

# Estafeta

Voice of the East Timor Action Network/U.S.

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Detained East Timorese rebel leader Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão, left, and exiled East Timorese pro-independence activist José Ramos Horta embrace after a joint media conference at Gusmão's residence in Jakarta Friday, July 2, 1999. It was their first face-to-face meeting in 24 years. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)

## July 4 Militia Attack on the Humanitarian Team in Liquiça: Another Slap in the Face to the UN

*Adapted from a report issued on July 8 by the International Federation for East Timor Observer Project (IFET-OP)*

Red and White Iron (Besi Merah Putih), a pro-Indonesia armed militia, attacked a 77 person convoy in the town of Liquiça on July 4, 1999. The convoy was returning to Dili, the capital city, after delivering food and medicine to thousands of internally displaced East Timorese in and around the village of Sare (Ermera district). Workers and volunteers from six East Timorese NGOs (Yayasan HAK, Etadep, Caritas East Timor, Yayasan Kasimo, Timor Aid, and Posko for Emergency Aid to Internally Displaced Persons) comprised the Humanitarian Team, the coalition that organized the convoy. Accompanying them were an official of the

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and Patrick Burgess, the Humanitarian Affairs Officer of the United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET). American medical doctor Dan Murphy and Max White, an ETAN activist, also participated.

The July 4 attack must be seen in the context of the militia-created humanitarian crisis. According to the UNHCR, approximately 30,000 East Timorese have fled their homes over the past six months due to attacks by pro-Indonesia militias such as Besi Merah Putih (BMP) [the Catholic aid organization Caritas estimates the number of refugees to be 85,000]. These East Timorese fled to forests and villages of the remote interior where they are struggling for survival

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## U.S. "Deeply Disturbed" by Militia Attacks on Civilians in Dili

*by Lynn Fredriksson, DC Representative*

The Clinton administration has finally arrived at a consistent and unified position on East Timor. U.S. Ambassador Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretaries of State Harold Koh and Stanley Roth, National Security Council officials and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright all publicly support fair application of the New York Accords which call for a vote in East Timor in August. They condemn Indonesian military-supported paramilitary terror against the East Timorese people and hold the Indonesian military and government responsible for security in East Timor, which must improve dramatically if a free and fair vote is to be held in August. They call for redeployment of Indonesian troops, open access to East Timor and the release of Xanana Gusmão.

Stronger and stronger statements are made more and more frequently. This trend intensified after April massacres in Liquiça, and in Dili at resistance leader Manuel Carrascalão's home. More condemnation followed recent paramilitary attacks on UN outposts. The writing on the wall is unmistakable, and it's splattered in blood: The U.S. government can safely hedge no longer.

So why hasn't this shift in position affected the Indonesian government, the Indonesian military and the paramilitaries, or the horrendous conditions in East Timor?

The problem is a continuing reluctance to utilize the significant influence the U.S. government wields over Indonesian President Habibie and General Wiranto — especially through remaining U.S. military assistance, and billions of dollars of U.S. and multilateral assistance to Indonesia. All such economic aid should be halted immediately and only reinstated — at the very least — after the Indonesian government disarms those

*(continued on page 7)*



## About East Timor and the East Timor Action Network

*Estafeta* is the Portuguese word for messenger. In East Timor, it is used for the young people who, with great courage and ingenuity, carry messages throughout the resistance and civilian underground.

East Timor is a half-island the size of Massachusetts located 400 miles northwest of Australia. It was a Portuguese colony for four centuries, and its 600,000 people briefly tasted independence following the anti-fascist Portuguese revolution in 1974. But peace and nationhood was short-lived.

On December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor after getting the "green light" from President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. Indonesian armed forces still occupy East Timor, with essential military and diplomatic support provided by the United States.

More than 200,000 East Timorese people (one-third of the pre-invasion population) have been killed by massacre, forced starvation and disease. But the people of East Timor continue to struggle for their legal and moral right to self-determination.

Systematic campaigns of rape, murder, torture and arbitrary arrest have terrorized the population, and natural resources (including oil, coffee and marble) were pillaged by Indonesian dictator Suharto's military-business complex. In spite of increased attention following the award of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to two East Timorese leaders and even after a popular uprising in Indonesia forced Suharto from power, the pattern of human rights abuses continues.

Heightened international awareness of the horror of East Timor arose after November 12, 1991, when Indonesian soldiers acting under high-level orders killed more than 270 nonviolent demonstrators at Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili, East Timor. Unlike previous similar massacres, this one was witnessed by foreign journalists, whose video footage and photographs documented the incredible courage of the demonstrators — and the horrific inhumanity of the Indonesian army.

The East Timor *Action Network* was created in response to the Dili massacre. ETAN is a grassroots movement of more than 9,000 members, with local chapters in 22 cities and states. We work for human rights and political self-determination for the people of East Timor. Changing US government policy is key to ending Indonesia's occupation. We in the US have the freedom to engage in peaceful

protest with (to say the least) much less risk than East Timorese and Indonesians; it's a privilege we shouldn't take for granted.

Suharto ruled Indonesia brutally for 32 years — and oversaw genocide in East Timor for 23 — until he was forced out by the Indonesian people in May, 1998. Vice-President Habibie is a transitional figure who could allow real democracy or could return Indonesia to blatant military rule. Indonesian national elections were held a year after Suharto's fall, and though a new President and a new Assembly have yet to be chosen, the incumbent Golkar party no longer


has the overwhelming majority that it once commanded. ETAN continues to work with Indonesians who are struggling for democracy in their country, especially with groups and individuals who support self-determination for East Timor.

For East Timor, the fall of Suharto marked the beginning of a new era. Under Habibie's administration, Indonesia has agreed to a United Nations-

administered vote in East Timor. In this "popular consultation," scheduled for August this year, the people of East Timor will choose between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. For the first time, the people of East Timor will be able to decide on their own political future — provided that the pro-integration militia violence that has wracked the territory does not jeopardize the legitimacy of the vote.

In support of East Timor, ETAN embraces tactics ranging from public education to protest, lobbying to local organizing, resource production to media work. Our grassroots pressure led to the ending of military training aid to Indonesia in 1992, and the cancellation of several major weapons sales to Indonesia, including F-5 and F-16 fighter planes. In November 1997, we pushed into law an effective ban on the use of US weapons in East Timor. The current stance of the US State Department on East Timor is far from what it was in 1975, a change due in a large part to the efforts of US citizens who support East Timor's right to self-determination.

ETAN is made up of people like you who contact their representatives in Washington, protest, and educate others about the situation in East Timor. We survive on your generous donations of time, talent and money. Please join us, and thank you. ■



The East Timor *Estafeta* is the newsletter of the East Timor Action Network of the United States. We welcome your comments and suggestions on improving its layout or content.

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## UN Update: Terror and Hope for the East Timorese

On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement for the United Nations to conduct a "popular consultation" on "special autonomy" for East Timor. Originally the vote was to be held on August 8, 1999 but because of horrific conditions on the ground it has been delayed for at least two weeks. If the ballot is a free and fair reflection of the wishes of the East Timorese people, it will end the long-standing violation of international law created by the Indonesian military's invasion and occupation.

For the first time, the people of East Timor will be able to decide their political status. Should the East Timorese people reject autonomy, the accord obligates Indonesia to take steps necessary to repeal its annexation of East Timor and to transfer authority over the territory to the United Nations. If the voters approve autonomy, Portugal and the UN will legally recognize East Timor as part of Indonesia.

Unfortunately, the Indonesian military and its paramilitary proxies are resistant to following the lead of Indonesian elites willing to let East Timor have its freedom. Indonesian police, who have been charged by the UN with providing security for the consultation process, have done little to rein in agents of military terror.

On June 22, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the UN was delaying East Timor's vote on its political future. In a report to the Security Council, Annan wrote that security concerns and logistical problems meant the vote would be delayed for at least two weeks. As *Estafeta* goes to press, the vote is scheduled for the weekend of August 21, though it could be delayed further.

While the UN presence has led to a more peaceful environment in some areas of the territory, Annan reported to the Security Council that pro-Indonesia "militia activities continue to have a constricting effect on political freedom, silencing pro-independence activists and their supporters and forcing them into hiding, thus jeopardizing the necessary openness of the consultation process." He also pointed to the voting and registration problems created by large numbers of terrorized internal refugees and argued that a free and fair vote is not yet possible under current conditions. Annan therefore postponed the start of voter registration for three weeks, until July 16.

The UN Security Council agreed, declaring in a unanimous statement that

militia violence was having "an intimidating influence over the local population." The council also expressed "grave concern" at a pro-Indonesian militia attack on a UN regional office in Maliana in July which injured one UN worker and up to twelve East Timorese. The council pointed out that the atmosphere of violence favored the anti-independence side, while public expression by pro-independence activities had been "severely limited."

Human Rights Watch reported that "local police made no effort to disperse the attackers, and there were reports of Indonesian army personnel among the militia members" during the Maliana violence. Indonesian Armed Forces chief General Wiranto commented: "If there are one or two incidents, that is normal...don't blow it out of proportion." A militia leader answered a reporter's query as to whether there would be more such attacks in Maliana by saying, "no, not unless they do something to make us angry."

But U.N. special envoy to East Timor Jamsheed Marker told reporters, "We are here to do a job, and we are not going to be chased away... we are not going to allow this to knock us off track."

Six more attacks on UN facilities and personnel have followed. Militias have made death threats against UN personnel, accusing them of pro-independence bias, and have called for the expulsion of UN representatives critical of militia actions.

Since Annan's delay announcement, the terror squads have also continued to threaten

and attack pro-independence East Timorese.

Ian Martin, Chief of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), said militia attacks on UN representatives in the occupied territory exhibited a "disturbing pattern" and called police inaction to halt the attack on a humanitarian convoy (see story, p. 1) "inexcusable." He traveled to Jakarta to demand that Indonesia control the militias. Subsequently, General Wiranto and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas headed a delegation of 16 ministers and 15 senior officials on a one-day visit to Dili on July 12.

Pro-independence activists expressed understandable skepticism as to the sincerity of Alatas and company: East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmão described the trip as "a simple public-relations exercise." Xanana also told *The Australian* newspaper that though Wiranto admitted privately his ability to put the militias out of business in two days, the General refuses to do so. (Falintil, the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance, has been observing an official cease fire for three months.)

After a one week delay in the beginning of East Timorese voter registration, on July 14 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote the President of the UN Security Council that "the security situation in the Territory as a whole remains serious, and there has not been time to assess properly how far recent steps taken by the Government will result in an improvement," but approved the start of registration. Halfway through the twenty day registration period Annan will judge whether "the people of East Timor are able to participate in the popular consultation safely and free of intimidation." At that point he will announce whether the process can move forward.

On July 15 the United Nations convened a new round of talks between Indonesian and Portuguese diplomats to plan the post-consultation future of East Timor. There is still no direct East Timorese participation in UN talks on their country.

As the newsletter goes to press, tens of thousands of East Timorese have registered to vote despite paramilitary intimidation at several sites and a militia attack in the southern subdistrict of Zumalai. But amongst many disturbing logistical concerns, how to assure safe and fair registration of the thousands of East Timorese internal refugees remains an especially daunting challenge for the UN and international observers. ■

**International Federation for East Timor (IFET) Observer Project**  
**webpage:**

<http://www.etan.org/ifet>

**United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) webpage:**

<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm>

This site provides access to the daily UNAMET press briefing from Dili, UNAMET press releases, radio programs, civic education materials and official United Nations documents, as well as other materials of special interest. Information is posted in English, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese and Tetun.



# East Timor Observer Project Needs Grassroots Support

The May 5 United Nations announcement of the August "popular consultation" in East Timor came amidst the less encouraging news that the Indonesian military is continuing to arm pro-integration paramilitary groups in East Timor. Since early April, at least 150 people have been killed by these militias, and many more continue to suffer needlessly because paramilitaries prevent food, medicine, and relief supplies from reaching internally displaced refugees. More than 80,000 have been driven from their homes, many into camps where they are subjected to involuntary "pro-integration" indoctrination and more terror.

The International Federation for East Timor (IFET), of which ETAN is a member, is working to support UN efforts to ensure that the East Timorese people are able to decide their political future in an atmosphere free of coercion and terror. The IFET Observer Project (IFET-OP) volunteer team will observe the consultation process (scheduled for late August) in a non-partisan mission which will support East Timor's right to peaceful self-determination.

The people of East Timor are at a crossroads of crisis and opportunity. We in the international community can help ensure that East Timor's future is brighter than its horrific past. IFET-OP is encouraging individuals to join our project, and groups to send representatives. In addition to observing and reporting on the campaign and voting process, IFET-OP observers, as visible representatives of the world community, help deter violent efforts to subvert the process.

Since May, over 50 individuals from the US — and many more from around the world — have applied to take part in the IFET-OP delegation. We are now in the process of selecting these applicants and holding training sessions. A number are already in East Timor (see report on p. 5).

Members of the project are observing the registration process, campaigns, balloting (including procedures and conditions at polling sites, conditions en route to and from voting booths, and related matters), and the transportation and tallying of ballots. Some participants will remain in East Timor after the vote to observe that there is no retaliatory violence and that post vote commitments proceed smoothly. The IFET-OP team has begun issuing internationally distributed reports about conditions on the ground, and will release an overall report.

Monitoring of the human rights situation will proceed through personal observation and interviews with religious personnel, public officials, local non-governmental organizations, political activists, and the general population. Our office in Dili will regularly relay information collected to UN officials, journalists, national governments and other appropriate authorities.

IFET-OP takes no position for or against the proposed autonomy plan. Its mission in East Timor is to ensure that the East Timorese people are able to make that decision themselves. In addition to agreeing to follow the U.N.-issued Code of Conduct, all observers associated with the IFET-OP sign a contract by which they agree to be nonviolent, nonpartisan, and to respect IFET-OP decisions. Our observers are neutral; we work with non-aligned groups in East Timor, Indonesian non-governmental organizations, UN personnel, and other observer missions. IFET-OP will be in contact with Indonesian civilian and military

officials and both pro-independence and pro-autonomy advocates.

If the vote is delayed past August, we will need additional observers with one or more of the following skills: Indonesian, Tetum, or Portuguese language fluency, election monitoring, human rights monitoring or accompaniment experience, and medical training. Please become part of the emergency support network for US observers taking part in the IFET project. Emergency network members may be asked to contact Congress, the State Department, Indonesian officials and others in response to the needs of the observer teams and events in East Timor. Please call Kristin Sundell at 773-878-4033 if you can help.

IFET-OP observers are volunteers who pay their own transportation, food, and lodging costs. Many are hosting house parties or engaging in other grassroots fundraising initiatives. IFET-OP itself is raising substantial funds for an office in Dili and staff to coordinate the project within and outside of East Timor. This is where we need your help. Individuals and organizations can make a real difference by making a financial contribution to the IFET-OP Observer Project to help us cover our extensive costs. And contact your nearest ETAN chapter to see how you can help activists in your area to fundraise for individual participant and overall IFET-OP expenses.

An ETAN/L.A. activist recently wrote, "A few of our friends and colleagues are already in Dili, and begging us for funds to continue their work there. We need \$200,000 to run the operation for three months. This is not for individual needs, but for the overall IFET-OP organization. We can't let them down now, not after all the work everyone has done... If everyone on this list can get 10 friends and family members to donate 10 dollars each, plus whatever you can afford to donate, we will have over \$4000 to donate to IFET-OP." If everyone receiving this newsletter contributed \$10 and got one friend to also contribute \$10, the project's expenses would be paid for.

Make checks out to ETAN, with IFET-OP in the lower left memo line. Individuals or agencies who wish to make tax-deductible donations or grants of \$100 or more to this project should make checks out to A. J. Muste Memorial Institute; put IFET-OP in the memo line.

Checks should be sent to:

International Federation for East Timor Observer Project  
P.O. Box 1182

White Plains, New York 10602 USA

Telephone: 1-914-428-7299; fax: 1-914-428-7383

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Observer project details and reports can be found at <http://www.etan.org/ifet>.

If you have questions or would like to apply to participate, please contact the U.S. IFET-OP office at the address below. ■

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## Congressional Action Alert

East Timor's August vote is approaching quickly; voter registration has already begun. Congress has increased the pressure on Indonesia to permit a free and fair vote, but more must happen before the East Timorese can cast their ballots freely. We need your help to keep up the pressure.

### What you can do

Call the Congressional Switchboard: 202-224-3121. Ask for your Representative's office and then ask for the foreign policy aide. For a current list of congressional e-mail addresses, office and fax numbers, try <http://www.visi.com/juan/congress/>.

\* H.R. 1063 closes loopholes and bans all remaining U.S. military training to Indonesia. This a priority!

\* Rep. Bill Luther (D-MN) has introduced a resolution (H.Res. 251) condemning recent paramilitary attacks on the UN mission.

\* Rep. Tony Hall (D-OH) is seeking co-signers on a letter to President Clinton calling for increased U.S. pressure on Jakarta. Offices should contact Rep. Tony Hall's office to sign on.

\* Congressional delegations are being organized in both House and Senate. Interested offices should call Patrick Kennedy's (D-RI) office in the House and ETAN's Washington office for more information for the Senate.

## Excerpts From the First Weekly Bulletin from East Timor issued by the International Federation for East Timor Observer Project

*The following is taken from a weekly bulletin published by IFET-OP in Dili, available by email from [altin@atlantic.net](mailto:altin@atlantic.net) or at the IFET website [<http://www.etan.org/ifet>]. For paper subscriptions, contact the U.S. IFET-OP office at 831-728-4190.*

Following an official inauguration on June 22nd, 1999 the IFET-OP Dili office and compound is in full operation. There are currently several full-time staff members from the United States, Germany and Canada living in the compound, with more soon to follow.

In the last few weeks our staff has met with many church officials, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and student organizations. The well-known East Timorese human rights NGO Yayasan HAK has agreed to work closely with IFET-OP. Yayasan HAK has formed its own "Committee for a Free and Independent Ballot". The Indonesian NGO Volunteer Team for Humanity will also work with IFET-OP to station observers throughout East Timor.

### POLITICAL SITUATION

Not much has changed in the political arena in the last few months. The military and police still have an overwhelming presence and continue to back the pro-integration militia reign of terror. Whenever a request for intervention or protection is made, either by Timorese or UNAMET, the police drag their feet or, more often than not, simply refuse to provide any assistance.

During our numerous interviews with Timorese, church officials and NGOs, we ascertained that the civil government has been conducting a program to "socialize the offer of wide-ranging autonomy." Though according to UNAMET's schedule the campaign period has not begun, the provincial government of East Timor actively campaigned for autonomy from the moment the agreement was signed.

From the governor to the village head, the bureaucracy has been organized to promote autonomy. While the military, police, and militias are terrorizing pro-independence civilians into silence, the civil bureaucracy has been openly campaigning for autonomy.

The governor has funneled funds down the chain of command: the bupati, camat, and kepala desa have all been allotted money for the explicit purpose of "socializing autonomy." In the villages, the government has a "door-to-door" system. Four people in each village are paid to persuade or coerce other villagers into supporting autonomy. The campaigners never mention that the rejection of

autonomy will lead to independence; they instead describe the result of such a vote as "civil war." They tend to clarify the meaning of such "civil war" by threatening to kill people if they reject autonomy. The campaigners tell people that the vote will not be secret and that the government will know how each individual voted.

Government sources in Dili report major budgetary cuts in many departments, from which funds are diverted for promoting autonomy. This is confirmed by Yayasan HAK's Committee for a Free and Independent Ballot, which accuses East Timor's Jakarta-appointed governor of approving three billion rupiah (US\$461,000) for each district to spend on autonomy promotion.

An illegal voter registration form obtained by AFP news service shows a space for the sub-district and columns for name, gender, age and address. The column for voting preference offers two choices: "Accept Autonomy" or "Reject Autonomy".

### WOMEN'S RIGHTS

At night in Liquica and other areas, drunken militia and Indonesian military personnel violate women and girls. Women are removed from their families and raped - gang raped in many cases. On Tuesday June 29, a delegation of women from the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET) held a press conference in Dili to report on their seven-day investigation. Among examples the delegation cited was the case of a 22-year old woman, six months pregnant, who was "taken from her home on May 15, 1999, beaten and gang-raped by 10 members of the Besi Merah Putih militia and five Indonesian soldiers, including the commander named C. Lucas."

They also cited the case of a "woman raped in front of her husband while her husband was beaten." The woman had not received a medical exam because only Indonesian doctors, whom she does not trust, were available (though the widely respected U.S. doctor Dan Murphy continues to practice in Dili, Australian and Philippine doctors recently attempting to enter East Timor were turned back).

The APCET delegation submitted to UNAMET documentation of extreme violence against women. The UN mission promised to present the findings to the Indonesian authorities. Patricia Kelly, an Irish attorney accompanying the APCET delegation, clarified how unlikely the prosecution of the perpetrators is by noting that there are no Timorese in the judiciary, and only two Timorese prosecutors, both forbidden to work on any cases involving Timorese. ■



(Militia attack, cont. from page 1)

without adequate food, medical care or shelter; many are in camps where conditions are extremely dire.

This crisis directly affects the validity of the UN-supervised vote. By virtue of their displacement and seclusion, tens of thousands of people are being excluded from voter education. Under present conditions, it is nearly impossible for them to register as voters. Without immediate Indonesian government support for a secure, safe environment, it will be unsafe for them to return to their homes; thus they will be denied genuine participation in the UN-supervised "popular consultation."

Despite the severity of the crisis, the Indonesian government has neither taken steps to relieve the refugee suffering nor assisted NGOs attempting to provide relief. The Indonesian military in East Timor allows pro-Indonesia militias to surround the camps and set up check posts on roads leading in and out. The militias intimidate and hinder the work of charitable organizations delivering aid. Visitors to the camps report that the militias receive food and money from the Indonesian military.

"They are sleeping outside or in crudely assembled shacks," said IFET-OP member Max White about the displaced persons in Sare. "According to our count, seven out of every ten persons there had malaria. We saw many indications of malnutrition and heard many stories of recent deaths. That they are contracting and succumbing to diseases is directly attributable to their displacement from their own homes and means of subsistence."

The exact number of refugees in and around Sare is difficult to determine given the lack of regular access by aid organizations. Jose Luis de Oliveira, the coordinator of the Humanitarian Team, estimates that about 3,800 displaced persons are in Sare and another 3,000 in nearby Faulara. Refugees in Sare say about 70 people died from disease since February, and another five were killed by the militia that surrounds the settlement.

In late June IFET-OP spoke to a priest providing food and medicine to displaced persons in two villages near Sare. He and his staff have compiled a list of the names of 1,654 persons in the villages of Madebau and Quelima. He described them as "traumatized because of the intimidation and terror they have experienced at the hands of the militias."

Most refugees in the Sare area originally hail from villages such as Lisadila and

Maubaralisa in the Maubara sub-district of Liquiça district. The BMP militia attacked their villages and burned down their homes from February to April 1999. Along the road to Sare are the charred remains of numerous deserted villages.

To date, the Indonesian government has taken no action against the Besi Merah Putih, despite the destruction of villages and the displacement of thousands. The BMP carried out the gruesome April 6 massacre in the Liquiça church compound, hacking to death at least 57 refugees from earlier violence, including women and children, and severely injuring dozens more. The BMP also participated in the April 17 militia rally in Dili and the subsequent massacre of displaced persons sheltering at pro-independence activist Manuel Carrascalao's house.

Indonesian government involvement in the militia violence is beyond question. The Indonesian military has been photographed training BMP members in military buildings. BMP rank and file stand at checkpoints on roads throughout Liquiça district; though Indonesian law forbids gun ownership by private individuals, the BMP openly carry rifles, automatic guns, and pistols through the streets. For the past six months, the BMP has rampaged through Liquiça district with official sanction and encouragement.

One day prior to the convoy's departure from Dili, the humanitarian NGOs requested a police escort. The police initially agreed, but later that evening informed the group there would be no escort. The NGO group also requested a police escort prior to departure from Sare on July 4. Again, the police declined.

The facts of the July 4 attack are documented by eyewitness testimony, video footage, and photographs. Returning to Dili after delivering the emergency aid, the eight vehicle convoy stopped in the town of Liquiça at about 4 pm. Patrick Burgess of UNAMET reported the group's intent at the local police station. While the convoy was parked, a vanload of BMP members arrived, carrying rifles, pistols, swords, and knives. They immediately began running toward the humanitarian mission members. Their van left and soon returned with another load of paramilitaries. In all, there were about thirty BMP attackers. Some humanitarian aid workers fled into the police station; others ran back to their vehicles and attempted escape. In the melee, they were slashed at, shot at, beaten, and stoned. This was clearly an act of unprovoked aggression by a pro-Indonesian

militia against a group of unarmed civilians.

The attack occurred in front of two of the main offices of Indonesia's security forces in Liquiça, the local police station and the military headquarters for Liquiça district (Kodim 1638). The mayhem continued for approximately ten minutes while police and military stood idly by. Police did not emerge from the station to disperse the BMP until after the humanitarian aid workers had fled.

All members of the convoy are now accounted for. One member of the humanitarian mission, Laurentino Soares, suffered severe head injuries [Human Rights Watch reports that Soares was also shot in the stomach].

Although the Indonesian government issued a statement deploring the attack, many of its officials faulted UNAMET staff and the humanitarian aid workers. Military headquarters in Jakarta alleged that UNAMET civilian police in the convoy were escorting three armed pro-independence guerrillas. Gen. Wiranto, the Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister, alleged that the incident was due to a lack of discipline among both pro-Indonesian and pro-independence groups. Deputy military spokesman Brig. Gen. Sudrajat similarly alleged the violence resulted from a confrontation between pro-independence supporters riding inside the UNAMET vehicle and the militia. East Timorese police allege that the UNAMET staffer fired shots from a pistol and thereby provoked the attack. Officials in the Indonesian government in East Timor claim the humanitarian organizations did not coordinate the trip with the government beforehand. All of these false allegations serve to divert attention from the facts of the attack and the responsibility of the Indonesian government to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Perhaps most disturbing is the term the Indonesian military headquarters in Jakarta uses to describe displaced persons in Sare: "anti-integration refugees" (pengungsi anti-integrasi). The military therefore views internal refugees dying of disease and malnutrition in political terms, unlike Father Baretto of Caritas East Timor, who argues that "charitable aid is above ideology."

For more details on the Humanitarian Aid Mission, see "Humanitarian Mission for Internally Displaced People," July 6, 1999. Copies of this statement are available from the IFET Observer Project International Office at ifet@etan.org. The IFET website is located at <http://www.etan.org/ifet/>. ■

(U.S. influence, cont. from page 1)

committing the violence in East Timor and helps the UN to create a peaceful environment in which East Timorese can safely voice their will at the ballot box.

While there is no doubt that "rogue elements" in the Pentagon and elsewhere favor continued unconditional U.S. assistance to the Indonesian military regardless of slaughtered civilians, most U.S. Congresspeople oppose such immoral, short-sighted policies. On June 22, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed an amendment to the State Department Authorization bill (based on Senate Resolution 96) urging a tougher U.S. policy toward Indonesia in support of conditions necessary for the vote in East Timor. On June 30, the Senate voted 98-0 to reinforce its own action by approving a similar amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. The actions required in these amendments are directed not only at the State Department, but at the Departments of Defense and Treasury as well. At press time, an amendment to the State Department Authorization bill, based on the recent Senate amendments and H.Con.Res. 97, is scheduled for a vote. [Patrick Kennedy's (D-RI) H.Con.Res. 97 also calls for a freeze of U.S. military assistance and arms transfers to Indonesia until Jakarta has assisted in the successful disbanding of its paramilitaries and has substantially reduced its own troop presence in East Timor.]

On July 15, Congressman Bill Luther (D-MN) introduced H. Res. 251, expressing concern over recent paramilitary attacks on the UN, and calling on the Indonesian government to secure the environment for a peaceful vote.

Among a steady stream of letters to U.S. and Indonesian officials, one initiated by Rep. Tony Hall (D-OH) to President Clinton is currently circulating for House signatures. It calls on the administration to do "everything in its power to convince Jakarta to call off the paramilitaries."

In early May, at a press conference with Francisco de Jesus da Costa, a survivor of the Liquiça massacre, Rep. Patrick Kennedy and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) announced pending resolutions condemning state terror in East Timor. The same week, Francisco, Vicente Soares Faria, Manuel dos Martires, Indonesian human rights activist Aryati, and Bishop Belo's biographer Arnold Kohen, testified before both the Human Rights and Progressive Caucuses, and the Human Rights Subcommittee to draw further attention to the

brutal killing and disappearances of hundreds in the weeks leading up to the UN agreement. ETAN has published a pamphlet entitled "Paramilitary Violence in East Timor" with testimony from these individuals. It is available for one dollar from ETAN.

Their testimony, coupled with earlier Washington visits of East Timorese activists Jose Ramos-Horta, João Carrascalão, Domingos Savio, Ezequiel de Olivera, and Luciano da Conceicao, among others, and the efforts of hundreds of activist lobbyists throughout the U.S., have moved Washington policy this year. Chris Smith (R-NJ) created a focus for this pressure by reintroducing a bill (H.R.1063), based on one initiated by Nita Lowey (D-NY) last year, to close loopholes that have allowed the Pentagon to continue training Indonesian troops despite congressional intent.

Though attached to an extremely problematic bill (the Emergency Appropriations that funded the U.S. war on Yugoslavia), Congress approved \$6.5 million to support the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor. The State Department subsequently provided an additional \$3.5 million. Years of education and lobbying created the environment in which this funding was expeditiously approved.

This year the State Department and other administration offices have received countless faxes, letters and phone calls demanding U.S. action to force the Indonesian government to disarm the paramilitaries, withdraw troops from East Timor, release Xanana Gusmão and other political prisoners, open access to East Timor, and expand the UN mission. These messages have been heard.

We must now urge more specific demands about ending U.S. military and financial assistance to Jakarta. The World Bank has already suspended Social Safety Net funds to Indonesia until it meets ten economic and human rights related conditions. Because one of these conditions pertains specifically to East Timor, the U.S. should continue suspending these funds until after the August ballot in East Timor. And it is high time for a statement from President Clinton.

Activists must continue to increase support for H.R. 1063 to guarantee it comes to a Congressional vote by November. We need more co-sponsors (especially Republicans) as well as commitments from those willing to vote. We must maintain the ban on IMET training and the prohibition on use of U.S. weapons in East Timor within the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. We must maintain the "Leahy Amendment", which prohibits U.S. training to foreign units committing human rights abuses, in the Defense Appropriations bill. And we must work to increase support for H.Con.Res. 97. Finally, Representatives and Senators should be encouraged to join a congressional delegation that will monitor the vote in East Timor.

Politicians in Washington have traveled a good distance for East Timor. It is critical that they walk the final miles. Without serious pressure from Washington the Indonesian government is unlikely to stop the pre-vote violence in East Timor. Without your continued activism the U.S. government is unlikely to take these final steps. Please keep up the pressure for the East Timorese people, and... A luta continua! ■

## New Resources on East Timor

"License to Kill" is a compelling 45-minute video documentary on paramilitary violence in East Timor. Paramilitary leaders speak candidly about their relationship with the Indonesian military (ABRI/TNI). An excellent organizing tool, the video is available from ETAN for \$12 postpaid.


"Licensed to Kill" (different than above-listed "License to Kill") outlines the genesis of military backed militia violence. Available with "East Timor on the Brink" for \$15 postpaid.

"East Timor on the Brink" (first broadcast on Australian TV June 3) is a look at East Timor today, including economic interests of the Indonesian military & its allies, and the foreign training of Indonesian troops.

### ORDER FROM:

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## ETAN/NY Dedicates "East Timor Way"

On Saturday, July 17, ETAN/New York dedicated a street sign naming 68th Street "East Timor Way." The sign — posted by the City of New York at the northwest corner of Madison Ave. and 68th Street in Manhattan — temporarily names the street in front of the Indonesian consulate. The posting of the sign is the result of a lawsuit by ETAN.

Some 40 people attended the ceremony where a traditional East Timor cloth temporarily covering the sign was removed. Speakers at the ceremony and subsequent demonstration included John M. Miller, coordinator of ETAN/NY, Nancy Chang of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and the lead attorney on the lawsuit, and Amy Goodman of Pacifica Radio.

The dedication ceremony was followed by a demonstration in support of self-determination and human rights for East Timor directly across from the consulate. Charles Scheiner of ETAN and Rev. Max Surjidanata, an Indonesian-American activist, spoke at the

demonstration. The dedication and protest took place on "Integration Day," the anniversary of the day East Timor was annexed by a decree of then-President Suharto on July 17, 1976 in a move not recognized by the United Nations.

"The street naming commemorates the courage and spirit of the people of East Timor. 'East Timor Way' will serve as a daily reminder to the Indonesian Government of its pledge to allow a free and fair vote by the East Timorese people on their political status," said John M. Miller.

With the support of CCR, ETAN sued the City of New York, challenging the city's refusal of ETAN's request for a temporary street renaming. The posting of the sign on July 17 is a partial settlement of the federal lawsuit which criticizes the arbitrary way in which the city implements its temporary street sign policy. ETAN and CCR will continue to litigate the first amendment issues involved.

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