

gratulations and wishes for a bright and productive future for this most deserving individual.●

**H.R. 4367 THE VETERANS' OBLIGATED PERIOD OF SERVICE COMPENSATION ACT**

**HON. CHARLES F. DOUGHERTY**

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 27, 1979

● Mr. DOUGHERTY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge my colleagues to give their support to the House resolution to deny benefits to military personnel who fail to complete their initial term of obligated service.

H.R. 4367, introduced by my esteemed colleague from Tennessee, Mr. BEARD, seeks to resolve the problem of attrition during first-term enlistments.

As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I am all too familiar with the manpower shortage problems facing our Armed Forces. The present rate of separation during first term enlistment is 40 percent. The All-Volunteer Force cannot survive under this heavy rate of attrition.

H.R. 4367 is directed toward those individuals who either become separated through some fault of their own, or are victims of expeditious discharges. In the first case, loss of benefits would be an incentive to stay with the service. In addition, H.R. 4367 would seek to modify the current flagrant use of expeditious discharge as a convenient mechanism for dropping undesirable personnel from a unit—servicemen who would otherwise be reassigned to duties more fitting to their capabilities.

In the recent debates on registration, this august body heard abundant documentation on the threatening manpower shortage in the military. H.R. 4367 seeks to resolve the manpower shortage at the greatest source of attrition—during the first-term enlistment.

The savings from this bill would be realized in terms of funds presently expended for recruiting and training individuals to replace the vacancies created by first-term separations. A recent General Accounting Office report states that the total Department of Defense costs due to first-term attrition equaled \$3.8 billion for the years 1974 through 1977. One-half of this is due to service-connected disabilities which would not be affected by H.R. 4367. The remaining half could yield a savings potential of \$500 million per year.

In summary, I draw a parallel with the private sector where just and necessary benefits accrue after reasonable amounts of time. In the military services, this is 180 days. We cannot in conscience provide lifelong medical and veterans benefits to men and women who have broken their obligations to the military. In these times of financial accountability we must address this waste on behalf of our people.

In conclusion, I encourage my fellow Members to reflect on these figures and join the 58 cosponsors in supporting H.R. 4367.●

**TRAGEDY IN TIMOR**

**HON. TOM HARKIN**

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 27, 1979

● Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Speaker, the news today is full of tragic stories about Vietnam's "boat people," who leave their homeland to face an uncertain future in their crumbling boats on the high seas. There is another group of people whose future is equally uncertain, though their case has not been brought to our attention by the press. According to the Indonesian Assistant of Defense and Security of the Regional Territory of East Timor, nearly half the population of East Timor, a small section of Indonesia, has disappeared since 1974, 1 year before Indonesia waged war against them. What has happened to over 300,000 people? Thousands of East Timorese have died, and are dying, as a result of the barbaric actions of the Indonesian army. In addition, Indonesian bombs have destroyed this primitive agricultural area, and thousands more are dying of hunger and disease. I would like to insert into the Record, for the edification of my colleagues, a discussion of this tragedy, as reported by the Asian Bureau Australia Newsletter, a publication by concerned Catholic human rights advocates.

The newsletter follows:

**TIMOR'S CONTINUING TRAGEDY**

Indonesian government reports have claimed since early in 1976 that the situation is "close to normal", but information from church and Timorese sources indicate that the tragedy of Timor has simply entered another, and increasingly desperate phase. In their thousands, people are coming down from the hills. Many die when they come. Their homes, clans and crops have been destroyed over the years of the war. Yet until the last moment they have kept to the mountains. There they are Timorese. Desperate for food, clothes and medicine they cross to Indonesian control not knowing what it means.

But there too, food and medicine are scarce. In the area around Dili, the crop is a complete failure. The season has been a bad one with insufficient rain during the growing season for the required harvest of corn. The food situation is far from good' one commentator reported.

The displaced people flooding into the towns of East Timor, without shoes, or tools, or cooking utensils, face a lean and tragic kind of "normality."

**WHERE ARE THE PEOPLE**

Statistical information from the Indonesian Assistant of Defense and Security of the Regional Territory of East Timor recorded the following population figures in October 1978.

Catholics	255,417
Protestants	4,354
Confucians	
Moslems	661
Animists	68,839
Total number	329,271

In 1974, one year before the war, the diocese of Dili recorded the population of Portuguese Timor as follows:

Catholics	220,814
Protestants	2,550
Confucians	5,660
Moslems	183
Animists	460,112
Total number	688,769

These statistics are shocking and puzzling. Whatever their shortcomings the figures indicate a drastic decrease in population. Where are the other 359,498 people?

A few thousand have migrated to Portugal and Australia. A large number withdrew into the mountains after the Indonesian invasion in December 1976. Some of these were killed in military actions. They have died or they are still in the mountains.

**MAJOR OFFENSIVES**

Recently the Indonesian armed forces launched major offensives against Fretilin forces. According to reports, one commenced in September 1977 and involved the injection of an additional 15,000 troops into the Timor campaign. This operation was given no publicity whatever by Indonesian authorities. Its existence appears to have been leaked to the Australian press from local Defense Department sources, but it was also credibly reported by Fretilin.

Messages from non-Fretilin sources in Dili gave some inkling of the full horror of the campaign. A priest wrote: After September the war was intensified. Military aircraft were in action all day long. Hundreds of human beings die daily, and their bodies are left as food for the vultures. If bullets don't kill us we die from epidemic disease; villages are completely destroyed. The war is entering its third year and no end is in sight. The barbarities (understandable in the stone age), the cruelties, the looting, the shooting of people without any justification, are now part of everyday life in Timor. Total insecurity and the terror of being arrested is our daily bread... Fretilin troops who surrender are disposed of. For them there is no prison.

During 1978, the military strength of Fretilin was steadily eroded in the face of the continuing isolation of the forces of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, the starvation and disease caused by war, and particularly by Indonesian air attacks on the rich food-producing mountain valleys. The decline in the fortunes of Fretilin culminated in the killing of their President, Nicolau Lobato, on the morning of 31 December 1978, in a valley near Turiscai. In spite of the fact that for some two years official Indonesian spokesmen had been claiming that Fretilin had been reduced to 'some roving bands', the killing of Lobato was received in Jakarta with some rejoicing. According to the Indonesian daily, 'Kompas', the killing of the Timorese leader was the culmination of an operation which commenced on 11 December and involved the use of 2,500 troops who were whisked from place to place by helicopters.

Fighting continues in several areas. 'Up until Easter 1979', one report states, 'the Ermera district was not yet quiet and safe'. Even after Easter some military have been reported killed in fighting. On 26 March 1979 the Military Command of East Timor was officially ended by the Indonesian Minister of Defense and Security. In the beginning of April, some warships left Dili with a few battalions that had completed their duties in East Timor. But immediately after their departure, some new battalions arrived to take their place.

**MANY THOUSANDS DIE**

Many thousands have died of hunger and disease. Recent reports indicate widespread malnutrition. Small towns and villages are depopulated. Everywhere people are burying their dead.

The appalling physical condition of the refugees is due to the fact that several hundred thousand Timorese have kept to the mountains where the resistance has been based, or gone there to escape the brutal treatment meted out on the local population by Indonesian troops. They had few medical supplies and no doctors to treat the thousands of casualties resulting from Indonesian bombing and military actions. Another obvious reason for their poor physical



cal condition would have been the fact that for more than a year Indonesian forces had been destroying the crops in the mountain valleys which had been a major source of food available to these people.

Despite the vast numbers killed, it seems unlikely that the figures quoted reflect an accurate count of the population of East Timor. In official statistics, or in village prayer books, the bodies of the dead are counted. But living people are harder to trace and despite Indonesian claims of peace and order, it seems very possible that thousands of Timorese in mountain areas are now simply not counted. The Indonesian administration does not reach them. Many people continue to resist or evade the Indonesians.

#### MORE REFUGEES; MORE CORPSES

According to the Assistant of Defence and Security of the East Timor Territory the total number of displaced persons in rural and urban areas is over 300,000—a number equaling the vast majority of the recorded population!

There is an influx of refugees to major towns. There are estimated to be 17,861 displaced persons in the capital Dili, 37,449 in Mallana on the western plains, an incredible 69,799 in the small town of Viqueque, in an area where the Indonesian army is still on the alert against armed resistance. Reportedly, 300 people die each month among the refugees of Ermera. In spite of a state subsidy of five million US dollars and the availability of supplies in Dili, the Indonesian Red Cross is unable to carry out an efficient program. Lack of transportation is the big bottleneck. Unfortunately, supplies, stored in the godown of Dili, promote manipulation, black market and the like. Medicines are sold in the shops for prices only very few can afford to pay. The death toll is so high that people started using the expression "The more refugees, the more corpses".

#### FIVE METERS OF BANDAGE

The numbers of refugees are still increasing since each day there are new arrivals coming down from the mountains. They come back in extremely dire conditions, practically naked and starving to death.

They have already lost many friends and relatives. They hope to find something to eat. When the food does not materialize they become very disappointed. If there is any food at all, it is very little and very late. Which makes the whole aid program of care for refugees actually meaningless.

In February 1979 the government's health centre in Maubisse, for example, had a supply of 300 pills of chloroquin and five metres of bandage. But according to the health officers everyday 160 patients come for treatment. At the same time there were medicines for sale in the Chinese shop. However, people could not afford to pay for them. In the middle of March, five tons of corn arrived in Maubisse. More than 6,000 people had been waiting for the corn during five weeks. It is ironical that aid is provided in small quantities and with long delays. No wonder that people start complaining that the Indonesian authorities want them to die off by hunger and disease. All over the area one hears rumours about aid manipulations by the regional government. Many kinds of clothes and medicines are for sale in the shops in Dili. What happens to the food supplies?

Those who attempt to aid refugees are placed in an invidious position, as they buy rice for hungry people at inflated prices on the black market. Are they thieves or saviours?

#### BACK TO SCHOOL

During the war, most schools were closed. Some were destroyed or damaged in the fighting. Others had no teachers, or no pupils.

Some school buildings were taken over for use by the army.

In 1979 a foreign visitor to a primary school found the teacher happy and proud to demonstrate recent successes. Her small students rose to their feet to sing a patriotic song in Indonesian—a foreign language, until now, for speakers of Tetum and Portuguese. It was an achievement for them to sing 'Indonesia Raya' and an achievement to stand too. The visitor was shocked to see the worst effects of malnutrition he had witnessed in his extensive travels in Asia.

Indonesian teachers seem unaware of the cultural implications of their presence. Experience of Indonesians as colonial masters in Irian Jaya has shown a lack of appreciation of the social and cultural situation of the people.

Under the Portuguese the church has been the main agent of education in East Timor. They are now reluctant to seek Indonesian subsidies for church schools, and the Indonesian administration is pushing ahead with its own plans for educational reconstruction. The attitude of the Timorese church is critical in determining the effect on the people of Indonesian education policy.

During the years of fighting, the Indonesian government has seldom taken risks in its selection of visitors permitted access to East Timor. Even before the invasion a tight control was maintained on access to information. Most Indonesian citizens have heard only heroic accounts of the victories of their army. They read propaganda of an enthusiastic welcome given by the Timorese to their Indonesian liberators. They have accounts of administrative matters such as the establishment of health centres, removed from the total context of war.

Now, however, a greater number of civilians have obtained entry, and the complexities of the situation are gradually being revealed. There is an element of shock in the discovery by Indonesian people of the long, brutal and costly nature of the military campaign in Timor and the effects now being suffered by the Timorese people.●

#### A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION WELCOMING POPE JOHN PAUL II

HON. LEO C. ZEFERETTI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 27, 1979

● Mr. ZEFERETTI. Mr. Speaker, each of us is well aware of the upcoming visit of Pope John Paul II to the United States. I know I speak for the vast majority of my colleagues in anxiously anticipating the honor of the Pope's presence on American soil.

Therefore, I have joined my esteemed friend and colleague, Representative JOSEPH ADDABBO, in introducing a resolution extending an official welcome to His Holiness on behalf of the U.S. Congress. Mr. ADDABBO and myself were among those chosen as Special Representatives of the President to attend the investiture and inaugural Mass of the Pope in October of last year.

Pope John Paul II is the spiritual leader of nearly 50 million American Roman Catholics and he enjoys the respect of millions of people of every religious denomination around the globe. Although he was invested just a short time ago, His Holiness has already distinguished himself as a dynamic advocate

of peace and fellowship among all nations.

We are indeed honored by this happy and blessed event, and I urge my colleagues to act expeditiously on this official welcome to the Holy See.●

#### PAY RAISE FOR FEDERAL EXECUTIVES AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

HON. JOSEPH L. FISHER

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 27, 1979

● Mr. FISHER. Mr. Speaker, for the time being the difficult question of a pay raise for Federal executives and Members of Congress has been settled by the House. It now goes to the Senate for action. On a very close vote the House has approved a continuing appropriation resolution that includes a pay raise of 5.5 percent for high-level employees and Members. Although my preference is to delay the effective date of any pay raise for Members of Congress until after the next election, I did vote for this resolution. I thought that the need for a pay raise for some 22,000 senior executives and judges was more important than denying the raise to 535 Representatives and Senators.

During the debate on the resolution I tried to decouple the pay of Members from that of the much larger number of nonelected officials. I offered an amendment that would have given high-level executives a raise of 7 percent—the same as all others in Government will receive. If that amendment had passed, then the question of whether to go forward with a raise for Members could have been voted on separately. I believe that this is the appropriate way to handle the pay issue and I would have liked to establish that as a precedent. Until this matter is settled, the House will be doomed to making a spectacle of itself each year as it goes through contortions trying to get a raise for itself without having to vote the raise in a clear, unambiguous way. By avoiding separate votes for Members and executives pay, the House places in jeopardy the orderly and efficient conduct of the Federal Government.


Unfortunately my amendment was defeated. Without the separation of the two pay raises, I could not vote for a raise for the executives unless I also voted for a raise for Members. This seemed to be the responsible course of action under the circumstances.

I will continue to work for a separation of the issues and for a delayed raise for Members. The raise for Members should not go into effect until after an intervening election. I support legislation to put this principle into effect. I also support strict limits on outside earnings for Members. The justification for periodic pay increases for Members is enhanced when Members refrain from potentially conflicting outside employment for pay. I hope that we can avoid future divisive debates over pay by agreeing to these changes in the process.●



Questions on East Timor


1. Mr. Holbrooke,



Some time ago you testified before this committee that fighting in East Timor had died down by mid-1976. Now we see grim accounts, which Senator Kennedy has described as "the spectre of mass famine". The Senator and others have attributed this situation to fierce warfare through late 1978. Could you comment on what appear to be inconsistencies with your earlier testimony?

(Background: In a recent statement, the Indonesian Defense Minister said that 1,200 Timorese guerrillas had been killed in a single battle on Christmas Day, 1978.)

2. Mr. Holbrooke,



In September 1978 Ambassador Masters, along with other diplomats, visited East Timor. Press reports described largescale starvation and disease. Why has it taken a full year to launch a significant program of relief assistance, and when did the starvation conditions first arise?

(Background: See attached article of 9/29/78 from the Far Eastern Economic Review, "Timor's Arithmetic of Despair".)

3. Mr. Holmes (USAID official),

Mr. Cameron believes that there is an urgent, immediate need for medical and other relief programs in East Timor. I have been informed that a number of additional private relief agencies would be willing to set up programs in East Timor, given the cooperation of the Indonesian government. I have been assured that funding is also available from other Western governments. How can the U.S. help facilitate these possible relief efforts, and would we be able to assist these organizations?

4. Mr. Holmes or Mr. Holbrooke,

When will East Timorese villagers be allowed to return to their traditional homes?

(Background: If the response is in terms of the denudation of the land by too many years of slash and burn agriculture, point out that area specialists who have spent years in East Timor reported no problem with ecological destruction as late as 1975.)

5. Why aren't more doctors and relief agencies being allowed in immediately?  
Why aren't more Red Cross personnel on the ground in East Timor now?  
When can more go in?  
How many foreign relief workers and doctors are currently in East Timor?

6. Is aid being flown directly to East Timor?

(Background: In October, the Australian press reported that 150 tons of food aid sent by Australia had been left sitting on the docks of Jakarta for three months.)

~~OTHER QUESTIONS FOR MR. HOLBROOKE:~~

MORE QUESTIONS FOR MR. HOLBROOKE:

1. I find the question of the number of Timorese deaths rather confusing. The State Department's 1978 Human Rights Report said that most of the human losses in Timor came prior to the Indonesian intervention. Now we see these new, horrific reports. What is the true situation? Why weren't relief agencies allowed in much earlier?
2. If there was little fighting after March 1976- the official Department position- why is there mass starvation now?
3. There were more International Red Cross personnel in East Timor prior to the December 1975 intervention than there are now. When will significant numbers of ICRC people and other relief personnel be admitted?
4. Why did the Indonesian government take so long to allow independent relief agencies into Timor?
5. Do American journalists have free access to East Timor?

QUESTIONS FOR CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES:

1. What do CRS monitoring mechanisms consist of?
2. Since CRS staffers are all local people, who may be subject to Army pressure, how can CRS be sure that food is getting through to people?

(Background: Indonesian Red Cross workers have been severely hampered by the actions and corruption of the military. How is one to be assured that CRS' local staff-Indonesians and Timorese- is any less susceptible to military pressure?)

QUESTION FOR MR. WOLFF TO ASK MR. HOLBROOKE:

Can all international relief agencies enter East Timor? If not, when? When can a significant number of doctors enter East Timor?



January 19, '79

I have been able to ascertain fairly exactly the current position of José Ramos Horta, through discussion <sup>with</sup> of his cousin Dulce, with whom he is communicating regularly.

In a private discussion she confirmed that he is being detained, as his earlier letter to Amnesty stated. She doesn't know about this letter, but is very worried about José, who asked her to keep the matter quiet, as he asked Amnesty, and to do nothing at this stage.

He is able to ring her weekly from Maputo, and is also writing. He cannot, however, talk freely on the phone (Dulce believes all calls are monitored) and all his mail to and from is read. She said the place he is staying at is a FRETILIN headquarters but that he told her he works each day on a 'quinta' (farm). He stressed that he has no problems with FRELIMO over leaving, and that his only problems are with FRETILIN, who will not allow him to leave.

What this means exactly I don't know. It could mean:

- (i) he is being outrightly physically coerced
- (ii) his wife and child are being used as hostages (an earlier report claims that this was the means used to induce Horta to return to Maputo in October)

or (iii) that he voluntarily accepts--as he always has--the 'revolutionary discipline' of FRETILIN and is serving a sentence of detention, and it would seem, labour, on these terms.

I don't think (i) is the reason.

Dulce says that José's health is ok now, although previously he was not well, but that he is suffering from 'psychological fatigue'.

The main protagonist in his detention seems to be Rogerio Lobato.

José says that he expects his detention to end in February, when he is to attend a conference in Poland, between February 20-25. Dulce said he is 'certain' he will be able to go. She thinks he will be travelling alone, but doesn't know his plans after that.

We agreed to meet regularly and I suggested she telephone Gilberto Schlittler in New York to talk to him about the situation. I suggested that if José doesn't exit in February, discreet pressure should be applied at various Mozambican embassies. She and I would make a joint approach here, and perhaps people in NY and London could do the same.

I'm fairly sure there is no question at this stage that José fears for his life, as has been suggested in some quarters, especially as I think the Mozambican government is keeping an eye on the situation due to inquiries and claims already made about his position.

For reasons of José's safety, the above information should be treated with the utmost discretion.

To end on a happier note, José's friends might be interested to know that his new son is called Mau Bere.



CONFIDENTIAL

1. A large amount of money--\$50,000--is required to send a mission to East Timor.

2. The aims of the mission:

1) a proposal, now almost a year old, has been made by one of the world's leading newspaper organisations to do a major story on Timor centred on getting a journalist in there. They promise world syndication of the story, in the style of the My Lai massacre story.

The history of this proposal is a sad one: it has been worked on consistently for almost a year (during which it could have changed the course of the war), with no success. Having exhausted all other channels it is now necessary to appeal more openly (at the risk of jeopardising the necessary secrecy of the operation) to the U.S. and English groups in the hope that it is not too late to do something, and that the money might be raised.

I have utmost confidence in the newspaper organisation and individuals concerned, although we can't guarantee in advance what they'll write. I think about \$5,000 may be obtainable from them before the event. Afterwards, if successful, there should be considerable reimbursement from the media story. There would be efforts made to legally tie them to this before the event.

2) Ten tons of medical aid would be taken, for distribution inside Timor, as a matter of course.

3. Despite the drastic change in the military situation, it is still possible (and always has been) to enter via the south coast, but needs to be done soon. My sources of information for this are the most reliable possible.

4. Both the newspaper people and the team capable of undertaking the mission are ready to go. Their only obstacle is money. They could probably be in Timor within a month of receiving the money.

5. The history of the continuous attempts to send such a mission are long and complex and can only be told after the war. It's sufficient to say that in the past three years it's always been possible to enter Timor and that the factors preventing it have been firstly, financial, and secondly, --from late '76 until now--political. The second difficulty no longer applies so long as strict security measures are observed by those who read this document.

6. The very large amount of money is necessary to provide maximum security for those involved (inflatable rafts, radio transmitters, etc. are all



expensive items), to underwrite the cost of a vessel which, obviously, cannot be insured, and to include ten tons of medical aid. If the vessel returns intact, a proportion of this money will be readily recoverable. All figures given here are based on a detailed budget already prepared.

7. The conditions on which the money would have to be given are almost so outrageous as to be unacceptable to anyone:

- i) It would have to be raised in secrecy
- ii) It would have to be handed over, on faith, probably in a cash lump sum.
- iii) After this, the donors would have to be left in ignorance of the fate of the money for some time.
- iv) If the mission was unsuccessful (e.g. the vessel was sunk, or impounded, by the Indonesian military) there would be almost no redress.

THE MOST PESSIMISTIC POINTS MADE, I'LL LIST THE FEW POINTS OF REDRESS THERE ARE:

- v) A 'banker' would be appointed from the outset who would keep detailed accounts throughout, to be made available on completion of the mission.
- vi) Sources (see last para of point 1. above). The money recoverable from press sources (see last para of point 1. above).
- vii) Although it is impossible, for security reasons (and the planners would not participate if these were breached) to raise money publicly before the event, it would be possible to do so after, ~~if~~ if the mission was successful. A newspaper appeal could be launched for aid to East Timor (to be run simultaneously with the story?) The accounts which had been kept would be important to this.
- viii) Even if the mission failed some of the money might be recoverable, sick though it sounds, by telling the story of its failure to the media. ~~By the way, I have been told that the Indonesian government is not likely to allow this.~~

8. The possibility of raising this money entirely independently of Australia raises the first hope for <sup>the</sup> success of such a mission for some time. It is important to keep the proposal quite 'insulated' from the Australian movement at this point. I stress that at least one aid attempt has failed simply because people became involved in the organisation of it who were just not capable of keeping quiet about it. People who read this document should make a conscious decision about who it is necessary to speak to about it & who not. They should let others who have access to it know who else is told. Obviously, if this scheme appears supportable, you will have to talk to money-raisers, but please restrict giving information to necessary people. A ~~list~~ distribution list is given above. ////////////////



EAST TIMOR AD-HOC STRATEGY AND ACTION GROUP

To obtain or share information and/or up-to-date news on developments:

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PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY AND ACTION

OF AD-HOC EAST TIMOR GROUP, DECEMBER 9, 1979

1. To work for increased humanitarian aid to East Timor
2. To work for broader representation of a wide range of relief agencies.
3. To work for increased press coverage and greater number and range of journalists reporting from East Timor.
4. To open human rights issues involved in the continuing Indonesian military occupation.
5. To raise awareness of the right of East Timorese for genuine self-determination.
6. To work for an end to U.S. military aid to the Indonesian military regime.
7. To urge support for members of Congress (e.g. Thomas Harkin, D-Iowa) who have or might be willing to bring up East Timor in hearings, etc.
8. To raise funds for possible increased activities, including especially a person to work full time in Washington to further the above principles.



SWB

FE/6092/A1/2

13 Apr 79

SWB

# The Americas

**Cuba to drop Timor issue from Havana agenda** The matter of East Timor will no more be entered on the agenda of the non-aligned summit conference to be held in Havana, Cuba, next September, Cuban President Fidel Castro's special envoy said in an arrival statement [on 11th April]. L. Rodriguez Perez, Minister of Steel and Industry ... said the Cuban Government will not enter East Timor as a subject of discussion. Rodriguez ... will extend an invitation as well as a special letter from President Fidel Castro to President Suharto. He said that the letter dealt with subjects calling for settlement at the Havana meeting. Rodriguez had issued similar invitations to the Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore. . . (Antara in English 1036 gmt 11 Apr 79)

**Cuban minister in Singapore (FE/6089/A1/4)** Singapore home service reported (in English 1330 gmt 9 Apr 79) that the Cuban Minister of Heavy Industries, Lester Rodriguez Perez, had called on the Foreign Minister, Rajaratnam, on 9th April to discuss the forthcoming summit of heads of state of non-aligned countries.

**Cuban envoy in Nepal (FE/6089/A1/4)** Kathmandu radio's service in English for abroad reported (1450 gmt 8 Apr 79) that the delegation led by Zoilo Marinello Vidaurreta had held talks with the Foreign Minister, Krishna Raj Aryal, on 8th April concerning preparations for the summit conference of non-aligned countries in Havana in September.

**Chilean trade delegation in China (FE/6090/A1/3)** Minister of Foreign Trade, Li Qiang, gave a banquet on 10th April in honour of Roberto Kelly Vasquez, Chilean Minister of Economy, Development and Reconstruction. Also present were Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Chen Jie, and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Wenjin. Li Qiang and Vasquez held talks that morning. (NCNA in English 1528 gmt 10 Apr 79)

**Chinese view of Nicaraguan struggle against dictatorship** Noting the recent fighting against government forces in Nicaragua, the NCNA commented (in English 1955 gmt 10 Apr 79) that the Somoza regime was "in an unprecedentedly isolated position both at home and abroad" and the country's economy was deteriorating. The agency quoted well-known members of Nicaragua's opposition factions as saying that the regime was very unpopular and the vast majority of the Nicaraguan people desired to see a thorough reform of the administration.

**Bolivian Vice-Minister discusses tin production in Indonesia** (Text) Bolivia is looking forward to Indonesian support at all international tin negotiations, because both countries are members of the group of tin-producing countries. This hope was stated by Bolivian Vice-Minister of Mining and Metallurgy (?Agalbe) when he met Minister of Mining and Energy Subroto today [9th April]. The Bolivian Vice-Minister said that Bolivia, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are the biggest tin producers in the world, supplying 80% of the metal on the world market. (Jakarta home service 1300 gmt 9 Apr 79)

**Pakistan deplores US aid cut (FE/6089/A1/2)** Karachi home service reported (in English 1005 gmt 11 Apr 79) that the Pakistan Defence Minister, Ali Ahmed Talpur, had told newsmen on 11th April that he deplored the cutting off of US economic aid to Pakistan and accused the USA of applying double standards to countries in the region. He said that Pakistan's nuclear policy was geared to peaceful purposes and accelerating the pace of economic development.

[Note: Section A1 was last published in FE/6090.]

us would imagine that they were pictures from Cambodia, not a place called Timor.

But while the world's attention is understandably focused on mass famine in Cambodia, a similar tragedy is unfolding today in East Timor—and for similar reasons.

Over 250,000 people in East Timor—half the total population—now face critical starvation conditions, due to the ravages of a civil war which has raged since the Portuguese literally abandoned their island colony in 1975, with no preparation for self-sufficiency much less independence. This vacuum invited the subsequent invasion by Indonesian forces in an effort to incorporate the island into Indonesia.

A bloody guerrilla war has continued since then, and Timor was sealed from the view of the international community—by Indonesian authorities—very much as the regime of Pol Pot closed Cambodia to outside view. But finally the desperate conditions confronting their peoples could no longer be contained, and the spectre of mass famine could not be kept secret.

After many years of serious charges of human rights violations, Indonesia finally opened East Timor to the view of several international and voluntary agencies, permitting an international response to the escalating human needs on the island. Unlike Cambodia, the United States moved expeditiously to respond to the appeals of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services for emergency relief supplies.

In June, the Office of International Disaster Assistance in the Agency for International Development (AID) first provided some \$1.3 million in cash and food assistance to the ICRC and Catholic Relief Services. The total now is \$2.9 million in cash, plus \$4.7 million in Public Law 480 Food-for-Peace commodities—or some \$7.6 million combined.

In August an AID team visited East Timor and, along with an official of Catholic Relief Services, surveyed additional needs and reported their findings to our Government as well as to my office. I have closely followed developments in East Timor, and I commend AID for its expeditious action in support of international relief programs.

But if the specter of Biafra and Cambodia is not to be entirely repeated in East Timor, we must move not only to provide food and medicines. We must act as well to give strong diplomatic support to efforts to bring peace as well as relief to the people of Timor.

Mr. President, I ask that the following articles on the crisis in East Timor be printed in the Record.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1978]  
TIMORESE BATTLE FAMINE; RELIEF OFFICIALS  
COMPARE IT TO BIAFRA, CAMBODIA  
(By Paul Zach)

**JAKARTA.**—The Indonesian province of Timor is battling a famine and outbreak of disease that some relief officials here are calling as bad as Biafra and potentially as serious as Cambodia.

While the plight of Cambodian refugees in Thailand has been drawing most of the attention, officials of the U.S.-based Catholic Relief Services have mounted a virtually un-

noticed effort here to distribute 9,000 tons of food to 240,000 people in East Timor.

Volunteers from the International Red Cross and Indonesian Red Cross are rushing aid to another 60,000 villagers, some of whom have been reduced to skeletons loosely draped with skin.

Indonesian authorities are blaming the tragedy developing in Timor on a drought and on the lingering effects of a brutal civil war that followed Indonesia's takeover of the former Portuguese colony in 1976.

[Indonesia has been accused by Timorese exiles and some international human rights groups of fostering the famine through its occupation policy there. Among their charges are that Indonesian troops forcibly take food that was to have gone to the Timorese people.]

"I have been doing this sort of work for 14 years, but East Timor is the worst I have ever seen," said Frank Carlin, the head of the Catholic Relief Services office in Indonesia.

Interviewed while directing operations in East Timor, about 1,500 miles east of Jakarta, Carlin and a handful of coworkers admitted they face a difficult task convincing the world of the need for aid in yet another pocket of suffering in Southeast Asia.

The stricken province comprises the eastern half of Timor island, sliced off from the west by Portugal nearly 400 years ago for use as its coffee plantation. When the Portuguese pulled out in 1974, they left behind a single high school, a native population of 653,000 that was 90 percent illiterate and only 13 miles of roads.

The absence of roads and facilities in the hostile jungles and mountains is hampering relief work. About \$1.2 million of the \$7.7 million budgeted for East Timor by the Red Cross is going for the charter of helicopters.

The Red Cross and Catholic relief group, with aid mainly from their own coffers, and the governments of the United States, Australia and West Germany, have managed to set some stocks of high-protein biscuits, sugar, dried milk powder, rice, cooking oil, corn soya blend, and some medical supplies to the docks of the province's capital city, Dili.

But transferring the supplies from the docks to the needy has been slowed by overgrown jungle tracks and limited carrying capacity of helicopters. Red Cross delegate Cedric Neukomm said his organization needs an additional \$4 million to charter ships and increase the operating hours of helicopters.

Neukomm, a veteran of Red Cross work in critical areas, said he found conditions in East Timor worse than in Lebanon, Biafra or Bangladesh.

"What you have is a situation where people for four years have been on a starvation diet. Obviously, many will die and continue to die. But they still have a chance and a will to live and if we can get the supplies to them in time they will survive," he said.

Rescue workers report that as many as nine people die each day from starvation in the vicinity of the village of Halotia, 50 miles southwest of Dill. Red Cross doctors, who conducted a survey there, discovered 80 percent of the 8,000 villagers had malaria. Farther east, in Laga, doctors estimated malnutrition and disease claim three to five victims each day.

The terrain that has impeded transfer of supplies also has made it impossible for officials to determine the full extent of the problem.

U.S. Embassy officials, who have helped dole out \$5.1 million in aid, said they believe the worst is behind them and substantial progress has been made in dealing with about 5,000 critical cases.

Other officials in East Timor said they fear only the fringe areas of suffering have been reached so far and that heavy rains expected in December could cut off supplies and lead to more deaths.

About one-fifth of East Timor's population of about 800,000 is believed to have fled from coastal areas to the mountains during fierce fighting that broke out in 1978 between a pro-communist independence group called Fretilin and a movement favoring merger with Indonesia.

The Indonesian government later launched an all-out invasion to bolster the latter group. After eight months of civil war, President Suharto announced in July 1976 that East Timor had been incorporated as the 27th province of Indonesia, a move still drawing fire from other Third World countries in United Nations debates.

To temper the criticism, Indonesia has allocated \$15 million for development in East Timor this year. Thus far, most government contributions have gone for window-dressing like the introduction of color television in Dili.

Bitter battles between Fretilin guerrillas and Indonesians continued after annexation. The violence drove thousands of villagers into the mountains in search of refuge. It was not until Fretilin leader Nicolau Lobato was killed by Indonesian militia in an ambush late last year that the fighting subsided and people began returning from the mountains.

The island's poor soil barely allows subsistence level agriculture for residents in the best weather. But a drought last year wiped out the corn crop and the people took to eating the seeds that were to be used for this year's planting. Thus, there was little food for those returning from the mountains.

[From the New Republic]  
ANOTHER CAMBODIA

Next time you see a photo of a gaunt-eyed, swollen-bellied Cambodian child, or read a report about mass death from war, disease, and starvation in Indochina, think about the small Asian island of East Timor. Much the same thing that has happened in Cambodia has happened in East Timor, some 2500 miles to the southeast. Between a tenth and a third of the island's population—50,000 to 200,000 persons—has been killed or has died from lack of food and medicine since fighting started in 1976. Half a generation of Timorese children may have been rendered mentally retarded by malnutrition. Right now 250,000 Timorese are languishing in re-settlement camps which one recent visitor, a refugee-relief expert, described as "horrible—as horrible as any I've seen anywhere, including the Thai-Cambodian border." Of these 260,000, about 60,000 face starvation unless relief supplies reach them within the next two months, and 28,000 are in critical condition at this very moment.

For Americans, there is a big difference between Timor and Cambodia. We do not have the luxury, in the case of Timor, of blaming what's happened on Khmer Rouge fanatics or the communist government of North Vietnam. The agony of East Timor is the result of a bloody and brutal territorial seizure by America's friend, Indonesia, and we are deeply implicated in what has happened. Indonesia's original invasion, in December 1975, occurred just 13 hours after President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had visited Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, raising no public objection to the impending attack. American weapons were used in the initial assault and throughout Indonesia's four-year campaign to suppress nationalist guerrillas. The Ford administration accepted Indonesia's claim to East Timor, and so did the Carter administration, which (despite its stated policy of limiting world arms transfers) increased military sales to Indonesia from the Ford level of three million dollars to \$112 million in 1978.

Despite consistent reports by Australian and other sources about Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, and despite occasional congressional hearings on events there, the



Carter administration has raised scarcely a public peep over human rights violations on the island. The US doesn't want unfortunate goings-on in an obscure place to frustrate better relations with the world's fifth most populous country, a resources-rich anti-communist ally strategically placed in the gap between the Asian mainland and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indonesia, in effect, has extorted the United States into silence by making it clear it would allow no Western humanitarian relief agencies to visit and help Timor if too much were said about what's going on there. Even now, Carter administration officials are afraid to say too much, lest Indonesia refuse to cooperate in saving those who face starvation between now and the monsoon season.

The conscience of America will be eased to know that the US government, having supplied the weapons of Timor's destruction, is now providing 8119 tons of a high-protein rice and corn soy blend to feed its refugees, and has furnished \$2.9 million in aid to the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services, the agencies responsible for helping Timor's population. However, the conscience of America should not rest too easy. American officials raise some doubt whether enough transportation facilities exist on the island to get food and medicine to all who need it before the rains start. An American researcher who has done extensive work on Timor, Arnold Kohen, also cites church and government sources in Australia, Indonesia, and the US as charging that Indonesian military authorities have systematically plundered previous relief shipments and parceled out the remainder on a politically discriminatory basis. The conscience of America really should not rest at least until the US government has done all it can to assure that the people it has made miserable really are helped.

It is not terribly surprising that America has paid little attention to Timor up to now. It is located nowhere—at the far southern end of the Malay archipelago, 350 miles north of Australia. The whole island is about double the size of New Jersey, and for 400 years it has been divided culturally and politically into eastern and western parts. West Timor was a Dutch colony with a large Moslem population, and naturally joined Indonesia (which is predominantly Moslem) when the rest of the country won its independence. East Timor, however, was Portuguese and heavily Catholic. It was not at all necessary or natural that it would join Indonesia when the Portuguese withdrew in 1975. A brief, bloody civil war was fought in September of that year between left- and right-wing factions committed to independence. The left-wing faction, Fretilin, won out, using arms provided or taken from the former Portuguese garrison.

Indonesia was willing to tolerate a Portuguese East Timor, but not an independent mini-state. The right-wing government of President Suharto has asserted that Fretilin was a communist movement, but US officials say there is no evidence whatever to support the claim. Probably Indonesia figured it had nothing to gain by tolerating an independent neighbor. The Indonesians first sent in commando units from West Timor, which seized border areas in September 1975 and (according to Australian intelligence sources) killed five Australian television reporters who filmed the invasion.

In late November, Fretilin declared independence and on December 3 it appealed to President Ford to prevent Indonesia from invading. During Ford's visit to Jakarta, Kissinger issued a public statement saying that the United States "understands Indonesia's position on the question" of Timor. Whatever American officials may have said in

private about what Indonesia was about to do, it certainly had no deterrent effect. On December 7 Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion against the East Timor capital of Dili. A high-ranking Indonesian general confirmed to a US congressional delegation that "of course there were US weapons used. These are the only weapons that we have."

There is virtually no dispute that the initial invasion was accompanied by widespread, indiscriminate killings of civilians by Indonesian troops. As in Vietnam, and as in Indonesia's own civil war, ethnic Chinese seem to have been a special target of systematic brutality and murder. US State Department officials admit excesses during the early days of fighting, but claim offending soldiers and commanders were removed and disciplined. Critics of US policy assert, however, that the top commander of the forces attacking Dili was not disciplined at all, but was decorated and promoted to brigadier general.

It is an interesting parallel between Cambodia and East Timor—and one which may not be coincidental—that the Indonesian government, like Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia, made it almost impossible for the outside world to know what it was doing as it attempted to assert control over the land. Prior to its invasion, Indonesia warned Australia to get all its nationals out of the country, and also demanded the departure of International Red Cross workers. As in Cambodia, foreign visits were permitted only rarely, and then were tightly controlled.

Because of the secrecy, it's impossible to know exactly what transpired in Timor from 1975 until this year, when a few Westerners again began to travel around the country as part of relief efforts. Indonesia justified its secrecy, and its activities, as an "internal matter" after May 1976, when an Indonesian-appointed "Regional Popular Assembly" unanimously voted to ask for incorporation of Timor into Indonesia. This action has been declared invalid three times by the United Nations General Assembly. The Carter administration's official human rights report declared diplomatically that the US "has accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, but it does not recognize that a valid act of self-determination occurred." Recognition of the incorporation, however, saves the US from having to object to its ally's use of US-supplied equipment to commit aggression.

On the ground in East Timor, it's clear that after Indonesia's invasion, Fretilin's forces fled the island's small urban centers for the rugged highlands. The insurgents may have numbered as many as 25,000 persons. In 1976, the Indonesian military began to make use of Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco" counter-insurgency aircraft—slow-moving planes equipped with infrared detectors, bombs, rockets, napalm, and machine guns, specifically designed for close combat support against an enemy without an effective antiaircraft capability. US congressional committees have been told by critics of American policy that Indonesia used the planes not only to destroy guerrilla strongpoints, but also to wreck the villages and crops of highland dwellers in order to separate them from Fretilin.

Estimates of casualties in Timor vary greatly. In 1976, a leader of a provisional government created by Indonesia said he believed 80,000 persons had been killed. In March 1977, James Dunn, an Australian parliament researcher and former consul in Timor who is the most energetic gatherer of information about the island's travail, told a US congressional committee that 100,000 persons had been killed. He based his estimate on reports from Indonesian church officials and refugees. At the same congressional hearing, US State Department officials said such high reports were "great-

ly exaggerated." One official said that the death toll was probably 10,000. This year, James Dunn compared pre-war Portuguese census figures with current Indonesian military estimates of the population and found that 300,000 persons are "missing." Kohen, citing church sources, says more than 200,000 have died. One US State Department official said last week that 100,000 is the "generally accepted figure" on Timorese deaths. Another said he knew of no accepted figure. What American intelligence agencies know from Australian monitoring of Indonesian military communications, US officials will not say.

The most intense fighting in Timor has occurred during the Carter administration's tenure in office—and so have most of the casualties. In mid-1977, Indonesia offered an amnesty to Fretilin, but also moved 10,000 fresh troops into the country and stepped up counter-insurgency operations. In the fall, a French photo-journalist slipped into the country and later claimed that the Indonesian army was "systematically wiping out" villages suspected of supporting the guerrillas. In 1978, employing search-and-destroy techniques, heavy air bombardments, and helicopter-borne attacks, the Indonesians began to make decisive headway against Fretilin. On the last day of the year, an Indonesian force killed the opposition's president, Nicolau Lobato.

The level of continuing resistance in Timor is in dispute. Indonesian authorities seem confident enough now to allow some Westerners to make helicopter visits around the countryside more or less freely as they inspect refugee camps. However other sources, including Arnold Kohen, contend that the resistance is still alive. Kohen asserts, citing reports from US government officials and church sources, that the Indonesian military's policy is to execute summarily all Fretilin members, supporters, and their families, leaving resistance fighters little choice but to hide when they are unable to fight. Although the US government recognizes Indonesia's take-over of Timor, it's still not clear that Timor has acquiesced.

During 1978 and 1979, a massive stream of Timorese refugees—some 300,00—has descended from the interior highlands to coastal areas and towns, driven by a combination of war devastation and drought to seek food, medicine, and shelter. The condition of the refugees has been described by witnesses as being worse than in Biafra, the Sahel, or Bangladesh during their respective disasters. In September 1978, church relief workers told visiting correspondents that 500 people per month were dying in one East Timor district alone. Other recent visitors say a third of the refugees are marasmic—emaciated, bellies swollen from malnutrition—or post-marasmic, in a state where their bodies are consuming their own protein. Of 250,000 now in refugee camps, one experienced relief official said he guessed 25,000 "are not going to make it" in spite of international relief efforts. The scale may be smaller, but Timor is another Cambodia—and it is partly our responsibility.

#### WINDFALL PROFITS TAX—UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

● Mr. GARN. Mr. President, on October 30 I wrote to Secretary William Miller, Secretary Charles Duncan, Jr., Secretary Harold Brown, and Mr. Stuart Eizenstat asking questions on the effect of the windfall profits tax on refiners and integrated producers. As of this date I have not received a reply to my questions from any of them.

We are about to start debate on the windfall profits tax and I am disappointed that I have not had the courtesy

I spent July 25-30 in Washington, D.C. conducting unofficial discussions on Indonesia with the intent of establishing contacts for future work. The following is a rough description of my meetings and other related activities.

July 25: Upon arrival in D.C., I went immediately to the office of Representative Thomas Harkin (D.-Iowa). I delivered a copy of James Dunn's April 6, 1979 "Notes on the Current Situation in East Timor" to one of Harkin's aides, Holly Burkhalter. I then went to meet with Bruce Cameron, the Foreign Policy Lobbyist at Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). He talked with me for an hour, giving advice on my already scheduled appointments, suggesting points and questions to pursue with some of them, making appointments with people whom he considered it worthwhile for me to visit, the most important being Senator Kennedy's human rights aide. Bruce pointed out that the next day would be important, because the Senate and House Foreign Affairs Conference Committee would be meeting to consider the two houses' Foreign Security Assistance Bills for 1980. At stake was a \$10 million amendment in Indonesia's favor proposed by Senator John Glenn (D.-Ohio) for Indonesia. Bruce told me that he was not able to do any last minute lobbying on this question, and that I should raise the question with Stanley Roth, foreign policy aide to Rep. Stephen Solarz (D.-N.Y.). I also gave Bruce a fifteen minute summary of recent political and human rights developments in Indonesia. He asked about the reports that the U.S. embassy had substituted Jusuf Wanandi for Yap Thiam Hien last year during Vice President Mondale's meeting with Indonesian human rights advocates in Jakarta.

July 26: I first met with Stanley Roth in Stephen Solarz's office. He explained that Solarz was going to be fighting against additional funds for Morocco and Zaire, in his position as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. Roth said that Solarz would probably not be willing to raise the question of Glenn's \$10 million amendment, because he did not want to gain a reputation as a generalist on these matters. Roth did however promise to raise my objections with Solarz before the meeting and also stated that our prospects for changing some of the Congressional approach to Indonesia were good for the long term. He said that if someone else takes the lead on questions of human rights and arms sales to Indonesia, one could count on support from Solarz. He encouraged me to continue working in Washington on the issue. A follow-up phonecall on July 30 to Roth revealed that Solarz was interested, but not in initiating. Roth said that Rep. Lester Wolff (D.-N.Y.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, had been talking about raising the issue of Glenn's amendment before the meeting. This is because I managed to see Wolff's non-Asian affairs foreign policy aide, Sue Hartstein, just before the conference meeting. This meeting was arranged by my Congressman's (Richard Ottinger D.-N.Y.) human rights aide, Melissa Grant. I explained to Ms. Hartstein that Indonesia had recently realized a \$1 billion windfall from the OPEC price rises, and that due to inflationary pressures, was really unable to sink this money into the economy. She promised to raise the issue with the Congressman. She had never heard of Timor. She asked my advice on a proposed \$60 million grant to Indonesia for population control. I offered to write her in the near future on this question.



From Wolff's office I went to Foggy Bottom to meet with John Saltzberg of the Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. He is now working under Mark Schneider on Asia. Previously, he was Rep. Donald Fraser's staff member on the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, and played an important role in the human rights hearings conducted by Fraser. We spoke for an hour. I presented a straightforward critique of State's reporting on human rights in Indonesia and Timor, and also gave him an update on the trials and recent reports from Timor. I provided him with a number of articles and documents. He told me that he was very interested, because it seemed that there was some discrepancy between current reality and the State Department's recent reporting. He requested a detailed critique of the 1979 human rights report submitted to Congress. I raised the issue of recent Indonesian requests for large quantities of anti-riot equipment to be bought with U.S. security assistance money. He was interested, saying that it gave him "something to get a handle on". He asked me to stay in touch and to continue providing him with information, because State will soon begin preparing the 1980 human rights reports.

I went from Foggy Bottom back to the Hill to meet with Bob Holstine, minority staff member of Wolff's Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is the staff member with responsibility for East Timor. Really a disgusting guy. He did most of the talking, weaving a web of innuendo, insinuation, rumour and fiction. I interrupted little, as I felt there was no point to argue with him. Every now and then I interjected something when his talk bordered on the totally ludicrous. But my intention was to simply establish contact for future reference. He told me that his contacts around Washington had acknowledged that Americans had been in Timor on investigating during recent years, particularly prior to the FRETILIN claims of June 1978, but didn't believe that they had been involved in fighting. Also acknowledged that 60,000 could be dead. He did everything possible to disparage Dunn, Saltzberg, Chomsky and other troublemakers... He seemed very out of touch with the last couple of years of campaigning in this country. He offered to "run reports by his sources" for me.

After Holstine I went to visit briefly with Clayton Fowler, foreign affairs aide to Senator Zorinsky of Nebraska. Zorinsky is a Democrat on Glenn's Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, but his primary work is on Western Hemisphere affairs... He was in the forefront of Congressional critics of Somoza in Nicaragua. I outlined the situation in Indonesia and Timor, not asking for anything, just asking Fowler to raise the issue with Zorinsky. He was receptive, took some materials for reading and asked me to stay in touch. He also wanted to know who else on the Hill was interested and/or doing anything on the issue.

July 27: During the morning I edited Dunn's recent report for inclusion in the Congressional Record by Tom Harkin's office. This will probably be done during the debate on the Foreign Aid bill after the August recess. Ottinger's office has also offered to put the student trial exception that appeared in Indonesia and TAPOL Bulletin in the record. Bruce Cameron requested that I prepare for him a draft of a statement relating the boat people issue to Timor for submission to members of a house junket to Asia to look into the Indochinese refugee situation.

In the afternoon I met with Carl Ford of Senator Glenn's office. I spoke with him on Timor, Indonesia and American arms aid. He gave me the standard line on continuing military aid to ASEAN countries... to maintain influence. But he was willing to concede that Timor is a special case. He acknowledged that mass murder has taken place and

that it is one of the worst instances of human rights violations. He said that on the basis of our conversation he will request to visit Timor when he goes on a factfinding visit to Indonesia at the end of the year. I gave him materials and promised to remain in contact.

July 28: I wrote a three page statement on Timor and the boat people for Bruce Cameron. In a follow-up phonecall on August 2 he told me that they had used the statement as I had written it, simply adding a paragraph. This was distributed to the Congressmen going to Indonesia, along with excerpts from Dunn's report and other information on Timor. The people carrying out this exercise were concentrating exclusively on Timor.

July 30: In the morning I met with Senator Kennedy's human rights aide. My purpose was to impress upon him the seriousness of the situation in Indonesia and Timor. I gave him a rundown on the history, recent reports and who is interested in Washington. He requested that I submit to him various suggestions and if possible, the names of notable prisoners. I will explain to him the present situation, where advocates are awaiting the outcome of the 1979 releases. I will probably emphasize three points with him: 1) The student trials 2) The remaining Buru prisoners and in particular the Savanajaya detainees and 3) their need for international observers and relief organizations to be allowed into East Timor.

In the afternoon I met with Fariborz Fatemi, staffmember in charge of human rights on Don Bonker's (D.-Washington) Subcommittee on International Organizations. He told me of his plans to hold further hearings on Indonesia and the Philippines in October. He wants to obtain an update on Indonesia from Amnesty International and Ben Anderson, and also to learn how State had been formulating its human rights reports for submission to the Congress. He is superb. He recognizes the seriousness of the conditions in Indonesia, and also spoke favorably of Bonker's concern for human rights. Fariborz asked me to keep in contact and in September to submit a dozen questions that could be used in putting together questions for the subcommittee. A side note on the Subcommittee on International Organizations: A friend of mine from my class at Vassar College, Carole Grunberg, is the staff member in charge of International Organizations.



October 1, 1979

Notes on Washington II

During the week of September 17-23 I returned to Washington, D.C. to continue the work that I began in July (See Notes on Washington of 8/6/79- Now I). This time the nature of my work changed considerably. Whereas in July I went as a "concerned private citizen", this time I functioned as an "Indonesia expert" working for Bruce Cameron, the foreign policy lobbyist at the ADA (See Now I).

The week began with a Monday evening meeting at the ADA. This session had been requested by Bruce in order to coordinate some of the work that is being done on East Timor and Washington, and to give him more background on the issues. It was attended by Arnold Kohen, myself, Bruce, Holly Burkhalter-an aide to Rep. Tom Harkin (D.-Iowa), Veronica Parke, Rachel Grossman and Bruce's intern, Lexie Dewey. We talked for two hours. Bruce is developing various strategies on Timor, with a primary focus upon the need there for massive relief aid. Also of importance is publicizing to role of American military aid. We emphasized to him that any noise from Washington will unsettle Jakarta. The hope is to get some hearings again.

On Tuesday and Wednesday I worked at the ADA offices, preparing three one page briefs on the Timor issue for distribution on the Hill. These were written for Sen. DeConcini (D.-Arizona), who had agreed to ask questions on Timor in the Senate's mark-up session on the Foreign Aid bill, but they have been circulated in other offices. The two questions that DeConcini agreed to ask were 1) Is U.S. economic aid reaching East Timor? If not, why not? and 2) Is U.S. Supplied military aid being used in East Timor and if so why? Bruce gave me a number of names to call to make appointments for later in the week. Arnold stayed around until Tuesday afternoon editing his article for The New Republic. I also worked with Bruce's intern, Lexie, who is focusing her work on Timor.

On Thursday 9/20 I had a series of meetings. Accompanied by Lexie Dewey, I met first with Bob Paquin, the foreign affairs aide to Sen. Leahy (D.-Vermont), who is on the Foreign Relations Committee and who would be attending the mark-up session. We talked about Timor for 45 minutes. What was interesting to me was that he has recently been hearing about Timor via other channels. The issue seems to be slowly spreading around the Hill. Paquin asked me to have DeConcini's aide, Jerry Bonham, contact him after our Friday meeting. I lunched on Thursday with Gareth Porter, author of a number of pieces on Vietnam and Cambodia, and foreign affairs aide to Rep. Clarence Long (D.-Maryland), who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations. We only talked about Vietnam and Cambodia. In the afternoon I went to the offices of the Christian Science Monitor, where I met with Dan Sutherland, a staff reporter who is interested in doing a piece on East Timor. He was particularly interested in the reports of the manipulation of humanitarian aid from abroad, a point that I was emphasizing in all of my meetings. I gave him material and we will probably speak again in the near future. He is proposing to do this article on top of all his other responsibilities at the paper.

On Friday 9/21 I met with four people. In the morning I met briefly with Jerry Bonham, aide to Sen. DeConcini. He was busy (or did not want to talk), so I did little more than leave him the question briefs, a copy of Jill Jolliffe's article in The Manchester Guardian and a copy of the recent ACFOA report on Aid and East Timor. Then I went to meet with Dawn Calabria, human rights aide to Rep. Stephen Solarz (D.-N.Y. See NOW I). I described the reports on the refugee situation, and then discussed the visit of a U.S. AID official to Southeast Asia which was taking place at that time. One of the issues on his agenda was Timor, and according to Dawn, the AID relief fund was considering giving considerable aid to Timor (via Indonesia?). The figure was apparently going to be over \$1 million. From Solarz's office I went to meet with Chris Nelson, staff member on Lester Wolff's Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Also present were another Democratic staff member and the minority counsel, Jon Holstine (See NOW I). I presented my case forcefully because Holstine was present. At our previous meeting I heard his side without much comment, but this time, in the presence of his fellow staff members, I laid it on the line. I then had lunch with Nelson, to "make friends" for future reference. His basic line is that one should not reopen the Timor issue for "political reasons", but he agreed that conditions warranted international attention.. During the afternoon I met again with Gareth Porter, and this time we discussed only the situation in Timor and Indonesia. He was very interested. He has been involved with his Congressman in emphasizing the need for international oversight of relief aid to Cambodia, and he thinks that he can get Long to take a similar stand on aid destined for Timor, if Congress has any say in such a disbursement. Gareth is also interested in having hearings on Timor before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee. Some of the other members of this subcommittee are very good, including Howard Wolpe (D.-Michigan) and Rep. McHugh (D.-N.Y.) who represents the district which includes Ithaca and Cornell.

I also met a couple of times with Holly Burkhalter. She has been doing some fantastic work on Timor. Recently, she has taken a number of important initiatives in approaching her boss (Rep. Harkin) on the issue. Harkin is excellent on human rights and has been receptive to her suggestions. One thing she is working on is setting up an East Timor Monitoring Group that would bring together a number of concerned Congressmen. It would serve an oversight function, circulating statements to fellow Congressmen and collecting information. She is becoming acquainted with the issue and has a wide range of materials. Over the phone on 9/28 she told me that the statement that we had circulated amongst a group of Congressmen who went to Southeast Asia during August to investigate the "boat people" situation (See NOW I) had had some good results. The Representative to Congress from Guam, Antonio Juonpat (a non-voting representative), who is chairman of the Interior Committee's Subcommittee on Pacific Affairs (probably overseeing American trust territories in the Pacific) apparently made a real "pain in the neck" of himself while the delegation was in Jakarta. All he wanted to talk about was Timor and he even requested permission to visit the island..but this was not allowed. Holly and I talked about various ways to follow up on this, including having Harkin go talk to Juonpat, and us going to meet with his Subcommittee staff. There is the possibility of getting him to hold hearings. Holly had the Asian Bureau Australia report on Timor inserted in the Congressional Record last week, and then had it reprinted in the bulletin of the Democratic Study Group, a publication that is read all over the Hill. This should be an on-going operation, because



there is plenty of other recent material worth printing for distribution on the Hill. Holly is without a doubt going to be important in our future work.

During the week in Washington I decided that the time had come for me to move down to continue this work on a regular basis. I have a house in Arlington already, at a price that will allow me a few months to find work. I asked Bruce about working for him on human rights, something he said that he had already considered, but at the moment ADA has no funds available, although they have applied for a grant. I expect to begin doing volunteer work for him on this issue on a regular basis.

Visit reports by:

Jeremy Mark

(working with  
Carmel B.)

1042 Westbrook Drive  
Rome, New York 13440  
Phone: 315-336-4490  
June 7, 1979

Ms. Meg Greenfield  
Editorial Page Editor  
The Washington Post

Dear Ms. Greenfield:

Your editorial on East Timor (May 30, 1979) not only misrepresents, but worse, it makes light of a serious conflict in Southeast Asia. East Timor has not appeared out of nowhere to claim its independence. Along with other former Portuguese colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, Timor, since 1960, was scheduled for decolonization. To suggest that its claim is an unreasonable extravagance, which the world cannot afford, shows both a shocking ignorance and a contempt for international law.

Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975, and announced several months later that a so-called "People's Assembly" had decided to join Indonesia. As the Washington Post itself pointed out in an editorial on May 23, 1976 ("Integration Without Choice"), Jakarta's need to keep 30,000 troops in East Timor to back up this "decision" exposed the real nature of the "People's Assembly". But one cannot pretend that this situation came about simply because Jakarta "had the power" and the Timorese did not, as your recent editorial states. This sort of explanation, coming from a renowned Washington-based newspaper, is nothing short of cynicism. Surely the editors of the Post are aware that Indonesia's invasion was carried out almost exclusively with American supplied-arms. This is a matter of record, as stated in the four Congressional hearings on East Timor held by former Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minnesota). And, according to the Los Angeles Times (Nov. 25, 1977), by late 1977, Jakarta's original arms supplied was seriously depleted, by the heavy fighting in East Timor. The United States and other Western countries, notably France and Britain, saw fit to help replenish these arms supplies. I would draw your attention to the fact that the United States has, since 1976, supplied Jakarta with sixteen OV-10 counterguerilla aircraft, manufactured by the Rockwell International Corporation. These planes, according to February 1978 testimony before the Fraser subcommittee, are equipped with infrared detectors, rockets, bombs and napalm, and are useful chiefly against an enemy without effective anti-aircraft weaponry at their disposal. In short, these planes are ideally suited for warfare against the Timorese independence forces. Data from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies shows very clearly that prior to our shipment of the OV-10 planes to Indonesia, Jakarta lacked such aircraft. The United States has, therefore, played a significant role in increasing Indonesia's destructive capacity in East Timor.

The only paragraph in your editorial that approaches the Timor problem soberly is the final one, in which you refer to reports that as many as 100,000 people may have been killed thus far. I find it incredible that you can mention a figure of this sort and still treat so cavalierly the question of East Timor's independence.



Your recommendation that East Timor be opened to foreign journalists and the International Red Cross is sound. But recent history shows that Jakarta is loath to allow any independent observers completely free access to East Timor. Jakarta has already led selected visitors on carefully-controlled "tours": I personally know of a British journalist who visited East Timor under such circumstances in September 1978. As for the International Red Cross, in 1976 Jakarta accorded that organization what proved to be a symbolic, 48 hour visit. If the Timorese are to be properly assisted, not only the International Red Cross but other reputable agencies as well (such as Catholic Relief Services) must be given permission to work freely throughout the territory.

The International Red Cross, however, cannot be relied upon as a news source, since their reports usually remain confidential for a number of years. For an accurate picture of events to emerge, East Timor must be opened to knowledgeable, neutral observers-- preferably foreigners who lived in Timor before the invasion. Several Americans and other Westerners are familiar with the local languages in East Timor, and would be in a good position to look beyond the surface of the situation. Journalists who have visited East Timor recently, it should be noted, have not been allowed independent interpreters. This state of affairs only underscores the sort of coverup that the Indonesian government is seeking to perpetuate.

The distortions found in your editorial demand rectification. I would suggest that this may be best accomplished (and the war in East Timor given the serious attention it warrants) by inviting an informed observer, such as Noam Chomsky, to address the question in the pages of the Post.

Sincerely,

*Roberta A. Quance*

Roberta A. Quance

P.S. The Post might also send an experienced reporter to interview East Timorese refugees who live close to Lisbon. The distinguished American newspaper that uncovered the Watergate events has a responsibility, in the case of East Timor, to help put an end to the systematic coverup carried out by Jakarta. Recent reports from responsible figures in the Catholic Church inside East Timor say that from 60,000 to 120,000 people may have been killed to date as a result of the Indonesian invasion. Persistent reports of this nature warrant an immediate investigation by the Post.

410 Stewart Ave.  
Ithaca, NY 14850  
Nov. 26, 1979

Mr. Bob Wahls  
Photography Editor  
The Daily News

Dear Mr. Wahls,

I spoke with you on Sunday concerning the photographs on East Timor that you received from Kevin Healy. I am an old friend of Kevin's and have also done a bit of writing on the subject, for The Nation and Newsday. Richard Dudman of the St Louis Post-Dispatch picked up on my Nation piece, as did Murray Kempton.

The situation has gotten a good deal worse since I wrote the abovementioned articles, as illustrated by the photos and the enclosed New Republic piece. You may be interested to know that Father Bryan Hehair of the US Catholic Conference in Washington recently informed two Timorese priests who visited him that when Pope John Paul was here, he raised the Timor issue with Zbigniew Brzezinski. This is perhaps an indication of the seriousness of the matter. Naturally, The News can check this with Father Hehair.

The Catholic Church cannot take any open action, however, since Indonesia is a predominantly Islamic country and churches in general must watch their step there.

Many churchmen are convinced that public exposure of the situation in East Timor can help improve the situation. Since I grew up in Queens and still visit there frequently, I know the power of the Daily News to sway public opinion. I hope that you can do something with the photos.

Feel free to contact me if I can be of any assistance. My home phone is 607 272 7557, but through Friday the 7th of Dec. I can be reached through Kevin at 202 667 0746.

Thank you for your attention,

Sincerely,

Arnold S. Kohen



Stephen S. Rosenfeld  
The Washington Post  
1150 15th St., NW  
Washington, D.C. 20071

Dear Mr. Rosenfeld,

Thank you for your excellent column, "The Policy of Famine" (Nov. 23), which gave long overdue coverage to a much-neglected issue.

For several years, I have done extensive research on the case of East Timor, which you mention. Most recently, I assisted Morton Kondracke in an article that he wrote for The New Republic ("Another Cambodia", Nov. 3). I have also written for The Nation and Newsday on this subject, and am currently preparing an article for the San Francisco-based bi-weekly, Inquiry. In addition, I assisted Jack Anderson's office in their investigation of the situation, which resulted in two columns on Nov. 8 and 9, and may result in others.

I find one paragraph of your Nov. 23 column particularly relevant to the East Timor situation:

"The civilian victims are customarily removed, by remoteness and the starver's censorship, from the news coverage that might help the humanitarian community mobilize the political community. The starver's troops often limit or deny the victims the benefit of international relief, if it is offered."

The popular image one has received from recent press coverage of East Timor is that the territory is finally open to international relief agencies. This is true, however, in only a very limited way: the International Committee of the Red Cross has only been allowed to bring in three staffers to oversee an operation aimed at 60,000 "critical cases." There is one ICRC doctor, one nurse, and one administrator on the ground. This is not because the ICRC cannot spare more people; it is due to the desire of the Indonesian military to keep the territory as closed to outside scrutiny as possible.

Catholic Relief Services also has an operation in East Timor, but here there is no fulltime, independent CRS staffer on the ground. CRS' Jakarta director visits Timor only periodically. Those CRS relief workers who are actually on the scene are either Indonesian or Timorese, and are in no position to defy the Indonesian military authorities. This is a point worth stressing, since over the last four years there have been numerous reports that relief aid donated from abroad rarely reaches the intended recipients; these same reports say that the Indonesian military systematically plunders foreign relief shipments. These reports are supported by a detailed account that I recently received from an acquaintance of mine in the U.S. Intelligence

Community.

In other words, Timor is another Cambodia in more ways than one. Unless the international community finds ways to provide significant oversight over the East Timor relief operation, it is doubtful that the situation will improve to any great extent.

There are some Members of Congress who have expressed interest in doing something about the East Timor situation, but more help is needed. Before anybody can do anything, however, people have to know the facts, as distinct from both Indonesian government propaganda and State Department evasions. You will be interested to know that there is a pronounced policy split within the State Department on this question, with some people deeply disturbed over what they see as a deliberate Department policy to downplay the East Timor situation, or ignore it entirely. Half-truths on the part of the Department have become standard fare on this issue, and things really are not getting any better.

I would be prepared to write an Op-ed piece for the Post and detail the current status of the Timor situation. I feel that such a piece is both timely and necessary, since the issues have become so blurred by flawed press reports that even a concerned observer# would have difficulty figuring out what is going on. At the same time, coverage in the Post would help the humanitarian community mobilize the political community, something that cannot happen too soon.

I will be in Washington from Nov. 29-Dec. 6, and can be reached at either of the following numbers: 667-4094 (message only) or 638-6447 (Americans for Democratic Action). Otherwise, my numbers in Ithaca are 607 272 7557 (home); 607 256 3619 (office).

Thank you for your attention, and again, thank you for an excellent column.

Sincerely,

*Arnold S. Kohen*

Arnold S. Kohen

P.S. I can provide personal references on request.





The Australian Associate of OXFAM



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Chairman  
Mr. David Scott  
Director:  
Mr. Adrian Harris  
Hon. Treasurer  
Mr. Philip Harris

September 5, 1979.

Mr Arnold Kohen,  
410 Stewart Avenue,  
ITHACA, N.Y. 14850 U.S.A.

Dear Arnold,

Thank you very much for sending me the interesting items  
on East Timor. I admire your commitment and perseverance.

Apart from Jill Jolliffe's interview with the priest in  
Portugal, there has not been much on the current situa-  
tion in the Australian press. Our recently retired Head  
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Allan Renouf, has  
just published a book which has some interesting histori-  
cal references to U.S./Australian/Indonesian connivance  
just prior to the invasion. I have sent Sue some brief  
references and I think she will try to obtain a copy of  
the book which has several pages of revelations about  
Australian foreign policy re East Timor.

I am enclosing a copy of a review prepared by the Austra-  
lian Council for Overseas Aid which attempts to draw to-  
gether the most recent information on the situation of  
people in East Timor.

With again thanks and good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

David Scott

Enc.

Dear Arnold,

Many thanks for your letter. I do remember having met you during my visit nearly two years ago. I have also sent a copy of the article I wrote for "World Review" to your address. I am delighted that Noam Chomsky has taken an interest in the Timor affair, and it gives me some hope that this travesty of human rights and justices will continue to receive some attention. As you will now know the Fretilin President, Nicolau Lobato has been killed by Indonesian troops near Maubisse. He died on 31 December 1978, supposedly after he and other members of Fretilin had been ambushed. My enquiries here suggest that he might in fact have been lured into some kind of trap by a defector, and that he and some 22 other Timorese were then summarily executed. But of course I have no hard evidence at this moment. Nicolau's death is a tragic loss, and unfortunately it does mean that Fretilin's military capability has now been substantially reduced with the remaining independence forces more or less confined to the area between Suai and Bobonaro in the south west. I fervently hope that interest in the plight of the Timorese people will not diminish. Their suffering has clearly been terrible, and our governments stand condemned for having helped the Indonesians cover up this gross violation of human rights, to say nothing about the right of self-determination. In effect a small nation has been callously and cruelly raped. I have just received some information via a third party - one from an Indonesian general who insists that Australian and U.S. diplomatic and intelligence officials in Jakarta were informed of Indonesia's intention to invade East Timor some 2 weeks ~~before~~ the invasion was launched on 7 December, 1974. Another source is a highly placed official involved in Indonesian operations in E. Timor. The latter has admitted that most reports of atrocities are true and has stated that the death toll of 100,000 might well be on the low side. This places the Timor tragedy among the worst, relatively speaking, in recent history. It also explains why the Indonesians are so reluctant to let anyone out. But a few are getting out and I am hoping to add substantially to my files on this subject.

Arnold, I have heard nothing from the New York Review of Books, but of course I would be happy to write an article about events in Timor. You might be aware that I have been trying to get to an American University to do some work on the Timor affair. Thanks to an initiative from Donald Fraser I was invited to apply for a Woodrow Wilson fellowship, and I should ~~have~~ learn the outcome of my application within 3 or 4 weeks. I have suggested as my topic the performance in human rights of the U.S., Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Britain in the West Irian and Timor affairs. If this comes off, I would be delighted to speak at Cornell on Timor. As you might know, I worked on Indonesia in the Defence And Foreign Affairs Departments for some years and I am thus well acquainted with the course of events over the past 20 years. I also tried the Carnegie Endowment but there has not been much response from that body. If you have any suggestions I should be glad to hear about them. If all else fails, we owe it to the memory of those tens of thousands of Timorese who have been put to the sword, and to those who continue to suffer, to place the full facts of the rape of East Timor before civilized and caring people in the international community.

By the way, what has become of Donald Fraser and John Salisbury? To whom can we now send information about Indonesia and Timor? Here in Australia public interest in the Timor situation has diminished. In universities as well as in government circles, I regret to say that Timor is a subject most shy away from, because of "the overriding importance of the Indonesian relationship" as well as a pervasive sense of guilt and shame. I have continued to write and speak out my situation is an increasingly lonely one, and there have been some efforts to silence me. But Arnold I cannot ~~get~~ turn away from this terrible tragedy. In recent years my experience has been in broader international issues - the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, S.E. Asia, the Indian Ocean Question, but in a broad international perspective the Timor experience remains no less ugly and unacceptable than as a particular country study.

Thank you for writing. Let us keep in touch, and hope for the possibility of an early meeting. Perhaps we should press for an international conference on East Timor. A British group talked about it, and even went as far as asking me to attend, but nothing more happened. Best wishes Q Q



While Western governments have roundly condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (and, repeatedly, human rights violations in Indochina), they have said scarcely a word about events in another part of Southeast Asia, where the Indonesian military regime continues what has been described as one of the most brutal instances of armed occupation since the Second World War. Indonesian forces equipped almost exclusively by the United States invaded the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in late 1975 (see Kohen, The Nation, Nov. 26, 1977), and since then, amidst reports of massive atrocities, have been attempting to crush the nationalist movement there. Despite convincing testimony in four hearings through February 1978 before former Rep. Donald M. Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations, the Carter Administration remains firmly committed to a policy of averting its eyes and stepping up sales of advanced counter-guerilla aircraft to Jakarta. The consequences of this policy became apparent in September 1978, when a party of journalists and diplomats -- including the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia -- were brought to East Timor on what reporter Norman Peagam termed "a carefully organized official visit." One ambassador told the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review (Sept. 29, 1978) that the children in one Indonesian-run "transit camp" were so undernourished that "they reminded him of victims of an African famine." Church relief workers told the same correspondent that in one East Timor district alone, as many as 500 people a month have died of starvation. Michael Hodgman, a Member of

Parliament in Australia's ruling conservative coalition later stated that the Jakarta regime may be guilty of "the greatest cover-up in history since the Nazi concentration camps". He also charged that 30,000 to 40,000 had died of starvation as a result of Indonesian use of defoliants, which also appear to have generated the flow of refugees from areas controlled by East Timor's FRETILIN independence movement.

Although Hodgman's reference to the Third Reich may seem a bit exaggerated, one of the early advocates of the East Timor invasion, General Yoga Sugama, head of Indonesian equivalents of both the FBI and CIA, in an interview aired on Dutch TV (Sept. 23, 1978) compared his position to that of one of the Nazi leaders. Sugama spoke in English:

What I like to say is this: the position given to me has never had any precedent in any country, not before. The only precedent was during Hitler's time and was given by Himmler -- only with a great difference -- that Himmler is doing it subjectively, because he has the power to do that and he is a powerful man who can do anything on earth, responsible to Hitler himself. While me, I am doing this and like to be responsible to the parliament and the government.

The Indonesian Parliament, with 61% of its members appointed by President Suharto, is widely seen as a rubber-stamp body for the military government.

Oil-rich Indonesia has enjoyed a strategic position in the thinking of a generation of major policymakers, including Presidential National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who last year targeted the Southeast Asian archipelago republic as one of seven Third World nations with which the United States should



"develop new and wider relationships" ("Memorandum for Members of the Cabinet", The Nation, June 24, 1978). Given the acknowledged importance of the Jakarta regime, one is hardly surprised that the Carter Administration has not moved from its position on East Timor. Instead, over the last year, and even in the months since the ambassadors' visit to East Timor, administration officials have cited Indonesia as one of the nations which exemplify the effectiveness of the Carter human rights initiatives. Indonesia's recent domestic record on human rights and its actions in East Timor therefore require some scrutiny.

Since the military seized power in 1965, Indonesia has been holding more untried political prisoners than any other developing country aligned with the United States. Until quite recently, it appeared that all but a few of those still imprisoned from 1965 would remain in detention. But large scale releases -- according to reliable reports, close to 10,000 prisoners -- began in December 1977. Jakarta claims that another 10,000 were freed in 1978, and that an equal number are scheduled for release later this year. According to the Indonesian government, by the end of 1979 all long-term political detainees will either have been freed or brought to trial. At first glance, the problem appears to be close to resolution, and indeed, this is the view of the Carter Administration. In fact, the problem remains much deeper than Washington's official assessment suggests.

Amnesty International currently puts the number of long-term, "1965" political prisoners at 30,000 -- 20,000 more than the Indonesian regime acknowledges. Informed observers, Indonesian

human rights advocates and some former prisoners say that a significant number of detention centers are not officially designated as such by the ruling military authorities. It has been charged that many people who were supposedly released years ago are forced to work as servants of army officers or as laborers on military-run plantations, with limited freedom of movement, for little or no pay. Amnesty International has said that, to its knowledge, no Indonesian political prisoner brought to trial in connection with the 1965 events has been found innocent -- not great testimony to the impartiality of the courts; Amnesty has also criticized Jakarta's practice of continuing to bring political detainees to trial many years after their arrest. Close to 1,000 prisoners "convicted" over the last thirteen years are not officially considered political detainees. In addition, an unknown number of detainees have been sent to "transmigration centers" in remote areas of the sprawling island nation; the Indonesian government has called this program "release through resettlement", but others, notably the London Times, have described it as "the tropical equivalent of Siberia." International pressure reportedly led to some curtailment of the practice in 1978, but late in the year there were many reports of official pressure on released prisoners to "volunteer" for resettlement. It is also uncertain whether all those who were sent to "transmigration areas" in years past are now free to leave -- or that the practice won't resume in force once the international outcry has died down. Meanwhile, the Jakarta government continues to refuse Amnesty International's request for a comprehensive list



of those released and those remaining in prison. The aforementioned General Yoga Sugama said in September 1978 that the list would not be made available because "That would involve a lot of work. . . .and it is in fact not at all important."

The condition of the nearly 10,000 prisoners released in December 1977, in most cases after more than twelve years of systematic brutalization (including beatings, forced labor and lack of proper food and medical facilities), is also worthy of note: almost all were elderly and suffering from chronic, disabling diseases. According to Amnesty International, two criteria used in determining which prisoners were freed were health and age. A camp official on the notorious prison island of Buru (which the Jakarta regime now wants to rename "Freedom Island") told Newsweek: "The government knows that these people are too old and too tired to indulge in any political adventures once released in Java." To sort out the more vigorous, another set of criteria has been invoked, in terms reminiscent of psychiatric abuses in the Soviet Union. In a December 1977 interview with the Indonesian newsweekly Tempo, Admiral Sudomo, then head of KOPKAMTIB (the security command responsible for the prisoners), spoke of the categories derived from "psycho-tests" that are used to determine the "ideological level" of those still in detention:

We cannot read people's thoughts. By means of psycho-tests, we can measure their knowledge of ideological matters and then check this with the report of their interrogation. From this, we know and determine their classification. There are two categories: K (keras, or hard) which is further divided into four groups, and L (lunak, or soft) which is further divided into L-0,

L-1 and L-2. Observations are taken every six months. It is estimated that the results are 60-70% accurate.

Henry Kamm identified a few of the "psycho-tests" in an April 26, 1978 report in the New York Times. They include

an American test, the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Its application to Indonesian prisoners. . . was to test the firmness of their convictions and motivation and their capacity to influence others. . . The other test on political attitudes, was designed by Hans Jurgen Eysenck, the British psychologist. The degree with which Communist sentiments were held was scored on a scale ranging from "tough-minded" to "tenderness".

In June 1978, Eysenck dissociated himself from Jakarta's use of his work. He stated that in any event, his tests are not designed to measure political attitudes in a non-Western culture. Admiral Sudomo, for his part, told Kamm that "the 30%" whose test results put them in the "diehard" communist category would be released anyway, but placed under "closer supervision". Observers say, however, that the tests have been used to pick out "recalcitrant" prisoners who will be kept in detention indefinitely.

The Carter Administration has expressed no opinion on the Indonesian regime's use of "psycho-tests", but when Vice President Mondale arrived in Jakarta last May, a week after the Kamm report was published, official enthusiasm over human rights progress in Indonesia had not been dampened. Mondale told reporters that recent Indonesian measures on human rights had received a "very favorable reaction" in the United States. A May 14, 1978 report on the Mondale visit by Terrence Smith of the New York Times offers an interesting glimpse of the Carter human rights policy at work:

. . . Jakarta has been seeking authority to purchase a squadron of A-4 ground attack bombers to augment its antiquated air force. The request has been held up on procedural grounds and was flatly opposed by human rights advocates in the State Department who felt Jakarta should be compelled to release some of Indonesia's 20,000 political prisoners. Rather than make a final decision in advance, Mr. Carter asked Mr. Mondale to take soundings on the ground on both the plane request and the Suharto government's attitude on human rights.

Once there, the Vice President found that the planes were indeed important to the Indonesians and with a little gentle prodding they could be induced to accelerate the release of the political detainees. Some hurried phone calls back to Washington and a few hours later the Vice President was given the discretionary authority to grant the plane request if he felt adequate progress could be obtained on human rights. More talks with the Indonesians persuaded him that this was the case. Shortly before he left, he announced the plane sale.

There is no mention of East Timor in the Carter-Mondale human rights equation, nor is there mention of the Suharto regime's domestic crackdown early last year. In January 1978, security forces rounded up 600 student leaders who had been vocally opposing Suharto's impending re-election as president; elected student councils were "frozen" and several campuses were subsequently occupied by troops, with a reported four students killed and many wounded. As punishment for reporting the student campaign against massive official corruption, Jakarta's leading dailies were shut down by the military for two weeks, and were allowed to resume publication only after they promised that they would never again criticize the government. Several prominent elder statesmen who had been critical of Suharto's policies were designated "unpersons" by the authorities: their names may not be mentioned in the press. Days before Mondale's May arrival



in Jakarta, one of Indonesia's leading poets, W.S. Rendra, was detained without charges. Rendra was freed in late October, but dozens of students remain imprisoned without trial, and press controls remain in force.

Some responses to the December 1977 political prisoner releases have been considerably more qualified than the Carter Administration's "very favorable reaction." The London Times, for example, commented editorially: "It may be wondered whether the Indonesian Government deserves any credit for these releases in face of constant criticism from bodies such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists." Others, while obviously welcoming the releases, emphasize that Jakarta deserves no reward for releasing thousands who were broken in health and detained illegally for so long. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Patricia M. Derian told the Wall Street Journal on May 11, 1978 (without specifying the countries concerned): "We aren't the tooth-fairy handing out sugar plums to kids who put their teeth under the pillow. Why should we pass out a treat to nations that ~~are~~ treat their citizens as they should?" Derian's comment is particularly apt with regard to Indonesia. And the "treat" that Mondale presented to Jakarta (the A-4 aircraft) may well be used against the residents of East Timor, who in the eyes of the United Nations are not Indonesian citizens (In December 1978 the U.N. General Assembly, for the third time, refused to recognize Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over East Timor), and from all indications do not want to be. Press accounts of the September ambassadors' visit do

suggest -- rather pointedly -- that the East Timorese have not been "treated like they should."

Information that has filtered out of East Timor over the past year provides some perspective on the Washington-Jakarta A-4 transaction. Although the Indonesian military has barred independent observers (aside from rare, tightly controlled press tours), Catholic sources charge that as of late 1978, many villages continued to be subjected to Indonesian terror, including saturation bombing and the destruction of food supplies. A steady stream of letters from East Timorese Catholic priests appealing to the "Free World" for help, have spoken in detail of Jakarta's systematic barbarities against the population (Some of the letters have been published in Hansard, the record of the Australian Parliament). The priests have said that FRETILIN has managed to keep up its resistance, but emphasize that guerillas captured by the Indonesian forces are summarily executed. Meanwhile, Jakarta still refuses entry to the International Red Cross and other independent agencies (all outside relief organizations have been banned from East Timor since the December 1975 invasion), earning the December 1, 1977 criticism of Amnesty International. And since former Rep. Fraser began hearings in March 1977 to probe what he called "allegations of genocide" carried out by the Indonesian armed forces, only a few selected East Timorese have been allowed to go abroad. The former Bishop of East Timor, an archconservative figure who retired in late 1977, returned to his native Portugal griefstricken over the unrelenting horrors of the Indonesian occupation. Catholic sources

say that the Vatican, in quiet protest, has thus far refrained from appointing a successor to his post.

The Carter Administration, in contrast, insisted last July that it had "no information to substantiate charges of a pattern of atrocities by Indonesian troops." Since the March 1977 hearings, the administration has also claimed that the East Timor war is only "a low-level insurgency", but a different conclusion may be reached in a revealing International Herald Tribune report from Jakarta (Dec. 5, 1977, entitled "Indonesia Anxious to Replace Decrepit Arms"). The article quotes a Western diplomat as saying that the Jakarta generals "are running out of military inventory. The operations on Timor have pushed them to the wall." New arms deals with the United States -- and nations such as Britain, France, West Germany and the Netherlands -- take on a grim significance, especially when one recalls that in November 1976, Indonesian Catholic sources reported that already as many as 100,000 East Timorese (out of a population of 650,000) had been massacred by Indonesian troops. Similar charges have since been voiced by other non-FRETILIN sources; when one takes into account later casualties as well as deaths from war-related starvation and disease, a harrowing picture emerges.

In early 1978, according to Western press reports, Jakarta launched an all-out offensive against the FRETILIN resistance. At the same time, the Carter Administration announced a \$125 million sale of 16 F5E aircraft to Indonesia, and refused to rule out the possibility of their use in East Timor. However, it is the A-4 deal negotiated in May by Mondale which, according to



Michael Klare of the Institute for Policy Studies, may have a more direct impact on East Timor. Klare notes that the A-4, a mainstay of the U.S. arsenal during the Indochina war, is particularly suited for bombing missions against guerillas. The A-4 is also known to spray wide areas with weaponsfire and high explosives, thereby causing heavy civilian casualties. In an August 15 letter to Rep. Fraser, the State Department claimed that they had "taken care to satisfy (themselves) that the Indonesian Government has no intention of using the A-4 aircraft in East Timor." Yet another statement in the same letter undermines any confidence one might have in such assurances. Referring to Jakarta's use of other U.S.-supplied weaponry (notably the OV-10 Bronco, a counterinsurgency plane that has reportedly enabled Indonesia to reach into and bomb East Timor's forbidding mountain areas), the Carter Administration noted that since the U.S. recognizes Indonesia's claim to East Timor, it does "not believe that such use is inconsistent with the agreements under which such equipment was made available to the Indonesians."

Furthermore, the Carter Administration has a history of withholding key information on past U.S. arms policy toward Jakarta. In response to the March 1977 "allegations of genocide", the State Department -- in what some have seen as a transparent attempt to defuse the issue -- said that the previous administration had "secretly stopped processing new requests for arms" for Jakarta during the six month aftermath of the December 1975 invasion of East Timor. The Fraser subcommittee later learned with surprise that the Indonesian regime had never been informed

of the "suspension"; then, in a February 1978 hearing before the subcommittee, Cornell University Southeast Asia specialist Benedict Anderson revealed that the policy had apparently never gone into effect. He cited a Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales print-out (uncovered by Max Holland of the Washington-based Center for International Policy) which listed four separate new transactions during the period of the "suspension". Interestingly enough, three of the four transactions involved maintenance and spare parts for the OV-10 Bronco.

When an Australian TV reporter, who was taken on a tour of sections of East Timor in July 1977, exposed the staged character of the trip and managed to glean information embarrassing to Jakarta, no journalists were allowed back until July 1978. But, as this later visit was restricted to the capital, Dili, it only raised further questions about the extent of Indonesian military control. Finally, in a display designed to "achieve world acceptance" (London Sunday Times, Sept. 3) of its claim to sovereignty, the Indonesians led a party of handpicked ambassadors and journalists through a few East Timor towns in early September 1978.

The children who had reminded one ambassador of "victims of an African famine" (their village also was beset with tuberculosis, cholera and the danger of widespread pneumonia) were not unusual. Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent David Jenkins was told of 14 similar "transit camps", some of them worse than the one visited. Jenkins reported that

There is a serious shortage of food, medicine and clothing, compounded by the problem of "bureaucratic leakages", the Indonesian euphemism for corruption.

Given the careful planning of the tour, one is forced to conclude that the Indonesian military intended that foreign visitors witness this human misery -- which Jakarta had done little to alleviate. Indonesia's response to the urgent need for humanitarian assistance is instructive, as reported by the Sydney Morning Herald on September 11:

Indonesia is looking for foreign aid for East Timor, but the Foreign Minister, Professor Kusumaatmadja, who accompanied the party, indicated the donor countries must acknowledge Indonesian sovereignty.

In October seventy-six Australian MPs, doubting that relief assistance would reach the intended recipients, called for impartial distribution of aid through the International Red Cross. The Indonesian authorities dismissed the request. And Michael Richardson, Southeast Asia correspondent for Australia's leading daily, the Melbourne Age, points out that while Jakarta was appealing for foreign aid -- on its terms, for the victims of its own aggression -- the military were marketing East Timor's coffee to help pay for the upkeep of their troops: he reported on October 14 that according to Singapore shipping sources, in 1978 the Indonesian army was expected to export coffee valued at \$7.5 million (about 60% of prewar production levels).

Since March 1977 -- and most recently in January 1979 -- the Carter Administration has asserted that it "continues to encourage" the presence of the International Red Cross in East Timor. Although the Jakarta regime has thus far not been persuaded, in the Administration's view the outlook is not bleak: on the contrary, as of January 1979 officials maintain that "The



Indonesian Government appears to be taking very seriously its role in providing political stability and improving living conditions in East Timor." The cynicism of this statement can only be rivalled by the 1978 State Department human rights report, which informs us that "most of the human losses in East Timor appear to have occurred prior to Indonesia's intervention" (a reference to East Timor's brief civil war in August and September 1975 which, according to the International Red Cross and other agencies, claimed from 1,500 to 3,000 lives). Bernard Gwertzman, in what was to be the only press comment on this report, noted in passing (New York Times, Feb. 10, 1978) that the State Department report was "gentle on alleged atrocities in East Timor" -- not that this prompted the Times to initiate an investigation.

Three weeks after the September ambassadors' visit, a disabled yacht drifted into Dili harbor, where its Australian occupants "heard explosions in the distance", saw "frigates, patrol boats, barges crammed with Indonesian soldiers, and many aircraft and helicopters" -- a scene differing markedly from that afforded by the diplomats' guided tours. The skipper of the yacht told the Canberra Times (October 20, 1978): "We were left without doubts that Dili was still a war zone." FRETILIN has recently suffered some setbacks, including the capture and killing of their president, Nicolau Lobato, on December 31, 1978. It is impossible, however, for outside observers to determine precisely the level of continuing fighting.

Washington and Jakarta seem to have struck a good bargain over the political prisoner releases. Jakarta has learned that

it can trade some of its officially acknowledged prisoners (most of them old and ailing and no threat to the established order) for a fresh supply of arms. Washington, for its part, has not only armed a strategic ally but has given the transactions a veneer of legitimacy through the purported application of human rights criteria. There are no signs, however, that the Carter Administration will look too closely, either at the completeness or the particulars of the releases, recent cases of domestic repression or the ruthless campaign in East Timor. One can predict rather gloomily that the Carter Administration -- and most Western governments -- will in fact brandish Jakarta's prisoner releases as evidence that human rights violations are a closed chapter of Indonesian history.

# Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Donald McHenry  
Ambassador  
The United Nations

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This week the United Nations General Assembly will once again consider a resolution rejecting Indonesia's claim to the annexation of East Timor. The right of a colonial people to determine its own political future is an internationally accepted principle enshrined in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. It is a principle to which you have scrupulously adhered during the drawn out negotiations over the future of Namibia. The Indonesian Government is denying this right to the people of East Timor. The petition for integration into Indonesia which was passed by the Indonesian-selected East Timor Regional Popular Assembly in May 1976 has already been rejected three times by the United Nations General Assembly.

The official United States position on this issue is that the East Timorese people have been denied their right to self-determination, but that the country's annexation by Indonesia is an accomplished fact. It is an accomplished fact only because the United States Government originally acquiesced to the invasion and has since supplied most of the armaments needed to extend the military occupation. This policy contradicts the principles on which the United States and the United Nations were founded.

During the past four years of warfare the people of East Timor have been decimated because they oppose annexation. A U.S. AID mission which recently visited the island lent credence to reports that between 150,000 and 250,000 people have already died, and the lives of another 200,000 seriously threatened by starvation and disease. Recent reports indicate that armed resistance to Indonesia's annexation continues.

We urge you to support the resolution on East Timor currently before the United Nations in order to make clear to the Indonesian Government that the United States supports the right of the people of East Timor to determine their own future.

Sincerely,



COMMITTEES:  
AGRICULTURE  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

# Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

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C

October 22, 1979

Dear Colleague:

Within the next several weeks, the United Nations will consider a resolution rejecting Indonesia's claim to the annexation of East Timor.

Though the United States' official position is that the East Timorese people have been denied their right to self-determination, our Ambassador to the United Nations has consistently opposed the resolution condemning Indonesia's brutal annexation of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony.

Today, four years after the original Indonesian invasion, the people of East Timor have been nearly wiped out. Thousands have died as a result of ongoing resistance to the Indonesian military operations in the area, and thousands more have died from disease and starvation. At this time, approximately 250,000 sick and starving East Timorese have streamed down from the mountains, where they fled to escape the fighting, and are living in squalid refugee camps.

It is clear that this humanitarian crisis stems from the internationally condemned and savage annexation of East Timor by Indonesia.

Enclosed is a letter to Ambassador McHenry, urging him to support the upcoming resolution affirming the right of the East Timorese people to determine their own future. Will you please join me in sending this message to our Ambassador?

If you would like to sign the letter, please contact Holly in my office, at 5-3806.

Sincerely,



Tom Harkin  
Member of Congress

# Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

October 22, 1979

The Honorable Cyrus Vance  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, DC

*also sent to  
Christopher, Derien  
AID Director Doug Bennet,  
Holbrooke.*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We wish to take this opportunity to express our great concern for the condition of refugees in East Timor. It is our understanding that there are as many as 250,000 sick and starving East Timorese in camps located in Indonesian-controlled areas, 60,000 of whom are in critical condition. There have been numerous reports that more than 100,000 people have died during the past four years of warfare.

Knowing that the United States has recently made a commitment in emergency aid to the International Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Service, we would urge you to monitor closely the administration of the relief programs and the distribution of food. As you know, there have been problems in the past with the corruption of international aid to Indonesia, and there have been constant reports that international assistance earmarked for East Timor has been diverted for profit by the Indonesian armed forces and other officials. Because of the desperate human need in East Timor, we hope that there will be sufficient numbers of international observers to administer the aid programs and oversee the distribution of food and medicine.

It is our understanding that the East Timorese refugees have come from mountain areas where they traditionally reside to escape Indonesian military operations and the widespread starvation which is directly related to this war effort. We are concerned about the long-term implications of the current refugee situation. Are the East Timorese being permanently relocated in the refugee camps? Will they be allowed to return to their indigenous villages? We expect that the US Department of State will seek answers to these questions from the Indonesian Government, and we would like a report on the question of Timorese resettlement.

While we strongly support continued, generous aid to the East Timorese, it is clear that the humanitarian crisis

The Honorable Cyrus Vance  
Page 2  
October 22, 1979

in this area stems from the internationally condemned and brutal annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. The United States must continue to aid the victims, but until the East Timorese themselves are allowed to determine their own political future; resistance, fighting, starvation and death will continue to be their tragic fate.

We respectfully request your consideration of these questions and concerns, and look forward to hearing from you on this important matter.

Sincerely,



Tom Harkin  
Member of Congress

TH/hb

*Cosigned by  
Howard Wolpe &  
Beckley Bell*





INTERVENTION GIVEN BY

MR. PAULO PIRES

A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF "UDT"

(TIMORESE DEMOCRATIC UNION)

TO THE 4TH COMMITTEE

TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORG.

NEW YORK, OCTOBER 22, 1979



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Bureau,

This is the first time that the "UDU", Timorese Democratic Union, has the honour, represented by one of its members to the IV Committee of the United Nations Organization, to address this Committee on the question of East Timor.

I would like to thank you for the opportunity that is given to me, as a member of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDU); first, to furnish concrete informations to this Committee about the actual situation of East Timor, based on letters and documents which were brought to us by different sources; second, to make known to this Committee our aspirations which are also the aspirations of the Timorese people; third, and finally to appeal to the United Nations for the preservation of the rights of the small countries since they do not have the possibility to defend themselves. In reality, the simple fact of listening to all representatives of the Timorese people, namely, the UDU, shows the sincere will of this Committee and of the United Nations to contribute for a fair solution, as much as possible, of one question which has been dragged along since 1975. We believe that the United Nations can contribute, in a decisive way, to make the legality become a reality again in East Timor. Until this happens, the situation in East Timor is and will be a "juridical gap".

I would like to introduce myself before continuing. I was an eyewitness, taking part in all the events, military as political, since August, 1975 until July, 1976. I was forced to join various and successive political organizations which were created despite ours and the refugees will, to justify lately the military Indonesian intervention in East Timor as an action requested by the Timorese people and legitimized by their leaders.

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At the same time, I participated actively in a Joint Secretariat, constituted by some political leaders of UDTU, (Democratic Timorese Union), of PDTA, (People's Democratic Timorese Association) of KOTA, (Monarchist Party), and of Labor Party, cooperating to labor together the document known as the Document of the 31 items. This agreement, although it was accepted by Indonesia, was never performed or put into practice by the Indonesian Government.

On November, 1975, I was invited to lead one delegation of UDTU and PDTA to the Western, namely, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Italy.

When I went back from Europe, on December 27, 1975, there was already in Dili a provisional government pro-Indonesia.

The taking of Dili was considered "a military victory" and not a "help of voluntary Indonesians to their Timorese brothers" as the Indonesian government made the world believe. So, the consequences of the military victory over Dili were obvious. Also, the Timorese refugees in Atambua, Indonesia, were strongly affected. The Indonesian social assistance was taken away from them, because they did not accept the political integration. For that reason, I was given Credentials by the provisional government of Dili as their "delegate" to the military authorities and local civilians to protect the Timorese refugees' interests.

We could not avoid all kinds of pressures and revenges against the refugees.

It was at that time that I refused to cooperate with the provisional government and I was chosen by the refugees as a member of a refugees' committee which was created by their own initiative to send a S.O.S. to the international humanitarian

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organization, including the International Red Cross.

We fought against everything and everyone for our survival and for our evacuation to Portugal. The Netherlands Embassy, which represents the Portuguese interests in Indonesia, knows very well how difficult it was to execute our evacuation.

Mr. Chairman,

this is a small summary of what happened in East Timor behind the political scene since 1975-1976, that is, before and during the Indonesian military intervention in the island. The rest of it, is already common knowledge.


Mr. Chairman and Members of the Bureau, the question of East Timor is not yet solved. It is still pending, because the United Nations consecutive resolutions were not accepted by Indonesia, and, the people of East Timor continue repudiating the integration into Indonesia, dying and resisting bravely in the mountains of Timor.

Indonesia has tried to convince the world that the process of decolonization of East Timor has already taken place on July 17, 1976, in accordance with the spirit of the Letter of the United Nations, 1514 (XV), and, with the resolution of the General Assembly, 1541 (XV).

Regarding that Popular Assembly which proclaimed the integration of Timor into Indonesia, as its 27th State, on July 17, 1976, we would like to ask only two questions: -how did they choose the representatives of the People to that Popular Assembly? -in which psychological context did such a Popular Assembly take place?

We are not going to answer these questions. The ones who took active part in the said Popular Assembly will furnish the answers. We received a letter that was brought to Djakarta

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
by a friendly officer of the Indonesian Army. The letter was written by one of those who joined a forced recruitment of the people to the Popular Assembly. The author of the letter holds nowadays a high position in the government of East Timor. We quoted him literally: "As a result of the international pressure, the Indonesians or Javanese thought about forming the so called "Derwan Perwakilan Rakyat" (People's Representative Assembly). You would never imagine it! A puppetry! The visit of the Minister of the Internal Administration, Mr. Amir Mohamud, was eminent. There was not capable personnel to hold all those positions. Everything had to be done in a hurry because the Minister, Mr. Amir Mohammud, had to invest the new members of the Popular Assembly and also because they were afraid of the international newsmen. So, what did they do? They picked up any available individual and with some capacity. The "auggottas" DTR for the members of such a Popular Assembly, were not elected by the people. They were picked up as a staghunt. I, myself, following orders of Bufati, from Dili, also provided some. It was that Assembly, which was set up in a hurry, the one that introduced the integration's request. Generally, the important speeches are made by the Political Police which is called Intel or Bakian (Badan Administrasi Koordinator Intel). I consider the formation of the DPR, on May 30, illegal, because its members were not elected by the people but chosen in a hurry."

The author of this letter, at a certain point, asks:  
- How is it possible to a democratic election<sup>to</sup> take place in a complete situation of war?

The population, at that time, was sheltered at the mountains... By the way, the warriors were at a distance of either one or two kilometers from Dili. At that time, 90% of the territory was yet under the resistance forces.

Even the small towns occupied by the invaders were not safe and it

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was normal for a small occupied town to be retaken from one day to the next one by the Timorese. Therefore, to speak about a democratic election during an open war is pure and plainly an absurd. To speak about the proclamation of the integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia as of July 17, 1976, is a puppetry, because even the most ingenious of the human beings would not believe it. As you are in Europe, you do not know what is happening in our country and in Indonesia.. Do not believe the integration of East Timor into Indonesia because some leaders of UNT, KOTA and Labor Party who signed the documents, signed them because they were in fear of being killed.


Even many of TDTA members are revolted and want to go to Australia or Portugal (Letter dated May 10, 1979).

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Bureau,

this letter is sufficiently clear to be commented.

The reasoning that the people of East Timor is small and poor, so they would not have any possibility of survival as an independent country, it is unfounded and is against the principle of the liberty of the Nations. In reality, it has to be reminded that, on 1967, with regard to the exiguity of the territory of East Timor, the Third Commission of the Special Committee, which took the task upon the occupied insular Caribbean, emphasized that the Declaration of the United Nations about the concession of independence to the colonial countries and nations applied to all dependant territories, whatever its size, population or other factors. The same subcommission also recognized that the small territories had presented "specific problems" but underlined categorically that the people of the small countries were the only ones called to express, in full liberty, their opinion about the way they wanted to adopt to achieve the objectives of the resolution 1514(XV). On the other hand, the Second Subcommission, which took the task upon the Pacific Ocean Islands, on its report about the Cook, Niue and Tokelau Islands, announced the statement that concerning the question of size, isolation and limited resources should not delay in any event the application of that resolution on the territories





(XIX). It also underlined the importance of increasing the assistance for the development and for the educational progress as an important source to improve the economic potential of those territories and the capacity of the inhabitants to exercise their inalienable rights to self-determination. Furthermore, there are other countries even smaller and poorer than East Timor in the world.

The Javanese authorities use, in the internal politics, to convince the people, the reasoning that East Timor constitutes an integral part of Indonesia, because they belong to the same race.

In fact, nothing is more unbalanced than the Indonesian empire in all respects: geographic, cultural, anthropological, and historical. Which cultural and anthropological affinity does exist between either Irian Jaya and Java or Timor and Java? the people of East Timor do not feel integrated and identified with Indonesia. For this reason the struggle goes on, even though the authorities have denied such fact. The author of the letter we mentioned, continues on his report: "The war goes on. Two helicopters take out every morning to Dili, to carry the corpses of the Javanese killed in combat. Everyone grieves for peace and the withdrawal of Indonesians from East Timor. The people want Portugal to come back to decolonize East Timor and to give them their independence. Last March, a battalion was sent to Dili to pick up individuals to be shot to death. Many of them had already disappeared. They pick them up during the night and in cars without license plates. The situation is serious. Not satisfied with violating the Rights of the People, the Indonesian soldiers are openly on a phase of violation of the Human Rights".

Many letters and informations that we received, either through or directly from the military Indonesian officers, told us about situations truly dramatic. I am not going to show them all

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because it would take too much time to do it. I will make some references to give you an idea of what is happening nowadays in East Timor.


Therefore, a letter dated October 7, 1979, from Dili, says distressed: "time passes rapidly ... we are waiting for the day of liberty. Do you know what it means to spend your life between fire and sword, covered with blood and tears ? Pay attention to the following... the writing in red"... means the total destruction. Because that "writing in red " started already on March 1, 1979, and until now it continues. Our Timorese leaders do not believe it because they are kept away from the reality and from us". Listen to this voice and to others because they know what they are speaking about.

Another letter from Dili. September 17, 1979, "Four years are passed and our people continue to die by several forms: by weapons, starvation, diseases, and, the worst enemy, that lately appeared, is the hunger. Then, these are the weapons that the Indonesian master is using at the present moment. The war is still on.

If a foreign delegation appears, all war material is hidden. If that delegation walks on the streets, the military vehicles are not around as well as the soldiers. If, by accident, they visit the hospitals, the wounded persons from the war, are hidden".

Once again a letter from Dili, dated August 20, 1979, regretting the fate of the one who is obliged to live as a foreigner in his own land. The International Red Cross was here, on April 18, 1979, to identify the persons who wanted to leave. The persons who had already applied are now suffering, because the Javanese consider them as foreigners. The worst suffering is when the conqueror considers as foreign the landowners. Here, only the ones who enlisted themselves as Indonesian citizens have rights to every-

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thing. The land of Timor is soaked with the people's blood. The Timor of the XX Century is like this. The ones who keep the Portuguese citizenship lost all their rights".

Another letter of September 10 reports the following: "On the forthcoming of the International Red Cross, in less than 2 days more than 17.000 persons were enrolled, only in Dili. The public servants who enrolled and appeared in the application list, have already lost their rights since August 1st. Sincerely, I appeal to you to worry about us, because we are in deep water". And finally, he remarks that the warfare continues. I think that those letters, omitting on purpose, a really dramatic series of events, which shows us a mortal hatred against the invader, are enough to elucidate the war atmosphere which is glowing and concealed in Timor.

How many persons had already died in Timor? The letters forthcoming from Timor estimate in almost half of the population. Besides those letters, we have with us a copy of the census made by the regional territorial Assistance for the Defense and Security of the State of East Timor.

The computation of the inhabitants of East Timor, on 1974, one year before the war broke out, was as follows:

Catholics	_____	220.314	Persons
Protestants	_____	2.550	"
Confucionists	_____	5.660	"
Muslims	_____	135	"
Animists	_____	460.112	"
Total		688.771	"

Four years later, the Regional Territorial Assistance for the Defense and Security of the State of East Timor, registers the number of inhabitants of East Timor, during October, 1978, after the war has been dragged for three years, as follows:





Catholics	255.417	Persons
Protestants	4.354	
Confucionists	(there are no figures)	
Muslims	661	
Animists	68.839	
Total	329.271	

Is it so drastic? Where are the remaining 359.500 persons?  
If we believe this report, how many inhabitants will still be in Timor within 3 or 4 years?

(A)

Mr. Chairman and members of the Bureau,

The war in Timor has already lasted for 4 years and it will not be over so soon. Why such a long resistance? Why a so small nation with only 650.000 souls, contrived and still contrives to face a so numerous nation, with 130 millions of inhabitants?

Why and how the Island of Timor, despite the total isolation from the rest of the world and divided in two, one of them belonging to Indonesia, without any possibility of receiving external help, could and still can oppose an army so strong and numerous as the Indonesian? Why? Because it is another historical battle. It is an heroic, nationalistic and national battle. It is heroic, because it fights against everything and everyone: against its own geographic position, because it is an island without communication with the external world, against it are all countries which knowing that it is suffering, do not speak out. It is national, because it is the whole nation that resists in a body, either with weapons or refusing to support the Indonesians or to collaborate with them in the internal administration. Armed and psychological battle. The battle is nationalistic, because <sup>we</sup> we do not fight for an ideology. The people of Timor fight for their liberty, demanding their right to self-determination and to independence to death. This right is inalienable. It is sacred.

(x)

The war is still on. Our affirmation is based also on the fact that till now the Indonesian Government does not yet allow the foreign independent press to visit East Timor. And also, the Indonesian government does not grant exit permits to those our country men, who want to join their families aboard. Such as, children, wife or husbands who are still in East Timor, even those who already had tickets in their hands.

STATEMENT DELIVERED TO THE  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Elizabeth Traube

October, 1979

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

In preparing this statement I began by asking myself what, if anything, I could contribute to these proceedings which might be of unique value. And I recollected, all too sharply, an uneasiness I felt nearly three years ago when I sat here in the visitors' gallery, and listened to the discussions on East Timor. You are all fluent in the rhetorical forms that convention requires for such discourse, and you may find my uneasiness naive when I tell you its source. It was simply this: when I tried to picture an East Timorese assisting at those discussions, one of those mountain farmers whom I had learned to know and respect, I could not think what he would have made of them. I tried to translate the debate into a Timorese language, and I could not imagine my friend finding it anything but remote; and not out of "simplicity", for these are not "simple" people, these people whose rights and future are now at issue. On the contrary, it is in contrast to the depth, complexity, and vitality of their culture that the rhetoric of debate would have seemed dry and distant.

You see, I looked for the East Timorese amidst the accusations and the counter-accusations, the allegations and the denials, the talk of communists, fascists, aggression, terrorism; I looked for them, and I could not find them. Today, I want to bring the East Timorese closer to you by articulating one of their conceptions of political reality. I am well aware of the arrogance implicit in such a project, but I am an anthropologist and my profession is in many ways an arrogant one. For I deal, or claim to deal, in the translation of culture, and my work is premised on the daring conviction that the members of different cultures can engage in communication and come to understand one another. Thus we have much in common, we anthropologists and you of the United Nations, and I thank you for granting me this opportunity to address you. For me to address you on the behalf of the East Timorese would be inappropriate, as I am not their designated spokesperson, and even the arrogance of an anthropologist has its limits. But I shall endeavor to speak in their conceptual language, and so make accessible to you their highly original and often profound outlook on the world.

Let me first describe the nature of my contact with East Timor. From October 1972 through November 1974 I conducted research for my doctoral dissertation (submitted to the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, June, 1977) on what was then the overseas province of Portuguese Timor. For most of that time I was located in the administrative district (concelho) of Aileu, some 25 miles south of the coastal capital of Dili. The districts of Aileu, Ermera, Ainaro and Same comprise the territory of an ethnic group known as the Mambai. The Mambai number

over 80,000, speak an Austronesian language (also known as Mambai), and eke out a subsistence existence based on swidden agriculture and animal husbandry amidst the mountains and high valleys of the rugged Timorese interior.

During my stay with the Mambai I became fluent in their language and conversant with their ways of life. I also attained an adequate command of the closely related Tetun language which serves as a lingua franca throughout the province. I have travelled widely in East Timor, and I am familiar with the ethnographic literature on the various peoples of the Lesser Sunda chain to which Timor belongs. So much for credentials. I should stress, however, that my claims to direct and privileged knowledge concerning East Timor end in 1974, prior to the events of immediate concern in these discussions.

When I left East Timor the three political associations, UDT, APODETI, and FRETILIN, had formed in Dili and were beginning to extend their operations into the mountains. At that time, the mass of the population had not aligned themselves or affiliated with any one political association, but it was my impression that, of the three, FRETILIN was the most likely eventually to achieve wide popular support. This impression was founded on my general knowledge of East Timor and my contacts with FRETILIN leaders. Underlying the FRETILIN political ideology and tactics is a concept of political development as a process of interaction between the predominantly Western educated leadership and the indigenous cultures. Such interaction is more easily advocated than realized, yet the overall orientation of FRETILIN activity seemed to me most consonant with the real conditions for East Timorese nationalism.

Had the Portuguese remained on East Timor and supervised the decolonization process (as FRETILIN urgently and repeatedly requested them to do), I would have predicted a FRETILIN political victory. Furthermore, in the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of the colonial government to Atauro, I believe that FRETILIN popularity must have been greatly enhanced. But this is opinion, albeit an informed one. It is a hypothesis based on my reading of the same materials available to you: the reports of the UDT coup and the swift, successful retaliation mounted by FRETILIN; the interlude when FRETILIN administered the territory as caretakers for the Portuguese government on Atauro; the politically motivated declaration of independence on November 28, 1975; the Indonesian occupation initiated on December 7, 1975 which forced FRETILIN into the mountains; and the persistent, deeply distressing reports of atrocities committed by the Indonesian armed forces against the civilian population in efforts to eliminate FRETILIN resistance.

I leave it to other speakers to analyse and interpret these events, although my own views necessarily inform this statement. But I shall return to the East



Timor that I knew, and to a moment when the future, although uncertain, still seemed to be subject to the strictures of a traditional past, a moment when the collective knowledge of a largely illiterate mountain people seemed relevant to the decisions which lay ahead.

For the East Timorese knew that there were decisions to be made. The overthrow of the Caetano government in April of 1974 sent a shock throughout the province. I was in the mountains at the time, engaged in the ceremonial reconstruction of a clan temple, and we paused in our activities to take stock of the new situation. Thus long before the first UDT and FRETILIN spokesmen made their ways into the interior, the Mambai had plunged into a concerned and continuous debate. The idioms were different in the mountains where such terms as "colonialism", "decolonization", "independence", "self determination" were not part of everyday language. The language in which Mambai discussed their future was drawn from mythology rather than from Western political and legal traditions; and their discourse, which wandered freely between political and cosmological concerns, was premised on fundamental concepts of rule, hierarchy, and order.

Mambai attention focused on the possibility of a Portuguese withdrawal. For them this was no simple matter, "this matter", as one old man put it, "of our younger brothers going away." On East Timor Portuguese colonial rule is the object of mythological representations, and in its potential termination Mambai saw a challenge to an established order of things. This order, which encompasses far more than colonial rule, is encoded in a narrative tradition referred to as the "walk of the flag" (bandeira ni lolain); the flag is the Portuguese flag, and the stages of its "walk" constitute the mythological foundations of an entire sociopolitical system.

According to the foundation myth, the Portuguese are the younger brothers of the Timorese. They too were born on the sacred mountain of origins at the center of Timor, but they vanished over the "water and sea" (era nor taisa), taking with them the several insignia of sovereignty. Their elder brothers remained behind in the "wide and broad" (mlua nor beka) land of Timor where they established their realms and performed their appointed ritual functions. But even as the people increased and thrived under the aegis of an ancient, cosmic law, the jural order of society foundered:

Women and men do not tremble before one another	Hina nor maena ba rih ro
Do not fear one another	Ba tmau ro
They stab one another	Ro sa ro
And they slay one another	Ro tar ro.

Thus the Timorese ancestors traversed the water and the sea, and reached the land

of Portugal. There they paid homage to their younger brothers, and beseeched them to restore the flag to its original homeland, and establish a "heavy rule // weighty ban" (uku rihun // badu dmedan). This the Portuguese agreed to do. They sailed into the harbor of Dili where all the peoples of Timor, the "children of the east, west, north and south", were gathered to welcome them. This event inaugurated a new regime in which the Portuguese took their place as the defenders of jural order, while the Timorese retained their ancient ritual function of maintaining cosmological balance.

Traditions of this type are widespread in East Timor, where Portuguese rule was historically established and legitimated through its integration into traditional structures of exchange. In the early stages of the colonial occupation, the Portuguese contracted alliances with local rulers, granting military titles and insignia of office in exchange for commercial and military cooperation. During the "pacification" campaigns conducted in the early twentieth century, these alliances were extended and rigidified as the Portuguese incorporated the interior kingdoms into a system of indirect rule. This rule was sustained economically and politically by indigenous systems of tribute which the colonial administration effectively appropriated. The subsequent abolition of the tribute systems and substitution of a cash head-tax tightened Portuguese control over the territory, but at the same time confounded the traditional political orders, and, at least in some areas, severely undermined the legitimacy of Portuguese rule.

Due to a complex of historical, political, and cultural factors which I have analysed elsewhere, the Mambai preserved a strong sense of Portuguese legitimacy even after the abolition of the tribute system. To them present-day colonial rule was the trace of an ideal, mythical order; as such, its existence was more significant than were the actual abuses of the system, of which the Mambai were by no means unaware.

In 1974 this mythological model of order provided the basis for Mambai political discourse. As one might expect, the Mambai were by no means delighted with the prospect of "decolonization", or the lowering of the colonial flag, to use their idiom. However, they had swiftly and astutely perceived the inevitability of a major change in their political situation, and for this too mythology offered a model. The "walk of the flag" deals with the interlinked problems of legitimacy and succession; it tells how a new system of rule was instituted with the consent of the people. Thus in myth, the legitimacy of Portuguese rule derives from a mutual agreement made by Europeans and Timorese in the interest of society as a whole - and beyond that, in the interest of the encompassing cosmos. In Mambai

conceptions, political processes both reflect and influence cosmological processes. Perhaps some of you here today are familiar with such orientations to the world, for they have a long and venerable history, and have provided the ideological foundations of many a great and powerful state. I know no better way of communicating the gravity with which Mambai view political issues than by reference to the relation between polity and cosmos. Where political events are invested with cosmological resonances, they are not taken lightly. Furthermore, the mode of resolving political issues is deemed as important as the actual resolution.

Although the Mambai had not arrived at a preferred alternative to colonial rule by the time of my departure, they had envisioned the process of decision making, and their vision merits our attention. The Portuguese, as the Mambai perceived them, had grown old and weary, and would have to "surrender the rule" (sra ukun) to younger and fleeter heirs; similar events had occurred in the past, as when the Timorese ancestors turned over control of Timor to their young Portuguese brethren. Now as then succession would entail a collective decision. To this end Mambai called for a series of reunions and a period of careful deliberation in which the Portuguese and all the peoples of the land might gather together, express their views, and arrive at a consensual solution. Indeed, what the Mambai espoused was a process of self-determination, but informed by a deep sense of an orderly, reasoned political process as essential to cosmological well-being.

What message do these mythological models have for you of the United Nations in your deliberations concerning East Timor? First of all, they suggest an ability and a willingness to engage in collective decision-making, both of which were amply demonstrated in the months prior to the Indonesian occupation. As I read the events of those months, the peoples of East Timor drew upon their own cultural traditions and actively participated with the FRETILIN leadership in the complex process of formulating political positions. Allow me to quote one of my colleagues, Professor Shepard Forman, who spent fifteen months, from August 1973 to October 1974, with the Makassae of East Timor. In his statement to the Committee on International Relations, June 28, 1977, Professor Forman expresses his belief that "the people of East Timor are perfectly capable, provided the opportunity, of articulating decisively their political choices." I share this belief.

Professor Forman's confidence in the East Timorese grew out of his research into Makassae political history and his observation of a local act of self-determination in which over 475 Makassae household heads participated in an election resulting in the administrative autonomy of four villages. My similar evaluation of East Timorese capacities is inspired by the careful, deliberate, reflective manner in which Mambai sought to apply the mythically articulated political

principles of consensus, consent, and legitimacy.

In closing, however, I wish to make a somewhat different point concerning the Indonesian claim to sovereignty over East Timor. I would not dispute this claim on the basis of cultural grounds abstracted from their historical context. As an anthropologist I am well aware of the pervasive family resemblances between the cultures of East Timor and those contained within the Republic of Indonesia. However, contemporary East Timor is in significant respects the product of a colonial history which, for better or for worse, has cumulatively differentiated the eastern half of the island from the rest of the archipelago. The colonially imposed division of the outer arc of the Lesser Sundas between two competing spheres of interest, Dutch and Portuguese, is a fundamental historical fact which must inform the demarcation of post-colonial boundaries.

The movement toward nationalism in East Timor today represents a stage in what I refer to as the historical construction of culture. By this I mean that East Timorese cultures are, in significant respects, the product of their historical interaction with Portuguese colonial policies. As a peripheral territory which, apart from the short-lived Portuguese involvement in the sandalwood trade, was run at an economic loss, the province of Portuguese Timor was spared the massive intervention characteristic of colonial policies in areas more central to economic interests. Nonetheless, over the past three centuries Portuguese administrative and economic policies have interacted with and influenced the indigenous cultures of East Timor, generating a distinctive situation which contrasts markedly even with that on the western half of the island.

The point is that however messy it may make our maps, history has severed East Timor from the other territories now comprising the Republic of Indonesia. One can point to objective differences in demographic, ecological, economic, social and political conditions. But what is perhaps even more significant is that the people of East Timor do not perceive their own interests as coincident with those of their powerful neighbor. For the East Timorese live with a sense of history, and the myth I have introduced into these proceedings is but one expression of the way in which their cultural identities have been constituted in the course of a specific historical interaction with a particular European presence.

This brings us to the other side of the question, the cultural construction of history, or the ways in which the members of a determinate culture create their historical reality by investing the past with meaning. Such creation is a cultural activity, and the Mambai mythology of colonial rule gives us access to the processes involved. The Mambai mode of construction would probably find as little



favor with nationalists as with the Indonesians, inasmuch as it serves to legitimate a particular colonial relationship. Indeed, the widespread East Timorese respect for Portuguese rule, concretely evinced in religious attitudes toward the colonial flag, is all too often condemned as a "product of colonialism" or an instance of "colonial indoctrination". In so doing, however, one loses sight of the significance of cultural traditions, and reduces the members of these cultures to a passive role of responding to colonial stimuli.

But the Mambai did not passively submit to the European presence. Rather, they actively and creatively appropriated the political fact of colonial rule, harnessing it to their own cultural traditions, and generating or re-generating their sense of cultural identity out of a mythically articulated relationship to the Portuguese. It is this dynamic character of culture as it confronts and utilizes a new phenomenon that I have in mind when I speak of the cultural construction of history. And my point is that, today, the culturally interpreted colonial experience is a part of East Timorese reality.

This creativity of culture raises another issue. Inasmuch as mythologies are dynamic structures sensitive to changing conditions of existence, it is not impossible that if the Indonesian occupation of East Timor should become routinized, new models might someday be generated to legitimate this new system of foreign rule. For if the Indonesians of today are foreigners in East Timorese perceptions, so too were the early Portuguese colonizers. The latter had to be made into kinsmen, just as their flag had to be made sacred.

Nevertheless, given the dramatic circumstances of East Timor's "integration" into the Republic of Indonesia, ideological resolutions of the kind reached during the Portuguese regime become increasingly unlikely. Despite the superficial similarities to the old colonial situation, the conditions for the imposition of a foreign power are fundamentally different today from those which obtained in the past. The critical factor in the contemporary situation is that when the Indonesians intervened in East Timorese affairs, a national identity was in the process of formation. Precisely how advanced this process was, I cannot say, but that it had been initiated by 1974 and was intensified under the FRETILIN leadership are indisputable facts. Thus the East Timorese were decisively engaged in a new form of collective political activity which generated a heightened sense of their unity as a people. It is this activity and consciousness which irreversibly differentiates the Indonesian intervention from the earlier colonial intervention. Under Portuguese rule, individual and to some degree isolated populations were able to come to terms with a foreign presence which, moreover, did not resort to large scale military operations until relatively late in the occupation. Today, however,

the political climate is producing a polarization of the Indonesians with their supporters, and the forces of resistance coalescing around FRETILIN. In such a situation conflict is inevitable.

What I fear is that in the escalating crisis, the very survival of the indigenous cultures is seriously threatened. You will hear evidence concerning the present threat to their physical survival, and you must evaluate it for yourselves. My point, however, is that the invasion and resistance, whatever the success of one or the other, will end in the annihilation of East Timorese culture which might have encountered the Indonesians on entirely different terms.

For, the final tragedy of the situation is that, prior to the occupation, the peoples of East Timor were not hostile to their Indonesian neighbors, but rather curious and eager to know them better. Unlike other parts of Southeast Asia, in the outer arc of the Lesser Sundas there was no question of deep-seated antagonisms between the indigenous populations, no burning history of invasion and conquest. To be sure, it is an area of cultural diversity. But diversity can be the condition for genuine cultural exchange, and this might have been realized by now had the Indonesians not perceived an independent East Timor as a political threat. Today, both the Indonesians and the East Timorese are entangled in the consequences of that perception. I myself believe it to be a false one, for I am convinced that an independent East Timor and the Republic of Indonesia could co-exist in peace.

The reality of the situation in the outer arc of the Lesser Sundas is that on the eastern half of the easternmost island a people emerged from a specific and unique colonial experience. In what by now is a familiar if paradoxical pattern, the colonial period had generated boundaries between this people and their closely related neighbors, while simultaneously laying the foundations for a new national unity. Thus what draws the East Timorese together and separates them from their neighbors is the colonial past.

Today the choice is between repeating the colonial past in a different and far more destructive form, or acknowledging the rights of the East Timorese people to determine their own future free from foreign interference. I call upon both the United Nations and the Republic of Indonesia to pursue this latter course. It is my firm belief that such a course serves the mutual interests of the Indonesian and the East Timorese peoples.

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2 November, 1979

To the Editor:

In your October 31 issue the Reuters article which reports on the famine in East Timor contains an odd twist. The article attributes the current crisis to indigenous resistance against Indonesian aggression, but not to the aggression itself. The significance of the Indonesian intervention is muted throughout, while the language of the article works to legitimate Indonesia's integration of "Loro Sae", as East Timor is referred to in the article. This reference, together with the dateline "Dili, Indonesia" (my emphasis) and the simple, declarative statement that "Loro Sae...became Indonesia's 27th province in July 1976 after its occupation by Indonesian forces", effectively mask an extraordinarily complex political situation. Surely The Times is not unaware that the United Nations have repeatedly "deplored" the Indonesian occupation and have called upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its forces; that the Portuguese Government continues to regard itself as the legitimate administering power; that FRETILIN declared the independence of East Timor prior to the Indonesian occupation. Thus the United Nations, the colonial power, and an indigenous liberation movement are in agreement on one point, the illegitimacy of the Indonesian integration of East Timor. If The Times has chosen to accept the Indonesian Government's definition of the situation, it should at least inform its readers that this definition remains contested.

The article contains other distortions. Forinstance, the territory is described as poor "in the best of times". But this is only partially accurate. Although eastern Timor is affected by the aridity and uncertain rainfall characteristic of the Lesser Sunda region, it is relatively fertile in contrast to neighboring areas. Prior to the Indonesian occupation Portuguese Timor, while poor by Western standards, was able to satisfy the economic needs of the population. What, then, has precipitated the current crisis? Neither natural conditions nor a temporary shock nor "small-scale fighting". A famine of the reported dimensions indicates a serious and continuous disruption of production. What the article refuses to address is the role played by the Indonesian intervention, an intervention which has been roundly condemned by the international community and which, by The Times' own admission, sparked the resistance of the indigenous population,

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Soon to come are superpowerful computers, packaged in tiny panels, that will increase the chances of a pilot to fight and live to fight another day. At present, a pilot must fly directly at his target at least for a few moments—an exceedingly dangerous maneuver.

The new electronic fire-control devices will eliminate that danger, permitting a flier to release his weapons while he is maneuvering violently—even if he is rolling upside down.

Technology is being developed to help pilots in other ways. New radar and lasers, now under test, will make American warplanes virtually immune to enemy jamming, a major problem. These devices are in what is known as a "constant jump mode"—that is, they move continuously and automatically from one frequency to another, defying enemy efforts to pinpoint them. Because of the Russian emphasis on disrupting enemy communications, this effort to jam-proof U.S. planes is a top Air Force priority.

#### ON THE GROUND

Other advances in technology promise dramatic improvements in the ground-support area. One example: New aircraft engines will have far fewer parts than those flying today. This not only will reduce the chances for failure but drastically cut the number of spare parts that must be bought and stored.

Another example: Streamlining of the Air Force Logistics Command. Gen. Bryce Poe II, who heads the command, claims that when Israel defeated Egypt and Syria in the brief but intense Yom Kippur War of 1973, it was logistics that made the decisive difference. He says: "It was a logistical conflict between us and the Soviets. We beat them hands down over a longer distance." His command is responsible for 800,000 items, from patrol dogs to nuclear weapons, with a budget of 16.4 billion a year. If it were a private business, it would rank 10th on a list of the top 500 corporations in the country.

Largely through the use of computers and automated equipment, the Logistics Command has reduced its depots from 21 in the mid-1950s to five today. At the same time, it has cut the number of people employed from 225,000 a quarter of a century ago to 91,000 today, and that number is scheduled to drop another 10 percent by the early 1980s. Despite these decreases, Poe says, the Logistics Command is doing essentially the same amount of work.

As the Air Force prepares for its new challenges, there are many in the service who worry that this elite corps is in serious danger of losing the very asset that has made possible its technological leadership: The high quality of its people.

#### THE EXCUSE

One warning sign is that, for the first time since the introduction of the all-volunteer force seven years ago, the Air Force is not filling recruitment goals.

Even more worrisome is the fact that experienced men and women—both middle-level enlisted personnel and commissioned officers—are leaving the service in increasing numbers. The loss of pilots and engineers, critical to the future of the Air Force, is particularly acute.

A shortage of 2,000 pilots and 900 engineers is currently reported.

While there is concern in the Pentagon, in commands outside Washington the reaction is close to alarm. "We are in deep, serious trouble," declares Gen. Alton D. Slay, head of the Systems Command.

At Langley Air Force Base, Va., home of the Tactical Command, the situation appears particularly bleak. Gen. W. L. Creech, the tactical commander, described the steps he had taken to improve life in the service for his pilots. The result? "We've made so much

progress they're leaving us now with smiles on their faces," he says. "Our pilot-retention rate is the best in the Air Force—and its terrible." Not only is the loss of pilots reaching serious proportions, but there is also a less noticed loss of sergeants which, Creech says, "could reach a flood unless we address the issue."

For the long-range health of the service, the shortage of engineers may be even more serious than the loss of fliers. The Air Force counts on recruiting 800 to 1,000 engineers a year. It is now reaching only 40 percent of that goal, says Lt. Gen. Andrew P. Insue, the service's manpower chief, and experienced engineers are leaving in record numbers.

"We are back-filling jobs that were held by captains and majors and lieutenant colonels with second lieutenants. A man with one year of experience replaces a man with 12. The experience exchange is disastrous," says Lt. Gen. Lawrence A. Skantz, commander of the Aeronautical Systems Division in Dayton. Largely responsible for the manpower problem, say top Air Force officers, is the series of ceilings that have prevented military pay from keeping up with the cost of living and with raises received by union workers. Coupled with this is the price industry will pay men and women with certain critical skills. A pilot who takes an airline job can make two or three times the income he could achieve in the service. An engineer right out of college can go to work in industry for \$18,000 or more. The Air Force can offer \$12,000.

But beyond this difference in compensation is a growing bitterness, a feeling that service life is going to get steadily worse.

"Almost in every area, from the perspective of people in the service, there have not only been pay cuts but reneging on the deal they made with the country," Creech says.

Thus, twin challenges face the Air Force as it prepares to move into space in the 1980s:

It must maintain the momentum of its revolution in technology and at the same time attract and hold the men and women whose special talents are needed to manage that revolution.

#### ANOTHER CAMBODIA

### HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 8, 1979

● Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, a critical situation similar to that in Cambodia has resulted from civil strife on the island of East Timor. Over 60,000 people, approximately one-third of this small Asian country's population, already suffer from disease and severe malnutrition. Current assistance is insufficient in reaching those afflicted, and it is clear that thousands of East Timorians will face starvation unless immediate action is taken by the international community to provide relief for those it is intended to reach.

The following article which appeared in New Republic magazine on November 3 depicts the deplorable conditions in East Timor and what must be done in order to alleviate the plight of this beleaguered population. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert this article into the RECORD:

#### ANOTHER CAMBODIA

Next time you see a photo of a gaunt-eyed, swollen-bellied Cambodian child, or read a report about mass death from war, disease,

and starvation in Indochina, think about the small Asian island of East Timor. Much the same thing that has happened in Cambodia has happened in East Timor, some 2,500 miles to the southeast. Between a tenth and a third of the island's population—60,000 to 200,000 persons—has been killed or has died from lack of food and medicine since fighting started in 1975. Half a generation of Timorese children may have been rendered mentally retarded by malnutrition. Right now 250,000 Timorese are languishing in resettlement camps which one recent visitor, a refugee-relief expert, described as "horrible—as horrible as any I've seen anywhere, including the Thai-Cambodian border." Of these 250,000, about 60,000 face starvation unless relief supplies reach them within the next two months, and 25,000 are in critical condition at this very moment.

For Americans, there is a big difference between Timor and Cambodia. We do not have the luxury, in the case of Timor, of blaming what's happened on Khmer Rouge fanatics or the communist government of North Vietnam. The agony of East Timor is the result of a bloody and brutal territorial seizure by America's friend, Indonesia, and we are deeply implicated in what has happened. Indonesia's original invasion, in December 1975, occurred just 12 hours after President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had visited Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, raising no public objection to the impending attack. American weapons were used in the initial assault and throughout Indonesia's four-year campaign to suppress nationalist guerrillas. The Ford administration accepted Indonesia's claim to East Timor, and so did the Carter administration, which (despite its stated policy of limiting world arms transfers) increased military sales to Indonesia from the Ford level of three million dollars to \$112 million in 1978.

Despite consistent reports by Australian and other sources about Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, and despite occasional congressional hearings on events there, the Carter administration has raised scarcely a public peep over human rights violations on the island. The U.S. doesn't want unfortunate goings-on in an obscure place to frustrate better relations with the world's fifth most populous country, a resources-rich anti-communist ally strategically placed in the gap between the Asian mainland and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indonesia, in effect, has extorted the United States into silence by making it clear it would allow no Western humanitarian relief agencies to visit and help Timor if too much were said about what's going on there. Even now, Carter administration officials are afraid to say too much, lest Indonesia refuse to cooperate in saving those who face starvation between now and the monsoon season.

The conscience of America will be eased to know that the U.S. government, having supplied the weapons of Timor's destruction, is now providing 8119 tons of a high-protein rice and corn soy blend to feed its refugees, and has furnished \$2.9 million in aid to the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services, the agencies responsible for helping Timor's population. However, the conscience of America should not rest too easy. American officials raise some doubt whether enough transportation facilities exist on the island to get food and medicine to all who need it before the rain starts. An American researcher who has done extensive work on Timor, Arnold Kohen, also cites church and government sources in Australia, Indonesia, and the U.S. as charging that Indonesian military authorities have systematically plundered previous relief shipments and parceled out the remainder on a politically discriminatory basis.

The conscience of America really should



not rest at least until the U.S. government has done all it can to assure that the people it has made miserable really are helped.

It is not terribly surprising that America has paid little attention to Timor up to now. It is located nowhere—at the far southern end of the Malay archipelago, 350 miles north of Australia. The whole island is about double the size of New Jersey, and for 400 years it has been divided culturally and politically into eastern and western parts.

West Timor was a Dutch colony, with a large Moslem population, and naturally joined Indonesia (which is predominantly Moslem) when the rest of the country won its independence. East Timor, however, was Portuguese and heavily Catholic. It was not at all necessary or natural that it would join Indonesia when the Portuguese withdrew in 1975. A brief, bloody civil war was fought in September of that year between left- and right-wing factions committed to independence. The left-wing faction, FRETILIN, won out, using arms provided or taken from the former Portuguese garrison.

Indonesia was willing to tolerate a Portuguese East Timor, but not an independent mini-state. The right-wing government of President Suharto has asserted that FRETILIN was a communist movement, but U.S. officials say there is no evidence whatever to support the claim. Probably Indonesia figured it had nothing to gain by tolerating an independent neighbor. The Indonesians first sent in commando units from West Timor, which seized border areas in September 1975 and (according to Australian intelligence sources) killed five Australian television reporters who filmed the invasion.

In late November, FRETILIN declared independence and on December 3 it appealed to President Ford to prevent Indonesia from invading. During Ford's visit to Jakarta, Kissinger issued a public statement saying that the United States "understands Indonesia's position on the question" of Timor. Whatever American officials may have said in private about what Indonesia was about to do, it certainly had no deterrent effect. On December 7 Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion against the East Timor capital of Dili. A high-ranking Indonesian general confirmed to a U.S. congressional delegation that "of course there were U.S. weapons used. These are the only weapons that we have."

There is virtually no dispute that the initial invasion was accompanied by widespread, indiscriminate killings of civilians by Indonesian troops. As in Vietnam, and as in Indonesia's own civil war, ethnic Chinese seem to have been a special target of systematic brutality and murder. U.S. State Department officials admit excesses during the early days of fighting, but claim offending soldiers and commanders were removed and disciplined. Critics of U.S. policy assert, however, that the top commander of the forces attacking Dili was not disciplined at all, but was decorated and promoted to brigadier general.

It is an interesting parallel between Cambodia and East Timor—and one which may not be coincidental—that the Indonesian government, like Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia, made it almost impossible for the outside world to know what it was doing as it attempted to assert control over the land. Prior to its invasion, Indonesia warned Australia to get all of its nationals out of the country, and also demanded the departure of International Red Cross workers. As in Cambodia, foreign visits were permitted only rarely, and then were tightly controlled.

Because of the secrecy, it's impossible to know exactly what transpired in Timor from 1975 until this year, when a few Westerners again began to travel around the country

as part of relief efforts. Indonesia justified its secrecy, and its activities, as an "internal matter" after May 1978, when an Indonesian-appointed "Regional Popular Assembly" unanimously voted to ask for incorporation of Timor into Indonesia. This action has been declared invalid three times by the United Nations General Assembly.

The Carter administration's official human rights report declared diplomatically that the U.S. "has accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, but it does not recognize that a valid act of self-determination occurred." Recognition of the incorporation, however, saves the U.S. from having to object to its ally's use of U.S.-supplied equipment to commit aggression.

On the ground in East Timor, it's clear that after Indonesia's invasion, FRETILIN's forces fled the island's small urban centers for the rugged highlands. The insurgents may have numbered as many as 25,000 persons. In 1978, the Indonesian military began to make use of Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco" counter-insurgency aircraft—slow-moving planes equipped with infrared detectors, bombs, rockets, napalm, and machine guns, specifically designed for close combat support against an enemy without an effective anti-aircraft capability. U.S. congressional committees have been told by critics of American policy that Indonesia used the planes not only to destroy guerrilla strongpoints, but also to wreck the villages and crops of highland dwellers in order to separate them from FRETILIN.

Estimates of casualties in Timor vary greatly. In 1978, a leader of a provisional government created by Indonesia said he believed 60,000 persons had been killed. In March 1977, James Dunn, an Australian parliament researcher and former consul in Timor who is the most energetic gatherer of information about the island's travail, told a U.S. congressional committee that 100,000 persons had been killed. He based his estimate on reports from Indonesian church officials and refugees. At the same congressional hearing, U.S. State Department officials said such high reports were "greatly exaggerated." One official said that the death toll was probably 10,000. This year, James Dunn compared pre-war Portuguese census figures with current Indonesian military estimates of the population and found that 300,000 persons are "missing." Cohen, citing church sources, says more than 200,000 have died. One U.S. State Department official said last week that 100,000 is the "generally accepted figure" on Timorese deaths. Another said he knew of no accepted figure. What American intelligence agencies know from Australian monitoring of Indonesian military communications, U.S. officials will not say.

The most intense fighting in Timor has occurred during the Carter administration's tenure in office—and so have most of the casualties. In mid-1977, Indonesia offered an amnesty to FRETILIN, but also moved 10,000 fresh troops into the country and stepped up counter-insurgency operations. In the fall, a French photo-journalist slipped into the country and later claimed that the Indonesian army was "systematically wiping out" villages suspected of supporting the guerrillas. In 1978, employing search-and-destroy techniques, heavy air bombardments, and helicopter-borne attacks, the Indonesians began to make decisive headway against FRETILIN. On the last day of the year, an Indonesian force killed the opposition's president, Nicolau Lobato.

The level of continuing resistance in Timor is in dispute. Indonesian authorities seem confident enough now to allow some Westerners to make helicopter visits around the countryside more or less freely as they inspect refugee camps. However other sources, including Arnold Cohen, contend that the resistance is still alive. Cohen as-

serts, citing reports from U.S. government officials and church sources, that the Indonesian military's policy is to execute summarily all FRETILIN members, supporters, and their families, leaving resistance fighters little choice but to hide when they are unable to fight. Although the U.S. government recognizes Indonesia's take-over of Timor, it's still not clear that Timor has acquiesced.

During 1978 and 1979, a massive stream of Timorese refugees—some 300,000—has descended from the interior highlands to coastal areas and towns, driven by a combination of war devastation and drought to seek food, medicine, and shelter. The condition of the refugees has been described by witnesses as being worse than in Biafra, the Sahel, or Bangladesh during their respective disasters. In September 1978, church relief workers told visiting correspondents that 500 people per month were dying in one East Timor district alone. Other recent visitors say a third of the refugees are marasmic—emaciated, bellies swollen from malnutrition—or post-marasmic, in a state where their bodies are consuming their own protein. Of 250,000 now in refugee camps, one experienced relief official said he guessed 25,000 "are not going to make it" in spite of international relief efforts. The scale may be smaller, but Timor is another Cambodia—and it is partly our responsibility.—MORRIS KONDRACKE

## THERE IS NO ESCAPE

HON. RON PAUL

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 8, 1979

● Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, there is no more eloquent champion of the free market and individual liberty than Dr. Hans Sennholz, chairman of the economics department of Grove City College. His latest book, "The Age of Inflation", is a masterpiece which I unhesitatingly recommend to everyone interested in our No. 1 economic problem.

Dr. Sennholz understands and can effectively articulate the moral order that must underlie freedom, as few do. I would like to call to my colleagues' attention his excellent essay that highlights the November issue of *The Freeman*.

The essay follows:

### THERE IS NO ESCAPE

(By Hans F. Sennholz)

The Carter energy plan contains a familiar ingredient: it takes money from the working taxpayers to give to the nonworking population. It proposes a windfall profits tax on oil producers and a fuel subsidy to poor consumers. When enacted, it may introduce "fuel stamps" just like "food stamps" to enhance the lives of some 25 million people who are believed to be poor.

Transfer programs now comprise the lion's share of the federal budget. During the past decade transfer payments grew by almost 300 percent, while wages and salaries rose by 134 percent. In 1970 these transfer payments amounted to \$57 billion; in the federal budget for 1980 they are estimated to exceed \$226 billion. How much longer can the transfer grow at twice the rate of the earnings that are supporting them?

Surely, the political transfer process cannot continue to grow indefinitely. There are limits of economic output as well as political

Dear Jack,

As I said when I saw the the second of the two East Timor columns that you did, I was ##### taken aback that the current situation was not referred to in any way. There is little doubt that something compared with Biafra and Cambodia is of news value, and at the same time there is fertile ground for your office to plow.

Item: many reliable sources have told me that there are deeper divisions concerning the East Timor policy than ever before, particular in the State Department and the Intelligence Community. I personally know of one instance of a fairly senior CIA official who practically cried when describing his current information on the East Timor situation.

In the State Dept., there was said to be an intense debate concerning the US position on the recent UN resolution on East Timor. The hardliners won out, but there are many who are deeply dissatisfied with this position.

ITEM: While it may be true that more than half of Timor's population has been wiped out as a result of the war, the survivors are by no means safe. The Indonesian military has only allowed a handful of independent relief workers into East Timor, and these people only arrived in October 1979. Specifically, there are only three International Red Cross personnel on the ground to supervise a program aimed at "60,000 critical cases". International Red Cross staffers in New York have told me that this is all the Indonesians will allow, ##### the #  
##### that without public pressure this will not be expanded.

ITEM: Catholic Relief Services also has a program in East Timor, but in this case there is no fulltime supervisor on the ground. Their director in the Indonesian capital visits East Timor periodically, and one of their people from New York visited briefly, but there are no staff members to supervise the program in any way. CRS staff in East Timor are all Indonesians, who are in no position to defy the military. Corruption of aid, reported by everyone from the Indonesian Jesuits to Indonesian government officials, cannot be significantly tempered without outside observers supervision.

Item: The State Department has made it clear that the official position is to keep the situation quiet, supposedly so that their "quiet diplomacy" with the Indonesians will bear fruit. But what are the concrete results of nearly four years of the State Dept's work? Three ICRC people on the ground

Important press material for background

- 1) Melbourne Age, Dec. 12, 1975: Shortly after <sup>Indonesia</sup> launched the fullscale invasion, one of its radio broadcasts threatened to kill anyone who supported FRETILIN.
- 2) Manchester Guardian, January 10, 1976: Among other things, Australian intelligence leaks on how the five Australian TV journalists were in fact murdered; also information on how Australians lied about their knowledge of early Indonesian involvement in Timor. Important because State Department tries to claim that they "knew very little" about this period.
- 3) 3) 1976 Washington Post editorial; also shows that the WP was not willing to accept Indonesian propaganda claims. Why then does the State Department?
- 4) Melbourne Age, April 27, 1976; more on death of Australian journalists.
- 5) The Australian, Jan. 28, 1977; news accounts of Dunn report on Indonesian atrocities.
- 6) The London Times report of same.
- 7) The Bulletin (published by Australian Financial Review, March 19, 1977; an extremely important profile of Dunn.
- 8) same publication, March 26, 1977; some particularly revealing accounts of Carter Administration attitudes.
- 9) Ithaca Journal (a Gannet paper), # Feb. 28, 1977; encircled portion is erroneous.
- 10) WP and NYT accounts of Dunn revelations; in this case the NYT is a bit quick to rely on State Dept. sources; notice how apologetic the State Dept. is for the Indonesians.
- 11) WP and NYT report of State Dept. claim that military aid had been suspended to Indonesia.
- 12) Transcript of Australian Broadcasting Commission report on how Carter Administration and Australian gov't moved to dilute the impact of Dunn testimony.
- 13) Christian Science Monitor account of hearing; see marked portion.
- 14) Melbourne Herald, April 7, 1977; see how quick Holbrooke is to sweep atrocities under the carpet.
- 15) New York Times, July 17, 1977; account of Center for International Policy findings concerning Carter Administration policy and East Timor.
- 16) Extremely important Melbourne Age account of journalist Richard Carleton's guided tour to East Timor. Remexio, one place the Indonesians said they couldn't take him because it was in FRETILIN hands, is the place described by journalists who went on the Sept. 1978 visit. Aug. 10, 1977
- 17) August 11, 1978 Age continuation of report on Carleton visit. Parts also appeared in London Observer.
- 18) International Herald Tribune, Dec. 5, 1977 (also appeared in LA Times, Nov. 25, same year) on how Indonesia needs to replace military gear used up in Timor operations. See marked portion
- 19) Feb. 10, 1978 New York Times report on release of State Dept Human Rights report. Gwertzman writes that the State Dept, appears to be "gentle" on reports of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor.
- 20) New York Times, May 14, 1978; an excellent example of how the Carter Administration is rearming Indonesia. See marked portion: it is unbelievably hypocritical.



### The Situation in Brief

In a November 5 Washington Post article, the reknowned nutritionist Jean Mayer called for an end to the use of starvation as a means of warfare. On Nov. 13, the Head of the Law of War Branch of the U.S. Marine Corps replied to Mayer, assuring readers that the Carter Administration has already signed protocols that outlaw "starvation as a weapon."

The Carter Administration's real attitude is quite different: it has supported to the hilt Indonesia's continuing military operations in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, both in terms of military equipment and diplomatic support. The Australian press and the Far Eastern Economic Review, as well as the San Francisco Chronicle, have recently reported that tens of thousands of East Timorese have died of starvation and disease since Indonesian forces launched a fullscale invasion on December 7, 1975 (the day after Ford and Kissinger left the capital of Indonesia after a state visit). Moreover, unless impartial international relief agencies are given access to East Timor, there is every indication that tens of thousands of others will meet a similar fate. It should be stressed that East Timorese in both Indonesian-controlled and guerilla-held areas are in similar danger of death from starvation and disease. The Jakarta military regime has barred the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from entering East Timor since the Dec. 1975 invasion. On Dec. 1, 1977, Amnesty International criticized this persistent Indonesian refusal to allow in independent relief agencies. From one side of its mouth, the Carter Administration has said that it would "encourage" Indonesia to admit the ICRC into East Timor, ~~(these over a period of more than 18 months; it would seem that all this amounts to sweet-sounding human rights rhetoric,~~ because the Indonesians have shown no indication that # they will allow in the ICRC. Given the enormity of the situation -- it is quite possible that 100,000 or more East Timorese have died as a result of the invasion, out of a population of 650,000 -- the Carter Administration's lenient attitude toward Indonesia is shocking. The East Timor situation on a per capita basis could well be the worst holocaust of recent times: given that the war in Timor continues, it may well be that one-third or more of the population will have died before this is over. Recent phone conversations with the Carter State Department betray an almost gloating attitude on the part of administration officials; the Carter line is that resistance to the Indonesian occupation is all but ended, this based on the fact that reporters who went to East Timor in early September saw no sign of resistance. This is not surprising, considering the well-orchestrated nature of the visit. But the Carter Administration feels that now that Rep. Fraser is leaving Congress, no one will raise the East Timor issue again; essentially, the Carter Administration feels that they have rode out the storm over East Timor.

The "storm" began scarcely more than a month after Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as President. A report charging Indonesian forces with the wanton killing of anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 East Timorese -- in some cases pulling people out of Catholic churches where they had taken refuge -- circulated on Capitol Hill. The report was written by James Dunn, director

Encouragement  
have  
imposed  
been  
reflected  
over the  
last year  
and a half.



"transit camps"; the group was told by church relief workers (presumably Indonesian or Timorese, although they may have been among the small group of European nuns and priests that have lived in East Timor ##### for decades) that in one district of East Timor alone (there are 14 districts there), 500 people have been dying per month of starvation. That is only one report among the ones attached.

The Sunday Times (London) reported ##### prior to the diplomats' visit that the Indonesians had arranged the trip for the purpose of winning international acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over East Timor (The U.S. recognizes the Indonesian claim and argues that although Indonesia's original invasion violated ##### ## bilateral agreements on the use of U.S. arms for purposes of aggression, once Indonesia announced the annexation the situation in East Timor became an internal affair of Indonesia's; therefore, use of U.S. arms would then be used in East Timor to "suppress an insurgency"; More on this later). The visiting diplomats called for an international relief operation for East Timor; but the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who accompanied the party, indicated that aid would only be accepted if the donor nations recognized Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over East Timor. The U.N. General Assembly has twice rejected the Indonesian claim, and is slated to discuss the issue in late November. The carefully-orchestrated visit was designed to convince the world body that resistance to the Indonesian occupation has ended. The fate of the Timorese in the "transit camps" is something else again; there is absolutely no assurance that the Indonesian regime will feed or give medical attention to these people; the US ambassador to Indonesia should know this better than anyone, for he is in constant touch with the American business community in Jakarta, which complains incessantly that Indonesia has one of the most corrupt governments -- if not the most corrupt -- in the world. During famines last year in two parts of Indonesia proper, the Jakarta regime was accused of gross negligence in dealing with the situations. The State Oil Company, Pertamina, went bankrupt in 1976, with over \$10 billion in debts, in large part incurred by government-endorsed projects that would have been suitable for Miami Beach or Beverly Hills, not for one of the poorest countries in the world. The Indonesian government hopes and prays that no one will want to take a close look at what has been happening in East Timor; this is why the International Committee of the Red Cross has been barred, this is why no journalists have been allowed to travel freely there, this is why no further East Timorese have been allowed to leave the country since the Dunn disclosures. The Carter Administration is cooperating with these Indonesian efforts by pretending that ##### Indonesia's release of many thousands of political prisoners over the last year (who had been held since 1965 without trial) is all that one can hope for. In reality, many thousands of 1965 prisoners are still in detention without trial or charges, and the Timor holocaust is something that simply won't go away. Perhaps the best indication of what the Carter Administration is willing to tolerate can be ~~received~~ *gotten* by a glimpse of what the Indonesian hierarchy says and how the Carter human rights people respond. In late September the Head of Indonesia's two major security agencies -- which means ~~that~~ *that* one person directing the Indonesian equivalent of the FBI and CIA -- compared his power to that of SS Chief Heinrich Himmler.

of the Australian Parliament's equivalent of our Congressional Research Service foreign affairs unit. Dunn has a long association with East Timor, dating back to 1962-1965, when he was Australian consul there. In January 1977, at the request and expense of church groups such as Australian Catholic Relief, Dunn travelled to Portugal, where he interviewed many East Timorese refugees, including more than a dozen who had lived in Indonesian-occupied areas after the invasion. Dunn, fluent in Portuguese and conservative by instinct, cautioned the refugees not to exaggerate their stories; nevertheless, after carefully sifting through the material he received, the stories were uniformly horrifying. Dunn was quoted in the London Times as saying that Indonesian atrocities against the population of East Timor during the Dec. 1975 invasion made the My Lai massacre "look like a gentlemen's picnic." Dunn also received further information on the fate of five Australian TV newsmen who were believed murdered by Indonesian forces while filming evidence of Indonesian military operations in East Timor -- this in October 1975 at a time when Indonesia was piously denying any military involvement in East Timor. The Carter Administration has ~~thus~~ ignored the death of the journalists<sup>s</sup> as had two successive Australian governments. It should be noted that the Australian press has not forgotten what happened to these men, and has demanded on several occasions an official inquiry as to what happened to them. The Australian press corps still harbors a good deal of bitterness about the case of the TV journalists.

The Carter Administration tried in every way to minimize the Dunn report. It is clear that the administration ~~has~~ distorted what Dunn was trying to say: Dunn stressed that although Indonesian Catholic sources and others had said that as many as 100,000 East Timorese had ~~been~~ during the invasion, he could in no way authenticate such figures. What Dunn was saying quite directly was that nations concerned with human rights should launch their own investigations, take action to assure that Indonesia admit independent relief agencies into East Timor, etc. The Carter administration showed no willingness to conduct an investigation, and one may assume from their general attitude that no strong ~~(private or public)~~ representation was made to get the Indonesians to open up the territory. In the ~~the~~ hearings held by the Fraser Subcommittee, the Carter Administration stated outright that they had made no attempt to talk with the Timorese refugees in Portugal. What the Carter Administration did do was ~~to~~ give Indonesia a 28% increase in military aid; ~~to~~ misrepresent the timing of delivery of aircraft crucial to the Indonesian war effort; conclude another highly questionable aircraft deal with Jakarta; back Indonesia's position in the UN; try to prevent the holding of further hearings.

Recent Carter Administration actions follow this line, but get even worse. In early September, the Indonesians conducted what one journalist called a ~~carefully~~ "carefull-organized official visit" to selected areas of East Timor for a group of diplomats and journalists, including the U.S. Amassador to Indonesia. The group was shocked by what they saw: thousands of Timorese in Indonesian-controlled areas were suffering from advanced malnutrition and diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis; the Timorese were living in what the Indonesians referred to as

### Inventory of Press Material

\*Particularly pertinent points are marked with red pen.

#### Part One: Recent developments

- 1) Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 29, 1978
- 1A) Related to above: New York Times, Feb. 15, 1976, on figure of 60,000 dead: note that same person who said that repeats it in FEER, Sept. 29.
- 2) Cabberra Times, Frontpage, Oct. 3, 1978; on Australian MPs; excellent for background on International Red Cross situation.
- 3) A: Manchester Guardian, Sept. 14, 1978; on defoliants  
B: The Australian, Feb. 21, 1977; a bit of background on MP Hodgman; note that the ruling party in Australian politics is the Liberal-Country Party coalition, a conservative alliance.
- 4) The# Australian, Sept. 12, 1978:
- 5) San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 13, 1978, notice that the writer finds virtually no evidence that the Indonesian gov't is making a concerted effort to allieviate the humanitarian situation.
- 6) San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 18, 1978; please note that a month after the events described in the other stories, the Indonesians have the nerve to peddle the line that these people still face starvation. If they really intend to bring in humanitarian aid, where is it? and where is the Carter Administration while this is happening?
- 7) The Age (Melbourne), Sept. 15, 1978, letter to editor, provides useful data on what the international aid situation actually is.
- 8) Melbourne Sun Sept. 7, 1978, starred portion shows why Indonesians arranged the ambassadors visit.
- (9) Sunday Times (London) Sept. 3, 1978; again, it is shown why the Indonesians invited the ambassadors in.
- 10) A recently-issued Indonesian gov't brochure on the ### on how their own Red Cross can do the job; note abovementioned Oct 3, Canberra Times piece on what Australian Parliamentarians think of this.
- 11) A: Melbourne Herald, Sept. 11, 1978  
B " " " " " " " " Sept. 12, 1978
- 12) Melbourne Herald editorials, Sept. 11 and 12, 1978
- 13) The Australian, Sept. 12, 1978, editorial
- 14) Asian Wall Street Journal, Sept. 26, 1978, note especially comments of the Indonesian Foreign Minister; the notion that he # doesn't want the people in Timor to be dependent on aid is ridiculous; Indonesia is #2 receiver of World Bank monies, has received easily in excess of \$2 billion in American aid since 1965, and receives approximately \$2 billion annually (in recent years) from the Intergovernmental group on Indonesia, of which the US is a leading member. Further, much of the aid that Indonesia receives must go for specific projects, so Indonesia is as aid dependent as any country in the world; the esteemed Foreign Minister id merely trying to "encourage" outsiders to give their money but stay away from Timor. And the problems in Timor do not seem "manageable".
- 15) The Sunday Times, London, Aug. 20, 1978, of general interest,

- 16) Canberra Times, Sept. 13, 1978, more on why independent help is needed/
- 17) Canberra Times, Sept. 12, 1978, more of the same.
- 18) Melbourne Sun, Sept. 13, 1978, more
- 19) Newcastle Morning Herald, Sept. 14 editorial, excellent and informative.
- 20) Sydney Morning Herald, Sept. 11, 1978, Note Indonesian Foreign Minister's "indication". Where is the ambassador of the Carter human rights administration when the Indonesians are conducting starvation diplomacy?
- 21) Notes on a conversation a friend of mine recently had with a Timorese priest who is a leader of the refugee community in Portugal. It is especially interesting for its description of Indonesian food distribution policies. Please treat the addresses of the priests as confidential.
- 22) Transcript of Dutch TV program during which the Indonesian security chief compared himself with Himmler; call Dutch TV people in Washington for confirmation.
- 23) Sydney Morning Herald, Sept. 12, 1978: Australian MP on the situation.
- 24) Canberra Times, October 4, 1978; the moderate sounding statements toward the bottom of this one are contradicted by a little Nov. 9, 1978 Canberra Times report, which I am calling
- #25) Meanwhile, it is abundantly clear that the Indonesians are continuing their efforts to starve out the resistance; see Mayer, #26, Washington Post, Nov. 5, on starvation as a weapon of war, and #27, the Marine Legal Advisor's response, Nov. 13.
- 28) Melbourne Age, Sept. 30, 1978: Portugal's UN call for self-determination for East Timor.
- 29) Melbourne Age, Oct. 30, 1978, news of Suharto's upcoming visit to Australia, which leads into
- 30) Nov. 3, 1978 letter to editor, Melbourne Age, from Shirley Shackleton, widow of one of the five Australian TV journalists murdered by Indonesian forces in East Timor in October 1975
- 31) Melbourne Age, Oct. 13, 1978, This article shows just how hypocritical the Indonesians are in claiming that there are no resources in Timor to feed the people there, and it plainly points up their corruption.
- 32) Sydney Morning Herald, Oct. 14, 1978; in a public relations maneuver, the Indonesians have for months been saying that flights into the East Timor capital will be resumed; This article shows how real these promises are. It is clear that the Indonesians don't want outsiders poking about.
- 33) The Melbourne Age, Nov. 11, 1978; likewise, the Indonesians don't want heads of families (males) to leave Timor; priests have smuggled letters out of the territory suggesting that this is because most males have seen military action in some form, or have been more likely than women to witness conditions of war. It seems clear that the Indonesians are trying hard to prevent further stories of atrocities from leaking out of East Timor. Negotiations on re-unification of families began in early 1976; there have been delays, and now there is another "delay". Highly suspicious, isn't it?



Jack Anderson

# East Timor Shouldn't Be Ignored

Now and then, a story cries out to be told. The tragedy of East Timor is such a story. It should not go ignored by those who claim membership in the human race.

Malnutrition and death have always been commonplace in East Timor, a piece of earth abused by man and nature. The 600,000 people of this remote country — a rugged, mountainous island slightly larger than the state of Connecticut — were accustomed to hardship. For most of them, life was labor and death came early.

But they were unprepared for the slaughter that began on Dec. 7, 1975, when the Indonesians overran the island. The invaders bludgeoned and starved the populace into submission. Today, there are an estimated 330,000 survivors — the rest wiped out by warfare, disease and starvation.

The world seemed oblivious to the desperate plight of these beleaguered, isolated people. Some of their leaders escaped, sought us out and begged us to tell their story. They tried for months to smuggle our reporter, Hal Bernton, past the Indonesian naval blockade into East Timor to confirm their charges. But each time, the arrangements fell through.

Meanwhile, we have pieced together the story from top-secret intelligence reports and eyewitness accounts. We published the first installment in an earlier column. Now here is the rest of the story that Indonesia, with official U.S. connivance, has tried to hide from the world:

First, a bit of background. East Timor was a primitive but placid Portuguese colony until the Japanese seized the island during World War II. Under a harsh occupation regime, the Timorese became

resistance fighters. They lost 50,000 people before the island was liberated.

Then East Timor reverted quietly back to colonial status. Not until August 1975 did the Portuguese finally pull out. A brief civil conflict between two native factions brought the Fretilin party to power. Though it included some leftist elements, it was dominated by non-communists dedicated to the ideals of Western democracy.

In Jakarta, meanwhile, the Indonesian generals decided East Timor was ripe for plucking. They decided to test the strength of the new nation with a covert military probe. Relates a classified U.S. intelligence report, dated Sept. 19, 1975: "A combined force of some 200 special forces troops and Indonesian-trained guerrilla troops crossed the border. But the Indonesian soldiers met stiff resistance from Fretilin fighters and were forced to fall back."

An alarmed Fretilin leader, Ramos Horta, sent a cable to Jakarta, offering to cooperate with Indonesia. The olive branch was brusquely rejected by the Indonesian generals. They were "losing patience," according to a secret report, "with President Suharto's go-slow approach to the Portuguese Timor problem and . . . pressing him to authorize direct military intervention."

By Dec. 3, 1975, an intelligence dispatch to Washington reported that the hawkish generals had triumphed: "Ranking Indonesian civilian government leaders have decided that the only solution in the Portuguese Timor situation is for Indonesia to launch an open offensive against Fretilin."

But it was essential to neutralize the United States. For the Indonesian army

relied heavily on U.S. arms which, under our laws, could not be used for aggression.

As it happened, President Gerald Ford was on his way to Indonesia for a state visit. An intelligence report forewarned that Suharto would bring up the Timor issue and would "try and elicit a sympathetic attitude" from Ford.

That Suharto succeeded is confirmed by Ford himself. The United States had suffered a devastating setback in Vietnam, leaving Indonesia as the most important American ally in the area. Indonesia was also a major oil producer at a time when the United States was beginning to feel the petroleum pinch. Against this background, the remote little nation of East Timor may have seemed insignificant.

Ford also received the impression, he told us, that Suharto planned not to stage an invasion but to put down a rebellion. The U.S. national interest, Ford concluded, "had to be on the side of Indonesia."

But it was naked aggression against another nation that the Indonesians had in mind. Ford gave his tacit approval on Dec. 6, 1975. The Indonesians struck the following day — on the 34th anniversary of our own Pearl Harbor.

Footnote: Five days after the blitzkrieg invasion, the United Nations voted to condemn the attack as an arrant act of international aggression. But the United States turned a deaf ear to the death cry of the young struggling nation. On orders from Washington, the United States abstained from voting. Thereafter, the U.S. delegate maneuvered behind the scenes to resist U.N. moves aimed at forcing Indonesia to give up its conquest.

**Jack Anderson**

# Island Losing a Lonely, Infamous War

An anguished voice drifted across the airwaves like a cry in the wind. "Women and children are being shot in the streets! We are all going to be killed!" cried the disembodied voice. "I repeat, we are all going to be killed! This is an appeal for international help. . . Please help us!" Then there was silence.

The desperate plea was picked up on short-wave radio in the early dawn of Dec. 7. But it was 1975, not 1941; East Timor, not Pearl Harbor. And the aggressors were not Japanese but Indonesians armed with U.S. weapons. They swept through the independent nation of East Timor, gunning down innocent civilians in the streets, just as the haunting voice had charged.

It was a day of irony as well as infamy. The last time Timor was overrun by foreign troops, the invaders were Japanese. The impoverished people who lived there had formed an underground to fight on the side of the United States. But three decades later, the United States supported the aggressors. President Gerald Ford gave his tacit approval for the invasion on Dec. 6, 1975.

The world scarcely noticed the obscure war raging on this isolated, mountainous island 400 miles off the Australian coast. In most newspapers, the aggression was capsuled in a few paragraphs on the inside pages. The plaintive appeal for help was ignored by those who heard it. It was the last gasp of a tiny radio station in the capital city of Dili, followed by ominous silence.

Indonesia threw a naval blockade around the island, ostensibly to pre-

vent arms from reaching guerrillas in the mountains. But the blockade also screened the news that filtered through to the outside world.

Exiles who escaped from the island appealed to the United Nations, which sent a fact-finding team to Timor. The group was given the Potemkin village treatment; they were led by the Indonesian conquerors through carefully arranged peaceful scenes. The conducted tour was so flagrantly phony that the U.N. observers flew to Australia and tried to hire a Portuguese frigate to transport them secretly back to Timor to visit the guerrilla camps in the jungle outback.

Somehow, the Indonesians learned that the U.N. mission was preparing to sneak onto the island. They were so upset over the embarrassments that might be uncovered, according to intelligence reports, that the authorities in Jakarta actually considered sinking the frigate with the U.N. observers on board. U.S. intelligence agencies learned of the bizarre plot but buried the information deep in their files without alerting the U.N. representatives that their ship might be torpedoed.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian forces hastily launched a fierce offensive against the guerrillas, making it impossible for the U.N. team to find a safe place to land in Timor. The frustrated U.N. representatives, led by Italy's Wispeare Gucciardi, finally returned to file a timid report confessing that the truth about the Timor tragedy "remains elusive."

Exile leaders spent months trying to complete arrangements to smuggle

our associate, Hal Bernton, past the naval blockade to a secret landing spot on the shores of East Timor. But it was never quite possible to coordinate the venture.

Instead, we agreed to seek out the facts from here. U.S. sources have shown us secret reports; eyewitnesses have given us first-hand accounts. A year ago, our ambassador to Indonesia, Edward Masters, was able to visit East Timor under Indonesian auspices. More recently, relief agencies have been admitted to the area. We have seen their reports.

The East Timor population in 1974 was estimated at more than 600,000; now it is believed to be scarcely half that number. The rest apparently have been wiped out by warfare, disease and starvation.

The survivors live in abject poverty. Their rice-and-coconut economy has collapsed under the ravages of war. The population in the countryside has been starved deliberately to stifle the resistance movement.

The guerrilla forces are being eroded by casualties and defections. The resistance has been weakened further by squabbling among its military and political leaders.

Benighted U.S. policies have helped to bring this about. By supporting Indonesia's ruthless rule, the United States brought disfavor upon the pro-American moderate.

Thus the United States has been a shameful accomplice in the suppression of our former allies on East Timor. When the resistance at last dies, there probably won't be even a despairing voice crying out over short-wave radio.

Newsday, Nov. 8, 1979

# ANDERSON

## **Genocide in Timor Supported by U.S.**

Washington—An anguished voice drifted across the air waves like a cry in the wind. "Women and children are being shot in the streets! We are all going to be killed!" cried the disembodied voice. "I repeat, we are all going to be killed! This is an appeal for international help . . . Please help us!" Then there was silence.

The desperate plea was picked up on short-wave radio in the early dawn of Dec. 7, 1975, from East Timor. The aggressors were Indonesians armed with U.S. weapons. They swept through the independent nation of East Timor,

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*Jack Anderson is a syndicated columnist.*

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gunning down innocent civilians in the streets, just as the haunting voice had charged.

It was a day of irony as well as infamy. The last time Timor had been overrun by foreign troops, the invaders had been Japanese. The impoverished people who lived there had formed an underground to fight on the side of the U.S. But three decades later, we supported the aggressors. President Gerald Ford gave his tacit approval on Dec. 6, 1975, for the invasion.

The world scarcely noticed the obscure war, which raged on this isolated, rugged, mountainous island 400 miles off the Australian coast. The plaintive appeal for help was ignored by those who heard it. It was the last gasp of a tiny radio station in the capital city of Dili.

Exiles who escaped from the island appealed to the United Nations, which sent a fact-finding team to Timor. The conducted tour was so flagrantly phony that the UN observers finally filed a timid report confessing that the truth about Timor "remains elusive."

Recently, U.S. sources have shown us new top-secret reports; eyewitnesses have given us first-hand accounts. Finally, relief agencies have also been admitted to the area. We have seen their reports.

The toll of the dead and dying can only be described as genocide. No body count has been taken. But the population in 1974 was estimated at more than 600,000; now it is believed to be half that number. The rest apparently have been wiped out by warfare, disease and starvation.

The survivors live in abject poverty. Their rice-and-coconut economy has collapsed under the ravages of war. The population in the countryside has been deliberately starved in order to stifle the resistance movement. Slowly but surely, the guerrilla forces are being eroded by casualties and defections.

The leadership has passed largely from freedom-loving moderates to hard-core radicals. By supporting Indonesia's ruthless rule, the U.S. brought disfavor upon the pro-American moderates and has been a shameful accomplice in the suppression of our former allies on East Timor.



**Jack Anderson**

## 300,000 Die; U. S. Idle

WASHINGTON — Now and then, a story cries out to be told. The tragedy of East Timor is such a story. It should not go ignored by those who claim membership in the human race.

Malnutrition and death have always been commonplace in East Timor, a piece of earth abused by man and nature. The 688,880 people of this remote country — a rugged, mountainous island slightly larger than the state of Connecticut — were accustomed to hardship. For most of them, life was labor and death came early.

But they were unprepared for the slaughter that began on Dec. 7, 1975, when the Indonesians overran the island. The invaders bludgeoned and starved the populace into submission. Today, there are an estimated 300,000 survivors — the rest wiped out by warfare, disease and starvation.

The world seemed oblivious to the desperate plight of these beleaguered, isolated people. Some of their leaders escaped, sought us out and begged us to tell their story. They trisled for months to smuggle our reporter, Hal Bernton, past the Indonesian naval blockade into East Timor to confirm their charges of carnage. But each time, the arrangements fell through.

Meanwhile, we have pieced together the story from top-secret intelligence reports and eyewitness accounts.

**FIRST**, a bit of background. East Timor was a primitive but placid Portuguese colony until the Japanese seized the island during World War II. Under a harsh occupation regime, the Timorese became resistance fighters. They lost 50,000 people before the island was liberated.

Then East Timor reverted quietly back to colonial status. Not until August 1975, did the Portuguese finally pull out. A brief civil conflict between two native factions brought the Fretilin party to power. Though it included some leftist elements, it was dominated by non-Communists dedicated to the ideals of Western democracy.

In Jakarta, meanwhile, the Indonesian generals decided East Timor was ripe for plucking. They decided to test the strength of the new nation with a covert military probe. Relates a classified U.S. intelligence report, dated Sept. 19, 1975: "A combined force of some 200 special-forces troops and Indonesian-trained guerrilla troops crossed the border. But the Indonesian soldiers met stiff resistance from

Fretilin fighters and were forced to fall back."

An alarmed Fretilin leader, Ramos Horta, sent a cable to Jakarta, offering to cooperate with Indonesia. The olive branch was brusquely rejected by the Indonesian generals. They were "losing patience," according to a secret report, "with President Suharto's go-slow approach to the Portuguese Timor problem and . . . pressing him to authorize direct military intervention."

By Dec. 3, 1975, an intelligence dispatch to Washington reported that the hawkish generals had triumphed: "Ranking Indonesian civilian government leaders have decided that the only solution in the Portuguese Timor situation is for Indonesia to launch an open offensive against Fretilin."

**BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL** to neutralize the United States. For the Indonesian army relied heavily on U.S. arms which, under our laws, could not be used for aggression.

As it happened, President Gerald Ford was on his way to Indonesia for a state visit. An intelligence report forewarned that Suharto would bring up the Timor issue and would "try and elicit a sympathetic attitude" from Ford.

That Suharto succeeded is confirmed by Ford himself. The United States had suffered a devastating setback in Vietnam, leaving Indonesia as the most important American ally in the area. Indonesia was also a major oil producer at a time that the United States was beginning to feel the petroleum pinch. Against this background, the remote little nation of East Timor may have seemed insignificant.

Ford also received the impression, he told us, that Suharto planned not to stage an invasion but to put down a rebellion. The U.S. national interest, Ford concluded, "had to be on the side of Indonesia."

But it was naked aggression against another nation that the Indonesians had in mind. Ford gave his tacit approval on Dec. 6, 1975. The Indonesians struck the following day — on the 34th anniversary of our own Pearl Harbor.

**BY THE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT**, Indonesian warships began shelling the sleeping seaport of Dili. Terrorized men, women and children, aroused out of their beds, stumbled into the streets. From the skies, Indonesian paratroopers dropped on the town and opened fire indiscriminately on the milling townspeople.

The Fretilin fighting forces, caught unawares, put up no resistance. But grief turned to anger, and anger to action. They withdrew to the mountains and began a long, losing, guerrilla campaign.



Anderson



note new  
post-coded  
address

Apartado 33  
Rio de Mouro  
2735 Cacem  
PORTUGAL


January 10

Dear Arnold, Enclosed is a slightly crazy proposal you might be interested in looking at. I'd appreciate if you'd let me know ~~about~~ your feelings as soon as possible.

Haven't got time to write much. Latest news I have is that Rogerio Lobato is in Angola, having travelled on ~~tax~~ from Maputo, after receiving pledges of support and solidarity from Samora Machel. The same is expected of Neto. FRETILIN have announced a new ruling 'troika' consisting of Carvarinho, Vicente Reis and one other, unnamed, person drawn from the Central Committee. My feeling is that this appointment was made from outside and that there is no real information about whether the people named are still fighting, dead, or in Indon. hands. I may be wrong. I'm anxiously awaiting more reliable news from Dili, which I may have in a few days.

I had a letter from Noam yesterday, and will be replying soon. TAPOL have provided me with some money to finish the refugee testimony report, which I hope to be able to produce very soon.

Keep well,  
regards



P.S. John Sinnott should  
be in N. York sometime  
around end of Jan. He's  
going to London 25th, then on.



Office of Public Affairs

# A.I.D. News

The Agency for International Development Washington, D.C. 20523

FOR RELEASE  
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1979

AID-79-101  
Contact: John Metelsky  
(202) 632-8332

## TWO U.S. RELIEF AGENCIES TO AID EAST TIMOR VILLAGERS

The Agency for International Development is providing grants of \$751,100 to Catholic Relief Services and \$500,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross to help 200,000 displaced villagers on the Indonesian island of East Timor.

These grants bring to approximately \$8 million U.S. Government assistance in food and other relief supplies to people of East Timor.

CRS, a private voluntary agency, will airlift food and medical supplies to Timorese in isolated villages using chartered helicopters and two chartered barges will be used to carry relief supplies to the people on the north coast.

CRS also will buy medications and vitamin tablets for an estimated 200,000 people.

The grant to ICRC will enable the relief agency to continue airlifts of food and other emergency supplies to remote areas of the island.

East Timor, about 1,500 miles east of Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, is a former Portugese colony and has a population of about 600,000.

- more -

Portuguese authority collapsed in August 1975 when civil war between several Timorese political factions broke out. At the request of some factions, Indonesia intervened in December 1975 and in July of the following year East Timor was formally incorporated into Indonesia. Fighting between Indonesian forces and a Timorese group known as Fretilin continues at a low level.

The disruption of recent years, exacerbated by chronically poor economic conditions has resulted in the displacement of some 200,000 mountain tribal people. They now are located in 150 resettlement villages throughout the island.

Some 60,000 of these villagers are suffering from acute malnutrition. Many of the children are afflicted with marasmus, a wasting away of the body caused by severe malnutrition. Many adults and children also have malaria, parasites, respiratory infections and skin ulcers.

Last June, the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Edward Masters, determined that East Timor needed U.S. disaster relief assistance.

AID then gave a \$1 million grant to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to deliver food and medical assistance for six months. AID later provided another \$300,000 to airlift supplies.

AID also gave CRS a \$671,000 grant to deliver food, medicine, clothing and soap to people in resettlement villages. In addition, AID provided CRS with a \$150,000 grant to buy 300 tons of corn seed to enable farmers to plant for the April 1980 harvest. AID also gave CRS a \$777,925 grant to distribute 8,200 metric tons of U.S. Food for Peace rice and high protein food blends of corn-soy-milk. The value of the rice and food blends, including transportation, is about \$4 million.

CONVERSATION WITH MORTON KONDRACKE, FOREIGN EDITOR,  
NEW REPUBLIC, OCTOBER 23, 1979

KONDRACKE (after exchange of pleasantries): Here's what I'm going to do -- I'm gonna .. I'm gonna rework this thing ... uh and and write it under my ~~#####~~ own byline but give you fullsome credit..I can do it in an italics below the piece saying that you're you know you did research or I can do it in the body of the story ..the reason I'm doing it is partly for partly for convenience cause I wanna I wanna say what I wanna say and take take basic responsibility for it, it's not that it would be terribly different from what you say and it will be harder in the beginning, in fact .. I mean, what I wanna say is that there's something going on right now that is as horrible as Cambodia and that the U.S. is implicated in it and uh

(I try to clarify some things, pay him compliments -- too many, I talked too much, he was quite nervous and I could have asked him some meaty questions) I do emphasize clearly that unless I see his piece first I am reluctant to have my name on it; I suggest a Thursday meeting and "chat"; then I put in something about stereotypes he may have off me (re: Cameroh & Jeremy meeting)

Kondracke... I don't have any stereotypes...The, the..(stammering) I have no stereotypes at all, the only , uh, I have no stereotypes, I think as a matter of of both convenience and effectiveness it's better if I just do ~~###~~ it and we don't have to dicker over over terminology and

(I say that "I'm interested in only one thing: accuracy ... there are different ways of approaching it, I believe that my piece was accurate

KONDRACKE: I have no questions about ... I accept your piece I think that the uh um I have no problems with your piece , I reread it yesterday and I think that it needed to be it needed to be worked around so that the reader knows at the outset what we're talking about (talks about latest stuff, including USAID)

I've got two eyewitnesses who've been out there who say that the situation is as bad or worse than it is in Cambodia, on the Cambodian border# and I think that that's a good way to start

(I raise "a couple of things") on fee: at normal rate-- he tries to worm out of it, ("I guess, he says) I note that it was commissioned (unnecessary statements) "I guess I can get you the full rate.. I'll have to work Peretz over, but I'll do my best." "As far as I'm concerned I will fight like hell." "You'll certainly be paid, whether you're paid the full you know rate is ten cents a word , not exactly fulsome anyway..."

KONDRACKE: I would encourage you unless you have other business in Washington not to come down, but you've got your name problem on the thing .."

(Again, I talk too much, cite qualifications, etc,)

I do say that "name problem is a real problem", emphasize that I don't want to identify myself with something that I "strongly disagree with."

KONDRACKE then says that he can just refer to me in the piece as a source and quote from me , that I've done extensive research and "not affiliate you with the piece"



(I come in and state that I still would want to see it, and in all fairness I should have my name included at the bottom, or "Morton Kondracke with Arnold Kohen, or something"

KONDRACKE: Well, what I don't want to get into is if for example I ..... if I say in this piece, which I may well, that uh uh something to the effect that uhm I really haven't, I've heard reports that, for example, of brutality on the part of FRETILIN uhm.

(I note that I'm sure there have been at times, it ~~was~~ was war, but if his sources are trying to place the major blame .... I have not found a single source to ... said Kondracke, but again, I talked too much.)

Then he says I'm welcome to come (yeah!)

I say yes, and that I have more stuff from inside government sources., which I didn't want to get into on the phone, it may help him get some further information and make him feel better about the accuracy of it, etc.

KONDRACKE: The problem is that Thursday is late...Thursday we could change conceivably fix little things but we can't change anything that's major in the piece and the issue would be you know if you want your name on it or you don't want your name on it ... I have a feeling that you will not have any problem having your name on it because the line that I'm prepared to take is not in any significant way ~~###~~, as a matter of fact is not at all different from, what I'm going to do largely is rewrite the piece, take the same information and recast it in, come at it in a different way... (he adds "not much" concerning FRETILIN brutality, I note that I could refer him to documents, and other materials by people not on the left, eyewitness testimony, "I think that this is important because this is a kind of classic case of "blame the victim"

KONDRACKE, understands that Indonesian pressure helped lead to the civil war etc. notes that "no one" has given him any significant information of FRETILIN brutality, and that he's going to see the Indonesians today. , I say, good luck, see if they can keep their story straight

KONDRACKE: "There is absolutely no question in my mind where morality and questions of justice is in this case.

(I sound like agrarian reformer) (really nonsensical)

KONDRACKE (sarcastic here) I've got piles of documents, I've got to through them all today.

He'll be in with xerox copy after 9PM  
changes could conceivably be made "but I'm telling you not major changes if you don't like the piece or ... we cannot tinker a lot at that stage, if it's largely a question of disassociating yourself from the piece with the understanding that you'll still get paid or or you know, saying okay, it's subject to I'll take I'll take the blame if anything that's not right you can be referred to as something in the body of the story as someone who's done work in this field I can quote you or I can put you in at the bottom as researcher or however you, let me see how much I use what you actually wrote, and how much I base what I write on all the research that I did(?)

KONDRACKE: My line is not going to be different, certainly not going to be different. as far as I can see, the State Dept. people have been their actions in this case suggest to me that your'e thoroughly right, and that they're ducking, they have not been very cooperative, the disaster relief people have been wonderful, but the Bureau of East Asia has not been cooperative at all

and they haven't even called me back, I mean Cannon was supposed to work out something with somebody, Holbrooke is out of the country, Oakley is in New York, and  
so .....

① On "FRETELIN Brutality"

What are sources?

If USAID, say "U.S. Sources"  
say " don't just state it as fact.

journalistic practice,  
ethics, etc — TRUTH



410 Stewart Ave.  
Ithaca, NY 14850  
June 11, 1979

The Editor  
The New York Times

To the Editor:

There was an Orwellian irony in the report of a statement by an Indonesian delegate to the recent meeting of nonaligned nations in Colombo (news story, June 8, 1979). The delegate, acting as spokesman for Malaysia and Singapore as well as his own country, reportedly said that the three nations "were united in their condemnation of the wholesale killing of civilians when Pol Pot was in power, but nevertheless supported the seating of the Pol Pot delegation because of the manner in which a new Government under Heng Samrin was installed in Phnom Penh with the help of Vietnamese soldiers."

I find this extraordinary: the Indonesian Government has never expressed the slightest regret over the massacre of 500,000 of its own citizens in the months following General Suharto's military takeover in 1965. There has been a similar lack of official regret over the tens of thousands of Indonesian political prisoners who, until largescale releases began eighteen months ago, were all held under appalling conditions, in most cases for more than twelve years without trial. According to Amnesty International, at least 20,000 of these prisoners remain in detention.

Nor has the present Indonesian Government shown any qualms over its December 1975 invasion of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. According to authoritative Catholic sources, tens of thousands of East Timorese have been killed thus far, and these same sources assert that Indonesian atrocities continue. While Jakarta solemnly condemns the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, it is carrying out a similar exercise in East Timor, in defiance of six United Nations resolutions which called on Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the territory, and reaffirmed the right of the East Timorese to determine their own future.

Yours Sincerely,

*Arnold S. Kohen*  
Arnold S. Kohen

P.S. I am the author of the enclosed Nation article, which details the history of the events. Thank you for your attention. I hope that you are able to publish this letter.

## Outline for OP-ED on Indonesia and the United States

Successive American Administrations have pointed Indonesian President Suharto's regime as a model of stability, and argue that continued U.S. support for that regime is warranted because it is so stable. In fact, the real reason for this so-called stability is massive U.S. financial assistance, both directly and through international financial institutions effectively under American control. U.S. aid to Indonesia since the Suharto regime came to power in 1965 has topped \$2 billion. On the military side, although 90% of the Indonesian arsenal is American-supplied (See page 62, June July 1977 Hearings), U.S. arms aid to Indonesia falls way below many repressive Third World regimes such as South Korea and the Philippines. In the wake of the bloody purge of the Indonesian Left in 1965-66 (which claimed the lives of at least 500,000 people (source: Indonesian Security Chief Sudomo, New York Times, April 19, 1978), the United States did not pour huge quantities of arms into Indonesia; on the contrary, U.S. advisors argued that since the Left opposition had been effectively destroyed (leaving hundreds of thousands of political prisoners in jail, at least 20,000 of whom remain imprisoned to this day after more than 13 years without trial, according to Amnesty International), there was little point in a massive inflow of military hardware. This began to change after the fall of Saigon, and shipments of US counterinsurgency equipment since 1975 have enabled the Suharto regime to carry out its brutal campaign in East Timor (See enclosed tables for military aid figures.)

The State Department has admitted (See June July 1977 Hearings, page 62) that the Indonesian military would have had a difficult time conducting an operation on the scale it has done (and continues to do) in East Timor were it not for American-supplied materiel. The US shipped counterinsurgency planes to Indonesia in 1976



and 1977 that were ideally suited for service in East Timor (see 1978 Anderson testimony); it is crucial to understand that the Indonesian military lacked such equipment prior to the U.S. shipments.

How has US financial assistance affected the "stability" of the Suharto regime? According to Anderson, US aid has enabled the regime to buy off the government bureaucracy, has made many generals fabulously wealthy, but has in no way encouraged the regime to broaden its base of support. (On the harrowing of support for the regime, see Anderson's succinct article in the Southeast Asia Chronicle)

At the same time, official corruption has been monumental. In 1976, the military-run State oil company, Pertamina, went bankrupt with at least \$10 Billion in debts ; Indonesia has the distinction of being the only OPEC country to have its state oil company go bankrupt (For details of corruption, see Anderson Chronicle article; for further details, see Student White Book of 1978, which will be mailed to you; it also contains information of Suharto's personal wealth). Indonesia also has the distinction of being the world's #1 importer of rice. These and other factors led to the brief student protests of early 1978, which resulted in a crackdown against even the mildest forms of peaceful dissent. Thirty one student leaders are currently on trial under archaic colonial laws ("insulting the Head of State", which previously applied to the Queen of the Netherlands), precisely for daring to publicly challenge the Suharto regime's notions of development; it should be stressed that by no stretch of the imagination can these students be called leftists or communists. The Suharto regime has in fact created a whole new set of opponents, including the Islamic parties that originally were ~~#####~~ supporters of Suharto.

Concerning Timor: The aggressiveness of the military regime <sup>full</sup> ~~against the~~ traditionally <sup>aggressive</sup> ~~in~~ war time has shown its force in East Timor, where any <sup>1 1/2</sup> ~~constraints~~ <sup>diff. prevalent in</sup> situations have been absent <sup>1 1/2</sup> ~~of~~ (like the International Red Cross).

cheers.

410 Stewart Ave.

Ithaca, NY 14850

August 9, 1979

Morton Kondracke  
THE New Republic

Dear Mr. Kondracke,

At the request of Bonnie Wilker Stephens, I am sending you a copy of a preface that Noam Chomsky has recently written for a short book on East Timor. I am also enclosing some recent, pertinent materials from the press. Chomsky informs me that you may soon be contacting me concerning a possible article on East Timor for TNR.

As an avid reader of TNR, I noticed with interest an article in your most current issue on the plight of Rumanian Jews who had fled the Iron Guard regime during the last world war. That situation is of great personal significance to me, as my family on my father's side -- a large one, I might add -- are Rumanian Jews, and some were still there during the Iron Guard butchery. I have always been haunted by accounts of those incidents, and perhaps in part for this reason, my interest and concern were strongly aroused during the early days of Indonesia's December 1975 invasion of East Timor. Then and since, numerous reports of largescale Indonesian atrocities have appeared in the Australian press, have been reported by many reliable church officials and, indeed, from Indonesians who are horrified at their government's actions. The more that I have learned about the situation in East Timor, the more I have realized how little progress we have made since those bloody days in Bucharest nearly four decades ago.

Indonesian atrocities are continuing in East Timor, while even some of those who are aware of the situation prefer to remain silent. The Timorese are an inconvenience to much of the world, just as the European Jew was an inconvenience to many in the West forty years ago. I hope that the New Republic will agree that the question of East Timor requires urgent, immediate and serious attention. We scorn the victims of Bucharest by ignoring the victims of today. The Timorese # I saw recently in refugee camps outside of Lisbon had the dazed look of the Jews who survived Hitler's genocide. They both have claims on our concern.

Sincerely,

  
Arnold S. Kohen

Telephone: 607-272-7557 home  
607-272-256-3619 office



Letters Editor  
Newsday  
550 Stewart Ave., Garden City, N.Y. 11530

Some considered remarks concerning Arnold Kohen's article "We Must Oppose the Occupation of East Timor" (Jul. 25) and John Metzler's letter in response (Aug. 2):

First, Newsday is to be commended for printing Mr. Kohen's piece. Considering the facts--that while the U.S. Gov't was not responsible for the Indonesian invasion and subsequent ravaging of East Timor, it probably could have prevented it, and even now could exercise a positive influence--the almost complete silence by the American press on the issue is disturbing and all but inexplicable.

Secondly, Mr. Metzler was incorrect on a number of points. FRETILIN, the native Timorese resistance group, was not and is not "a darling of the East Bloc." The Soviets have been as mum on the situation as has the U.S.--the former to curry favor with the Indonesian military dictatorship, the latter to continue its lucrative partnership with that regime in exploiting the Indonesian land and its people. And in writing that "The Indonesian invasion came many long months after bitter internecine civil war had already ~~begun~~ started," Mr. Metzler is supporting the same fallacy that our State Dept. uses to justify Indonesia's brutal military annexation. In fact the "civil war" was won handily by ~~Portuguese~~ FRETILIN in several weeks, after only a few thousand casualties (as has been reported by responsible, on-the-scene Australian journalists). When the Indonesians invaded on Dec. 7 1975, East Timor was at peace. FRETILIN had even kept the Portuguese flag flying, hoping their former colonial masters would return to effect an orderly transfer of power.

(MORE)

Finally we wonder what Lester Wolff, our Long Island Democrat, has to say about all this. Considering his chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and his recent grandstanding on his Vietnam trip and the boat people issue, perhaps he could show some concern for the less glamorous situation of those 1,200 Timorese near Lisbon, "refugees from one of the world's least known wars."

Mark Sanborne  
Bill Rogers

Northport

Sanborne  
29 Locust Rd., Northport  
261-0648

Rogers  
39 Colner Dr., Northport  
757-1481

)(NOTE: the writers are members of Cornell University's "Friends of Indonesia" society.

TO: Members of the House  
FROM: Bruce P. Cameron,  
Foreign Policy Director, ADA

September 4, 1979

This week you will be voting on the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. In this letter I would like to bring to your attention the activities of a particular government in Southeast Asia.

1. This government has tens of thousands of political prisoners, most of them imprisoned at the time this government attained power.
2. This government has invaded and is attempting to force its will on a neighboring country.
3. For all practical purposes, this government has sealed off the country it has invaded from outside inspection and scrutiny.
4. This government has ignored the international community's condemnation of its invasion and the demand that it withdraw its troops, confident that its major ally will continue to supply it with even more arms to conduct its occupation.
5. Officials of this government sell visas costing up to \$5000 to people who wish to seek refuge in the West.
6. Tens if not hundreds of thousands of people in the invaded country are facing starvation, and the international community has done little to assist.

I am talking about Indonesia. The country invaded was East Timor. The supplier country--which helps sustain the invasion against popular opposition--is not the Soviet Union, but the United States.

You have probably not heard about East Timor or the continuing invasion of that country by Indonesia. The State Department systematically distorts our view of the situation there. The U.S. and most of the Western media ignore it. The information in this letter comes primarily from Indonesian Catholic sources relayed either through Australian or United Nations agencies.

East Timor is a former Portuguese colony which occupies the eastern half of an island in the Indonesian Archipelago close to Australia. On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian government launched a full scale invasion of that territory.

In its continuing efforts to subdue the population, the Indonesian army--directly or indirectly--has been responsible for the deaths of well over 100,000 people, probably closer to 200,000. Indonesia's policies of crop defoliation, crop burnings, isolating portions of the population in areas without food, all have created a situation where tens of thousands are starving.

A July 1979 report by Australian aid agencies, who have been barred from East Timor but have received information from church sources, paints a grim picture of concentration camp-style "strategic centers" set up by the Indonesian army to control the captive population. Many deaths are recorded in these "centers" from starvation and disease.

The most startling information to be received recently came from the Indonesian Assistant of Defense and Security of the Regional Territory of East Timor. In October 1978, he estimated the population of East Timor to be 329,271. In 1974, the diocese of Dili, the capital of East Timor, estimated the total population to be 688,769, a discrepancy of 359,498 people. Census estimates of this type are not reliable; nevertheless, something is happening in East Timor which deserves serious attention.

At the time of the invasion, the ruling force in East Timor was FRETELIN, which enjoyed widespread support. In a civil war between rival independence forces in September of 1975, FRETELIN gained power and on both sides no more than 3,000 people were killed.

Since the Indonesian *integration* of East Timor, the United States has granted Indonesia \$178,328,000 in military aid, in addition to cash sales. In late 1977, when Indonesian military equipment was in short supply, U.S. aid and sales were crucial in enabling the Indonesian army to launch new offensives and commit new atrocities. In the years 1976, 1977, and 1978, the U.S., the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank have provided Indonesia with more than \$2,200,000,000 in economic aid. To the best of our knowledge, the only aid that has reached the East Timorese from these sources in all these years has been military aid, American guns, bullets, counterinsurgency aircraft, and the like, which have been instruments of death, not economic well being.



In summary, the United States government, during both the Ford and the Carter Administrations, has been a partner of the Indonesian government in its suppression of the East Timorese. The State Department has admitted that over 90 percent of Indonesia's armaments are supplied by the U.S. In its public posture on the East Timor situation, the State Department makes statements worthy of Pravda in the time of Stalin. Massacres and brutal atrocities are converted into "efforts to ease the plight of impoverished people." Those who finally abandon the resistance effort and leave the rubble of their devastated villages and defoliated fields are "seeking protection in the areas controlled by the Indonesian government." (emphasis added)

The Carter human-rights policy has not applied in the case of Indonesia and East Timor. In dealing with Indonesia, the Administration has pursued a policy of "all carrots and no sticks" and not surprisingly the Indonesian government has continued its barbarous policies.

While the State Department has covered up and distorted the plight of the people of East Timor, it has not been sparing in its criticism of Vietnam and in its efforts to focus world attention on refugees from Vietnam. ADA has no quarrel with U.S. condemnation of the Vietnamese government. In July, ADA's National Board unanimously adopted a resolution strongly condemning the policies of the Vietnamese government.

But the board also observed that U.S. policy toward Vietnam has been one of "all sticks and no carrots." The United States has offered no incentives to the Vietnamese government to change its policies. The United States has tilted toward China in the Vietnamese-Chinese conflict. With China, the United States has coordinated an international effort to encourage other countries, notably the Nordic countries and Japan, to withdraw aid to Vietnam. Since the end of the war in Vietnam, total U.S. aid is zero. Total new aid from the international agencies to which the United States contributes has been on the order of \$60 to \$80 million, all from U.N. agencies. The U.S. Treasury Department is working vigorously to insure that a \$60 million loan to Vietnam from the International Development Agency will not be dispersed and that no new loans will be made to Vietnam by the international banks.

The State Department would have us believe that its motivation is simply humanitarian, that its efforts to stop aid are to persuade the Vietnamese government to change its policy towards its citizens. But the Indonesian case demonstrates unequivocally that the State Department is willing to overlook enormous atrocities.

I believe that the evidence is clear. In relationships with the governments of East Asia (as opposed to individual refugees), promoting greater respect for human rights now plays almost no part in U.S. policy. But it should--not only because people are important, but also because such a policy would be in our national interest. It is in our interest that Vietnam not export refugees to other countries in Southeast Asia. Therefore it is in our interest that Vietnam not become paranoid about U.S.-Chinese collusion and make preparations for further war, but instead concentrate on economic development. It is in our interest to have a Vietnamese economy strong enough to offer incentives for most people to stay (under no possible scenario will all want to remain).

In the case of Indonesia, our national-interest stake in seeing an end of atrocities in East Timor is somewhat less. The Indonesians after all are not sending East Timorese refugees out in open boats to die at sea or to become burdens on other countries. But it is not good for the health of any democracy to fill a major role in the suppression of another people. It is also not good for Indonesia--a poor country with a mixed record in economic development--to divert so much of its resources to an occupation that it likely cannot win short of genocide.

To conclude, ADA urges your support of two changes in the foreign aid bill:

1. The prohibition against direct aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos should be lifted. Minimally, the President should have discretion to provide humanitarian aid to the peoples of these countries.
2. Military aid to Indonesia should be prohibited and the funds shifted to provide for humanitarian relief to the East Timorese through international agencies or private organizations.

TO: Tony  
FROM: Marty

QUESTIONS FOR EAST TIMOR HEARING:

It is my understanding that there will be three groups of individuals testifying. The first group will consist of Congressman Harkin and Bruce Cameron of ADA. The second will be a representative from Catholic Relief Services (known as CRS). The third group will be the U. S. government representatives. Richard Holbrooke will be the principal witness in this group. Chris Holmes of A.I.D. will accompany him, and the U. S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Amb. Masters, also is expected to be there. Here are some questions for each group:

For Harkin and Cameron:

- How long has the extent of the starvation and dying in East Timor been known to the United States government?
- It is my understanding that some 300,000 people have come down from the mountains in East Timor and have gone to refugee camps. What has been happening to those who survive? Are they permitted to return to their original homes? Are they just kept indefinitely in these camps?
- Who are the people who are starving? Are they mainly women and children, like in Cambodia? Are there significant anti-Indonesian forces still in hiding?

For the Catholic Relief Services representative:

- What oversight or monitoring mechanisms does CRS employ to insure that its food and supplies get to the needy people?
- Do you have any difficulty in getting into East Timor or in moving around once you are there?
- When did you start your assistance programs? Are other international groups trying to join with you in your efforts?
- Aren't most of the CRS people in East Timor from Indonesia? Does this put them in a difficult position in dealing with the Indonesian authorities on the scene in East Timor?

For the U. S. Government people (Holbrooke, Holmes, and Masters):

- The claim has been made that as many as 200,000 of East Timor's population of 650,000 have been killed since the Indonesian invasion in December, 1975. How many are estimated to have been killed by military action and how many by starvation and disease?  
FOLLOWUP: The Manchester Guardian on Nov. 12 of this year stated, and I quote: "There is a weight of evidence that the famine is the result of the use of starvation as a military strategy to crush opposition to Indonesia's takeover." Is this true?
- In the September 29 issue of Far Eastern Economic Review in 1978, there was an extensive article about the starvation and disease in East Timor. The article pointed out how 500 refugees a month were dying in one district alone in East Timor. If the situation was that serious, why did the United States wait until this year to determine that the disaster there warranted U. S. assistance?

- It is my understanding that displaced people and famine have been caused by the war situation in East Timor. Is the fighting over, or can we expect more refugees and starvation?
- When did we first learn about the scale of the famine and disease in East Timor?  
FOLLOWUP: Why has it taken us so long to respond? Are our assistance procedures slow and cumbersome to implement?
- What is the State Department doing to facilitate a more international response to the situation in Timor?
- What other groups have indicated that they wish to participate in the relief effort in East Timor? Are we promoting their cause with the Indonesian government?
- Is the Indonesian government permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross to enter East Timor? Why aren't there more ICRC people in there?
- Throwing money at a situation like this is not an effective way of fighting famine and disease unless the programs are effectively implemented. How does A.I.D. monitor its assistance to make sure that it gets to those who need it?
- Is relief assistance for East Timor being planned in the budget for the coming fiscal year?



Dec. 23, 1979

Dear Skeptical Journalist,

Enclosed is the Dec. 14 London Times piece. I'll make my reservations clear in due course, but first let me state a general principle.

In the enclosed Sept. 76 Michael Richardson article, he states that "Indonesia's credibility is low," and observes that, for one, Jakarta had refused (again, this was Sept. 76) to allow in the ICRC, contrary to their promises. Recall that the ICRC only began its operations in Oct. 79 -- (and ~~after~~ <sup>after</sup> ~~telling~~ <sup>telling</sup> so many lies in the interim that Richardson, a busy man, probably can't even remember them all. And recall that when an emergency food and medical situation was exposed for all (all that wanted to, that is) to see in Sept. 78, the Indonesian military still kept people like ICRC out of the picture. They wouldn't even let "Frank" ("I ride in a chopper eighteen hours a day") Carlin of CRS into the territory until a few months ago. Recall that in Oct. 78, a few weeks after the grim conditions were unveiled, Mike Richardson reported that the Indonesian military ~~(said that the military would market Timor coffee worth some \$7.5 million in 1978. "Marketing of the coffee comes at a time when the Indonesian government has just made an appeal for international relief assistance in East Timor" said Richardson. And of course, the appeal for aid did not include an appeal for outside observers or medical personnel -- just send us the stuff. Western friends --; at any rate, enclosed is the clipping. In 1977 Richardson did a long, two-part series on how valuable the Timor coffee had become, not that this helped the Timorese any.~~

What reason is there, now, in Dec. 79, for anyone with an ounce of common sense (and integrity) to take Jakarta at face value?

Yet, in an article that gets it right in certain key respects, David Watts manages to generalize his observation of four "centres" into an evaluation of the territory-wide aid program. As I told you, I'm awaiting news from London on how Watts managed to reach his conclusions, but in the interim, let me make a few observations.

On Monday the 17th, I spoke with Ms. Claremont (sp?) of ICRC, New York, and she said that some of their villages (they have 13) were on the road to recovery, while others were still "very, very critical." One would assume that the Indonesians would take visitors to some of the better ICRC cites which, one would also ~~also~~ <sup>also</sup> are more secure militarily than CRS areas.

From Watts' description of the ~~centres~~ centres he visited, it seems that they were ICRC areas. How can he possibly know what things are like in CRS' 120 areas? He notes that the tour was supervised by the Indonesian military, yet is somehow able to conclude, from a limited sample that may well be unrepresentative, that "the relief programmes are working well now." I don't understand it.

I also don't understand the overall figures. Kondracke was told in late October that 250,000 people were in resettlement camps. (TNR) On the one hand, perhaps 50,000 have gotten better and are no longer receiving relief supplies. On the other, is the administration (along with Jakarta) working to minimize the problem? We really don't

Nov. 3

know, do we? In his Nov. 6 article, even Peter Rodgers said that the figure was 300,000, "whose condition, according to relief workers, ranges from 'bad to critical'". Now, ~~if~~ it may be possible that 100,000 people had recovered well enough in one month to be dropped from the "relief roles", to coin a phrase -- I really don't know enough about such operations to know -- but it doesn't seem too likely, given that the Indonesians as well as the State Dept. say that those living in or around the "regroupment areas" are going to stay there, at least for now -- has there been enough time for a harvest in one month? There are a lot of unanswered questions, like this one

Other points in Watts' piece:

1) He simply states that there can be few Timorese in the mountains remaining alive, but I fail to see how he can know one way or another. In the April 1977 congressional visit to a few selected sites, the participants were made to believe that the war was all over -- if their personal impressions were of any indication. In fact, the fiercest fighting, according to many reliable reports, came after April 1977. How is one supposed to sort fact from illusion here? Of course, the Indonesians won't let Richardson in, at least not yet -- but he might be the one to crack this thing.

2) Possibly because FRETILIN supporters in London are academic Marxists and were close to some of the few Marxists in FRETILIN, Watts concludes that FRETILIN was Marxist. You've heard it from Leoneto, of course, to the contrary. Interestingly, even the London Marxists never believed that FRETILIN was Marxist, and never particularly cared -- they're more into theory than Marxist practice, anyway.

3) Watts' figure of 2,500 fighters is all wet; at the time, Richardson estimated that anywhere from 20,000 to 30,000 Timorese men of fighting age had received training during compulsory military service under the Portuguese. And this notion that FRETILIN dragged people off to the hills with them is 90% fiction, as I'm sure Richardson can tell you.

4) Watts skips a bit ahead of his story in talking of people fleeing from place to place. Leoneto said that life in many areas remained normal until mid 1977, when the intensive bombing campaign began.

5) The stuff attributed to the Indonesian Red Cross is something like the Paul Zach story that talked about hungry Timorese eating seeds (In checking thru my files I found a ~~1977~~ later story about how shipments of seeds hadn't arrived yet -- perhaps the Indonesians were trying to cover themselves by saying that the people ate the seeds, rather than admitting that they hadn't shipped them soon enough.) I see no reason why any intelligent journalist has to report this stuff, unless, of course, another view of the situation is given to balance things off (Actually, that is probably hypercritical, but you get the drift -- better to get more hard facts ~~rather~~ than to rely on Indonesian stories on what may or may not have happened -- and it's worth noting that the Indonesian Red Cross is a military-run organization administered by a general. Neither Amnesty International nor the ICRC consider it to be an autonomous organization.)

6) From all reliable accounts, the Indonesian drive in 77-78 was aimed at securing large sections of the territory that remained under

# Holly — Questions for Down or C. Marty

- 1) Would Mr. Holbooke or Ms. Derian like to comment on the recent reports <sup>on</sup> from Timorese refugees that appeared in the New York Times last week? <sup>both</sup>  
We see here allegations of fairly systematic mistreatment of the population, of an atmosphere of terror, and we also see that people are prevented from leaving Timor unless they can pay large bribes. What does the administration plan to do about the situation, particularly on the question of free emigration?
- 2) The administration has consistently denied that the Indonesian army has been carrying out large scale human rights violations in East Timor.  
##### Yet many such reports continue to appear. It is clear that our relationship with Indonesia is important -- nobody denies that. But what are we going to do about East Timor? Clearly our approach up until now has not had much impact on the Indonesian government.
- 3) What is the Department of State doing to assure that representatives of American news organizations gain access to East Timor?
- 4) Recent refugee reports indicate that international monitoring of relief aid going to East Timor is probably the only way that this aid will actually reach the people. Why has the administration not pressed harder for on-the-ground inspection? A handful of outside observers, such as there are now, can hardly be ~~that~~ expected to do the job alone.



To the Editor:

The Reuters report published in the New York Times on October 31, 1979 is widely at variance with important aspects of what is known about that tragic situation. The notion that the appalling conditions currently existing in East Timor are a result of "fighting in 1975-76" -- a four year old battle, in other words -- and "small scale fighting until about a year ago, is simply ludicrous. No where is it explained how ~~four years of~~ fighting and smallscale skirmishes until about a year ago could result in devastation that has been compared to the current situation in Cambodia. Nor is it mentioned that Jakarta's military carried out fullscale search-and destroy operations in East Timor to root out an indigenous movement for independence -- or that Jakarta's actions have been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations. Indeed, the U.N. General Assembly continues to reject the Indonesian claim of sovereignty over East Timor.

The article also creates the misleading impression that the Indonesian government, in facilitating aid to the stricken East Timorese, is acting with ~~complete~~ benevolence, charity and good will. In fact, Jakarta's military barred the International Red Cross from East Timor from the time of the December 1975 invasion until April 1979, when an initial ICRC ~~mission~~ exploratory mission was conducted. It was only on October 1, 1979 ~~that~~ that the ICRC began its actual relief operations. Numerous reports from church sources and government officials in the U.S. and Indonesia confirm that many tens of thousands of East Timorese died in ~~the~~ the four years since the Dec. 1975 invasion. Jakarta ignored Amnesty International's December 1, 1977 statement calling for the presence in East Timor of recognized, independent relief agencies. Even after September 1978, when a group of Western diplomats and journalists were shocked by ~~the widespread advanced malnutrition~~ the widespread advanced malnutrition that they witnessed on a brief trip to East Timor, the Indonesian government persisted in denying entry to independent aid agencies. Now, when it is clearly too late for many of those who desperately needed assistance, the Indonesian government still persists in limiting the number of ~~outside observers~~ outside observers who could supervise the impartial distribution of aid. I have received many reports of Indonesian military corruption of aid supplies, as well as accounts of the political distribution of aid -- exactly what we are now concerned about in Cambodia.



Dear Representative

There is a country in Southeast Asia guilty of massive violations of human rights.

This country has invaded a neighboring W nation, and continues its occupation of that nation by force of arms.

This country has frustrated efforts by international humanitarian agencies to provide food and medical assistance to the war victims.

Tens of thousands of war victims are reported to have died of starvation and disease, conditions that could have been alleviated had the invaders granted access to international relief organizations.

An Australian Member of Parliament has charged that 30,000 to 40,000 people have died of starvation owing to the invaders' use of defoliants.

Tens of thousands of others may die unless ~~international~~ international relief organizations are allowed to carry out ~~a massive~~ an immediate and largescale operation.

In addition, it has been reliably reported that the invaders have been selling exit visas to those who seek to escape from the military occupation of their country.

We are not talking about Vietnam. We are talking about Indonesia.

Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in December 1975, only hours after President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had left Indonesia after a State Visit. While in Jakarta, Dr. Kissinger told reporters that the United States "understands" Indonesia's position on the question of East Timor.

Persistent reports from Catholic Church sources indicate that from one sixth to one third of East Timor's original population of 690,000 have either been killed by Indonesian troops or have died of war-related starvation and disease. A July 1979 report by Australian aid agencies, who have been barred from East Timor but have received information from church sources, paints a grim picture of concentration camp-style "strategic centers" set up by the Indonesian army to control the captive population. Many deaths are recorded in these "centers" from starvation and disease.

The United States State Department admitted in July 1977 that Indonesia's troops were armed "roughly 90 percent" with American-supplied weaponry at the time of the December 1975 invasion. Fighting between Indonesian troops and East Timorese independence forces  
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has continued, and so have U.S. arms shipments to Jakarta -- at a much greater level than before the invasion.

Let us make a comparison that may shed some light on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. ADA believes that U.S. policy toward Vietnam has been one of "all sticks, no carrots". The United States has done nothing to offer incentives to the Vietnamese government to change its policies. ~~#####~~ The U.N., not the U.S., deserves the principal credit for the success of the Geneva conference on refugees. The United States has tilted toward China in the Vietnamese - Chinese conflict. The United States With China has coordinated an international effort to encourage other countries, notably the Nordic countries and Japan, to cease aid to Vietnam. Since the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975, total aid from the United States to Vietnam has been zero. Total new aid from the international agencies to which the United States contributes has been on the order of \$60 - \$80 million, all from U.N. agencies. The Treasury Department is working very vigorously to insure that the 1978 \$60 million loan from the International Development Agency is not dispersed to Vietnam and that no new loans are approved by that agency or by the Asian Development Bank.

The State Department would have us believe that its motivation is simply humanitarian, that its efforts to stop aid are designed to convince the Vietnamese to change their policies. But regarding Indonesia, whose army has caused a comparable level of suffering, no similar policy has been implemented. A safe estimate is that at least 150,000 East Timorese have been killed directly by the Indonesian occupation forces or indirectly through starvation as a result of the Indonesian army's defoliation and burning of crops or its isolation of East Timorese independence forces in areas without food. Yet since the invasion of East Timor, total aid to Indonesia from the United States, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank amounts to \$2.6 billion. ADA's best information is that none of these aid funds, except military aid, have been used in East Timor. And American aid to Indonesia is not limited to financial and military support. The United States has been an unflicking supporter of Indonesia's position on East Timor at the United Nations (The U.N. in six resolutions has rejected Indonesia's claim of sovereignty over East Timor, and has called on Jakarta to withdraw all its forces ~~#####~~ and allow the territory its internationally recognized right to self-determination). Indeed, without American support at the United Nations ~~#####~~ (and U.S. military aid and spare parts), Jakarta would be hard-put to continue its brutal East Timor policy.

In the case of Indonesia -- in contrast to the case of Vietnam -- the U.S. has pursued a policy of "all carrots, no sticks", with an equal lack of success in getting that government to change its fundamental policy.

ADA believes that it is time for the United States to serve notice to Jakarta that the U.S. is prepared to reconsider its aid commitments to Indonesia until the following conditions are met:

- 1) There must be full and immediate access to East Timor to recognized international relief organizations.
  - 2) The Indonesian government must allow an international team of experts, constituted by a recognized international human rights organization such as the International League for Human Rights## or the International Commission of Jurists, to enter East Timor immediately to conduct a full investigation of the situation there, both at the present and since the Indonesian invasion.
  - 4) ##Indonesia must make a complete withdrawal of its troops from East Timor, in line with U.N. resolutions on the question, by the end of 1979. This would be accompanied by a United Nations presence in the territory leading to internationally supervised free elections.
- ##  
####
- 3) The immediate implementation by the Indonesian occupation forces of a policy that allows free emigration from East Timor to all those desiring it, and an end to the selling of exit visas.

August 29, 1979

Dear Bruce,

Hope that you had a nice vacation. You're probably sitting now with piles of papers that have accumulated during your absence, wondering what to do with it all. But please try to find time for this -- it's probably the most important document on East Timor ~~###~~ to appear since Dunn's testimony.

This is the report I told you about. It has been adopted by the Australian Council on Overseas Aid, a respected group that includes a goodly number of churchmen. They were in East Timor before the Indonesian invasion, and have more background knowledge than most anyone. Dunn, I believe, is in close touch with them.

Nazi-like crimes are described in the report, and I hope that you read it carefully.

Note two especially important clippings. One, from the Manchester-London Guardian, August 20, 1979 (found by Don Luce on a stopover in London), has a statement by a 63 year old Portuguese Catholic priest who just came out of the hills (and was with Fretilin for over three years) in July. If I have to fly to Lisbon myself to convince him to come to Washington and the UN and to American Catholic organizations, I'll do it. At any rate, I believe that he plans to come here in October.

A July 31 clipping from the respected Melbourne daily the Age elaborates a bit on Dunn's letter to the New York Times. Note Also the clipping on bribes. And the cartoon of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser with Suharto. Fraser denounced the Vietnamese as Nazis in July. It would all be a lot more convincing if he had said one word on the situation in Timor, 350 miles from Australian shores.

Extra copies of my Newsday piece, too.

Now, about the letter that you asked me to write. Enclosed is the draft -- in need of retyping, but easy enough to read. My suggestions at the end are obviously for ADA to decide on, but one can't very well ask for anything less. One can't sanction Indonesia's spurious claim to East Timor. You should also keep in mind that if the regime changes in Jakarta, as it may well do, the ~~###~~ attitude on Timor may change. Leave "realism" to the State Department. Leave International Law, The UN Charter, the Nuremburg Tribunal's findings and other similar mundane documents to us. No?

Chomsky's thing is an intro to a book on Timor that I've written along with a friend from TAPOL in London. THE Far Eastern Economic Review pieces include a hot exchange between them and Carmel.

See you for a relaxed dinner and drinks when I get to DC in the middle of December? On me?

Best,



# AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

SUITE 850

1411 K STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

(202) 638-6447

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the House  
FROM: Bruce P. Cameron,  
Foreign Policy Director, ADA

September 4, 1979

This week you will be voting on the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. In this letter I would like to bring to your attention the activities of a particular government in Southeast Asia.

1. This government has tens of thousands of political prisoners, most of them imprisoned at the time this government attained power.
2. This government has invaded and is attempting to force its will on a neighboring country.
3. For all practical purposes, this government has sealed off the country it has invaded from outside inspection and scrutiny.
4. This government has ignored the international community's condemnation of its invasion and the demand that it withdraw its troops, confident that its major ally will continue to supply it with even more arms to conduct its occupation.
5. Officials of this government sell visas costing up to \$5000 to people who wish to seek refuge in the West.
6. Tens if not hundreds of thousands of people in the invaded country are facing starvation, and the international community has done little to assist.

I am talking about Indonesia. The country invaded was East Timor. The supplier country--which helps sustain the invasion against popular opposition--is not the Soviet Union, but the United States.

You have probably not heard about East Timor or the continuing invasion of that country by Indonesia. The State Department systematically distorts our view of the situation there. The U.S. and most of the Western media ignore it. The information in this letter comes primarily from Indonesian Catholic sources relayed either through Australian or United Nations agencies.

East Timor is a former Portuguese colony which occupies the eastern half of an island in the Indonesian Archipelago close to Australia. On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian government launched a full scale invasion of that territory.

In its continuing efforts to subdue the population, the Indonesian army--directly or indirectly--has been responsible for the deaths of well over 100,000 people, probably closer to 200,000. Indonesia's policies of crop defoliation, crop burnings, isolating portions of the population in areas without food, all have created a situation where tens of thousands are starving.

A July 1979 report by Australian aid agencies, who have been barred from East Timor but have received information from church sources, paints a grim picture of concentration camp-style "strategic centers" set up by the Indonesian army to control the captive population. Many deaths are recorded in these "centers" from starvation and disease.

The most startling information to be received recently came from the Indonesian Assistant of Defense and Security of the Regional Territory of East Timor. In October 1978, he estimated the population of East Timor to be 329,271. In 1974, the diocese of Dili, the capital of East Timor, estimated the total population to be 688,769, a discrepancy of 359,498 people. Census estimates of this type are not reliable; nevertheless, something is happening in East Timor which deserves serious attention.

At the time of the invasion, the ruling force in East Timor was FRETELIN, which enjoyed widespread support. In a civil war between rival independence forces in September of 1975, FRETELIN gained power and on both sides no more than 3,000 people were killed.

Since the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the United States has granted Indonesia \$178,328,000 in military aid, in addition to cash sales. In late 1977, when Indonesian military equipment was in short supply, U.S. aid and sales were crucial in enabling the Indonesian army to launch new offensives and commit new atrocities. In the years 1976, 1977, and 1978, the U.S., the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank have provided Indonesia with more than \$2,200,000,000 in economic aid. To the best of our knowledge, the only aid that has reached the East Timorese from these sources in all these years has been military aid, American guns, bullets, counterinsurgency aircraft, and the like, which have been instruments of death, not economic well being.

In summary, the United States government, during both the Ford and the Carter Administrations, has been a partner of the Indonesian government in its suppression of the East Timorese. The State Department has admitted that over 90 percent of Indonesia's armaments are supplied by the U.S. In its public posture on the East Timor situation, the State Department makes statements worthy of Pravda in the time of Stalin. Massacres and brutal atrocities are converted into "efforts to ease the plight of impoverished people." Those who finally abandon the resistance effort and leave the rubble of their devastated villages and defoliated fields are "seeking protection in the areas controlled by the Indonesian government." (emphasis added)

The Carter human-rights policy has not applied in the case of Indonesia and East Timor. In dealing with Indonesia, the Administration has pursued a policy of "all carrots and no sticks" and not surprisingly the Indonesian government has continued its ~~barbarous~~ policies.

While the State Department has covered up and distorted the plight of the people of East Timor, it has not been sparing in its criticism of Vietnam and in its efforts to focus world attention on refugees from Vietnam. ADA has no quarrel with U.S. condemnation of the Vietnamese government. In July, ADA's National Board unanimously adopted a resolution strongly condemning the policies of the Vietnamese government.

But the board also observed that U.S. policy toward Vietnam has been one of "all sticks and no carrots." The United States has offered no incentives to the Vietnamese government to change its policies. The United States has tilted toward China in the Vietnamese-Chinese conflict. With China, the United States has coordinated an international effort to encourage other countries, notably the Nordic countries and Japan, to withdraw aid to Vietnam. Since the end of the war in Vietnam, total U.S. aid is zero. Total new aid from the international agencies to which the United States contributes has been on the order of \$60 to \$80 million, all from U.N. agencies. The U.S. Treasury Department is working vigorously to insure that a \$60 million loan to Vietnam from the International Development Agency will not be dispersed and that no new loans will be made to Vietnam by the international banks.

The State Department would have us believe that its motivation is simply humanitarian, that its efforts to stop aid are to persuade the Vietnamese government to change its policy towards its citizens. But the Indonesian case demonstrates unequivocally that the State Department is willing to overlook enormous atrocities.

I believe that the evidence is clear. In relationships with the governments of East Asia (as opposed to individual refugees), promoting greater respect for human rights now plays almost no part in U.S. policy. But it should--not only because people are important, but also because such a policy would be in our national interest. It is in our interest that Vietnam not export refugees to other countries in Southeast Asia. Therefore it is in our interest that Vietnam not become paranoid about U.S.-Chinese collusion and make preparations for further war, but instead concentrate on economic development. It is in our interest to have a Vietnamese economy strong enough to offer incentives for most people to stay (under no possible scenario will all want to remain).

In the case of Indonesia, our national-interest stake in seeing an end of atrocities in East Timor is somewhat less. The Indonesians after all are not sending East Timorese refugees out in open boats to die at sea or to become burdens on other countries. But it is not good for the health of any democracy to fill a major role in the suppression of another people. It is also not good for Indonesia--a poor country with a mixed record in economic development--to divert so much of its resources to an occupation that it likely cannot win short of genocide.

To conclude, ADA urges your support of two changes in the foreign aid bill:

1. The prohibition against direct aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos should be lifted. Minimally, the President should have discretion to provide humanitarian aid to the peoples of these countries.
2. Military aid to Indonesia should be prohibited and the funds shifted to provide for humanitarian relief to the East Timorese through international agencies or private organizations.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 9, 1979

Dear Arnie:

Thank you for sending me your article on Timor.

I've recently joined the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department. in charge of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. My address is HA/HR, Room 7802 New State, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. My telephone number is 632-3559.

Would appreciate being kept informed of developments in Timor.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'JP Salzberg', written in a cursive style.

John P. Salzberg  
Human Rights Officer  
Bureau of Human Rights and  
Humanitarian Affairs

Mr. Arnold S. Kohen,  
410 Stewart Avenue,  
Ithaca, New York 14850.



PERMANENT MISSION OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

STATEMENT BY  
THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL  
AMBASSADOR FUTSCHER PEREIRA  
BEFORE THE 4TH COMMITTEE  
ON "THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR"  
ITEM - 91

OCTOBER 22, 1979

Mr. Chairman,

As I take the floor for the first time before this Committee, allow me to address to you and to all the other members of the bureau the most sincere congratulations of my delegation on your unanimous election.

We are sure that under your able guidance this Committee will discharge itself most honourably of the tasks that have been assigned to it. My delegation, for its part, will give its full cooperation and assistance towards the orderly conduct of the work of the Committee.

May I also be allowed, Mr. Chairman, to extend our congratulations to a distinguished member of the Secretariat, Mr. Thomas Tanaka, who has recently been promoted, and who is now occupying a post of responsibility in this Committee. He is well known to us, and therefore I need not further elaborate on his merits.

Mr. Chairman,

The question of East Timor has now been in the agenda of the General Assembly, as a separate item, for the last four years, but - all the same - it has not been possible, so far, to devise for it a political solution acceptable to the community of nations.

The position of my country regarding this issue has been repeatedly stated, in many instances, before the General Assembly and the Security Council.

.../...

No one can deny that, after 25th April 1974, Portugal always pursued its most firm intent to decolonize the territories under its administration, in full compliance with the principles that recognize to all peoples under colonial rule, the right to self determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Portuguese Delegation has had previously the opportunity of describing in detail the evolution of the process of decolonization of East Timor, and I need not refer again, before this Committee, to the facts that led to the present situation, nor recall the position assumed by my Government in each instance.

But it remains that Portugal is still considered as the administering power of that territory, despite the fact that conditions prevailing in East Timor - and known to all of us - prevent the Portuguese Government from exercising the inherent responsibilities.

This is, indeed, the reason why I am opening today the debate on the present item in our agenda.

At the outset, therefore, I would like to reiterate that:

- Portugal recognizes as the fundamental principle in this matter the right of the people of East Timor to self determination, in accordance with resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV).

We have no claim, whatsoever, over East Timor, be it political, territorial, economic, strategic, or of any other nature.

.../...



It was not for material or selfish reasons that we denounced the military intervention of Indonesia in East Timor, and appealed to the United Nations to be seized of this issue.

Finally let me stress once more that our sole purpose, in this respect, has been and continues to be the safeguard of the legitimate rights and interests of the Timorese people.

Mr. Chairman,

Four years have elapsed since the military intervention of Indonesia in East Timor. The drama afflicting the people of East Timor seems, however, far from coming to an end. Despite recent allegations that I quote "the people of East Timor are now living in peace and prosperity", unquote there are reasons to believe that the people of the island are faced with major humanitarian problems. Indeed reports coming from different sources, and quoted both by the Indonesian press and by documents of the United Nations, are by no means reassuring. It is true that we do not have at our disposal information from totally impartial or direct sources. Yet there seems to be no doubt that the number of displaced persons remains enormous, that the health situation in East Timor is steadily deteriorating and that the number of those in need of food and shelter has reached intolerable proportions.

We would fail to fulfill our duties if we did not call the attention of the international community to these conditions.

.../...

But these and other humanitarian aspects - as for instance the case of the displaced Timorese people who would like to return to their homeland - can only find a suitable solution in the framework of a political and legal formula which takes into account the real aspirations of the population and at the same time is acceptable to the United Nations.

Some humanitarian bodies and specialized agencies, like the International Red Cross, could provide invaluable assistance to the people of East Timor and the possibility should not even be discarded of organizing an international movement of solidarity aimed at alleviating the material hardships they seem to be currently facing.

However this is not possible while Indonesia persists in assuming a position which, with all its moral and political weight, this General Assembly has been rejecting.

In closing my statement, I therefore address a pressing appeal to Indonesia to reconsider its attitude so that a solution, safeguarding the legitimate rights of the Timorese people, could be found that would be simultaneously acceptable to the Community of Nations hereby represented. We are only moved, I dare repeat, by the rights and interests of the people of East Timor and by the desire to ensure that their destiny - whatever their choice may ultimately be - is in accordance with their freely expressed wishes and aspirations.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

Statement delivered to the Fourth Committee of  
the United States General Assembly

Bruce P. Cameron  
Americans for Democratic Action

October 1979

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

It is a privilege for me to appear before this committee. I commend the committee for all its work in the field of decolonization. I come here today to speak as a citizen critic of my government's policy toward the decolonization process in East Timor.

My organization is a political organization. It supported President Carter when he ran for office in 1976. We have been particularly proud and supportive of the changes the new administration made with respect to the remaining colonial problems in southern Africa: Rhodesia and Namibia. But in Asia, my government has aided and abetted the brutal occupation and recolonization of East Timor by Indonesia. In my testimony I want to highlight six specific aspects of U.S. support of Indonesia.

First, I should state that my government was among the leading advocates of the adoption of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. It is appalling that the last two American administrations have so cavalierly ignored the fundamental human right of self-determination in the case of East Timor. At the same time, I would like to express the hope that my government and other United Nations members, including the industrial democracies, will realize that it is not too late for this basic right to be granted to the people of East Timor.

1. Indonesia launched its full-fledged invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975. The invasion took place just twelve hours after President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger left Jakarta. While we do not know that they specifically condoned the invasion, it is quite clear that they made no efforts to stop it. At the time of the invasion roughly 90 percent of Indonesian weaponry was U.S. origin.

2. From December 1975-December 1976 there occurred a most curious incident in the history of U.S.-Indonesian relations with respect to East Timor. It should be understood that none of this was revealed until March 1977. The American people and the U.S. Congress were informed at that time that during that six month 1975-1976 period the U.S. "administratively delayed the provision of additional security assistance to Indonesia although military equipment in the pipeline continued to be delivered (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Robert Oakley)." In point of law, all military aid should have been terminated since Indonesia's use of U.S. origin weapons outside its borders violated a 1958 agreement with Indonesia as well as U.S. law.



Subsequent to March 1977, we learned that the Indonesian government was never informed of the "suspension." Often we criticize our State Department for not using the leverage it possesses. In this case it claimed to have used leverage while not informing the leveragees.

But in February 1978, we learned that even that was a lie. In fact, at least four separate new orders for military equipment were processed during the so-called administrative suspension. These orders, worth \$1,260,741, primarily involved spare parts and maintenance for the Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco."

3. In late 1976, the Indonesian military received and began to make use of 16 Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco" counterinsurgency aircraft. This plane, equipped with infrared detectors, bombs, rockets, napalm and machine guns, is specifically designed for close combat support against an enemy without an effective anti-aircraft capability. Indonesia has used this weapon in the most barbarous way: saturation bombing of FRETILIN held areas with the intent of killing the inhabitants and destroying their crops. In the last year we have seen the results as many tens of thousands of people have poured out of the mountains from areas where crops can no longer be grown.

4. In March 1977, the United States Congress held its first major hearing on East Timor. By that time there already were reports that 60,000 to 100,000 people had been killed in the wake of the Indonesian invasion. And whatever the actual number, there was substantial evidence of widespread barbarities carried out by the Indonesian armed forces. Despite all this, my government's State Department showed an extremely callous attitude toward the plight of the East Timorese and U.S. responsibility for it.

I quote from Mr. David Kenny, then Country Office for Indonesia, Department of State:

Sir, I think the question you were referring to in general terms was... whether or not in view of the situation in Timor, particularly the fact that U.S. origin weapons were used there, whether we should be continuing aid to Indonesia. And the answer I gave... is that was the wrong question...

Based on the information we have, which is very conflicting and does not support the charges in general applied by Mr. Dunn (who also testified at this hearing), (the right question is) should we be allowing this situation in Timor to be affecting all of our policy goals in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

In sum, Mr. Kenny and other members of the State Department said they had found sources, which to this day they have not named, that contradicted reports of serious human rights abuses by the Indonesians. And therefore since the reports conflicted, the U.S. was neither under any compulsion to investigate seriously the situation in East Timor or to revise our aid relationship; it is important to note that this statement was made two months and three days after President Carter took office and has since pledged that respect for human rights is "the soul" of U.S. foreign policy.

The State Department has viewed the plight of the East Timorese people as an issue of such small importance that even as recently as January of this year, the State Department stated that it is impossible to "confirm or refute" most allegations of human rights violations in East Timor. As recently as July of 1978, it stated it had "no information to substantiate a pattern of atrocities by Indonesian troops."

Let me point out that if the State Department was as ignorant as it claimed and unable as it claimed to resolve the conflicting testimonies, it was by choice. Of the many types of military aid supplied by the United States one is called Military Assistance Program; it is military aid provided on a grant basis. The United States has given Indonesia roughly \$80 million since 1974 in this category. One of the conditions of eligibility of this aid is that the recipient country must agree that

it will, as the President may require, permit continuous observation and review by...representatives of the United States Government with regard to the use of such articles or related training or other defense services.

If the United States Government truly wanted to know how this aid was being used and its affect on the East Timorese, it could have sent a team to East Timor as early as December 1976 to engage in "continuous observation" of Indonesian military operations. To the degree that the United States State Department has been ignorant, it was a conscious deliberate decision.

5. After nearly two years of military stalemate, the Indonesians launched an offensive in September 1977. Evidence which I am sure you have heard from other testimony indicates that Indonesian tactics became increasingly brutal during this period with the Indonesian government systematically wiping out villages thought to be sympathetic to FRETILIN.

Despite this, Indonesia apparently was still making little progress and the war was exhausting their supplies. A Western diplomat in Jakarta was quoted in a November 25 Los Angeles Times article: "They are running out of military inventory. The operations in Timor have pushed them to the wall." The Carter administration's response is revealed by the following chart:

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS  
(in thousands of dollars)  
Congressional Presentation Documents

	1978 (Dec.1976)	1979 (Dec.1977)	1980 (Dec.1978)
1976	3,101(actual)		
1977	25,000 (estimated)	5,853 a	
1978	25,000 (proposed)	125,000 e	112,078 a
1978		15,000 p	40,000 e
1979			30,000 p

The columns in the chart represent the figures for FMS agreements in the Congressional Presentation Documents (CPD) for the years 1978-1980. The rows are actual, estimated or proposed FMS agreements for that year. CPD's are issued during the year preceding the calendar year they are projecting, and basically represent the thinking of the administration in December of the year before the books are released. Hence the CPD for FY 1978 reflects administration policy as of December 1976. The FMS agreements projected in 1976 for FY 1977 are \$25,000,000, with the same amount estimated for the following fiscal year. By December 1977 the Carter Administration had dramatically revised its estimates for FY 1978 from \$25,000,000 to \$125,000,000. By December 1978, \$112,078,000 worth of sales had been approved.

In addition to the \$112,078,000 in FMS sales to Indonesia in 1978, there were commercial sales. These included 15,000 M-16 rifles and ammunition costing more than \$5 million. Also in 1978, Indonesia took delivery of 16 Bell 205 UH-1H helicopters from earlier sales.

6. Over the last two months, the Indonesian military finally has permitted international agencies to begin to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of East Timor and my government has contributed about \$3 million. This, of course, is

a positive development, since many tens of thousands of Timorese have come out of the mountains to the coastal plains over the last year. The U.S. Agency for International Development estimates that 200,000 people are "seriously affected," with 25,000 of these people close to death.

But while dispensing aid, the United States is also beginning to join Indonesia in another big lie about why aid is necessary. I am sure you have heard in great detail the tactics of the Indonesian armed forces trying to starve FRETILIN in to submission by the burning and defoliation of crops and bombing attacks on food-producing areas.

That is not, however, the reason for the mass movement of people that we have begun to hear from U.S. officials in Washington. Rather the principal blame is being placed on the East Timorese themselves and secondarily the Portuguese. The argument is that 400 years of slash and burn agriculture have finally led to a situation where there is little arable land left in the mountain areas. This also will be the justification to support the Indonesian decision not to allow the people in camps to return to their mountain homes if and when they are restored to health which, in other words, is a policy of forced resettlement.

I think it is wise in this case to dismiss the arguments of the United States Government and rely instead on the report of James Dunn, Director of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Legislative Research Service of the Parliament of Australia. In an April 6, 1979 report, he points out that "in the last years of Portuguese rule food supplies were generally adequate in all parts of East Timor," save for temporary famine conditions that occurred from time to time in certain districts. He also pointed out that the mountain areas had rich food producing valleys which had been subjected to Indonesian air attack. In sum, while there may be some natural basis for the present calamity, the major cause of the decline of food production in the mountain areas is Indonesian military operation using predominantly U.S. weaponry.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

This concludes the portion of my testimony detailing U.S. efforts in aiding militarily and abetting diplomatically Indonesia's brutal occupation and recolonization of East Timor. I would also like to bring to your attention that in the process the Carter administration has violated



two laws dealing with human rights, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Carter in the last two years.

Public Law 95-118 enacted on October 3, 1977 states:

The U.S. Executive Directors of the international financial institutions are to oppose any loan, any extension of financial assistance or any technical assistance to countries engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights...unless such programs serve basic human needs.

However, from the time that law was adopted until December 1978, the United States failed to oppose 6 different loans to Indonesia in the area of mining, transportation, industry, and power generation, none of which by the U.S. Treasury Department's own definition are programs which meet basic human needs. The total worth of these programs was \$139.2 million. It is important to note that in the same time period, the U.S. Executive Directors opposed similar projects to fourteen countries including Korea, Laos, the Phillipines and Vietnam.

Similarly, a law was enacted on September 26, 1978 making it a legal requirement for the administration to deny security assistance to any country whose government engages in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights, unless the Secretary of State shall find that extraordinary circumstances necessitate a continuation of security assistance for that country, and that, based on all the facts, it is in the national interest to provide such assistance. The intent of Congress was clear that extraordinary circumstances were those involving overriding national security interests. It has cited Indonesia's size, potential wealth and strategic and political position in Southeast Asia. It has also cited Indonesia's concern for possible infiltration by or confrontation over oil rich shelf areas with its communist neighbors. Notably, the Administration has not stated that it agrees with these concerns. In sum, by no stretch of the imagination do extraordinary circumstances exist warranting an exception being made to the finding that Indonesia is a gross violator of human rights and therefore its military aid from the United States should be terminated.

(such as might exist in the Middle East because of oil and South Korea because of a potential threat from North Korea. However, this Administration has always defended military aid to Indonesia on the basis of only moderately important foreign policy goals, certainly not the kind that would override human rights considerations.)

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

However, we know that in 1979 the United States in its government-to-government sale (FMS) of defense articles has already offered the Indonesians equipment and services worth \$27,143,669. Notably these include bomb components, a rocket bomb carrier and 14 A-4's; the latter is a counter-insurgency aircraft that was particularly effective in Vietnam. In addition, there are pending applications for licenses for sales to Indonesia worth approximately \$26 million. These include 2 C-130 transport planes as well as a whole panoply of riot control equipment and small arms.

But as you are probably aware it is the view of the United States government that the Indonesian human rights situation, even that in East Timor, is improving. They maintain this despite the fact that in the last six months there have been credible reports of frequent disappearances, the maintenance of 40 prisons for FRETILIN prisoners and political dissidents as well as reports of the summary execution of FRETILIN soldiers who surrender to the Indonesian forces, not to speak of the countless horrors which have occurred in East Timor in the last three years and ten months.

In summary, not only has the United States government been an active partner in the near genocidal practices of the Indonesian government in East Timor and acted to cover up the entire situation, but it has also violated its own laws in doing so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

April 16, 1979

Committee for Justice  
P.O. Box 54  
Charlotte, Michigan 48813

Dear friends,

Last May we received from you a generous contribution of \$5,000 towards the work of releasing Indonesian political prisoners. As you undoubtedly know, the year just passed has been one of some successes. Our evidence and that obtained by other organizations indicates that many prisoners are indeed being released. We believe these releases are at least in part a result of the work of committees such as our own.

At the same time, as you are also likely aware, the current military regime in Jakarta has covered up several highly repressive policies under the guise of "prisoner release". Most important among these is the forced relocation of some prisoners to camps on different islands from their current site of imprisonment. The government then adds them to the release statistics.

Even more importantly, the more than 14,000 political prisoners still being held on Buru Island -- including some of Indonesia's most prominent artists, trade union leaders, and many others -- continue to face a future of prison camp life. Some of the prisoners' families are now apparently also being held against their will at the Buru camp.

Most seriously of all, however, in terms of current developments, is the situation in Indonesian-occupied East Timor where perhaps as many as 100,000 to 120,000 people have been killed by Indonesian military forces. Many thousands are also being subjected to aerial bombardment, possibly crop defoliation, frequent "search and destroy" operations, and other attacks against their lives and against their right to determine their own futures.

During the past year, we in Tapol--USA have tried to respond to these developments by building and extending the campaign. We helped to launch the A-4 Action Committee which protested the sale of U.S. air force equipment to Indonesia as this equipment was well-suited to counter-insurgency operations in East Timor. From this campaign we developed a far wider set of contacts with church and human rights groups and concerned individuals who have not previously been as aware of Indonesia and East Timor as they have of other parts of the world.

In addition, we have worked intensively with Professor Noam Chomsky of MIT, providing him with information. This work has led to his inserting a major chapter on East Timor in his forthcoming book with Ed Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights. Professor Chomsky's chapter has been independently published in Inquiry magazine (you will be receiving a copy) and is to appear soon in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Because of his activist approach to scholarship, Professor Chomsky also agreed to present a summary version of his East Timor essay to the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations this past November. The appearance of Professor Chomsky created some U.S. press coverage and was front-page headlines in Portuguese newspapers, partly through our work with a correspondent here.

Finally, we have worked to intensify our contacts with other human rights organizations, church groups, and to increase the numbers and range of individuals who are familiar with the problems of political imprisonment and denial of democratic liberties in Indonesia and the brutal Indonesian attempt to suppress independence and self-determination in East Timor.

Much of our work has been possible through your contribution. In particular, we have been able to channel funds to a part-time researchers and organizer who has shown a remarkable dedication and creativity in helping to build the campaign. Among the ideas with which we are working at present, are: a campaign to expose the Buru Island prison camp as a violation of the Indonesian government release pledges, a possible nationwide conference of human rights activists with little current knowledge of Indonesia, and the developing of ties with Indonesia-related issue groups in the U.S. such as the Liquified Natural Gas community opposition in the Los Angeles area. We are also working to place articles on Indonesia and East Timor in major journals such as The Nation, The New Republic, etc. and have found new recruits to our work who are actively making contacts, writing drafts, and researching.

At this time we believe the campaign has reached a new threshold in the U.S. We are hoping to expand our work while maintaining the current projects. Except for our one part-time paid person, all work for Tapol--USA is done on a volunteer basis and most work will continue to be done in that way. We are actively seeking donations from many different sources, and the size and number of donations will greatly effect the work we can do this coming year.

May we request that you consider the possibility of renewing your donation of last May, or, if that is not possible, of making a donation of whatever size you can to contribute towards the work of Tapol--USA in the coming months.

For Tapol--USA,  
In Solidarity,

Please send any contribution directly to our

Prof. Richard W. Franke



# Tapol

U.S. Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

P. O. Box 609, Montclair, N.J. 07042

-3-

P.S. You may also be interested to know that Chomsky and Herman have written an extensive chapter on the Indonesian massacre of 1965 which will appear in their book. We shall see that you receive a copy. They discuss both Indonesia and East Timor frequently in speaking engagements around the country as well. Tapol--USA provided assistance to Prof. Chomsky in drafting the section on the Indonesian events of 1965 and after. This was done during the past 12 months through the efforts of our part-time researcher/organizer.

# The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd.

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## PRESS RELEASE

### PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST CONDEMNNS GENOCIDE IN TIMOR

Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, one of the heroes of the revolution which overthrew the Fascist Government of Caetano, and led directly to the liberation of Portuguese African colonies, is visiting London at the invitation of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

As well as answering questions about the forthcoming Portuguese Elections, Otelo is campaigning against the continued supply of military equipment to Indonesia, because the Indonesians are exterminating large parts of the population of the former Portuguese colony of Timor.

A meeting of Labour Members of Parliament in the House of Commons on October 23rd heard Major Carvalho appeal for the most active protest against the forthcoming state visit of the Indonesian President to Great Britain. At the same meeting, the enclosed statement by Noam Chomsky was distributed, having just been published by Spokesman pamphlets. It contains a convenient short exposition of the crisis in Timor.

Major Carvalho will present his case against the invasion of Timor to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, on October 24th and will then lecture at Oxford University and to numerous organizations representing the Portuguese community.

24th October 1979

## MOTION OF CONDEMNATION OF THE INDONESIAN INVASION

The International Conference on East Timor brings together a large number of participants, who represent various portuguese and foreign - political as well as social currents.

They are in solidarity with the People of East Timor and their struggle for liberation and condemn strongly the military invasion of East Timor by the Indonesian regime.

The fullscale invasion started on December 7th, 1975 and the Suharto government has since then been trying to ignore the national reality of East Timor, which was consolidated during centuries of portuguese colonization and which has its own historically defined identity.

The indonesian aggression violated the basic rights of the People of East Timor, which were reconized through U.N. resolutions. This aggression is against the principles of the international law.

Moreover indonesian forces have made use of sophisticated counter-insurgency weapons against the corageous popular resistance. The indonesian military onslaught has resulted in indescribable barbarism including the massacre of tens of thousands of civilians. Bearing these facts in mind, those participating in the International Conference on East Timor:

- accuse the indonesian regime of genocide against the People of Timor and call for the strong condemnation of this crime by the international community, and demand the immediate withdrawal of indonesian troops from the territory of East Timor
- declare that the indonesian attempt to annex the territory of East Timor and the move to install a foreign administration is illegal
- denounces of any nation that leans toward a policy of fait accompli. Such policy tries to ignore the inalienable rights of the people of Timor and the continuation of their struggle to expell the invador
- demand the immediate liberation of the Timorese patriots emprisoned by the indonesian occupation forces and the free circulation throughout the whole territory of East Timor of international humanitarian organizations, whose mission is to aid people subjected to the war.

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# The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd.

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24th October 1979



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EUN602 EPA597

1041 : HUNGER :

DILI, INDONESIA, / OCT 21 / REUTER -- EMERGENCY SUPPLIES WERE BEING UNLOADED FROM AN INDONESIAN NVAL TRANSPORT SHIP HERE TODAY TO DISTRIBUTE TO THOUSANDS OF STARVING VILLAGERS IN EAST TIMOR.

THE VESSEL ARRIVED FROM JAKARTA LAST NIGHT WITH 700 TONNES OF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS. THE SHIP ALSO CARRIED SEVERAL VEHICLES TO DISTRIBUTE THE AID ON THE BARREN ISLAND.

THE INDONESIAN RED CROSS HAS SPENT 200 MILLION RUPIAH (300,000 DOLLARS) IN A MAJOR OPERATION TO PROVIDE AID TO THE VILLAGERS OF EAST TIMOR. IT IS WORKING WITH THE CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICE (CRS) ON THE PROJECT.

+OUR PROGRAMME IS BASED ON A TARGET FIGURE OF 240,000 BUT WE RECKON WE HAVE ALREADY REACHED ABOUT 300,000. + CRS FIELD REPRESENTATIVE DAMASUS KAUT TOLD REUTERS.

RELIEF WORKERS SAID THOUSANDS OF VILLAGERS WERE STILL RETURNING FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO WHICH THEY FLED DURING THE CIVIL WAR ON THE ISLAND IN 1975 MANY HAD RETURNED TOO LATE TO PLANT CROPS READY FOR THIS YEAR.  
MORE IH/PI/HK

NNNN

EUN603 EPA598

1044 : HUNGER 2 DILI :

RED CROSS WORKERS SAID MANY PEOPLE HAD DIED OF MALNUTRITION AND DISEASE ON THE ISLAND AND MORE WOULD DO SO IF THEY DID NOT GET HELP QUICKLY.

+ONE OF THE BIGGEST HANDICAPS APART FROM TRANSPORTATION IS THAT STARVING VILLAGERS ARE MILLING AROUND AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY HOW MANY WILL BE IN THIS VILLAGE OR ANOTHER TWO DAYS FROM NOW. + ONE WORKER SAID.

BUT AID OFFICIALS SAID THE FAMINE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION BETWEEN INDONESIAN TROOPS AND REMNANTS OF THE FRELATIN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN THE EAST OF THE PROVINCE.

THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY OF EAST TIMOR WAS INCORPORATED INTO INDONESIA IN JULY 1976 AFTER AN EIGHT-MONTH CIVIL WAR BETWEEN THE FRETILIN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND PRO-INDONESIAN GUERRILLAS SUPPORTED BY REGULAR INDONESIAN TROOPS.

REUTER IH/PI/HK

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EUN196 EPB618

1100 JOURNALISTS:

-79  
JAKARTA, OCT 20. REUTER -- INDONESIA TODAY DENIED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEATHS OF FIVE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS IN EAST TIMOR IN 1975.

A STATEMENT BY INFORMATION MINISTER ALI MURTOPO FOLLOWED A VISIT TO INDONESIA BY MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (AJA) INVESTIGATING THE DEATHS OF THEIR COLLEAGUES.

THE FIVE JOURNALISTS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED IN CROSSFIRE BETWEEN FRETILIN GUERRILLAS FIGHTING FOR AN INDEPENDENT EAST TIMOR AND PRO-INDONESIAN GUERRILLAS. THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY WAS INTEGRATED INTO INDONESIA IN 1976.

THE STATEMENT SAID THAT AT A MEETING WITH THE AJA REPRESENTATIVES, +GENERAL ALI MURTOPO REFERRED TO THE SAD ACCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THE FIVE JOURNALISTS AT BALIBO AND SAID THAT INDONESIA HAD NO INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEATHS.+

IT ADDED THAT GENERAL MURTOPO AGREED TO GIVE THE AJA INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT AND TO INVESTIGATE THE FATE OF ANOTHER AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST, ROGER EAST, WHO DISAPPEARED WHEN INDONESIAN TROOPS ENTERED THE EAST TIMOR CAPITAL OF DILI IN DECEMBER 1975.  
REUTER ISA/PI/JOS

- 20/10 tass 6-10 -

-79

statement by indonesia's minister of information  
indonesia 1 (one) two takes  
moscow/october 20/tass +indonesia's principled  
stand expresses itself in its striving for  
friendship and mutually advantageous  
cooperation with all states, regardless of the difference  
in the political, economic and social systems. indonesia  
wants relations of friendship and mutually advantageous  
cooperation with the soviet union with due consideration for  
the national interests of both countries+, minister of  
information ali murtopo told pravda's special correspondent  
in jakarta.

it is easy to establish the spheres of coincidence  
of interests in the independent and foreign policy  
of indonesia and the foreign policy of the soviet union,  
the minister said. though indonesia now cooperates closer  
with western states than with socialist countries, it has a  
positive attitude to the proposals to study the possibilities of  
raising the relations with the soviet union and other socialist  
states to a higher level, first of all in the sphere of economy and  
trade.  
( more)

- 20/10 tass 6-10 -  
indonesia 2 (two)

the soviet union's participation in indonesia's  
projects of economic development, ali murtopo said, will  
yield results of benefit to both countries,  
in view of the fact that the soviet union is a developed  
industrialised state. besides that, the development  
of commercial cooperation would widen the market for  
indonesian goods.

the minister of information holds that the relations  
of mutually advantageous cooperation can also be  
developed in the sphere of foreign policy. for instance,  
both countries declare against all forms of colonial  
oppression, racism and apartheid. both countries come out  
for world peace. the soviet union, just as other socialist  
countries, supports the nonaligned movement, ali murtopo  
said in conclusion.

item ends ++++++



PRIEST CONFIRMS TIMOR CIVIL WAR DEATHSJIMMY BURNS

LISBON, AUGUST 23

A claim that up to 200,000 people on the former Portuguese island colony of Timor (population 650,000) in South-East Asia have died during the last three years of civil war are probably correct, according to a Portuguese priest who has recently returned from there.

Sixty-three-year-old Father Leoneto Vieira de Rego, a member of the Salesian Order, told *The Observer* in Lisbon this week that an exact figure was difficult to estimate. But in the village where he had last been staying about a third of the people had died, mainly from starvation as a result of the war. This was in a rich agricultural region which in the past had never been short of food. The fate of other more barren areas had probably been much worse, he added.

Father Rego's testimony has ended almost four years of silence about conditions on east Timor which was invaded in December 1975 after the withdrawal of the Portuguese Administration.

His eye-witness account will be used as evidence in Geneva next week during a meeting of the United Nations sub-committee for human rights. The committee is to discuss the problems of east Timor in the face of Indonesia's continuing refusal to abide by a United Nations Resolution calling for a withdrawal of the invading troops from the island.

Father Rego joined the guerrillas of Fretilin, east Timor's National Liberation Movement, in July 1976 after Indonesian troops occupied the village of Soibada where he had been teaching at a missionary school.



For three years he travelled extensively on the island but earlier this year surrendered to the Indonesian authorities, gravely ill from malaria and malnutrition. He was subsequently imprisoned before being allowed back to his native Portugal.

Father Rego said this week that Fretilin had suffered a series of major defeats in recent months but that isolated pockets of resistance were still continuing.

He added, however, that to talk of recognising Indonesian rule in east Timor was quite unjust.

"Indonesia invaded east Timor, and the country is under military occupation as surely as Europe was occupied by Nazi Germany, and Timor was occupied by Japan during World War II," he said.

Father Rego appealed for a neutral international organisation to carry out a full-scale investigation on the island so as to bring conclusive proof to the world of the situation there.

He recognised, however, that this would be impossible in the short term since the Indonesian authorities were insisting on an information blockade around the island.

Journalists are told that they can cover the war but are given no official guarantees.

"And this means that any journalist who does go in there has very little chance of coming away alive," he added. Earlier this year the Australian Association of Journalists opened an official inquiry into allegations that five of their colleagues (two Australian, two British, and one New Zealander) working for Australian Television were murdered by Indonesian troops in 1975.

According to Father Rego the course of the war in Timor altered in the summer of 1977 when Indonesia began to deploy air power on a major scale against Fretilin troops. The "search and destroy" offensive forced large sectors of the local population to flee from their villages. Crops were destroyed caused widespread famine.

Large numbers of Timorese are now either in "protected" compounds

December 27, 1979

Mr. Arnold Kohen

SINCE YOU ASK FOR A LIST OF PLACES AND PERSONS, AND TO AVOID FURTHER COMPLICATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGEST ONLY THREE NAMES AND A FEW PLACES AS FOLLOWING:

NAMES: - Fr. Leão da Costa ( in Dili, Timor Timur )

- Fr. Domingos da Cunha ( Dili, Timor Timur )

- Domingos Oliveira ( Dili )

PLACES: - Oe-Cusse ( a former Portuguese enclave in Western (Indonesian) Timor)

- Bobonaro

- Atsabe

- Suai --- (Suai, Maucatar, and Fohorém)

- Same

- Turiscai

- Aileu

- Soibada

- Viqueque

- Watucarbão

- Lospalos

- Baucau

- Manatuto

*Turube worked here,  
as well as Remexio.*

*The list is half a  
"sentiment list" (Leoneto says that even  
the few who supported integration in  
these places now hate the Indonesians)*

*Other places are abysmal on  
on humanitarian level*

THOSE PERSONS WILL SUGEST FURTHER PLACES TO VISIT AND OTHER PEOPLE TO CONTACT FOR YOUR PURPOSES.

PLEASE AVOID CONTACT WITH PRIESTS OF THE "SALESIAN ORDER" WHO LIVE IN BAUCAU, LOSPALOS AND FATUMACA, AS WELL AS FR. ANTÔNIO COSTA WHO IS IN DILI AND WORK FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT.

THE INDONESIANS ARE EASILY CONVINCED BY BRIBES.

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND INTEND TO DO. GOD BLESS YOUR HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS.

Sincerely yours

*Fr. Leoneto Vieira do Rego*  
Fr. Leoneto Vieira do Rego

*Turiscan  
Remexio  
Maubara  
Betano  
Suro*

*→ worst places*

Dear Gerhard,

Nov. 28, 1979  
*and the Manchester Guardian*

Now, if Morton Kondracke and Marty Peretz, Stephen Rosenfeld (Post Op ed editor), The London Times, Tom Harkin and Jack Anderson consider Timor a legitimate issue, what is Whitney Ellsworth's excuse? London Review or no London Review, he or someone else can call a reviewer to look at Jolliffe's book or Chomsky's book (even if they don't like it, it sets off some discussion). But nothing?

The extra copies are for the NYR, etc.

Best,

Arnold



# press release

## AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

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October 26, 1979  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

U.S. AID BRUTAL OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR, ADA REPRESENTATIVE TELLS UNITED NATIONS

New York, N.Y. -- Speaking before the Fourth (Colonialism)

Committee of the United Nations General Assembly today, Americans for Democratic Action Foreign Affairs Director Bruce Cameron charged the United States with aiding and abetting the brutal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia.

Cameron told the Committee that ADA, a national political organization that has been one of the leaders in rallying support for the "Draft Senator Edward Kennedy for President" movement, has "been particularly proud and supportive of the changes" made by the Carter administration "with respect to the remaining colonial problems in Southern Africa: Rhodesia and Namibia."

But in Asia, Cameron argued, the U.S. record has been very, very different.

Indonesia launched a full-fledged invasion of East Timor, a Portuguese colony for over 400 years with an estimated population of 690,000, on December 7, 1975. Since then, an estimated one sixth to more than one-third