and a penal court to try war crimes and

crimes against humanity. We will seek the cooperation of UN human rights agencies as well as of NGOs such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and Asia Watch to advise and assist us in our own efforts to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law in our country.

We will proclaim a general amnesty and national reconciliation. To be true to ourselves, we will forgive our worst enemies. For a society to be healthy, sane and happy, it cannot be based on hatred and revenge. Because of its credibility and standing over the past 20 years, the Church will be expected to play a major role in the healing process for our society.

East Timor is a relatively small country. But with an area of 18,889km² and a total population of 700,000 (1974 figures), it is at least equal, if not larger, in size and population to at least 30 independent states which are members of the UN. For instance, it is almost 10 times the size of Luxembourg and has twice the population. It is 60 times larger than the Seychelles.

In terms of natural resources, East Timor is potentially self-sufficient in most agricultural goods, meat and fish. It also has large oil reserves and other minerals.

On the economic front, we will channel our resources into food production in order to feed our people. We will seek the cooperation of the UN Specialised Agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Food Program, UN Development Program (UNDP). However, all our policies will be a result of close consultation with the people in each region, town and village in East Timor.

In addition, in cooperation with the FAO and other international bodies, we will initiate a massive reforestation program to save our badly damaged environment.

Regarding the 'Timor Gap Treaty', we will look at its terms, seek clarification and renegotiate. The sea boundary dispute will have to be settled through an international tribunal. We will seek international partnership in mineral explorations such as oil, but we will not sacrifice our own environment for short term gains.

The civil war in 1975 and the subsequent invasion, uprooted thousands of people. Properties were abandoned, destroyed or sold at unfair prices. This situation will have to be redressed. A voluntary resettlement plan will be effected to allow the many tens of thousands of Timorese displaced and uprooted from the ancestral lands to return.

We believe in free education and health care for our people. The money saved from not having a standing army will be well used in these areas. At least 40 per cent of our resources will be allocated to our best resource – our people – through massive investment in health and education. With the cooperation of WHO we will seek to eradicate malaria, tuberculosis and other preventable diseases within a decade.

It is estimated that over 100,000 Indonesians are now living in East Timor. Most are poor Indonesians who came to our country looking for a better life. We would not be true to ourselves if we were to turn our backs on our poor neighbours. Indonesian migrants in East Timor will be welcome to stay and, with us, to build a better home for us all. They have brought with them the wealth of their culture which can enrich the whole community.

We are as determined as we are optimistic about our future. To Indonesia and our other neighbours in the ASEAN we are offering a hand of friendship and appealing to them to help us bring peace and freedom to East Timor. More pain and misery and loss of lives can be spared, more embarrassment in the international forums can be avoided if ASEAN live up to its responsibilities.

Thankyou.

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