


**1993**



# OOST-TIMOR

MET DEZE AVOND WILLEN WE LATEN ZIEN DAT HET BLOEDBAD VAN 12 NOVEMBER 1991 (MEER DAN 120 DODEN) GEEN INCIDENT WAS

INFO AVOND



**VIDEO** OVER DE ANTI- C.G.I.

DEMO IN PARIJS (16-7-1992), DEZE VIDEO VERTELT OOK MEER OVER DE MILITAIRE DIKTATUUR IN INDONESIA.

**COLD BLOOD**, VIDEO OVER OOST TIMOR EN GEEFT EEN BEELD VAN DE GEBEURTENISSEN VOOR EN NA 12 NOVEMBER VORIG JAAR (ENGELS GESPROKEN)

**VERDER** ZIJN ER BROCHURES, KRANTENKNIPSELS EN IS HET MOGELIJK VRAGEN TE STELLEN.

**TIJD:** 17 jan. ★ 7 uur eten (opgeven)  
★ 1/2 9 infoavond

**PLAATS:** de SKwotter  
Otterstraat 82 Utrecht





Mit Transparenten machten die Schiffsbesetzer auf ihr Anliegen aufmerksam.

Foto: AP




Die MS Schrött - von den Besetzern so getarnt - mit Bannern Werbung für Ost-Timor.

Foto: Uwe Gottschling

## Allemaña

Hapara fo armas ba Indonesia. Roahi funu iha pontekais Peenemünde okupa husi activista dame, atu protesta kontra eksportasaun sasan 39 roahi funu NVA ba Indonesia





1993, UK:  
Demonstrations by **British Coalition for East Timor** outside Indonesian Embassy in London. Seen here are Chang so Young and Chun Soon OK = Progressio partners from Korea and Jonathan Humphries, former Chair of the British Coalition for East Timor who staged a sit-in hunger strike for a few days.





**EAST TIMOR:  
INDONESIAN  
TROOPS  
OUT NOW!**

1993, UK: A demonstration outside the Rolls Royce factory in Bristol to protest about Hawk sales to Indonesia. The demonstration was called "**Oil, Arms, Terror**" and organized by Hugh Dowson of the United Nations Association. Participants included Estevão Cabral, Prof. John Taylor, Dr. Peter Carey, Liem Soi Leong, and other members of the **British coalition** for East Timor etc.



1993, UK: Round-table meeting as part of the **Christian Consultation on East Timor**. From 1995 until 2004 Progressio facilitated this international ecumenical network.





1993: East Timor Youth Ambassador Elisabeth Exposto during an ETAN organized speaking tour (USA)





**Portuguese UN Mission  
New York City, USA**

1993: Australian and USA organizations worked together to bring three Timorese Youth Ambassadors from Australia to the USA for a speaking tour, organized by ETAN. In the USA they were joined by Abe Barreto and Constancio Pinto. This was the first of more than a dozen U.S. speaking tours that ETAN organized for exiled Timorese activists, many of whom are now Ministers, Parliamentarians and other leaders of the country. On the picture we see (from left to right): Elisabeth Exposto, Maria Bras, Danilo Henriques and Abe Barreto meet with the Portuguese ambassador to the United Nations.





White Plains, New York, USA

1993: Elizabeth Exposto being interviewed by activist and photographer Andrew Courtney during Timorese Youth Ambassador tour.





**White Plains, New York, USA**

1993: During the Timorese Youth Ambassador Tour, Abe Barreto explained the East Timor situation to Indonesian-American Reverend Max Surjadinata. The Reverend was one of ETAN's earliest members.





1993: East Timor Youth Ambassador Danilo Henriques during an ETAN organized speaking tour (USA)



1993: Mr. Akatani at WESPAC





Amsterdam, The Netherlands

17 August 1993: Group Purnama provides new head for colonial ruler Van Heutz






17 Aug 1993 - Amsterdam, The Netherlands

"Our colonial past nourished the dictatorial present. Stop genocide in East Timor"







#### Japan

1993, Aug: Mr. Shohachi Iwamura, a Japanese soldier dispatched to East Timor during World War II, reports his participation in a gathering of Australian ex-soldiers

#### Japaun

1993, Aug: Sr. Shohachi Iwamura, soldadu Japones iha Timor durante Funu Mundu II, koalia konaba ninia partisipasaun iha enkontru eis soldadu sira iha Australia.



#### Tokyo, Japan

1993, Nov: Mr. Mari Alkatiri with Fr. Jaime Coelho S talking about East Timor, before a demonstration towards the Indonesian Consulate in Tokyo.

#### Tokio, Japaun

1993, Nov: Sr. Mari Alkatiri no Pe. Jaime Coelho SJ koalia konaba problema sira Timor Lorosa'e nian, hahu demonstrasaun ba Konsulatu Indonesia nian iha Tokio.






Tokyo, Japan  
1993, Nov: Mr. Mari Alkatiri, speaking tour and interview  
inTokyo.

Tokio, Japaun  
1993, Nov: Sr. Mari Alkatiri, palestra no enrevista iha Tokio.





Kobe, Japan

1993, Dec: Demonstration towards Indonesian Consulate in Kobe.

Kobe, Japan

1993, Dez: Demonstratsaun ihasoru Konsuliadu Indonesia iha Kobe.



Kobe, Japan

1993, Dec: Demonstration in front of Indonesian Consulate in Kobe.

Kobe, Japaun

1993, Dez: Demonstratsaun iha Kobe, iha Konsuliadu Indonesia iha on



# FREE EAST TIMOR



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12 Nov 1993 – The Netherlands: Group Purnama and sympathizers block Shell station to protest against Dutch investments in the Suharto regime



## Oost-Timor, 2 jaar na het bloedbad.

Vrijdag 12 nov. hebben we in Den Haag d.m.v. een demo en een actie bij de Indonesische ambassade en bij een Shell pomp heldacht, dat 2 jaar geleden op Oost-Timor tijdens een demonstratieve begravenisstoet 273 mensen door het Ind. leger in koude bloede zijn doodgeschoten en 300 mensen na afloop zijn "vermist".

De "demo" bestond uit  $\pm$  30 mensen, 2 busjes met geluidsinstallatie, waarvoor Oost-Timorese strijdliederen te horen waren en een aantal spandoeken met leuzen als: Den Haag. Jakarta = bloedhandel en Ind. Ambassade: vertegenwoordigers van onderdrukte volken en van massagraven. We vertrokken zonder politie begeleiding, die hadden we 't verkeerde vertrekpunt doorgegeven, naar halverwege het binnenhof, waar we naartoe liepen, werden we tegenhouden en moesten we een half uur wachten op de woutenbegeleiding. De rijkels wijzigden intussen onze route: zeek actie bij de Shell pomp, want daar hoorden we niet lang, vanwege de denkweg naar de pomp ook lag. Bullshit! Vandaag, eerst langs het Binnenhof al waar we een brief met eisen aan minister Kroijmans van buitenlandse zaken wilden overhandigen. De eisen waren: opheldering verkrijgen bij zijn Ind. ambtsgraaf Alatas, over het lot van de 300 "verdwenen" Timorezen. iedereen die asiel zoekt in de Ned. ambassade in Jakarta, een veilige uittocht garanderen.

Kroijmans was er natuurlijk niet, daarvoor in de plaats andere ongeïnteresseerde wachten om de open te nemen. Snel weg van de ambassade waar we na een uur aankwamen. Net als vorig jaar stonden er weer draaghekken voor het eigenlijke ambassade hek. (?) Je hadden 27 keuzen gemaakt, die we daar achter de draaghekken in de grond hebben gezet. Symbolisch 27 keuzen met 27 namen van

voornamelijk jongeren, geboren uit de lijst van de 273 vermoorde Timorezen. Er zijn bloemen gelegd en een verklaring en een gedicht voorgedragen, waarna 1 minuut stilte was, om alle vermoorde oost-Timorezen te herdenken. (dat zijn er sinds de annexatie (1975) 200.000, een derde van de bevolking!)

Omdat we tijdens de demo geen toestemming kregen om naar een Shell pomp te gaan, waar we een spandoek wilden ophangen, hebben we na de ambassade het vercameld en zijn we alsnog gegaan. Shell is groot geworden in Indonesië en rooft daar nog steeds, voornamelijk met dochterbedrijven grondstoffen, bijv. goud op de Molukken. Dat gaat natuurlijk gepaard met minimale lonen en zeer slechte arbeidsomstandigheden. Omdat onderdrukkende systemen en dit soort multinationals en bedrijven elkaar in stand houden, hebben we dus ook hier tegen geprotesteerd, met een spandoek **Breek Shell en Shell helpt Suharto**.

Niet alleen in Den Haag maar over de hele wereld zijn acties geweest om de schendingen van de mensenrechten op Oost-Timor onder de aandacht te krijgen. o.a. in Australië, Zweden, Portugal, Canada en de U.S.A.

In Oost-Timor zelf hebben de Ind. militaire autoriteiten (net als vorig jaar) veiligheidsmaatregelen opgevoerd om protesten te voorkomen. (o.a. met 't arresteren van mensen)

Stop handelsbetrekkingen met Indonesië!

Breek Shell!

VIVA TIMOR-LESTE!


VIVA WEST-TIMOR!

VIVA MALUKU! MORDITA!

SPRINGSTOF - Handwritten and stenciled Utrecht activists' weekly, distributed on pushbike to about 200 addresses in town.

Platen, posters, T-shirts, en nog veel meer.





12 Nov 1993, The Netherlands: Mikkie (Group Purnama) reads statement in front of the Indonesian Embassy





12 Nov 1993, The Netherlands: Memorial of Santa Cruz. Silent protest in front of the Indonesian Embassy





The Netherlands – National media coverage of protests on 12 Nov 1993





Een deelnemster aan de betoging donderdag voor de Indonesische ambassade in Den Haag. Een petitie waarin wordt gevraagd om vrijlating van alle politieke gevangenen in Oost-Timor werd in de brievenbus gestopt toen bleek dat ambassadeur B. Tjokroamidjojo niet thuis gaf.

Foto: ANP

onafhankelijkheidsbeweging Fretilin de schuld van het bloedbad.

De kapel op de begraafplaats ziet er glanzend schoon uit. Dichtbij legt een vrouw bloemen op een graf van een onbekende dode waarop een groot, zwart kruis staat. Om haar zuster te gedenken, zegt ze. 'Maar dit graf is ook voor de doden van 12 november.'

Rondom het kerkhof rijden militairen in veldtenue rondjes. In de loop van de middag komen ongeveer twintig mensen het kerkhof op. Ze fluisteren tegen elkaar. Judith Maria is gekomen om haar twintig jaar oude zoon te gedenken. 'Zelfs een hond of een varken gaat op zoek naar een verloren kind. Zou een moeder dat dan niet doen?' Zij en anderen leggen eveneens bloemen bij het graf met het zwarte kruis.

Arsenio Horta is ook op het kerkhof. Hij is de jongere broer van Ramos Horta, een onafhankelijkheidsstrijder die het land in 1975 ontvluchtte en die sindsdien in Portugal woont. Een derde broer hoort tot de slachtoffers van Dili. Arsenio ontkent contacten te hebben met zijn broer in Portugal. 'Hij had zijn eigen idealen voor een onafhankelijk Oost-Timor, maar wij leven hier, we kunnen ons de onafhankelijkheid niet veroorloven', zegt hij.

De patrouillerende militairen houden de begrafenisgangers nauwlettend in de gaten. Een van hen zegt: 'Het is overal rustig gebleven op Oost-Timor. En dat betekent dat de mensen een hoop hebben geleerd van het verleden.'

## Alleen op Oost-Timor blijven acties tegen bloedbad in Dili uit

DILI/DEN HAAG (Reuter) — In Portugal werd donderdag in het parlement en op scholen druk gediscussieerd over Oost-Timor. In Australië trokken honderden demonstranten de straat op. In Den Haag postten leden van kerkelijke, politieke en maatschappelijke organisaties voor de deur van de Indonesische ambassade om te protesteren tegen het bloedbad in de Oosttimorese hoofdstad Dili, precies een jaar geleden. Alleen in Dili zelf bleef het stil.

De enige journalist die toestemming kreeg naar Dili te komen (van het persbureau Reuter), meldde dat de kerken 's ochtend voller waren dan normaal, maar dat vrijwel niemand het bloedbad openlijk durfde te herdenken. 'Het is voor ons, voor de jongeren, een belangrijke dag. We zullen die herdenken, maar we zijn bang dat openlijk te doen', zei een meisje in een kerk nabij de begraafplaats Santa Cruz.

Precies een jaar geleden schoten Indonesische militairen daar op een man die rouwde om de dood van een onafhankelijkheidsstrijder. Volgens de autoriteiten kwamen er vijftig mensen om en zijn sindsdien ruim zestig mensen vermist. Maar mensenrechtenorganisaties zeggen dat er tussen de 150 en 200 doden zijn gevallen. Indonesië geeft de

The Netherlands - National media coverage of protests on 12 Nov 1993



ABOORD VELUWS DAGBLAD / APeldoornse Courant - 13 nov. '93

Memorial Massacre  
Netherlands


## Herdenking in Den Haag van bloedbad Oost-Timor



NIEUW - De slachtoffers van het bloedbad in Oost-Timor, twee jaar geleden, zijn gisteren in Den Haag herdacht. Bij de ambassade van Indonesië werd een minuut stilte in te genomen. De demonstranten plaatsten 27 kruisen voor de ambassade met daarop de namen van 27 jonge slachtoffers. Het Indonesische leger opende op 12 november het vuur op Oost-Timorezen, die demonstreerden tegen de Indonesische overheersing en voor onafhankelijkheid. Zeker 50 demonstranten werden gedood en 91 demonstranten raakten gewond. Tienentwintig mensen worden nog altijd vermist. (Foto ANP)

The Netherlands - Regional media  
coverage of protests on 12 Nov 1993





## Viva Timor Leste !

there's a land torn apart in the Timor sea  
it's been colonised and plundered in the last four centuries  
first the Portuguese took it as their property  
but after their revolution  
they left the country torn apart behind  
and the people in confusion

general Suharto took advantage of that  
he smelled oil in the Timor sea  
he took the country by storm  
raping and murdering the people  
with help from western countries  
big companies and the CIA.

locked out from the rest of the world  
there's taking place a genocide  
smothered by transmigrators  
who have been given more rights  
but from the mountains, the guerilla keeps fighting  
like the youngsters in the city, fighting for independence!

they don't accept a culture smashed down their throats  
they won't forget the torturing, imprisoning  
and killing of their loved ones

so fight against Suharto, worldbank, hypocritical government:  
who hear nothing, see nothing and say nothing  
and getting rich over dead bodies

Free East Timor! East Timor Free! Viva Timor Leste!





SIDE A: We Can't Be Beaten (Rossa Taffou)  
SIDE B: Hamutuk (Unity) (Angelo Madeira) Sung in Tetum.

**We Can't Be Beaten**  
SONGS FOR EAST TIMOR

**AETA**  
CASSETTE  
SINGLE

**We Can't Be Beaten**



**SONGS FOR EAST TIMOR**  
CASSETTE SINGLE

**We Can't Be Beaten**

**SONGS FOR EAST TIMOR**

Paul Stewart - Vocals and  
Colin Buckler - Drums  
(Painters & Dockers)  
Angelo Madeira - Lead Guitar  
Inacio Carvalho - Bass Guitar  
Zeni Gusmão - Vocals  
Kikas Azavedo - Vocals  
Teresa Madeira - Vocals  
David Bridle - Vocals, Keyboards  
(Not Drowning Waving)  
Lito Santos - Rythm Guitar  
José Napoleão - Rythm Guitar  
Rachael Kerr - News Reader  
Recorded by James Taylor.  
Produced by David Bridle.  
Cover photograph - The Age  
Thanks to Richard Micallef,  
Louise Byrne and Michael Barclay.  
Recorded at SBS, Melbourne, Australia.

© AETA 1993. Australia-East Timor  
Association, PO Box 93, Fitzroy,  
Victoria 3065, Australia

**HAMUTUK**

Maluk Timor-oan iha mundo tomak  
Fo liman kaer metin tuba rai metin  
Se o halo sala Timor-oan maka terus  
Iha Timor laran ho mos rai seluk

Mai hamutuk fo neon ba malu  
Hussik a'at ba kotuk  
Buka dalan los  
Hodi loron ruma Timor ukun-an

Maluk Timor-oan iha tassi balu  
Tau matan ba maluk iha Timor laran  
Sira maka terus sira maka susar  
Loron to'o ona hodi loke matan

Mai hamutuk fo neon ba malu  
Hussik a'at ba kotuk  
Buka dalan los  
Hodi loron ruma Timor ukun-an

Hodi loron ruma Timor ukun-an  
Hodi loron ruma Timor ukun-an

**UNITY**

Fellow Timorese around the world  
Unity means joining hands, standing firm  
If you don't do the right thing  
The people in East Timor will suffer

Let's work together  
Leaving behind the bitterness of the past  
If we follow the right path  
Then one day East Timor will be free

Fellow Timorese across the seas  
Think of your brothers inside East Timor  
Remember their great pain and suffering  
The time has come to see things clearly

Let's work together  
Leaving behind the bitterness of the past  
If we follow the right path  
Then one day East Timor will be free

Then one day East Timor will be free  
Then one day East Timor will be free



# Double Standard! Japan's Stand on East Timor

Free East Timor Japan Coalition  
presented to the UN World Conference  
on Human Rights  
June 1993

## INTRODUCTION

Although the fact is not well known, the guidelines issued by the Human Rights Committee to governments to use in drawing up their reports request governments to report on their stand and on measures which are taking for the right to self-determination of the people in South Africa and Palestine. In other words, in considering the human rights situation in one country, that country's response to the problems of other countries must be taken into consideration. To expand the interpretation further, one can say that, even if the human rights situation in the country itself is good, if that country's corporations, for instance, export pollution abroad, or do not treat the workers humanely, or if the country exports arms, say, and for the sake of profits closes its eyes to the suppression of human rights by the government of that country, or if it does not join in economic sanctions to right such wrongs, then that country can hardly be said to have a good human rights record. We can thus see in these guidelines the understanding of the UN that the protection of human rights cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the international community.

The representative of the Japanese government, at the Asian Regional Preparatory Meeting in Bangkok, stated as follows:

"Human rights is a matter for which the international community is justified in sharing its concern. .... My delegation does not accept the view that to express concern over grave violations of human rights in whatever country such abuses may occur is an interference in that country's internal affairs."

It also affirmed guidelines for linking ODA and human rights.

"The Official Development Assistance Charter, which the Government of Japan adopted in June of last year, articulates that, when development assistance is to be provided, full attention should be paid, among other things, to the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in a recipient country, and to the efforts being made in that country to promote

democratization."

We welcome all of these statements.

However, we must also take a hard look at just what diplomatic efforts Japan has actually made, or is making, to enhance human rights. Here we will report, in terms of the points below, what concrete policies the Japanese Government has adopted with respect to the case of East Timor. Indonesia, it will be recalled, invaded East Timor in December 1975, when the latter was in the process of obtaining its independence from Portugal, and unilaterally annexed it in defiance of United Nations resolutions. We note that Indonesia is the largest recipient of Japanese ODA in the world. Because of its diplomatic and economic support for Indonesia over the past 18 years, Japan is seen in the eyes of the East Timorese as their invader's "sponsor."

## EAST TIMOR: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

### 1. The Sovereignty Issue

The Japanese Government does not recognize Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Japan, it has stated, "is not in a position to make a judgement (on the sovereignty issue)." "Negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia are taking place under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, and Japan holds in high regard these efforts by the Secretary General." (26 Nov., 1986, Education Committee, House of Representatives) In its annual Countries of the World, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes care to delineate on its maps the borders of East Timor, marking them in the same manner as other disputed areas such as Western Sahara.

### 2. Position at the UN

The United Nations General Assembly has adopted eight resolutions in which it calls on Indonesia to withdraw from the territory (1975, 76), rejects the claim that East Timor was integrated into Indonesia (1976, 77), request the UN special representative to carry out on-the spot investigation in East Timor (1975, 76, 77, 78), invites UNICEF and UNHCR to start humanitarian aids (1979), calls for the Secretary General's mediation among all the parties concerned (1982), and affirms the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence (almost all years). The Security Council has passed similar resolutions twice (1975, 76). A "non-self-governing territory," East Timor is taken up at sessions of the Special Committee on Decolonization year in and



year out. The Human Rights Commission likewise hears testimony every year about the flagrant human rights abuses in East Timor and this year, for the first time, adopted a resolution. The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has adopted resolutions on the situation in East Timor in 1982, 83, 84, 87, 89, 90 and 92.

The votes of the Japanese government were as follows:

a. General Assembly resolutions: Against (1975, '76, '77, '78, '79, '80, '81, '82) \*

b. Security Council resolutions: For (1975)\*\* , Abstain (1976)

c. Commission on Human Rights

1982: Indonesia was eligible to be considered at the commission under procedure 1503 (for consideration of communications that governments have committed a "consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights"), but the commission voted (by a margin of two votes) not to consider Indonesia. Japan was one of the countries that voted to let Indonesia off the hook.

1992: The commission discussed the Santa Cruz massacre, but Japan opposed the EC draft resolution, throwing its weight behind a weak "Consensus Statement" that was adopted in the end.

1993: Japan supported a "no action" motion by Malaysia and abstained on the draft resolution presented by the EC, Canada, the US, and others.

\*In 1983 Japan is reported to have lobbied for a postponement of debate on East Timor.

\*\*Japan worked to get criticism of Indonesia removed from the text of the draft and succeeded in getting a watered down resolution.

### 3. Economic Aid to Indonesia

Japan has never applied sanctions in any form whatsoever with regard to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. Grant component is not included here for, as is well-known, it is far less important in Japanese economic aid.

#### (1) Annual results of loans

1975: yen loans worth \$1.7 billion (including \$150 million for Indonesia's state oil company, Pertamina; \$140 million IGGI emergency contribution; \$200 million for a liquified natural gas development project; \$900 million for the Asahan aluminum refinery project)

1976: yen loans totalling ¥67.3 billion (¥41 billion as IGGI

pledge project aid; ¥26.3 billion Asahan project aid)

1977: yen loans totalling ¥55.5 billion (¥49.1 billion as IGGI pledge project aid; ¥6.5 in non-IGGI aid)

1978: ¥90.1 in yen loans (¥54.8 billion as IGGI pledge project aid; ¥35.5 billion for Asahan project)

1979: ¥88 billion in yen loans (¥55 billion in IGGI pledge project aid; ¥33 billion in non-IGGI aid)

1980: yen loans totalling ¥58 billion (IGGI pledge)

1981: yen loans totalling ¥58 billion (IGGI pledge)

1982: yen loans totalling ¥63.2 billion (IGGI pledge)

1983: yen loans totalling ¥67.5 billion (IGGI pledge)

1984: yen loans totalling ¥71.6 billion (IGGI pledge)

1985: yen loans totalling ¥75.4 billion (IGGI pledge)

1986: yen loans totalling ¥80 billion (¥74.7 IGGI pledge project aid; ¥5.3 billion in local cost financing)

1987: yen loans totalling ¥88 billion (¥27.2 billion in IGGI pledge commodity loans; ¥47.2 billion in project aid; ¥13.6 billion for local cost financing) \*\*\*

1988: yen loans totalling ¥197.6 billion (¥38.1 billion in IGGI pledge commodity loans; ¥41.3 billion in project aid; ¥72.4 billion in sector program loans; ¥24.2 billion in local cost financing; ¥21.5 billion for non-IGGI petroleum loans)

1989: ¥178.4 billion (¥81 billion in project aid; ¥97.4 billion in commodity loans).

1990: ¥181.6 billion (¥105.3 billion in project aid; ¥76.2 billion in commodity loans).

1991: ¥161.2 billion (¥93.7 billion in project aid; ¥67.5 billion in commodity loans).

( In 1988, 89 and 90, sector program loans are not separately classified. )

1992: \$1.32 billion ( approx. ¥160 billion ) ( \$530 million in sector program loans)

Since 1987 Indonesia has received the biggest allocation in Japanese bilateral aid. In 1992 Japan accounted for 68.9% of all bilateral aid to Indonesia.

\*\*\*This marks a shift from project-centered aid to financing support-type aid and was in response to the financial difficulties caused by the fall in petroleum prices and increase in debt accumulation. There was a big jump in the share of aid for commodity loans (of funds for importing goods needed for economic development, to help improve the recipient country's international balance of payments), for local cost financing (to support the part of a project to be managed by the recipient country with local currency), and sector program loans (to support development projects in certain sectors), and these funds surpassed project aid funds.

(2) ¥100 million aid to relief activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in East Timor, 1979.



### **(3) Aid to Japanese NGOs working in E.Timor**

- a. Small-scale grant: for technical assistance provided by a group of volunteers from Ikusei Kogyo Technical High School (1991)
- b. Project aid from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications International Volunteer Savings to the Catholic Schools Support Group (office in the Nagoya Catholic Justice and Peace Committee) to provide necessary materials for education in areas of East Timor in dire need.

### **(4) Indonesia Nationwide Shortwave Monitoring Project (Yen loan Project)**

**Scale:** first phase: ¥2.6 billion; second : ¥5.7 billion

**Purpose:** provide equipment to monitor shortwave transmissions, and to record and analyse their frequencies, strengths, transmission sites and to build monitoring sites throughout Indonesia in order to control illegal shortwave transmissions; also to provide related engineering services.

**Consultant:** Nihon Tsushin Kyoryoku

**Supplier:** Sumitomo Shoji Tsushin Denshi Division

**Manufacturer:** Nihon Denki

**Technical Assistance:** From 1980 to 1984 the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications sent a total of 14 specialists in the fields of frequency supervision, shortwave bureau supervising, and frequency monitoring to the Jakarta Monitoring Center.

**State of progress:** 21 monitoring stations were completed between 1979 and March 1985 (first phase). Construction of 9 more stations began in 1987 (second phase).

**Relation to East Timor:** A monitoring station (mobile trailer type) was set up in Kupang, West Timor during the first phase, and in August 1991 a monitoring station (also a mobile type) was set up in Dili, East Timor.

In East Timor "Radio Maubere" (shortwave communication with Australia) was operated by Fretilin since the start of the Indonesian invasion, but transmissions ended with the surrender, in 1978, of the operator, Alarico Fernandes. Transmissions began again in early 1985. The transmissions were used to report on conditions in East Timor (Indonesian attacks, the situation in the resettlement camps, repression of human rights), to request investigations by Amnesty International, and to convey to the UN Secretary-General peace proposals. Since East Timor was closed to outsiders until early 1989, these transmissions were the sole means of direct

communication with the outside world. However these transmissions too were stopped because of Indonesian bombing raids. In 1986 the accuracy of Indonesian bombing improved dramatically and strikes began to get closer and closer to the transmission sites, so that by 1987 it was virtually impossible to continue. Indonesia jammed the transmissions as well.

### **Military use suspected:**

Given the fact that the timing of Japan's grant for the mobile monitoring stations overlaps with the period when Radio Maubere resumed broadcasting and then had to stop, the suspicion arises that the mobile monitoring facilities were used to prevent Fretilin broadcasting in East Timor. It is also feared that the monitoring trailer operating in Dili since 1991 is being used for military purposes.

Replying to our inquiries as to this point, the Foreign Ministry commented, "Information of the monitoring sites and equipment cannot be made public because they relate to Indonesia's shortwave monitoring administration. .... It has already been made clear that as a principle Japanese aid is not to be used for military purposes, so there is no need to make another notification (to this effect)."

### **(5) NGO Activities on East Timor and Aid**

**Chofu (Tokyo) City Council Resolution** (19 Dec. 1991), calling for:

- a. Withdrawal of Indonesian army
- b. Making Indonesian troop withdrawal from East Timor a condition for the granting of ODA in line with Japan's Four ODA Principles \*\*\*\*
- c. Campaigning at the UN for respect for the East Timorese' right to self determination

\*\*\*\* The four points to be considered in providing ODA, proclaimed by former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in April 1991: 1. military expenditures of the recipient country, 2. arms export and import, 3. possession and development of nuclear and chemical weapons, 4. conditions with regard to basic human rights and democracy.

**Petition to the Prime Minister signed by 262 Diet members** (12 Dec. 1991), calling on Japan:

- a. To review ODA policy toward Indonesia
- b. To send a UN investigative team to East Timor
- c. To urge the Security Council to take up the self-rule issue

**Mitaka (Tokyo) City Council Position Statement** (25 June, 1992), calling on Japan:

- a. To vote in favor of a resolution in the UN General



- Assembly (should there be one) in support of East Timor's right to self determination and independence.
- b. To call for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops
- c. To work at the UN for respect for the East Timorese' right to self-determination
- d. To review Japan's ODA policy vis-a-vis Indonesia

**Petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bureau of Economic Cooperation from the Free East Timor Japan Coalition regarding the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia)**

**Meeting (8 July, 1992), calling for the Japanese delegation to strive so as to realize at the CGI Meeting:**

- a. Raising of human rights issues in East Timor and Indonesia
- b. Raising the issue of the Indonesian Government's restrictions on NGOs activities
- c. Making continued aid to Indonesia contingent on Indonesia's abiding by the Consensus Statement of the UN Commission on Human Rights, inclusion of East Timorese in the negotiations held between Indonesia and Portugal, termination of suppression of freedom of speech, etc.

**Petition to the Prime Minister from 70,000 Japanese** (delivered 12 November 1992), calling for Japan to:

- a. Call on the Indonesian Government to respect the East Timorese' right to self-determination
- b. Take an active role at the UN to realize a just exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of East Timor
- c. In line with Japan's Four ODA Principles, make granting of ODA contingent on an Indonesian troop withdrawal from East Timor
- d. Make public information on the shortwave monitoring facility in Dili built with yen loans, and take concrete measures to prevent its use for military purposes

**Hino (Toyo) City Council Resolution**  
(25 March, 1993)

- a. Calling on Japanese Government to demand withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor
- b. To actively mediate at the UN to bring about peace talks
- c. To make granting of ODA contingent on an Indonesian troop withdrawal

**4. Involvement in petroleum development in Timor Gap area jointly administered by Australia and Indonesia**

In international bidding in December 1991, Japan

Indoensia Oil together with the Australian company BHP won bidding on lot 91-012 and Nippon Oil, together with Royal Dutch Shell (the Netherlands) and Chevron (USA) won bidding on lot 91-02.

## 5. Meeting with East Timorese opposed to Integration

Every year since 1986 East Timorese have visited Japan at the invitation of the East Timor Japan Coalition, but they have never been allowed to meet with staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## 6. Summary

Japan is Indonesia's No.1 investment, import, and export partner, and it has never allowed human rights considerations stemming from the invasion of East Timor to get in the way of "business as usual". What is this if not a clear case of the selectiveness and double standards which were so sharply criticized by the Asian countries in their Bangkok Declaration?

Through the efforts of NGOs however, a number of steps toward the advancement of human rights have been taken;

- a. Nonrecognition of the annexation
- b. Annual visits to East Timor by staff of the Japanese embassy in Jakarta\*\*\*\*\*
- c. Assistance to Japanese NGOs working in East Timor
- d. Observing of trials of East Timorese political prisoners\*\*\*\*\*
- e. Raising of the East Timor issue with President Suharto at the time of the Prime Minister's visit to Indonesia (January 1993). Also, the Government has more frequently taken up human rights issues regarding East Timor with Indonesia through diplomatic routes.
- f. Objecting to the Indonesian Government's rejection of the International Federation for East Timor's participation in the Asian preconference of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights


\*\*\*\*\* & \*\*\*\*\* Independence of informants and the quality of the findings are questioned.

**Free East Timor Japan Coalition** consists of 10 solidarity groups in Sapporo, Sendai, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Okayama, Zentsuji, Kure, Shimonoseki, Oita and Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace.

#About the content of this paper please contact the writer, Kiyoko Furusawa of Tokyo East Timor Association.

1-2-9-302 Naka-machi, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180 JAPAN  
Tel.81-422-55-7937 Fax:81-422-55-7768





## TIMOR LESTE, UMA RESPONSABILIDADE INTERNACIONAL

### Apoios:

A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste  
Associação Doze de Novembro  
Centro de Documentação e de Divulgação  
da Cultura de Timor  
Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere  
Instituto Erasmus  
Movimento Cristão para a Paz  
Paz e Justiça para Timor Leste  
Universidade Católica Portuguesa  
Universidade de Coimbra  
Universidade de Lisboa  
Universidade do Minho

Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian  
Fundação Luso-Americana para o  
Desenvolvimento  
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay  
Caixa Geral de Depósitos

### Comissão Organizadora:

Prof. Alberto Amaral – (Reitor Univ. Porto)  
Prof. Nuno Grande – (Pró-Reitor Univ. Porto)  
A. Barbedo de Magalhães – (Coordenador)



### Patrocínios:

Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros  
Ministério da Educação  
Secretaria de Estado da Juventude  
Governo Civil do Porto  
Câmara Municipal do Porto  
Câmara Municipal de Lisboa  
Câmara Municipal da Amadora

### Secretariado:

Fac. Engenharia, U.P.  
Rua das Bragas – 4099 PORTO CODEX  
Tel.: (02) 200 21 48/Fax: (02) 31 91 25

## 2º CURSO DE INTRODUÇÃO À INDONÉSIA E TIMOR LESTE

### Objectivos:

- Fornecer informação base, histórica e sócio-política, que permita compreender a situação presente e antever perspectivas de evolução.
- Fundamentar e dinamizar a intervenção política, tendo como base informações actualizadas sobre as realidades indonésia e timorense.

O curso terá 25 horas, incluindo:

### a. CONFERÊNCIA DE ABERTURA E AULA INAUGURAL

por especialistas indonésios e americanos (3h)

**Porto** 05/10/94 – 4ª feira, das 17h30 às 19h00 (FEUP) – Professor George Aditjondro (Universidade de Salatiga, Indonésia).

**Coimbra** 13/10/94 – 5ª feira, das 18h00 às 19h30 e das 21h30 às 23h00 (Universidade) – Prof. B. Anderson (Cornell University, EUA).

**Lisboa** 14/10/94 – 6ª feira, das 18h00 às 19h30 e das 21h30 às 23h00 (Fac. Psicologia e C. Educação) – Prof. B. Anderson (Cornell University, EUA).

### b. OITO SESSÕES

de duas horas, a cargo do Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhães (16h) sobre os seguintes temas:

- Povoamento. Relações com a Ásia e Pacífico antes da chegada dos europeus.
- Expansão portuguesa e europeia e a Insulíndia. Duas colonizações diferentes.
- A Igreja Católica em Timor. O Islão na Indonésia.

- Partilha colonial e «pacificação». Revoltas e sentimento nacionalista.
- Efeitos da II Grande Guerra em Timor e nas Índias Orientais Holandesas.
- O mundo bipolar. Da democracia à ditadura militar indonésia. Invasão de Timor.
- Timor e Indonésia de 1975 a 1994.
- Timor e Indonésia, perspectivas de futuro.

Cada aula terá uma parte dedicada a temas de actualidade política relacionada com Timor ou com a Indonésia e vocacionada para a intervenção.

As oito sessões terão lugar em:

**Porto** – 4ªs feiras, das 21h00 às 23h00, na Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade do Porto.

1994	26 Out.	09 Nov.	23 Nov.	14 Dez.
1995	01 Jan.	18 Jan.	01 Fev.	15 Fev.

**Coimbra** – 2ªs feiras, das 18h45 às 20h45, na Universidade de Coimbra.


1994	24 Out.	07 Nov.	21 Nov.	12 Dez.
1995	09 Jan.	23 Jan.	06 Fev.	20 Fev.

**Lisboa** – Sábados, das 15h00 às 17h00, na Fac. Psicologia e C. Educação – Universidade de Lisboa.

1994	29 Out.	12 Nov.	26 Nov.	17 Dez.
1995	07 Jan.	21 Jan.	04 Fev.	18 Fev.

**C. AULAS FINAIS E CONFERÊNCIA DE ENCERRAMENTO** por especialistas estrangeiros (6h), em data e local a designar.





## TIMOR LESTE, UMA RESPONSABILIDADE INTERNACIONAL

### Comissão de Honra:

Presidente da República  
Primeiro Ministro  
Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros  
Ministro da Educação  
Secretário de Estado da Juventude  
Governador Civil do Porto  
Presidente da Câmara Municipal do Porto  
Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa  
Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Amadora  
Secretário da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa  
Bispo da Igreja Lusitana (Comunhão Anglicana)  
Imam da Mesquita de Lisboa

### Comissão Organizadora:

Prof. Alberto Amaral — (Reitor Univ. Porto)  
Prof. Nuno Grande — (Pró-Reitor Univ. Porto)  
A. Barbado de Magalhães — (Coordenador)

### Secretariado:

Fac. Engenharia, U.P.  
Rua dos Bragas — 4099 PORTO CODEX  
Tel.: (02) 200 21 48 • Fax: (02) 31 91 25



## VI JORNADAS DE TIMOR DA UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

### Objectivos:

- Dar expressão à obrigação internacional de assegurar o exercício do direito à autodeterminação de Timor Leste.
- Fornecer elementos para um melhor conhecimento de Timor e abrir perspectivas para o seu futuro.
- Promover o debate entre timorenses e entre estes e não timorenses, e desenvolver laços de solidariedade.

## PROGRAMA

### a. ABERTURA E SESSÕES INTERNACIONAIS

04/10/94 (3ª feira) — Reitoria da Universidade do Porto (UP), Rua D. Manuel II, Porto

#### 18h00 SESSÃO DE ABERTURA

Intervenções de representantes da Resistência Timorense, personalidades dos EUA, Filipinas e Indonésia, Mauread Maguire (Prémio Nobel da Paz) e Presidente da República.

#### 20h30 JANTAR TIMORENSE

Incluirá algumas manifestações da cultura timorense.

05/10/94 (4ª feira, feriado) — Faculdade de Engenharia da UP, Rua dos Bragas, Porto

#### 09h00 TIMOR LESTE E O SUDESTE ASIÁTICO

Intervenções de personalidades da Indonésia, Filipinas, Tailândia, Malásia, Austrália e Índia, seguidas de debate.

#### 11h00 TIMOR LESTE UMA RESPONSABILIDADE INTERNACIONAL

Intervenções de personalidades da Alemanha, Austrália, EUA, Filipinas, França, Holanda, Indonésia e Itália.

13h00 Almoço na cantina da UP.

#### 15h00 SESSÃO DE ENCERRAMENTO

Intervenções de personalidades da Alemanha, Argentina, EUA e Indonésia e do Prof. Gilmar Mendes (Ex-Conselheiro do Presidente do Brasil), Bispo Soma do Japão e Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros.

*Todas estas sessões são públicas*

### b. SESSÕES NACIONAIS

Os interessados poderão apresentar as suas comunicações em Lisboa, de 29 de Outubro de 1994 a 18 de Fevereiro de 1995 — sábados —, das 17h30 às 19h00.

Os temas das comunicações deverão estar relacionados com História e Cultura; Timor Leste e a Comunidade Internacional; Perspectivas para o Futuro.



## CURSO DE VERÃO A INDONÉSIA E TIMOR LESTE

### Docentes das aulas básicas:

- Benedict R. Anderson - Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies da Cornell University, Ithaca, USA  
- Introdução Geral à História da Indonésia;  
- O Exército Indonésio.
- Daniel Lev - Professor de Ciências Políticas na University of Washington, Seattle, USA  
- Religião e Instituições Islâmicas na Indonésia;  
- Sistema Legal Indonésio no Contexto Social e Político.
- Liem Soei Liong - Engenheiro Químico, Indonésio e refugiado político, editor do boletim Tapol e membro do Forum Democrático Indonésio.  
- A "Nova Ordem" de Suharto;  
- Oposição ao Regime e Futuro Político da Indonésia.
- Artur Teodoro de Matos - Professor de História da Universidade Nova de Lisboa  
- Introdução Geral à História de Timor Leste no Império Português.
- Adriano Moreira - Professor Catedrático do Instituto de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.  
- Timor Leste e o Mundo: - O Fracasso da Descolonização.
- Abílio Araújo - Timorense, autor de "As Elites em Timor" (1974), "Timor Leste, uma Luta Heróica" (1976) e "Os Lorikos Voltaram a Cantar" (1977), e, ainda, iniciador dos polémicos debates sobre o barlaque, em Timor, em 1969, e José Ramos-Horta - Timorense, autor de "Funu, the Unfinished Saga of East Timor" (1987).  
- O Nascimento do Movimento Independentista Timorense.

### Docentes das aulas optativas:

- Roger S. Clark - Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA.  
- Timor Leste e o Direito Internacional.
- Masao Yamaguchi - Professor of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies e Presidente de Japan Society of Anthropology.  
- Antropologia Timorense.
- Ingrid Wessel - Professora de História Indonésia e de História do Sudeste Asiático do Sudostasian - Institut der Humboldt - Universität zu Berlin, Alemanha.  
- História do Sudeste Asiático;  
- A Manipulação da História na Indonésia.
- John Taylor - Professor de Ciências Sociais da South Bank University de Londres, UK.  
- História da Indonésia: Séc. XIX e XX.
- Michel Robert - Assistente da Universidade de Sorbone, Paris, França.  
- Timor Leste e as Nações Unidas.
- Sérgio Adorno - Professor da Universidade de S. Paulo, Brasil e Presidente da Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia.  
- De Colonizado a Colonizador.
- Akahisa Matsuno - Professor de Estudos Indonésios na Osaka University of Foreign Studies, Japão.  
- Envolvimento dos Militares Indonésios na Política.

Local: Centro Escolar Turístico e Hoteleiro do Estoril  
Av.ª Conde Barcelos • 2785 ESTORIL

NOTA: Frequência permitida apenas aos inscritos

### COMISSÃO ORGANIZADORA:

Prof. Alberto Amaral - Reitor da UP  
Prof. Nuno Grande - Pró-Reitor da UP  
Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhães - Coordenador das Jornadas

Concepção: Graça Afonso

Arranjo Gráfico: Gabriela Tasso

Colagem (Fotografia do Xanana): Rui Pacheco

### SECRETARIADO DE APOIO:

Por Timor - Biblioteca • Animação • Encontro  
Câmara Municipal de Lisboa - Pelouro da Cultura  
R. São Bento 182, r/c - 1200 LISBOA  
Telefones: 60 57 02 • Fax: 397 71 28

### APOIOS:

#### Câmaras Municipais de:

- Amadora
- Cascais
- Lisboa - Pelouro da Cultura
- Loures
- Oeiras
- Porto
- Setúbal


#### Junta de Turismo da Costa do Estoril

#### Universidades:

- dos Açores
- Católica Portuguesa
- de Coimbra
- de Lisboa
- do Minho
- Nova de Lisboa
- Técnica de Lisboa

### PATROCÍNIOS:

- Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian
- Fundação Luso Americana para o Desenvolvimento
- Fundação de Macau
- Fundação Oriente
- Governo de Macau
- Instituto da Juventude
- I.C.C.I. (Coimbra)
- Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica
- Ministério da Educação
- Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros
- Presidente da República
- RICOH
- Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa - Dep. de Jogos
- Secretaria de Estado da Juventude



## V JORNADAS DE TIMOR

DA UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO  
E CURSO DE VERÃO

### TIMOR LESTE E A INDONÉSIA

Camínhos para a Liberdade, a Autodeterminação  
e a Democracia

LISBOA, 22 DE JULHO DE 1993

ESTORIL, 23 A 29 DE JULHO DE 1993



Universidade do Porto





## SESSÃO PÚBLICA DE ABERTURA

(Entrada livre e gratuita a todo o público interessado, com tradução simultânea para português)

### DATA:

22 Julho de 1993 (5.ª Feira)

### HORÁRIO:

15.30 - 17.30 Horas

### INTERVENIENTES:

Personalidade Indonésia  
Professor Americano  
Bispo Português  
Observador da Igreja Anglicana na ONU  
Representantes Timorenses  
Presidente da República

### CONTACTOS:

Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil (LNEC)  
Coordenador: Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhães (UP)  
Resp. Imprensa: Eng.ª Paulo Conceição (UP)  
Fax: 351 - 1 - 849 76 60  
Telef. 351 - 1 - 848 21 31 / 848 26 21

### LOCAL:

Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil (LNEC)  
Avenida Brasil  
1700 Lisboa

### TRANSPORTES:

Autocarros: 17, 31, 45, 50, 83  
Metro: Estação de Alvalade

## SESSÕES PÚBLICAS INTERCALARES

(Entrada livre e gratuita a todo o público interessado, com tradução simultânea para português)

### DATA:

23 de Julho de 1993 (6.ª Feira)

### 1.ª SESSÃO

### HORÁRIO:

15.00 - 16.30 Horas

### TEMA:

PARLAMENTARES E TIMOR LESTE

### INTERVENIENTES:

Garrie Gibson - Membro do Parlamento Australiano  
Professor Adriano Moreira - Presidente da Comissão Eventual da Assembleia da República para Timor  
Eurodeputados Portugueses  
Fernando Morán López - Pres. do Intergrupo de Timor do Parlamento Europeu  
Lord Avebury - Presidente de Parliamentarians for East Timor

### 2.ª SESSÃO

### HORÁRIO:

17.00 - 18.30 Horas

### TEMA:

SITUAÇÃO EM TIMOR E NA INDONÉSIA E SOLIDARIEDADE INTERNACIONAL

### INTERVENIENTES:

Max Stahl - jornalista que filmou o massacre de 12 de Novembro de 1992  
Refugiado timorense  
Refugiado indonésio  
Carlos Vilares - Solidariedade de Moçambique  
Joaquim Pinto de Andrade - Associação Cívica Angolana  
Roger Clark - Distinguished Professor de Direito da Rutgers University, USA  
Secretária de Estado da Juventude

### 3.ª SESSÃO

NOITE CULTURAL TIMORENSE

### HORÁRIO:

21.15 - 23.00 Horas

### LOCAL:

Centro Escolar Turístico e Hoteleiro do Estoril  
Av.ª Conde Barcelona - 2765 Estoril  
Telef. 351 - 1 - 466 09 99 / 466 32 93 / 466 35 35 Fax: 351 - 1 - 468 27 64

### ACESSO:

COMBOIO: Linha de Cascais, sair na Estação do Estoril + autocarro que passe junto ao Campo de Golfe e sair na 1.ª paragem a seguir aos Quatro Caminhos.  
AUTOMÓVEL: Auto-Estrada de Lisboa a Cascais, saída em direcção a Sintra, Estoril, Alcoitão e Autódromo, passar por baixo da auto-estrada virar na 2.ª à direita em direcção ao Centro Escolar. O Centro fica a cerca de 500 metros da saída da auto-estrada.

## SESSÕES PÚBLICAS FINAIS

(Entrada livre e gratuita a todo o público interessado, com tradução simultânea para português)

### DATA:

29 Julho de 1993 (5.ª Feira)

### 1.ª SESSÃO

### HORÁRIO:

15.00 - 16.30 Horas

### TEMA:

AS UNIVERSIDADES, AS AUTARQUIAS E TIMOR LESTE

### INTERVENIENTES:

Representantes Autárquicos  
Professor da Universidade de Tóquio - Japão  
Professor de uma Universidade Oriental  
Professor Sérgio Adorno - Universidade de S. Paulo, Presidente da Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia  
Professor Benedict Anderson - Cornell University, USA  
Reitores de Universidades Portuguesas  
Ministro da Educação

### 2.ª SESSÃO

SESSÃO DE ENCERRAMENTO


### HORÁRIO:

17.00 - 18.30 Horas

### INTERVENIENTES:

Personalidade Indonésia  
Personalidade Americana  
Líderes da Resistência Timorense  
Coordenador das Jornadas  
Reitor da Universidade do Porto  
Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros





# paiz e justiça para timor-leste!

BOLETIM DO GRUPO CRISTÃO "PAZ E JUSTIÇA PARA TIMOR-LESTE"

Dir.: Pe. José Lopes Baptista Nº 25 March 1993

## 1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE ISSUE OF TIMOR

This Bulletin is published at a time when several new developments regarding the question of East Timor have taken place or can begin to be discerned.

We must remember the process of the arrest and illicit trial of Xanana Gusmão by Indonesian authorities. Its meaning, both from the viewpoint of the consequences for the organization of the Timorese Resistance and especially from what it can reveal of the internal situation of Indonesia and its relations with the international community, has been the object of detailed analysis (see following pages) in a press conference by Father José Baptista and Professor Barbedo de Magalhães.

In addition, some facts regarding international organizations deserve to be emphasized. On the one hand, the clear condemnation of Indonesia in Geneva by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, and on the other the important role played by the new American administration, whose favorable vote was essential to the approval of a Resolution, after ten years of hesitation. This may mean that the real possibilities of action on the part of the international community related to this issue are far from exhausted or have even been developed.



As well, a new round of negotiations in Rome between Portugal and Indonesia, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, will take place. Rumors abound about a change in the framework of negotiations, including the direct intervention of the Catholic Church. At the same time, some ecclesiastical authorities, like the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta, have appealed to the Church's participation in order to achieve "integration with dignity", which justifies fears regarding possible alterations in the framework of the negotiations

The Church cannot distance itself from the situation existing in East Timor, and must reflect these changes. As is proclaimed in the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, "There is no genuinely human reality that cannot find an echo in its heart". Some of these changes, which are directly linked to its actions, have made this reflection particularly urgent.

## 2. NECESSITY TO REFLECT ON THE INTERVENTION OF THE CHURCH

The reflection on the intervention of the Church in the East Timor issue for which we have appealed is not merely, in our opinion, related to the public positions of the Pope, the Vatican or the Bishops, their words, gestures or omissions, or to the effective power they may have to solve the problem. They are not irrelevant, but beyond them there is a whole way of thinking, feeling and building the Church which should be gone into in more depth. How, for example, is the public expression of the conscience of the Church construed? Which means of communication, participation, frank lively confrontation, or in Church terminology, co-responsability, do they represent?

## 3. SOME CONCERNS

The case of East Timor is indeed indicative of the road yet to be travelled in this regard. One can simply refer to some of the concerns that are part of the final statement of a National Encounter of Christians "Solidary with East Timor" in February 1991. "The diplomatic actions of the Apostolic Nunciature in Lisbon was criticized when it neither accepted nor forwarded to Timor letters from Portuguese Christians manifesting solidarity with the sister Church in this territory. Even more serious was the retention of letters signed by nearly three hundred Catholic bishops and several hundred other Christians and directed to the UN Secretary General supporting the proposal of the Apostolic Administrator of Dili regarding a free democratic referendum through which the people of East Timor might choose its own future".

## 4. SOLIDARY OF THE CHURCH IN TIMOR...SILENCES ELSEWHERE

It is not possible to make a simple (or much less, a simplistic) reading of the positions of the Catholic Church on East Timor.

If, from the beginning, the actions of influential Christians in the Indonesian government was a determining factor in the occupation, repression, and genocide of the people of East Timor, and if at times the Church has lent itself to obscure manoeuvres regarding the surrender of the Resistance, it is also true that the Church is a fundamental reference for the people of Timor, as indeed recognized in Indonesia itself. A report prepared by an Indonesian university goes so far as to say: "The Catholic Church controls an important resource -- the people -- (...) while the Indonesian government does not "own" the people in any sense".

If, in the abovementioned National Encounter of Christians, the "lack of information about and reflection on the issue of East Timor



*within Christian communities*" was mentioned, and *"the frequent silences of the authorities of the Christian Churches"* was deplored, it is also true that the Churches, and especially the Church in Timor, are an important part of the effort of information and solidarity that have kept the issue alive.

If the actions or omissions of Vatican diplomacy have fostered the idea that it supports *"integration with dignity"*, it is also true that many have supported the proposals of Mons. Ximenes Belo regarding a referendum in East Timor under UN auspices, underlining the importance of the right to self-determination of the Timorese people. Maintaining the status of the Dili diocese continues to be a sign of non-integration of the territory with Indonesia.

#### 5. THE RISK OF FORGETTING PRINCIPLES...

These public positions taken by Christians clearly represent the plurality and as well the contradictions which characterize the ecclesiastic community. This cannot be forgotten in considering the Timor issue. It does not simply represent different ways of understanding the Church and its principles, but also reflects the extent to which it is part of diverse societies. But this must be subject to analysis, and these conditions must not be present as though they were general and universally valid principles.

It is serious, regarding principles, and extremely reductive in terms of analysing reality, to wish to make others believe that one would have to choose between a small nation and the position of a large Catholic minority within the largest Muslim nation in the world. As the professor Benedict Anderson stated in a lecture at the Catholic University at Oporto, *"the problem here (in Indonesia) is that the more the Catholic and Protestant communities are identified with a government which is very repressive and corrupt, the more Christians will end up being considered guilty due to their association with the regime"*. And the recent developments of the situation in Indonesia, with the weakening of

the presence of Christians in the area of power, at the same time that disturbances against churches are taking place, seem to indicate that their involvement in the Timor issue has not led to a stable position for the Christian community and may on the contrary, as Professor Anderson maintained in the same lecture, seriously compromise it in the long run.

#### 6. AND THE IMPORTANCE OF REMEMBERING THEM...AND APPLYING THEM WITH COHERENCE....

The Church is not only the result of the juxtaposition of this plurality, of these tensions, of these contradictions. It is also invited to transport memory, to develop it, to allow itself to be criticized by it. In its most recent memory are several affirmations regarding East Timor to which one should refer. Thus, in an interview to Radio Renascença during this pastoral visit to Portugal in May 1991, Pope John Paul II stated in regard to the people of East Timor that he wished that *"this community may be able to live according to its own principles and convictions, its own language, its own culture, its own traditions, its religion"*. He suggested that the international community was the appropriate context for the solution of the problem of Timor. He listed the principles that should be taken into account in this solution: *"Justice, human rights and national rights"*. We find the same affirmation of national identity of the Timorese in the position of the Portuguese Bishops, published in 1984: *"it is illusory to think that behind the sad events which are taking place in Timor there does not exist the awareness of a deeply felt national identity"*. And the statement of principle regarding the solution of the case of Timor in a sermon by Mons. João Alves, Bishop of Coimbra, in Cova de Iria: *"Let us collaborate actively in the search for a just solution to the problems of the Maubere People of East Timor, which must be based on respect for its own will, correctly expressed"*.

On recalling these fundamental principles (recognition of the Timorese as a people with its own national identity; the importance of the international community, exemplified in most complete fashion by the



UN, as the most appropriate framework for solving the problem according to criteria of justice and human and national rights, we are appealing especially to coherence of action.

#### 7. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

This debate reveals that the border, often used to delineate the relations between the Church and the "world", between the defense of general principles ("criteria") and the search for concrete paths to the solution of problems ("politics") is a tenuous one. Often, and clearly in the case of Timor, it is impossible in realistic terms to think of human rights (such as the right of life and to liberty of expression and conscience) or of cultural rights (including the right to identity and to religious expression) apart from the general context of the political and social organization of the territory, particularly as long as the right to self-determination has not been exercised.

#### 8. ONLY IN TOTAL FREEDOM, WITH THE OCCUPIERS OUT OF ITS TERRITORY, CAN THE PEOPLE OF TIMOR EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

In the framework of the negotiations now taking place, one should remember that this is the fundamental question opposing Indonesia to the International Community, and only the Timorese, in freedom, can exercise this right.

Any use of prisoners - even former leaders of the Resistance - is unacceptable. As long as East Timor is not free of Indonesia occupation, as long as the Timorese cannot speak and organize themselves freely in their own homeland, it is impossible to make a free choice. It would be to betray the rights and the soul of the Timorese people to accept as valid

statement made out of a context of total freedom by any Timorese, even leaders or former leaders on the highest level. Only the people can choose their destiny.

#### 9. THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN CHURCH IN THE INVASION AND ANNEXATION OF TIMOR

The role played by the Indonesian Church in the annexation of Timor is well known. As it feels itself to be in a minority position (only 3% of the population) within the most populous predominantly Muslim nation (nearly 86% of Indonesians consider themselves Muslims), it was in the Christian population of Timor the possibility of increasing its numbers. Therefore, long before the invasion, several Indonesian missionaries and even priests contacted the bishop of Dili and other priests, attempting to convince them to advantages of annexation for the Church of Timor.

It was not by chance that of the five persons who pressured Suharto most to invade Timor, three were Catholics and only one nominally Muslim (not active):

General Benny Murdani (Javanese, Catholic), defender of the hardest line, who from the beginning supported a military invasion and forced annexation;

General Maraden Panggabean (of the Batak Protestant Church, from Sumatra);

General Ali Murtopo (Javanese, nominal Muslim, who favored an indirect intervention);

Harry Tjan Silalahi (Catholic, of Chinese ethnic origin, from Java);



Lam Bian-Kie (Catholic, of Chinese ethnic origin, from Sumatra).

Professor Benedict Anderson, in a lecture given in Oporto in the Catholic University on 27 May 1992, recalled that one of these persons had said to him nearly a month before the invasion, *"Oh, don't worry, it will be over in three weeks. Very simple. They are Catholics like us, we'll take care of it. No problem."* Of course it was an enormous mistake.

#### 10. THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH OF TIMOR IN THE DEFENSE OF ITS PEOPLE AGAINST THE ARBITRARY ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES

On the other hand, the Church of Timor, at least after it saw some of the horrors of the invasion, did not hesitate in taking the side of its people, whom it attempted to protect. Many Timorese are right when they said (and still say today) that only the Church has protected them and continues to protect them from the fury of the occupiers. Many Timorese priests have been the object of pressure or have been expelled from Timor because they remained faithful to the demands of the Gospel and to their responsibilities to an oppressed, humiliated, suffering people.

#### 11. THE RISK OF IDENTIFYING THE INDONESIAN CHURCH WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

The identification of the Indonesian Church with the Indonesian government's annexationist policy can bring dire consequences in the long run for the Church of this great nation.

Therefore, in his lecture at the Catholic University, Professor Benedict Anderson made the following appeal:

*"If any of you have contacts with or can talk with Indonesian Catholics, it would be good to talk very seriously with them about the risks run by the Catholic community on identifying itself with Indonesian policy toward East Timor. It is very important, for the physical and moral future of the Catholic community that it stop lobbying the Vatican against a sound policy for East Timor".*

#### 12. PRESENT SITUATION OF THE CHURCH IN INDONESIA

Professor Ben Anderson's appel seems to have been prophetic. As General Benny Murdani is the person most responsible for the massacre of nearly 400 Muslims in Jakarta in the port area of Tanjung Priok in September 1984 and as the Catholic and Protestant generals are so deeply involved in the massacres, not only in Timor but also on other islands, it would be easy to identify the church with the worst aspects of the military dictatorship, thus making it the prime target of rebellions and attacks.

As it was incapable of integrating Timor, it has begun to pay the price of having offered this poisoned gift and condoning the most brutal and inhumane methods which characterized the invasion and annexation of Timor.

After September 1992, some churches and other mission buildings were attacked on the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura. In one case, a church was burned, while nearly ten thousand Muslims demonstrated against the arrogance of certain Christians. This sort of situation had never occurred since Suharto came to power in 1965. Obviously, behind the attacks are also military officers who do not wish to lose their power and who wish to find scapegoats...



On the other hand, while the previous government had eight Christian cabinet ministers, among which five Catholics, the government named by General Suharto in March 1993 had only three Christian cabinet ministers, of which only one is Catholic.

It has thus become clear that the future of the Church in Indonesia - as is the case everywhere - will best be preserved and defended by its coherence with the principles it proclaims rather than by complicity with criminal practices and genocide.

The Church which suffers in Timor and the Church which lives, evangelizes and works in Indonesia deserve all our brotherly support and solidarity. But it is the Indonesian Church to whom we must appeal to show coherence with evangelical principles, to the greater good of the Indonesian people, of the people of East Timor, and of the future of the Indonesian Church itself.



*She was catholic; she has been detained, interrogated, tortured.  
She resisted rape... and she desapeared...  
Her name: Maria Gorete Joaquim, Timorese, 17 years old.*

## **PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE ARREST OF XANANA GUSMÃO**

### **REASONS AND OBJECTIVES**

CÍRCULO UNIVERSITÁRIO DO PORTO, MONDAY 14 DECEMBER 1992,  
3:00 P.M. SPONSORED BY THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, OPORTO  
UNIVERSITY

1. XANANA: A SYMBOL OF THE RESISTANCE OF AN ENTIRE PEOPLE
2. REASONS FOR HIS ARREST:
  - 2.1 TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR THE INDONESIAN REGIME;
  - 2.2 IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SUHARTO AND THE MILITARY, THE LATTER ARE LOSING GROUND AND FEAR THAT THEY WILL BE MARGINALIZED IN THE POST-SUHARTO PERIOD.
3. OBJECTIVES OF HIS ARREST:
  - 3.1 IN ORDER THAT PORTUGAL'S POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS BE WEAKENED - OR TO PREVENT IT FROM GOING TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT ALL-AND TO MAKE IT STOP BLOCKING THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EC AND ASEAN;
  - 3.2 TO WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH;
  - 3.3 FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION.
4. AT THE DIFFICULT JUNCTURE, COHERENCE AND FIRMNESS IN THE DEFENSE OF THE UNALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION AND IN THE HOPE OF NEW AND PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS IN WHICH PORTUGAL CAN PLAY THE ROLE OF CATALYST HAVE BECOME MORE VITAL THAN EVER



## 1. XANANA: A SYMBOL OF THE RESISTANCE OF AN ENTIRE PEOPLE

When on 22 November 1978 the last support base of the resistance on Monte Mantebian fell into the hands of the Indonesian occupiers, and on 31 December of the same year the President of FRETILIN died in combat, Indonesia proclaimed victory.

With the death of nearly 80% of the members of the Superior Council of Struggle, and with 90% of its arms in the hands of the occupiers, few believed that the Timorese resistance could recuperate from such severe setbacks. And ever fewer could imagine that low-key José Alexandre Gusmão, one of the three last survivors of the Central Committee of FRETILIN in the interior (of nearly fifty at the beginning of the war!) would be able to become the symbol of the Maubere Resistance. A poet of delicate sensibility, he received in May 1975 the First prize in the Literary Contest of the Timor Tourist Center. In the first years of occupation he was merely a photographer of the Resistance.

But when in 1979 nearly all the guerilla fighters had been captured or killed, or had disappeared, and FALINTIL were reduced to a few scattered groups in the mountains, without contacts among themselves and totally isolate from the exterior, Xanana Gusmão took the initiative of scouring the hills and valleys in search of survivors.

In the sequence of these contacts, which took place from 1-8 March 1981, FRETILIN was able to carry out a national conference in East Timor, in which Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão was elected leader of the armed resistance.

From that day on, Xanana Gusmão, who was never a Western-style chief, but rather the interpreter of the feelings of his people, has attempted in the most diverse ways, to attain three goals:

- a) to make the Maubere Resistance, still traumatized by the civil war (August-September 1975) a genuinely national movement;
- b) to awaken international opinion to the drama of East Timor, and achieve greater commitment on the part of Portugal as well as international support for a negotiated solution respecting the right to self-determination of East Timor;
- c) to attempt to establish a dialogue with Indonesia with a view to achieving a negotiated solution.

Xanana Gusmão thus took part in the Lari-Gutu talks on 23 March 1983 with the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian forces in East Timor, Coronel Purwanto, to whom he presented a Peace Plan which proposes *"the organization of the free and democratic consultation of the Maubere people"*.

In the same year of 1983, FRETILIN appealed for convergence on the part of all Timorese nationalists, with a view to self-determination and independence. In 1984 Xanana Gusmão made a radio appeal with the same objective to the Timorese abroad, in which he said, *"We, in the interior, are united. It is best that those of you abroad be united as well"*.

This appeal, to which the leadership of FRETILIN and UDT abroad responded with a mutual cooperation agreement in the framework of a Nationalist Convergence, was crucially important in revitalizing the issue of East Timor on the international scene.

Xanana Gusmão searched in many for international support (including the Eastern bloc countries, without success), until he concluded that the international entity which was closest to his objectives and which could give most effective support was the Catholic Church. He thus, over time, approached the Church, on which the Timorese people depends to a great extent.



And he found, in the Church of Timor, not only humanitarian support, but in the words of Mons. Ximenes Belo, initiatives in favor of a referendum for the territory. In our opinion, he had to pay for this support with tactical and strategic concessions which may have limited his capacity of manoeuvre and provoked criticism. In addition, he was forced to avoid traps and repudiate several Vatican attempts to make him surrender.

He felt, with his people, the hope of support on the part of an almost mythical Portugal, and on several occasions he expressed his desire that the Portuguese return to Timor to conclude the process of decolonization begun in 1974. But he also suffered, along with his people, disillusionment with the numerous hesitations and delays on the part the Administering Power. His words and actions, often apparently contradictory in nature, are the echo of this hopes and disappointments, and thus have on occasion been misunderstood.

To Indonesia, he has held out an olive branch on many occasions, as when on 10 May 1983, he affirmed:

*"FRETILN declares that Maubere people is aware that it is a part of Southeast Asia. FRETILIN thus declares that it does not wish that East Timor be a source of conflict. East Timor will be a non-aligned country and it will follow a policy of peaceful coexistence. These principles will govern its relations with all countries, and it will strengthen technical, economic and cultural links with neighboring countries. The Maubere people know that they must respect their neighbors interest and believes that its legitimate interests will be respected in return."*

In order to consolidate a genuinely national resistance and to open the doors to democracy, he transformed the FALINTIL, the armed forces of FRETILIN, into the non-partisan Armed Forces of liberation of East Timor. In his message of 7 December 1987, Xanana Gusmão affirmed:

*"The FALINTIL will have only one mission, to defend our homeland and to maintain internal order, established by a Constitution that proclaims the defense of individual liberties and the respect for the interests of all citizens and social classes of East Timor! So that the glorious FALINTIL may carry out their mission, within the framework of the Government (of whatever political orientation), it is necessary to affirm the neutrality of the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor."*

In a letter dated 31 december 1988, to complete the process of depoliticizing of the Armed Forces of National Liberation, the Commander in Chief Xanana Gusmão announced his resignation from FRETILIN.

On 5 October 1989, Xanana Gusmão makes his opinions even clearer:

*"The FALINTIL (...) have taken on, in these last eleven years, their real role of defending the homeland, thus freeing themselves from political dependence on any party (...)"*

*The FALINTIL are not involved in politics, but they are committed to helping build a free and democratic nation, based on respect for freedom of thought, association, expression and on integral respect for universal human rights.*

*A multi-party system and a market economy will be the foundation of an independent East Timor (which the guerrilla forces are building with their corpses.) A free and non-aligned state with the firm purpose of joining ASEAN, as a more positive contribution to regional stability".*

In September 1990, Xanana Gusmão affirmed with serene confidence, in an interview given to an Australian journalist:

*"If, three or four years ago, we were still concerned with 'after the disappearance of the FALINTIL', now this is merely seen as the price*



*demanded by our homeland. It is not only with pleasure but with pride that the FALINTIL can observe that its sacrifices have encouraged and consolidated the bases of a genuinely national resistance, and has made them indestructible.*

*The internal situation cannot be equalled, and we cannot hide our satisfaction on affirming this. Our hopes, at the beginning of this phase, have become an exciting reality, built with the corpses of all those who have died for our homeland; our trust in the unequalled abnegation of our people has become a certainty and the faith which always has guided us has become a total commitment to the duty to seek victory.*

*Regarding the war, on a global scale we are aware that time is on our side and not Jakarta's. Militarily speaking, the FALINTIL are aware that they have fulfilled their duty, and we are politically psychologically and morally more and more prepared to accept our own disappearance, because we know that this will not mean the end of the war. The Maubere people will continue its struggle and will never give up, whichever way the winds of History may blow".*

But after this yet another important step was taken by the Maubere resistance: international opinion was made aware of the involvement of the younger generations in the struggle for self-determination and the recognition, in Indonesia and throughout the world, that the problem of Timor has not yet been solved.

So that his people's struggle might be internationally known, Xanana began to go to Dili relatively often, and encouraged young people to demonstrate on the few occasions when foreign journalists or personalities visit the territory.

He was strongly committed (according to some, excessively so) to the organization of demonstrations on the proposed visit of a Portuguese Parliamentary delegation, and along with his people, he suffered a major blow when this visit was cancelled. He then decided to take advantage of

the presence of foreign journalists and of the UN relator for Torture in order to organize the 12 November 1991 demonstration, which resulted in yet another massacre.

The consequences are known to all. Besides the nearly 600 dead and missing, international public opinion (including that of Indonesia) was finally awakened to the drama of Timor.

After Santa Cruz, Timorese young people have suffered, through torture and death, the weight of a criminal, inhuman and brutal occupation. Many feel that the price paid by the Timorese has been too high. But those hundreds of deaths, filmed and commented upon by independent journalists, had a greater impact on international public opinion than the hundreds of thousands of dead, prisoners, starving persons, of those who were raped and tortured for sixteen years.

Attempting to keep the flame of international solidarity alight, and to keep the doors open to a dialogue which might lead to a negotiated solution, Xanana ran risks, staying for long periods in Dili in order to give interviews, appeal for support and send out messages.

The Indonesian military, seeing that their time was running out, felt that the time had come to show their strength and their capacity to inflict blows upon the Resistance. Xanana was arrested.

Some would have preferred for him to resist (and thus be killed) or commit suicide. But Xanana, in psychological terms and in his background, is not like the generous communist heroes who resisted against fascisms, just as he bears no resemblance to a Hitler who preferred suicide to being captured.

As a man of extreme sensibility, he is aware that the leaders who were psychologically more rigid died in combat, like Nicolau Lobato, or were tortured to death, like Cravarino.



And he also knows that most of those who continue to resist, within Timor and abroad, owe their lives to concessions made to the brutal occupiers, to manifestations of false repentance, to invitations to their companions to surrender and other such revolting favors which are also part to the *via sacra* of the Timorese under occupation.

Others imagined that Xanana Gusmão might become a Timorese Nelson Mandela, forgetting that, besides the psychological differences, the Indonesian regime is even more brutal and less respectful of legality regarding its prisoners - namely the Timorese, thousands of whom disappeared after being arrested - than the aberrant South African regime of Apartheid.

Once arrested, and while members of his family, like those of Abílio Araújo and others, were tortured in vile fashion, Xanana Gusmão was forced to become an Indonesian pawn and to adopt Indonesian discourse - as occurred with the puppet governor of East Timor - inviting companions to surrender and accusing the Church of supporting the Resistance, from which this Indonesian pawn distances himself.

But at the same time, the astuteness with which he is able to sneak through messages from Xanana the Resistance Fighter, on recognizing Ma Huno as new leader and on affirming "*it's all up to them*", that is, the other members of the Resistance, and on recalling "*they did not fight for me*", as though saying, now that I am forced to go along with the occupiers in order to save the lives of other companions, it is their turn to take on the struggle which is that of the whole people and not only my personal fight or that of any other leader.

Though it was not necessary, it is also Xanana who reminds us that, if he were free, his answers to the journalists would be different.

Now that Xanana is in the hands of the occupiers, the greatest treason to Xanana the Resistance fighter would be to accept as valid the affirmations of Xanana in the role he is forced to play as pawn of Indonesia.

And we believe that would be unjust to a person who has done so much for his people, to call a traitor one who has taken on the responsibilities for sixteen years of struggle in order to spare his companions and leave them free to continue this same struggle.

It would be equally unjust to confuse the struggle of a whole people with that of one man who, in isolation from his own people, in Indonesian prisons, is no longer able to change history.


Yes, because the Maubere people can change history, and Xanana was one of the main architects of the changes to come. Now that he, isolated and alone, cannot instigate change, it is up to the Timorese to join efforts and continue the struggle, which is that of an entire people and not merely of one man or a handful of men.

As the young Timorese resistance fighter, Donaciano Gomes, said a few days ago, "*The man they captured was Jose Alexandre Gusmão, not Xanana. Xanana is in the soul, the body and the spirit of the Timorese.*"

More than a chief and the leader of a people, Xanana was and is the expression and symbol of the struggle of the entire Maubere people.

And as he used to say about his own disappearance (not necessarily physical), "*our disappearance will not mean the end of the war. The Maubere People will continue to struggle, and will never give up, whichever way the winds of history may blow.*"





The impact of the Indonesian invasion and occupation in the population (above) and in the livestock (below).

	1973 (thousands)	1979 (thousands)	Percentile reduction
Buffaloes	141	24	83%
Horses	139	15	89%
Pigs	305	27	91%
Sheep and Goats	308	36	88%

## 2. REASONS FOR HIS ARREST

### 2.1. TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR THE INDONESIAN REGIME

The collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, divided between the USA and the USSR, which resulted from the Second World war.

After the Communist advances of 1974-1975 in Indochina, Africa and South America, which seemed virtually unstoppable, judging from the American defeat in Vietnam, whose capital, Saigon, fell into Communist hands on 30 April 1975, there followed the complete collapse of the Eastern bloc and of most of the Communist regimes in Europe and Africa and part of Indochina.

After the American support of dictatorial anti-communist regimes which took place in the Sixties and Seventies, there followed the withdrawal of this support and the fall of regimes like that of Marcos in the Philippines (1986), of Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea (1987), of Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan (1988), of Pinochet in Chile (1989) and others.

The exercise of the right to self-determination also came into being in the last three years even in cases where it had been suppressed for more than forty years, as in Namibia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in Eritrea and even in Canada (Quebec).

The result of these developments, which have altered almost completely the world geostrategic context, is that Indonesia has lost the importance it possessed as a bastion against Communist advances. The deep waters of the Strait to the north of Timor that American atomic submarines used without having to surface as a special concession from Indonesia is no longer as important as it was in previous decades.



Even the impunity with which large states controlled or even annexed weaker neighbors suffered a blow with the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait.

For all these reasons, in October of this year the Indonesian government suffered its first major defeat in the American Congress when a program supporting the training of Indonesian military officers in the U.S. was voted down.

The election of an American president who protested against the Vietnam war in the name of human rights and the rights of peoples, is yet another important factor in this framework of change.

We can thus affirm that the Indonesian government has realized that the international context made it impossible to keep East Timor indefinitely isolated from the world and victim of continuous occupation, and that this occupation was beginning to have direct effects on Indonesia, for the following reasons:

- a) The awakening of international public opinion, including that of the U.S., and international pressure after the 12 November massacre, including the suspension of economic support by several countries (Holland, Canada, Denmark), which let the American Congress to cut off financial support to the training of Indonesian officers in the U.S.
- b) The elections of a new U.N. secretary-general who was more sensitive to the problem of East Timor.
- c) The Portuguese boycott of the EC-ASEAN agreement.
- d) The election of a Democratic President in the U.S. and the promises made by Bill Clinton that he would review American policy toward Indonesia, taking into account the problem of East Timor.

- e) Developments of international policy, increasingly intolerant of invasions and annexations (Kuwait 1991) and more open to self-determination (Namibia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Canada, Eritheia, etc.) and more and more willing to intervene in "internal" affairs for humanitarian reasons (Iraq, Serbia, Montenegro, Somalia, etc.).
- f) The awakening of public opinion in Indonesia's neighborin countries (Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore) to the drama of East Timor, which makes it more difficult for the respective governments to continue to support the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.
- g) The Indonesian presidency of the Non-Aligned Countries, which demands that Indonesia show moderations and capacity for dialogue in the solutions of conflicts.

## 2.2 IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SUHARTO AND THE MILITARY, THE LATTER ARE LOSING GROUND AND FEAR THAT THEY WILL BE MARGINALIZED IN THE POST-SUHARTO PERIOD.

It is well known that when he came to power in 1965, Suharto's basic support came from the military, who carried out a double function (military and politico-economic) for many years.

As time passed, however, increasingly serious conflicts began to arise between Suharto, who was obsessed with his own personal power (and that of his family) and the corrupt military forces, who were accustomed to cashing in on their "double function".

Twice in 1991 Suharto named general officers to leadership functions which were openly rejected by the Indonesian Armed Forces.



The conflicts continued and the Indonesian President was forced to discuss the matter on television and force the ABRI to accept his nominations. The boycott on the part of hardline military officers of the visit of the Portuguese Parliamentary delegations and the Santa Cruz massacre are part of a conflict between the politicians who are more open to evolution (and who are aware that without it there are serious risks of internal disturbances and the loss of the international support which is so necessary for development) and the more radical military who can only impose their opinions by brute force.

Internally, within Indonesia itself, the military are losing ground, and are afraid that they will be marginalized in the struggle for the Vice-Presidency and for the succession by civil sectors who are more open to democratization. And therefore they hasten to affirm their strength and to attempt to gain points in the context of internal politics.

Summing up, we can say that Xana's arrest is related to:

- a) The coming presidential elections in Indonesia and the desire of the military, led by Try Sutrisno, to affirm their presence in the vice-presidential race;
- b) Economic competition between the military and Suharto's family (which owns large companies and exercises several monopolies);
- c) The ascension of a non-military middle class which demands greater capacity of intervention and democratic openness, and which publicly demands a referendum for self-determination for East Timor (as was proclaimed recently by Ms. Berar Fathia, candidate to the Presidency of Indonesia);
- d) The necessity to cover up other conflicts, like those of Western Papua New Guinea (Irian Jaya) and Aceh (northern Sumatra).

### 3. OBJECTIVES OF HIS ARREST

- 3.1 IN ORDER THAT PORTUGAL'S POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS BE WEAKENED - OR TO PREVENT IT FROM GOING TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT ALL - AND TO MAKE IT STOP BLOCKING THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EC AND ASEAN.

The date of Xanana Gusmão's arrest, though it is related to the approaching Indonesian presidential elections, has even more to do with the upcoming talks between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations, in the presence of the UN Secretary-General.

Thus the haste with which the televised interviews with Xanana were carried out.

And, because one of the main objectives was to shock Portuguese public opinion to the point that concessions would be made in the New York talks, the journalist João Gabriel was authorized to remain in Indonesia and interview Xanana Gusmão.

It is curious that several Indonesian journalist now have attempted to come to Portugal - perhaps to give credibility to lies published in Indonesian newspapers about Portuguese position. From what they say, it would seem that they believe that faced with the end of Timorese resistance (as if the capture of Xanana Gusmão would put an end to the resistance of an entire People!), Portugal's only alternative would be to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia and preserve a little bit of Lusitanian culture in East Timor!

With Xanana's arrest, along with so many other arrest and tortures, the Indonesian military have provided the Portuguese government with additional reasons not to go to New York to speak with the representative of the Indonesian government.



If Portugal gave in to the temptation to reject dialogue in the prevailing conditions, it would be isolated and Indonesia would be able to affirm that it was Portugal, not Indonesia, who refused to enter into a dialogue. Indonesia, in this case, would win its gamble.

From then on, Portugal would be isolated and it would be easier for Indonesia to convince the remaining EC partners, in the name of realism, to sign the agreement between the EC and ASEAN which has been boycotted since July.

### 3.2 TO WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH

Taking into account the mutual influence of the Catholic Church in the strategy of Xanana Gusmão and of him in some of the courageous attitudes of the Bishop Mons. Ximenes Belo the arrest of Xanana Gusmão can also be seen as a blow on the Church of East Timor.

Colonel Prabowo, son in law of Suharto, said publicly that it was impossible to control East Timor as long as Xanana, Mário Carrascalão and Ximenes Belo were not thrown down.

Mário Carrascalão has left his post of Governor and is now placed in Jakarta. The change of Governor made the detention of Xanana easier. The next target will certainly be the Church of Timor and its Bishop.

### 3.3 FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION

Within Indonesia, the hardline military have recovered from the humiliation they experienced with the inquiry - promoted by Suharto - against those responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre, and they have gained points in the struggle for the succession. In addition to this, they have told Alatas that he should not make concessions to Portugal in New York next 17 December.

Abroad, they attempted to intimidate the American President - Elect before he took office by affirming that they are not impressed by his policy of defending human rights and the rights of people (with which the Carter administration had previously annoyed Indonesia).

These military officers forget that the brutality of their acts is not read as proof of their strength but rather as a sign that they are losing.

### 4. AT THIS DIFFICULT JUNCTURE, COHERENCE AND FIRMNESS ARE VITAL

Although this moment is difficult and serious for the Timorese, developments internationally and within Indonesia contain many hopeful signs. Everything indicates that time is running out for the Indonesian regime, especially for the hardline military officers.

There is, therefore, every reason to persevere.

The Timorese Resistance itself, though it has been hit hard, has shown that it will continue the struggle, including through armed acts of its own initiative. This has been confirmed not only by Resistance sources but also by General Theo Syafel himself.

In these circumstances, it is crucial:

- a) That Portugal maintain the issue of Timor before the United Nations, participating in the talks that the Secretary-General is promoting in the framework of the mandate that the General Assembly of the UN has conferred upon him. Regardless of how many reasons Indonesia has given Portugal to refuse to participate in the talks, not to answer this appeal of the UN Secretary-General would be disastrous for Portugal and for the people of East Timor.



- b) That Portugal maintain with firmness and coherence its beyond of the EC - ASEAN agreement, without which it would lose one of its main trump cards;
- c) That support be given to the Church of East Timor and to the proposal of Ximenes Belo regarding authentic self-determination;
- d) That support continue to be given to the Timorese Resistance, with understanding for the passions necessarily provoked by so much struggle and so much pain, and helping to the greatest possible extent to foster dialogue and concerted efforts among the several currents of the Resistance regarding the objective which unites us all: authentic self-determination for East Timor.

Oporto, 14 December 1992

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# Timor's Untelevised Terror

*As the World Looks Elsewhere, A Small Island Suffers a Hideous War*

By Sven Bergman

**D**ILI, EAST TIMOR — "Can you take this to the outside world?"

A nervous Catholic priest held a bunch of papers in his hands, lists with names of people in his parish who had disappeared or were imprisoned, tortured or killed in recent months in East Timor.

East Timor is half of an island in the Indonesian archipelago 400 miles north of Australia. In the last 17 years, as many as 200,000 people — a third of East Timor's population — have been killed by the occupying forces of the Indonesian government. Yet unlike the suffering and cruelty in, say, the former Yugoslavia, the victims and survivors here have only just begun to capture the attention of the world.

In November 1991, a British TV crew was on hand when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on thousands of young people participating in a huge pro-independence funeral march at the Santa Cruz cemetery here. The videotape of the massacre, which showed people being shot down, shocked western politicians — candidate Bill Clinton among them — into criticizing Indonesia's human rights abuses.

Nevertheless, East Timor remains tightly controlled. We did not dare to accept the priest's papers. Outside of the building where we were talking, agents of the ever-present Indonesian military secret service were waiting for us. Foreign journalists, delegations and organizations are allowed into East Timor only on a very selective basis, and tourists are tightly motored. The agents decided it was time for us to leave.

East Timor's terror began in late 1975 after Portugal withdrew from its colonial empire. The people of East Timor, ruled since the 16th century, were not inclined to join Indonesia, as West Timor, a former Dutch colony, had done in the 1940s. Four hundred years of Portuguese rule had created a distinct language, Tetum, and a distinct cultural identity. In the fall of 1975, a leftist group, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), won a brief civil war and began setting up a national government.

The military government of Indonesia, presiding over an island nation with hundreds of ethnic groups and languages, worried about the destabilizing influence of an independent country on its periphery. But East Timor's claim to self-determination had been recognized in United Nations resolutions. The Indonesians were also worried about maintaining good relations with the rest of the world, especially the United States. They needn't have worried. In December 1975, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid a state visit to Jakarta, the Indonesian capital. It is widely thought that Kissinger and Ford told the Indonesian generals that the United States would not object to the annexation of East Timor. The next day, Dec. 7, 1975, the Indonesian forces, armed mainly with American weapons, invaded East Timor.

The lightly armed FRETILIN forces offered strong resistance for three years in the island's mountainous interior. The Indonesian army pursued them, destroying villages, massacring inhabitants and relocating refugees in strategic villages. The Indonesians also destroyed crops, creating famine. By late 1979, the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services were comparing the famine in Timor to the deliberate starvation of the citizens of Biafra in the late 1960s. Protests from U.S. congressmen helped force Indonesia to allow foreign humanitarian aid into the besieged areas. But world attention remained sporadic.

**T**his history is invisible when you first arrive in Dili, the capital of East Timor. The city is small and calm. With its distinctive colonial-era architecture, it could be a port city in Portugal. Save for the pervasive presence of Indonesian soldiers, it seems at first glance like a normal place.

When we drove out to the countryside, the face of Indonesian occupation became apparent at the first military checkpoint. Our hired driver, Jose, got out to show his papers to the military police. A large Balinese soldier leaned over him, studying the silver ring on Jose's hand with an indifferent look. Then the soldier reached down,

slowly removed the ring and put it on his own finger. Jose said nothing. When we realized what had happened, we wanted to go back and retrieve the ring. Jose stopped us. He just wanted to leave. Fear had forced him to swallow the humiliation.

We drove west through the dry barren countryside, passing through resettlement villages built by the government to accommodate internal refugees dislocated from their homes by massive military sweeps. The villages, strategically placed along main roads for easy control of the population, consisted of small, square cement-and-bamboo houses in straight lines. There were red and white Indonesian flags everywhere and Indonesian soldiers with U.S.-made M-16 rifles slung over their shoulders. Morning and night, military trucks carried camouflaged soldiers in and out of the towns. Military helicopters swept overhead. An unofficial curfew left the streets quiet and empty after nine in the evening. That same evening we arrived in an isolated village. About 30 Timorese gathered around us in the dark.

"Once this was a village full of life. Now there are only us left," said an older man pointing toward the quiet, staring band of villagers. "All the others are dead."

They wanted to help us, but we had to drive on—nobody dared to put us up. The next morning our military babysitters questioned us about where we had been and took our pictures. After we made a brief visit to a Catholic elementary school, the secret policemen even talked to the nun and her young pupils. The secret police's suspicions left us ill-at-ease, worrying about the safety of the innocent people who had talked to us.

Until recently, the West's concern about East Timor has been overshadowed by its economic ties with the Indonesian government. "On one side there is a small people of 600,000," one priest explained, "and on the other side a nation with rich natural resources and 185 million people."

The Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 did prompt some second thoughts. The Indonesian government initially put the death toll at 19. When the British videotape, which had been smuggled out of the country, indicated far more casual-



ties, the estimate was upped to 50. Sources in the Timorese resistance put the death toll at 273. Amnesty International estimates that at least 100 and possibly as many 250 people were killed. Human rights organizations have also collected eyewitness testimony that Indonesian soldiers invaded local hospitals after the massacre and dragged away the wounded.

The European Parliament and the U.S. Congress quickly condemned Indonesia. Last October, Congress cut \$2.3 million dollars in military aid to Indonesia – the first time in 17 years that Congress has reduced such aid over the issue of East Timor. On the campaign trail, candidate Clinton told a New York radio reporter that East Timor had been ignored in an “unconscionable” manner.

To date, Indonesia has retained strong international financial backing. The Consultative Group on Indonesia, a World Bank consortium of donor countries, decided in July to give Indonesia \$5 billion in aid, credits and loans in 1992-93. But there are signs that the administration is following through on Clinton's campaign statements. Last week, the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva approved a strong resolu-

tion on East Timor that won unprecedented support from the United States.

The U.N. action couldn't be more timely. Last November, the military arrested Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the Timorese resistance, and charged him with rebellion, conspiracy and leading a separatist movement. As many as 20 relatives and friends were arrested with him; hundreds of people have been detained in recent months for periods ranging from a few hours to a few months, according to Amnesty International. Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo said last month that the arrested were being subject to “all types of torture.”

Gusmão is now on trial in Dili. The Portuguese government, citing various U.N. resolutions rejecting Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, says that Jakarta “lacks the legal, political and moral authority” to put Gusmão on trial. With the exception of a one hour visit with a representative of the International Red Cross, Gusmão has not been allowed to meet with any independent observers since his arrest. He has been shown on TV, however, urging his followers to surrender, a statement that many believe was coerced. Indonesian authorities have selectively admitted international


observers into the courtroom and insist that Gusmão's trial is open and impartial.

The leaders of the Indonesian government remain intransigent. After the Santa Cruz massacre, Gen. Try Sutrisno, the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, said that the Timorese who resist integration into the Indonesian state are “delinquent people [who] have to be shot, and we will shoot them.” Last week, President Suharto, who has ruled Indonesia for the last 27 years, selected Sutrisno as his vice president and likely successor.

When we finally boarded the boat to leave East Timor, we were visited by two high-ranking intelligence officers. In a last awkward effort to influence our impressions, one of them apologized for our being followed, interrogated, photographed, videotaped and our baggage thoroughly searched.

“There are good and bad tourists,” he explained. “Sometimes the bad tourists try to smuggle out letters from East Timor, letters which later are given to the U.N.”

*Sven Bergman, a TV journalist in Sweden, visited East Timor late last year.*



BY MIKE UPTON FOR THE WASH. POST



**FREE XANANA!**  
**Free East Timor!**  
**BOYCOTT BALI!**

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**HANDS OFF EAST TIMOR'S OIL**



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